'm'^"!^'' 1 JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1989 j me. r
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SUBMITTED TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
U.S. SENATE
BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED
FEBRUARY 1990
Printed for the use of the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Foreign
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Senate respectively
UMASS/AMHERST
31EDbb01b7t>a7as
101st Congress 1
2d Session JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1989
REPORT
SUBMITTED TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
U.S. SENATE
BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED
FEBRUARY 1990
Printed for the use of the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Foreign
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Senate respectively
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
24-900 WASHINGTON : 1990
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida, Chairman
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan
GEO. W. CROCKETT, Jr., Michigan
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California
TOM LANTOS, California
PETER H. KOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LAWRENCE J. SMITH, Florida
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
MEL LEVINE, California
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio
TED WEISS, New York
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona
JAMES McCLURE CLARKE, North Carolina
JAIME B. FUSTER, Puerto Rico
WAYNE OWENS, Utah
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
DOUGLAS H. BOSCO, California
FRANK McCLOSKEY, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
John J. Brady, Jr., Chief of Staff
John R. Sinclair, Minority Chief of Staff
WILLIAM S. BROOMHELD, Michigan
BENJAMIN A. OILMAN, New York
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
JIM LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
MICHAEL DeWINE, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
JOHN MILLER, Washington
DONALD E. "BUZ" LUKENS, Ohio
BEN BLAZ, Guam
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
PORTER J. GOSS, Florida
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island, Chairman
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
ALAN CRANSTON, California
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
JOHN F. KERRY. Massachusetts
PAUL SIMON, Illinois
TERRY SANFORD, North Carolina
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York
CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas
RUDY BOSCHWITZ, Minnesota
LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
GORDON J. HUMPHREY, New Hampshire
CONNIE MACK, Florida
Geryld B. Christianson, Staff Director
James P. Lucier, Minority Staff Director
(II)
FOREWORD
The country reports on human rights practices contained herein
were prepared by the Department of State in accordance with sec-
tions 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended. They also fulfill the legislative requirements of section
31 of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act and section 505(c) of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended.
The reports cover the human rights practices of all nations that
receive U.S. foreign assistance as well as those nations that do not
but are members of the United Nations. They are printed to assist
Members of Congress in the consideration of legislation.
Dante B. Fascell,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Claiborne Pell,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
(Ill)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
Department of State,
Washington, DC, January 31, 1990.
Hon. Claiborne Pell,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Hon. Thomas S. Foley,
Speaker, House of Representatives.
Dear Sirs: I have the distinct honor to present the report pre-
pared in compUance with sections 116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and section 505(c) of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
Janet G. Mullins,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
Enclosure.
(V)
CONTENTS
Page
Foreword iii
Letter of Transmittal v
Introduction 1
Africa:
Angola 6
Benin 14
Botswana 22
Burkina Faso 30
Burundi 37
Cameroon 46
Cape Verde 55
Central African Republic 61
Chad 69
Comoros 77
Congo 83
Cote d'lvoire 91
Djibouti 98
Equatorial Guinea 104
Ethiopia 110
Gabon 123
Gambia, The 130
Ghana 137
Guinea 146
Guinea-Bissau 153
Kenya 159
Lesotho 173
Liberia 182
Madagascar 193
Malawi 203
Mali 211
Mauritania 218
Mauritius 228
Mozambique 235
Namibia 246
Niger 261
Nigeria 268
Rwanda 283
Sao Tome and Principe 291
Senegal 297
Seychelles 307
Sierra Leone 314
Somalia 321
South Africa 332
Sudan 355
Swaziland 373
Tanzania 383
Togo 394
Uganda 402
Zaire 413
Zambia 426
Zimbabwe 435
Central and South America:
Antigua and Barbuda 448
Argentina 453
Bahamas 461
(VII)
VIII
Page
Central and South America — Continued
Barbados 466
Belize 471
Bolivia 477
Brazil 484
Chile 497
Colombia 510
Costa Rica 522
Cuba 529
Dominica 547
Dominican Republic 551
Ecuador 562
El Salvador 569
Grenada 590
Guatemala 597
Guyana 611
Haiti 620
Honduras 630
Jamaica 644
Mexico 653
Nicaragua 667
Panama 683
Paraguay 695
Peru 708
St. Kitts and Nevis 724
St. Lucia 728
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 732
Suriname 736
Trinidad and Tobago 744
Uruguay 752
Venezuela 760
East Asia and the Pacific:
Australia 769
Brunei 774
Burma 780
Cambodia 792
China 802
China (Taiwan only) 826
Fiji 840
Indonesia 849
Japan 867
Kiribati 873
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of 877
Korea, Republic of 885
Laos 900
Malaysia 908
Marshall Islands 921
Micronesia, Federated States of 924
Mongolia 928
Nauru 934
New Zealand 939
Papua New Guinea 944
Philippines 950
Singapore 969
Solomon Islands 982
Thailand 986
Tonga 1002
Vanuatu 1006
Vietnam 1011
Western Samoa 1020
Europe and North America:
Albania 1025
Austria 1033
Belgium 1039
Bulgaria 1044
Canada 1061
Cyprus 1066
IX
Page
Europe and North America — Continued
Czechoslovakia 1072
Denmark 1088
Estonia 1093
Finland 1103
France 1109
German Democratic Republic 1115
Germany, Federal Republic of 1127
Greece 1133
Hungary 1142
Iceland 1154
Ireland 1159
Italy 1164
Latvia 1170
Lithuania 1177
Luxembourg 1186
Malta 1191
Netherlands, The 1197
Norway 1203
Poland 1209
Portugal 1220
Romania 1228
Spain 1243
Sweden 1249
Switzerland 1255
Turkey 1260
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1274
United Kingdom 1292
Yugoslavia 1304
Near East, North Africa, and South Asia:
Afghanistan 1320
Algeria 1328
Bahrain 1339
Bangladesh 1347
Bhutan 1359
Egypt 1365
India 1381
Iran 1400
Iraq 1411
Israel and the occupied territories 1423
Jordan 1446
Kuwait 1455
Lebanon 1468
Libya 1479
Maldives 1486
Morocco 1492
The Western Sahara 1506
Nepal 1508
Oman 1519
Pakistan 1526
Qatar 1542
Saudi Arabia 1549
Sri Lanka 1561
Syria 1579
Tunisia 1591
United Arab Emirates 1602
Yemen Arab Republic 1609
Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of 1619
Appendixes:
A. Notes on preparation of the reports 1624
B. Reporting on worker rights 1627
C. Selected international human rights agreements 1629
D. Explanation of statistical table 1636
E. U.S. bilateral assistance FY 1989 1637
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
INTRODUCTION
1989 Human Rights Report
This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department of
State in compliance with Sections 116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.* The legislation
requires human rights reports on all countries that receive
aid from the United States and all countries that are members
of the United Nations. In the belief that the information
would be useful to the Congress and other readers, we have
also included reports on the few countries which do not fall
into either of these categories and which thus are not covered
by the Congressional requirement.
Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act with the foregoing
sections of law so as to to be able to consult these reports
when considering assistance programs for specific foreign
countries. One of the very important consequences — perhaps
unintended — of these legislative provisions is that they have
made human rights concerns an integral part of the State
Department's daily reporting and daily decisionmaking. A
human rights officer in an Embassy overseas who wants to write
a good annual human rights report on the country in which he
or she works must carefully monitor and observe human rights
developments throughout the year on a daily basis. As a
consequence he or she will report on such developments
whenever something of human rights significance happens in the
country of assignment. In the past 12 years, the State
Department has become decidedly better informed on and
sensitized to human rights violations as they occur around the
globe.
* Section 116(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act provides as
follows:
"The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate, by January 31 of each year, a full and complete
report regarding...
"(1) the status of internationally recognized human
rights, within the meaning of subsection (a)...
(A) in countries that received assistance under this
part, and
(B) in all other foreign countries which are members of
the United Nations and which are not otherwise the subject of
a human rights report under this Act."
Section 502(B) (b) of the Foreign Assistance Act provides as
follows :
"The Secretary of State shall transmit to Congress, as part of
the presentation materials for security assistance programs
proposed for each fiscal year, a full and complete report,
prepared with the assistance of the Assistant Secretary of
State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, with respect
to practices regarding the observance of and respect for
internationally recognized human rights in each country
proposed as a recipient of security assistance."
(1)
The year 1989 may very well go down in history books as a
watershed year regarding the worldwide cause of human rights.
The revolutionary changes in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the
German Democratic Republic, and Romania le£t Albania as the
only totalitarian regime left intact in Europe by year's end.
In Poland's elections. Solidarity won nearly all contested
seats and saw one of its members installed as Prime Minister.
Constitutional reforms in Hungary should lead to the
installation of a government by consent of the governed in
1990. Free elections are promised in Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Romania.
What was striking about these dramatic changes in Eastern
Europe was that, except for those in Romania, they occurred
almost without bloodshed. The Soviet Union's acceptance of
these changes was undoubtedly a significant factor in the
peaceful character of the transition, as was the orderly and
democratic spirit of the popular movements themselves.
The spectacular events in what were once known as the Soviet
satellites tended to overshadow remarkable steps taken by the
Soviet Union in the direction of an open society. Elections
to the Congress- of Peoples' Deputies, though rigged in some
areas, were genuine contests in others, and resulted in the
election of numerous opponents of the old order. The Supreme
Soviet, chosen from members of the Congress, became a
legislative branch relatively independent of the executive.
There was further progress regarding freedom of expression, of
association, of assembly, and of religion. Many restrictions
on emigration were relaxed.
Though reformers strengthened their hold on the top echelon of
the Soviet Government, "new thinking" has failed to penetrate
many parts of the Soviet bureaucracy. Incidents of the
autocratic use of power continue to be reported. The absence
of a legal tradition and of legal institutions empowered to
protect the rights of individuals add to the leadership's
difficulty in getting its reform policies fully enforced. The
creation of an independent judiciary remains critically
important for the enhancement of respect for human rights in
the Soviet Union.
In the Western hemisphere, democratic processes and human
rights gained considerable ground. The year 1989 marked the
end of the Stroessner dictatorship in Paraguay, election of
the leader of the democratic opposition as President of Chile,
and peaceful elections in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, El
Salvador, and Honduras. Elsewhere in the world, human rights
progress was recorded in southern Africa, where U.N.-
supervised elections took place in Namibia. The newly elected
constituent assembly began drafting a new constitution, and we
expect independence day to be in the early part of 1990.
Newly elected President de Klerk of South Africa has taken
some encouraging steps leading to dialogue with the black
opposition.
Around the globe, the positive trends are unmistakable, making
the setbacks all the more stark. After having moved in the
direction of a freer society for more than a decade, China
reversed course last June with its suppression of student
protests, large-scale arrests, renewed prohibition of the
expression of dissenting views, and a renewed commitment to
totalitarian governance and indoctrination. Severe repression
of all forms of political opposition continued in Burma, and
North Korea remained one of the most repressive totalitarian
regimes .
Going against the prevailing trend in the Western Hemisphere
was Cuba, which once again sharpened repression, particularly
of human rights activists, many of whom had cooperated with
the 1988-89 U.N. Human Rights Commission investigation. The
Government staged a show-trial and then executed a group of
military officers who might have been a threat to Castro.
Also of concern was the serious setback in Haiti in January
1990 involving the suspension of civil liberties and the
arrest, beating, and/or deportation of prominent opposition
politicians.
Ethnic violence in Senegal and Mauritania took scores of lives
in both countries and resulted in the displacement of at least
200,000 people. In Liberia, unknown numbers of persons were
killed, and thousands sought refuge in neighboring countries
during fighting between dissidents and units of the army.
Ethnic strife and insurgency took at least 8,500 lives in Sri
Lanka and more than 1,000 lives in Sudan. Repressive measures
and clan warfare in Somalia caused the deaths of perhaps
several thousand persons, and repression and civil war
resulted in thousands of casualties in Ethiopia.
Other areas plagued by insurgency, civil unrest, terrorism,
and countermeasures taken by governments include Colombia, El
Salvador, Guatemala, India, the Israeli-occupied territories.
Northern Ireland, Peru, and the Phillippines, as well as
long-suffering Lebanon. Elsewhere armed conflicts continue to
be waged in Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, and Afghanistan.
As we look to 1990, the questions before us and before the
world community are whether the human rights gains of 1989 in
Eastern Europe and other parts of the world will be lasting
achievements. Is there a danger of relapse? Will human
rights problems stemming from domestic rather than
international conflicts increasingly draw our attention?
For our part, the United States remains committed to the
worldwide promotion and consolidation of human rights and
democracy. We see these goals as principal foreign policy
challenges. We actively champion them abroad because they
reflect the best that is in ourselves. And we do so because
we have found that in those countries where human rights and
democratic values have taken hold, we find friends — not
enemies. These are the world's most stable governments, the
most dynamic societies, the bulwarks of freedom, respectful of
the rights of their citizens and of their neighbors, and the
most responsible contributors to the well-being of the world
community.
This year, as last, there are 159 separate reports. The
guidelines followed in preparing the reports are explained in
detail in Appendix A. In Appendix B is a discussion of
reporting on worker rights, as required by Section 505(c) of
the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by Title V of the Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984 (Generalized System of Preferences Renewal
Act of 1984) .•
Although the legislation requires reports on worker rights
only in developing countries that have been beneficiaries
* Section 505 (c) of the Trade Act provides as follows:
"The President shall submit an annual report to the
Congress on the status of internationally recognized worker
rights within each beneficiary developing country."
under the Generalized System of Preferences, in the interest
of uniformity, and to provide a ready basis for comparison, we
have here applied the same reporting standards that we have
applied to all countries on which we prepare reports.
Appendix C contains a list of 12 international human rights
covenants and agreements and indicates which countries have
ratified them. Appendix D contains explanatory notes on the
statistical table in Appendix E, which shows the amounts
obligated for U.S. economic and military assistance for fiscal
year 1989.
Definition of Human Rights
Human rights, as defined in Section 116(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act, include freedom from torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged
detention without charges; disappearance due to abduction or
clandestine detention; and other flagrant denial of the rights
to life, liberty, and the security of the person.
Internationally recognized worker rights, as defined in
Section 502(a) of the Trade Act, include (A) the right of
association; (B) the right to organize and bargain
collectively; (C) prohibition on the use of any form of forced
or compulsory labor; (D) a minimum age for the employment of
children; and (E) acceptable conditions of work with respect
to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and
health.
In addition to discussing the topics specified in the
legislation, our reports, as in previous years, cover other
internationally recognized political and civil rights and
describe the political system of each country.
In applying these internationally recognized standards, we
seek to be objective. But the reports unashamedly reflect the
U.S. view that the right of self-government is a basic
political right, that government is legitimate only when
grounded on the consent of the governed, and that government
thus grounded should not be used to deny life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness. Individuals in a society have the
inalienable right to be free from governmental violations of
the integrity of the person; to enjoy civil liberties such as
freedom of expression, assembly, religion, and movement,
without discrimination based on race, ancestry, or sex; and to
change their government by peaceful means. The reports also
take into account the fact that terrorists and guerrilla
groups often kill, torture, or maim citizens or deprive them
of their liberties; such violations are no less reprehensible
if committed by violent opponents of the government than if
committed by the government itself.
We have found that the concept of economic, social, and
cultural rights is often confused, sometimes willfully, by
repressive governments claiming that, in order to promote
these "rights," they may deny their citizens the right to
integrity of the person as well as political and civil
rights. There exists a profound connection between human
rights and economic development. Experience demonstrates that
it is individual freedom that sets the stage for economic and
social development; it is repression that stifles it. Those
who try to justify subordinating political and civil rights on
the ground that they are concentrating on economic aspirations
invariably deliver neither. That is why we consider it
imperative to focus urgent attention on violations of basic
political and civil rights. If these basic rights are not
secured, experience has shown, the goals of economic
development are not reached either. This is a point which the
Soviet Union's reformers seem to have recognized.
United States Human Rights PolicY
From this premise, that basic human rights may not be abridged
or denied, it follows that our human rights policy is concerned
with the limitations on the powers of government that are
required to protect the integrity and dignity of the
individual. Further, it is in our national interest to
promote democratic processes in order to help build a world
environment more favorable to respect for human rights and
hence more conducive to stability and peace. We have
developed, therefore, a dual policy, reactive in the sense
that we continue to oppose specific human rights violations
wherever they occur, but at the same time active in working
over the long term to strengthen democracy.
In much of the world, the United States has a variety of means
at its disposal to respond to human rights violations. We
engage in traditional diplomacy, particularly with friendly
governments, where frank diplomatic exchanges are possible and
productive. Where we find limited opportunities for the United
States to exert significant influence through bilateral
relations, we resort to public statements of our concerns,
calling attention to countries where respect for human rights
is lacking. In a number of instances, we employ a mixture of
traditional diplomacy and public affirmation of American
interest in the issue.
The United States also employs a variety of means to encourage
greater respect for human rights over the long term. Since
1983 the National Endowment for Democracy has been carrying
out programs designed to promote democratic practices abroad,
involving the two major United States political parties, labor
unions, business groups, and many private institutions. Also,
through Section 116(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, funds
are disbursed by the Agency for International Development for
programs designed to promote civil and political rights abroad.
We also seek greater international commitment to the protection
of human rights and respect for democracy through our efforts
in the United Nations and other international organizations,
and in the process devised by the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
Preparation of these annual reports constitutes an important
element of our human rights policy. The process, since it
involves continuous and well-publicized attention to human
rights, has contributed to the strengthening of an
international human rights agenda. Many countries that are
strong supporters of human rights are taking steps of their
own to engage in human rights reporting and have established
offices specifically responsible for international human
rights policy. Even among countries without strong human
rights records, sensitivity to these reports increasingly
takes the form of constructive response, or at least a
willingness to engage in a discussion of human rights policy.
In calling upon the Department of State to prepare these
reports. Congress has created a useful instrument for
advancing the cause of human rights.
Richard Schifter
Assistant Secretary of State
for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
AFRICA
ANGOLA*
The People's Republic of Angola (PRA) is ruled by the sole
legal political party, the Marxist-Leninist Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) . President Jose Eduardo
Dos Santos is both Head of State and chief of the MPLA. His
rule was reconfirmed by the MPLA's Second Party Congress in
December 1985. All major policy decisions are made by a small
elite in the MPLA, which also controls all means of mass
communication. Open political dissension is not tolerated.
force of about 30,000, as well as a comparable number of
irregular troops. It has the allegiance of a substantial
portion of the population, especially among Angola's largest
ethnic group, the Ovimbundu.
UNITA controls the southeastern quarter of Angola's
territory. The United States supports UNITA in the Angolan
conflict and has provided it with assistance. The PRA
receives extensive military assistance from the Soviet Union.
As of November 1, 1989, half of the estimated 50,000 Cuban
troops who were stationed in the country had been withdrawn in
accordance with the New York accords of December 22, 1988.
Under these agreements, Cuba is obligated to withdraw a total
of 33,000 troops by April 1990, and all Cuban troops are to be
out of Angola by July 1, 1991.
A civil war, combined with a Communist command-style economy,
has devastated the country's infrastructure, forced a return
to barter in some areas, and led the PRA to divert much of its
revenues to the military, including payments to the Soviet
Union for military equipment and to Cuba for combat troops.
Although the PRA receives substantial foreign exchange
earnings from oil exports, the expenditure of hard currency
for weapons and the impact of war on the productivity and
distribution networks of Angolan agriculture appear to have
created a chronic food shortage in both the cities and the
countryside. The PRA, in response to the generally critical
economic situation, announced in 1987 its intention to
institute some market-oriented economic reforms. By the end
of 1989, little progress had been made, although the
International Monetary Fund voted in midyear to admit the PRA.
The civil war between the PRA and UNITA has ravaged Angola
since 1975 and has resulted in widespread human rights abuses
on both sides with many civilian casualties. A regional
conflict on Angolan and Namibian territory has added further
destruction and violence. On December 22, 1988, the Republic
of Cuba, the People's Republic of Angola, and the Republic of
South Africa signed a series of agreements (the New York
accords) under U.S. mediation which are leading to
independence for Namibia in accordance with the U.N.
Settlement Plan and the phased and total withdrawal of Cuban
troops from Angola. This has significantly reduced regional
*The United States does not recognize or maintain diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of Angola and has no
diplomatic personnel there to monitor human rights conditions
or evaluate allegations of abuses.
ANGOLA
tensions. In June 1989, at Gbadolite, Zaire, President Dos
Santos and Dr. Savimbi, leader of UNITA, agreed to a ceasefire
and committed themselves to achieving national
reconciliation. In the months that followed, the cease-fire
broke down and fighting resumed with new charges of human
rights abuses. In December the PRA, with the help of Soviet
advisers, launched a new military offensive into UNITA-
controlled areas of southeastern Angola. As the year ended,
the U.S., Zaire, and other countries in the region were
working to reestablish the cease-fire and get negotiations
started to end the civil war.
One human rights group, Africa Watch, has estimated total
civil war victims at 200,000 Angolans killed, more than 20,000
children orphaned, and 20,000 to 50,000 Angolans left as
amputees due to the widespread use of land mines by both
sides. In addition to extensive violence against civilians,
human rights remained restricted across the board with
problems of mistreatment of prisoners, arbitrary detentions,
lack of fair trial, and restrictions on freedom of speech,
press, association, movement, worker rights, and the right of
citizens to change their government.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Reports of political killings on the part of PRA forces and
UNITA, both in combat areas and in the form of summary
executions of prisoners, persisted in 1989. It is difficult
to evaluate the various claims and counterclaims. The
fighting also resulted in many civilian deaths. While some of
these deaths were inadvertently caused by military operations,
others may have been deliberately perpetrated by opposing
forces to intimidate civilian populations. The PRA and UNITA
publicly and repeatedly accused each other of practicing
terrorism against their respective opponents, including
killing or maiming civilians.
UNITA has charged that Cuban forces have been involved in
attacks on civilians. In addition, UNITA has asserted that
FAPLA and Cuban forces used aerial chemical warfare against
military and civilian opponents in 1989. Tests carried out by
American forensic experts, however, did not yield postive
results .
b. Disappearance
There is no information either to confirm or deny that secret
arrests or clandestine detentions are practiced by PRA
security agencies or by UNITA, although each side has accused
the other of such practices.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Allegations of torture and mistreatment made by both sides
appear to have some basis in fact, but torture of opponents
does not appear to be a generalized systematic practice of
either PRA organizations or UNITA. The number of torture
allegations against UNITA increased in 1989. Little
information is available on the administrative structure and
ANGOLA
practices within UNITA-held areas. Reports that UNITA
mistreats some prisoners could neither be confirmed nor
disproved .
PRA prison authorities reportedly have wide latitude in the
treatment of prisoners. Treatment of political detainees in
the prisons controlled by the PRA Ministry of State Security
appears to be harsher than treatment in the regular prisons.
There are reports of sexual torture of UNITA prisoners and
mistreatment, including beatings, threats, and prolonged
interrogation with the use of force. Family visits appear to
be arbitrarily restricted in many instances. In 1989 foreign
advisers, including Cubans and East Germans, continued to
assist PRA state security services and may have helped operate
the state security prisons. AI ' s 1989 Report notes that three
former security officials were convicted of ill-treating
prisoners during 1988 (nine were tried) .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under laws enacted by the PRA, persons suspected of committing
serious acts against "state security" may be held by the
Ministry of State Security without charge for an initial
period of 3 months, renewable for a further period of 3
months. Such detainees need not be presented to a judge
within 48 hours of their arrest, as stipulated in the Code of
Criminal Procedure for persons suspected of other kinds of
crime, and apparently have no right to challenge the grounds
of their detention. After 6 months in detention without
charge, the detainee must be informed of the accusations, with
the State Security Service either informing the public
prosecutor of the charges or releasing the suspect. Once the
case is presented to the public prosecutor, there does not
•appear to be a specific time limit within which a suspect must
be brought to trial.
The deterioration of the security situation has exacerbated
the general decline in judicial safeguards and due process.
The PRA has established regional military councils throughout
much of Angola. They are responsible directly to President
Dos Santos and have broad authority to restrict the movement
of people and goods, to requisition people and goods without
compensation, and to try crimes against "state security." The
MPLA has also created "People's vigilance Brigades" for urban
areas, whose powers are not clear but which include general
administration and "protecting the people and ensuring public
order and stability."
Press accounts alleged that UNITA had detained or executed
Pedro "Tito" Chingunji, a former UNITA representative in the
United States, at the beginning of the year. Chingunji was
later seen alive and apparently well in Jamba, UNITA's
headquarters in southeastern Angola.
The number of political detainees and prisoners held by the
PRA at the end of 1989 was not known. However, the PRA
claimed to have released 700 political prisoners during the
first 6 months of the year. If this figure is correct, it
appears that the MPLA has been holding many more regime
opponents than previously believed.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
ANGOLA
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Although the PRA Constitution provides for an independent
judiciary, in practice the judiciary follows MPLA party
guidelines. The Constitution also states that no citizen
shall be arrested and brought to trial except under the terms
of the law, which includes a public trial and the right of the
accused to legal counsel. There is, however, insufficient
information to determine if, or to what extent, these rights
are observed in practice in regular criminal and civil cases.
In the past, AI has expressed concern that trials of political
opponents of the PRA, notably in military tribunals, do not
conform to internationally recognized standards. AI ' s 1989
report notes that 20 defendants convicted in 1988 for ties to
UNITA were not given adequate opportunity to present their
defense or to appeal their cases. AI also reported the 1989
conviction of two military pilots on espionage charges. They
were sentenced to death and not permitted to appeal.
Judicial lines of authority are unclear, especially since the
PRA's regional military councils have been given
responsibility for the trial of offenses against "state
security," including "economic crimes." It is not known which
trials are open to the public and under what rules of
procedure the various military and civilian courts operate.
The PRA Constitution also provides for a People's Supreme
Court, but no information is available about its jurisdiction.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Although the Constitution provides for the inviolability of
the home and privacy of correspondence, the PRA conducts
arbitrary searches of homes, censors private correspondence,
and monitors private communications.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The resumption of the conflict in August, after the breakdown
of the June cease-fire, led to some of the most violent
fighting in 1989. Displaced persons interviewed in UNITA
territory have stated that FAPLA forces capture escaping
civilians, particularly children, and send them to special
camps within PRA territory or to Communist countries such as
Cuba and East Germany for "reeducation."
New York Times reporter Kenneth Noble visited Samba Caju (180
miles east of Luanda) as part of a group of reporters taken to
the town by PRA authorities. There he conducted interviews
with townspeople under PRA auspices. He wrote that UNITA
soldiers invaded the town on September 17, 1989, shooting
civilians (at least 15 were killed and 40 wounded) and
destroying shops, houses, and a medical clinic.
Africa Watch reports that some of the refugees interviewed by
its representatives stated that UNITA captured civilians,
transported them to UNITA territory, and forced them to farm.
The PRA and UNITA have accused each other of placing land
mines in footpaths to agricultural fields as part of a
strategy to deny food to civilians in contested areas.
Thousands of civilians have lost limbs as a result of the
widespread use of land mines. According to the Africa Watch
10
ANGOLA
study, mines placed by FAPLA forces accounted for most
civilian casualties in northern Angola, while UNITA-placed
mines were blamed for civilian casualties in eastern Angola.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The PRA Constitution provides for freedom of expression, but
the Angolan people live under censorship, intimidation, and
control of the media. Opposition views are not tolerated, and
critics such as Bartolomeu Dias Fernandes, who was accused of
"insulting the Head of State," have been sentenced to long
prison terms.
Although the PRA is especially sensitive to criticism in the
foreign press, in 1986 it began to allow the controlled travel
of foreign correspondents to Angola, a practice which
continued in 1989. The circulation of Western journals and
periodicals in PRA-controlled Angola is tightly restricted.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Although the PRA Constitution calls for freedom of assembly,
it is denied to any political group or movement other than the
MPLA or its associated mass organizations. All other
political movements have been banned. There are numerous
unconfirmed reports of arrests of people who voice support for
opposition movements or alternative political systems. The
People's Vigilance Brigades, which have some law enforcement
authority in urban areas, and the martial law climate
throughout the country tend further to restrict freedom of
assembly and association.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Although the PRA Constitution provides for the inviolability
of freedom of conscience and belief and for separation of
church and state, the PRA authorities publicly emphasize the
importance of propagating atheism and have been critical of
religious activities. Approximately 85 percent of the Angolan
population is either Roman Catholic or Protestant, while the
remainder practice a variety of animist beliefs. Systematic
persecution of priests, pastors, and catechists and
confiscation of Church property occurred in PRA-controlled
areas between 1975 and 1979, but since then the PRA has eased
its antireligious stance and has not moved to close down
officially recognized churches. Church services are held
regularly, and there is wide attendance.
Foreign and Angolan missionaries are allowed to carry out
their normal activities. UNITA respects freedom of religion
in the areas it controls and provides limited administrative
support to both Catholic and Protestant churches. In the
past, UNITA has captured foreign missionaries in contested
areas and released them unharmed after publicly warning them
of the dangers of being caught in the combat zone.
The PRA refuses to recognize smaller religious sects that it
deems subversive, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses. The most
recent known case of repression concerns the Tocoist Church,
founded in Angola in 1949, which has a syncretic blend of
11
ANGOLA
Christian beliefs and indigenous religious practices. The
Government banned the Church in 1977, and, in early 1987,
approximately 60 Tocoists were killed in a confrontation with
irregular units of the MPLA military and state security
forces. Although this ban was lifted in 1988, there were
reports of more arrests of members in that year.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
As a result of the fighting and the widespread use of land
mines by both sides, travel by road in most areas of Angola is
dangerous. The PRA is acutely sensitive about security and
has tightly restricted travel. It has also instituted a pass
system within Angola, and foreigners are generally prohibited
from traveling outside the principal cities. UNITA has
publicly warned that it considers all of Angola to be a war
zone and that it cannot guarantee the safety of persons
traveling there.
Angolan citizens are allowed to travel abroad, but this travel
is carefully controlled by the PRA's restrictions on issuance
of passports and exit visas and by currency restrictions.
Emigration is restricted. The PRA limits travel to Angola
through a selective and stringent visa policy.
An estimated 670,000 persons, and probably a greater
proportion of the Angolan population of 8 to 9 million, have
been displaced internally. Africa Watch reports that the PRA
authorities have forcibly displaced thousands of civilians, in
part to deny UNITA a social base, and that UNITA has captured
thousands of civilians and forced them to work on UNITA farms.
There are some 400,000 Angolan refugees resident in
neighboring countries. Approximately 300,000 Angolans are
still refugees in Zaire, and an estimated 94,000 are in
Zambia. There are approximately 11,000 Zairian refugees or
displaced persons in Angola. Namibian refugees have been
repatriated as a result of the New York accords, which also
led to the departure of a large contingent of South African
nationals affiliated with the African National Congress.
By the end of September 1989, approximately 2,100 Angolan
refugees were repatriated from Zaire to the PRA and nearly
1,900 Zairian refugees returned home from the PRA. This
repatriation, sponsored by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, was intended to return 5,000
refugees to their homes--2,500 from each country--by late
November 1989. A new registration for other refugees wishing
to return home was expected to begin in January 1990.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Angolans do not have the right to change their government.
Most of Angola is ruled by a small group of officials within
the party apparatus of the ruling MPLA. The PRA Constitution
provides for popular participation in the political process,
but political activity is limited to participation in the MPLA
or in one of its controlled and sanctioned organizations such
as its youth wing, the Angolan Women's Organization, or the
trade union movement. Political power is centered in the
elite membership of the Politburo and the somewhat larger
Central Committee. Party membership is very restricted, with
fewer than 30,000 members.
12
ANGOLA
The PRA Constitution provides for a popularly elected National
People's Assembly, established in 1981, and people's
assemblies at the provincial and local level. However,
despite recent suggestions from President Dos Santos that the
powers and membership of the National People's Assembly be
broadened, only candidates chosen and endorsed by the MPLA
have been elected. Key members of the party also hold
leadership positions in the provincial and local assemblies.
A new round of elections is planned for 1990 under the
existing restrictions, but depending upon progress in the
negotiations between the MPLA and UNITA, this may be subject
to change.
Both the MPLA and UNITA have primarily ethnic bases of
support--the MPLA among the Mbundu, and UNITA among the
Ovimbundu, Ganguela, and Lunda-Chokwe . The National Front for
the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) has its base among the
Bakongo, but the FNLA is no longer a major force in Angolan
politics and has in part been integrated into the MPLA.
Members of all of Angola's ethnic groups and religions
participate in both organizations, some at high levels of the
party. However, non-Mbundu groups are greatly
underrepresented in the small group within the ruling PRA
Central Committee and Politburo. Mesticos (Angolans of mixed
racial background numbering only about 1 percent of the
population) remain the most highly skilled and educated group
in Angola and are inf luential--politically, culturally, and
economically--beyond their numbers in the PRA.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The PRA did not respond to AI ' s 1987 appeal for information
concerning numerous political detainees, and neither the PRA
nor UNITA would let Africa Watch researchers into the country
in 1989 (Africa Watch's report was based on interviews with 87
Angolan refugees in camps in Zaire and Zambia). The PRA has
allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
the United Nations Children's Fund, and Catholic Relief
Services to provide food assistance in areas it controls.
UNITA allows the ICRC, Medicins Sans Frontieres, and Operation
Handicapped International to conduct similar operations in
areas under its control. Neither the PRA nor UNITA have yet
responded to ICRC requests for access to all persons arrested
in connection with internal events and the military situation
in the country.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Because of the disturbed situation prevailing in most of
Angola, there is little information available on the existence
or extent of discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
religion, language, or social status. There is also no
information available on the extent of violence against women
in Angola. Given the country's 500-year colonial legacy,
Portuguese is the official language of Angola.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Angolan workers do not have the right to form independent
trade unions. The sole, legally recognized, trade union
13
ANGOLA
organization in the PRA is the National Union of Angolan
Workers (UNTA) , which was formed in the late 1950 's as an
appendage of the MPLA and became the ruling party's official
labor wing after Angolan independence in 1975. The
preindependence labor centers of rival liberation
organizations ceased to exist soon after the MPLA took control
of most of the country. The monopoly situation of the UNTA is
ensured by the statutory basis of the single-union structure.
In addition, the activities of the labor central and its
affiliates are tightly controlled by the MPLA. Strikes are
illegal and considered to be a crime against "state security."
The PRA has ratified ILO Conventions 87 and 98 regarding
freedom of association and collective bargaining. The UNTA is
affiliated with the continent-wide Organization of African
Trade Union Unity and the Communist-controlled World
Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers do not have the right to bargain collectively. The
PRA, through its Ministry of Labor and Social Security,
controls the process of setting wages and benefits, but it
coordinates its actions with UNTA and employers. There are no
export processing zones in Angola. As far as is known, labor
legislation is applied uniformly throughout the PRA.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Existing PRA legislation authorizes compulsory labor for
breaches of labor discipline and participation in strikes. On
the basis of this legislation, the International Labor
Organization (ILO) in 1984 cited the PRA for being in
violation of ILO Convention 105, which prohibits forced
labor. Also, in 1988 the ILO Committee of Experts cited the
PRA for its failure to bring its legislation into conformity
with ILO Convention 105, which the PRA had ratified in 1976.
During 1989, both the PRA and UNITA accused each other of
relying on forced conscription of young males for recruitment
into the military forces.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
There is no information available on this subject.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is also no information available on this subject.
14
PENIN
The People's Republic of Benin is a single-party state headed
by President Mathieu Kerekou, who came to power in a military
coup in 1972. In 1974 President Kerekou declared Benin to be
a Marxist-Leninist state under the direction of a single
political party, the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin.
However, on December 7, 1989, the party's Central Committee,
the standing committee of the National Revolutionary Assembly,
and the National Executive Council (cabinet ministers plus the
six provincial governors), under the chairmanship of the
President, announced that Marxism-Leninism was no longer the
State's official ideology.
Benin's Armed Forces number approximately 4,000 personnel. In
addition to the regular army, there are small navy, air force,
and militia contingents. The army is the main internal
security force, backed by the paramilitary gendarmerie,
regular police units, the presidential guard, and the
Documentation and Information Service, the Government's
intelligence agency.
Benin's unCerdeveloped economy is largely based on subsistence
agriculture, cotton production, regional trade, and a low
level of offshore oil production. In June the Government
signed agreements with the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund which included austerity reforms, e.g., reducing
the number of state enterprises, cutting wasteful fiscal
expenditures, deregulating trade, and encouraging private-
sector activity. Benin's small modern economy, however,
remained depressed in 1989 due to falling world prices for
local exports, relatively high debt service charges, and
widespread unemployment.
Human rights continued to be circumscribed in 1989. In the
face of social unrest and strikes by students, teachers, civil
servants, and even some military personnel over the
deteriorating economic situation and alleged corruption, the
Government cracked down hard on demonstrators in January,
February, and December 1989, killing one worker and two
youths, including a 12-year-old, and detaining a number of
persons. On August 29, 1989, the President granted a general
amnesty and clemency to 133 political detainees, to another 30
persons accused of coup-plotting, and to 29 persons in exile.
He also stressed the importance of human rights by: approving
a visit from an Amnesty International (AI) mission in April;
authorizing the establishment of a nongovernmental National
Commission on Human Rights; and personally visiting the
military Camp Guezo Detention Center in June to discuss with
security officials the problem of arbitrary detention. Major
human rights concerns included mistreatment of prisoners and
detainees, arbitrary detentions, restrictions on freedoms of
speech, press, assembly, and the right of citizens to change
their government.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section I Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or other extrajudicial
killings in Benin in 1989, but the Government's use of lethal
force in countering public disturbances and strikes in 1989
15
BENIN
led to the deaths by gunfire of at least one striking factory
worker at Save in January and two young demonstrators in
Cotonou in December.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearances in 1989.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Beninese penal code requires that prisoners be treated
consistent with "prison discipline and security."
Mistreatment of prisoners and detainees occurs. Cases of
prison death from torture (primarily beatings), disease, or
poor prison conditions were reported by private sources and by
AI in its 1989 Report.
There were credible reports that two prisoners died after
having been tortured in 1989. Serge Gnimadi, a 21-year-old
member of the National Union of High School Teachers, was
arrested on January 23 for allegedly engaging in vandalism and
other activities threatening public order during strikes in
Porto Novo. He died in prison at the end of February; the
Government stated tetanus was the cause of death. Luc
Togbadja, a student arrested for transporting antigovernment
tracts on March 3, was detained at Cotonou's Camp Guezo until
May 6. He was then moved to the Petit Palais, a security
forces installation, and reportedly beaten to death there.
President Kerekou visited Camp Guezo shortly thereafter to
investigate allegations of human rights abuses, but at the end
of 1989 there had been no report or formal investigation, and
no disciplinary action had been taken against responsible
persons .
Prison conditions in Benin are very poor. Sanitation and
medical facilities are deficient, and the prison diet is
inadequate unless supplemented by food from friends or
relatives. Much public attention has centered on conditions
at two remote detention centers: the civil prison in Segbana,
where there had been protests in 1988, and Sero Kpera military
camp in Parakou. The amnesty in August reportedly eased
significantly the overcrowding in several prisons, including
Segbana, where members of the Dahomey Communist Party had been
detained.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
While Benin's legal system requires judicial review of
detention, this is not always observed in political cases.
The Constitution states that no citizen may be arrested
without an arrest order authorized by an established judicial
body. However, there is no time limit with respect to
charging a defendant or bringing the accused to trial. In
practice, persons have been detained incommunicado, some for
extended periods, without charge and without recourse to legal
assistance or judicial hearing. Outside the judicial system,
the Government has used an administrative body, the Permanent
National Commission of Inquiry, to question political
detainees about their activities and to decide whether they
should remain in custody.
The President publicly addressed the question of arbitrary
arrest and detention in 1989. On June 20, he visited Camp
Guezo (Benin's military and security headquarters) to discuss
16
BENIN
military personnel involvement in arbitrary arrests.
President Kerekou asked security officials for a complete
accounting of all prisoners being held at the camp and warned
against arbitrary detention. Kerekou then organized a June 22
working session with a number of security and judiciary
personnel and ordered them to settle quickly all proven cases
of arbitrary arrest. By year's end, this was accomplished.
There was no evidence of further investigation of, or actions
taken against, security officials.
At the beginning of 1989, over 200 Beninese were believed
detained in various prisons for political reasons. During the
January-February 1989 strikes, 68 persons were arrested for
vandalism or otherwise disturbing public order. On April 1,
40 detainees were released from Camp Sero Kpera in Parakou.
Among these was Dr. Afolabi Biaou, who had been arrested in
1985 and detained since then without charge. Both AI and the
American Association for the Advancement of Science had made
appeals in his case. An unknown number of persons were also
arrested during antigovernment demonstrations in early
December. Most are believed to have been released.
The August amnesty freed 133 political detainees, including
several whose cases had been noted by AI , the International
Human Rights Law Group, and the American Association for the
Advancement of Science. They included: Anselme Agbanoundo, a
geological engineer arrested in October 1985; Thomas Houedete,
an economist and professor at the University of Benin,
arrested in October 1985; Didier D'Almeida, arrested in
November 1984; Yako Toko Chabi, in detention since 1985; and
Jonas Gnimagnon, Chairman of the Committee of Wives and
Relatives of Prisoners of Conscience, arrested in May 1989.
The Government had reportedly suspected these persons of ties
to the banned Dahomey Communist Party.
The August amnesty also freed 30 persons suspected of coup
plotting in 1975 and 1977. At the end of 1989, as many as 20
others remained imprisoned for alleged involvement in more
recent conspiracies to overthrow the Government. One group,
allegedly involved in a March 1988 plot, is still awaiting
trial. A second group, implicated in a Libyan-backed plan to
overthrow President Kerekou, was tried and sentenced in
February 1989.
There was no use of forced exile in Benin as a means of
political control in 1989. The August amnesty also included
an invitation for 29 voluntary exilees to return to Benin,
although it is not confirmed that any had accepted the amnesty
by the end of the year.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Benin's legal system is based on French civil and customary
law. In recent years, a civilian court system organized on
provincial and national levels has operated, with the People's
Central Court as the highest regular court of appeal. In
September 1988, the Government held elections for civilians to
sit on local tribunals for the first time. Defendants have
both the right to be present at their trial and the right to
an attorney (at public expense, if needed).
In the past, the Government rarely brought security cases to
the trial stage. However, in 1988 a new law established the
17
BENIN
State Security Court, and in 1989, as noted above, a number of
political opponents charged with involvement in a
Libyan-backed plot were tried before this Court in an open
trial and sentenced in February. Their testimony, including
segments critical of government policy, was broadcast on
public television.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Benin's Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
home and requires a warrant from a judge before the police can
enter a residence. In practice, authorities enter homes
without a warrant in suspected security cases. Reports
indicated that the security police also monitor telephones and
the mail of persons suspected of antigovernment activities.
Section 2 Respect For Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Public expression of political opinion is controlled, and open
criticism of the Government, as occurred during the 1989
strikes and disturbances, is not permitted. However, some
negative coverage of the Government and its policies appeared
in the independent press during 1989. Most Beninese appear
willing to discuss politics freely in private or in small
groups, even in the presence of foreigners.
The Government owns and operates the local radio and
television stations and one daily newspaper. The Beninese
media also includes three independent private newspapers (La
Gazette du Golfe, Tam-Tam Express, and La Recade) , as well as
La Croix, a weekly paper published by the Catholic Church, and
Echo, a monthly journal of opinion circulated throughout West
Africa. The official media generally carry those stories that
are approved by, or serve the interests of, the State.
Private newspapers treat controversial political issues with
circumspection, but many articles appeared in the private
press in 1989 mildly criticizing President Kerekou and the
party on various domestic political and economic issues.
There are limits to such criticism, however, as in March the
Government arrested and briefly held Parfait Agbele, a
journalist with the Gazette du Golfe, reportedly after he had
begun research for a story on Luc Togbadja's death. In
September the Government confiscated a number of copies of the
Gazette after it had published a controversial opinion poll on
the Government, and in October it suspended the paper "until
further notice." The suspension was canceled on December 8
but with the caveat that future editions be submitted to the
Government for prior censorship.
There is normally no censorship of foreign books or artistic
works. Foreign periodicals are widely displayed on
newsstands, and foreign radio broadcasts are readily available
to much of the population through shortwave radio. No attempt
is made to interfere with foreign radio broadcasts.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
In recent years, the Government has permitted the formation of
a number of nonpolitical , private, social, service, and
professional organizations. All meetings of a political
nature, however, must be approved by the State. The
18
BENIN
Government used gunfire against alleged stone-throwers
participating in antigovernment demonstrations in 1989.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Christianity, Islam, and traditional religions all coexist in
Benin, and adherence to a particular faith does not confer any
special status or benefit. There are no restrictions on
religious ceremonies, teachings, or foreign clergy, and
religious conversion is freely permitted.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Domestic movement is not restricted. Passport and exit
permits are necessary for travel outside West African
countries but are usually not difficult to obtain. Emigration
is common; many Beninese move to neighboring countries to earn
a living and do so without jeopardizing their citizenship.
The Government encourages the repatriation of its citizens
living abroad but with only limited success to date.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, there were 869 identified refugees in Benin as of
August 1989, 808 of whom were Chadians who had fled the
fighting in their country. Although some settled in Benin,
many now were in the process of returning to Chad. The
Government imposes no restriction on the return of refugees.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government
through democratic means. Political leadership is exercised
by President Kerekou and a small group of senior officials,
many of whom are military officers. The Cabinet and Political
Bureau are made up of persons from a variety of ethnic groups
and geographic areas. The People's Revolutionary Party, the
sole recognized political party, controls the selection of
candidates for the National Revolutionary Assembly and local
government bodies. While party membership is not a requisite
for holding office or for civil service employment, it can be
helpful for political and career advancement. The National
Revolutionary Assembly itself rarely takes issue with policies
formulated by the President. In the June elections for the
National Revolutionary Assembly Beninese citizens voted "yes"
or "no" for a single slate of candidates, chosen in advance.
There were reports of soldiers intimidating voters, and at a
number of polling stations the principle of the secret ballot
was not honored. The Assembly, which has little influence on
policymaking, reelected Kerekou without opposition to the
Presidency 2 months later.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In the past, the Government considered any attempt to
investigate human rights practices to be interference in its
internal affairs. However, 1988-1989 saw a change in that
policy. In 1988 the International Committee of the Red Cross
19
SESIS.
was permitted to visit Benin and investigate prison
conditions. In April 1989, AI representatives visited Benin
to discuss the organization's concerns on a number of human
rights issues.
In April the National Revolutionary Assembly passed a law
creating the Beninese Commission on Human Rights. The
Commission, which at the end of 1989 was still in the process
of being organized, is a nongovernmental entity designed to
promote human rights and review complaints forwarded by
private citizens. It will be comprised of 45 members,
including lawyers, representatives of nongovernmental
organizations, and government officials.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no evidence that discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, language, or social status exists in Benin.
The Constitution states that women are by law the equals of
men in the political, economic, cultural, and social spheres,
and the Government officially encourages opportunities for
women. The Constitution also notes that the State "protects
the family, in particular, the mother and child" and calls for
the development of maternity hospitals and childcare
facilities. Female employees have the right to paid maternity
leave, although the actual enjoyment of this benefit is
limited mostly to civil servants, teachers, and other
professionals. Beninese women play a major role in the
commercial sector as well as in small-scale family farming,
but they have not traditionally had the same educational
opportunities as men.
Violence against women, such as wife beating, has been given
little attention by the Government. Civil penalties may be
applied in cases of domestic violence, but the police and
courts are often reluctant to intervene, considering such
affairs to be "family matters." The Organization of
Revolutionary Women of Benin serves to transmit government and
party policy on such issues and make known women's views to
the leadership.
According to several local medical practitioners, the practice
of female circumcision is not widespread in Benin. However,
published reports in the United States suggest about 20
percent of the female population is subject to this practice,
mostly in the northern part of the country. The Government is
making efforts to eradicate this practice through an education
campaign conducted by government-employed health workers, and
there are signs that the practice is diminishing, especially
in urban areas.
Section 6 Workers Rights
a. The Right of Association
Benin's Constitution states that "union activities are
guaranteed to workers," and workers are free to join the union
of their choosing. However, the National Workers' Union of
Benin (UNSTB), which is closely linked to the Government and
party (the President of the National Assembly acts as head of
the UNSTB), is the only legally recognized trade union
federation in the country. Approximately 75 percent of wage
earners belong to organized labor unions. Civil servants are
20
BENIN
obligated to join the UNSTB as a condition of their
employment. In August Benin's National Union of High School
Teachers declared its independence from the UNSTB and 2 weeks
later held a widely publicized and cordial meeting with
President Kerekou.
While the right to strike is not explicitly denied or
protected in the Beninese labor code, the last labor strike
prior to 1989 occurred in 1975 and was forcibly suppressed by
the Government after 3 days. However, at various times during
1989 civil service employees at all 15 government ministries,
teachers, and professors went on strike for nonpayment of
salary arrears. Given such broad opposition, the Government
did not interfere with the strikes, but it arrested several
persons who allegedly engaged in vandalism or other activities
causing public disturbances during the strikes. Also, during
a strike by workers at the sugar cane factory at Save in
January 1989, soldiers reportedly opened fire into the crowd
in an attempt to restore order, killing at least one worker.
The UNSTB is affiliated with the Organization of African Trade
Union Unity and the Communist-controlled World Federation of
Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is provided for under the Beninese labor
code. Individual labor unions negotiate with employers on
labor matters and represent workers' grievances to employers
and to the Government. The Government often acts as arbiter.
Until the National Union of High School Teachers became
independent in August, all labor organizing and collective
bargaining took place under the umbrella of the
government-controlled UNSTB. The Beninese labor code
prohibits employers from taking union membership or activity
into account when making decisions on hiring, work
distribution, professional or vocational training, or
dismissals. Benin's labor laws apply throughout the country,
including in the export processing zone.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited under Article 3 of
the Beninese labor code and is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age For Employment of Children
The Beninese labor code prohibits the employment or
apprenticeship of children under the age of 18 in any
enterprise. However, enforcement is erratic at best, and
child labor does occur, especially in the subsistence economy,
where children below the age of 14 often work on family farms.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Benin's labor force of 1.9 million (out of a population of 4.5
million) is primarily employed in agriculture (80 percent),
with less than 2 percent of the population involved in the
industrial (wage) sector. For the wage sector, the Beninese
labor code establishes a 40-hour workweek and sets a minimum
wage of approximately $40 per month. In many instances,
however, the Government's ability to enforce labor laws and
regulations in the wage sector is limited by a shortage of
administrative and financial resources and a difficult
21
BENIH
economic environment in which unemployment is high. The
minimum wage level normally provides for a degree of food and
housing for a family, but in order to provide a decent living
it usually has to be supplemented by other means, such as
subsistence farming.
The Government has given vigorous support to policies designed
to improve the conditions of workers in both the agricultural
and industrial sectors. It has, for example, committed itself
to the provision of free or low-cost medical care and social
services and set occupational safety standards. The labor
code sets stringent health and safety standards, but again the
resources needed to enforce these regulations are limited.
22
BOTSWANA
Botswana is a multiparty democracy. The Constitution vests
executive power in the President, currently Quett K. J.
Masire, who was elected in 1984. The President selects the
Cabinet from the 38-member unicameral National Assembly.
While there are several political parties in Botswana, in
practice the country's politics are dominated by the ruling
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which has held a large
parliamentary majority since independence in 1966. All
citizens, including whites, are free to participate fully in
the economic and political life of Botswana.
Botswana's small army, the Botswana Defense Force (BDF),
consists of 6,200 soldiers. The national police force numbers
about 2,900. Both the BDF and the police are subordinate to
civilian authority. The army is still being expanded to help
resist incursions by the South African Defense Force (SADF)
against suspected ANC (African National Congress) targets in
Botswana. There were no cross-border raids by South African
defense forces in 1989. However, there were continued bomb
threats and minor explosions (believed by local observers to
be engineered by South Africa) which reinforced Botswana's
security worries.
Botswana has a mixed economy and strongly encourages private
enterprise. Fueled by the development of mineral resources,
especially diamonds, the country's economy has grown at a
rapid rate, with real growth in gross domestic product (GDP)
averaging 11 percent since 1979. Since independence in 1966,
per capita GDP has increased from $69 to approximately $1,500
in 1988. However, some 75 percent of Botswana's population
lives in rural areas and remains partially dependent for its
livelihood on subsistence farming and animal husbandry.
Botswana's human rights record remained good in most
respects. The legal rights of citizens are provided for by
law and respected in practice. Political violence is
virtually unknown, and there is a wide range of public
expression. However, violence against women is a persistent
problem in a male-dominated society, and mistreatment of
detainees, though not condoned by the Government, persists.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reported killings instigated either by the
Government or opposition groups. Unlike previous years, there
were no casualties from alleged South African incursions
against suspected ANC targets in 1989.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances
in 1989.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There are continuing reports of police improperly treating
persons in custody. Some lawyers report that the police often
beat up suspects and detainees, although the practice is not
23
universal or condoned by political leaders or government
officials. Penalties for police abuses can range from
internal police disciplinary action to regular criminal
prosecution, as in a recent case where a constable was
prosecuted for unlawful wounding of a suspect. Police may
also be sued in civil court if they abuse arrestees.
Flogging is commonly used as a sentence for men for a variety
of offenses, including violation of prison rules, rape, armed
robbery, burglary, and related offenses.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Citizens are protected from arbitrary arrest under the
Constitution. After an arrest, a suspect must be charged
before a magistrate within 48 hours. Once a suspect has
appeared before a magistrate, he can be detained only if the
magistrate issues a writ of detention, which is valid for 14
days. The detention writ must be renewed every 14 days
thereafter. There are complaints that police and rangers from
the Department of Wildlife sometimes hold people longer than
the prescribed 48 hours, but it is not a general practice and
offending officers are punished or sued successfully in civil
actions. Persons charged under the National Security Act must
be arraigned before a magistrate within 96 hours. Under this
Act, suspects, once arraigned, may be held indefinitely, but
this Act has rarely been invoked in practice. There are no
reported abuses of these detention procedures. There is a
functioning system of bail, and arrestees have access to
attorneys of their choice, although there is no functioning
system of public defenders for those unable to afford a lawyer.
There is no practice of incommunicado detention in Botswana.
However, Botswana does not promptly or automatically notify
embassies when foreign citizens are detained or arrested.
The Constitution allows the President to declare a person a
prohibited immigrant and deport him from. the country. No
explanation is required, nor is any normally given, and the
order is not subject to judicial review. A prohibited
immigrant can reenter Botswana only with the permission of the
President or his designated representative. In 1989 one
person, a British journalist, was deported under this
provision, reportedly for maintaining a relationship with
African National Congress supporters.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Botswana's judiciary is independent of the executive and
legislative branches of government in both law and actual
practice. Botswana has two court systems, the regular courts
and the customary (traditional) courts.
In the regular courts, the defendant's rights to due process
are guaranteed by law and largely honored in practice. Trials
are held in public, and court records are public. Trials
under the National Security Act (NSA) may be held in camera,
but no trials took place in 1989 under the NSA. Defendants
have the right to be represented by an attorney, but the
courts as a rule only appoint public defenders for those
charged with capital crimes (murder and treason) ; the lawyers
in these cases serve on a pro bono basis. Thus, those charged
with noncapital crimes are often tried without legal
24-900 O— 90-
24
BOTSWANA
representation if they cannot afford an attorney. Defendants
can confront witnesses and present evidence. While the burden
of proving guilt lies with the prosecution in ordinary
criminal cases, some provisions of the National Security Act
appear to shift the burden of proof to the accused. However,
these provisions have yet to be tested because the Government
has not yet brought charges under the National Security Act.
The customary courts usually handle land, marital, and
property disputes as well as minor crimes. There are clearly
defined appeal procedures and appeal courts in both systems,
with the possibility of appeals to the highest court in
Botswana, the High Court. Customary courts are open only to
members of a tribe. The chief presides over the court, and
there are no attorneys for either side.
There were no political prisoners in Botswana at the end of
1989. Two South African commandos, who were convicted of
treason in October 1988 for their participation in a bloody
commando raid inside Botswana, remained in prison.
(Botswana's law, which is based on Roman-Dutch law, allows
even noncitizens to be charged with treason.) The High Court
turned down the commandos' appeal in July 1989, although it
did set aside the sentence of corporal punishment.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
These rights are safeguarded by law and respected in
practice. A search warrant issued by a magistrate is required
for an official to enter a private residence, except in cases
of suspected diamond theft, drug trafficking, or national
security matters. There were no reported instances where this
exceptional authority was exercised in 1989.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press:
Freedom of speech and press are provided for in the
Constitution and are respected in practice. Opposition
viewpoints and criticism of the Government are freely
expressed, as was evident during the campaigning for the
October parliamentary elections. In two instances the police
videotaped political rallies, but a public outcry forced them
to cease this practice.
Although the Botswana Press Agency (BOPA) is part of the
Department of Information and Broadcasting, it functions with
a great deal of autonomy, and its editorials do not always
reflect the Government's view. However, both the Government
and the independent press follow unwritten rules against
criticizing senior officials directly or discussing the
personal lives or financial affairs of important figures.
Morever, one independent newspaper which printed a story
critical of the Government soon found few advertisers and
attributed this action to government pressure. In addition,
access to government officials is difficult for the
independent press as civil servants reportedly prefer the
"tame" reporters from BOPA.
There is an ongoing debate on the proper coverage of national
security issues, which has, in the past, brought the
independent press under strong government criticism.
Controversy arose in 1988 when the Government barred reporters
25
BOTSWANA
and seized their notes during the court-martial trial of a
Botswana Defense Force (BDF) corporal, claiming "national
security" would be compromised by coverage of the trial. The
press insisted that the Government was using "national
security" to mask politically embarrassing facts.
Books and publications are not censored. Academic freedom is
respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Botswana has a long history of peaceful assembly which is
integral to their traditional village life and is exemplified
in the village meeting, the kgotla. During kgotla meetings,
people freely question leaders and voice opinions on local
politics. Permits are required for public meetings and
demonstrations and are usually granted as long as the police
believe public order will be maintained.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is practiced and encouraged. There is no
state religion in Botswana, although the majority of the
population claim a denomination of Christianity as their
belief. Active groups of Hindus, Muslims, Baha'is, and others
practice their faiths freely. There are no restrictions on
religious groups, their places of worship, the training of
members of clergy, religious publishing, religious education,
conversion, or participation in charitable activity.
Missionaries are allowed to enter the country and proselytize,
and foreign clergy can enter and serve expatriate
congregations. There is no discrimination based on religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens of Botswana are not restricted in their movements
within the country, in their foreign travel, emigration, or
their right to return. Passports are easily obtained.
Refugees documented by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) are readily accepted into Botswana,
although they are required to live in the refugee settlement
at Dukwe. Refugees may be authorized to live elsewhere for
documented reasons. Due to allegations from neighboring
countries that refugees are using Botswana as a launching area
for operations against their home countries, Botswana has
declared that Dukwe refugees found off the settlement without
permission will have abandoned refugee status and will be
repatriated.
Although the Government revoked the refugee status of
Zimbabweans remaining in Botswana in July 1989, the
Government, in cooperation with the UNHCR, has been remarkably
understanding regarding their plight. The Government has
given special consideration to integrating selected persons,
including students and employed workers.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have the right peacefully to change their government
through democratic means, although in practice one party, the
26
BOTSWANA
BDP, has dominated Parliament since independence. The
President and Members of Parliament are elected by universal
suffrage and secret ballot. Thirty-four of the 38 members of
the National Assembly are elected every 5 years; the remaining
4 are appointed by the President. Following the October
elections, the BDP holds 28 of the 34 elective seats in the
National Assembly. At present there are eight political
parties. Two of the parties were established just prior to
the deadline for registering parties for the October
elections. At the end of 1989, three of the parties were
represented in Parliament.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There were no international investigations of human rights in
Botswana in 1989, and the Government continued to permit
international organizations involved in humanitarian affairs
to operate in the country. In general, the Government rarely
comments on human rights violations in other countries though
it frequently denounces South Africa's apartheid.
There are no active human rights organizations in Botswana
which focus specifically on domestic issues, but a
national-level, nongovernmental human rights watch group, the
Botswana Association for Human Rights, was in the process of
organization at the end of 1989. The goals of the Association
are to focus national attention on those laws which need to be
amended, to make recommendations to the national law reform
committee, to heighten public awareness about human rights,
and to pressure the Government to ratify more of the existing
international instruments on human rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Tswana majority comprises an estimated 95 percent of the
population. Although ethnic differences are not entirely
absent, no ethnic or other group suffers from serious
discrimination. Groups that live in remote areas, including
the Kgalagadi and the San (formerly called bushmen) , are
becoming increasingly integrated into social service programs,
but still lag behind the rest of the population in terms of
educational and economic development and continue to be poorly
represented in the political arena.
Women make up 53.9 percent of the population, and almost 50
percent of female Batswana are heads of households.
Political, social, and economic opportunities for women are
limited by a series of laws, and women have no legal recourse
to challenge sex discrimination cases.
Women married under either common law or customary (tribal)
law are subject to practices in which wives assume a legal
status equivalent to the husband's child. Essentially, this
means that a woman cannot make a legally binding agreement
without her husband's consent or assistance. A woman can
enter a binding transaction as a public trader, but she can
become a trader only with the consent of her husband. Under
customary law the husband is permitted to have other wives
after consulting with the first wife and the families.
Deference to the husband's wishes also carries over into the
health field where a women is required to obtain her husband's
permission for the use of contraceptives or for such operations
27
BOTSWANA
as a hysterectomy.
Many observers believe that domestic violence is common in
Botswana and is increasing. Under customary marital
practices, men have traditionally held the right to physically
"chastise" their wives, although this attitude is gradually
changing. Because marital problems are considered to be a
problem to be dealt with between the husband and the wife, the
police are reluctant to intervene. Frequently problems are
settled through the extended families, and as a result, few
cases of domestic violence ever come before the courts. The
incidence of rape is also increasing in Botswana. The maximum
penalty is life imprisonment with mandatory corporal
punishment; the average sentence is 4 years with corporal
punishment. A form of female circumcision exists in Botswana,
but is rarely performed and only by traditional doctors.
The Government has been slow to introduce reforms to improve
the status of women. The governing party only established a
women's wing in 1987 to focus on women's issues. There has
been, since 1981, in the Ministry of Home Affairs, a women's
affairs unit, which iias published a woman's guide to the law
and information on the citizenship law and undertaken research
on maternity leave problems, teenage pregnancy, and various
laws affecting women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers are free to establish or join labor unions.
Government workers who are pensionable may not join unions,
although they may have associations that function as
quasi-unions . Unions are well developed in the mineral sector
and also among railway workers and bank employees, but other
sectors are less well organized by trade unions. There is one
major confederation of unions, the Botswana Federation of
Trade Unions (BFTU) .
Trade unions in Botswana are independent of government control
or party affiliation, and they actively seek to represent the
interests of their members. However, union leadership is
severely restricted by a government regulation that requires
all elected union officials to work full time in the industry
their union represents. This practice has been criticized by
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU),
which has also noted that "the dissolution of trade union
organizations by government is possible under the law at all
times. "
Botswana also severely restricts the unions' right to strike.
Legal strikes are theoretically possible, but only after an
exhaustive arbitration process, so that there has never been a
legal strike in Botswana's history. However, illegal wildcat
strikes were common in 1989, including major job stoppages by
teachers and bank employees. Once a strike has been declared
illegal by the Government, management has the right to dismiss
employees, and strikers can be jailed. The Government has yet
to employ such extreme measures against strikers, although the
Government did withhold prestrike pay from striking teachers.
Unions may freely join international organizations and labor
representatives regularly attend international conferences.
BFTU is affiliated with the ICFTU. In addition, the Botswana
Mine Workers Union belongs to a regional mine workers' union
28
BOTSWANA
federation. However, unions have chafed under government
regulations which prohibit unions from receiving financial
contributions from outside Botswana.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Although employers are required under the Trade Union Act to
bargain with any trade union that has organized at least 25
percent of the work force, the actual frequency of collective
bargaining varies depending upon the organizing strength of
the union in a particular industry. Collective bargaining is
common in sectors such as mining and railways where the trade
unions are relatively strong, but virtually nonexistent in
other sectors. Collective bargaining is also limited by the
Government's incomes policy, which sets public sector salaries
as a benchmark for private sector wage settlements.
Although there are laws in Botswana which prohibit employers
from dismissing workers for union activities, there is some
dispute as to how well they are enforced. Other reasons are
always given for such dismissals, so it is difficult for the
dismissed employee to prove that union activities were the
real reason. Dismissals can be appealed to labor officers or
the civil courts, but labor officers rarely do much more than
order 2 months' severance pay, and most workers cannot afford
civil litigation. There are no export processing zones in
Botswana. Labor laws are applied uniformly throughout the
country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is not practiced in Botswana and is
specifically forbidden in the Constitution.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Botswana law prohibits the employment of children under 12
years of age by anyone except members of the child's immediate
family. No juvenile under the age of 15 may be employed in
any industry, and only those over 16 may be employed in night
work. No person 16 or younger is permitted to work in
hazardous jobs, including mining. Botswana law also protects
young people from recruiters for jobs outside the country.
There are reports that some scattered violations of these
standards do occur, especially in small-scale enterprises, in
large part because the Department of Labor in the Ministry of
Labor is insufficiently staffed to enforce full compliance.
Although education is not yet compulsory, it is almost
universally available, and most children attend school at
least through the primary grades. The Government has
indicated it hopes to make 9 years of education compulsory by
1992.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Botswana requires a minimum wage of approximately $80 per
month. The minimum wage is generally enforced. This amount
is barely adequate for one person to maintain a decent
standard of living, and, in most cases, workers must
supplement this amount through other means, such as
subsistence farming. Most Botswana families have more than one
wage earner.
Botswana law mandates a maximum 48-hour workweek, with
provisions for overtime pay (time and a half) for work over 48
29
BOTSWANA
hours. Most major employers adhere to the workweek laws, but
some smaller firms refuse to pay overtime, and no action is
taken against them.
The Government sets job health and safety standards, and these
regulations appear to be generally observed, although the
Department of Labor lacks personnel to ensure enforcement
30
BURKINA FASO
Burkina Faso is ruled by a military regime headed by Captain
Blaise Compaore, who took power from Thomas Sankara on October
15, 1987 in the country's fourth military coup since 1980.
The new military regime continued the ban on political parties
and activities and gave no indication that the country will
return to constitutional rule. Instead, President Compaore
moved to firm up a narrow political base by forming a "popular
front" of various leftwing and centrist groups, military
officers, and miscellaneous civilians to assist in running the
Government. He has also formed a network of Revolutionary
Committees (CR's), loosely organized at national, regional,
and local levels, to mobilize the population and promote
revolutionary goals.
The Burkina Faso armed forces number about 7,500 members,
including 5,200 in the army, 100 in the air force, and 2,200
in the paramilitary gendarmerie and the police. All police
and internal security forces are controlled by the Ministry of
Defense.
Burkina Faso, one of the world's poorer countries, is
overwhelmingly tied to subsistence agriculture, with 90
percent of the population living in rural areas. Agriculture
is, however, highly vulnerable to fluctuations in rainfall.
Frequent drought, lack of communications and other
infrastructure, a low literacy rate, and a stagnant economy
are all longstanding problems. The country has a per capita
income of about $180 per year.
Human rights continued to be circumscribed in 1989. Problem
areas were extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions,
mistreatment of detainees, and restrictions on press, speech,
assembly, and the right of citizens to change their government
through peaceful means. The Government did allow the
establishment of a local human rights organization (which
intervened in some specific cases), permitted some political
groupings to form and distribute pamphlets discreetly, and
released all political opponents held in prison.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Four members of the armed forces were summarily executed
without trial in September 1989 after allegedly plotting a
coup d'etat. The four were Minister of Defense Major
Jean-Baptiste Lengani, Minister of Economic Promotion Captain
Henri Zongo, the officer in charge of the communications unit,
Captain Sabyamba Koundaba, and an unidentified bodyguard of
the Minister of Defense. After the coup attempt of Christmas
1989, the Government made a point of denying rumors that 7
people had been executed and said all arrestees would receive
trials .
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearance.
31
BURKINA FASO
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and mistreatment of detainees have been persistent
problems for a number of years. Amnesty International
published a special report in 1988, "Burkina Faso, Political
Imprisonment and the Use of Torture from 1983 to 1988," giving
accounts of the imprisonment of political opponents and
torture under the present and preceding governments. Police
brutality continued in 1989, although there were fewer
credible reports, usually involving severe beatings, often at
the time of apprehension. A Catholic Church-sponsored
organization has alleged that the police and gendarmerie beat
and tortured at least 15 people arrested for political reasons
in 1989. The Government denied that anyone has been tortured.
Prison conditions are poor, with most prisons holding double
their design capacity, and are characterized by the lack of
sufficient food, minimum hygiene, and medical support.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There were continuing reports in 1989 of arbitrary arrest.
The law permits preventive detention without charge for a
maximum of 72 hours, renewable for a single 72-hour period in
criminal cases. In practice, there are frequent violations of
this restriction in cases involving both Burkinabe and foreign
nationals, especially in political cases. Several
schoolchildren, for example, were held in detention without
charge for a number of months in 1988. In addition, in cases
of emergency or national security, the military code, which
provides for indefinite detention, overrides the civil code.
Access to lawyers is not normally permitted in security cases,
although it is provided for by law.
The Government detained several persons for political reasons
during 1989, but by the end of the year all had been released,
many within a few days of their arrest. Immediately following
the discovery of the alleged coup plot on September 18, three
or four government officials were arrested and held briefly
for questioning. These persons were later released, but four
others were summarily executed without trial. The Government
also released a number of persons detained since the overthrow
of the Sankara government in 1987, including former Interior
Minister Ernest Nongria Ouedraogo. In this connection, 23
junior military personnel, detained at various times since
Sankara "s overthrow on s-uspicion of coup-plotting, were
released August 4, 1989. An unknown number of people were
arrested as a result of a coup attempt over Christmas 1989.
Numbers rumored range from 5 to 30 prisoners, including
military personnel. They were still being held at year's end,
and the Government had provided no names or other information,
despite requests.
Some intellectuals, ex-military officers, and former
government officials remain in self-imposed exile abroad,
partly due to fear for their safety should they return.
Captain Boukary Kabore, leader of resistance at Koudougou
airforce base against Compoare's coup in 1987, is now exiled
in Ghana. He charged in 1989 that the popular front
Government is attempting to liquidate all remaining Sankara
loyalists. The Government has encouraged opponents of the
Sankara regime to return home, but few have done so. Kabore
stated in an interview in November that if he had the chance
to seize power in Burkina, he would do so.
32
BURKINA FASO
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The regular judiciary, patterned after the French system, has
continued to function for most criminal and civil cases.
Defendants traditionally receive a fair trial and are
represented by counsel. In 1987 the Government began the
practice of appointing civil service attorneys to represent
those who do not wish to retain, or are unable to afford, a
private attorney.
The people's revolutionary courts begun under Sankara
continued to hear cases primarily involving public
corruption. The president of each people's court is a
magistrate appointed by the Government to head a tribunal
composed of magistrates, military personnel, and members of
the CR's. The court president asks questions directly of the
defendant .
In December 1988, seven soldiers were convicted by a military
court in Bobo Dioulasso. The trial was held in secret, and
the seven were executed the day after conviction without an
opportunity to appeal. In the 1989 case of the four persons
summarily executed, there was no known trial.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Government authorities generally do not interfere in the daily
lives of ordinary citizens, and there is no general monitoring
of private correspondence or telephones. Under the law, homes
may be searched only under authority of a warrant issued by
the attorney general. An exception exists, however, in
national security cases, where a special law permits
surveillance, searches, and monitoring of telephones and
correspondence without a warrant. This law is used against
persons suspected of opposition to the Government.
The Government encourages participation in the CR's and also
in organizations being formed to support the Popular Front.
However, it was still not clear in 1989 if lack of
participation will result in dismissals from civil service
positions, as was the case in previous regimes.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
While there is no formal government censorship, the Government
employs intimidating methods to limit freedom of speech and
press. For example, repeated references by the regime to
enemies of the State at home and abroad inhibit both
government-employed journalists and ordinary citizens from
expressing critical views. Similarly, it uses occasional
dismissals from government service and arbitrary arrest to
quash debate on political topics. In 1989 several persons
were arrested and held briefly for distributing political
leaflets .
Under the control of the Minister of Information, the media,
which consists of a daily newspaper, a weekly magazine, a
monthly magazine, and radio and television stations, are all
government owned, and all journalists are civil servants. The
media do not engage in serious criticism of the Government and
33
BURKINA FASO
reflects government positions on both international and
national issues. Journalists who try to report stories
without political bias may be replaced for failing to support
sufficiently the political views of the Government. In 1989 a
private newspaper, L 'Observateur , attempted to publish its
first edition since it was burned down in 1984. The
Government quickly cut off the electricity and stationed
police at the doors, ostensibly because the newspaper did not
have the proper permits. It subsequently made it clear that
no permit will be granted. A small, private all-music radio
station authorized to broadcast in the last days of the
Sankara administration remains closed as well, after being
shut down in the first days of the Compaore Government.
A new information code has been pending for more than a year.
A number of proposed provisions involve insuring government
control of any means of communication, publicly or privately
owned, and government licensing of journalists. It would also
institute prison terms or fines for violation of the code.
Foreign newspapers and magazines entered the country freely
during 1989. For the most part, foreign journalists traveled
freely and filed stories without censorship and enjoyed access
to government officials. Films are subject to censorship by a
review board which includes religious authorities as well as
government officials. There were no known instances of
political censorship of movies. There is no interference with
international radio broadcasts.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Under both the Sankara and Compaore Governments, political
parties as such have been banned, and administrative
permission is generally required for assemblies of any kind.
However, in 1989 the Government permitted several small
political groupings to meet more or less openly, with the more
centrist groups invited to join the Government's popular
front. Nonpolitical associations for business, religious,
cultural, and other purposes exist and experience no
difficulty in obtaining permission to meet or in associating
with international bodies in their fields.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Burkina Faso is a secular state, and there is no official
discrimination on religious grounds. Islam and Christianity
exist side by side, with about 40 percent of the population
Muslim and about 15 percent Christian. The remainder of the
population practices traditional African religions. Muslim
and Christian holidays are recognized as national holidays.
Social mobility and access to modern sector jobs are neither
linked to, nor restricted by, religious affiliations.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Travelers within Burkina Faso are routinely stopped at police
and military checkpoints. There appears to be little
restriction on foreign travel for business and tourism. Exit
permits, once used to limit movements of workers to
neighboring countries, particularly to Cote d'lvoire where 2
million or more Burkinabe continue to reside and work, are no
longer required.
I
34
BURKINA FASO
Refugees are accepted freely in Burkina Faso, and attempts are
made to provide for their care in cooperation with the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. There were
approximately 270 refugees and displaced persons in Burkina
Faso at the end of 1989, mainly from Chad.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government
through democratic procedures. The military have dominated
the political process since 1980 through four changes in
leadership. To bolster his popular front. President Compaore
has taken some steps to create an opening to small
conservative and centrist political forces, but he has not
publicly indicated any movement toward a constitution,
national elections, or political parties in the future. He
relies on an amorphous grouping of people, including military
officers, to help run the Government and has a loose network
of Revolutionary Committees throughout the country to mobilize
support .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There were no known international investigations of Burkina in
1989. A new, local human rights organization, the Burkina
Movement for Human Rights and Rights of Peoples (MBDHP) , was
formed, led publicly by the President, Administrative Chamber
of the Superior Court. While the MBDHP has not directly
publicly criticized the Government on specific human rights
issues, after the September executions it publicly reaffirmed
its opposition to the death penalty and the need in Burkina
for fair public trials. Privately, it has brought a number of
specific issues to the attention of the Government, such as
the treatment of prisoners immediately after the September
1989 coup plot. Members were not harassed in 1989.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Minority ethnic groups are as likely to be represented in the
inner circles of the Government as are the dominant Mossi, who
comprise 50 percent of the population. Government decisions
do not favor one ethnic group over another.
In the largely rural African society of Burkina Faso, women
still occupy a subordinate position. Women supply much of the
labor in family farming and are active in the market economy.
The Government is committed to expanding opportunities for
women, including in cabinet and civil service positions.
Women make up one-fourth of the government work force, which
represents one-third of the total salaried work force in the
country. Women make up approximately one-third of the total
student population in the primary, secondary, and advanced
school systems. While there is no known discrimination
against women in the granting of scholarships for advanced
study, schools in rural areas have disproportionately fewer
girls than schools in urban areas.
Violence against women, expecially wife beating, occurs fairly
frequently in the rural areas, less often in the urban areas.
The Government is attempting through the National Women's
35
BURKINA FASO
Association (UFB) to educate people on the subject. Specific
cases can be brought to the UFB which attempts to offer
protection and counsel. Such cases are sometimes brought
before a "popular conciliation tribunal" for mediation. The
Government also sponsors campaigns against female genital
mutilation, which still occurs in many rural areas, although
it is becoming less common in urban centers. Another form of
multilation is by scarring the face of both boys and girls of
certain ethnic groups, which is rapidly disappearing. The UFB
also takes the leadership in these campaigns.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have traditionally had the legal right to associate.
There are a number of autonomous unions and five labor
federations. Organized labor continues to be an important
force in Burkina Faso. All unions jealously guard their
limited independence from the Government. However, despite
legal rights, the unions have been prevented from engaging in
activities the Government opposes. Under the previous regime,
many labor leaders were arrested and held for long periods.
Some were reportedly tortured. One former trade union
official was detained briefly in September 1989, allegedly in
connection with a nonunion dispute.
Organized labor has the legal right to strike, but the Sankara
government eliminated this right in practice. The Compaore
Government has not faced major labor unrest, and its attitude
has yet to be tested. There were several minor strikes in
1989. The International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee
of Experts noted with satisfaction in 1989 that all the
teachers dismissed following a strike in 1989 had been
reinstated, that sanctions against officials had been lifted,
and that all political prisoners and admistrative detainees
had been freed.
The largest federation, the National Organization of Free
Trade Unions, is affiliated with the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Another federation is
affiliated with the World Confederation of Labor, and a third
is affiliated with the Communist-controlled World Federation
of Trade Unions. The other two federations are unaffiliated.
The five federations take turns representing labor at the ILO
meetings and participate in African regional labor meetings as
we 1 1 .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions have the right to bargain for wages and other benefits
within a specific bargaining unit, such as a company or
factory, but cannot bargain industry-wide. They represent the
interests of their members in the private and public sectors,
as well as before the labor inspection service of the
Government and before the courts.
There are no export processing zones in Burkina Faso.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is not employed and is prohibited by law.
36
BURKINA FASO
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The labor code sets the minimum age for employment at 14, the
average age for completion of basic secondary school.
However, the Government lacks the means to enforce this
provision adequately, even in the small-wage sector. Most
children actually begin work at an earlier age owing to the
large number of small, family subsistence farms and the
traditional apprenticeship system.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
A minimum monthly wage of about $75 and a maximum workweek of
48 hours are stipulated by the labor code, as are safety and
health provisions. This minumum wage is not adequate for a
worker to support a family, and wage workers usually must rely
on supplementing income through the extended family and
subsistence agriculture. A system of government inspections
and labor courts ensures that these provisions are applied in
the small industrial and commercial sectors, but they have
been impossible to enforce in the dominant subsistence
agriculture sector which involves 90 percent of the population.
37
BURUNDI
The Republic of Burundi is a one-party, military-controlled
state led by President Pierre Buyoya, an army major who came
to power in a bloodless coup in September 1987. The executive
power is held by a 30-member Military Committee for National
Salvation. The 22-member Cabinet appointed by the Military
Committee is composed of 20 civilians and 2 military
officers. While the Military Committee is the ultimate
decisionmaking body, the Cabinet formulates and proposes
policies and manages the day-to-day business of government.
The National Party for Unity and Progress (UPRONA) is the only
political entity in Burundi. As President of the Republic and
head of the Military Committee, Buyoya plays a dominant policy
role. With the Constitution suspended officially. President
Buyoya exercises legislative and regulatory powers as well.
After assuming power in 1987, Buyoya embarked upon a slow but
steady campaign to promote ethnic justice. The dominance of
the minority Tutsi over the majority Hutu ethnic group remains
the overriding social and political issue in Burundi. It was
an underlying cause of a serious outbreak of interethnic
violence in northern Burundi in August 1988, in which at least
5,000 people lost their lives after Hutu peasants began
killing local Tutsis, followed by a bloody military
intervention to restore order. In the wake of the violence,
the Government accelerated its policies of ethnic
conciliation. This helped lead to the rapid repatriation of
the approximately 50,000 refugees who had fled to neighboring
Rwanda and the thousands of others who had sought refuge
elsewhere in Burundi .
The Burundian armed forces, dominated by the Tutsi, are small
in number but well equipped and well trained to maintain law
and order. In addition, there is a regular police force
responsible for public order and a separate force of security
police responsible primarily for internal state security,
including the monitoring of dissent. The State Security
Police have the same powers of arrest as the regular police
and are subject to the same process of judicial review.
Burundi is a poor country with one of the highest population
densities in Africa. The AIDS epidemic has made serious
inroads among its 5 million people, and it is expected to
adversely affect economic activity in coming years. Most
Burundians (90 percent) earn their livelihood as subsistence
farmers working small, privately owned plots. The small
monetary economy is based on coffee, which accounts for nearly
90 percent of foreign exchange earnings, and other cash
crops. Burundi is one of the highest per capita recipients of
foreign assistance in Africa.
While human rights continued to be restricted in several key
areas in 1989, President Buyoya accelerated efforts to achieve
ethnic reconciliation in the wake of the August 1988
violence. By the early months of 1989, the repatriation and
resettlement of nearly all of the 50,000 refugees under the
auspices of the Quadrilateral Commission of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) , Burundi, Rwanda, and
Zaire had been completed efficiently and without serious
incident. Throughout 1989 the Government and party undertook
an extensive public education campaign based on dialog between
Hutus and Tutsis. In May the National Unity Commission, a
high-level assembly of representatives of both ethnic
communities charged by President Buyoya with recommending
long-term solutions to the ethnic problem, released its
38
BURUNDI
report. The Commission called for sweeping changes, including
the reestablishment of democratic institutions, the
elimination of discriminatory employment practices,
educational reform, and the creation of a national body to
oversee the operations of the security services. By year's
end, considerable progress had been made in the areas of
education and employment, but progress was slow in integrating
Hutus into the military forces. Major human rights concerns
in 1989 included mistreatment of prisoners (one detainee died
of beatings while in custody in 1989) and restrictions on
freedom of press, assembly, and the right of citizens to
change their government by democratic means.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no confirmed instances of politically motivated or
government-instigated killings in 1989. From the evidence
that emerged in late 1988 and early 1989, including
house-to-house censuses in the affected communes coordinated
by international organizations, most outside observers are now
in agreement that the August 1988 ethnic violence resulted in
between 5,000 and 10,000 deaths. The Government acknowledged
that innocent civilians were among the victims of the Army
intervention, but it denied vengeance killings took place.
There is no public information that the Government has taken
any action to punish soldiers who may have exceeded their
orders in using force against innocent civilians.
b. Disappearance
There were occasional reports by exile opposition groups of
disappearances in Burundi during 1989, but international
relief and human rights organizations have not been able to
confirm any such cases. It is likely that several cases of
disappearance connected with the ethnic violence in August
1988 will never be resolved, given the uncertainty over the
number of deaths and the large population flows that occurred
in the affected areas in the following months.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is forbidden by law, but cruel treatment of suspects
or detainees has occasionally occurred in the form of beatings
at the time of arrest or interrogation. A September 1989
incident in which a detainee in Bujumbura died following a
beating was documented in the government-owned newspaper,
which reported that the officer in question was being
prosecuted .
Since coming to power, the Buyoya regime has allowed regular
inspection of prison conditions by the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC). ICRC access to individuals detained
following the ethnic violence in 1988 was restricted for
nearly 3 months, and access to a dozen detainees suspected of
participating in a coup plot was restricted briefly in early
1989. In both instances, full access was restored. Prison
conditions remain severe due to lack of adequate hygiene,
medical care, and food; but the Government has begun a program
of improving conditions.
39
BURUNDI
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Police officers are empowered to detain suspects without an
arrest warrant but must submit a written report to the public
prosecutor's office within 24 hours. The public prosecutor
examines the report and can either order the release of the
detainee or issue an arrest warrant valid for 5 days. The
public prosecutor then must state the charges before a
magistrate in the presence of the detainee. The magistrate
either releases the detainee or issues orders confirming the
detention, initially for 15 days and subsequently for 30-day
periods as necessary to prepare the case for trial. Bail is
set only in cases of embezzlement or similar crimes involving
financial wrongdoing. In general, the prescribed procedures
for arrest and imprisonment are followed. However, time
limits for issuance of arrest warrants and appearance before a
magistrate are often exceeded, usually due to a shortage of
magistrates and prosecutors. The Government has begun to
address this problem by increasing the number of magistrates.
There were no known political detainees at the end of 1989.
Approximately 40 persons arrested in the wake of the August
1988 violence remained in custody at the end of 1989 pending
completion of investigations. A dozen individuals, including
two military officers and several prominent businessman, were
detained in March in connection with an alleged coup and have
not yet been brought to trial. Six signatories (among 27) of
an open letter to the President criticizing the Army's role in
the ethnic violence were released in January 1989 and allowed
to return to their former jobs. Two other signatories were
detained briefly in 1988. Of the others, several fled the
country, while those who remained of this group were not
detained. The signatory students were readmitted to the
university.
In June between 10 and 20 local members of the Jehovah's
Witnesses were detained for acts of civil disobedience, such
as refusing to salute the flag. According to reliable
sources, all those detained were released by early fall.
The Government does not exile its nationals as a means of
political control. Since his ouster, Ex-President Bagaza and
his wife have been denied permission to return to Burundi, but
the Buyoya Government has said it is willing to negotiate the
conditions of their return. Citizens of other countries
suspected of criminal activity or lacking proper residency
documents are often expelled. This occurred in April when the
entire Libyan community, including resident diplomats, was
expelled in the wake of an alleged coup plot.
with regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary's independence is limited by the requirement
that it adhere to the guidance and reconwnendations of the
party, the Government, and the President. Judges are
appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the President. In
general, there is a high degree of autonomy in the court's
daily administration of justice. The President has the power
to pardon or reduce sentences. In cases of major political
interest, the Government has occasionally interfered with the
judiciary.
40
BURUNDI
Burundi has separate court systems to deal with military,
civil/criminal, and state security cases. In early 1989, a
new court, the Cour des Comptes (Court of Accounts), was
established to investigate and prosecute cases of official
corruption. While little is known about this Court's
proceedings, it became important in 1989 in prosecuting
high-level officials. Military tribunals have jurisdiction
only over military personnel. The State Security Court has
jurisdiction over both civilian and military personnel, and
its proceedings need not be made public. To date, this Court
has been used only once, in prosecuting ex-President Micombero
in the mid-1970's. Burundi law provides the right to counsel,
and indigents are provided defense counsel by the State.
Pretrial proceedings may involve lengthy investigations. The
courts are hampered by a lack of trained legal personnel and
by heavy case loads.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The inviolability of the home and of private correspondence
were provided for in the suspended Constitution and are still
respected in practice. A judicial warrant is required for a
law enforcement official to enter and search a private
residence. The State Security Office monitors political
dissent through the State Security Police and by employing
informers who report on discontent and dissent as well as on
criminal activity. Membership in the sole legal party is not
required by law. There is no coercive population control.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
While there are significant restrictions on speech and press
freedoms, since the beginning of the Buyoya regime there has
been an unprecedented outpouring of public debate and
questioning on formerly taboo subjects, such as ethnic
relations and official corruption. The debate on ethnic
relations intensified following the 1988 ethnic violence, and
throughout 1989 party meetings were held in every province to
discuss the ethnic issue. Political debate is largely
confined to UPRONA party meetings, the forum for dialog
officially encouraged by the Government. The Government's
tolerance for public criticism outside party forums is
limited. Possession of opposition political tracts is a
punishable offense, e.g., the arrest, after the August 1988
ethnic killings, of a number of Hutu intellectuals and
students, signatories of an open letter critical of the army's
role, (see Section l.d.).
The Government controls all domestic print and broadcast
media. The French-language daily and Kirundi-language weekly
newspapers are published by the Ministry of Information, which
also operates the domestic radio and television stations. The
media are traditionally required to support the fundamental
policies of the party and the Government. Some criticism of
the Government is permitted in the printed press, but
journalists are state employees and subject to disciplinary
action if their criticism goes beyond what is considered
tolerable. The Government has interfered on occasion with the
distribution of foreign news publications but has never
interfered with radio reception from foreign sources. Public
censorship occurs only in the case of sexually explicit
foreign film material or publications
41
BURUNDI
Academic freedom is limited. Primary and secondary school
teachers are expected to support government policies. At the
university, professors come from many different countries,
both East and West, and are generally permitted to lecture
freely in their subject areas, conduct research, and draw
independent conclusions. However, two university professors
were among the six signatories of the August 1988 open letter
to President Buyoya who were detained for several months.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
In the aftermath of the August 1988 ethnic violence, a ban on
public assemblies of more than five persons and a nationwide
curfew were in effect for 2 1/2 months. No such measures were
instituted in the spring of 1989 following the discovery of
two coup plots. However, no political meetings or
associations other than those tied to the ruling party are
permitted. The Government permits nonpolitical private
associations, but requires that they be registered and
accorded legal recognition before they may function.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Since coming to power. President Buyoya has made sweeping
changes in Burundi's policies toward organized religion,
reversing the repression of religious expression under the
Bagaza regime. President Buyoya freed all religious
prisoners, reopened the closed churches, returned confiscated
church properties, including houses and schools, authorized
weekday religious services, reinstituted the activities of
catechists, and authorized church schools (including
seminaries and literacy/catechism classes), publications, and
radio broadcasts. Most of the missionaries who were expelled
under President Bagaza are being allowed to return, and there
are no restrictions on new missionaries.
Organized religion, in particular the Catholic Church, plays a
key role in the development of the country and the lives of
both rural and urban Burundians.
Religious expression continues to be regulated by civil laws
and regulations. Religious organizations are subject to the
same rules and restrictions which apply to secular
organizations. All religious associations must receive
approval from the Government to operate in Burundi, and a
Burundian citizen must be appointed as legal representative of
each association. Religious groups may not engage in
political activity critical of the Government. During the
Bagaza regime, two religions were banned: the Seventh-Day
Adventists and the Jehovah's Witnesses. The Buyoya Government
has since legally recognized the Adventist Church and returned
all of its confiscated properties. It has, however, continued
the ban on the Jehovah's Witnesses, allegedly because of their
refusal to recognize the authority of the State (see Section
l.d.). There are no barriers to the maintenance of links with
coreligionists in other countries. Participation in religious
groups does not exclude individuals from membership in the
UPRONA party or from receiving social benefits.
42
BURUNPI
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government has not instituted restrictions on internal
travel since the aftermath of the August 1988 ethnic violence
in the north, when nationwide restrictions were enforced for a
period of 2 1/2 months.
Some 60,000 Burundian citizens fled to Rwanda following the
1988 ethnic violence in northern Burundi. Under the terms of
an agreement negotiated in November 1988 by the Governments of
Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) , the Government of Burundi
agreed inter alia to grant a general amnesty to those who had
fled. All but a few hundred of the refugees had returned
voluntarily to their homes by early 1989, and on May 31
voluntary repatriation ended. As with past returning
refugees, this group of repatriated Burundians was accorded
full rights as citizens.
The UNHCR reported that during the period September through
November 1989, approximately 300 new refugees crossed from
Burundi to the Muhero camp in Rwanda. This new outflow
reflects residual fears in the areas affected by the events of
August 1988. It was also probably prompted in part by police
movements following a large-scale prison escape in the region
in September.
Burundi claims to host some 260,000 refugees, most of whom are
Rwandan Tutsis who have resided in Burundi since the 1960 's.
The Government works closely with the UNHCR in refugee matters
and does not force resettlement. However, it has periodically
repatriated Zairians and Rwandans who lack residence permits
or who have been arrested on suspicion of criminal activities.
The Government continues to discourage migration to urban
areas through an active public education campaign. Foreign
travel and emigration are relatively free, though travelers
must explain the reason for their trip and must surrender
their passports to the Immigration Office on their return to
Burundi. Prospective Burundian travelers must have exit visas
as well as passports.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
No mechanism exists in Burundi that allows citizens to change
their government through democratic procedures. Since
independence, there have been three changes of government, all
by military coups. When he took office. President Buyoya
promised a new constitution and a return to civilian rule
within 2 years, but progress towards these goals has been
slow. When it released its report in May, the
government-appointed National Unity Commission called for
increased democratization as a means of promoting ethnic
conciliation, including the reinstatement of the constitution
and the national legislature.
Political participation takes place only within the one-party
structure, and voters can express dissatisfaction only by
voting against incumbents for party positions. The party is
open to all Burundian citizens supporting its principles, and
both men and women are active members and officeholders. The
UPRONA party, together with its affiliated youth, women's, and
43
BURUNDI
labor movements, claims a membership of approximately 1.4
million persons, over three-quarters of the adult population.
The party regularly holds local and regional meetings, where
party members discuss issues and make recommendations.
Formerly, the slate of candidates for local and national party
offices was selected by government cadres and voted upon by
party membership. Since President Buyoya came to power, any
party member wishing to run for office can have his or her
name on the ballot. Allegations that Hutus were discriminated
against in this process are thought to have contributed to the
unrest prior to the outbreak of ethnic violence in August
1988. Voting is secret in localities where members are
literate, but in some rural areas where members are
illiterate, voting is accomplished by a show of hands.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
After initially rejecting calls for an international
investigation into the August 1988 ethnic violence, the Buyoya
Government stated that it would permit the United Nations
Secretary General to dispatch a U.N. Information Mission to
examine ethnic tensions and the refugee problem. This
mission, organized by local U.N. representatives, took place
in late 1988 and reported positively on relevant
developments. In addition, the Government permitted extensive
visits by outside observers, including the ICRC, journalists,
diplomats, and historians.
An Amnesty International delegation that visited Burundi in
June urged the Government to ensure that all current detainees
be brought to trial promptly and fairly if they face criminal
charges, or else be released.
Burundi is a party to several United Nations' instruments on
human rights. In July 1989 it ratified the Human Rights
Charter of the Organization of African Unity.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Historically, the minority Tutsi have dominated the majority
Hutu people. Civil strife has erupted between the two groups
several times in the modern era, most recently in 1972 and
1988. In both instances, a Hutu uprising that left many Tutsi
dead was followed by military intervention that resulted in
massive killings of Hutus. The violence was followed in both
cases by thousands of Hutu refugees fleeing Burundi, and in
both cases after the violence had subsided the refugees were
encouraged by the Government to return. Unlike in 1988, large
numbers of those who fled in 1972 remained outside the
country. Another important dissimilarity was that the 1988
killings were limited in area and duration, and the Government
moved rapidly to restore ethnic confidence with the support of
the international community. In the aftermath of the 1988
violence. President Buyoya stepped up the pace of reform,
appointing a Hutu Prime Minister, an ethnically balanced
Cabinet, and a National Unity Commission to recommend
fundamental reforms.
De facto discrimination by Tutsis against Hutus, however,
remains in many areas of society, although it is not condoned
by law. There are few Hutus in the Army, and the majority of
44
civil service jobs, as well as university places, are held by
Tutsis. As a result of President Buyoya ' s ethnic reform
efforts, Hutus made substantial inroads into the civil service
in 1989, and the number of Hutus entering secondary school
exceeded the number of Tutsis for the first time in recent
years. However, the pace of integration in the military
remained slow. Tutsis dominate the modern economic sector,
while in rural areas economic opportunities are roughly
equivalent for both ethnic groups.
Women hold a secondary position in society, although their
status is changing slowly from traditional patterns. The
suspended Constitution, respected in practice, provides for
legal equality. The current legal code prohibits polygamy and
a dowry requirement, allows women some control over family
matters, and provides for land inheritance by women. Women in
Burundi are able to obtain divorces, but there is strong
social pressure against divorce.
Traditional practices continue to prevail in many of these and
other areas of social conduct, however. In the preponderant
rural sector, women perform the bulk of field labor, while
cattle raising and wage labor are generally reserved for men.
Although fewer women than men obtain a formal education, once
a degree is obtained women can generally find suitable
employment. The Government has not discriminated against
women in hiring, and the civil service pay scale makes no
distinction between men and women. Women are not
significantly represented in business, the professions, and at
higher levels of government, although the situation has
improved in recent years.
Violence against women, especially wife beating, is known to
take place, but as there are not studies available, the extent
ot the violence is difficult to quantify. Police do not
normally intervene in domestic disputes. Severe cases are
dealt with by the legal system. The Government officially
discourages violence against women but addresses the problem
largely through the Burundi Women's Union which provides
counseling and, when deemed necessary, referral to legal
authorities .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Burundian workers do not have the right of association as
defined by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The
UPRONA party controls the National Trade Union Confederation
(UTB) and has institutionalized this single trade union
structure by means of legislation. No other unions are
allowed by law. The present head of the UTB was named by
President Buyoya, but all other officeholders were elected by
the UTB membership. The principal role of the UTB, to which
virtually the entire salaried work force belongs, is to serve
as an intermediary between workers and employers in labor
matters. The UTB formulates its programs and policies in
concert with the Ministry of Labor. Unauthorized advocacy of
a strike or lockout is a criminal offense. Although they are
technically permissible, there have been no strikes in recent
years. The UTB is a member of the Organization of African
Trade Union Unity.
45
BURUNDI
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers do not have the right to organize outside the UTB.
Within the UTB, they have the right to bargain individually
and collectively in labor disputes. In practice, the UTB has
often forced employers to revise their practices. This has
usually come after implementation of one or more steps of the
official three-step process of dispute resolution: direct
employer-employee discussions under the auspices of the UTB;
an administrative hearing before a government labor inspector;
and a legal proceeding before the labor court in which the UTB
represents the employee. There is almost universal membership
in UTB among salaried employees, and antiunion discrimination
is not a problem in practice. There are no export processing
zones in Burundi, and labor laws are applied uniformly
throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
While forced or compulsory labor is not permitted under
Burundi law, the ILO Committee of Experts has noted that
provisions of ordinances concerning the conservation and
utilization of soils and the creation and maintenance of
minimum areas of food crops are in violation of ILO Convention
No. 29. It has urged the Government to bring the texts into
conformity with the Convention and into line with what the
Government asserts is actual practice. The Committee also
noted that the various legislative provisions which call for
imprisonment and an obligation to work as punishment for
expressions of political views contrary to those of the party
are not in compliance with ILO Convention 105. The Government
has indicated that it intends to examine the possibility of
revising the prison legislation, but it has not yet taken any
action.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
In the modern, urban section of the economy, children under
the age of 12 may not be employed in any capacity, nor may
children under the age of 16 be engaged in dangerous or
strenuous work. However, as a practical matter in this poor,
largely rural country, many children are obliged by custom and
circumstance to help their families in subsistence agriculture.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Over 90 percent of the population of Burundi is engaged in
subsistence agriculture. Worker rights are prescribed by the
Burundi Labor Code and by the UTB, but these rights have
relevance primarily for workers in the small, wage sector of
the economy. The established minimum wage is the equivalent
of approximately $1.03 per day in Bujumbura, and $0.90 per day
in rural areas; this wage level is inadequate to provide a
decent living for urban families, who frequently supplement
their income through family gardening or small commerce.
Wages are higher for workers in the few private sector
businesses and in skilled jobs. Working hours vary between 40
and 45 hours per week. Saturday afternoons, Sundays, and
holidays are times of rest. In the modern economic sector,
minimum health and safety standards are monitored by the
Ministry of Labor. The enforcement of these standards is
limited.
46
Political power in Cameroon is concentrated in the Presidency
and a single party, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement
(CPDM) . President Paul Biya is Head of State and head of the
CPDM. The President makes all major decisions and appoints
all government and party officials, although key
parliamentarians have some behind-the-scenes influence. The
National Assembly generally approves measures proposed by the
Government. Although the Assembly has the right to propose
legislation, it does so rarely. Cameroon's political system
is influenced by its ethnic and linguistic diversity, which
includes 230 languages and 3 separate European colonial
traditions (German, French, and British). French and English
are official languages. A careful balancing act among the
various groups within the Government and party is required to
maintain political cohesion, and this acts as a check on
government power.
Internal security responsibilities are shared by the National
Police (Surete Nationale), the National Intelligence Service
(CENER) , the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Military
Intelligence, and, to a lesser extent, the Presidential
Security Service. The Ministry of Territorial Administration
is in charge of prisons, and the National Police has the
dominant role in enforcing internal security laws.
Cameroon's per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of about
$970 in 1987 placed it among the middle-income developing
countries. However, the declining prices of Cameroon's key
commodities, including coffee, cocoa, and petroleum, and the
rigors of structural adjustment are likely to reduce 1989 per
capita gross domestic product to an estimated $850.
Cameroon's diversified agricultural base, food
self-sufficiency, and government policies aimed at promoting
private-sector growth help mitigate the effects of declining
terms of trade and other external difficulties.
Human rights remained restricted in Cameroon in 1989.
Positive developments included the release of dissident author
Albert Mukong and more openness in addressing human rights
issues. In March a senior official responded publicly to
Amnesty International's (AI) concerns about political
prisoners, admitting that some persons remained in detention
despite the expiration of their sentences. President Biya has
officially advocated greater democratization, and modest steps
have been taken to expand popular political participation.
Major human rights concerns in 1989 included the abuse of
detainees, use of arbitrary arrest and detention powers, harsh
prison conditions, and restrictions on freedoms of speech,
press, assembly, women's rights, worker rights, and the right
of citizens to change their government through democratic
means .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of such killings in 1989.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance.
47
CAMEROON
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although the penal code proscribes torture, renders
inadmissible in court evidence obtained thereby, and prohibits
public servants from using force against any person, there
were credible reports of severe beatings of suspects while in
custody in 1989. On one occasion, witnesses observed security
officers publicly punching and beating a man. Inside prisons,
poor conditions are common. Prisoners suffer from serious
malnutrition unless provided food by friends or family.
Brutal treatment of inmates may have led to violent uprisings
in at least two Cameroonian prisons in 1989. Persons under
"administrative detention" (e.g., political detainees) are
kept in special camps or prisons to which access by families
and friends is severely restricted.
AI • s 1989 Report stresses the harsh conditions in Nkondengui
Prison in Yaounde and New Bell Prison in Douala.
Overcrowding, the lack of medical care, and malnutrition may
have contributed to a high death rate in both prisons in 1988,
according to AI .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under Cameroonian law, a person arrested on suspicion of
having committed a nonpolitical offense may be held in custody
up to 24 hours before being charged. The period of custody
may be renewed up to three times with the express agreement of
the Attorney-General. However, after an investigating
magistrate has determined the case should be brought to trial
and has issued a warrant to that effect, there is no
limitation on how long the detainee may be held in "preventive
detention" pending trial.
Accused persons awaiting trial constitute the majority of
persons in the prisons at Yaounde and Douala. Release on bail
is permitted by law only in the Anglophone provinces, whose
legal system retains features of British common law. Even
there, bail is granted infrequently. There have been cases of
local or provincial authorities ordering the continued
detention of persons even after a court ordered their
release. CENER and Military Security do not implement fully
the penal code requirement that detainees be brought before a
magistrate for investigation of possible offenses. They have
held detainees incommunicado.
Persons may also be held in "administrative detention" under
legislation pertaining to subversion. The penal code defines
administrative detention as "the loss of liberty for a
political felony or misdemeanor." Such detention by regional
authorities is initially for 1 month, renewable twice, and may
be extended up to an additional 6 months by the Minister of
Territorial Administration. Those arrested and placed in
administrative detention do not disappear. Their families are
told where they are, though not always promptly. They are
released eventually, though the detention may be lengthy, in
some cases exceeding the theoretical maximum of 9 months.
State of emergency provisions, invoked following the 1984 coup
attempt, were allowed to lapse in 1989. There is, therefore,
no longer a legal rationale for unlimited administrative
detention. Government of Cameroon authorities state that they
are working to ensure that officials who have had delegated
48
CAMEROON
authority to order such detention are made aware of the
changed circumstances.
Albert Mukong, a well-known critic of the Government who had
been held for nearly a year, was released on May 5 after the
Government dropped charges against him. It is widely believed
that Mukong was arrested for having condemned, during a
British Broadcasting Corporation broadcast, frequent
constitutional changes and attributing Cameroon's economic
difficulties to embezzlement of state funds by senior public
officials. The legal justification for his detention remains
unclear but was apparently an old ordinance which proscribes
conduct "likely to bring to contempt or ridicule any public
authority or (which) incites hatred against the government."
Frederic Batoum and Samuel Zeze remained in prison without
charge at the end of 1989, apparently for supporting the
banned opposition party, the Union of Cameroonian People
(UPC). They had first been arrested in 1985, released in
1986, and then detained again shortly afterwards. Abdoulaye
Mazou, a former senior official of the Ministry of Education,
was sentenced to 5 years for having assisted his brother to
escape after the 1984 coup attempt. Although his sentence has
expired, he remains in prison and is reportedly ill.
An estimated 40 political detainees, including Moussa Mahmonde
and Mohamadou Djidji, who were not released in 1986 at the end
of their sentence, reportedly remained in detention at the end
of 1989. Most of these were apprehended around the time of
the 1984 coup attempt.
Cameroon does not engage in the practice of forced exile.
Early in his first term. President Biya publicly encouraged
all those living abroad for political reasons to return to
Cameroon without fear of reprisal.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Trial by a presiding magistrate is provided for in law, and
this practice is followed except in the case of persons held
under administrative detention or state of emergency
regulations. Public trials are also guaranteed by law,
although exceptions are allowed for the public good or for
national security reasons. Trials which involve prominent
persons or which are controversial have sometimes been held in
private.
Magistrates in Cameroon are career civil servants responsible
to the Minister of Justice and are required to have law
degrees. Their decisions are not usually subject to
government interference, and they generally are considered to
conduct fair trials. The Minister of Justice has publicly
cautioned magistrates against awarding "excessive" damages
against the State, and there have been reported cases of the
Government refusing to pay damages where a court has found
against it. Defendants in felony cases are provided attorneys
if they cannot afford to engage their own.
Crimes involving subversion or illegal use of weapons, as well
as crimes involving the military, are tried by military
tribunals. Each tribunal has three members, and its presiding
officer must be a magistrate. In some cases, the magistrate
is a civilian, in others a military officer. As in felony
49
CAMEROON
cases tried in the regular court system, defendants are
entitled to counsel.
In a March 1989 press conference, Cameroon's Ambassador to
France answered publicly a question from AI about political
prisoners held in Cameroon. According to AI, he indicated
that most of them are military officers implicated in the 1984
coup attempt. Some of them were never brought to trial, and
others have been held past the end of their sentences. Those
trials were conducted in secret by military tribunals and did
not conform to internationally recognized standards of
fairness. Lawyers were given little time to prepare a
defense, and defendants had no right of appeal. The
Ambassador admitted that coup-plotters were still held under
administrative internment and asserted that their continued
detention was necessary in view of the danger they pose to
public safety. This is the first time in years that a
government official has publicly addressed the issue of
political prisoners/detainees held without trial in Cameroon.
Traditional courts continue to play an important role in
Cameroon, particularly in rural areas. Their authority varies
by region and by ethnic group, but they are often the arbiters
of property and domestic disputes and may serve a probate
function as well. Most systems permit appeal of first-
instance decisions to traditional authorities of higher rank.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Both invasions of the home and tampering with correspondence
are violations of Cameroonian law. There have been frequent
reports of police harassing citizens and entering homes
without warrants during periodic searches for criminals.
Police officials also sometimes enter homes and demand to see
receipts for household property as a customs law enforcement
measure. Surveillance of suspected dissidents and the
monitoring of their mail and telephone conversations are
common practices.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution of 1972 provides for freedom of expression
and of the press, but Cameroonian law and practice restrict
these freedoms. While there is no evidence anyone is punished
for privately criticizing the Government, there are definite
limits to public speech.
The Government's official position is that it "supervises" but
does not "control" the press. However, officials working with
the media have referred to television, radio, and the press as
instruments of national policy to be used by the State in
furtherance of its aims. The Government publishes two
official newspapers, the English and French editions of the
Cameroon Tribune, and controls radio (the most important
medium) and television. Most official journalists are civil
servants who may be transferred to less desirable positions if
they do not practice self-censorship.
Media criticism of the Government invites detention. There
have been several cases of print or broadcast journalists
being detained after pursuing stories critical of the
Government in recent years. Early in 1989, for example, two
50
CAMEROON
journalists from the independent press were detained after
publishing a story recounting the reasons for a local town
council's vote of no-confidence in its Mayor. AI noted in its
1989 Report that there seems to be a pattern in the official
use of detention powers as a means of intimidating
journalists. Despite this, the number and frequency of
private publications rebounded somewhat in late 1989. No
written ground rules for publication exist. The independent
press enjoys greater latitude in covering issues than the
government-owned press, but all publications are still subject
to official censorship.
Although many periodicals carrying articles critical of
Cameroon's Government circulated in 1989, toward the end of
the year the Government seized one edition of a foreign
newsmagazine.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly and association are provided for in the
Constitution but are restricted in law and practice. The
penal code prohibits public meetings, demonstrations, or
processions without prior government approval. While there
have been no reports that such permits have been denied, large
public meetings in which the Government plays no role are
virtually unknown. On short notice, authorities canceled this
year's traditional May Day parade because they were concerned
that the unemployed might demonstrate. Organizations must
register with the Government; any form of opposition political
organization is effectively prohibited.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Cameroon is a secular state. There is no established
religion. Roughly 20 percent of Cameroonians are Muslims, 30
percent are Christians, and the rest follow traditional
beliefs. Officials of the Government and the CPDM include
members of all three groups. Freedom of religion is provided
for in the Constitution, but for a religious group to exist
and to function legally, it must be approved and registered
with the Ministry of Territorial Administration. There have
been cases in the past of a small group's application being
rejected on the grounds that it was too nearly identical to an
existing group. The Jehovah's Witnesses were banned in 1970
and have been periodic targets of harassment since that time.
The Government does not discourage the practice of traditional
religions. Acts of witchcraft, divination, or magic "liable
to disrupt public order or tranquility, or to harm persons or
property" are outlawed, with potential penalties of up to 10
years' imprisonment.
Missionaries played a major role in the development of
Cameroon and continue to be active. Foreign clergy suffer no
ill-treatment. There are no particular restrictions on places
of worship, training of clergy, conversion, religious
education, or religious participation in charitable
activities. The literacy and Bible translation organization,
SIL, operates freely and plans to expand. Independent
Christian and Muslim publications exist in Cameroon, and there
is no evidence they are more heavily censored than is the
secular press.
51
CAMEROON
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement within the country is not restricted by
law. Police continue to stop travelers to check
identification documents, vehicle registrations, and tax
receipts as a security and immigration control measure, though
use of the practice declined sharply in 1989.
Exit visas are required to leave the country and are sometimes
obtained only after long delays. The Government has been
known to refuse issuance of a passport or to confiscate a
passport in order to control someone it considers a real or
potential threat. Married women must obtain written consent
from their husbands before the Government will issue an exit
visa. There are no restrictions on voluntary repatriation,
and there is no forced resettlement.
Over the years, Cameroon has served as a safe haven for
thousands of dispaced persons and refugees. Approximately
35,000 refugees remain in Cameroon, the majority of them
Chadian. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) recognizes about 4,100, most of them Chadian or
Namibian. With the Chadian conflict largely over, many
Chadians have returned. As of September 30, 1989, there were
3,622 Chadian refugees at the Poli-Faro camp, down from 6,346
at the beginning of the year. Many of the Chadians living
outside Poli-Faro have integrated into the Cameroonian economy
and do not receive government or international assistance.
Though Cameroon occasionally returns illegal Chadian
immigrants, there were no confirmed reports of forced
repatriation of recognized Chadian refugees in 1989. Cameroon
is also host to 67 Namibian students and 400 other refugees of
various nationalities.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Because Cameroon continues to be a one-party state with
political power and administrative responsibility concentrated
in the Presidency, citizens do not have the right to change
the Government through the electoral process. The President
appoints all cabinet ministers, governors, and prefects.
President Biya succeeded constitutionally to the office of
President upon the resignation of former President Ahidjo, and
was elected unopposed in 1984 and 1988.
While the Constitution does not explicitly exclude the
existence of other political parties, in fact only the CPDM is
permitted to operate. Membership in the CPDM is open to all
religious and ethnic groups and is strongly encouraged. No
one attempted to gain legal recognition for a second political
party in 1989. The UPC was rebuffed in 1985 when it sought
such legal recognition. Opposition groups, including the UPC
and the Cameroon Democratic Party, periodically send letters
or pamphlets into the country (usually seized by customs
officials) or are heard on foreign radio broadcasts. A number
of former UPC members are now active in the CPDM.
Some within the CPDM have begun to advocate greater pluralism,
but it is unclear whether they wish to make room for other
parties or are merely seeking opportunities for broader debate
or greater influence within the CPDM.
All members of the 180-seat National Assembly must be members
52
CAMEROON
Of the CPDM. National Assembly elections with multiple
candidacies were held for the first time in 1988, but the CPDM
limited the number of candidates per constituency to two. The
next elections are due in 1993. Voting is by universal
suffrage and secret ballot. The 1988 elections took place
with few irregularities and no allegations of fraud.
Debate in the National Assembly usually remains within fairly
narrow parameters. The National Assembly has not formally
rejected a major government initiative in recent years.
However, the behind-the-scenes power of key National Assembly
representatives limits the Government's freedom of action.
Some government proposals are shelved before reaching the
stage where they are subject to formal rejection.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government does not usually respond publicly or privately
to inquiries from any human rights organization. However, in
1989 a government official responded publicly to AI ' s charge
that Cameroon holds political prisoners (see Section I.e.).
The Constitution affirms support for the freedoms guaranteed
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United
Nations Charter. Under President Biya, the Government has
devoted increased attention to human rights in such
international forums as the United Nations and the Non-Aligned
Movement. Also, Cameroon has submitted reports on the status
of human rights in the country to two United Nations
committees .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Access to the Government's social programs is open to all
Cameroonian citizens on a nondiscriminatory basis. President
Biya has repeatedly stressed publicly the dangers of
tribalism, but there remains deep-seated suspicion among
ethnic groups. Cameroon is officially bilingual, but
Anglophones are a distinct minority (20 percent) and often
charge that the majority Francophones discriminate against
them by denying them economic opportunity and a share of real
political power commensurate with their numbers. The
Bamileke, the country's largest single ethnic group (between
15 and 20 percent of the population), level similar charges
against the rest of the body politic.
Women are granted equal rights under the Constitution, and
some are politically active in the party and the sole labor
federation. The women's wing of the CPDM has developed
programs to encourage the economic and social productivity of
Cameroonian women. Women are increasingly well represented in
the modern wage sector. They make up less than 1 percent of
the army and do not serve in the navy or air force. They may
join the police and the gendarmerie but make up a very small
percentage of these forces.
Significant cultural pressure is brought to bear on women to
remain subservient to men. In late 1989, for example, a
columnist for a government-owned newspaper admonished a reader
to remember "your husband is the direct authority the lord has
placed on you." Also, the Government requires a husband's
consent before his wife may obtain an exit visa (see Section
2.d.), a policy the Government asserts is intended solely to
53
CAMEROON
preserve and strengthen the stability of family life.
Polygamy is permitted by law and tradition, but polyandry is
not .
Hospital reports of admissions of battered women indicate
declining violence against women, at least in urban areas. A
government-owned newspaper in late 1989 featured a readers'
debate on the pros and cons of wife beating, stating in its
introduction that it took no position in the debate. There
are no reliable statistics on the extent to which violence
occurs. In crimes of passion, men are sometimes treated
lightly by the courts. Violence directed against women in
other than a domestic context is not a major problem. Female
circumcision is not common in Cameroon. It is practiced by a
limited number of traditional Muslim families and is almost
unheard of in other groups.
One of the goals of the sixth 5-year plan for economic,
social, and cultural development is to improve educational
opportunities for women. The percentage of female secondary
school students increased 45 percent between 1970 and 1986.
Girls made up 45.7 percent of primary school pupils in 1986,
but their percentage drops to 38.3 percent at the secondary
level. Women are also disadvantaged in access to higher
education (14 percent of students) and professional
opportunities. Regional differences in access to education
also exist.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The labor code recognizes the right of workers to establish
trade unions without prior authorization and to join trade
unions of their choosing. In practice, there is but one
umbrella organization in the country, the Organization of
United Cameroonian Workers (OCWU) , which operates parallel to
the CPDM, and trade unions in the country are subordinate to
the OCWU. The top union leadership is nominated by the
Government. The OCWU permitted multiple candidates to run in
worker delegate elections in late 1987 and early 1988, but it
retains the right to approve candidacies, thus assuring
political orthodoxy. The OCWU does not play a major role in
Cameroonian politics, although it has a membership of
approximately 450,000 in a working population of more than 3
million. It pursues worker grievances and seeks improvements
in government programs for worker safety and training.
Strikes are illegal, and political activity by trade unions,
excepting action designed to protect economic and other
interests, is prohibited. The OCWU is a member of the
Organization of African Trade Union Unity. The OCWU maintains
contact with foreign trade union organizations, including the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations, but such contact requires government
authorization.
The International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee of
Experts (COE) observed in 1989 that various legislative
provisions, which regulate the right of public servants to
organize, restrict their right to strike, and ban foreign
workers from trade union office, are inconsistent with ILO
Convention 87 on Freedom of Association. It has expressed the
hope that the Government will amend the legislation in the
near future.
54
CAMEROON
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The labor code recognizes the right of trade unions or trade
union federations to engage in collective bargaining with
employers or groups of employers. In practice, true
collective bargaining between employers and workers is rare,
owing to the small size of the modern industrial sector, the
small number of large employers, and the involvement of the
Government in the process. Under the law, all employers of
more than 10 workers must permit the election of a worker
representative from among the employees. This individual has
a statutory right to discuss labor conditions with the
employer on behalf of the employees and enjoys special
protection from arbitrary dismissal. Candidates for these
positions must be approved by the OCV«/U.
There are no export processing zones in Cameroon, but one is
in the planning stage.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
While forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law, the COE
has noted that provisions of the labor code, the law
establishing the National Civic Service for participation in
development, legislation respecting prisons, and the Merchant
Shipping Code are in violation of the ILO conventions on
forced labor. The Government has stated repeatedly that
amendments to bring these laws into compliance with ILO
conventions are being processed or are under study. There
have been reports of levies of communal labor being employed
in some traditional societies.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The labor code sets the minimum working age at 14, a rule
which appears to be respected in the modern wage sector.
Labor inspectors are empowered to enforce provisions of
Cameroon's labor code, as are labor courts. In rural areas
where farming occupies 80 percent of Cameroon's citizens,
children participate at early ages in agricultural work
alongside adults. Street vendors in urban areas are
occasionally under age 14, more frequently during school
vacations than at other times.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Under the labor code, the minimum annual paid vacation is 18
days, and the legal workweek is 40 hours for nonagr icultural
employees and up to 48 hours per week for agricultural
workers. In order to make room for younger workers, civil
servants are encouraged to retire upon reaching the minimum
retirement age of 55. Minimum monthly wages are set by the
Government for all public and private sector jobs. Minimum
wage rates, which range from $62 to $103 per month, are based
on geographic zones, types of industry, and worker seniority
and qualifications. The lowest wages are insufficient to
support a family, but usually are supplemented by a second job
or another family member's earnings. Workers with
middle-range wages also are likely to need second incomes to
support a family, especially in Yaounde and Douala.
Occupational safety and health is mandated by law, based on
ILO standards. In theory, these standards are enforced by
Ministry of Labor inspectors and labor courts, but they lack
the means for effective enforcement.
55
CAPE VERDE
Cape Verde is ruled by the African Party for the Independence
of Cape Verde (PAICV), the sole legal political party, under
the leadership of President Aristides Pereira. Most
government ministers are also senior members of the party, and
many of them were leaders of the revolutionary movement to
free Cape Verde from Portuguese rule. The Constitution
adopted in 1980 declares the party "the supreme expression of
the interests of the popular masses." Members of the Popular
National Assembly, which is formally the supreme organ of the
State, are elected from a slate of candidates proposed to the
electorate by the party. The Assembly selects the President,
who, as Head of State, proposes the Prime Minister to the
Assembly. The Assembly is subordinate to the executive; it
has never reversed government/party decisions, although
deputies increasingly debate issues openly, and critical views
are often reported in the media.
Security responsibilities, formerly divided between the
military, the security, and police forces, were consolidated
under a single government department in February 1986. The
reorganized Ministry of Defense and Security operates under
guidelines and leadership approved by the party. A largely
voluntary party paramilitary unit, the "Popular Militias,"
supports the security forces and has been accused of making
arbitrary arrests.
Cape Verde has few natural resources, and for years Cape
Verdeans have emigrated to improve their economic condition--
over 500,000 live abroad. A 20-year drought has also hindered
Cape Verde's development efforts for its population of
400,000. However, heavy summer rains in 1987 and 1988 may
have signaled the end of the drought and promised improvements
in the agricultural sector. The Government is the largest
nonagricultural employer. It controls banking, the import of
most basic commodities, airlines, the press, and schools. It
depends importantly on generous foreign assistance and
remittances from Cape Verdean emigrants.
The Constitution bans opposing political parties, and in
practice the Government uses its authority, e.g., detention
powers, to limit opposing views. Freedom of speech, press,
and assembly and association are not technically limited by
law but have been in practice. Discrimination and violence
against women are common. There were no known political
prisoners held at the end of 1989.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reported instances of politically motivated
deaths, but one jnan died while in official custody (see
Section i.e. ) .
b. Disappearance
There were no reported instances of officially inspired
disappearances .
24-900 O— 90 a
56
CAPE VERDE
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Periodic police brutality occurs In August on Maio Island, a
man died in police custody, allegedly of a severe beating;
although local medical authorities determined that the cause
of death was strangulation, a government-appointed special
commission found that the deceased, a former mental patient,
killed himself. There was no evidence of torture or other
cruel and unusual punishment of prisoners and detainees in
1989.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Cape Verdean law requires that an accused person, unless
caught in the act of committing a crime, be brought before a
judge to be charged within 48 hours of arrest. In exceptional
cases, with the concurrence of a court official, the formal
charge process may be delayed, but it still must take place
within 5 days of arrest. For crimes against state security,
however, persons may be detained for up to 5 months without
trial upon a judge's ruling. This loophole is occasionally
abused, and cases of arbitrary arrest by members of the
"Popular Militia," a voluntary paramilitary party
organization, occur periodically. There is a functioning
system of bail, and everyone is entitled to representation by
an attorney in civil or criminal cases. Those unable to
afford legal counsel are represented by lawyers named by the
state-run Lawyers' Association.
There were no known instances of forced exile for political or
other reasons. With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see
Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system is composed of a Supreme Court, whose
members are appointed by the Government, regional courts, and
local popular courts. Trials are conducted by one judge
without a jury. The autonomous Institute for Judicial
Support, to which most private lawyers belong, provides
counsel for indigent defendants. Trials appear to be handled
expeditiously, and evidence suggests that the courts protect
individual rights in criminal cases. Verdicts can be appealed.
Appeals to the Supreme Court are common. For example, in June
the Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision in favor of
Teofilo Santos Silva, allegedly fired from the Bank of Cape
Verde for statements vilifying bank leadership. The bank was
ordered to restore Santos to his former position or to
compensate him for damages.
The popular tribunals adjudicate minor disputes on a local
level in rural areas. The "judges," who are appointees of the
Ministry of Justice, are usually prominent local citizens
without legal training. Their decisions can be appealed
within the regular court system.
Political/security cases of a nonmilitary nature are tried
before the criminal courts. There have been no cases tried in
recent years, and there were no known political prisoners at
the end of 1989.
57
CAPE VERDE
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
. Correspondence
The Constitution recognizes citizens' rights to the
inviolability of domicile, correspondence, and other means of
communication. The law requires warrants issued by a judge
before searches of homes may be conducted. In practice, these
rights are observed.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution proclaims freedom of speech and intellectual
creativity, including the rights of authorship, but it also
stipulates that none of these rights and freedoms may be
exercised "contrary to national unity." While freedom of the
press is not specifically guaranteed by the Constitution, a
law adopted in December 1985 assures citizens the right to
express their thoughts in the press, but at the same time the
party underlined that this right should be exercised
responsibly. People rarely criticize the Government
publicly. Debate in Parliament is lively, but within the
accepted one-party system.
The newspaper Voz di Povo, radio, and television are
government owned. Occasional articles critical of some
aspects of government policy are printed or broadcast, but
this is probably done with prior authorization from the
Government. Local radio broadcasts carry items from Western
news agencies as well as from Communist countries, generally
balancing coverage and identifying sources on controversial
international issues. In 1989 the PAICV Third Congress
granted limited autonomy to the National Press, a publishing
house formerly controlled entirely by the party leadership.
A Catholic monthly newspaper, which has carried criticism of
some aspects of life in Cape Verde, is tolerated without
interference as long as its articles are not viewed as a
threat to the Government. On occasion, the editor and
contributors have been called before popular tribunals to
explain their articles. There is also a monthly newspaper,
Noticias, published in Mindelo which, since its inception in
1988, has followed an independent editorial policy.
Foreign periodicals generally circulate freely in Cape Verde
even when they contain articles critical of or unflattering to
the Government, as is sometimes the case with Portuguese
newspapers. International radio broadcasts are received
clearly without interference.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The freedom to meet, to associate freely, and to demonstrate
is provided for in the Constitution, but as a practical matter
no organizations opposed to the Government or its policies are
permitted. Party-sponsored "mass organizations" of women and
youth are prominent. For a discussion of freedom of
association as it applies to labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution requires separation of church and state.
Freedom of worship is respected by the Government, and members
of all faiths practice their religion without harassment. At
58
CAPE VERDE
least two-thirds of the population, probably including most of
the government and party leadership, are nominally Catholic,
but the predotninance of Catholicism does not appear to affect
adversely other faiths. Evangelical Protestants and
Seventh-Day Adventist are the two other principal religious
communities .
At least two faiths, the Baha'i and Christian Science, which
were formally banned or suppressed under the Portuguese, have
been permitted to reestablish themselves and operate freely
since independence. There are no restrictions on religious
practices, teaching, or contacts with coreligionists outside
Cape Verde. The Catholic Church, for example, openly opposes
birth control methods which are advocated and supported by the
Government. A few foreign missionaries are active in Cape
Verde, and more than half the Catholic clergy are non-Cape
Verdeans. Cape Verdean consular law requires, however, that
missionaries applying for residency belong to a denomination
with a recognized membership in Cape Verde. In this context,
two American Mormon missionaries were asked to leave Cape
Verde in September after their visitor's visas expired.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no extraordinary legal or administrative
restrictions on either travel or residence within the
country. All resident Cape Verdeans wishing to leave the
country, either temporarily or permanently, must obtain exit
permission from the Government. Such permission has not been
denied for political reasons. Emigration has long been an
important and recognized alternative for those wishing to
escape the prevailing harsh economic conditions.
The Government goes to considerable effort to maintain close
contact with emigre communities and provides every opportunity
for Cape Verdeans living abroad to maintain their ties with
the homeland, including making provision to vote in
elections. Repatriation is a constitutional right, and the
Government does not discourage intending repatriates.
The law allows for revocation of citizenship on several
grounds, including activities contrary to the interest of the
country. However, there are no known cases of the Government
instituting proceedings to deprive persons of citizenship for
political reasons.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The party's monopoly of power in Cape Verde is specified in
the Constitution. Opposition parties are illegal and do not
exist. Therefore, citizens are unable to change the one-party
political system through a democratic process.
At the national level, government officials are selected by
the party, and senior leaders are selected from among the
small group of men who actually led the struggle for
independence. The Secretary General of the party is President
of the Republic, the Deputy Secretary General is Prime
Minister, and the third-ranking party official is President of
the National Assembly. Five other members of the party's
political commission are also ministers. Not all ministers or
secretaries of state are party members, but all clearly serve
at the pleasure of the party.
59
CAPE VERDE
Current party membership is about 6,000, which is about 4
percent of the total adult population and represents a
doubling in size since independence in 1975. Within this
elitist party, there exists a modest scope for meaningful
political activity. The delegates to the Third Party Congress
in 1989 were elected by secret ballot, and the party announced
plans to allow free elections of certain local officials,
whether candidates are party members or not.
Twice-yearly National Assembly sessions serve to ratify —
never reverse — earlier party/government decisions.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government in the past has permitted visits by private
organizations to investigate conditions of persons convicted
for political or related offenses. There are no known
official or nongovernmental human rights organizations in the
country; none critical of the Government would be permitted.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Racial discrimination is not a serious problem in Cape Verde,
where the vast majority of the population shares various
proportions of Portuguese and African ancestry. Sex
discrimination exists, although it is prohibited by the
Constitution. Many traditional, male-oriented values of the
Portuguese and African ancestors of today's Cape Verdeans are
still part of the country's culture.
The Code of the Family, enacted in October 1981, prescribes
the full equality of men and women in law, including equal pay
for equal work, but in practice women customarily have been
excluded from certain types of employment and are often paid
less than men. Both the Government and the party are making
efforts to bring women into various economic and social
activities where they have been traditionally absent,
including in the labor-intensive economic development
projects. The Organization of Cape Verdean Women was founded
in 1980, with party encouragement, to sensitize Cape Verdeans
to issues affecting women.
Domestic violence against women remains extremely common.
Crimes such as rape and wife beatings are largely ignored by
police and are rarely brought to trial. Even then, penalties
for first offenders are usually suspended, and physical and
psychological retaliation against a woman who wins such a
trial is the norm. Government efforts are occasionally made
to increase women's awareness of their legal rights, such as
in special periodic television or radio programs addressing
these issues, but these programs rarely reach the rural women
most strongly affected by such crimes.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of association is limited. Workers in several
sectors are organized into unions within the Central Sindical
(UNTC-CS) . The trade union central is affiliated with the
PAICV and headed by a high-ranking party member. About
one-third of the active work force are nominal members of the
60
UNTC-CS. Individual unions perform some traditional trade
union functions and act also as party affiliates.
There is no reference to the right to strike in the
Constitution or in any legislation. In the absence of any
legal prohibition against strikes, the NUC believes that the
right to strike exists, but it has never exercised this
theoretical right. Union leadership has taken positions on
specific issues in opposition to government policies in state-
owned enterprises.
The UNTC-CS is affiliated with the Organization of African
Trade Union Unity, in whose councils it has never taken
positions independent of those officially sanctioned by the
Government. It maintains contact with and receives assistance
from both Communist and non-Communist national unions abroad.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions are by law the designated means by which workers are
represented. The right of unions to function without
hindrance is mandated. Howevei;, there is no true collective
bargaining. Wages for government employees are set by the
Ministerial Council. Wages for state enterprises are proposed
by the ministry controlling the state enterprise and approved
by the Ministerial Council. Labor laws require that private
companies pay the prevailing wage, which usually implies the
wage that is paid in the Government and state enterprises.
The UNTC-CS and the unions have influence in the process.
There are no export processing zones in Cape Verde.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is constitutionally prohibited and
is not practiced in Cape Verde.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 14, and children under 16
are prohibited from working at night, more than 7 hours per
day, or in establishments where toxic products are used. All
enterprises submit a yearly report to the Director General of
Labor with information on the salary and ages of each
employee. There is no inspection mechanism.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wage rates are established by the Government for both
civil servants and private enterprises. As of January 1,
1987, the minimum wage for civil servants was approximately
$84 per month. Wages for unskilled workers are considerably
lower, and in rural areas the daily minimum for the least
skilled types of labor is about $1.62 per day. In most
circumstances, a family cannot survive on a single minimum
wage. Multiple incomes, shared housing, and extended families
help bridge the gap for many minimum wage earners.
There does not appear to be an overall safety and health
code. The normal workweek for adults is 44 hours over 5 1/2
days. A worker is entitled to at least 1 free day per week.
These regulations seem to be respected in practice, but there
is no enforcement mechanism.
61
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
The Central African Republic (C.A.R.) is a one-party state in
which General Andre Dieudonne Kolingba has exercised virtually
full political control since his accession to power in a
bloodless coup on September 1, 1981. In 1986 President
Kolingba established the only legal political party, the
Central African Democratic Assembly (RDC), and introduced a
new Constitution, which was subsequently approved in a
national referendum. In that same vote he was elected without
opposition to a 6-year term as President. The new
Constitution established a directly elected parliament
(National Assembly) and an advisory body known as the Economic
and Regional Council. Both have met regularly since 1987.
The Ministry of Defense controls a military police force
(Gendarmerie Nationale), in addition to the armed forces,
which number about 3,800. These forces share internal
security responsibilities with the civilian police force
(Police Nationale) under the Ministry of Interior, which is
responsible for policing major roads and keeping records of
the movement of vehicles. The Presidency has its own security
force, which has collateral responsibility with the border
police for airport security.
The C.A.R. is a poor, landlocked, and sparsely populated
country, most of whose inhabitants derive their livelihood
from subsistence agriculture. The essentially agrarian
economy has suffered in the past from ineffective government
fiscal and developmental policies and adverse global trends.
Since 1982 the Government has tried to implement economic
structural reforms in cooperation with international donors.
However, with continuing unfavorable world economic trends,
progress has remained elusive.
Human rights remained restricted in 1989. The Government did
release several political prisoners, including a journalist,
and moved to put into effect a law authorizing the resumption
of trade union activity. However, the Government took further
action to repress the religious activities of the Jehovah's
Witnesses and two other religious groups. In September, under
unexplained circumstances, the Government brought back from
Benin 12 former dissidents, arrested them on arrival, and held
them without charge throughout the remainder of 1989.
Principal human rights problems continued to be mistreatment
of prisoners and detainees, arbitrary detentions, intrusive
surveillance of political opponents, and restrictions on
freedom of speech and press, association, the right of
citizens to change their government, women's and minority
rights, and worker rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There have been no reports of killings or executions for
political motives by government forces, although at least one
death from mistreatment while in official custody occurred
(see Section I.e.).
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearance.
62
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Penal Code prohibits torture and provides for sanctions
against those found guilty of physical abuse. Nonetheless,
there are reports of police beatings of criminals or suspects.
Family members, legal counsel, doctors, and clergy generally
have access to prisoners, including prominent political
detainees. The latter frequently receive special privileges,
including permission to leave the prison periodically.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under Central African law, political detainees may be held
without charge for as long as 2 months but must then be
formally charged or released. In regular cases, those
arrested must be brought within 96 hours before a magistrate,
who decides whether formal charges will be filed. In
practice, this limit is often exceeded owing to inefficiencies
in judicial procedures. No system of bail exists. When
political detainees are charged, local judicial procedures
(which are modeled on the French system) allow for open-ended
preventive detention while the public prosecutor prepares the
state's case against the accused.
The exact number of political detainees and political
opponents in exile is not available. During high-security
events, the Government controls the activities of about 10
opponents, particularly supporters of former Emperor Bokassa,
by holding them under house or village arrest until the event
is over. Four students arrested in September 1988 for alleged
but unspecified political reasons were released soon
thereafter without any known charges having been brought
against them.
It is the Government's announced policy to encourage
dissidents to return to the C.A.R.; several former opponents
of the regime have returned and been appointed to high
positions in the Government. In late August, a government
opponent. Gen. Francois Bozize, and 11 followers returned from
Benin. It is not clear whether they were forcibly expelled
from Benin, but all were taken into custody upon arrival in
the C.A.R. and were in detention awaiting trial at the end of
1989.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
j' e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary consists of regular and military courts, with
the Supreme Court at the apex. In most cases involving common
criminals, the Government permits legal procedures modeled
after French Law to be fairly and openly applied, although
execution of the law is hampered by inadequate training of
officials and persistent traditional beliefs regarding
witchcraft and sorcery that sometimes take precedence over
strict rules of evidence. The accused have a right to legal
counsel at all stages in the formal procedures and have the
right of appeal.
: In 1988 a High Court of Justice was created to try political
prisoners, replacing the Special Tribunal of civilian
♦ magistrates and military advisers which had adjudicated
political cases from 1981 to 1987. It functions in much the
63
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
same manner as the ordinary courts, except there is no right
of appeal, although the possibility of presidential clemency
exists. No cases have yet come before this Court, although a
president of the court was named in October.
The number of political prisoners is unknown. Political
opponent Ruth Rolland was released from prison in September by
a Presidential Decree of General Clemency. Rolland had been
tried, convicted, and imprisoned for distributing tracts
critical of the Government. She was rearrested on December 16
on unspecified charges.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Government interference with privacy is common only in
political and security cases. The law formally prohibits the
invasion of the home without a warrant, and this prohibition
is not generally abused in civil and criminal cases. If a
political crime is considered to be involved, police are
allowed to search private property without written
authorization. The consensus among Central Africans is that
their Government can and does keep a close watch on any
citizen who opposes or appears to oppose it, but government
surveillance is rare in practice.
To combat increasing local crime, including robbery and
assault, citizens' action groups, called vigilance committees,
were created by the RDC. These committees, consisting of 20
volunteers per neighborhood, patrol the streets and have the
right to stop and hold suspected criminals briefly before
handing them over to the police. A code of conduct guides
committee members, forbidding them, for example, from invading
private property or acting in the capacity of a police
officer. In September the RDC decided to establish vigilance
committees throughout the country.
Civil servants are not required to be party members, but there
are strong social pressures to join, particularly in the case
of those holding higher level positions.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The right of private citizens to speak publicly about
political developments or to criticize the Government is
circumscribed, although most people feel free to comment
privately on political affairs. The National Assembly
Tprovides a limited forum for public discussion of government
policies .
Newspapers, radio, and television are all government owned and
controlled. Domestic news favors upbeat stories and
noncontroversial events. Reporting on international news is
selective and tends to avoid events that may be embarrassing
to friendly foreign governments.
Thomas Kwazo, a journalist serving a 3-year sentence for
filing an "unauthorized" story, was released following the
September Clemency Decree for various prisoners.
64
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Despite constitutional guarantees of the right to assembly,
only assemblies of a nonpolitical nature can take place
without government approval. Groups that register with the
Ministry of Interior can hold meetings. Government forces
quickly disband unlawful assemblies and, in some instances,
arrest the participants.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
A variety of religious groupings are active in the country
(approximately 35 percent traditional African, 50 percent
Christian, 15 percent Muslim). Religious organizations and
missionary groups are generally provided religious freedom by
Central African custom. However, any group whose behavior is
considered political in nature is quickly stifled. In 1986
the Jehovah's Witnesses were banned by the Minister of the
Interior for alleged advocacy of civil disobedience. This
restriction was only partially enforced, and Witnesses
continued to congregate quietly for religious services in
private homes. In April 1989, about 100 participants at such
a meeting in Bangui were rounded up and detained by police
under direct supervision of the Minister of the Interior.
Most were released within 2 days; the others a few days
later. The last four foreign Witnesses remaining in the
country were expelled shortly afterward. Other religious
groups also have been affected. In February the Minister of
the Interior suspended the activities of the Fraternal Union
of Baptist Churches on unspecified grounds. It resumed its
activities in July. In September he suspended indefinitely
the activities of the Union of Evangelical Pentecostal
Churches for "irresponsible conduct." It remained suspended
at the end of 1989.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
People are generally free to move about within the country.
There are police checkpoints along major roads which sometimes
present an obstacle to travelers unwilling or unable to pay
bribes expected by some officials.
The right of voluntary travel and repatriation is recognized.
Financial and educational constraints, rather than government
controls, act to restrict most foreign travel and emigration.
There were no known cases of revocation of citizenship.
A reduction of political tensions in Chad since 1985 prompted
many Chadian refugees in the C.A.R. to return to their
homeland voluntarily. Their number in the C.A.R. declined in
1989 to less than 3,000, from a high of 45,000 in 1984-85.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the ability to change their government
through democratic means. The power and prerogatives of the
President and the sole party are not subject to change from
below. There has been progress in expanding participation in
the political process. The President makes all important
national policy decisions, althouah he allows his raH;--"-
65
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
considerable leeway in day-to-day activities of government
administration. The President is also head of the party, the
RDC. Approval of the RDC is required in order to run for
political office, including the National Assembly.
The Constitution grants the National Assembly, elected by
secret ballot in free elections, the authority to debate and
vote on bills proposed by the executive and to initiate
legislation of its own. Deputies are promised immunity from
prosecution or other government interference for opinions
voiced or votes cast during the exercise of their duties in
the National Assembly. Assembly sessions in 1989 were marked
by occasional frank criticisms of government policy, and for
the first time the Assembly considered budgetary matters.
Virtually all measures proposed by the Government eventually
were adopted by nearly unanimous votes after significant
amendments by the Assembly. In March the Deputies elected a
new Assembly President.
Elections for municipal councilors were held in May 1988. In
the seven largest towns, the Ministry of the Interior chose
one member of the elected municipal council to serve as
mayor. In all other municipalities the mayors were, at least
in theory, elected by the municipal councils; but in several
cases the councils were overruled by the Ministry of the
Interior .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no local organizations to monitor human rights
issues. However, the Government does permit representatives
of Amnesty International and the International Committee of
the Red Cross to visit Bangui periodically. The Government
also permitted an October visit of an International Labor
Organization (ILO) mission to investigate allegations of
worker rights abuses (Section 6.a.). Union representatives
indicated the visit went well. The Government plans to host
in January 1990 a conference on human rights sponsored by the
International Committee on African Human Rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution mandates that all persons are equal before
the law without regard to wealth, race, or religion. In
practice, some minorities tend to receive unequal treatment,
e.g., the forest-dwelling Bamingua, commonly known as pygmies,
are subject to discrimination and exploitation which the
Government has done little to correct.
There are more than 80 ethnic groups in the Central African
Republic, with about 70 percent of the population being
Ngbaka, Baya, or Banda. While President Kolingba has made
statements about the desirability of an ethnic balance in his
Cabinet, preference for high government and military positions
has been given to members of his Yakoma ethnic group
(approximately 10 percent of the population). Each ethnic
group has its own language, but the Sangho language is spoken
throughout the country.
Although the Constitution affirms the equality of all
citizens, women have traditionally been accorded fewer
opportunities than men. Certain jobs remain closed to women,
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
such as service in the gendarmerie. There are no precise data
on the percentage of women in the paid labor force. Many are
involved in traditional labor — gathering food and firewood and
keeping house — while others are in commerce as market
vendors. Educated women working outside the home typically
find clerical jobs, but some are gradually moving into
professional positions.
Polygamy is legally sanctioned, although increasingly fewer
women accept the practice. A prospective husband must
indicate at the time of the marriage contract whether he
intends to take further wives. Divorce is legal in the C.A.R.
and may be initiated by either partner.
Violence against women, including wife beating, occurs, but it
is difficult to gauge the extent of the problem, as it is
seldom officially reported. The Ministry of Justice does not
generally hear many cases from people complaining of spouse
abuse, although the issue does come up during divorce trials
or in civil suits for damages. Most often, women will
tolerate abuse in order to retain a measure of financial
security for themselves and their children.
Female genital mutilation (circumcision) has been forbidden by
law since the 1960's, but it is practiced by some ethnic
groups. Enforcement of the prohibition is rare as it is
basically considered a private, family matter. It is
practiced in rural areas and, to a lesser degree, in the
Muslim quarters of Bangui. Many urban dwellers consider it an
outdated custom.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
A 7-year suspension of most trade union activity ended on May
19, 1988, when a law concerning trade union freedom and the
protection of union rights was adopted. The new law provides
employees and employers the right to establish and join
organizations of their own choosing, to draw up their own
constitution and rules, to elect their own representatives,
and to formulate their program of action. Implementation of
the law was delayed nearly a year while the Government drafted
detailed regulations and guidelines.
On May 1, 1989, the law entered into full force, and the
Minister of Labor gave workers throughout the country official
permission to begin organizing. The Government determined
that all trade union activity should begin from the ground up
with elections organized by profession and place of work.
Only after all major trade unions are in place will workers be
permitted to convene a congress to set up a National
Federation. Once the law had entered into force, teachers,
civil servants, and employees at most of the large factories
and businesses in the capital, Bangui, met in groups organized
by profession and place of work in order to elect
representatives and draft statutes for their union locals. By
the end of November, 50 unions had held elections, 37 of them
had submitted their statutes to the Ministry of the Interior,
and 28 of them had been officially recognized. The other 9
are still in process. The Procurator and the Ministry of
Labor retain the right to review the statutes for compliance
with labor legislation. Encouraged by their official
recognition, local unions have stepped up their activities and
plan to send a committee outside of Bangui to organize unions
67
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
on a regional level. Two seats for labor representatives are
reserved on the Economic and Regional Council.
The new law permits strikes when all efforts at conciliation
have failed. It also allows unions to become affiliated with
international labor organizations; even during the 1981-88 ban
on union activity some labor leaders continued to attend
international labor congresses.
Despite this progress, there are unresolved problems with the
1988 law as written, e.g., restrictive membership requirements
and the uncertain role of federations. In June the ILO
Committee of Experts on Applications of Conventions and
Recommendations took note of recent changes outlined by the
Government's representative, but determined that C.A.R.
compliance with ILO conventions could only be assessed by a
direct contacts mission. A visit by such a mission took place
in October. The mission's report had not been made public by
the end of 1989.
In April the U.S. Government announced the suspension of
certain trade privileges accorded the C.A.R. , based largely on
the C.A.R. Government's failure to respect freedom of
association since 1981.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The 1988 union law, which applies throughout the country,
accords trade unions full legal status, including the right to
own property and to sue in court. Employers are forbidden
from discriminating against workers on the basis of union
membership or union activity, and infractions can result in
the assessment of legal damages. It is too early to tell
whether, or how effectively, these provisions will be
enforced. Mechanisms for collective bargaining spelled out in
the 1961 Labor Code fell into disuse during the ban on union
activity and had not yet been revived in late 1989. The 1988
law does not specifically address whether trade unions may
engage in collective bargaining. There are no export
processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The ILO Committee of Experts has for some years noted
"considerable divergencies" between legislation and practice
in the C.A.R. with respect to Conventions No. 29 and 105 on
forced labor. The Government has maintained that the C.A.R.
laws in question, which all date back to the 1960's, are
obsolete and are no longer observed. In its 1989 report, the
Committee noted that the Government had indicated its
readiness to accept, but has thus far not requested, ILO
assistance in drafting legislation to repeal the offending
laws .
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Employment of children under 14 years of age is forbidden by
law. The relevant legislation is only loosely enforced. Jobs
are in such demand that children in the labor force are
generally limited to helping the family in traditional
subsistence farming or retailing.
68
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wages are established by the Government, and a social
security system exists for private industry. The minimum wage
for a manual laborer, for example, is about $40 per month and
about $140 per month for a stenotypist. These salaries assure
a family the basic necessities but are barely adequate to
maintain a decent standard of living as measured against the
norms of industrialized countries. The Government has not
raised the minimum wage since 1980, partly in response to
pressure from international financial institutions. Much
labor is performed outside the wage and social security
system, especially in the large subsistence agricultural
sector by self-employed farmers. The law sets maximum working
hours for government employees and most people in the private
sector at 40 hours per week. Domestic employees may work up
to 55 hours per week. There are also general laws on health
and safety standards in the workplace, but they are neither
precisely defined nor actively enforced.
69
CHAD.
President Hissein Habre, whose support is based in the armed
forces, heads an authoritarian government which came to power
in 1982 after protracted civil war. Since then. President
Habre has governed through a Council of Ministers and a
National Consultative Council, both appointed by him. On
December 10, in Chad's first election since 1969, a new
Constitution was adopted by referendum, and Hissein Habre was
elected to a 7-year term as President. Legislative elections
for the National Assembly, as mandated by the new
Constitution, are expected to be held during the first part of
1990. The multiethnic National Union for Independence and
Revolution (UNIR) , created in 1984 to broaden Habre 's
political constituency, remains the only officially recognized
political party. Many former opponents continued to be
brought into the civil service and army, including some at the
ministerial level, while several hundreds of their followers
were released from prison. President Habre" s long-time rival,
ex-president Goukouni Oueddei, remained in self-imposed exile
in 1989.
The Government employs a large internal security apparatus.
In addition to the army and police, it includes the National
Security Service (DDS), the Special Rapid Intervention Brigade
(BSIR), the Rural Paramilitary Police (Gendarmerie), and a
Presidential Security Service. Chad has been concerned about
sporadic terrorism, mostly emanating from Libya, and chronic
instability among ethnic groups, notably the Hadjerai and
Zaghawa in 1988 and 1989.
Chad remains desperately poor, and its economy has been
severely dislocated by extended war with Libya and by
declining world prices for its principal export, cotton. Its
estimated 4.5-million population has one of the lowest per
capita annual incomes in the world, $178 in 1988. The
Government relies heavily on foreign donors, particularly
France, to finance government operations and to fund
development projects. The economy improved in 1989 as the
Government adopted a stringent World Bank plan, important
donors increased their aid, and abundant rains insured that
subsistence farmers and herders produced enough to feed
themselves .
Human rights in Chad remained circumscribed in 1989. Major
human rights concerns were: possible extrajudicial killings;
torture and harsh treatment of prisoners; indefinite and
incommunicado detentions; denial of fair trial; restrictions
on freedom of speech and press, assembly and association, and
the right of citizens to change their government
democratically. However, significant steps were taken in 1989
to improve the situation. Between December 1988 and December
1989, the Government released 625 dissidents or former Chadian
rebels from prison. Chad's new Constitution promises basic
political rights and liberties to all Chadians and secret
elections through universal suffrage. In August the Habre
Government further eased tensions with Libya with the signing
of a bilateral Framework Accord committing the two countries
to seek a political solution to their longstanding territorial
dispute, and to release all prisoners of war (POW's). Chad
continued to hold Libyan POW's at year's end, as well as an
unknown number of persons arrested in the wake of a military
revolt in April .
70
CHAD
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no confirmed instances of government-instigated
political or extrajudicial killings in 1989. In April a group
of senior military leaders, all of whom were members of one
branch of the Zaghawa ethnic group, led an armed revolt
against the Habre regime. The Government successfully put
down the revolt and arrested an unknown number of persons,
most of them Zaghawa. Their status at the end of 1989 was
unknown. There is concern that Army Commander Hassan Djamous,
who was implicated in the April 1989 military revolt, may have
been summarily executed.
b. Disappearance
There were no confirmed disappearances in Chad during 1989.
However, the fate of hundreds of Chadian soldiers who fought
under Goukouni and were captured in July 1983 has not been
clarified by the Government. Amnesty International (AI)
estimates the number of these "disappeared" prisoners as
between 500 and 1,000.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no confirmed reports of torture of prisoners during
1989. Due to government secrecy and the practice of holding
most political/security detainees (and many others) in
indefinite, incommunicado detention, it is difficult to obtain
information on torture and many other alleged abuses of
prisoners. For example, the Government has never clarified
the fate of Sa]eh Gaba, a journalist, who, according to many
reports, was tortured with electric shocks and beaten
severely, and who reportedly died in prison in June 1988. AI
requested the Government to conduct an urgent investigation
into the circumstances of Gaba's death, but no response had
been received by the end of 1989.
There were allegations that government troops continued to use
extreme measures and intimidation to maintain order in parts
of Guera prefecture, where a 1987 insurrection among members
of the Hadjerai ethnic group was met with strenuous
repression, including summary executions. There were also
reports in 1989 that the military had used similar measures
against members of the Zaghawa ethnic group following an armed
revolt in April by senior Zaghawa military commanders.
Prison conditions in Chad are harsh, and abuses in handling
prisoners, usually in the form of beatings, are understood to
be common. Conditions are reportedly severe in the special
detention centers maintained by the DDS and other security
organizations. The lack of food and medical treatment is
reported to be especially glaring, and prisoners in past years
are alleged to have died from the combination of malnutrition
and physical abuse.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under Chadian law, the authorities are required to show
probable cause in making arrests and to adhere to established
71
judicial requirements in detaining persons (see Section I.e.)-
In security/political cases (the term is very broadly
interpreted), the Government has a completely free hand.
Those who express views critical of the Government, or hold
views different from it, often are regarded as endangering the
security of the State and may be subject to indefinite
detention without trial. Many detainees are held
incommunicado, and most are never charged or tried.
The total number of political detainees, as distinct from
prisoners of war, is not known. Among detainees believed held
without charge, reportedly because of their political beliefs
or ethnic origins, are: Gamane Gody; Ahmed Lamine; Moussa
Konate; Gamane Moussa; Kef fine Abouzarga; Djibrine Daoud;
Djimet Gondje; Issa Kamsoul; Abderamane Tchere; and Dari
Tchere.
Between December 1988 and December 1989, the Government
released 625 Chadians from prison, including on December 22,
1989, Moukhtar Bachar Moukhtar, formerly Secretary of State,
Ministry of Agriculture. Most were former members of armed
factions opposed to the Government, especially the Chadian
Patriotic Front (FPT) which reconciled with the Government in
1988. Some of those released were considered political
prisoners rather than POW's. All were given the option of
joining (or rejoining) the Chadian armed forces, or of
returning to their former occupations. The Government has
steadfastly refused to allow the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) access to Libyan prisoners captured since
1986. In November, government authorities met with a
high-level delegation of the ICRC, and it was announced that
an agreement in principle had been reached "to permit the ICRC
to take measures leading to visits to the Libyan POW's."
However, by year's end, no such visits had occurred. A number
of Libyan POW's have joined the Libyan National Salvation
Front, which is opposed to Colonel Gadhafi's regime and which
is based in Chad. These Libyans are no longer considered
POW's by the Government.
A number of people, primarily members of a clan of the
Hadjerai ethnic group, were arrested on security grounds in
1987 and remained in detention during 1989 without charge or
prospects of trial. In December 1988, government troops
defeated a band of Libyan-backed rebels, most of whom were
Hadjerai, and more Hadjerai suspected of complicity with the
rebels were arrested and held without charge. According to
AI, more than 180 persons belonging to the Hadjerai ethnic
group were in secret detention at the beginning of 1989.
These included a number of children.
The President has called for persons in exile to return to
Chad; many of them have done so and have been integrated into
the Government and military. Nevertheless, there also have
been reports of detention by government security forces of
former Chadian exiles upon their return to Chad, including
Hadja Merami, and her daughter Azzine. Although Hadja Merami
was subsequently released, her daughter was reportedly still
held without charge at the end of 1989. President Habre's
long-time rival, ex-president Goukouni Oueddei, remained in
self-imposed exile in 1989.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
72
QhhD.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Chadian judicial system (the Supreme Court and several
lower courts) and Criminal Code have evolved from the body of
law (Napoleonic Code) inherited from the former colonial
power, France. This law includes safeguards against arbitrary
arrests and provides for specified detainee rights, including
the right to counsel and the right to be promptly informed of
charges. There is also a traditional system of law presided
over by sultans and chiefs. It is generally effective and
fair in resolving property and other civil disputes and in
dealing with cases involving petty local crime. Decisions in
customary courts may theoretically be appealed to the regular
courts.
Armed conflict over more than 20 years has severely disrupted
the legal system, and political/security cases almost never
come before the courts. The Government has made some effort
to restablish civilian law enforcement in liberated areas. AI
states in its 1989 Report that, since President Habre came to
power in 1982, no political prisoners have been brought to
trial or even had their cases referred to judicial
authorities. AI asserts they have been kept in secret
detention, under harsh conditions, and are released only when
it suits the Government's political purposes.
Whether accused of crimes or security offenses, most Chadians
do not get speedy trials, in part because of the rudimentary
nature of the Chadian judicial system. There are only a few
trained lawyers, judges, and other court personnel. Many of
Chad's tribunals do not even have law books. The few trained
judicial officials complain of a heavy backlog of cases.
Trials can be held in public or private at the option of the
Government. No legal right to a timely trial exists.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Under Chadian law, homes may be searched only during the day
and under authority of a warrant. In practice, there are many
instances where this law has not been respected, especially in
areas where ethnic unrest continues. Correspondence carried
by people traveling overland in Chad is often checked by
authorities at various points, but correspondence sent through
the Chadian postal system is less likely to be subjected to
such controls.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Officially, free speech is assured under Chadian law, but in
practice public or private statements that the authorities
consider seditious have led to arrest. There is no prior
restraint on the publication or broadcast of information in
Chad, but the media (television, radio, and two newssheets)
are government controlled and directed, and there is no
opportunity for opposing views to be heard. The small Chadian
press corps is careful not to criticize the Government or its
policies. Occasionally the Government authorizes controlled
public criticism of individual ministries or agencies of
government and officials. Academic freedom is nominally
respected but is subject to similar restraints.
73
CHAD
The Government's treatment of foreign correspondents, uneven
in the past, improved in 1989. The Government encouraged
visits by foreign journalists, facilitated their interviews
with public officials, and allowed them access to many areas
of the country long off-limits to the foreign press. It did
not impose prior censorship, a change from the past, but
banned an April issue of Jeune Afrigue magazine which
contained an article about the attempted military revolt.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly and association is restricted. Chadians
may assemble peacefully only as long as the purpose of the
meeting is not opposed to government policies. Prefects have
the nominal right to forbid a meeting, but prior permits are
not required unless the gathering anticipated is large enough
to cause a public hazard.
Membership in U^IR is voluntary. Although President Habre is
intent on having a single mass political movement to which all
Chadians will belong, he continued to permit the existence of
a number of small former opposition political groupings.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it pertains to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Chad is officially a secular state in which Islam,
Christianity, and other religions are practiced freely. Both
Islamic and Christian holidays are given official status.
More than 50 percent of Chad's population is Muslim, and Chad
is a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.
Christian missionaries may, nevertheless, enter the country,
proselytize, and provide assistance to local populations.
They are mainly active among the non-Muslim ethnic groups in
the south. Strictly religious publications are allowed to
circulate freely. The Government neither favors nor disfavors
members of particular religions.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Chadians enjoy freedom to move around the country except
within military zones or areas of recent or potential combat.
These restrictions generally pertain only to the northern
one-third of the country and are not enforced for the sparse
population of that large desert region. In the north,
retreating Libyan military left thousands of landmines under
the sand, which have claimed some civilian victims.
International travel is permitted, but regular passports are
expensive (about $60), and travelers must be cleared by Chad's
internal security services, a process which normally takes
less than a week. Chadians are free to emigrate.
In the past, thousands of Chadians fled to neighboring
countries because of drought and civil strife. As conditions
began to improve in 1986, most of these displaced Chadians
returned from neighboring countries, encouraged by the
Government. These returnees, as well as those Chadians who
fled the occupied northern zone, have been well received.
74
CHAD
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Under the Chadian political system in effect through late
1989, citizens did not have the right to change their
Government through elections and referendums. Since June
1982, Chad has been governed by President Habre, who heads a
Council of Ministers complemented by an appointed National
Consultative Council. Both Councils are carefully balanced to
promote ethnic and regional harmony, as is the membership in
the executive organs of the country's only authorized
political movement, the National Union for Independence and
Revolution (UNIR) . The main source of President Habre "s
authority has been the allegiance he commands from the armed
forces and the security services. In some areas, traditional
leaders (e.g., cantonal or village chiefs) are popularly
elected or chosen by the subordinate members of the
traditional hierarchy.
While ethnic unrest continued in some regions of Chad, and
opposition leaders such as ex-President Goukouni remained
abroad. President Habre made further efforts in 1989 to
achieve international and national reconciliation on the
political front. On August 31, Chad and Libya agreed to seek
a political solution to their conflict over the Aozou strip.
This Framework Accord, signed in Algiers, includes a provision
for an exchange of prisoners of war and, potentially, the
withdrawal of Libyan troops from the disputed northern border
area.
In addition. President Habre carried through on the
"Libreville Accords," signed in late 1985 in Gabon by the
Chadian Government and the rallying opposition parties,
calling for the drafting of a new constitution within 4 years
and eventual free elections. A Constitutional Commission
presented a draft document in March 1989, and after scrutiny
by the Government, the party, and the President, the people
approved a new Constitution by referendum on December 10.
President Habre was elected President without opposition at
the same time. The Constitution promises basic human and
political rights, including the rights of women and labor
unions. It also provides for a unicameral legislature
scheduled to be elected in 1990.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Chad cooperates with the ICRC in permitting some prison
visits, but continued to deny the organization access to any
Libyan POW's, although discussions on this issue continued in
1989. It did not respond to AI ' s appeal for an investigation
into Saleh Gaba's case (see Section I.e.). There are no local
human rights organizations that monitor and comment on the
Government's human rights policies.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There are 290 ethnic groups in Chad. They are roughly divided
between Saharan and Arab Muslims in the northern and eastern
regions, and Bantu peoples in the south. The latter group
includes both those who have retained traditional animist
practices and those who have adopted Christianity. Over 20
years of conflict have transformed the cofRplezity of ethnic
75
CHAD
divisions beyond simple north-south formulations. Between
1965 and 1985 as many as 11 factional armies contended at
times for control of the country. In an effort to build a
national government. President Habre has expanded ethnic and
geographic representation by appointing people to top
government and party positions from all parts of the country.
Officially, Chadian women enjoy full political equality and
the full protection of the law. In practice, neither
traditional law nor the inherited French Code fully protects
women's rights. The new Constitution specifically prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex. Women contribute the bulk
of labor in virtually all aspects of farming, even though men
are the heads of many agricultural cooperatives. Women also
engage in commerce ranging from managing simple market stalls
to the ownership of some larger businesses. Women serve
voluntarily in the armed forces, although they are excluded
from officer training programs.
Violence against women, mainly wife beating, reportedly occurs
in Chad on a fairly wide scale, but it is difficult to
quantify. Doctors in Chad estimate that about 7 percent of
admissions to emergency wards are for domestic violence cases
directed against women, about 3 percent against men. While
domestic violence is not sanctioned by the Government, the
police do not normally intervene in domestic disputes because
of strongly ingrained traditional attitudes of male
dominance. Formal legal remedies are ineffective. Customary
courts occasionally intervene, reflecting the mores of the
different ethnic groups they represent. OFUNIR, the women's
wing of the political party UNIR, is strongly and articulately
vocal in opposing domestic violence directed against women.
Early in 1989, OFUNIR organized a well-publicized lecture and
discussion on the issue. Female genital mutilation
(circumcision) has long been common in Chad; it is more
prevalent in the south as part of initiation rites and in
cities among all ethnic groups as a status symbol. The
Government opposes these practices but has not outlawed them
due to the deeply rooted traditional and religious attitudes
of many Chadians.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
About 95 percent of all Chadian workers are involved in
subsistence agriculture, animal husbandry, or fishing. As a
result, the labor movement is small and only marginally
effective. Chad's labor laws permit the formation and
functioning of unions subject to restrictions. The two rival
trade union federations were merged in 1988 into a single
national umbrella organization, the National Union of Chadian
Trade Unions (UNST) , which subsequently became the labor wing
of the ruling UNIR party. All unions are required to be
members of the UNST, which is controlled by the Government.
The UNST has not sought to affiliate with any international
trade union organizations except African organizations such as
the Organization of African Trade Union Unity.
The right to strike exists only if arbitration at three levels
in the Ministries of Labor and Justice fails. This process,
which in effect makes strikes illegal, has been criticized by
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The
International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts
(COE) has observed that various legal provisions of Chadian
76
law, which forbid public employees from exercising the right
to strike, prohibit trade unions from all political activity,
and suspend all strikes, are at variance with Convention 87 on
Freedom of Association, which Chad has ratified. The
Government has given assurances that these provisions will be
repealed, and the ILO is advising the Government on the
preparation of draft language for a new labor code.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Freedom of association and the right to form unions is
guaranteed in Chad's new Constitution, and the right of labor
to organize and bargain collectively is established in Chadian
law. However these rights are weakened by provisions that
allow the authorities to intervene in the collective
bargaining process and require prior government authorization
for collective agreements to come into force. Government
labor tribunals exist to hear worker -employer disputes. Their
decisions may be appealed to the judicial system. Labor laws
are applied uniformly throughout the country. There are no
export processing zones.
The ILO COE has welcomed the Government's stated intention to
amend the labor code to reduce significantly government
interference in the collective bargaining process.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The ILO has been critical of Chad in the past for the use of
forced labor. The Government is continuing discussions with
the ILO on revising its labor laws to meet ILO conventions on
forced labor, which Chad has ratified.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 14 in the wage sector, but
enforcement of this law is limited. There is general
compliance in practice, given the large pool of adults seeking
employment. However, children work on family farms at a much
earlier age.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The statutory minimum wage rate for workers in the formal
economy is approximately $25 per month, which is barely
sufficient for subsistence. The Government, the largest
employer, promised to begin paying civil servants their full
salaries in 1989, but frequent budgetary shortfalls caused
irregular payments. Most workers must supplement their
incomes through subsistence agriculture, second jobs, and/or
reliance on the extended family system.
Most nonagricultural work is limited to 48 hours per week,
with overtime to be paid for any excess. Agricultural work is
supposedly limited to 2,400 hours per year. All workers must
have at least 24 consecutive hours of rest each week, usually
on Sunday. Occupational health and safety standards are
established by law and ministerial decree; but, as with most
social legislation, enforcement is weak.
77
COMOROS
During much of 1989, the Federal Islamic Republic of the
Comoros was a de facto one-party State led by President Ahmed
Abdallah Abderemane, who, backed by the Presidential Guard,
had been continuously in power since 1978. Located in the
Mozambique Channel between East Africa and Madagascar, Comoros
comprises three islands and claims a fourth, Mayotte, which is
still governed by France. In 1989 there were four important
amendments to the 1978 Constitution, including one which would
have permitted President Abdallah to succeed himself in 1990.
On November 27, President Abdallah was assassinated under
mysterious circumstances. Under constitutional provisions,
the head of the Supreme Court became acting President, and
Abdallah's Cabinet of Ministers remained in place. However,
effective power rested with Bob Denard, a French soldier of
fortune, and approximately 25 European mercenaries who were
serving as the officers of the Presidential Guard. Denard and
his group eventually bowed to intense pressure from France and
South Africa and voluntarily departed the Comoros on December
15, leaving command of the Presidential Guard in the hands of
French troops who arrived that same day. At the invitation of
the acting President, a wide spectrum of Comorian political
leaders began roundtable discussions in mid-December to
prepare for new, democratic presidential elections in 1990.
About 25 mercenaries, primarily French, had trained and led
the South African-funded Presidential Guard, which had primary
responsiblity for internal security and which was the source
of a number of human rights abuses. France, which had
provided considerable financial and technical assistance to
the small Comorian armed forces and the gendarmerie, seemed
likely to reorganize the Guard and integrate it into the
regular armed forces in the wake of the mercenaries' departure
Agriculture dominates the economy, but Comoros is running out
of arable land, and soil erosion on the steep volcanic slopes
is an increasing problem. Revenues from the export of
vanilla, essence of ylang ylang, and cloves continue to fall.
Three major families, of which the late President Abdallah's
is one, control most of the import-export business. Comoros
is part of the French franc monetary zone and depends heavily
on France for budgetary support and technical assistance. In
1989 Comoros began to implement a number of economic reforms
sought by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank,
including a 5-percent cut in already low civil service
salaries.
Human rights were sharply restricted during President
Abdallah's rule. Freedom of speech, press, association,
citizens' rights to change their government, women's rights,
and worker rights were all significantly restricted. Several
weeks before he was assassinated, voters in a referendum
approved constitutional changes that removed restrictions on
President Abdallah's ability to succeed himself; there were
numerous reports of fraud and tampering with ballot boxes in
the referendum. During the brief period of rule by the
mercenaries after Abdallah's death, there were almost no
arrests, and virtually all political prisoners were released.
By the end of the year, politicians were actively engaged in
the preparations for presidential elections in 1990.
78
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of such killings in 1989.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance in 1989.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no substantiated reports of torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in 1989.
However, there were unconfirmed reports that in the last days
of the Abdallah regime, after the November 5 referendum on
constitutional changes, there was some torture of suspected
arsonists on the island of Anjouan.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
In 1989 there were no known cases of arbitrary arrest or
detention. In regular criminal cases, a person may not be
detained more than 48 hours without being charged. This is
generally followed in practice. However, under Abdallah" s
regime, there was apparently no such limit in cases involving
national security, which was interpreted broadly by the
Government. For example, four persons, including two former
•ministers, were detained for 2 months in 1988 in connection
with a pamphlet criticizing the Government for its neglect of
the island of Moheli.
From November 27 to December 15, when Denard and the
mercenaries effectively controlled the country, virtually all
those who had been detained after the 1985 and 1987 coup
attempts and in connection with the November 5 referendum,
were released.
with regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for the equality of all citizens
before the law and the right of all accused to defense
counsel. The Comorian legal system applies Islamic law and an
inherited French legal code. Most disputes are settled by
village elders or by a civilian court of first instance. In
regular civil and criminal cases, the judiciary is usually
independent, and trials are public, but in national security
cases during the Abdallah regime regular judicial procedures
were sometimes completely ignored.
One of Denard's last official acts was the release of Said
Moustafa Cheik of the leftist Democratic Front, whom Abdallah
considered to be the only political prisoner in the country.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of home and
property. There were no known cases of arbitrary interference
79
COMOROS
with privacy in 1989. There is no regular, systematic
interference with correspondence, but some members of the
opposition believed that their mail may have been screened by
the Presidential Guard (see also Section 2.a.)'
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Despite constitutional provision for freedom of expression,
thought, and conscience, they were significantly restricted
under President Abdallah's rule. Comorians discuss and
criticize the Government and its leading personalities openly
in some situations. During the parliamentary debates on the
constitutional changes, the Assembly's sole opposition member
spoke freely against the Government, for which he was sharply
criticized by President Abdallah, but otherwise suffered no
harassment. The so-called tribune libre, an informal private
forum for discussion of political, economic, social, and other
issues, has been in existence for several years. Meetings are
by invitation, but all subjects are covered, and the existence
of the group was known and tolerated by the Abdallah
Government. Attendees include figures from both the public
and private sectors.
However, the Abdallah Government restricted public criticism
of its performance. After political tracts critical of the
regime appeared in Mutsamudu, Anjouan, the Government
organized public meetings to criticize the authors. One
member of a leading business family, who wrote an open letter
critical of the President and accused a senior minister of
corruption, was harassed by the Government and fined
exorbitant amounts for petty tax and customs duty
irregularities .
There is a considerable degree of self-censorship by the
government-owned radio station and the semi-independent
bimonthly newspaper. Prior censorship is rare.
Foreign journals and newspapers are available, as are books
from abroad. The Paris-based Indian Ocean Newsletter, which
is often critical of the Comoros, generally arrives unhindered
through the international mail. To show solidarity with
fellow Moslem countries, Salman Rushdie's "Satanic Verses" was
banned in 1989, and in March the Interior Minister personally
led a public burning of foreign publications containing
excerpts from the book. For several weeks after that
incident, foreign publications were carefully screened and
some issues were confiscated. An issue of the local newspaper
was recalled in order to reprint a page containing an article
about the Rushdie affair deemed overly critical of Westerners.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of association. Under
Abdallah, Comorians were circumspect about organizing public
political gatherings, and political groupings opposed to the
Government kept a fairly low profile. The December roundtable
discussions on the presidential elections comprised
representation from a broad cross-section of society,
including the previously banned Democratic Front.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions see Section 6. a.
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c. Freedom of Religion
An overwhelming majority of the population is Muslim. The
Constitution holds Islam to be the "wellspring of the
principles and rules which guide the State and its
institutions." However, the State upholds the right of
non-Muslims to practice their faith. There are churches for
the small Protestant and Catholic populations. Christian
missionaries work in local hospitals and schools, but they are
not allowed to proselytize.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on travel within the country.
Passports and exit visas for foreign travel are generally
granted. One disgruntled former government official was
allowed to emigrate without any problem. A leading member of
the opposition was denied an exit permit but successfully
traveled to France anyway, via Mayotte and Reunion. Some
members of the large Comorian community in France opposed the
Abdallah Government, but in 1989 none of those returning to
the Comoros were subjected to governmental reprisals.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizen:
to Change Their Government
Under Abdallah, the right of citizens to change their
government through peaceful means existed in theory but not in
practice. With his November 27 assassination and the December
15 departure of the mercenaries who had led his Presidential
Guard, a new political era opened in the Comoros. No less
than 14 political groupings were represented in the roundtable
discussions on the presidential elections, which will be held
in 1990 at a date still to be determined. The roundtable
discussions indicate that the Constitution will probably be
modified to permit several political parties and presidential
candidates to contest the elections. Following these, the new
President would likely dissolve the Federal Assembly and
organize open, multiparty parliamentary elections.
In the 1987 Federal Assembly elections, opposition candidates
were permitted to run, but there was widespread fraud on
election day, and the ruling United Progress Party (UPP) won
41 of 42 seats. In 1988 an opposition candidate won the
by-election to fill the remaining vacant seat in the Assembly.
Traditional social and economic institutions also infltience
importantly the country's political life. Intra-island
rivalries have been a persistent and growing factor. Village
notables and Muslim religious leaders tended to dominate local
politics .
Comoros continues to claim sovereignty over Mayotte, which did
not join the other islands in declaring independence from
France in 1975. The results of a 1977 referendum on the
status of Mayotte--overwhelmingly in favor of remaining with
France--has never been accepted by the Comorian Government.
The French have indefinitely postponed a new referendum. In
the June 1988 French parliamentary elections, 98 percent of
the voters on Mayotte supported candidates advocating closer
ties to France, while less than 2 percent favored candidates
advocating independence or reunification with the Comoros.
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COMOROS
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights.
After 1986 the Abdallah Government did not respond to requests
from human rights organizations including, as far as is known.
Amnesty International's call for an investigation regarding
the alleged use of torture on some detainees held after the
1987 coup attempt. No local human rights groups were
permitted under President Abdallah' s regime.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The constitutional recognition of Islam's special status
formalizes the deeply held commitment of most Comorians to an
Islamic world view. The society respects authority based on
inheritance, age, wealth, and religious leadership.
The Constitution formally provides for the equality of
citizens regardless of race, sex, or religion. Nevertheless,
within Comorian society, men have the dominant role. Women
have the right to vote and to participate, in theory, in the
political process as candidates, but tradition has been a
powerful force in discouraging women from direct participation
in politics. Women are neither veiled nor limited, in terms
of employment, to minor civil service posts. Change in the
status of women is most evident in the major towns. Women are
finding increasing employment opportunities in the small paid
labor force, and generally receive wages comparable to those
of men in similar work. Property rights generally do not
disfavor women; for example, the house the father of the bride
traditionally provides to the couple at the time of their
marriage remains her property, even if her husband divorces
her .
Violence against women, including wife beating, occurs but is
believed to be rare. The Government has not addressed this
issue specifically, however, and there are no studies or
statistics available to help determine the extent of the
problem. When an expatriate chef at a new luxury hotel
slapped a woman for an alleged work infraction, her male
coworkers quickly came to her rescue, and the chef was quickly
fired. Female circumcision is not practiced in the Comoros.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution allows workers to form unions and to strike.
However, farming on small landholdings, subsistence fishing,
and petty commerce make up the daily activity of most of the
population. Hence, the wage labor force is small (less than
2,000 workers), and there are no formally constituted, legally
recognized unions at present. There have been sporadic
groupings of workers in various sectors (dockers, taxi
drivers) who have formed temporary associations for presenting
specific grievances, but these have tended to dissolve after
their demands were met. Public service employees are not
subject to the Labor Code but are granted the right to
organize in civil service legislation. There is an active
teachers' association.
A half-day strike at a new luxury hotel led to the firing of
the expatriate manager and improvements in pay and working
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COMOROS
conditions. There were also brief work slowdowns by teachers
and airport baggage handlers about late payment of salaries.
The increasing scarcity of jobs is also a real restraint on
labor complaints, organizational activities, and formal
strikes. The Government's inability to pay wages and salaries
on schedule sometimes results in work slowdowns, absenteeism,
and informal, peaceful protests.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The absence of formal unions does not mean that collective
bargaining does not exist. There are various informal
collective conventions between workers and employers. There
are no export processing zones. Labor legislation, to the
extent it exists, is applied uniformly throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced or compulsory labor in the Comoros.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment of children is 15. This is
generally respected. Child labor is not an issue due to the
lack of employment opportunities for adolescents and young
adults. Children do help in family units in the large
subsistence sector.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The currently accepted minimum wage is approximately $50 per
month, which is barely adequate to cover basic human needs.
However, the hours of work in any category rarely exceed 35
hours per week. In 1989 the Government reminded employers to
respect the Labor Code, which guarantees a day off per week
plus a month of paid vacation per year. Otherwise, the
Government's role in such labor-related fields as setting
health and safety standards is miminal.
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The People's Republic of the Congo is officially a
Marxist-Leninist state governed by an elite group of civilian
and military officials through the single legal party, the
Congolese Labor Party (PCT) . President Denis Sassou-Nguesso,
Chief of State and Head of Government since 1979, serves as
President of the 75-member PCT Central Committee. The
President nominates the other 12 members of the PCT Political
Bureau, the key policymaking group, whose selection is
approved by the Central Committee. Under Sassou, Central
Committee membership has usually reflected a balance among
Congo's rival southern, northern, and central ethnic groups.
The military and security services are firmly under the
control of the northerners, who are the ultimate arbiters of
power in Congo and have dominated its Government since 1968.
The need to maintain a consensus among the competing regions
and ethnic groups has provided a check on arbitrary and overly
pronorthern policies. Congo's National Assembly has limited
powers, but it has recently begun to serve as a sounding board
on social and economic issues and to draw representatives of
key interest groups outside the PCT into the political arena.
The security apparatus, which is under the direction of the
Presidency, is headed by the State Security Organization
(DGSE) and is patterned after those in Eastern Europe. Its
principal objective is to protect the State against all
possible dissident activity. As of late 1989, the military
forces were no longer routinely used for internal security
purposes because the police have been reorganized, removed
from the Ministry of Defense, and given special riot and crowd
control training. PCT "core groups" are in all ministries,
labor organizations, mass organizations, and urban districts.
They only intermittently attain their stated goal of
monitoring the activities of workers and neighbors.
The Congolese economy is highly dependent on oil, and
declining oil prices since 1985 have forced the Government to
cut its budget expenditures, cooperate with the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank in formulating a structural
adjustment program, and to seek debt relief measures. In
addition, since 1985 the Government has followed a policy of
liberalization of the economy and has moved toward a truly
nonaligned foreign policy. At the Fourth PCT Congress in July
1989, the party called for and adopted an economic program
emphasizing administrative reform, agricultural
self-sufficiency, privatization of state enterprises, and
encouragement of foreign investment. Despite its Socialist
policies, the PCT has never forbidden private property and
enterprise, and it has encouraged the indigenous commercial
sector in the past few years.
Human rights remained circumscribed in 1989. Most Congolese
live their lives with little government interference as long
as they do not criticize the Government. The principal human
rights problems include mistreatment and torture of detainees;
arbitrary detentions; lack of fair trial; discrimination
against women; and tight restrictions on freedom of speech and
press, assembly and association, worker rights, and the right
of citizens to change their government.
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RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for and Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of such killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reported cases of disappearance for political
motives .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
The practice of beating suspects at police stations and at
state security centers in the course of interrogations is
common. The public or the police frequently beat thieves who
have been caught in the act of stealing. Political detainees
are held incommunicado; Ammnesty International (AI), in
various statements and reports, has expressed concern about
the use of torture to extract information from detainees held
after the 1987 coup attempt. At the same time, several
political prisoners held incommunicado in the past are now
leading normal lives, including as government ministers.
Prison conditions in general are very poor.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution provides protection against arbitrary
indictment, arrest, and detention. But in practice a warrant
is not required to make arrests. Under the Code of Penal
Procedure a detainee must be brought before an investigative
judge within 3 days of arrest. The judge may then order
detention for a maximum period of 6 months, after which the
detainee must be charged or released. This law, however, does
not apply in cases involving security of the State, and
political detainees have been held for lengthy periods without
being brought before a judge or charged, e.g., the Government
held Georges Mf aouta-Kitoko, Christophe Samba, and Florent
Kihoulou without charge from 1986 to 1988 for belonging to an
independent political discussion group and writing a tract
calling for a "new society." The trial of those accused of
participation in the 1982 Brazzaville bombings did not take
place until 1986, and some of the accused were held
incommunicado for several years. A similar pattern appears
with respect to those accused in the 1987 coup attempt.
Despite government steps to increase the number of magistrates
and improve procedures, the administrative processing of
regular criminal cases is slow, and persons awaiting trial are
often held for lengthy periods. Whether a detainee is
formally charged usually depends upon the seriousness of the
crime and the economic situation of the family. For lesser
crimes, the person is usually taken to jail, where he may be
beaten and held for a few days, then released on bail pending
a trial which may never take place. A person accused of a
serious crime (e.g., murder, rape) is held in prison until the
trial, which may be held months or even years later.
The number of political detainees or prisoners in 1989 was
unavailable. In 1987, according to AI , the Government
arrested 60 or 70 people in connection with an abortive coup
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attempt by former army captain Pierre Anga and supporters with
alleged ties to President Sassou's predecessor, Joachim
Yhombi-Opango. The Government officially acknowledged the
arrest of four military men and two civilians for alleged
participation in the coup plot. Yhombi-Opango, Colonel Jean
Michel Ebaka, and Lt . Colonel Eboundit, the ranking military
officers arrested, remained in detention at a government
housing complex at the end of 1989. After one coup
participant was tracked down and killed by government troops
in July 1988, a number of his relatives and other associates
were arrested. The Government claims to have released some of
these persons. In November 1989, it announced the release of
some 40 civilians implicated in the 1987 coup attempt but has
refused to reveal the names of those released or still in
detention.
In 1988 the President announced an amnesty for most persons
held for political offenses since 1963, excepting those
arrested in connection with the 1987 coup plot. Despite this
announcement, it appeared that at least some other political
detainees remained in prison at the end of the year.
There were no known instances of exile being used as a means
of political control in 1989. With regard to forced or
compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of a Fair Public Trial
The legal system is not free from political interference. The
Constitution establishes the Supreme Court at the apex of the
judiciary, but in practice this Court is an arm of the
executive branch rather than an independent body. The amended
Constitution also provides for nonprofessional judges to be
elected to all courts below the Supreme Court. The stated
purpose of this was to "popularize justice," i.e., provide a
role for peers to influence the formal judicial process.
According to the law, any Congolese citizen can become a judge
but can adjudicate cases only in collaboration with trained
judges. All nominations must be approved by the party. By
law, the right to a fair and public trial exists in all cases,
and the judicial process is relatively fair and open for those
accused of common crimes. It is not unusual to have a higher
court reverse lower court decisions in nonpolitical cases.
Detained persons are entitled to legal counsel, and all
lawyers are regulated by the State. In capital criminal
cases, defense lawyers are provided by the Government for
those without funds.
While political cases usually do not come to the trial stage,
when they do they are tried by a special court, the
Revolutionary Court of Justice. Trials before this Court,
such as the August 1986 trial of 10 persons convicted of
causing bomb explosions in Brazzaville in 1982, have not met
international standards of fairness. In that case, AI
indicated that several judges were members of the PCT Central
Committee and had been involved in the case at an earlier
stage. In 1988 the President commuted the sentences of four
defendants in the case. There were no known political cases
tried before the Revolutionary Court in 1989.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There is generally little interference by the Government with
privacy, family, home, or correspondence so long as a person
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does not engage in any overt activity which involves or
implies opposition to the Government.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press are restricted, despite guarantees
in the Constitution. The Government allows some criticism of
its policies and programs judged not to be politically
sensitive, but it does not allow its ultimate authority to be
challenged publicly. The Government does not hesitate to
arrest people and hold them incommunicado for expressing views
it finds objectionable, as in the cases of the "new society"
writers (see Section l.d) and Jean-Felix Demba Ntelo, who was
released by presidential decree in 1988 after several months
in custody. (The Government maintains that these persons were
involved in a coup plot.)
The State owns and controls all media except for one weekly
religious newspaper. A state censorship committee reviews the
content of all newspapers, movies, books, and records.
Articles considered to be critical of the Government or its
leaders are censored. The Government and party, through
general guidelines for journalists, control the kind of news
Congolese journalists may publish from various sources of
information. Self-censorship, however, is the general pattern.
The Congolese have access to Zairian radio and television, as
well as to news and feature programming from France and the
United States. Western papers and magazines are freely
available. However, individual issues containing articles
critical of Congolese domestic politics have been pulled from
newsstands and the mails; and foreign journalists working on
domestic issues are occasionally detained or expelled.
Foreign journalists are generally permitted to travel freely
once an entry visa and a special permit for travel to the
interior are obtained. These are usually granted.
Academic freedom is limited. The Congolese educational system
borrows liberally from the Soviet system in form, but it
offers a broad range of materials, including American, to
students. Increasing numbers of Congolese pursue higher
education in American and other Western institutions.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right of peaceful assembly is limited by the State's
perceived self-interest. Political meetings are permitted
only for the party and its affiliated organizations.
Government permission is not required for groups to assemble
for religious or social purposes, but it is required for the
use of official facilities. Government authorization is also
required to establish professional clubs and organizations, of
which there are several.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is guaranteed by law, but the Government
is officially atheist. Christmas Day, for example, is
officially called Children's Day. Religious organizations,
such as the Salvation Army, must obtain government permission
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to work in the Congo. Jehovah's Witnesses are not permitted.
Members of the Baha * i faith may hold services but are
prohibited from organizing and teaching. With these important
exceptions, the government and party position toward religious
affairs is characterized by political pragmatism, with
regular, though unofficial, contacts between the respective
leaderships .
The Catholic Church, the largest single religious community,
maintains a seminary for the training of its clergy and has
missions throughout the country. Masses are held in French
and the various local languages. The Catholic church
publishes the only independent newspaper. La Semaine
Africaine. Catholic and other missionaries are active in
managing private missions and providing other social
services. Some social services formerly provided by the
Catholic Church have lapsed, but a few continue as joint
church-government ventures, especially in education. With the
recent liberalization in Congo's economic policies, there are
some signs of government efforts to solicit church support,
including the provision of seats for religious representatives
in the National Assembly.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government exercises limited control over the internal
movement of its citizens through identification card checks
and control points outside all major towns where soldiers or
militia rigorously check identification documents. Congolese
citizens wishing to travel abroad require exit authorization
from the -State Security Organization (DGSE) . Passports are
generally granted but must be returned to the DGSE after the
traveler returns from abroad. There are no known instances of
Congolese being refused the right to return to their country.
There are no known cases of a native-born Congolese being
denied citizenship.
The Congo is the home of about 2,000 refugees, primarily from
Chad, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire.
In the case of Zaire, refugees are often indistinguishable
from the sizable number of Zairians in Congo engaged in
economic pursuits. Refugees are subject to surveillance and
occasional harassment and expulsion by the Congolese
Government, but there has been no widespread or systematic
forced repatriation of refugees. The Congo is a party to the
U.N. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, and a representative of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees is resident in Brazzaville.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Congolese people do not have the right to change their
government through democratic processes. Under the
Constitution, the President of the Central Committee of the
Congolese Labor Party (PCT) is automatically President of the
Republic. After coming to power in a surprise Central
Committee maneuver in 1979, Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso was
reelected by regular party congresses in 1984 and 1989. The
President is the most powerful single person in government,
but his authority is limited by his need to maintain a
consensus in the Political Bureau and within the larger
Central Committee. The Congolese military, whose leadership
is drawn primarily from the north, supports the Government,
24-900 O— 90 4
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CONGO
and its officers occupy key positions among the ruling group.
Government and party positions, however, are awarded to
representatives of the southern and eastern ethnic groups in
numbers sufficient to ensure their support or acquiescence and
to maintain a rough regional and ethnic political balance.
Opportunities for political involvement by Congolese citizens
are limited to the Marxist-Leninist Congolese Labor Party
(PCT), including its mass organizations, and to participation
in national, regional, and local assemblies. The PCT is the
"supreme social and political organization." No other
political parties are permitted to operate, and political
competition takes place almost exclusively within the PCT
framework. PCT membership is approximately 10,000 out of a
population of some 2 million. Membership is awarded on the
basis of political loyalty and public service.
The national, regional, and local assemblies are elected by
universal suffrage from single, party-approved lists, which
contain only one candidate for each seat. The selection
process can involve a certain amount of negotiation within the
PCT, and incumbents have been turned out of office in the
process. National Assembly representatives are chosen on a
merit basis from a broad spectrum of the population, including
party members, the army, small farmers, workers, and
representatives of religious groups. The powers of the
National Assembly are limited, but its debates on social and
economic issues have some impact. Regional and local
assemblies may discuss issues and make recommendations before
decisions are made at the national level. The last elections
for the national, regional, and local assemblies took place in
September 1989.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Congo Government rarely publicizes the arrest, trial, or
release of political opponents. Polite listening without
response is standard government procedure when faced with
human rights inquiries from foreign governments or
nongovernmental organizations. Foreign journalists have been
expelled for investigating human rights issues, such as the
circumstances under which political detainees are held. The
Government did permit AI to send an observer to the 1986
bombing trial. It did not respond, however, to AI ' s
subsequent request to send a delegation to review the human
rights situation or to its 1987 memorandum concerning the 1986
trial. There are no human rights organizations in the Congo.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Under the Constitution there is no official discrimination
based on race, sex, religion, language, or social status. As
previously noted, northerners, especially those of the Cuvette
region, exert strong influence in politics and in the security
services. There are occasional reports of mistreatment of
pygmies. Such incidents seem to be the result of cultural
friction between those forest dwellers and villagers, rather
than government policy, which specifically calls for
integrating the pygmies into the economy and society.
Women have the same legal rights as men in commerce, politics,
and society. Among some ethnic groups, women are often the
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chief decisionmakers. There is a large disparity, however,
between salaries for men and women, and women are relegated to
a secondary role in the modern sectors of society. This also
holds for rural society where women are heavily involved in
traditional family farming. The husband has considerable
legal or actual control over the activities of his spouse, a
control usually moderated by the influence of the extended
family. Congolese women may not receive official travel
documents without the permission of their husband, father, or
male head of family.
Anecdotal evidence suggests violence against women, for
example in the form of wife beating, is not widespread in the
Congo. However, there are no studies or statistics available
to determine more precisely the extent of the problem. There
are no specific laws addressing violence against women beyond
those protecting individuals regardless of sex. Legal
remedies through the court system are available but are rarely
used. In this strongly family-oriented society, informal
remedies through the extended family system are most readily
used. The Government has not specifically addressed the issue
of violence against women, but in any case relies on the PCT
women's organization to take the leadership role in educating
the public in such matters. Female genital mutilation
(circumcision) is not practiced among the Congolese; it may,
however, occasionally be found among West Africans resident in
Brazzaville or Pointe Noire.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The labor code adopted in March 1975 provides in theory for
the right or workers to associate. In practice, given its
historically active political role, the labor movement is
scrutinized closely and controlled by the Government and
party, largely through the umbrella union, the Congolese Trade
Union Confederation (CSC), which is itself an appendage of the
party. No group is allowed to form an independent,
alternative union outside the party. As long as political
subjects are avoided, there is a degree of democratic dialog
within the labor movement and between the CSC and the
Government .
The CSC unions are prohibited from striking, although wildcat
strikes occur with relative impunity.
The CSC is affiliated with the Communist-controlled World
Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) , but it is free to and does
associate with other international and regional labor
organizations. As a reflection of the Government's efforts to
improve contacts with Western countries, the CSC leadership in
1988 proposed establishment of a bilateral relationship with
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organization's (AFL/CIO) African American Labor Center
(AALC) . However, the AFL/CIO's policy against association
with WFTU-af filiated unions has limited the contacts and
prevented Congolese participation in AALC-sponsored activities.
Despite government assertions that the single trade union
system results from the common will of the workers and from
political, economic, and historical development, the
International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee of Experts
again in 1989 noted that a trade union monopoly established by
legislation is in violation of ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of
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CQNGQ
Association, which the Congo has ratified, and has urged the
Government to bring its legislation into conformity.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The CSC is represented in every ministry and state-owned
enterprise and serves on management boards along with a member
of the Government and the party. Known as the "determinant
trilogy," this structure is responsible for ensuring that the
three major points of view are represented in the
decisionmaking process and serves as Congo's form of
collective bargaining in both the public and private sectors.
While no alternatives to strikes exist, the local unions
within the CSC have been able, in some instances, to persuade
the Government to provide workers with increased benefits,
including wage increases. The entire Congolese labor force is
treated equally under the law; there are no exceptions such as
those granted, for example, to export processing zones, of
which the Congo has none.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There were no reports of forced or compulsory labor, which is
legally prohibited.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment of children is 16. Outside the
Government and major employers, this minimum is often ignored,
especially in small family enterprises or family farms in the
subsistence agricultural sector.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Working conditions for the 50 percent of the population in the
modern sector are generally good and include a social security
system. These conditions include a maximum 40-hour workweek,
at least 1 day of rest per week, family benefits, severance
pay, and medical care. The minimum monthly wage is $85 for
urban employees. Domestic workers must be paid at least $75
monthly. Outside the Government, large corporations, and
foreign enterprises, these minimums are often ignored. While
many salaried Congolese have a rather high standard of working
conditions and social benefits, the minimum wage does not
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and his
family. Workers at this wage level and many others in the
informal sector are dependent upon the extended family,
including other salaried family members, and some subsistence
farming, in which most of the rural population is still
engaged. There is a code of occupational safety and health,
although it, too, is not rigidly enforced.
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Power in Cote d'lvoire is concentrated in the Democratic Party
of Cote d'lvoire (PDCI) and its long-time leader. President
Felix Houphouet-Boigny, who is in his mid-to-late eighties.
Although the freedom to form other parties is provided for in
the Constitution, in practice no other party has been allowed
to participate in the political process. Basic policies are
set within the PDCI; the unicameral National Assembly has never
publicly challenged a policy put forth by the party.
The Ministry of Internal Security includes the Surete Nationals
and the gendarmerie, the national police, structured along
French lines. The Surete has an arm tasked with intelligence
gathering and counterespionage responsibilities. The
gendarmerie is responsible for territorial security, especially
in the rural areas.
During the 1980 's Cote d'lvoire has been squeezed by a heavy
debt burden and falling prices for its exports, principally
coffee, cocoa, and tropical woods, and per capita income has
slipped in recent years from well over $1,000 to $740. In 1989
the economy continued to decline and the financial situation
remained critical. A new International Monetary Fund and World
Bank financial package was being assembled at the end of 1989.
In 1989 human rights remained circumscribed. The President
continued to advocate dialog with dissenters in settling
disputes, but it is unclear if this has eased the lingering
threat of detentions and conscriptions, such as those which
took place in 1988, and their stifling effect on critics,
including students, teachers, and trade unionists. One
businessman was widely believed to have been convicted on
manufactured charges because of his connection with a
well-known dissident. Other areas of human rights abridgement
included restrictions on freedom of speech and press, academic
freedom, and freedom of assembly and association; and
limitations on women's and worker rights, and the right of
citizens to change their government through democratic means.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or extrajudicial killings in
1989.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of officially sanctioned abduction or
disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Penal Code prohibits official violence without "legitimate
justification." The Code does not, however, specifically
mention or prohibit torture, or the level of violence officials
may use if "justified." While there were no confirmed reports
of torture in 1989, foreign Africans are routinely treated more
roughly by police on arrest than are Ivorians. This rough
treatment is reported to include beatings, often with the
objective of extracting a confession.
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d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution and pertinent statutes prohibit arbitrary
arrest or imprisonment. The Government has, however,
occasionally detained persons considered a threat to internal
security. The Government has also used the threat of forced
conscription, such as that which occurred in 1988, to
discourage student and trade union efforts peacefully to oppose
the Government or its policies. In 1988, 20 former officials
or members of the Secondary Schoolteachers' Union were detained
and conscripted into varying lengths of military service.
Under the Code of Penal Procedure, a public prosecutor can
order the detention of a suspect for up to 48 hours without
bringing charges. The Code dictates that further detention
must be ordered by a magistrate who can authorize periods of up
to 4 months, but who must also provide the Minister of Justice,
on a monthly basis, with a written justification for continued
detention. There have been unconfirmed reports that local
police have held persons for more than 48 hours in a few
cases. Bail is -technically available but is not commonly
provided. Defendants are not guaranteed the right to a
judicial determination of the legality of their detention.
Some prominent critics of the Government have chosen to live
and write in other countries (see Section 2. a.). Political
exiles from a number of countries have found Cote d'lvoire to
be a hospitable safe haven.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The modern judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court and
includes a Court of Appeals and lower courts. Although the
judiciary is generally considered independent of the executive
in practice as well as under the Constitution's separation of
powers provisions, the judiciary follows the lead of the
executive in cases concerning perceived national security
issues. There have also been credible reports that the courts
have given lenient treatment to individuals with personal
connections to the Government. One businessman, Innocente
Anaky, is widely believed to have been convicted of trumped-up
charges of financial impropriety because of his connections to
prominent dissident Laurent Gbagbo. Anaky is currently serving
a lengthy prison sentence.
Defendants have the right to be present at their trials.
Innocence is presumed, and defendants have the right of appeal,
although in practice verdicts are rarely overturned.
Defendants accused of felonies or capital crimes have the right
to legal counsel, and the judicial system provides for
court-appointed attorneys for indigent defendants. In
practice, however, many defendants cannot afford private
counsel, and court-appointed attorneys are not readily
available.
Ivorian law establishes the right to a fair public trial. This
provision is generally respected in urban areas. In rural
areas, justice is often administered at the village level
through traditional institutions which handle domestic
disputes, minor land questions, and family law. Dispute
resolution is by extended debate, with no known instances of
resort to physical or similar punishment. These traditional
courts are increasingly superseded by the formal judicial
system.
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Civilians are not tried by military courts. There are no
appellate courts within the military justice system. Persons
convicted by a military tribunal occasionally request the
Supreme Court to set aside the tribunal's verdict and order a
retrial .
The number of political prisoners is unknown, but is believed
to be small.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
All Ivorians are considered to be members of the PDCI. Party
regulations call for active participation in party activities
and payments of dues, which are collected in most cases through
deductions from paychecks. Most party regulations, however,
are not strictly enforced, and Ivorians who choose not to
participate do not suffer retaliation.
The Code of Penal Procedure specifies that a police official or
investigative magistrate may conduct searches of homes without
a warrant if there is reason to believe there is evidence on
the premises concerning a crime. The official must have the
prosecutor's agreement to retain any objects seized in the
search and is required to have witnesses to the search, which
may not take place between the hours of 9 p.m. and 4 a.m.
Legal safeguards against arbitrary searches are generally
respected in urban areas, although there have been reports of
police entering homes of foreign Africans, taking them to the
local police station, and extorting small amounts of money for
alleged minor offenses. Safeguards against arbitrary searches
are also believed to be ignored on occasion in the countryside.
In 1988 there were some reports that armed members of the
gendarmerie were directly involved in robberies of civilians,
particularly on the highways. There were no such reports in
1989; however, there were continuing reports, difficult to
substantiate, of police roundups of foreign Africans, also with
the intention of extorting money. Private telephone
conversations are monitored to some degree, although it is
difficult to estimate the extent of such monitoring. There is
no evidence that private correspondence is monitored.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Free expression in Cote d'lvoire is provided for in the
Constitution but significantly limited in practice. Public
criticism of basic government policies, the party, or the
President, rarely occurs. Critics of the Government express
themselves in informal situations without fear of reprisal.
Government policy assigns the media a positive role in
promoting national unity and development, allowing criticism of
failures to execute policy but not criticism of the policies
themselves. Investigative journalism is not permitted with
respect to the Government and its policies. The Government
operates radio, television, and a wire service, and owns
majority shares in the two daily newspapers. There are also
two weekly newsmagazines which are controlled by the party.
All of these media follow government policies. Several
periodic pamphlets are published privately.
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In April Vice President of the National Assembly Bamba was
detained for carrying political tracts advocating a multiparty
system. He was released and retains his elected position as
Deputy in the National Assembly.
Academic freedom is restricted. A university professor, Pascal
Kokora, was fired from his job in January 1988 after having his
linguistics class compare Ivorian and foreign news reports of
the trial of former Secondary Schoolteachers' Union officials.
As no alternative work was available for him, he left the
country after several months. This report last year indicated
that Kokora was given his job back in September 1988; in fact,
he was not reinstated and has once again left the country.
Laurent Gbagbo, generally considered to be Cote d'lvoire's
leading dissident, lived in voluntary exile in France from 1983
to 1988, when he returned and was given a job at the
university. In his current position, Gbagbo is limited to
research activities and publishing in scientific journals, and
he is not allowed to have significant contact with students.
In general, professors and students report that they are afraid
to express antigovernment sentiments in any public forum.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly is guaranteed by the Constitution, but in
practice is restricted when the Government perceives a
significant and immediate danger to public order (which can
include the expression of unwelcome political views) .
Gatherings occasionally are canceled to prevent the expression
of controversial views in public forums. Only nonpolitical
gatherings are permitted on campus.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
There are no known impediments to religious expression. There
is no dominant religion, and no faith is officially favored by
the Government. The open practice of religion is permitted,
and there are no restrictions on religious ceremonies or
teaching .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government exercises minimal control over domestic travel
but has increased internal security roadblocks for identity and
customs checks. Persons stopped at such roadblocks are
frequently harassed and "fined" for one minor infraction or
another. In 1989, at one checkpoint in Abidjan, security
forces slapped an American citizen and beat her French citizen
husband without cause other than perceived verbal insolence.
The army subsequently initiated an inquiry and suspended the
corporal in charge of the patrol pending the inquiry's findings,
Although Professor Kokora initially had some problems obtaining
a passport, Ivorians normally can travel abroad and emigrate
freely. Ivorians have the right of voluntary repatriation.
There are no known cases of revocation of citizenship.
Cote d'lvoire's refugee and asylum practices are liberal. The
country has resettled or granted safe haven to many refugees
from many different countries. In 1989 approximately 800
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COTE D'lVOIRE
refugees, mostly Africans from vneighboring countries, entered
the country. While in Cote d'lvoire, refugees receive 1-year,
renewable resident visas for their first 5 years in the
country, after which they may apply for permanent residence.
Cote d'lvoire does not take any significant responsibility for
the economic and social welfare of refugees, who become the
concern of private and international organizations.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
While in theory the citizens of Cote d'lvoire have the right to
a multiparty system, in practice they are unable to change the
one-party system of government. (The President recently
restated his long-held position that Cote d'lvoire is "not yet
ripe" for a multiparty system.) No opposition groups exist
openly, and the Government does not allow their formation.
Within the PDCI , the President wields power through a 13-member
Executive Committee, a 57-raember Political Bureau, and a
208-member Steering Committee. Political power is concentrated
in the President's hands, and most important decisions are m.ade
by the President himself. The 175-seat National Assembly
confirms and ratifies legislative initiatives received from the
President .
Within this strict one-party system, the Government continues
to encourage more open participation in the political process
by expanding the size of party institutions and by permitting
more party members to compete in legislative, municipal, and
local party elections. In 1989 an important mayoral race in
San Pedro was hotly, and by all accounts fairly, contested.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government is not a party to international human rights
accords but has been cooperative in the past towards
international inquiries into its human rights practices. It
did not respond publicly to Amnesty International's appeals in
1988 on behalf of the Secondary Schoolteachers' Union, and it .
is thus not known what impact, if any, these appeals may have
had on the Government's subsequent positive action.
In 1987 a group of Ivorians formed an internal Human Rights
Association. The Government has repeatedly refused to
recognize this association and has not allowed local
journalists to attend the two press conferences it has held.
Under these circumstances the group's ability to investigate
and report on alleged human rights violations has been very
limited.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no overt, official discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, language, or social status. Although French is the
official language and the language of instruction in the
schools, radio and television broadcasts are provided in major
local languages. Social and economic mobility are not limited
by policy or custom.
Males clearly play the preponderant role overall, although some
Ivorian traditional societies accord women considerable
political and economic power. Nonetheless, in rural areas
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COTE D'lVOIRE
tribal customs dictate that menial tasks are performed mostly
by women. Although PDCI policy is to encourage full
participation by women in social and economic life, there is
considerable informal resistance among employers to hiring
women, who may be considered "undependable" by virtue of
potential pregnancy.
Female genital mutilation (i.e., clitorectomy) is widely
practiced in Cote d'lvoire, particularly among the rural Muslim
population in the north and west. The operation, which takes
place at puberty as one element of a rite of passage, is
generally performed outside modern medical facilities.
Clitoral excision is illegal in Cote d'lvoire, but the
Government does not make strong efforts to prevent the
practice, and social pressures are sufficiently strong that it
persists, particularly in small villages where the tribal chief
is the primary decisionmaker. Excision is becoming less
frequent as the population becomes better educated.
Violence against women, especially wife beating, is neither
widely practiced nor tacitly condoned. However,
representatives of womens ' organizations state that wife
beating does occur, often leading to divorce. Doctors state
that they rarely see the victims of domestic violence. A
severe social stigma is attached to domestic violence of any
kind; neighbors will often intervene in a domestic quarrel to
protect an individual who is the object of physical abuse. The
courts and police view domestic violence as a family problem
unless serious bodily harm is inflicted, in which case criminal
proceedings do take place. The Government has no clear-cut
policy regarding wife beating beyond the obvious strictures
against violence in the Civil Code.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to form unions under the Labor Code of
1964, but almost all unions are organized within a single
government-sponsored labor confederation, the General Union of
Cote d'lvoire Workers (UGTCI). Only the University Teachers'
Union is independent of the confederation.
The leader of the UGTCI occupies a senior position in the party
hierarchy. Union membership is encouraged but not mandatory.
The UGTCI is a relatively passive coordination mechanism rather
than an active force for worker rights, although it has had
some success in improving working conditions and safety
standards. The UGTCI represents approximately one-third to
one-half of the organizable work force.
The right to strike is protected by statute, but in practice
strikes are rarely authorized by the UGTCI. There were no
official strikes in 1988, although there were several "work
stoppages." For example, workers in a factory near the capital
stopped work to protest a management plan to reorder
production. In this case, as usually happens, the Government
stepped in to mediate. In 1989 reliable sources suggested that
some wildcat strikes occurred without receiving publicity or
being officially acknowledged.
Generally, the Government negotiates with strikers and resolves
at least some of their economic grievances. In the 1987-1988
dispute with the secondary schoolteachers, the Government used
a variety of powers to coerce the teachers back to their jobs.
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COTE D' IVOIRE
This included arrest and detention of 20 of them and
conscription of several men into military service. There were
no reports that professional groups experienced persecution or
harassment in 1989.
The UGTCI formally prohibits its individual trade unions from
forming or maintaining affiliations with international
professional organizations in their fields, with the exception
of the Organization of African Trade Union Unity.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
In theory, collective bargaining is protected by the Labor
Code. In practice, however, only the UGTCI is allowed to
engage in collective bargaining with individual companies. The
UGTCI has representatives in every major business enterprise,
and the UGTCI Secretariat often plays a mediation or
conciliation role in relations between labor and management in
individual businesses. There are no export processing zones in
Cote d'lvoire, although there is some discussion about creating
such zones in the future. Labor legislation, to the extent it
is applied, is applied uniformly throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There have been no reports of forced labor in Cote d'lvoire,
and it is prohibited by law.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
In most instances, the legal working minimum age of 16 is
enforced among government employees and among large
multinational companies. However, children often work on
family farms, and in Abidjan some children routinely act as
vendors of consumer goods in the informal sector. There are
also reports of children working in what could be described as
sweatshop conditions in small workshops. Many children leave
the formal school system at an early age; lower grade education
is mandatory but far from universally enforced, particularly in
the rural areas.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Government enforces a comprehensive labor code governing
the terms and conditions of service for wage earners and
salaried workers and providing for occupational safety and
health standards. Those employed in the modern sector are
reasonably protected against unjust compensation, excessive
hours, and capricious discharge from employment. The standard
workweek is 44 hours. Minimum wages vary according to
occupation, with the lowest being approximately $110 per
month. This does not provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and his family. Government medical insurance and
retirement programs provide an element of income security for
salaried employees in the modern sector. Month-long paid
vacations and a substantial severance pay are also guaranteed.
There is, however, a large informal sector of the economy,
involving both urban and especially rural workers, in which
many of these occupational regulations are enforced erratically
at best.
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti is a one-party state ruled since independence in 1977
by President Hassan Gouled Aptidon and his People's Assembly
for Progress (RPP) which has been the only lawful political
party since 1981. Public life in Djibouti is dominated by two
ethnic groups, the politically predominant Issa (the tribe of
the President) and the largest single tribe, the Afar. The
presidency is considered to be reserved for an Issa and the
prime ministry for an Afar. Real authority in the Government,
civil service, party, and armed forces is in Issa hands.
Djibouti's security services, all under government control,
include an army of about 3,500 total personnel (primarily
ground forces with small naval and air units), and three
national police forces: the National Security Force and the
National Police, both under the Ministry of the Interior, and
the Gendarmerie, under the Ministry of Defense, which has been
involved in human rights violations. France guarantees
Djibouti's external security and maintains a force of about
3,800 military and naval personnel in Djibouti.
Djibouti's narrowly based fledgling economy depends almost
entirely on services to its (mostly French) 10,000 expatriate
residents and operation of the seaport, airport, and
Djibouti-Addis Ababa railroad. Although the State is the
largest employer, individuals are free to pursue private
business interests and to hold personal and real property.
Human rights in Djibouti remained tightly circumscribed in
1989. Areas of concern included: the continued denial of
political pluralism, in particular the domination of the
Government and single legal political party by the Issa tribe;
restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, and assembly;
refusal to recognize the refugee rights of Somali nationals
fleeing the Somali civil war; incidents of arbitrary arrest,
detention, and deportation; and allegations of the use of
torture by the security services.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There was no politically motivated killing, but at least one
person died while in official custody. This occurred after
the authorities, in the city of Tadjourah in June, arrested
five persons who protested the method of distribution of
emergency relief food aid. A young Afar man died under
unexplained circumstances in a hospital while in police
custody (see Section I.e.).
b. Disappearance
There was no disappearance of persons for political reasons.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
According to credible reports, in 1989 branches of the
Gendarmerie in particular carried out brutal interrogations of
some detainees (including Somali refugees), which included
beatings and other physical abuse, and there were allegations
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DJIBOUTI
of methodical torture of detainees in isolated cases. The
death in a hospital of a young Afar man while under
Gendarmerie custody in the spring sparked renewed public
allegations of torture by the security authorities. The
Government did not comment publicly on this incident.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
By law, a person may be detained no more than 48 hours without
an examining magistrate's formal charge. In practice, this
deadline is ignored in cases of political interest. An
accused has the right to legal counsel, which is provided by
the State, if the accused is destitute. An accused person
awaiting trial may, by a judge's order, be released on bail or
on personal recognizance, or be jailed pending the final
verdict.
The Director of a prominent U.S. human rights organization was
detained in 1989 for 4 days without charge, while undertaking
to ascertain the situation of Somali refugees (see Section
2.d.) .
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Djibouti's legal system is a mixture of Djiboutian legislation
and executive decrees, French codified law adopted at
independence, Shari'a (Islamic religious law), and traditions
of the native nomadic peoples. Crimes in urban areas are
dealt with according to French-inspired law and judicial
practice in the regular courts. Civil actions may be brought
under either French-inspired law in the regular courts or in
the context of tribal customs in the traditional court.
Shari'a courts handle only family matters such as marriage,
divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Decisions of all
three courts may be appealed to an appeals court of the same
system. Appellate decisions of all three court systems may be
appealed to the country's Supreme Court.
The Tunisian national charged with the fatal 1987 terrorist
bombing of an outdoor cafe remained in prison awaiting trial
at the end of 1989.
A special State Security Court may hear in closed session
cases of espionage, treason, and acts threatening the public
order or the "interest of the Republic." This Court last
convened in 1986.
Proceedings in all courts except the State Security Court are
open to the public. The judiciary appears to be generally
sympathetic to the government position and susceptible to
government influence in cases of political interest.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There were no reported incidents of arbitrary interference
with privacy, family, home, or correspondence in 1989.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These freedoms are restricted. Those who express public views
that are critical of, or perceived as threatening to, the
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DJIBOUTI
Government face prosecution for common crimes or detention for
days or weeks without charge.
Djibouti's radio and television stations and one newspaper (a
French-language weekly) are all government owned and
operated. All media personnel are civil servants. The
Government's avowed policy is to coordinate the dissemination
of all information in the interest of national development.
The news media do report on social and national development
problems within Djibouti, but the Government itself, its
policies, and those of neighboring governments are free from
criticism. The media largely avoid reporting on domestic
politics and ethnic strife in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia.
The editor-in-chief of the newspaper was removed from office
in April 1989 (and later reassigned to another ministry) after
publication of articles unflattering to the Government of
France. In addition, a journalist was arrested, held for
3 weeks, and subsequently dismissed from his job in connection
with the distribution of antigovernment tracts in Tadjourah.
As a rule, the Government does not censor or forbid the
importation of books and newspapers, but in 1989 the
Government banned importation of the book "The Satanic Verses."
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Government effectively bans political protest by selective
enforcement of public assembly permit laws and by detention of
persons without charge. (Detainees in such cases are usually
released with no ill-treatment within a matter of days, though
often not within the legally mandated 48-hour period within
which charges must be filed.) In 1989 public demonstrations
in protest of the death of the Afar held in custody in
Tadjourah resulted in the arrests of about 25 persons, of whom
11 were sentenced to 6 months in prison for unauthorized
demonstration against the authority of the State.
Permits for political meetings are not issued outside party
auspices; it appears that permits for such purposes are sought
only rarely. Peaceful assembly and association for
nonpolitical purposes are routinely permitted.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Djibouti respects freedom of religion for all faiths,
virtually the entire population is Sunni Muslim. The holy
days of Islam are legal holidays. The Government and all
private offices observe Islam's month of Ramadan with a
shortened workday. However, the Government imposes no
sanctions on those who choose to ignore Islamic teachings on
diet, alcohol consumption, religious fasting, etc.
The expatriate community supports Roman Catholic, French
Protestant, Greek Orthodox, and Ethiopian Orthodox churches.
Less than 1 percent of the population belong to these
Christian congregations. Foreign clergy and missionaries may
perform charitable works, but proselytization is a sensitive
issue and, while not illegal, is strongly discouraged.
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d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Djiboutians travel freely within Djibouti and may live and
work where they choose. In 1989 the police increased document
checkpoints aimed at controlling crime and especially the
influx of illegal aliens and refugees from neighboring
Ethiopia and Somalia. Djiboutians leave for, and return from,
international travel without restriction or interference.
Passports are available to all Djiboutians but are invalid for
travel to Israel and South Africa.
Djibouti cooperates with the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) to assist and protect the approximately
1,500 registered Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti city. As a
matter of policy, however, the Government does not recognize
as refugees the approximately 30,000 Somali nationals who have
fled the Somali civil war.
Although the Government has an informal agreement with the
UNHCR that these refugees will not be forcibly repatriated if
they do not "cause trouble," the UNHCR in fact has limited
ability to extend protection to these individuals. The police
routinely conduct sweeps of people thought to be illegal
aliens, and some Somali refugees have been deported as a
result. Africa Watch's October 1989 report indicates that
many refugees may have perished during the forced repatriation
in June of 125 people into an isolated area of Somalia. One
refugee reported that they were pushed across the border into
Somalia without shoes, water, or food. To avoid the heat they
walked during the night. At least 4 of his group of 20
reportedly died of thirst during the trek.
Djibouti's treatment of Somali refugees came in for serious
criticism from international human rights organizations,
particularly over several instances of expulsion of Somali
refugees into northern Somalia. Amnesty International (AI) in
December 1988 and Africa Watch in December 1989 appealed to
the Government to ensure that no refugees would be forced to
return to their country of origin or coerced, ill-treated, or
arrested if they opposed repatriation.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Djiboutians have neither the right nor the ability peacefully
to change their government. The Issa-dominated People's
Assembly for Progress (RPP) jealously guards its position as
Djibouti's only political party, a status it has enjoyed since
the Afar-dominated Djiboutian People's Movement (MPD) was
outlawed in 1981. The party chooses the candidates for the
presidency and the 65-member National Assembly, a legislative
body with no real power. Presidential elections are held
every 7 years, and elections for the National Assembly every 5
years. Citizens are encouraged to vote, but their only choice
is whether to cast a ballot for or against the party's
candidates. The two different ballots must be cast in
different boxes, making it obvious who votes against the party.
Section 4 Government Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government has been responsive in recent years to
inquiries concerning human rights practices, but it has taken
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no action to resolve the problems addressed by AI's and Africa
Watch's appeals on treatment of refugees. There are no
private human rights organizations in Djibouti.
The Government speaks out about human rights practices in the
Israeli-administered territories and in the Republic of South
Africa but is silent about human rights violations in Djibouti
and in neighboring Ethiopia and Somalia.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The dominant status of the Issa in the party, the civil
service, and the military is maintained by de facto
discrimination based on tribe and language against the Afar,
and discrimination based on tribe against the Isaak and
Gadaboursi .
Women in Djibouti legally possess full civil rights but are
traditionally secondary to men in public life, and generally
live within the constraints of Shari'a law. Women are active
in small trade; and many women are employed in offices and
stores, mostly as clerks and secretaries. There are women,
though only a few, in the professions (the judiciary,
medicine, teaching) and in the military and the police.
According to medical personnel, violence against women —
including rape and wife beating — appears to occur relatively
infrequently in Djibouti. Moreover, most domestic and
community violence is considered a family or tribal matter, is
dealt with accordingly, and is rarely brought to the attention
of authorities. The police and courts are almost never
involved. As a result, it has not become a public or
government issue, but the party-affiliated Djiboutian National
Women's Union (DNWU) in November 1988 began a government-
supported campaign against female circumcision. Progress in
the campaign has been slow, however, particularly in the
northern districts, where nomadic traditions of genital
mutilation of young girls (e.g., clitoral excision and
inf ibulation) are widely practiced.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Labor unions play a minimal role in Djibouti. Workers are
free to join or not to join unions as they choose. There are
30 individual labor unions in Djibouti, many of which
represent employees of only one private or state-owned
corporation. Only a small percentage of Djiboutian workers
are union members. The Government exerts control over
individual unions through Djibouti's sole government-organized
labor central, the General Union of Djiboutian Workers
(UGTD) . Key labor positions in the UGTD are held by persons
sympathetic to management.
Workers are free to strike, but in practice most labor action
is limited to short, wildcat protests.
The UGTD is affiliated with Africa's continent-wide official
trade union body, the Organization of African Trade Union
Unity. Unions are free to maintain relations and exchange
programs with unions and labor organizations in other
countries. A representative of the American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations ' s
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DJIBOUTI
African-American Labor Center led a seminar in Djibouti on
union administration in February.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The law recognizes labor's right to organize and bargain
collectively. In practice, formal collective bargaining
virtually does not exist; relations between workers and
employers are informal and paternalistic. On questions of
wages and health and safety conditions, the Ministry of Labor
encourages direct, ad hoc resolution by labor representatives
and employers. Either workers or employers may initiate a
formal administrative hearing at which the Labor Inspection
Service of the Ministry of Labor mediates. Wages are set by
employers in consultation with the Ministry of Labor to assure
adherence to mandatory minimum wage regulations.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Prohibited by law, there is neither forced nor compulsory
labor in Djibouti.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum age of 14 years for employment is respected
in practice. Children may and do work in family-owned
businesses such as restaurants and small shops, including at
night. Children are not employed under hazardous conditions.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wage rates are specified by government regulations and
by categories of workers and are enforced by the Ministry of
Labor. Increased last in 1976, minimum wages begin at less
than $80 a month for unskilled laborers and reach nearly
$1,400 a month for "directors" and medical doctors. The
minimum wage in most cases does not provide a decent living
for a worker and his family. However, many workers also
receive housing or housing allowances and transportation and
food allowances. Mandatory seniority bonuses range from 4
percent of the worker's basic salary after 2 years of service
to a maximum 52 percent after 26 years of service.
The legislated maximum workweek is 40 hours, often spread over
a 6-day workweek. Overtime pay regulations apply to
additional work. Workers are guaranteed daily and weekly rest
periods and paid annual vacations. The Ministry of Labor
enforces occupational health and safety, work hours, and wages
regulations through inspection, dispute mediation, and
administrative judgment by the labor inspection service.
These regulations are vigorously enforced.
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
The present leadership of Equatorial Guinea took power in
1979, establishing a military Government after overthrowing
the tyrannical dictatorship of Francisco Macias Nguema, which
had caused the murder or exile of one-third of the country's
population. In 1982 the national Constitution was adopted,
national and local assemblies were chosen, and the Government
was officially declared to be civilian. The Government has
been headed since the coup by President Obiang Nguema Mbasogo,
who was reelected (as the sole candidate) in August 1989 for a
7-year term. Obiang established in 1986 the country's sole
legal political party, the Democratic Party of Equatorial
Guinea (DPEG) . The party, made up mostly of Fang tribe
members from Rio Muni, the continental province of the
country, controls the Government without viable opposition.
Police and internal security forces are responsible for the
preservation of public order. They are augmented by the 300-
to 500-man presidential guard unit provided by Morocco. The
majority of human rights abuses has historically been caused
by the civilian police and internal security forces.
Equatorial Guinea is one of the poorest nations in the world.
Most of the population (an estimated 350,000, a figure
rejected by the Government of Equatorial Guinea as too low)
live by subsistence agriculture, fishing, and hunting, with
per capita annual income approximately $300. The small wage
economy, based on cocoa, lumber, and coffee, was devastated by
the death or exodus of thousands of trained and educated
citizens during the Macias years. Recent years have seen the
emergence of a very small middle class. The country's recent
inclusion in the West Africa franc currency zone has helped
create greater fiscal integrity and an improved investment
climate. Foreign aid is crucial to development, and
Equatorial Guinea receives substantial assistance, with Spain,
the previous colonial power, and France as the key donors. In
1989 France, Spain, and the Soviet Union announced that they
would forgive portions of the country's debts.
Despite modest progress in the economic sphere and in human
rights, political rights of all kinds, including speech and
assembly, continued to be tightly restricted in Equatorial
Guinea in 1989. Police brutality remained a significant
problem, although reports of harsh treatment of illegal
foreign workers declined. On occasion the President
intervened personally to resolve cases involving human rights,
most recently in October when senior police officers were
convicted of using excessive force against detainees,
including a World Bank contractor. The Government sought
advice and technical assistance from Western countries on
improving the prisons.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No such killings were reported in 1989.
b. Disappearance
There were no known disappearances in 1989.
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
In its public statements, the Government appeared to make a
serious commitment to reduce the use of torture and other
cruel treatment in 1989. However, harsh and abusive police
interrogation and punishment methods continued in 1989,
notably in two well-documented cases of abuse. In February
several Equatoguineans who had broken into an expatriate's
home were arrested and tortured by police for several days.
When they gave the police the names of their accomplices, the
latter were subsequently tortured also. The methods of
physical torture used against these men included beatings,
electric shock, and binding of limbs.
In a second case in September, a British subject on contract
with the World Bank accompanied several Equatoguinean friends
to the police station when the latter were taken in for
disorderly conduct. When he protested to the police about the
four female companions being tied up and bludgeoned on the
feet, the police commissioner had him tied up and severely
beaten in the same manner. When the international community
registered strong complaints, the Presidency apologized for
the incident. In mid-October, after a public trial, the
police officers responsible were convicted and sentenced to
several months in prison to be followed by assignment to lower
ranking positions. However, at the end of the year, one of
the officers was not in prison but rather under house arrest.
It was unclear whether the sentence had been carried out
against the other officer.
In contrast to the past, there were few reports in 1989 of
arbitrary police beatings of illegal Nigerian, Cameroonian, or
Ghanaian workers.
Prison conditions continue to be extremely harsh, with basic
amenities unavailable. In 1989 the Government expressed an
interest in improving jail conditions and in arranging
training for police personnel, and expressed willingness to
invite international organizations to inspect prison
conditions .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Despite constitutional provisions, there was little
enforcement of the rights of a person in detention to be
charged or released within a certain period of time, to have
access to a lawyer, or to be released on bail. Arbitrary
arrests by security forces or police have been commonplace,
often on spurious charges in order to extort money. Many
detainees are held incommunicado.
The number of political detainees held at the end of 1989 was
not known.
In 1989 there were no known cases of persons being exiled for
political reasons. There are a number of political exiles in
Spain. In 1988 Jose Luis Jones Dougan, the leader of an
opposition party in exile, returned and was arrested 2 months
later. He was subsequently sentenced to a long prison term
but apparently in December 1988 was released and permitted to
return to Spain. According to Amnesty International's 1989
Report, Dougan's efforts to gain recognition for his political
party were apparently considered to constitute a form of
treason. Another returned exile, Jose Primo Esono Mica, was
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
arrested and convicted with Dougan in 1988. Esono Mica's
30-year sentence was subsequently reduced to 15 years.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
There is a formal court structure, with the Supreme Court at
the apex, and also military and customary (tribal) court
systems. Tribal laws and customs are honored in the formal
court system when not in conflict with national law. The
tribunal provided for in the Constitution to decide
constitutional issues has never been established. Under the
Constitution, military tribunals hear all capital cases
(civilian and military). The death penalty has not been
carried out for several years. There is no separation between
the executive and the judiciary, and Supreme Court justices
serve at the pleasure of the President.
There was no progress in 1989 in efforts to reform the legal
system. The nation's mixture of traditional (tribal) law,
military law, and Spanish rules and procedures combine to
produce an inconsistent system of justice. There is no
concept of due process, and appellate proceedings are
nonexistent; the executive branch acts with little respect or
understanding for judicial independence. Laws are frequently
enacted by decree without any public announcement, excepting
an occasional brief mention on government radio. Defendants
who are unable to afford legal counsel stand little chance of
acquittal. The fact that few lawyers (approximately 20) in
the country depend on their connections to the Government
raises questions about the impartiality of the defense their
clients might receive. Unless represented by counsel, those
arrested in Equatorial Guinea usually have no way of knowing
if the offense they have been charged with is bona fide.
The Government in 1989 continued to maintain that it holds no
political prisoners. However, several persons, including
Esono Mica, remained in prison at the end of 1989.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There were fewer reports in 1989 of arbitrary interference
with privacy, including pressures by authorities to join the
sole political party and to participate in "spontaneous"
government-sanctioned celebrations. Persons deemed suspicious
are sometimes placed under surveillance, and there is a
general belief that telephone conversations are monitored
routinely, although correspondence remained sacrosanct.
Search warrants are not normally used, even though they are
required by the Constitution.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Open public criticism of the Government is not tolerated. In
the past, the press has consisted of sporadic government
bulletins. In late 1989, the first regular printing of a
newspaper was started, initiated by the Spanish Government.
While criticism of the Government did not appear in the paper,
it highlighted the need for a more open forum, one less
focused on government statements.
Both the television and radio stations are government
entities, whose broadcasting is almost solely government
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
propaganda. Nevertheless, entertainment programming,
including relatively recent movies and American television
shows dubbed in Spanish, appeared in 1989. There was
discussion early in the year of the Government establishing a
film censorship board to reduce the number of violent movies
from the West being shown. Radio propaganda was somewhat
reduced in 1989 to accommodate African and American pop
music. The Government strictly controls the publication,
importation, and distribution of articles critical of the
Government .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Despite constitutional provisions guaranteeing these freedoms,
the Government's firm position is that opposition political
organizations and assemblies will not be tolerated. Private
nonpolitical groups, such as professional organizations,
churches, and sports groups require government approval.
c. Freedom of Religion
With one exception, freedom of religion was generally
respected. Jehovah's Witnesses, originally banned from the
country in 1985, and harassed in 1986 and 1987, are still
prohibited. Foreign clergy and missionaries continue to play
an active role in educational development, and all
denominations are allowed to participate in charitable as well
as religious activities. Christianity, mainly Catholicism, is
the predominant religion. In general, active proselytizing by
Protestant denominations is discouraged, but conversions are
permitted.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There were no explicit restrictions on travel within the
country. There are restrictions on travel abroad, including
lengthy delays in obtaining passports. Many Equatoguineans
leave the country without formal documentation for both
economic and political reasons. A large number reside in
Spain, France, Cameroon, and Gabon, While third-country
African workers sometimes must resort to bribery to obtain
legal registration, even the formerly enslaved Nigerians
enjoyed virtual freedom to work and travel in 1989. With
regard to repatriation. President Obiang in 1989 told the
Equatoguinean expatriate community, many of whom had voiced
fear of repression, that they were welcome to return to the
country without any restrictions. Few returned in 1989 since
they enjoy a higher standard of living abroad than they would
in Equatorial Guinea. Also, the treatment of several
political exiles in 1988 underscored the Government's
determination to prevent any political role for persons with
views in opposition to the Government's (see Section l.d.).
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The people of Equatorial Guinea do not have the right to
change their government by democratic means. President Obiang
was reelected President in 1989 as the sole legal candidate.
Cristino Seriche Bioko, a Bubi , has held the office of Prime
Minister since 1982. Following the recent presidential
elections, Seriche was given the responsibility for
coordinating the administration of about half the government
ministries. Only members of the DPEG may hold public office.
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KOUATORIAL GUINEA
and the party controls the selection of all candidates. It is
uncertain whether all adults must pay party dues; in 1989 it
appeared that only government employees and employees of large
business establishments, i.e., those in the wage economy, must
do so .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In 1989 the Government showed greater willingness to interact
with international human rights organizations. The Government
publicly expressed the need to end human rights abuses. As
far as is known, the Government, after permitting an Amnesty
International (AI) mission to visit in 1988, did not respond
to AI's memorandum of November 1988 concerning unfair military
trials .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Although the law calls for equal treatment for all, tribal
groups are not always granted the same rights and privileges.
The Fang clans, of which President Obiang is a member,
dominate all aspects of government, the military, and social
life. Discrimination against the Bubi, Fernandino, and
Playero clans is consistent, whether in the granting of
political office or the approval of academic scholarships.
Women are confined largely to traditional roles, especially in
agriculture. A large majority of the population is
polygynous, and this has also contributed to the secondary
status in society given to women. Educational opportunities
are extremely limited for women. According to doctors in
hospitals, violence against women is not widespread, and abuse
of children is equally rare. The Government has not addressed
violence as an issue; it looks to the Ministry for the
Promotion of Women to advance the interests of women in
Equatoguinean society. According to the medical community,
female circumcision is not practiced in Equatorial Guinea.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Equatoguineans do not have the right of free association. In
the small wage economy, no labor organizations exist, although
there are a few cooperatives with limited power. Strikes are
prohibited by law. Equatorial Guinea has been a member of the
International Labor Organization since 1981 but has ratified
neither Convention 87 on Freedom of Association nor Convention
98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Equatorial Guinea has no legislation regarding these rights,
and there is no evidence of collective bargaining by any
group. There are no export processing or free trade zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor and slavery are prohibited by law. During 1989
no cases of forced or compulsory labor were reported. While
work roundups used to be routinely organized against third-
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
country Africans, forced labor of this type was restricted in
1989.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum age for employment is 16, but there is no
enforcement of this law. As in most of Africa, children at a
much earlier age assist families with traditional agricultural
production and sales.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is only a small industrial sector in the country. Most
salaried employment is provided by the Government,
construction companies, businesses providing retail goods and
services, and the plantation agricultural sector. In 1989
Equatorial Guinea had a statutory minimum wage of
approximately $35 per month, which was not adequate to provide
a decent living for a worker and family. The average monthly
wage was about $70 for the small percentage of the population
that had regular salaried employment, most of whom were
required to supplement this income with other income or
farming in order to provide a decent living for themselves and
their families. By law, working conditions included a maximum
48 hours workweek with a full day of rest each week plus
regularly scheduled national holidays. Occupational health
and safety standards do not exist. There was no effective
monitoring of work hours or labor conditions outside the
Government .
no
ETHIOPIA
The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is a
self-proclaimed Marxist state headed by President Mengistu
Hai le-Mariam, who came to power in 1977 following political
infighting for leadership of the 1974 revolution which
unseated Emperor Haile Selassie. A new Constitution in 1987
created new organs of government: a Council of State, a
Council of Ministers, and a Parliament (the Shengo) . The most
powerful institution in the country, however, is the
Marxist-Leninist Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) . Despite
the trappings of representative government, power remains in
the hands of President Mengistu, who is Chief of State,
General Secretary of the WPE, and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. Ethiopia is in a state of civil war, with the
regime seriously challenged by armed, active insurgencies
which during 1989 moved beyond regional borders.
Ethiopia's armed forces are the largest in sub-Saharan Africa,
numbering between 250,000 and 275,000. Cuban troops withdrew
in September after a 12-year presence. An extensive security
apparatus under the Ministry of Internal Affairs attempts to
control the population through a combination of surveillance
and informers. The Government justifies these security
measures and the size of its defense expenditures (estimated
at 60 percent of the government budget) on the basis of
external threats and internal insurrections. Military
setbacks in 1988 and 1989 compelled the Government to seek
diplomatic rapprochement with its neighbors and to try to
negotiate settlements with some internal opponents, most
notably with the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) ,
through the good offices of former U.S. President Carter, and
with the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) , under
Italian auspices.
The Ethiopian economy is based on agriculture, which
contributes 45 percent to the gross national product and more
than 80 percent of exports and employs 85 percent of the
population. Although the Government promotes the formation of
collectives and cooperatives, peasant farms still account for
about 93 percent of crop production, state farms for about 6
percent, and producers' cooperatives 1 percent. The major
agricultural export crop is coffee, providing 65 to 75 percent
of foreign exchange earnings. In 1988 the controversial
forced "resettlement" program of moving people vast distances
to unpopulated areas was suspended for lack of funds, but the
mandatory "villagization" program to move families into
villages in the same area continued in 1989, with no reports
of accompanying violence. Periodic drought and famine, the
Government's war effort, and Socialist economic policies have
made Ethiopia the world's poorest country, according to the
World Bank.
In 1989 the overall human rights situation in Ethiopia
remained generally deplorable. Major concerns included:
widespread abuses such as summary executions by all parties to
Ethiopia's civil strife; the use of torture as an accepted
practice in interrogation; arbitrary, incommunicado
detentions; the lack of fair public trials; serious
restrictions on freedom of speech and press, assembly and
association, and the right of citizens to change their
government; and limitations on women's and worker rights. In
May there was a coup attempt by the military leaders in which
atrocities were committed on both sides. However, in
September the Government announced the release of remaining
Ill
ETHIOPIA
members of the royal family and 84 other political prisoners.
The Government has shown new tolerance of religious
organizations and activities, including unacknowledged
emigration of Ethiopian Jews as part of improved relations
with Israel. While emigration remains restricted, the
Government issued passports in unprecedented numbers. It
allowed relief groups relative freedom in pursuing
humanitarian concerns. i
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The May coup attempt resulted directly from military
disenchantment with the regime and followed the loss of the
Tigray region to insurgents in February. The attempted coup
resulted in the executions of an unknown number of
generals — one estimate stated 38 senior officers were
executed — and other senior military officials and in the
imprisonment of nearly 200 others. Atrocities occurred on
both sides, with coup plotters murdering the Minister of
Defense, and loyalists killing rebellious generals. In
December the trial of the 14 most senior officers arrested in
the aftermath of the coup attempt began.
As a consequence of military setbacks in Tigray, the
Government resorted to the forced conscription of youths in
their early teens in April and May, which fed public
discontent at the time of the coup. After new military
reverses in the autumn, the Government launched a particularly
brutal conscription campaign in November. Some youths who
resisted conscription were shot. Reports also surfaced in
1989 that guards used lethal force against children
demonstrating at a government-run orphanage in November 1988,
resulting in four deaths. The guards responsible for the
deaths were arrested and charged. The results of this case
remain unknown.
Security forces used excessive force following the coup
attempt to quash student demonstrations, reportedly killing
two students (see Section 2.b.).
b. Disappearance
There were no reports during 1989 of politically motivated
disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The 1987 Constitution notably omits a passage from the 1955
constitution prohibiting cruel and inhuman punishment.
Torture has been used against members of most opposition
groups, including the EPLF, the TPLF, and the Oromo Liberation
Front (OLF) .
Political prisoners are initially taken to central
investigation centers operated by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, such as the central prison and the notorious "Third
Police Station" in Addis Ababa or the Mariam Gimki Center in
Asmara. Interrogation is often combined with physical abuse,
especially for those suspected of affiliation with an
opposition or insurgent group. Common methods of torture
include beating on the soles of the feet, suspension from a
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ETHIOPIA
rope in a contorted position, death threats, mock executions,
sleep deprivation, and submergence to the point of
unconsciousness in tanks of water.
Following the May coup attempt, Addis Ababa's political
detention centers were reportedly the sites of torture, as was
the basement of the Menelik (or Grand) Palace. Ethiopian
television showed film footage of the mutilated body of one of
the coup plotters. Additionally, both sides desecrated the
corpses of generals involved in the attempt. Coup
sympathizers reportedly ezhumed the body of the murdered
Minister of Defense, dismembered it, and left the remains in a
ditch. On the other side, loyalists in northern Ethiopia
beheaded the corpse of General Demissie Bulto (a coup
sympathizer and former commander of the Second Army) and
paraded the head through the streets of Asmara.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The 1987 Constitution provides for arraignment in court within
48 hours, arrest warrants, a fair trial, protection against
self-incrimination, and the right to counsel; however,
Ethiopians suspected of antigovernment actions or sentiments
continue to be subject to arrest or detention by the police
without charge or judicial review. In politically sensitive
arrests, the Government generally prefers to operate in
secret, taking the suspect from home at night.
Reports of arrests and detentions following the May coup
attempt attest to the fact that these practices continued in
1989. Additionally, family members of some alleged coup
participants were arrested in broad daylight in a surprise
move by authorities reacting to public rumors that arrests
would only happen at night. Treatment of officers arrested in
the coup attempt reportedly improved substantially by the end
of 1989.
On September 2, the Government released 87 prominent political
prisoners, some of whom had "disappeared" in previous years.
These prisoners were part of a larger amnesty on the eve of
the Ethiopian New Year. In addition to the release of three
grandsons of former Emperor Haile Selassie, the release
included former Ambassador to Canada and Permanent U.N.
Representative Berhanu Dinka, who "disappeared" in 1986, and
long-missing members of political movements who fell out of
favor with the Government during the turbulent late 1970's.
In the wake of the amnesty, Ethiopia's remaining political
detainees are estimated at between 400 and 500. At least 17
members of the EPLF, TPLF, OLF, and other groups are held in
two prisons in the Addis Ababa area. As in the past, sketchy
information, especially as regards the situation in northern
Ethiopia, pre\/ents accurate estimates of the total number of
opposition group members remaining in prison.
A state of emergency declared in 1988 remains in effect in
Eritrea and Tigray. Under it, security forces are empowered
to stop, detain, and hold indefinitely without court or
prosecutor's warrant, any person who has violated or is
suspected of having violated the special emergency decree or
who in any manner disturbs law and order within the emergency
areas .
An unspecified number of refugees from the Somali camps at
Aware in eastern Ethiopia were arrested for selling food
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ETHIOPIA
ration coupons. At year's end, they were being held without
trial by local Ethiopian authorities.
In Eritrea, 60 EPLF members took advantage of a government
amnesty offer and surrendered for reeducation and
reintegration into society. Voluntary repatriation, however,
has not greatly reduced the number of Ethiopians who remain in
exile, unable to return to Ethiopia for fear of persecution.
As many as 1 million Ethiopians are believed to have taken up
refuge in neighboring countries.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Ethiopia's judicial system remains bifurcated in practice if
not in theory. While nonpolitical civil and criminal
offenders are usually granted fair public trial, military and
political cases are subject to official manipulation and
executive meddling. The definition of what constitutes a
"political" case is sometimes farfetched and usually relates
to the Government's preoccupation with internal security.
The Supreme Court is at the apex of the judicial system.
Other judicial bodies include a newly announced Supreme Court
Council, a Worker's Control Committee, and military courts in
contested areas. Kebeles (urban neighborhood organizations
controlled by the WPE) have since the 1974 revolution been the
primary local units of judicial decisionmaking and law
enforcement. Their work has been marked by arbitrariness and
a failure to follow procedures that would ensure the right to
a fair trial supposedly guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution.
When the Ministry of Internal Affairs allows political trials
to take place, they are almost always held in secret, with
only the verdict (if even that) publicly announced. Even
prisoners cleared of charges or whose terms have been
completed may not be promptly released from prison. Some of
the most senior officers detained after the coup attempt were
arraigned in December before a military tribunal in public
session attended by local and foreign journalists. While this
does not by itself guarantee a fair trial, it is at least less
arbitrary than prior practices.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The 1987 Constitution provides for the "inviolability of the
house" and protects against unlawful entry into private
homes. In practice, warrants are not used for searches of
offices or private homes. In Eritrea and other war-torn areas
the state of emergency affords the armed forces great latitude
in searching or even confiscating suspected premises.
In the aftermath of the attempted coup in May, some families
of suspected coup plotters were subjected to searches of their
homes and seizure of their property, even though the targeted
suspect may have already been in custody.
Surveillance of persons, both visual and electronic, is not
subject to legal restraints. All mail is subject to
government monitoring. Ethiopian citizens can be called in at
any time for questioning by authorities and for mandatory
kebele meetings, political rallies, or marches. Refusal to
appear for any of the events may result in imprisonment
without hearing.
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ETHIOPIA
Local kebele association officials monitor urban Ethiopians,
whereas peasant association leaders perform the same function
in the countryside. These officials monitor visitors, items
brought in and out of houses, any meetings, and adherence to
local curfews. The scope of such surveillance and petty
interference in the private lives of Ethiopian citizens
depends heavily on the makeup of the kebele and its leadership.
There are some indications that kebele control has diminished
somewhat over the last year as a result of the general decline
in the authority of the Government among many Ethiopians. The
Government has also taken some steps to remove unpopular
measures by: reducing pressure to join the WPE; no longer
requiring party uniforms to be worn in government offices; and
lifting the ban on Sunday driving.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The major events influencing human rights in Ethiopia during
1989 were fighting in the northern parts of the country during
the spring and fall, and the coup attempt against President
Mengistu in May. Ethiopia's civil war, now in its 28th year,
continues to dominate the decisions of a government pursuing
its self-preservation at all costs. Both the Government and
the various insurgent movements have practiced forced
conscription, imprisonment without recourse, violence against
civilian populations, torture, and extrajudicial killing.
These abuses have taken place during a civil war and under a
declared state of emergency in the northern part of the
country.
Major insurgent groups include the EPLF, active in Eritrea;
the TPLF, active in Gonder, Shewa, Tigray, and Welo; the OLF,
active in southeastern and western Ethiopia; the Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) , active in areas of Gonder
and Meketel; and a new umbrella group calling itself the
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) ,
comprising the TPLF and its ally, the Ethiopian People's
Democratic Movement (EPDM) . There are another half-dozen
minor insurgent groups.
Insurgent forces made major advances in 1989 with the capture
of Tigray and lightning thrusts south within 70 miles of Addis
Ababa. According to press reports, the rebels claimed to have
killed, wounded, or captured an estimated 30,000 to 40,000
government soldiers and seized millions of dollars worth of
military equipment during an autumn campaign. Also, in
September the Air Force recommenced the terror bombing of
Tigrayan towns on crowded market days. When government forces
bombed Mekele, the capital of Tigray, school children were
among the casualties.
The poor showing of government forces in 1989 could be traced
to poor morale, use of forced conscription, and to the loss of
over 200 military officers in the May coup attempt.
Eyewitnesses reported that government security forces killed
and wounded teenagers resisting conscription. Ethiopian
authorities also reportedly tried to impress a number of
Somali Isaak refugees from refugee camps close to the Somali
border; however, the refugees were released after they had
been positively identified as Somalis by camp personnel.
Recent Ethiopian returnees from Somalia were explicitly
exempted from conscription by the Government.
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ETHIOPIA
During 1989 there were credible reports that all major parties
to Ethiopia's civil war engaged in abduction, imprisonment
without trial, torture, and summary execution of internal and
external opponents. Factional disputes within and between
insurgent groups were particularly violent, and included
assassination of leaders. There are credible reports that the
TPLF has forcibly conscripted teenagers and others as porters
and support workers. In some areas the EPLF, the TPLF, and
the OLF abducted local officials. There are numerous, albeit
unconfirmed, accounts from TPLF-controlled areas of closed
churches, destroyed clinics and schools, and destruction of
basic infrastructure by the insurgents.
Little information is available on the treatment of prisoners
of war (POW's). One insurgent group, the TPLF, as a matter of
practice releases ordinary soldiers upon capture, after
disarming them and confiscating their footwear. The rationale
for this action by the TPLF appears both humane (as a
guerrilla group they cannot care for large numbers of POW's)
and tactical, since it encourages some GPDRE units to
surrender. On December 31, the EPLF announced plans to
release 10,000 POW's under its control.
Both the Government and the insurgents have seized upon the
desperate need for food relief in 1989/90 as a political
issue. Deliberately or not, the Government has underestimated
the need for food relief in some insurgent-controlled areas.
The EPLF and TPLF initially insisted on complete control over
food distribution in areas held by them. By the end of 1989,
however, there appeared to be some flexibility on all sides.
Relief organizations and volunteer groups were allowed
relative freedom in pursuing their humanitarian activities in
all areas controlled by the Government. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), however, has been denied
access to Eritrea following a dispute with the Government.
The TPLF and EPLF have allowed these relief groups only
limited access into areas under their control. There were no
reported attacks on relief workers during 1989 by either
government or rebel forces, although Ethiopian staff members
were killed in riots at refugee camps in southwestern Ethiopia.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
There is no freedom of speech or press in Ethiopia. The
Government closely monitors the pronouncements of public
officials, academicians, and clergy. Some instructors and
professors in secondary schools and at the university have
resisted the politicization of education. Academic freedom,
although seriously circumscribed, still finds limited
expression at the university.
The Government owns and operates all information media and
exercises censorship through editorial boards and the Ministry
of Information. Expression of unauthorized political opinions
or of views at variance with the official government line can
result in imprisonment. Political, economic, and social
policies are formulated at the top levels of the government-
controlled media and government-organized citizen groups.
Books and magazines are confiscated if deemed to contain
sentiments opposed to the regime. Foreign magazines and
newspapers are not readily available since foreign exchange is
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ETHIOPIA
not granted to purchase them. Foreign radio broadcasts and
those of opposition groups are widely listened to by
Ethiopians .
During the search for the late U.S. Representative Mickey
Leland and his party, the local press gave relatively open,
accurate, and extensive coverage of the operation, and the
Government allowed the foreign press corps freely to enter the
country and to file reports without interference.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Notwithstanding constitutional provisions, assembly of any
sort not previously approved by the Government is forbidden.
In contrast, attendance at government-sponsored rallies,
meetings, and parades is frequently mandatory and enforced by
a wide range of sanctions. However, whereas frequent or close
association with foreigners in the past may have resulted in
government harassment and occasional detention, this is
generally no longer the case. Trade and professional
associations, such as the Rotary and Lions Clubs, are allowed
to operate, although their membership and activities are
monitored by the Government.
In late May, students at Addis Ababa University attempted
several demonstrations against the Government in the wake of
the attempted coup. However, internal security forces,
including special commandos, used excessive force to beat back
the students before actual demonstrations began, reportedly
killing 2 students and arresting at least 100. Similar
incidents occurred at the local commercial and technical
schools. Additional reports indicate the police broke up a
student demonstration in Addis Ababa's Revolution Square by
firing warning shots into the air. No one was killed,
injured, or arrested on that occasion.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Ethiopian nationalism and traditional values, including
religion, are an integral part of the national culture.
Government policy no longer ignores or tries to suppress
religion. In fact, religion is now being factored into
aspects of national planning. This planning, though, extends
to the selection of religious leaders sympathetic to party
policy. The Government nationalized most church property
(thought to include as much as 30 percent of all land holdings
in Ethiopia at the time) when it took power in 1974, and the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church reportedly is dependent on annual
government compensation payments to cover clerical salaries.
The Government's new attitude toward religion has resulted in
increased respect for freedom of worship and proselytism for
the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and Islam as provided in the
1987 Constitution. The Government continues to monitor
religious practice and any teaching which might be contrary to
its political views.
Party members are officially prohibited from worshiping, but
this ban is not enforced. According to press reports, kebele
officials often discourage church attendance, generally by
scheduling mandatory meetings on Sunday mornings. The
Government expunges reference to any deity from official
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ETHIOPIA
Statements and publications, television programs, and films,
although government-controlled media still give routine
coverage to church affairs and religious festivals. Ethiopian
Orthodox church and Islamic holidays are recognized by the
Government, and officials of both religions are allowed to
exercise jurisdiction over civil matters such as marriage.
Foreign Protestant evangelical organizations have experienced
a general trend of greater tolerance from central and local
government officials over the last 3 years. Local government
officials allowed a number of churches that had been closed to
reopen. The September 2 amnesty included the release of the
leaders of the Ethiopian Evangelical Mekane Yesus Church, some
of whom were arrested over 5 years ago. The Government issues
permits to foreign missionaries to enter and work in Ethiopia
in limited numbers, although ostensibly as development
specialists, not as missionaries. The Jehovah's Witnesses,
however, remain banned.
Ethiopia's small Jewish population, known as Beta Israel or
"Falasha" (a word meaning immigrant or outsider), lives in
Gonder and Tigray, areas often associated with recurring
insurgent activity. There have been no reports this year of
atrocities or discrimination toward Ethiopian Jewry at the
hands of Ethiopian authorities. Incidents of murder and
thievery reported in late 1988 were attributed to long-running
social conflicts in which land disputes and criminal activity
are seen as motivating factors; those Ethiopian Jews who were
victims were not attacked primarily because of their religious
beliefs. The Government permits f oreign-sourced development
assistance directed at Jewish areas, including assistance used
for the construction of synagogues. The burning of a
synagogue near Gonder city in November resulted from a fight
between two Jewish communities over the location of a new
synagogue.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement within Ethiopia increased markedly during
1989. While insurgent-held areas in Tigray remain
inaccessible to both Ethiopians and foreigners, the Government
allowed resumption of travel by citizens between Addis Ababa
and Asmara, the capital of Eritrea. The Government's
controversial internal resettlement program remained suspended
for lack of funding. Reports indicate that some of those
previously resettled have been trickling back to their
original home areas.
The Government's mandatory villagization campaign, which
collects scattered rural farmers into newly created villages,
continued in 1989. It is sanctioned under the 1987
Constitution, which states that "the state shall encourage the
scattered rural population to aggregate in order to change
their backward living conditions and to enable them to lead a
better life." The Government has announced plans that call
for 50 percent of the rural population to be moved into
villages by 1993. Unlike in prior years, there were no
reports during 1989 of violence associated with villagization.
Travel abroad by Ethiopians was much freer in 1989 than in
prior years, as the Government began issuing passports in
unprecedented numbers. However, the processing of passport
applications remains long and laborious. Exit visas must be
used within 15 days of issue, and renewal can be difficult.
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ETHIOPIA
Foreigners wishing to travel within Ethiopia must still obtain
travel permits, and access to areas of conflict remains
restricted. For diplomats, however, the process of obtaining
permits to travel to areas not in conflict has become largely
a formality. During 1989, only one permit request was denied
to U.S. Embassy personnel.
Emigration remains highly restricted, though marriage to or
adoption by foreign nationals is allowed. The Ethiopian
Government responded sharply to the U.S. Government's 1989
immigrant visa lottery. Ethiopian postal authorities
reportedly destroyed 100,000 applications mailed by those
wanting to participate in the program. People coming to the
Embassy for applications were beaten back by police at the
Embassy's gates.
Illegal emigration remains punishable by imprisonment or, in
exceptional cases, by death. Nonetheless, considerable
illegal emigration occurs either under the subterfuge of
travel abroad for business or to visit relatives, or by
overland treks and surreptitious crossing of borders.
The Government recognizes the right of voluntary repatriation,
and its proclamation of amnesty for Ethiopians living abroad
(numbering more than 1 million) remains in effect. Most of
these are in neighboring countries, mainly in refugee camps.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
repatriation programs have successfully repatriated
approximately 10,000 Ethiopians from Djibouti, Somalia, and
Sudan since 1986. As of 1989, these official and spontaneous
returnees came under the purview of a new tripartite
commission composed of the Ethiopian and Somali Governments
and the UNHCR.
There are no reports that returnees were mistreated or
discriminated against upon their return. Ethiopian refugees
in northern Somalia also may have returned to Ethiopia in an
effort to flee civil strife in that country.
Instability in neighboring countries has stimulated a
large-scale refugee movement into Ethiopia, with almost
800,000 entering the country--over 450,000 from Sudan and
350,000 from Somalia. Limited access to refugee camps by the
international community has made it possible to monitor the
level of relief and protection provided, although the
Government has denied UNHCR permission to stay in the camps
overnight .
There have been no reports that the Government has
systematically denied aid to refugees in Ethiopia. Also,
there were no reports of forcible repatriation. Violence at
Somali refugee camps during July and early August was mostly
among refugees themselves, although an Ethiopian guard was
killed. Ethiopian staff members were killed during uprisings
at Sudanese refugee camps at Fugnido and Itang during late
September, which resulted from tribal tension between local
Anuak people and Dinka and Nuer refugees.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change their Government
Citizens of Ethiopia are not free to change their government.
The 1987 Constitution institutionalizes all power in the WPE,
the President, his advisers, and the 23-member Council of
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ETHIOPIA
State. Political and economic policies are still dictated to
the populace with little opportunity for public debate.
The WPE and its mass organizations purport to offer Ethiopian
citizens a means of participation in government, but their
real role is to ensure adherence to Marxist-Leninist
principles. Official pressure on higher-level government
officials to join the WPE has slacked off in recent years.
Many members of the bureaucracy have declined party membership
without an adverse effect on their careers. Kebeles, the
primary party/government control mechanisms at the local
level, control housing allocation, basic food rationing,
political indoctrination, and implementation of other
government policies, such as registration and selection of
youths for national military service.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government resists attempts by international and
nongovernmental organizations to investigate human rights
cases. It did not respond to Amnesty International's call in
1988 for an impartial investigation into reports of
extrajudicial killings and lengthy and arbitrary detentions,
particularly in Eritrea and Tigray. Ethiopian authorities did
respond positively in 1989 to an international human rights
organization's request for a list of the 87 political
prisoners covered by the September 2 amnesty. There is no
governmental or private body to investigate alleged human
rights violations. Ethiopia is not a signatory to any of the
United Nations human rights documents or the African Charter
of Human and Peoples' Rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for the equality of all Ethiopians
irrespective of nationality, sex, religion, occupation, social
or other status. The highest government echelons are no
longer dominated by the Amhara ethnic group but include many
Oromos and a few Eritreans and Tigrayans. However, almost all
senior government and political figures are of Christian
origin, although the population is approximately 50 percent
Muslim.
American visitors to areas inhabited by Ethiopian Jews report
the existence of some economic discrimination. The general
poverty of the Jews has been aggravated by the Government's
villagization campaign, which is true of other farmers forced
to relocate from their traditional farming areas.
The rights of women are protected and women are promised
additional government support by the Constitution. However,
sex discrimination persists in Ethiopia's tradition-bound
culture. Various U.N. studies note cultural and traditional
biases, marriages imposed at a very young age, hard and
time-consuming labor, inadequate employment opportunities, and
below-average wages in urban areas.
village leadership is invariably male, and all clergy are
male. However, women in the principal Ethiopian cultures
(Oromo, Amhara, Eritrean, and Tigray) enjoy certain economic
rights equal to those of men. They may inherit, sell or buy
property, and engage in business. In some rural areas, women
24-ann r\ on
120
have a subservient status within the home, and child marriages
remain common, despite opposition by the Government.
Cultural attitudes about violence against women have improved
since the 1974 revolution. While wife beating continues to be
a problem, it is no longer as common as it once was. An
Ethiopian woman does have redress to police protection if she
is subjected to beatings by her husband, but the police are
sometimes slow to respond. Women have successfully
adjudicated many domestic violence cases in kebele courts,
with offending husbands sometimes placed in kebele detention
centers .
Long established practices, such as female genital mutilation
(circumcision), remain common among Ethiopian Orthodox
Christian and Muslim families. The Ministry of Health,
religious organizations, the Revolutionary Women's Association
(created in 1980 with the goal of improving the status of
women), and nongovernmental organizations have engaged in an
education and health campaign at the village level to
sensitize the populace against female circumcision, early
marriage, and harmful nutritional practices. A central tenet
of this campaign is that female circumcision is itself an act
of violence against women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
These is no independent labor movement in Ethiopia. The labor
force is organized into two umbrella mass organizations under
the control of the only legal political party. The Government
sees its own interests and those of working people as
identical and considers a single trade union structure
necessary to build a developed. Socialist society. The right
to strike is not recognized, and strikes are rare.
The Ethiopian Trade Union (ETU) embraces industrial and urban
workers with a combined membership of 318,000 (1988). Many of
ETU's top leaders have been trained in Eastern Europe, and as
an organization the ETU seeks to implement government policy,
expand control over the workplace, and prevent work
stoppages. The ETU is a member of Africa's continent-wide
official trade union body, the Organization of African Trade
Union Unity, and is affiliated with the Communist-controlled
World Federation of Trade Unions.
Rural workers are organized under the Ethiopian Peasants'
Association (EPA), which has 5.7 million members. The EPA is
an umbrella organization of some 20,000 smaller peasants'
associations, and in addition to being an implement of
government control, promotes literacy and advances
agricultural techniques. In some areas the local peasants'
associations have tax collection and militia responsibilities.
Despite guarantees on the freedom of association in the 1987
Consitution (Article 47), farmers and workers are not
permitted to organize outside the two recognized mass
organizations. Ethiopia has consistently been criticized by
the International Labor Organization (ILO) Governing Board for
failure to observe ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of
Association, which Ethiopia has ratified.
In 1989 the ILO's Committee of Experts noted that a draft
labor code is being drawn up and expressed the hope that it
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ETHIOPIA
would correct existing defects such as the imposition of a
single trade union system, the legal obligation of trade
unions and peasants' associations to disseminate among workers
the Government's development plans and Marxist-Leninist
theories, the right of the ETU to affiliate with international
organizations, restrictions on the right to strike, and
nonrecognition of trade union rights for public servants and
domestic personnel.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
In practice, collective bargaining does not exist. There are
no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Slavery was officially abolished in Ethiopia in 1942, but the
legal code does not otherwise address the issue of forced or
compulsory labor. In Socialist Ethiopia, citizens are
sometimes called on to perform certain civic obligations,
including "volunteer" assistance in community work projects
such as road-building and emergency repair. In factories,
workers are also expected to "volunteer" extra hours at no
pay, so production quotas can be met.
In 1989 the expanding civil conflict led to an often violent
forced conscription of teenage youths. Beginning in April,
there were eyewitness accounts of trucks picking up youths as
young as 13 from Addis Ababa's market area. The latest round
up of teenagers in Addis Ababa occurred in November. Forced
conscription was also reported in other areas of the country.
The young conscripts were often under armed guard and, by some
accounts, sometimes chained together to prevent their escape.
Quotas were established for each of Addis Ababa's kebeles.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The contract employment of children under the age of 14 is
prohibited in Ethiopia. This restriction appears to be
respected in factories, shops, and among domestic workers,
although children under 14 are frequently seen as street
vendors or beggars.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Current working conditions vary according to occupation and
region, but hours are generally long, conditions poor, and
wages low. Given high unemployment, there is pressure for
existing jobs in the modern economy. The minimum wage in
Ethiopia is 93 cents per day. Even in a country with the low
per capita GDP of $106, such a low minimum wage is not
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for an urban
worker and family. On the other hand, only unskilled day
laborers usually receive such a low wage.
Fringe benefits not required by law (transportation, meals,
shelter) raise the effective minimum wage. In some
corporations, fringe benefits reportedly account for almost
half of the payroll. Low-paid workers often supplement their
income by holding multiple jobs, receiving help from the
extended family, and engaging in subsistence farming.
Government wages have been frozen for 15 years. Some internal
government surveys reveal that as many as two of every five
salaried government workers earn less than what is required to
purchase a typical Ethiopian "grocery basket."
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ETHIOPIA
The law establishes 8-hour workdays and 48-hour workweeks.
The maximum legal workweek is generally respected in practice,
but as noted there is much uncompensated "volunteer" labor to
meet factory or office quotas. Health and safety codes for
the workplace are rudimentary and remain unenforced.
Compensation for occupational injuries and disabilities is
mandatory.
123
SABQH
President Omar Bongo, the head of Gabon's sole political party,
the Democratic Party of Gabon (PDG), has been reelected three
times in uncontested elections, most recently in November
1986. A 1983 constitutional amendment provides that only the
President-Founder of the party (President Bongo) may be a
candidate for president. Presidential power is extensive but
in practice is somewhat limited by a complex governmental
structure, which includes a 42-member Cabinet headed by the
Prime Minister. The 120-member National Assembly has no real
power. All major ethnic groups and regions are represented in
the Government, Political Bureau, and Central Committee of the
party.
The armed forces are comprised of approximately 4,000 army,
navy, and air force personnel. Internal security is shared by
the Gendarmerie, a paramilitary force of 2,700, and the
National Police, consisting of 2,000 troops, which works with
the Gendarmerie to maintain law and order in Libreville, Port
Gentil, and other provincial capitals. Uncontrolled
immigration is of particular concern. Security forces monitor
the presence and activities of thousands of illegal aliens and
occasionally conduct campaigns to find and deport them.
Gabon's relatively high per capita income ($3,200 in 1989) is
based on oil revenues, but it belies the underdeveloped nature
of the country and its economy. Although endowed with
petroleum, manganese, uranium, and vast timber resources, Gabon
has had limited agricultural and industrial development and
must import most of its food and manufactured goods. Rain
forest covers 85 percent of the country, and approximately
two-thirds of the populace lives in remote areas. The
TransGabon railroad, completed in 1986, now connects the
coastal capital of Libreville to Franceville in the southeast
interior. Due to the precipitous fall in revenue from oil
exports in recent years, the Government has imposed austerity
measures to meet World Bank and International Monetary Fund
program criteria. A massive onshore oil field discovered in
southern Gabon should boost petroleum output by 50 percent by
1990.
Human rights continued to be tightly restricted in 1989.
Principal concerns included mistreatment of prisoners and
detainees (there continued to be allegations of mistreatment of
Equatorial Guineans held as illegal aliens by the security
forces), lack of procedural safeguards in State Security Court
trials, and restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, and
assembly.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known political killings or summary executions in
1989.
b. Disappearance
There were no known cases of abductions or disappearances
ascribed to government security forces or any other group.
124
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Gabonese law and security enforcement officials use beatings as
part of the interrogation process. Two persons arrested in
conjunction with a foiled coup plot in late 1989 subsequently
died while in custody. According to the Government, one died
from malaria and the other from a combination of diabetes and
hypertension. No independent medical confirmation of the
causes of death had been made available by year's end.
Prison conditions are harsh, and the main prison, Central
Prison, has poor hygiene, inadequate medical facilities, and
insufficient food. No specific instances of mistreatment of
prisoners came to light in 1989, but Amnesty International's
(AI) 1988 Report stated that a number of criminal suspects and
alleged illegal aliens had been beaten and tortured at Central
Prison in Libreville in 1987.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Gabonese law protects against arbitrary detention through
clearly articulated judicial procedures (in the French
tradition) . Security forces have been known to disregard the
procedures, particularly in security cases, by detaining
persons indefinitely without charge. The Constitution
specifies that "acts against the security of the State" and
"actions against the Chief of State," which can include
advocating a multiparty system, are punishable crimes. There
were, however, no known political detainees or prisoners held
during 1989.
Exile is not used as a means of political control nor as a
sentence for convicted criminals. With regard to forced or
compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The court system, modeled on the French, has several levels.
The trial court (Tribunal de Premier Instance) hears questions
of fact and law in civil, commercial, ordinary criminal and
administrative cases. The appellate level is divided into two
courts, with a separate appeals court for criminal cases. The
highest level, the Supreme Court, has four chambers.
Outside the normal court system, there is a military tribunal
to handle all offenses under military law, a State Security
Court, and a special criminal court which deals with fraud and
embezzlement of public funds by officials. The right to a fair
public trial is provided for in the Constitution and generally
has been respected in criminal cases, but important procedural
safeguards are lacking in State Security Court trials. State
Security Court trials are open to the public, and defendants
are represented by counsel, with the right to appeal to the
Supreme Court or, if turned down by the Supreme Court, to the
President. However, court officials are appointed by the
President, who can also transfer and dismiss them by decree.
Although the judiciary is susceptible to intervention by the
executive, particularly in political or security cases, there
was no indication that such intervention occurred in 1989. On
January 1, 1989, and and on the 20th anniversary of the ruling
PDG, President Bongo continued his practice of commuting the
sentences of first offenders who were not convicted of first
degree murder or armed robbery.
125
QABQH
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Search warrants may be obtained after the fact but, as
occasionally happens in cases of suspected illegal aliens,
sometimes they are not obtained at all. There were credible
reports that in many cases the homes of those detained were
ransacked by security forces who confiscated personal effects.
The Government periodically monitors communications.
Membership in the ruling PDG is not mandatory, but it enhances
opportunities for political and career advancement. Gabonese
citizens' livelihoods are not normally compromised by failure
to join the party.
Section 2 Respect For Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These freedoms are restricted. Neither direct public criticism
of the President nor advocacy of a multiparty political system
is permitted. Gabonese citizens with access to the President
can express (and have expressed) their views, including
criticisms, directly to him in private meetings, and there has
been no retribution as a result. Public media — radio,
television, and the sole daily newspaper L 'Union — are
controlled by the Ministry of Information and disseminate
government visws and communiques. The media carry wire service
material (mostly Agence France Presse) which gives the public
some coverage of world events. The broadcasts of prodemocracy
demonstrations in China were apparently edited by the local
television station which downplayed the impact of the mass
demonstrations. However, the Government allowed the French
satellite system to broadcast these events. The President
encourages journalists to point out failures of individual
government officials or ministries and to highlight
inefficiency and corruption. Although foreign books and
magazines containing "scurrilous" material have been banned in
the past, this practice has not occurred in recent years.
Academic freedom is limited and public criticism of the
President or of the political system is not allowed. In 1989
students engaged in protest actions against curriculum content.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Government limits freedom of assembly and association to
recognized organizations. Permits and police notification are
required for all outdoor meetings. The Government generally
permits such meetings only if they are organized by the ruling
party (and its ancillary units such as the women's, youth, and
labor movements), cultural and entertainment impresarios, or
recognized church groups. Demonstrations are not permitted.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion, and the Constitution provides for
religious freedom. Because their activities were considered by
the Government as fostering disunity, Jehovah's Witnesses and
several small syncretistic sects were banned by presidential
decree in 1970. The decree was reiterated in 1985. As
recently as 1987, the courts sentenced 24 Jehovah's Witnesses
to short or suspended terms for belonging to a banned
organization.
126
The primary faiths are Catholic and Protestant. There are a
few Muslims (including President Bongo) and numerous adherents
to traditional religions. Foreign missionaries, including
Americans, are engaged actively in evangelical and
administrative capacities.
d. Freedotn of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Movement of i>oth Gabonese citizens and expatriates within the
country is not restricted formally, but travelsrs occasionally
encounter gendarmerie control points where identity cards and
other documents are examined. While Gabonese citizens may
return freely to Gabon from abroad, they must obtain exit
permits from the police, and government employees must obtain
permission to travel abroad.
There are approximately 200,000 non-Gabonese resident in Gabon,
many of whom ace from Equatorial Guinea or Cameroon.
Imm?.gro;.lon laws and presidential deciaes promulgated in 1985
imposed heavy monetary guarantee requirements on non-French and
non-American axpatriates working in Gabon and leviad exit visa ■
fees for each departure from che country. The Gendarmerie
periodica-^.y det3ins undocumented aliens who are :hen placed in
a holding camp under harsh condi.ions. Most of che decainees
are .oleased if-sr paying fines and bribes. In August the
Government of Senegal arranged for the voluntary repatriation
from Gabon of some 1,000 of its citizens.
The Government encourages but does not Eorce "regroupment ' — the
voluntary consolidation of small rural communicies into larger
villages along a road — by enhancing the delivery of public
services such 3S water, electricity, and schooling m the
larger 7:>. xiages .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights; The Right of Citizens
CO Chahge Their Government
The present policical system does not accord citizens che right
to change their govsrnment through the electoral process. The
Democratic Party of Gabon (PDG) is the sole political party of
Gabon. A party rrons: itu~ion amendment (March 1981) restricts
candidacy for presidential elections lO the Founder -President
of che PDG Among party members, there is competicion cor
elections to the National Assembly and for posicions on the
Central Committee, but this maneuvering is wichin the sole
political perty Presidential elections are held during the
7th year of the President's term. Nacional Assembly merabei:s
are elected for 5 years The f^ounci] of Ministers, which meets
under the chairmanship of the President or, occasionally ':he
Prime Minister, approves all government decisions proposed by
che President. The 42-membei Cabinet (reshuffled slightly in
August) includes representatives o^ maior ethnic groupb from
all regions of the country This large Cabinet allows the
various interest groups to havn a review role in policy
formulation, a share in politica) patronage, and a consultative
role on national resource distribution.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Ailegec Violations
of Human Rights
Gabon has not been the object of human •. ights investigations in
recent years, but in 1989 it invited representacives of Amnesty
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GAfiQH
International and other human rights organizations to visit
Gabon to ensure that coup plotters arrested in August receive
good treatment and due process of law. President Bongo
repeated his invitation to human rights observers in a November
address to the nation in which he also announced that the coup
plotters would be tried by the civil courts rather than placed
under the jurisdiction of a military court. There are no local
human rights groups. In the cabinet reshuffle of August,
responsibility for human rights questions remained with the
Secretary of State for Promotion of Women.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Gabon's relative prosperity has enabled the Government to
extend health and social security benefits to all its people,
regardless of tribal affiliation or region. Recent
difficulties in maintaining these benefits have been due to
severe budget cutbacks rather than to discriminatory
practices. There are no significant ethnic, racial, religious,
or social groups that have recently suffered mistreatment by
the Government.
Urban women are moving increasingly into the professions due to
improved educational opportunities, including in technical
training institutions in urban areas. Government and party
policies are supportive. In rural Gabon women still fill
largely traditional roles built around family and village,
e.g., hauling water, tending fields. The gradual introduction
of piped-in water and of electricity has had the effect of
improving living standards for rural women.
Violence against women in Gabon, including wife beating,
occurs, but there are no studies or statistics available to
help determine the extent of the problem. However, violence
against women is believed to be infrequent as it is not part of
the traditional social contest. The incidents that are
reported in the media from time to time invariably have their
genesis within the context of domestic disputes or are related
to violence against prostitutes. The Government does not
condone such behavior but has not directly addressed the issue.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers may organize labor unions but are not free to form and
join unions of their own choosing. All unions must be
affiliated with the government-sponsored Labor Confederation of
Gabon (COSYGA) , which is a specialized organ of the PDG and the
sole labor federation. It is estimated that over half of
Gabon's 90,000 salaried private-sector workers are unionized.
Government employees are not permitted to belong to unions.
Under Gabonese law, the right to strike continues to be
severely restricted; strikes are illegal if they occur before
remedies prescribed under the Labor Code (1978) have been
exhausted. In June demonstrators gathered outside the
presidential palace to protest a change in the Labor Code which
would have legalized piece-rate work in the industrial sector.
President Bongo met with a labor delegation to discuss the
matter, and he later agreed to rescind the announced change.
In an unusual conciliatory move, the demonstrators were paid
their regular wages for the afternoon of the demonstration.
Utilities workers in Gabon's oil capital of Port Gentil have
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GABON
Staged work stoppages in the past to protest government-ordered
cuts in salaries and personnel at the state-owned utilities
company.
COSYGA is a member of the Organization of African Trade Union
Unity and maintains ties with the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations and other national trade
union centers.
In its 1989 report, the ILO Committee of Experts (COE)
indicated that, in order to conform with Convention 87 on
Freedom of Association, the Government should revise existing
legislation to: provide workers who wish to form unions of
their own choosing the right to do so; eliminate the obligation
imposed on workers to pay a solidarity tax without their
consent; and eliminate compulsory arbitration which effectively
makes it legally impossible to strike.
b. The Right To Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions in each sector negotiate with management over specific
pay scales, working conditions, and benefits applicable to
their industry. Representatives of labor, management, and
government meet annually to agree on the minimum wage, which is
determined within guidelines provided by the Government.
Agreements reached between labor and management in each sector
also apply to nonunion and expatriate labor. According to the
Labor Code, workers may individually or collectively take
complaints of code violations to arbitration and may appeal to
labor and national courts. These provisions are respected in
practice. There are no export processing zones in Gabon.
The 1989 report of the COE recommends that existing legislation
be revised to expand protection against antiunion
discrimination and to provide protection, including penal
sanctions, for workers' organizations against employer
interference.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Although forced labor is prohibited by law, the COE has for
many years noted that provisions of the Merchant Shipping Code
are incompatible with ILO Conventions on forced labor. These
provisions permit the use of compulsory duties as one means of
administrative punishment or reprimand for merchant seamen.
The Government has often said that it is amending the Code, but
it has taken no action to date.
d. Minimum Age For Employment of Children
No minor below the age of 16 may work without the authorization
of the Ministries of Labor, Public Health, and Education, which
enforce this provision. It is granted rarely, and few
employees in the modern wage sector are below the age of 18.
Children at younger ages are involved in traditional family
farm labor in rural areas.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The (1978) Labor Code and the (1982) General Convention of
Labor govern working conditions and benefits for all sectors.
Labor legislation provides broad protection to workers. The
minimum wage for unskilled labor since April 1985 has been
about $200 per month for Gabonese and about $150 for
129
SAEQH
foreigners. Owing to labor shortages, most salaries are much
higher. These wages provide a decent living for workers and
their families. Work over 40 hours per week must be
compensated with overtime, and the workweek must include a
minimum rest period of 48 consecutive hours. Women have a
right to 14 weeks of leave during pregnancy, including 6 weeks
before delivery.
The Labor Code provides for occupational health and safety
standards to be established by decree of the Minister of
Health. Adherence to these standards, which are generally
adopted from the French model, varies greatly and usually
reflects company policy rather than governmental enforcement
efforts. There has been little unemployment for Gabonese
wishing to enter the wage economy, although it has been
increasing as the economy reacts to the recent decline in world
oil prices.
130
THE GAMBIA
The Gambia is a parliamentary democracy with an elected
president and legislature. Except for a coup attempt in 1981,
The Gambia has had a history of political stability under the
leadership of its only President since independence in 1965,
Sir Dawda Jawara. His ruling People's Progressive Party (PPP)
has dominated the unicameral Parliament, but several
opposition parties participate in the political process,
including two new political parties formed in 1986. In the
parliamentary and presidential elections held in March 1987,
President Jawara was reelected by a large margin, and PPP
candidates won an overwhelming majority in Parliament.
The confederation between The Gambia and Senegal, established
in 1982 following the coup attempt, formally ended in
September 1989, following Senegal's withdrawal of its security
forces from The Gambia. The two countries disagreed over the
function and ultimate purpose of the confederation, with The
Gambia insisting upon its sovereignty and Senegal favoring a
more fully integrated economic union. The Gambia has a small
army with an attached naval unit organized and trained by
British officers. Its gendarmerie forces, formerly headed by
Senegalese officers, are now under Gambian leadership. The
combined confederal battalion, which had been two-thirds
Senegalese and one-third Gambian, was disbanded in September
1989.
The Gambia's estimated population of 784,000 consists largely
of subsistence farmers growing rice and groundnuts (peanuts),
the country's primary export crop. The Gambia in 1989
continued a stringent program of economic reform which met the
targets agreed upon with the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, and other donors. The program has allowed The
Gambia to reschedule its external debt and to receive new loan
and grant assistance.
The Gambia has made particular efforts to promote observance
of human rights, including the subject in its Constitution of
April 24, 1970. In June the Organization of African Unity's
(OAU) Commission on Human and People's Rights established its
headquarters in Banjul. The Gambian Government founded a
Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies, in conjunction
with the OAU headquarters, to serve as a research institution
and training center for human rights issues.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no instances of political killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no allegations of torture in 1989. The
Constitution prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, and
degrading punishment.
131
THE GAMBIA
Prison conditions are severe, and there have been occasional
reports of mistreatment of prisoners. The deaths of several
inmates in 1988 at one prison due to inadequate diet was
investigated by a Presidential Commission on Prison
Conditions. The Commission found nutritional deficiencies and
some overcrowding, and its recommendations led to prison
reforms, including the passage of legislation specifying an
adequate prison diet. The Government allows prison visits by
representatives of the local Red Cross and by close family
members .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Based on British legal practice, well-developed constitutional
and legal procedures govern the arrest, detention, and trial
of persons accused of crimes. Under these procedures, a
detained person must be brought to trial within 1 week of
arrest. This waiting period, however, can be extended twice,
making 21 days the maximum period of detention before trial.
In 1987 the Government detained several suspected members of
the Movement for Justice in Africa, which was banned in 1980.
They were later released without charges being brought on
political grounds, although some were charged and tried for
possession of cannabis. There were no political detainees
being held at the end of 1989. There are some self-exiled
opposition elements who would be arrested for suspected
involvement in the 1981 coup attempt if they returned to The
Gambia, e.g., the alleged leader of the plot, Kukoi Samba
Sanyang .
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Three kinds of law operate in The Gambia: general, Shari'a,
and customary law. Shari'a, governing Muslims, is observed in
marriage and divorce proceedings. Customary law covers
marriage and divorce for non-Muslims, inheritance, land tenure
and utilization, local tribal government, and all other
traditional civil and social relations. General law, based on
English statutes and modified to suit the Gambian context,
governs criminal cases and trials and most organized business
practices. If there were a conflict between general law and
Shari'a, general law would prevail.
The Constitution provides criminal defendants with the
traditional rights of the English legal system, such as
presumption of innocence, the right of the accused to be
informed promptly of the charges, and the right to a public
trial. If released on bail, an accused person may face
charges indefinitely, since there is no maximum time limit for
completing the investigation and bringing the case to trial.
Appeals normally proceed from the Supreme (trial) Court to the
Court of Appeals, the country's highest tribunal.
While the judiciary operates independently and is free of
government interference, judges are appointed by the
Government. Because of the shortage of legal professionals in
The Gambia, the legal system is staffed in part by judges and
prosecuting and defense attorneys from other English-speaking
countries having the same basic legal system as the Gambia.
An opposition journalist, Sana Manneh, editor of The Torch,
accused four cabinet ministers of corruption in 1988 and
132
THE GAMBIA
subsequently was charged with libeling three of them in
October 1988. A 4-nionth trial ensued, avidly followed by the
private press and the public. In April Manneh was acquitted
on two counts of libel and given a warning for a third, less
serious count. The Government appealed this decision, and a
hearing date is set for March 1990.
The Government released 40 prisoners in December 1988 in honor
of the 40th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. In February 1989, in commemoration of Gambian
independence. President Jawara announced the release of 50
more prisoners, some of whom had participated in the 1981 coup
attempt. Currently, there are no known political prisoners in
The Gambia.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides guarantees, which are respected in
practice, against arbitrary search of person and property. It
does permit a search to which a suspect submits voluntarily or
if it is reasonably required in the interest of national
defense or public welfare. Under the Gambian criminal code,
search warrants based on probable cause are issued by
magistrates upon application by the police. The code also
specifies that police may conduct a search of a private
residence while a crime is in progress. There are a few
police and military checkpoints in and around Banjul, which
periodically stop drivers and search vehicles.
The rights of family are of extreme importance in The Gambia's
conservative Muslim society. Marriage, the raising of
children, and religious instruction are regulated by a
combination of personal preference and ethnic and religious
tradition. The Government does not normally intrude in family
matters. Family planning is encouraged but not enforced.
There is no effort to censor or control personal
correspondence or communications.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press.
While opposition parties have been relatively inactive since
the 1987 elections, members freely express their opinions
about the Government and ruling party.
The Government does not attempt to censor published materials,
whether they originate within or outside the country. In
practical terms. The Gambia, with its small, mainly rural,
largely illiterate, multilingual population, does not support
an active press. There are no daily newspapers. The
Government and the People's Progressive Party have newspapers
which are published on a biweekly or monthly basis. There are
several independent, intermittently published, mimeographed
newssheets. Both the opposition and the independent press are
openly critical of the Government. A biweekly mimeographed
paper, sponsored by a legal Socialist party, has been
particularly vocal in condemning the governing party. There
is, however, some degree of self-censorship in the government-
owned media, which exercises restraint in reporting criticism
of the Government. During the libel trial of the journalist
who accused four cabinet ministers of corruption. Radio Gambia
and the official press ceased coverage after the first week of
133
THE GAMBIA
the trial. However, the Socialist paper reported on the daily
events of the trial and was widely distributed; the
international press also covered the story.
There is no television in The Gambia, although Senegalese
broadcasts can be received. The Government dominates the
media through Radio Gambia. There have been no reported
instances of government interference with the one commercial
radio station, which mainly broadcasts music. Foreign
magazines and newspapers are available in the capital. There
is no university in The Gambia.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
In general, there is no interference with the freedom of
association and assembly which is provided for in the
Constitution. The Government almost always grants permits for
peaceful assembly but requires that these meetings be open to
the public. However, the Movement for Justice in Africa,
which was suspected of involvement in the 1981 coup attempt,
is banned.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The constitutional provisions of freedom of conscience,
thought, and religion are observed in practice. The State is
secular, although Muslims constitute over 90 percent of the
population. The schools provide instruction in the Koran for
Muslim students. Christians, both Catholic and Protestant,
freely practice their religion. There is a small Baha'i
community in Banjul. Missionaries are permitted to carry on
their various mission-related activities openly and freely.
There is no evidence of discrimination in employment,
education, or in other areas of Gambian life on religious
grounds .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution provides for freedom of movement, subject to
conditions protecting public safety, health, and morals.
There is no restriction on freedom of emigration or freedom of
return. Internally, police and military checkpoints exist in
and around Banjul, but there is no evidence that police harass
travelers. Because of historic and ethnic ties with the
inhabitants of Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Sierra Leone, and
Mauritania, people tend to move freely across borders, which
are poorly marked and difficult to police. Under the
confederation treaty of 1981, neither Gambians nor Senegalese
have needed passports or visas to travel to or reside in the
other country. It is not clear whether this will change as a
result of the recent dissolution of the confederation. The
Gambia also recognizes the Economic Community of West African
States' (ECOWAS) protocol which allows entry of ECOWAS country
citizens for up to 90 days without visas.
In late April and May, during the ethnic violence and unrest
in Mauritania and Senegal, over 7,000 Mauritanian citizens
sought refuge from Senegal in The Gambia. The Gambian
Government moved quickly, in conjunction with the Red Cross
and other donors, to set up temporary camps and feeding
centers for the Mauritanians and later arranged an airlift to
134
THE GAMBIA
help their voluntary return to Mauritania.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The President and the Members of Parliament are popularly-
elected, as are the district councils and the chiefs, who
exercise traditional authority in the villages and compounds.
Presidential and parliamentary elections are held every 5
years. Citizens must be at least 18 years of age to vote.
Balloting is secret, and measures are employed to assure that
illiterate voters understand the choices and voting
procedure. A functioning multiparty system exists in The
Gambia even though the People's Progressive Party under the
leadership of President Jawara has been in power since
independence. The principal opposition party, the National
Convention Party (NCP), contests both national and district
elections. Two newly formed opposition parties, the Gambia
People's Party (GPP) and the People's Democratic Organization
for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS) , contested for office
in the March 1987 presidential and parliamentary elections.
Campaigning was vigorous, active, and open to all parties.
The ruling PPP won by an overwhelming majority and now holds
31 of 36 elective seats in the Parliament. The NCP was the
only opposition party to win seats. The opposition charged
that the election was manipulated by the Government but did
not provide evidence to support its allegations. The
opposition also charged, with some justification, that the PPP
benefited from its control of Radio Gambia and access to
government vehicles for campaigning.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Govarnment is responsive to charges of human rights
violations and permits visits of international human rights
organizations to observe the conditioas of detainees and the
trial process. There were no reported requests by such
organizations for investigation of alleged human rights abuses
in The Gambia during 1989. The Gambia is an 3,::ti/e member of
the Un; red Nations Human lights Commission and of rhe
Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights. It took the initiative in persuading the OAU
to locate the Commission in Banjul which opened in June 1989.
The Government has also established the African Centre for
Democracy and Human Bights StuCiSs in conjunct ion with the OAU
Corami.ssion, which held its first colloquium in November.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Gambiar population is overwhelmingly Muslim and rural,
with 8^ percent living in villages While personal initiative
and choice are valued, there is considerable emphasis on the
collective aspects of rights and piivileges. Traditional
views, especially about the role of women in society, are
changing, but veiy slowly. Marriages are sciil often
arranged, and Mus ' im cradltion a' lows for polygamy. Domestic
violence (wife beating) and female circumcision are common
practices in The 'Gambia as in the region, reinforced by
traditional beliefs. As a result, the Government has been
passive in attempting to ■■•ounter these practices. However,
the Women's Bureau in t-.he Office of the President conducted a
study in late 1989 of women s rights, including specific
135
THE GAMBIA
questions on domestic violence, that will be used as the basis
for recommendations to the law reform commission. The Women's
Bureau conducts an ongoing campaign in the rural areas to make
women aware of their legal rights in divorce, property
matters, and in cases of assault.
In villages the women continue to perform work in the field
and provide for the majority of local food production. Women
also play an important role in the small, modern wage sector
of the economy. Most are in semiskilled jobs (e.g., assembly
work, handicraft shops, bus conductors), very few are in
skilled trades (e.g., carpentry, auto repair), and a small but
growing number are in midlevel supervisory positions (e.g.,
civil service, tourist hotels, and banks). There is no wage
or benefits discrimination for jobs that are performed both by
men and women. Females comprise over one-third of the
students in primary school, and, with growing educational
opportunities, women are beginning to participate increasingly
in the professions and in political life.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Labor Administration Act specifies that workers are free
to form associations, including trade unions. However, less
than 20 percent of the work force is engaged in the modern
wage sector of the economy, where unions normally are active.
The Gambian Workers' Confederation (GWC) and the Gambian
Workers Union (GWU) , are the two main independent and
competing umbrella organizations, and both are recognized by,
and have a good working relationship with, the Government.
The Labor Administration Act authorizes strikes. However,
because of a required 14-day cooling off period (21 days in
essential services), government conciliation efforts, and the
poor bargaining strength of the unions, few strikes actually
occur. In September about 200 workers of the China Building
Material Company outside of Banjul went on strike following
the dismissal of a worker; the outstanding issues appeared to
be differences between the Chinese management and Gambian
labor practices.
As a result of an incomplete merger effort between the GWC and
the GWU, both organizations claim affiliation to the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU);
however, the ICFTU continues to recognize the GWU as its
affiliate. Both unions are affiliated with the Organization
of African Trade Union Unity. In addition, there are two
other Gambian labor confederations, the Gambian Labor
Confederation, which is affiliated with the Communist-
controlled World Federation of Trade Unions, and the Gambian
Trade Union Congress, which is affiliated with the World
Confederation of Labor. The Gambia is not a member of the
International Labor Organization.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Under the Labor Administration Act, workers have the right to
organize and bargain collectively. While trade unions are
small and fragmented, collective bargaining agreements in May
resulted in revised minimum wage rates for categories of
workers in construction, carpentry, electrical engineering,
transportation, shipyards, hotels, and other occupations.
There is no export processing zone in The Gambia. i^abor laws
136
THE GAMBIA
ate applied uniformly throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Criminal Code prohibits compulsory labor. There is no
evidence of forced or compulsory labor in The Gambia.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The official minimum age for employment is 18. However,
because of the paucity of secondary school opportunities, most
children complete their formal education by age 14 and
informally enter the work force. Control of child labor does
not apply to customary chores on family farms or street
trading .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wages and hours of work are determined by the Joint
Industrial Council, pursuant to the Labor Administration Act,
which has representation from employees, employers, and
government. For example, the minimum wage for an unskilled
laborer is approximately $1.20 per day, usually supplemented
with transport and other allowances. The wages are higher for
various skilled laborers, with the minimum under the May 1989
agreement set at $2.89 per day for foremen and hotel chefs.
The private sector generally has provision for overtime pay.
These minimum wages do not provide for a decent standard of
living. However, most Gambians do not live on one worker's
earnings and rely on the extended family system, including
often some subsistence farming.
The workweek for government workers is four 8-hour days, with
a half day on Friday. Allowance is made for half-hour lunch
breaks. For the private sector, there are four 8-hour days
with half days on Fridays and Saturdays, making a 40-hour
workweek. Government employees are entitled to 1 month's paid
leave after 1 year of service; private sector employees
receive 15 days of paid annual leave.
Under the Factory Act, the Minister of Labor is given
authority to regulate factory health and safety, accident
prevention, and dangerous trades and to appoint inspectors to
ensure compliance. However, this system is less than fully
satisfactory, owing to the shortage of inspectors. The
Government announced in 1987 that it would submit to
Parliament a new labor code to replace obsolete labor laws;
and a new industrial injuries compensation act to replace the
existing workmen's compensation act. However, no action to
this end had been taken by the end of 1989.
137
QliAJaA
Ghana is governed by the Provisional National Defense Council
(PNDC) under the chairmanship of Flight Lieutenant Jerry John
Rawlings, who seized power from an elected government on
December 31, 1981, and abolished the constitution, which has
not been replaced. Under the Establishment Proclamation of
January 11, 1982, the PNDC exercises "all powers of
government." In practice, government policy is developed by
Chairman Rawlings, assisted by a number of close advisers,
both inside and outside the Government. In addition to
Chairman Rawlings, the PNDC consists of eight members, of whom
two are serving military officers and six are civilians. The
executive consists of ministries headed by secretaries, most
of whom are subordinate to a PNDC member responsible for that
particular area of government. There is no national
legislature or lawmaking body. All national, regional, and
many district officials are appointed by the PNDC.
The several security organizations which exist in Ghana report
to various departments of government, but all come under the
control of the PNDC. Most security cases of a political
nature are handled by the Bureau of National Investigation
(BNI), which reports to the PNDC member responsible for
security issues.
Starting in 1983, the Government adopted an Economic Recovery
Program (ERP) to redress a quarter century of economic
mismanagement and political instability which caused Ghana to
decline from one of Africa's most promising economies to near
collapse. Conducted in concert with the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and a consultative group of
bilateral donors, the recovery program has had a positive
impact. While economic growth has averaged 5 percent since
the inception of the ERP, and inflation has fallen far below
the triple-digit rates of earlier years, the austerity of the
recovery program has been a heavy burden for large segments of
the population.
Although the Rawlings regime has largely restored order
following the 18-month period of revolutionary excess in 1982
and 1983, there continue to be significant human rights
problems in Ghana. These include restrictions on such basic
rights as freedom of speech, press, and assembly, the right of
citizens to change their government, and legal due process.
In June 1989, the Government established regulations for
registering all religious organizations; it "froze" the assets
of four churches, expelling the expatriate missionaries of two
of them, the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Mormons. Summary
arrest and detention were continuing problems with instances
of incarceration without formal charges.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of politically motivated or other
extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
No politically motivated disappearances were reported in 1989.
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QOhUA
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There have been occasional credible allegations of torture and
beatings in recent years, although there were none in 1989.
Prisons in Ghana are antiquated and overcrowded; conditions
are harsh. Within the past few years, two American citizens
with medical problems died in Ghanaian prisons, and a third
stated he had been physically mistreated. The Government is
aware of unsafe and overcrowded prison conditions and has
established a commission to look into reform of the prisons
and the parole system.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
In routine criminal cases, arrests generally conform to the
legal procedures set forth in the criminal code. This code
requires that an arrested person be brought before a court
within 48 hours to be charged. However, the court can refuse
to release a detainee on bail and instead remand him without
charges for an indefinite period of time, subject to weekly
review as a case is investigated. Habeas corpus is limited by
a 1984 law which prevents any court from inquiring into the
grounds for the detention of any Ghanaian under PNDC Law 4
(Preventive Custody Law of 1982).
PNDC Law 4 provides for indefinite detention without trial if
the PNDC determines it is in the interest of national
security. Ghanaian security forces occasionally take persons
into custody, with or without a warrant, and hold them
incommunicado for extended periods of time, as in the
1987-1988 case of the journalist Ben Ephson. The threat of
such treatment serves as a deterrent to activities deemed
unacceptable by the State. PNDC Law 4 has been used against a
wide variety of persons, including trade union officials like
Akwasi Adu-Amankwah and student leaders like Tony Akoto-Ampaw,
both of whom were released in 1989.
In late June, the PNDC detained without charge the President
and the Secretary General of the Ghana Bar Association for
more than a week after the Association announced its intention
to hold a seminar commemorating the murder of three judges by
soldiers in 1982, shortly after Chairman Rawlings took power.
Following a decision by the Bar Association to cancel the
seminar, the President and Secretary General were released.
There are also reliable reports that Lebanese businessmen
suspected of illegal activities are often simply arrested and
incarcerated as a means of intimidating others.
In recent years, a number of American citizens have been
arrested and held without charge for lengthy periods without
the U.S. Embassy being notified or provided access as
stipulated in international conventions and in a bilateral
treaty. In 1989 the Government seized members of a religious
group — the Black Hebrews — who are American citizens and
long-time residents of Ghana. They were held several days
before appropriate officials at the American Embassy were
informed of their imprisonment. The Department of State
renewed its August 1988 travel advisory warning American
visitors and potential travelers of continuing problems with
Ghanaian authorities.
The number of political detainees/prisoners at the end of 1989
was unknown, but the most reliable estimates were around 200.
The Government claims the actual number is smaller. In
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GHAM
September 1989, Major Courage Quashigah, two other military
officers (one of whom reportedly committed suicide while in
detention), and two civilians were arrested for alleged
involvement in a coup plot. They had not been tried by the end
of 1989.
The Government does not practice forced exile. In 1988 the
Government continued quietly to encourage Ghanaian exilees with
valuable skills to return home, offering them amnesty. A few
officials of the former government have returned and resumed
careers outside politics, apparently without difficulties.
Others have remained abroad, particularly in the United Kingdom
and other parts of Western Europe, in order to conduct active
opposition to the PNDC or out of fear of political persecution.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
There are two court systems in Ghana. In the regular
"prerevolutionary" court system, traditional legal safeguards
are based on British legal practices. Trials are public, and
defendants have a right to be present, to be represented by an
attorney, and to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.
This system includes high courts, appeal courts, and a supreme
court headed by a chief justice. There are limitations,
however, to the independence of the regular courts. In April
1986, the PNDC summarily dismissed 16 judges, alleging that
they were guilty of malfeasance. By this action, the PNDC put
judges in the regular courts on notice that they serve at its
sufferance. The independent Ghana Bar Association has urged
the reestablishment of a judicial council to protect judges
from arbitrary dismissal and preserve judicial independence.
A separate public tribunals system at the national and regional
levels was set up by the PNDC in 1982 to bypass the regular
court system and speed up the judicial process by deemphasizing
legal "technicalities." This system includes the Office of
Revenue Commissioners, the National Investigations Committee
(which, established by PNDC Law 2, has the power to investigate
virtually any allegation referred to it by the PNDC), the
Special Military Tribunal, and the Public Tribunals Board.
Most sensitive political cases and those involving security
issues and capital punishment are heard by public tribunals.
No appeals were permitted until 1985, when the National Appeals
Tribunal was created.
The public tribunals depend largely on judges with little or no
legal experience, and they shortcut legal safeguards and due
process to provide "rough and ready" justice. Presiding judges
are more often laymen than lawyers; there are no published
guidelines concerning the admissibility of evidence; and
conviction is by majority vote of the panel trying a case.
Critics also contend that meaningful appeals are impossible
because no adequate record is kept of initial hearings before
tribunals. Judges on the appeals panel are drawn from the same
pool of "lay judges" who hear initial cases. In the course of
a September conference for tribunal officials, government
officials proposed the establishment of regional appeal
tribunals and the publication of tribunal judgments. The Ghana
Bar Association, citing such shortcomings, has elected not to
practice before the public tribunals. However, a number of
lawyers have ignored the Bar Association's decision and will
defend clients before the public tribunals.
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Qh&HA
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Citizens not engaged in activity objectionable to the
Government are generally free from interference with regard to
private conduct, although some critics characterize the local
Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) as
"neighborhood watch committees." Monitoring of telephones and
mail occurs, and forced entry into homes has been reported in
connection with security investigations. The State supports
family planning, but there has been no interference with the
right to marry or have children as one chooses.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedoms of speech and the press are restricted. Chairman
Rawlings has frequently encouraged people to speak out on
local community concerns, though not on government policy.
However, informers are said to exist, and some Ghanaians
hesitate to speak frankly at public gatherings or to attend
certain functions.
In September the Ghana Bar Association was to host the
biennial meeting of the African Bar Association with the
conference theme to be "Human Rights in Africa." The
Government had been involved in the planning for almost a
year, but, shortly before the conference was scheduled to
open, the Government withdrew its financial and logistical
support. Faced with this official oppositon, the Bar
Association canceled the meeting. The Government also
confiscated the passport of the Ghana Bar Association
President amidst allegations in a government-owned newspaper
that he had planned to use the conference to destabilize the
Government .
The Government owns the radio and television stations and the
two principal daily newspapers. Reporting in government-owned
media accentuates positive aspects of government policies but
also covers selected instances of corruption and mismanagement
in government agencies and state-owned enterprises. In
general, media criticism of government policies or of Chairman
Rawlings and PNDC members, as well as of foreign and domestic
policies, is not tolerated. Journalists are subject to
discipline or dismissal by the Government for running articles
deemed unacceptable. The editor of the government-owned
weekly The Mirror was dismissed in August 1988.
On occasion, the few remaining privately owned newspapers have
tried to be relatively bold in reporting selected issues,
including editorials and articles criticizing Ghana's foreign
policy and the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) . However,
several privately owned newspapers have closed down in recent
years, and in December 1985 the Government banned publication
of the Catholic Standard; it remained banned in 1989, although
Chairman Rawlings has said publicly that the ban is being
reconsidered.
A few foreign periodicals such as West Africa, Time, and
Newsweek are sold freely in Accra and other major cities, and
even issues critical of Ghana are allowed to circulate. Most
Western journalists are now routinely accorded visas and press
credentials as opposed to the practices of a few years ago.
141
GHAHA
Academic freedom is respected within the confines of the
campus. The National Union of Ghanaian Students, one of the
more vocal critics of the PNDC, is tolerated and allowed to
organize and hold meetings. Several political organizations,
including the June Fourth Movement and the New Democratic
Movement (NDM) , were founded by faculty and students at the
University of Ghana. The NDM is viewed with particular
suspicion by the PNDC. Just prior to examinations in May
1988, university students demonstrated over campus issues and
forced the closing of all three universities; they reopened in
December. During 1989 the Government made a concerted effort
to improve its relations with the university students. Senior
government officials and students discussed PNDC programs in a
serious but nonconf rontational manner, and Chairman Rawlings
addressed the graduation ceremonies at the three major
institutions without incident.
Critics have charged, and the PNDC Chairman has publicly
admitted, that fear of government reaction has led to the
creation of a "culture of silence" in Ghana. Senior officials
deplore this and ask people to speak out on issues, but
instances such as the detention of the President and the
Secretary General of the Ghana Bar Association in June
demonstrate that to do so can be dangerous and that the
boundaries of permissible discussion are still vague.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly and association are also restricted.
Individuals generally are free to join together formally or
informally to promote benevolent or nonpolitical causes, but
permits are required for public meetings or demonstrations,
and these are seldom granted for political purposes,
particularly if the applicant's views are at odds with those
of the Government. Political parties and political meetings
are prohibited. The Government barred persons with close ties
to the old parties from running as candidates for election to
the district assemblies.
Ghana has many private religious, social, and cultural
organizations which are allowed to organize and gather with a
minimum of legal or informal restrictions.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state-favored religion. Ghanaians are
predominantly Christian, and many senior government officials
are practicing members of various Protestant sects or Roman
Catholicism, with no particular advantages or disadvantages
attached to membership.
PNDC efforts to urge the major religious communities to
support its economic and social policies has created tension
between them and the Government. Chairman Rawlings publicly
criticized the Roman Catholic Church's prohibition on its
priests participating in the district assemblies. The PNDC
has also been sensitive to criticism of Ghana's human rights
record by leaders of various denominations. Chairman Rawlings
has not renewed his 1987 charge that worldwide church and
Christian organizations may be havens for foreign spy networks,
In June 1989, the Government laid down guidelines for the
registration of all religious organizations and made it clear
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GHANA
that any organization whose actions, it concluded, would lead
to social disruption or would offend the morals of the people
would not be registered, and thus not tolerated. The
Government requires full information about the property and
financial assets of the churches and makes the boards of
governors personally liable for contraventions.
Subsequently, the Government "froze" the assets of four
churches, two indigenous Christian churches, plus the
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) . The expatriate personnel of the
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Mormons were expelled with 7 days'
notice. The Government alleged that the Jehovah's Witnesses
refused to recognize Ghana's symbols of authority and that the
Mormons advocated racism. Ghanaian members of the Mormon
church have not been further harassed, but expatriate Mormons
have not been allowed to resume their missionary activities in
Ghana. At present, these four churches have not been allowed
to apply for registration.
Other foreign missionary groups have generally operated
throughout the country with a minimum of formal restrictions,
but some foreign missionaries find obtaining visas is becoming
more difficult. At least one missionary was denied entry in
1989 despite possessing a valid visa.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Ghanaians and foreigners are free to move throughout Ghana
without special permission. Police checkpoints exist
countrywide, allegedly for the prevention of smuggling, but
are less obtrusive than in the 1982-84 period. Roadblocks and
car searches are still a normal part of nighttime travel in
Accra .
As members of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), Ghanaians may travel without visas for up to 90 days
in member states. Ghanaians are generally free to exercise
this right, and nationals of other member states are free to
travel to Ghana. In August-September 1989, longtime Ghanaian
residents of Liberia and longtime Liberian residents of Ghana
abruptly returned to their "home" countries amidst press
allegations that they had been deported. Both Governments
officially denied their citizens had been deported. Ghanaians
are also free to emigrate or to be repatriated from other
countries. If a person is considered a security threat,
special permission to travel outside Ghana must be obtained.
There is no forced resettlement of populations. The
Government has not established policies to deal with the
roughly 150 refugees registered with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. Many unregistered refugees from
the Sahelian drought in neighboring countries remain in Ghana,
and efforts to settle or move these basically nomadic peoples
have had only limited success.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
There is no procedure by which citizens can freely and
peacefully change their laws, officials, or form of
government. Chairman Rawlings and the PNDC exercise total
executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative power.
The National Commission for Democracy (NCD) was established in
143
1984 to design new "democratic" structures which would help
establish the legitimacy of the PNDC.
In December 1988, and in January and February 1989, the first
elections of any kind since 1979 were held in Ghana to
establish district assemblies in 10 regions. An estimated
58.9 percent of the electorate, higher in the rural areas than
in the urban areas, turned out for the elections which were
generally peaceful and unaccompanied by fraud. The contests
revolved around the candidates' probity and competence. These
local assemblies have limited authority, and the PNDC has
emphasized that the first priority of the assemblies is to
establish local development programs. The Government names
one-third of the members of each assembly, which conduct
meetings and formulate development programs within guidelines
laid down by the Regional Coordinating Councils (RCC)
established in August 1989. The RCCs are dominated by
government-appointed officials.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no known locally organized hiunan .Ights groups
currently dealing wich Ghanaian human rights matters. Several
other organizations — most notably the Ghana Bar
Association — have attempted to address human rights ^ssues
from time to cime. The Gove^"nment ' s reactions to Irhese
efforts have ranged rrom indifference to active
discouragement. The Government does permit the International
Committee of the Red Cross co visit prisons. In September
1988, Ghana hosted a meeting of the International Federation
of Women Lawyers, which addressed human rights in Ghana, but
in 1989 it blocked ihe African Bar Association meeting. A
representative of Amnesty International applied to visit Ghana
in 1989 but was denied a visa.
The Government is sensitive to charges of abuse of human
rights and stoutly dsfends ics practices. The PNDC is
particularly cricical of charges from numan rights groups in
the West that it lacks a democratic structure. It insists
that 'participatory democracy" through people "s involvement in
mass organizacions such as che Commi : ees for the Defense of
the Revolution and the 3ist December Women's Movement has
'grassroocs" support and ts more broadly democratic than
previous Ghanaian governmencs. Ghana is a .Tiember of the U.N.
Human Sights Commission.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Although ethnic dicferences are intentionally downplaved by
the Government, occasional charges are aired that the PNDC and
the political leadership are dominateu by the Ewe etnair group
from eastern Ghana Chairman Rawlingb and a number or his
close advisors are Ewe.
The Government has made a concerted effort to raise the status
of women in Ghana. In 1985 it promulgated four laws which
overturned many of the customary, tiaditional, and :.olonial
laws which discriminated against women. These concerned
family accountability, intestate su<.;»'ession, customa'i divorce
registracions , and the administration of estates. Women in
urban centers and chose who nave enveied the inodern sector
encounter little overt bias, but resistance co women in
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GJHAHA
nontraditional roles persists. Women in the rural
agricultural sector remain subject to traditional male
dominance. Women do have a significant economic role as
market traders.
violence against women, including wife beating, occurs, but,
as there are no statistics or studies available, the extent of
the problem is unknown. Police do not normally intervene in
domestic disputes, and such cases seldom come before the
courts. Female mutilation (e.g., clitoridectomy) is practiced
only in the far northeast and northwest parts of the country.
The Government discourages the practice, although it has not
made it illegal. The 31st December Women's Movement, led by
Chairman Rawlings' wife Nana Komadu Agyeman-Rawlings ,
prominently promotes the economic and social development of
women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The PNDC has not interfered with the right of workers to
associate in labor unions. Trade unions in Ghana and their
activities are still governed by the Industrial Relations Act
(IRA) of 1958, as amended in 1965 and 1972. The independent
Trades Union Congress (TUC) , established in 1958, represents
organized labor in Ghana. It consists of a national
headquarters and 16 affiliated unions, representing a claimed
total membership of about 700,000 workers in skilled and
semiskilled trades. Union members elect their own leaders,
and representatives of the affiliated unions elect the TUC
leadership at quadrennial conferences, the most recent having
been in March 1988. The TUC publishes its own newspaper. It
is independent of government subventions and has publicly
criticized the Government at times for its economic policies
as well as its failure adequately to consult the trade union
movement .
The right to strike is recognized in law and in practice,
although the Government has on occasion taken strong action to
end strikes, especially those which threaten interests it
perceives as vital. Under the IRA, the Government has
established a system under which it seeks first to conciliate,
then arbitrate, disputes. Discussions have been under way for
some time to replace this system with labor tribunals to
arbitrate industrial disputes certified as deadlocked. The
Government has declared that establishment of labor tribunals
must be part of a new, consolidated industrial relations act,
which cannot be implemented piecemeal.
For several years the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Committee of Experts (COE) has criticized various aspects of
Ghanaian legislation pertaining to freedom of association.
The COE, again in 1989, expressed the hope that measures would
be taken to bring Ghana's laws into conformity with ILO
Convention 87 which Ghana ratified in 1967.
The TUC is affiliated with the Organization of African Trade
Union Unity (OATUU) . Consistent with OATUU guidelines, it
maintains no other international affiliations, although it has
friendly relations with other international labor
organizations, including the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions and the Communist-controlled World
Federation of Trade Unions.
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SHAM
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize is generally respected. Civil servants,
however, are prohibited by law from joining or organizing a
trade union. The TUC is a large, well-established union
organization whose membership has shown little growth in
recent years. Ghana's trade unions engage in collective
bargaining for wages and benefits with both private and
state-owned enterprises, though in the latter category the
threat of detention (a common practice in the early 1980 's)
hangs over union leaders to force agreement on issues. At the
end of 1989, no union leaders were under detention for
union-related activities. Akwasi Adu-Amankwa, a union leader
detained at the end of 1988 for activities not related to his
union responsibilities, was released and allowed to enter a
training program offered in the Netherlands.
There are no functioning export processing zones in Ghana, and
labor legislation is applied uniformly throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Ghanaian law prohibits forced labor, and it is not known to be
practiced. For a number of years, however, the ILO's COE has
urged the Government to revise various legal provisions which
permit imprisonment with an obligation to perform labor for
offenses which are not countenanced under ILO Convention 105,
ratified by Ghana in 1958.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Labor legislation in Ghana sets a minimum employment age of 15
and prohibits night uork and certain types of hazardous labor
for those under 18. In practice, child labor is prevalent,
and young children of school age can often be found during the
day performing menial tasks in the market or collecting fares
on local buses. Enforcement of minimum age laws is uneven,
especially since local custom and economic circumstances favor
children working to help their families. Violators of
regulations prohibiting heavy labor and night work for
children are occasionelly punished.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum standards for wages and working conditions are
established through a tripartite committee composed of
representatives of government, labor, and employees. It
establishes a minimum wage rate, and other salaries are
adjusted accordingly. Effective January 1987, the minimum
wage was increased 25 percent to $0.50 per working day at
current exchange rates. In early 1988, the TUC called for a
"meaningful" national wage of not less than $4.00 per day.
The current "living wage" — consisting of the actual wage and
customary benefits such as transportation and food
allowances — is about $1.00 per working day; the TUC estimates
the daily living costs of a family of four at $5.00. Thus,
the existing minimum wage is insufficient for a single wage
earner to support a family. In most cases, however,
households are supported by multiple wage earners, some family
farming, and other family-based commercial activities. An
upward adjustment in the living wage may be a major
labor/management issue in 1990. The basic workweek in Ghana
is 40 hours. Occupational safety and health regulations are
in effect, and sanctions are occasionally applied to violators.
146
GUINEA
Guinea has been ruled by the military since 1984. Under
President Lansana Conte, the military governs the country
through the Military Committee for National Recovery (CMRN) and
a joint military and civilian Council of Ministers. The
regime, which came to power following the 24-year reign of
Sekou Toure, suspended the constitution and rules through
ordinances, decrees, and decisions issued by the President and
various ministers.
Military and paramilitary forces number about 17,000 persons
(although accurate figures are difficult to obtain), with the
army alone consisting of some 10,000 officers and soldiers.
The 2,000-man national guard (Gendarmerie Nationale), a police
force, and a well-armed presidential guard provide internal
security. Both the military and police have been involved in
human rights abuses. In particular, abuses by police appear to
have been a motivating factor behind the reorganization of the
security services in 1989, placing the police under the
direction of an army officer.
Eighty percent of Guinea's population of 7 million is dependent
on subsistence agriculture. Per capita annual income is
estimated at barely $300. Mineral resources, mainly bauxite,
diamonds, and gold, are the major exports. Under President
Conte, Guinea's economic reform program is attempting to
diversify the small salaried work force, primarily through the
creation of producers' associations and cooperatives and the
promotion of foreign investment. However, efforts to reduce
the size of the civil service, the largest employer, have left
recent university graduates without jobs in the public sector,
a sinecure under the old regime. Increasing unemployment in
1989 was a source of growing government concern.
The human rights situation has improved markedly since the
Sekou Toure years; however, human rights in Guinea in 1989
remained circumscribed despite frequent government declarations
of an increased dedication to human rights. Major concerns
were the failure of the military Government to control abuses
by often poorly disciplined security forces, including killings
and beatings; the Government's silence on the fate of prisoners
still unaccounted for following a 1985 coup attempt; and the
Government's restrictions on freedoms of speech and press,
assembly and association, and the right of citizens to change
their government through democratic means. Women's rights are
restricted in several important areas. Acknowledging these
concerns, especially those in the political sphere, the
Government has widely publicized the promulgation of a new
constitution, scheduled for December 1990. President Conte
announced that this document would provide for an interim
5-year period of mixed military/civilian stewardship leading to
a multiparty, parliamentary system of government, headed by an
elected president, with strict separation of powers. A
drafting committee of 50 drawn from all sectors of educated
Guinean society, is currently drawing up a new constitution.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of politically motivated killings in
Guinea in 1989. However, in October the police in Labe beat to
147
GUINEA
death a young man who had been arrested on a minor charge.
When a group protesting the incident marched on the police
station and attacked it, the military was called in.
Ultimately soldiers fired into the crowd, killing 6 persons and
injuring 18. A government minister investigated the incident,
and subsequently the Government ordered the arrest of police
officers responsible for the young man's death. At the end of
1989 no formal proceedings had been launched.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances
in 1989. However, there is still uncertainty about the fate of
a number of military officers, mainly from the Malinke ethnic
group, who disappeared after their arrest following the 1985
coup attempt (see also Section I.e.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The military Government continued in 1989 to denounce the human
rights atrocities of the former Toure dictatorship and publicly
seeks to enforce provisions of the 1965 penal code which forbid
torture and abuse of authority. However, mistreatment of
detainees continues; the police and soldiers are widely
perceived by the public as using excess force, frequently
involving severe beatings as in the Labe incident. Amnesty
International's (AI) 1989 report noted that several students,
while in police custody in 1988, had been beaten and subjected
to mock executions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
A suspected criminal can be detained incommunicado by the
arresting authority during preliminary investigation and has
the right to counsel only after appearing before a judge. Such
detention is limited to 48 hours, or 96 hours if an extension
is granted by a tribunal. A system of bail for those accused
of less serious crimes, as defined by the presiding judge, is
available at the judge's discretion. In practice, despite
presidential admonitions and campaigns in the government -owned
media against corruption and harassment of citizens,
paramilitary elements use arbitrary detention as a means of
extortion. Political detainees, such as those held after the
1985 coup attempt, are often held incommunicado and without
charge for extended periods of time.
The Government has encouraged Guinean expatriates, including
former exiles of the Sekou Toure regime, to return home, but
few have chosen to do so. Significant numbers of Guineans live
in neighboring African countries and in France.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Guinean penal code provides for the presumption of
innocence of accused persons, the independence of judges, the
equality of citizens before the law, the right of accused to
counsel, and the right to appeal a judicial decision. The
judiciary includes courts of first instance (for justices of
the peace at the local level) and two Courts of Appeal (one in
Kankan, one in Conakry) . The Court of Annulment is the Guinean
148
GUINEA
court of last appeal. A special Court of State Security was
created in 1985 to try those allegedly involved in the July
coup attempt, but it did not meet in 1989.
According to ordinances issued in 1988, the Military Court
prepares and adjudicates charges against accused military
personnel, but to ensure equality before the law, all judgments
regarding violations under the penal code are rendered by civil
courts. Trials are public. Those accused of major crimes have
the right to an attorney; those accused of less serious crimes
must pay for legal counsel.
There is a traditional system of justice at the village or
urban neighborhood level where litigants present their civil
case before a village chief, neighborhood chief, or council of
wise men for judgment. Justice is not enforced uniformly. For
example, burglars caught in urban areas are sometimes beaten to
death by victims and their neighbors with the tacit approval of
police authorities. Authorities have publicly condemned such
summary justice.
Human rights organizations have continued to criticize the
Government's secretive handling of those tried by the State
Security Court and the Military Court for alleged involvement
either with the former Toure regime or the July 1985 coup
attempt. Much of the information concerning trial procedures
of these Courts was never made available, and the trials were
widely perceived as unfair. Despite presidential amnesties on
December 31, 1987, and on October 2, 1988, which released 106
persons (including 79 military personnel), the fate of many
others remained unknown at the end of 1989. It was widely
believed that many of the announced death sentences had been
summarily carried out shortly after the suspects were arrested
in 1985. Guinean officials have informed diplomatic and
international human rights observers that there are no longer
any political detainees or prisoners held in Guinea, implying
that all those imprisoned for their connection with the 1985
coup have been released.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government stresses traditional family values and the
inviolability of the home. In general, the military Government
is less willing than the previous regime to abuse police
powers, although unwarranted interferences in citizens' lives
continues, mainly through individual police harassment.
Security officials are known to monitor mail and telephone
calls .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Government has publicly stated that it supports free speech
and press. However, citizens do not generally feel free to
express public criticism of the Government, although criticism
of government officials is heard in private discussions.
The Government owns and operates the news media, and reporters
(who are government employees) practice self-censorship. In
1989 investigative reporting focused on social ills and
unscrupulous commercial practices (a favorite target of
official criticism), but no criticism of the senior levels of
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GUINEA
government or established policies was aired. The Ministry of
Information, Culture and Tourism continues to act both as
administrator and censor of media services.
Publications which incite crime or are contrary to good morals
are prohibited, as are insult, defamation, and libel. Some
groups — operating for the most part abroad — have expressed
criticism in clandestine tracts. Many foreign publications
circulate freely in Guinea, including some critical of the
Government, and no attempt is made to interfere with foreign
radio broadcasts.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Public gatherings can take place only with the approval of the
Government. The Guinean penal code bans any meeting which has
an ethnic or racial character or any gathering "whose nature
threatens national unity." Opposition groups are not
permitted. The Government does encourage the formation of
nonpolitical professional organizations, and their numbers
continue to increase.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Guineans generally enjoy religious freedom and tolerance for
the larger religious groups. Although an estimated 85 percent
of the population is nominally Muslim, there is no official
state religion. The Government observes both major Christian
and Muslim holidays. The Government and the quasi-
governmental National Islamic League (LIN) have spoken out
against the "proliferation of pseudo-sects (within Guinean
Islam) generating confusion and deviation." The President has
declared that the LIN is the only organization with
responsibility for coordinating the observance of Islam in
Guinea. Foreign missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant,
operate freely in Guinea.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government restricts the freedom of movement of individual
citizens for political reasons. For example, the 67 persons
granted amnesty at the end of 1987 were restricted to their
area of origin following their release from prison. That
restriction has gradually been relaxed in many cases and left
to the discretion of local prefects (governors).
Most Guineans, however, are free to move about the country and
to change their place of residence and work, although in
practice they face harassment by police and military
roadblocks, particularly at night. It is common for individual
citizens to pay bribes to avoid police harassment. Foreign
travel, strictly curtailed under Sekou Toure, is now permitted.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens are unable to change their government through
democratic procedures. The military Government suspended the
constitution and banned political parties and formal political
activity when it took power in April 1984. The Government
150
QUUSEA
delayed its previously announced intention to introduce a new
constitution in 1989. Rather, President Conte announced in
October that there would be an interim 5-year period of mixed
military/civilian stewardship leading eventually to a
multiparty, parliamentary system of government, headed by a
president, with strict separation of powers. At the end of
1989, the interim changes in government had not been introduced
or a timetable announced.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Senior government officials received representatives of the
International Committee of the Red Cross concerning
humanitarian issues, including possible prison visits. There
are no local organizations reporting on human rights issues in
Guinea .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
While racial or ethnic discrimination is prohibited by the
penal code, ethnic identification is still very strong in
Guinea, and mutual suspicion affects relations across ethnic
lines within and outside the Government. Official government
policy is to include representatives of all major ethnic groups
in the Government, but the Soussou ethnic group, to which
President Conte belongs, tends to predominate at the highest,
most influential levels. A disproportionate number of police
are Malinke, former President Toure's ethnic group.
Clandestinely circulated opposition tracts frequently play on
ethnic tensions to stir resentment against the Government. As
noted, many of those that "disappeared" after the 1985 coup
came from the Malinke ethnic group.
In rural Guinea, opportunities for women are limited by custom
and the traditional demands of subsistence farming. The
Government has affirmed the principle of equal pay for equal
work, but in practice women receive less pay than men in most
jobs .
Violence against women, mainly wife beating, is prohibited
under criminal law and is a ground for divorce under civil
law. Police rarely intervene in domestic disputes, and
prosecution of wife beaters is unusual but has occurred.
Health workers in Guinea state that wife beating exists, but
they differ in their opinions on the extent of the problem and
its severity. The issue has not received significant publicity
or government attention.
Female genital mutilation (circumcision) is practiced among all
religious groups in Guinea: Muslims, Christians, and animists.
According to Western health workers, the practice is nearly
universal among Guineans. Grandmothers will frequently see to
the circumcision of a granddaughter even when the parents are
opposed. The most dangerous form of circumcision,
inf ibulation, is not practiced.
151
GUINEA
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Guinea's new labor code, drafted with the assistance of the
International Labor Organization (ILO) and promulgated in
January 1988, states that all workers have the right to create
and participate in organizations that defend and develop their
individual and collective rights as workers. The code also
provides that workers have the right not to be a member of such
organizations. Further, it stipulates that a union must be
independent of political parties to be recognized as
representative of workers. The code requires elected worker
representatives for any enterprise employing 25 salaried
workers. The code also grants salaried workers the right to
strike 10 days after their representative union makes known
their intention to strike.
In practice, most salaried Guineans — many of whom are civil
servants — are affiliated with the country's sole trade union
central, the Guinean National Labor Confederation (CNTG) , which
has close ties to the Government. Private sector workers may
strike only with the permission of the CNTG board, a
requirement which reduces the likelihood of strikes. In March
taxicab drivers in Conakry participated in a 1 to 2 day strike,
protesting police harassment and increased insurance and
gasoline rates. According to reports, police arrested and
detained briefly over 50 rock-throwing drivers. Police held
the strike leader for several days. In the past, the
Government has dealt sternly with wildcat strikers, including
banning those in the public sector from further government
employment. The CNTG is affiliated with the Organization of
African Trade Union Unity.
The ILO Committee of Experts (COE) has commended the Government
for its new labor code but also noted that some question still
remains regarding legislative provisions that provide for the
establishment of compulsory arbitration. In its 1989 report
the COE commended a revision of the code limiting the
Government's power to refer a dispute to compulsory arbitration
to cases involving "essential services" and "national crisis."
However, the COE observed that the statute still permits either
party to invoke compulsory arbitration, a practice that could
limit the right to strike, according to the Committee.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Under the new code, representative workers' unions or union
groups can organize in the workplace and negotiate with
employers or employer unions. Union delegates are to represent
individual and collective claims and grievances before the
employer. Work rules and work hours established by the
employer are to be developed in consultation with union
delegates. Individual workers threatened with dismissal or
other sanctions have the right to a hearing before the employer
with a union representative present. Employers must give
advance notice of any plan to reduce the size of their work
force for economic reasons.
In practice, CNTG representatives take the lead in labor/
management talks. Collective bargaining has taken place, most
notably in 1986 when the CNTG concluded an agreement with the
mining companies, and again in 1988 when bank employees
collectively bargained for substantially higher salaries.
24-900 O— 90-
152
Labor legislation is applied uniformly throughout the country.
There are no export processing zones.
The above cited COE 1989 report commended the Government for
removing a provision of the law restricting the right to hold
union offices to Guinean nationals.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is not practiced in Guinea, and
article 2 of the labor code specifically forbids it. The COE
has noted the Government's stated intention to revise or repeal
various obsolete laws to bring them into compliance with ILO
conventions on forced labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment in practice as well as in the
new code is 16 years of age. Apprentices, however, may be as
young as 14 years old. Workers and apprentices below age 18
are not permitted to work at night or more than 12 consecutive
hours or on Sundays. According to the labor code, the Minister
of Labor must maintain a list of occupations in which women and
youth under age 18 may not be employed. Enforcement of these
provisions outside of the modern sector of the economy,
however, tends to be erratic, particularly in rural areas where
children of all ages work on family farms.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Government has not yet enacted minimum wage legislation,
but the labor code provides for the eventual establishment by
decree of a guaranteed minimum hourly wage. There are also
provisions for overtime and night wage rates which are fixed
percentages of the regular wage. Wages currently paid the
average worker in the public sector are generally not
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living. According
to the code, regular work is not to exceed 10-hour days or
48-hour weeks, with a 40-hour workweek being the norm. The
minimum weekly day of rest must be 24 consecutive hours,
usually on Sunday. Every salaried worker has the right to an
annual paid holiday accumulated at the rate of at least 2.5
workdays per month of service. Several articles of the code
provide for safe working conditions and the continued good
health of workers. These as yet represent the goal rather than
the practice.
153
GUINEA-BISSAU
The Republic of Guinea-Bissau is a one-party state with former
or present military leaders in key positions. General Joao
Bernardo Vieira serves as President of the Council of State
and Head of State, Commander-in-Chief, and General Secretary
of Guinea-Bissau's sole political party, the African Party for
the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) . In
elections held in June 1989, Vieira, the only candidate, was
elected for a second 5-year term as President. According to
the 1984 Constitution, the National Assembly decides
fundamental questions of internal and external policy, but
effective power and day-to-day decisions rest in the hands of
the President and the Council of State. Although the
President is the most powerful Member of the Council,
decisionmaking is collegial. The party selects all candidates
for office.
The Armed Forces (FARP) are responsible for state security,
both external and internal. FARP leaders are usually members
of the PAIGC and often hold key positions in the Political
Bureau or Central Committee. Security forces are under the
full control of the Government. Persons accused of political
crimes are tried by military tribunals.
Guinea-Bissau remains one of the least developed nations, and
most of the 974,000 population is engaged in subsistence
agriculture. The Government's postindependence efforts to
exercise central control over the economy failed to stimulate
agricultural production and resulted in chronic shortages of
most basic commodities, inefficient state-owned enterprises,
high unemployment, and a weak national currency. Beginning in
late 1986, the Government launched a series of reforms to
promote long-term economic growth by shifting from a state-run
centralized economy to a free-market system. While the
reforms spurred private commercial activity and improved
agricultural production, in 1989 inflation remained high, and
urban residents continued to witness a drop in their standard
of living.
The Government marked the 40th anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights by granting amnesty on December
13, 1988, to four prisoners imprisoned for involvement in a
1985 coup plot. However, most human rights remained tightly
restricted. Major human rights problems were abuse of
detainees in security cases, arbitrary arrest, lack of fair
trial, and limits on freedoms of association, speech, and
press, the right of citizens to change their government, and
worker rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of premeditated politically motivated
killing. (Also see Section I.e.)
b. Disappearance
There were no known cases of disappearance.
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GUINEA-BISSAU
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits cruel and inhuman punishment.
However, security authorities employ severe interrogation
methods, especially severe beatings. Amnesty International
(AI) stressed in its 1989 Report (covering 1988) that it
continued to receive allegations of the use of torture in
security cases and deaths in custody due to mistreatment,
noting in particular the detention center ("COP-2") in
Bissau. AI asked the Government in 1987 to establish an
independent commission of inquiry into these and other
allegations, but the Government never responded.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arrests in Guinea-Bissau are frequently arbitrary, as arrest
procedures are undefined, and the use of arrest warrants is
the exception rather than the rule. The legal system,
inherited from the Portuguese but modified by the
Constitution, includes important procedural rights, such as
the right to counsel and the right to a judicial determination
of the legality of detention (habeas corpus). Bail procedures
are observed erratically.
The Government has held persons without charge or trial,
sometimes for extended periods of time, including in
incommunicado detention. The number of political detainees
held at the end of 1989, if any, was unknown. The Government
has the legal right to exile prisoners but has not done so in
recent years.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Traditional law still prevails in most rural areas, and many
urban dwellers continue to bring judicial disputes to
recognized traditional counselors. Several traditional
counselors from a village in the Farim sector were reportedly
arrested in 1989 for their role in punishing, by death, two
persons accused of witchcraft.
With some exceptions, the official judicial system is based on
the Portuguese model. Intervals between arrest and trial are
often lengthy. All defense lawyers are court appointed, as
private legal practice is prohibited. The judiciary is a part
of the executive branch. Trials involving state security
usually are not open to outside observers and are conducted by
military tribunals. FARP members are tried by military courts
for all offenses. The Supreme Court is the final court of
appeal for both civilian and military cases, except those
involving national security matters. In this instance the
Council of State reviews all decisions.
The number of political prisoners at the end of 1989 was
unknown. However, approximately one-half of those convicted
in treason trials in 1986 have been released upon the
completion of their sentences or upon grants of amnesty. The
remaining prisoners, some of whom have been voluntarily joined
by their families, are confined to islands in the Bijagos
Archipelago. In 1988 the Government released Raphael Barbosa,
cofounder of the PAIGC, from a prison camp on the island of
Formosa .
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GUINEA-BISSAU
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Constitutional guarantees of the inviolability of domicile,
person, and correspondence are not always respected in cases
of serious crimes or state security. International and
domestic mail is subject to surveillance and censorship.
Membership in the PAIGC is not forced, although individuals
with political aspirations realize the importance of belonging
to Guinea-Bissau's sole political party.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of intellectual,
artistic, and scientific expression, with the significant
exception of cases in which these rights are exercised in a
manner "contrary to the promotion of social progress." In
fact, these freedoms are restricted. The Government controls
all information media and views the press as a vehicle of the
party. Journalists are government employees and must practice
self-censorship to maintain their positions. The media are
permitted to criticize and question some policies, although
they may not criticize individual officials.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
association, and government approval is not required for
peaceful, nonpolitical assemblies and demonstrations.
However, all existing organizations are linked to the
Government or the party, including the sole labor union, the
National Union of the Workers of Guinea-Bissau.
Antigovernment meetings are not tolerated.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Religious freedom is provided for in the Constitution and has
been respected in practice. Christians, Muslims, and animists
worship freely, and proselytizing is permitted. However,
religious groups must be licensed by the Government. In 1989
there were no reports of groups being refused licenses.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens are allowed to move freely throughout Guinea-Bissau.
Foreign travel is not restricted, nor is citizenship revoked
for political reasons. Thousands of persons have emigrated
for economic reasons. The return of expatriates is
encouraged, although the death in 1986 of one opposition
member in a car accident during a forced repatriation from
Senegal convinced some government opponents that they would
not be welcomed back to Guinea-Bissau. In May 1989, several
hundred Mauritanian refugees fleeing ethnic violence in
Senegal entered Guinea-Bissau. Most of the refugees were
quickly repatriated to Mauritania, but some remained in
Guinea-Bissau and were integrated into the Mauritanian
community residing in Guinea-Bissau. While sympathetic to the
principle of asylum, Guinea-Bissau does not host significant
numbers of refugees.
156
GUINEA-BISSAU
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right o£ Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right or the ability peacefully and
legally to change the government or the form of government.
Guinea-Bissau is led by the PAIGC Party and military elite,
headed by President Joao Bernardo Vieira. By the terms of the
1984 Constitution, all political activity takes place within
the party/state structure. The 1989 electoral slates for the
National Popular Assembly at the district, regional, and
national levels were party-approved lists, although not all
candidates were members of the PAIGC. Affirmative or negative
votes on the proposed slates were cast by secret ballot. The
President, members of the Council of State, and deputies of
the National Popular Assembly are elected to 5-year terms.
There are provisions for constitutional amendments and
national referendums initiated by the National Popular
Assembly, but the Assembly has never taken such initiatives,
and it meets infrequently. No single ethnic group dominates
party/government positions, but Papel and Creole (mixed-race)
groups, predominantly located in and around the capital of
Bissau, are disproportionately represented in the Government.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Although international human rights groups have visited
Guinea-Bissau, these visits have been tightly controlled. An
AI mission held discussions in June 1986 with President Vieira
and other key officials and attended one session of the
treason trial. However, the Government has not responded to
AI ' s 1987 request that an independent commission examine
various human rights issues. There are no local human rights
groups in Guinea-Bissau.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The population of Guinea-Bissau is composed of diverse tribal
groups, each with its own language, customs, and social
organization. The Balanta, Fula, Mandinka, Manjaco, and Papel
are important groups. Creoles enjoy an advantageous position
within the society due to their generally higher level of
education and their links abroad. Although the President and
other influential leaders regularly urge the nation to
overcome ethnic differences, the economic dominance of Creoles
(and to a lesser extent Mandinkas and Fulas) has created
resentment among other ethnic communities. Most of the
defendants in the 1986 coup trial were members of the Balanta,
the largest ethnic group (30 percent) .
While officially prohibited, discrimination against women
persists within certain ethnic groups, especially the Muslim
Fulas and Mandinkas of the north and east. The practice of
female circumcision is still widespread among these groups
despite official prohibition and educational campaigns against
this custom. Women enjoy higher status in the societies of
the Balanta, Papel, and Bijagos groups living mainly in the
southern coastal region. Physical violence as a means of
settling domestic disputes occurs among all ethnic groups.
While police will intervene in domestic disputes if requested,
the Government has not undertaken specific measures to raise
the public consciousness of women or to reduce violence
against them.
157
GUINEA-BISSAU
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Approximately one-half of the population of Guinea-Bissau is
of working age. While the Constitution provides for freedom
of association, only one labor union, the National Union of
the Workers of Guinea-Bissau (UNTG) , exists in Guinea-Bissau.
With strong ties to the PAIGC, the UNTG more closely resembles
a mass party organization than an independent union. The UNTG
is neither aggressive nor effective in promoting worker
rights. While not specifically forbidden, strikes do not
occur. Since the Government's use of force to disperse
students attempting to strike in 1981, the public's perception
has been that strikes, like antigovernment meetings, would not
be tolerated. The UNTG is affiliated with the
Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions and is a
member of the Organization of African Trade Union Unity.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Of the estimated 28,000 salaried workers in the country,
approximately 50 percent are employees of the Government.
Guinea-Bissau's small manufacturing sector employs fewer than
5,000 persons. The scarcity of salaried jobs has forced
employees to focus on obtaining and keeping employment rather
than on organizing and bargaining. Public employees are
permitted to join the UNTG, but the union's activities have
not emphasized organizing employees (whether private or
public) for the purpose of collective bargaining. The
Constitution does not provide and protect the right to
organize and bargain collectively, but the General Labor Law
of 1986 contains limited provisions addressing collective
bargaining. In practice, from the worker's perspective, the
right is neither protected nor practiced.
While expressing satisfaction with various provisions of the
1986 labor law, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Committee of Experts noted in both 1987 abd 1988 that the
Government's provision for the protection of workers against
antiunion discrimination does not appear to be accompanied by
penal sanctions against employers and that the General Labor
Act is not applicable to workers in the public service. The
Committee pointed out that public servants who are not engaged
in the administration of the State should be able to enjoy the
right of collective bargaining. There are no export
processing zones in Guinea-Bissau, and labor laws are
applicable throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is not permitted by law and is not
known to exist. There are no penal sanctions for offenders,
however, and the Government lacks the means to provide
adequate labor inspections.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The General Labor Act of 1986 established a minimum age of 14
for general factory labor and of 18 for heavy or dangerous
labor, including all labor in mines. In an overwhelmingly
rural and agricultural society, the traditional division of
labor practices both between sexes and age groups continues to
prevail. Children in rural communities do domestic and field
work for no pay. The Government does not attempt to
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GUINEA-BISSAU
discourage this practice and, in fact, delays the opening of
schools until the rice season has ended.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Even in the small wage sector, labor laws are unevenly-
enforced due primarily to the extreme economic
underdevelopment of the country and the vagaries of the legal
system. However, there are government regulations governing
such matters as job-related disabilities and vacation rights.
The maximum number of hours permitted in a normal workweek is
45 hours. Although not consistently enforced, a minimum wage
of approximately $13 a month is mandated by the Ministry of
Civil Service. The wage is inadequate to maintain even a
minimum standard of living, and workers must supplement their
income through reliance on the extended family and subsistence
agriculture. Existing legal, health, and safety standards for
workers are not enforced in a uniform and comprehensive manner.
159
KENYA
Kenya has had an elected civilian government since
independence in 1963. It has been a de facto one-party state
almost since independence and a de jure one-party state since
1982. President Daniel T. arap Moi maintains firm control
over both the Government and the party, the Kenyan African
National Union (KANU) . KANU membership is a prerequisite for
participation in national political affairs. The popularly
elected National Assembly (unicameral Parliament) of 202
members (including 12 appointed by the President and 2 ex
officio members) has little independent power in national
political affairs, but it is usually involved in local and
regional issues or in affirming the President's initiatives.
The Kenyan armed forces constitute a small professional
establishment with a total strength of 22,500 members. Kenya
has an internal security apparatus that includes the police
criminal investigation department (CID) , the paramilitary
general services unit (GSU) , and the directorate of security
and intelligence (DSI or Special Branch). The CID and Special
Branch investigate criminal activity and are also used to
monitor persons whom the State considers subversive.
Kenya's modern, market-oriented economy includes a
well-developed private sector for trade and light
manufacturing as well as an agricultural sector that provides
food for local consumption and substantial exports of coffee,
tea, and other commodities. Kenya's well-developed tourism
industry has surpassed coffee and tea as the top foreign
exchange earner. In 1989 a continued decline in world coffee
prices exacerbated a balance of payments problem. Although
economic growth continued, a persistently high population
growth rate contributed to a serious and growing problem of
unemployment. Kenyans are free to engage in private economic
activity and own property without government interference.
Human rights continue to be significantly restricted in Kenya,
and in 1989 there was further erosion in the respect for civil
liberties and political rights. With forced deportations, the
environment for refugees worsened in 1989. By-elections were
marked by government interference in support of particular
candidates and, in some cases, violence. In addition, the
Government banned two magazines, and Parliament barred the
largest English-language daily from covering legislative
affairs for a 4-month period. A number of persons were
charged with behaving "in a manner likely to cause a breach of
the peace," often in connection with making statements
critical of the Government or of political figures. There
were new charges of police brutality and also growing signs of
executive manipulation of the judicial system. In early June,
the Government released the seven political detainees held
under the Preservation of Public Security Act which allows
indefinite detention without charge or trial in national
security cases. Eight persons were publicly tried and
convicted on security charges (9 in 1988, and 39 in 1987).
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no political killings in 1989. However, deaths of
suspects in police custody in suspicious circumstances
160
KENYA
continued to occur, including the death of former Nairobi
student leader Titus Adungosi. The press reported that
Adungosi died in Kenyatta hospital of a stomach ailment while
serving a 10-year jail term for his complicity in the 1982
coup attempt.
Several deaths of prisoners held on other than security
charges occurred during 1989. The Government generally
conducts inquests into deaths in custody, though inquest
results are not often made public. In February four of the
five CID officers charged in connection with the 1988 death in
Mombasa police custody of Zairian musician Taabu Kotela
Kiombwe were found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to 5
years each. In September the State agreed to pay Kiombwe *s
family damages in an out-of-court settlement.
By the end of 1989, no officials had been held responsible for
the 1986-87 deaths in custody of two persons allegedly
involved in the underground movement Mwakenya.
Human rights activists have also commented that over the past
several years numerous suspects have been fatally shot by the
police, allegedly while fleeing.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically related disappearances in
1989.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is proscribed under the Kenyan Constitution. However,
torture and police brutality remained an important issue in
1989. While in 1989 there were markedly fewer public
allegations of torture and abuse by persons held on
political/security charges than in recent years, a number of
Kenyans told the press they were physically abused by the
police. Professor Maina wa Kinyatti, who was released from
jail in 1988, told the U.S. press after fleeing Kenya that
"people are still being put in water while in detention," (see
Section l.d.). President Moi and senior government officials
publicly condemned police brutality and torture, and some
police officials were convicted of human rights abuses in 1989.
Prison conditions in Kenya are poor and sometimes dangerous to
life and health. Detainees and prisoners have complained of
beatings, poor food, corruption, and inadequate facilities and
medical care. Prisoners often must sleep on cement floors.
Overcrowding persisted in 1989 and contributed to the rapid
spread of meningitis among prisoners. In August the director
of medical services said at least 20 inmates at Kodiaga
maximum security prison and 12 inmates at Bungoma prison died
of meningitis. The Government later provided inoculations for
prisoners. In a directive aimed at reducing prison
overpopulation. President Moi released 10,274 petty criminals
in October on the 11th anniversary of his presidency.
The Preservation of Public Security Act (PPSA) allows for
solitary confinement in security-related cases, with no
contact with family or legal counsel, although in some cases
lawyers and families have been permitted to visit detainees.
Correspondence with prisoners is monitored and occasionally
not delivered. Prisoners held on other than security grounds
are allowed one brief visit per month by family members.
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KENYA
Prison or security officers are usually present during visits
by family members or lawyers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution provides that most arrested or detained
persons shall be brought before a court "as soon as is
reasonably practicable," and that if such person is not
brought within 24 hours of his arrest or from the commencement
of his detention the burden of explanation is on the
authorities. The Constitution was amended in 1988 to allow
the police to hold people suspected of capital offenses for 14
days before being brought before a court. Capital offenses
include such crimes as murder and treason. In practice,
suspects of all types are often held incommunicado for long
periods before being brought before a court.
Kenya's PPSA allows the State to detain a person indefinitely
without charges or trial. A formal detention order must be
signed and publicly gazetted. There is no judicial review of
the legality of detention. Detention cases are reviewed by a
board appointed by the President which meets in camera every 6
months, but the Government is not bound by this board's
recommendations. In 1989 there were no new detentions under
this Act, and in June President Moi released all seven
detainees previously held.
In other cases, the number of which is difficult to gauge,
people were held in police custody and questioned without
being charged or officially detained under any specific
authority. For example, in 1989 a former Member of Parliament
was picked up by Nairobi police and questioned for 1 day. He
was not charged or detained. Observers estimate that there
are from four to eight people being held by Nairobi police in
this fashion at any given time — some held for hours, some for
days or even weeks.
Traditionally, neither exile nor threat of exile has been used
by the Government as a means of intimidation or punishment.
In June, however, Nairobi businessman Idris Osman, an ethnic
Somali, was deported to Ethiopia for alleged activities
incompatible with national interests and state security.
Although Osman held a Kenyan passport, Kenyan authorities
claimed his passport had been issued in an illegal manner.
Osman was deported despite a court order to airport and
immigration officials enjoining such action. In December two
other ethnic Somalis were deported under similar circumstances.
A number of Kenyan dissidents have resorted to self-exile. In
most cases, the exiles have not been formally charged with
crimes. In April, fearing rearrest, historian and former
university lecturer Maina v;a Kinyatti fled to Tanzania and
eventually emigrated to the United States. Kinyatti, who
reported being beaten and otherwise mistreated in prison, had
completed a 6-year jail term in October 1988 for possession of
an allegedly seditious document. In June President Moi
publicly announced a general amnesty and pardon to Kenyan
dissidents abroad who were willing to return home. Two such
exiles returned in 1989.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of fair Public Trial
Kenya's legal system, as defined in the Judicature Act of
1967, is based on the Kenyan Constitution, laws passed by
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Parliament, and conunon law or court precedent. Customary law
is used as a guide in civil matters affecting people of the
same ethnic group so long as it does not conflict with
statutory law. Kenya does not have the jury system. The
court system consists of a Court of Appeals, a High Court, and
two levels of magistrates' courts where most criminal and
civil cases originate. Civilians are tried in civilian
courts, and verdicts may be appealed to the Kenyan High Court
and ultimately to the Court of Appeal. Kenyans do not have a
right to legal counsel except in certain capital cases. Most
persons tried for capital offenses are provided counsel free
of charge if they cannot afford it. Military personnel are
tried by military courts, and verdicts may be appealed.
Attorneys for military personnel are appointed on a case by
case basis by the Chief Justice.
The President appoints the Chief Justice and appoints High
Court judges with the advice of the judicial service
commission. The President also appoints the Attorney
General. His power over the judicial system has steadily
increased through constitutional amendments adopted in 1986
and 1988, one of which gave the Government greater control
over the firing of judges. Among other things, these changes
give the President authority to fire the Attorney General, the
Auditor General, and High Court judges. Many observers in
Kenya and abroad have described these amendments as
undermining the independence of the judiciary.
The constitutional right to a fair public trial has been
circumscribed in many instances, notably in political/security
cases such as those involving alleged Mwakenya or Kenya
Patriotic Front (KPF) members. In cases involving the PPSA,
the courts have upheld the constitutionality of properly
executed actions taken under the authority of that Act but
have limited themselves to ensuring compliance with procedural
provisions. In cases without political implications the right
to a fair public trial is normally observed, although long
delays and postponements are common.
In 1989 there were 8 public convictions involving security
charges. In the first public prosecution in 1989 involving
membership in a subversive organization (in this case, the
KPF), Zachary Kariuki Paul Mwati admitted in court to three
charges of spying on Kenyan military installations, receiving
money from self-exile Koigi wa Wamwere, and sending seditious
documents to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) .
Mwati was held incommunicado before appearing in court. As in
most security-related trials of previous years, his conviction
was based on his "confession" that he was a KPF member.
Unrepresented, Mwati was sentenced to 4 years.
In March Joseph Andrew Kibagendi and James Ondari Omariba were
given 9 months each after being tried and convicted of
possession of a subversive document. Both men had legal
representation. Also, in March Daniel John Mwangi Theuri was
jailed for 20 months on his confession in court that he joined
the KPF. He was unrepresented.
In October Dixon Jowe Alieth, unrepresented by legal counsel,
was sentenced to 6 years in jail for possessing seditious
publications. Also in October, prison warden Wilson Awuor
Angonga was jailed for 4 1/2 years for membership in the
underground movement Mwakenya. Angonga, who also was not
represented by a lawyer, was held incommunicado for
approximately 4 weeks before he pled guilty.
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In November former primary school teacher Benjamin Andayi
Muhehe was sentenced to 12 months in jail after confessing to
a charge of leaving Kenya illegally to obtain military
training from a clandestine movement. Muhehe was held
incommunicado for more than a month. He, too, apparently was
not represented by a lawyer. Also in November, former
community development officer Stephen Mulili Kituu pled guilty
and was sentenced to 4 years for membership in Mwakenya.
Kituu, who had been held for 1 month before being sentenced,
was apparently not represented by legal counsel.
The draft version of the advocates bill which went before
Parliament in December contained no requirement that lawyers
obtain licenses. The Law Society of Kenya had argued
vigorously against the 1988 Government proposal that lawyers
be licensed. However, in December, the Kenyan press reported
that KANU planned to affiliate the Law Society to the ruling
party. The Law Society objected strongly to the proposed
affiliation, and President Moi later said that KANU had no
plans to merge the two organizations.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Searches without warrants are allowed under the Constitution
in certain instances "to promote the public benefit,"
including security cases. Security officials also conduct
searches without warrants to apprehend suspected criminals or
to seize property suspected to be stolen. Homes of suspected
dissidents have been searched without warrants, as have the
residences of foreign missionaries. Security forces
reportedly employ a variety of surveillance techniques,
including electronic surveillance and a network of informers.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although the Constitution provides for freedom of speech and
press, the exercise of these rights is restricted. No
criticism of the President is tolerated in any form. Kenya's
sedition laws have been criticized in Kenya and abroad for
failing to distinguish between violent and nonviolent
opposition to the Government. The threat of detentions and
prosecutions have been used to restrict freedom of speech and
press. For example, in April three Standard newspaper
reporters were picked up by police on separate occasions in
and around Embu, in apparent response to their coverage of a
political controversy involving KANU and a local bishop.
In 1989 there was an increasing pattern of arrests on charges
of behaving in a manner "likely to cause a breach of the
peace," often in connection with statements critical of the
Government or government officials. For example, in June a
man was jailed for 6 months for shouting in a bar that the
Government had failed to assist two self-exiles. In September
a high school business teacher was jailed for 3 months for
saying that the head of the civil service should "drop dead"
as he was misadvising the President.
Parliament rarely debates national issues such as foreign
policy. Government and KANU action against outspoken
politicians, clergymen, and lawyers, as well as the detention
provisions of the PPSA and the 1988 amendment, discourage
public exchange of views on political topics the Government
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considers sensitive. Sharp government criticism of churchmen
who opposed government policies continued in 1989 (see Section
2.C.). At the end of the year, the leader of the Green Belt
movement was heavily criticized by politicians and government
officials for her criticism of the plan to construct a
60-story building on open space in central Nairobi. The
movement was evicted from its government-owned headquarters on
1 day's notice (see also Section 5).
The single television and all radio stations are owned and
controlled by the Government. In June after the Daily Nation
newspaper was barred by Parliament from covering house
proceedings, the Voice of Kenya Press Review program dropped
its coverage of Nation news stories, allegedly on State House
instructions, for the 4-month period the Nation was barred.
Previously the Press Review program had highlighted main
articles in all three English-language dailies.
Privately owned newspapers and journals are published in
Kenya, and newspapers, magazines, and books from abroad are
readily available. There is no systematic censorship of the
press, although the press practices self-censorship and
confines its commentary within usually understood but legally
undefined limits. The press criticizes some government
policies and occasionally government officials but never the
President .
At times the Government intervenes to tell editors how to
handle sensitive stories. As former Assistant Minister in the
now-defunct Ministry of National Guidance and Political
Affairs Shariff Nassir commented, "although there is press
freedom in Kenya, editors should not be left to write whatever
they want." In December 1988, Financial Review editor Peter
Kareithi was picked up from his office by plainclothes police,
locked up for several hours, questioned, and then released.
Later, in April 1989, this popular weekly news/economics
publication was banned after it published controversial
articles on the Government's economic policies. Financial
Review Limited, publishers of the magazine, were also
proscribed from publishing under any other trade name.
In August the Government banned another magazine--the Nairobi
monthly Development Agenda. The magazine, only two issues
old, focused on the economy and current events. Unlike the
negative publicity which preceded the banning of the Financial
Review, the banning of Development Agenda occurred with no
warning; no Kenyan, official or private, had publicly
criticized the publication prior to its banning, and the
Government made no effort to explain the banning or offer any
justification for it.
The most salient example of curbs on press freedom occurred in
June when Parliament barred for 4 months the largest-
circulation English newspaper, Daily Nation, from covering
proceedings of the National Assembly. Parliamentary
criticism, which appeared to be well-coordinated, echoed
criticisms which had been made by the President several weeks
earlier. Members of Parliament (all of whom belong to KANU)
debated accusations against the paper's owners and editors,
including biased, inaccurcte, and critical reporting; foreign
ownership (with a subtheme of encouraging foreign reporting
against Kenya's interests) and an unduly high percentage of
ethnic Kikuyu management.
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In August, after a year of court delays, the Government
conceded the appeal of Bedan Mbugua, former editor-in-chief of
the proscribed Christian magazine Beyond (banned last year) .
Mbugua had been charged and convicted of failure to file
annual financial returns. However, it was widely believed
that the real reason for the banning was his publication of an
article criticizing queue voting and KANU's conduct during the
1988 elections. Mbugua had served 14 days of his 9-month
sentence before being released on bail pending appeal. The
judicial procedure followed in Mbugua 's case was highly
irregular. Rather than make a determination on the merits of
the appeal, the deputy public prosecutor requested that the
court set aside the conviction and sentence. Beyond magazine
remained banned at the end of the 1989.
More than 100 foreign journalists representing Western news
organizations are based in Kenya. In 1989 the Government
continued to criticize the foreign press for its coverage of
Kenyan issues. Local reporters increasingly came under attack
as well.
While there are no legal restrictions on academic freedom,
there are a number of de facto ones. The Government has
employed students and professors to monitor classroom
exchanges. Past detentions and trials of students and
professors for alleged seditious activities have inhibited
academic inquiry that might be construed as critical of the
Government .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly, while provided for in the Constitution,
is seriously limited by the Public Order and Police Act, which
gives authorities power to control public gatherings, defined
as meetings of three or more persons. It is illegal to
convene an unlicensed meeting, and politicians have been
arrested for violations of this Act. Although licenses to
hold public meetings are rarely denied, Bishop David Gitari
had difficulty obtaining permits to conduct fundraising
meetings for his church. Bishop Okullu was roundly criticized
by the Government for supporting the right of students to
protest peacefully.
Freedom of association is governed by the Societies Act which
states that every association must be registered or exempted
from registration by the registrar of societies. Some groups
have had difficulty obtaining registration or have been
deregistered. With the exception of civil servants, who are
required to join KANU, Kenyans are not legally bound to join
any political organization. Although the party and the
Government emphasize that it is voluntary, KANU party
membership is a prerequisite for voting and holding public
office. No other political party is permitted.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Kenya has no state religion. Freedom of worship is
acknowledged in the Constitution and generally allowed.
Foreign missionaries of many denominations are permitted to
work in Kenya, though on occasion the President and other
officials have publicly questioned the motives of certain
missionaries and accused them of interfering in politics.
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Four American missionaries were deported in 1989. The four
were affiliated with Associated Christian Churches of Kenya
(ACCK) , a U.S. -based missionary group which was deregistered
in 1988. The Government maintained that the four missionaries
were working in Kenya illegally.
Churches new to Kenya must obtain government approval to be
registered. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
has tried without success for 8 years to obtain registration.
In 1987 the Jehovah's Witnesses were deregistered but
continued to hold services under a stay order from the High
Court .
There is no religious requirement for voting or holding
office. Clergymen in Kenya have spoken out on political as
well as religious issues from their pulpits. In 1989 senior
officials sharply criticized certain clergymen, including
Anglican bishops Alexander Muge, Henry Okullu, David Gitari,
and Presbyterian Church of East Africa Reverend Timothy Njoya
for making political statements. In April, 30 armed thugs
raided Bishop Gitari 's home, and KANU youths disrupted a
sermon given by the prelate. The attacks came after Gitari
referred in a sermon to the blatant rigging of the February
elections in Kiharu district. The results of a State
House-commissioned police inquiry into the attack on Gitari 's
house, which allegedly found that the raid was organized by a
local government official, were not made public. In August
Reverend Timothy Njoya was summoned to appear before the Nyeri
District security committee and questioned for nearly 4 hours.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Although most Kenyans can travel freely within the country,
the Government has in the past used the PPSA to limit the
movement of persons deemed to be dangerous to the public
security. Persons traveling by road to sections of
Northeastern Province are required, due to the prevalence of
highway banditry in the area, to travel in convoys headed by
Kenyan police.
Kenya does not generally prohibit emigration of its citizens
but on occasion does prevent travel abroad, usually by critics
of the Government. In particular, it sometimes refuses to
return passports or issue new ones to people detained under
the PPSA for some time after they are released. The
Government does not regard the issuance of passports to
citizens as a right and reserves the authority to issue or
deny passports at its discretion. In 1989 lawyers Gibson
Kamau Kuria and Paul Muite were still unable to obtain their
passports. Kuria, who had been jailed for 9 months in
previous years after defending three political detainees, has
been forbidden to leave Kenya since his arrest 2 years ago
(see Section 4 ) .
During 1989 there was no known instance in which citizenship
was revoked for political reasons. In the case of Idris
Osman, an ethnic Somali, the Government alleged that he had
obtained his Kenyan passport by illegal means (see Section
l.d.). In December two additional ethnic Somali businessmen
were deported under similar circumstances.
In 1989 Kenya continued to accept some refugees for permanent
resettlement, though its acceptance rate dropped from 90
percent in 1988 to under 10 percent in the first half of 1989,
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subsequently increasing to 50 percent for the rest of 1989.
In 1989 the Kenyan Government stopped accepting virtually all
Ugandans for permanent resettlement. On April 5, Kenyan
officials entered a refugee camp outside Nairobi, rounded up
238 Ugandan refugees, and forcibly returned them to Uganda.
Although the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) protested the deportations, the Kenyan Government
publicly maintained that the refugees had volunteered to
return to Uganda.
In September an estimated 3,000 Somalis fled into northeastern
Kenya near the town of Liboi to escape fighting around the
Somali border town of Doble. In late September, 60 Somali
refugees were involuntarily returned to Somalia. During this
time the Government refused to permit the UNHCR and the Kenyan
Red Cross to travel or provide food to the Liboi area. In
November the Government reversed its decision and decided to
permit the UNHCR and the Red Cross to travel to the area. By
the end of the year unfavorable weather conditions, an
impassable road, and a flooded airstrip prevented UNHCR travel
to the border.
In an effort to control the refugee presence (around 12,000),
the Government initiated a series of procedures which confined
mandated refugees (i.e., refugees not accepted by Kenya and
awaiting resettlement to a third country) to the Thika refugee
camp. The Government also started limiting refugee cards to 2
years' duration rather than giving refugees indefinite or
permanent resettlement.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens cannot change the system of government in Kenya or
replace the party in power through the electoral process. The
Constitution prohibits formation of any political party other
than KANU, and President Moi and a small group of advisers
control all major policy decisions within the Government and
the party. Since 1964, when Kenya adopted a presidential
system, the party's candidate for President has been
unopposed. President Moi was reelected in 1988 to a third
5-year term. Numerous candidates compete in party and
parliamentary elections — also held every 5 years — but all
candidates must be KANU members, and the national party
headquarters has exclusive authority to approve candidates for
political office.
In 1988 KANU adopted a controversial queuing system for
electing KANU nominees. It requires voters to line up in
public behind photographs of the candidates. Only those
voters who have KANU membership cards are permitted to
participate in the nomination process. KANU members comprise
at most 50 percent of the voting age population. Candidates
who receive 70 percent of the vote in the queuing stage are
automatically elected without having to contest the
second-stage secret ballot election. In the 1988 elections,
one-third of the candidates were elected in this manner.
The public nature of the queuing process continues to raise
obvious questions about voter intimidation. In the 1988
elections none of the candidates known to be critical of
government/party policies was elected. Allegations regarding
the abuse of secret ballots continue as well. There were 24
petitions filed contesting the results of the 1988 races. The
High Court did not begin hearing the petitions until 1 year
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after the elections: 10 were withdrawn by the petitioners, 11
were dismissed by the High Court on technical grounds, and 3
were won by the petitioners.
KANU party branches, which often take their cues from State
House, have the power to suspend or expel members from the
party. There are no clear guidelines for activities requiring
disciplinary action. Thus party officials wield significant
power and can remove their political opponents from the
party. Since party membership is required to hold public
office, expulsion from KANU signifies political death, at
least for the short term. Expelled officials may eventually
be allowed back into the party but then are expected to adhere
to party policies.
In an extensive June 1989 KANU purge, 14 party members,
including former Vice-President Josephat Karanja, several
former cabinet ministers and 4 sitting Members of Parliament
were expelled from the party, thereby precluding their
participation in Kenyan politics. By-elections were held to
fill six vacant parliamentary seats. In two constituencies,
the voting was marred by violence and allegations of polling
irregularities. In two others, it was characterized by voter
apathy and extremely low turnouts.
The February by-election in Kiharu (necessitated by a
resignation from Parliament in December) was perceived by many
Kenyans as the most blatantly unfair of recent political
contests. In that by-election G.M.K. Mweru was declared the
winner (over Julius Kiano) with over 70 percent of the queue
vote in the party election, although the press reported
credible accounts which indicated that Mweru actually polled
no more than 800 votes to Kiano's approximately 9,500. (Kiano
was later named to head the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation.)
Local KANU officials who spoke out against the election
results later recanted after being threatened with expulsion
from the party. Despite protests by local KANU party and
church officials and petitions circulated among voters, the
results in this election were sustained.
The Sabatia seat left open by Moses Mudavadi's death was
filled by Mudavadi's son, Musalia Mudavadi, without an
election. KANU party officials exhorted voters to elect the
young Mudavadi unopposed. The candidates who had voiced an
interest in the seat backed out of the race, thereby paving
the way for Mudavadi to take the seat without a contest.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government reacts negatively to criticism of its human
rights record and discourages Kenyans from providing outside
human rights groups with information. President Moi has
publicly attacked Amnesty International and other groups for
"meddling" in Kenya's internal affairs.
In December 1988, two American lawyers from the Lav/yers
Committee on Human Rights sought and obtained high level
appointments with government officials to discuss human rights
concerns. In March a delegation from the Robert F. Kennedy
Memorial Center visited Kenya to present lawyer Gibson Kamau
Kuria with the RFK human rights award. The group met with
President Moi and other high-ranking government officials and
was able to move about freely in Kenya to speak to human
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rights advocates. Although the presentation of the award was
freely conducted before a large audience, the press conference
given by Kerry Kennedy on their last day provoked a series of
virulent anti-Kennedy parliamentary speeches and a week-long
anti-Kennedy press campaign.
Several Kenyan organizations, such as the Law Society of Kenya
and churches, address issues related to human rights, but none
focuses exclusively on human rights concerns. Kenya has not
ratified the Organization of African Unity's Human and
People's Rights Charter, adopted in 1981 in Nairobi.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Kenya is a diverse country that does not mandate legal
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, language
or social status. However, in November the Government
required all Kenyans of ethnic Somali origin to go through a
screening program designed to weed out illegal Somali aliens,
who, because the international border traverses areas
traditionally inhabited by ethnic Somalis, are
indistinguishable from Kenyan nationals of Somali origin. The
Government stated the screening was triggered in part by
security-related incidents (game park poaching and attacks on
tourists) in areas accessible from Somalia. As part of this
campaign the Government required Kenyan ethnic Somalis to
carry an additional form of identification stating that they
have proven themselves to be Kenyan citizens. They are the
only ethnic group in Kenya required to do so. Some ethnic
Somalis have refused to participate as a matter of principle.
The clergy, the Law Society of Kenya, and members of the
ethnic Kenyan Somali community criticized the screening
process as discriminatory and illegal.
Members of all ethnic groups may run for office, and ethnic
representation at the minister and assistant minister level is
broad. Twelve of Kenya's ethnic groups are represented in the
Cabinet. Members of 18 indigenous ethnic groups and 1
Caucasian hold positions at the assistant minister level.
The Asian community, numbering about 65,000, accounts for a
disproportionate share of the nation's economic wealth and
output. The Government's policy of Africanization of the
economy has resulted in some Asian emigration. Kenya amended
its citizenship law in 1984, depriving some Asians and
Europeans of citizenship. Under present law, persons born in
Kenya of non-Kenyan parents can no longer claim citizenship.
There is no legal discrimination against women, but
traditional culture and attitudes have long prescribed limited
roles for women. For example, in responding to criticism of
the Government by an environmental group (led by a female
professor) President Moi in December stated that the African
tradition is for women to respect men. Women may own property
and businesses. Women's roles are particularly restricted in
rural areas where they account for 75 percent of the total
agricultural work force.
Polygamy is not legal for people married under the Christian
Marriage Act, but it is permitted for those who marry under
African customary law. Kenya's law of succession, which
governs inheritance rights, provides for equal treatment of
male and female children (in contrast to much customary law
which favors the eldest male children) .
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Violence agains women, especially wife beating, has emerged in
Kenya as a fairly widespread and growing problem, according to
many doctors. While there are legal remedies, police and
judicial authorities are sometimes reluctant to intervene or
prosecute husbands who physically abuse their wives. The
Government has done little to address this issue beyond
general support to women's organizations. In the case of
female circumcision, which is still practiced by some Kenyan
ethnic groups and is not illegal, the Government officially
discourages the practice but leaves it to women's groups to
actively oppose female circumcision through health education
programs. In December President Moi publicly asked Kenyan
communities which still circumcise women to stop the
practice. Moi called female circumcision "outdated" and said
it was "unacceptable in modern Kenya."
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Civil servants, who comprise 21 percent of total wage earners
(and 41 percent of public sector wage earners) in Kenya, have
been barred from forming or joining unions since President Moi
deregistered their union in the early 1980's. Moreover, since
1985 all civil servants have been required to be members of
the ruling party, KANU. Other workers are, by law, free to
form and join unions but, except for the Kenya National Union
of Teachers (KNUT) , all unions must belong to the single trade
union confederation. The Central Organization of Trade Unions
(COTU) . KNUT is a separate organization that maintains
"fraternal" relations with COTU. During 1989 the Government
considered affiliating COTU to the ruling KANU party. In May
1989 the Government decided that COTU and KANU should
"cooperate" rather than be affiliated. The Government, COTU,
and KANU agreed that there should be no interference by the
party in the collective bargaining process.
The Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) of the
International Labor Organization (ILO) has discussed the ban
on civil service trade unions for the last several years. In
early 1989 the CFA expressed concern at the length of time the
Government was taking to follow through on the implementation
of "measures to permit the establishment of organizations
through which the Kenyan civil servants will be able to pursue
normal trade union activities" and asked for an update on the
plans originally promised in 1987.
The Government and KANU exercise considerable influence over
COTU and through COTU the entire trade union movement. The
President has the right to appoint or remove union leaders in
COTU for the positions of the Secretary General, the Deputy
Secretary General, and the Assistant Secretary General, though
it should be noted that the President has not exercised this
right and has permitted the unions to select COTU leaders.
Union leaders are discouraged but not prohibited from holding
political positions. Currently Sam Muhanji, the General
Secretary of the Kenya Union of Food, Commercial, and Allied
Workers (the largest union in Kenya) and W. Ndumbe, the
General Secretary of the Local Government Workers Union are
Members of Parliament.
The only workers prohibited by law from striking are members
of the armed forces, the police forces, the prison service,
and the national youth service. Other workers have the right
to strike 21 days after a written report of the dispute is
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submitted to the Minister of Labor. However, this right is
limited by the broad power given the Minister by the Trade
Disputes Act whereby the Minister has the authority to require
the two parties to go to the industrial court for mandatory
arbitration of their differences. Public sector workers are
not specifically prohibited from striking, but the Minister of
Labor enjoys broad authorities to prohibit public sector
strikes. In 1988 there were 92 strikes, mostly illegal
wildcat work stoppages occurring at a local level over
specific issues, often without permission from the national
union and often without providing the Minister with written
notification. The Government has not prosecuted trade
unionists involved in these wildcat strikes unless criminal
activity such as vandalism has taken place. The last public
sector strikes in Kenya occurred in 1986 when there were two
strikes involving 41 workers with 35 workdays lost.
COTU is affiliated with the Organization of African Trade
Union Unity and maintains relations, though not affiliation,
with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU). It sends observers to meetings of the ICFTU and the
Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is protected by law and is freely
practiced throughout the country. The only government
restriction on collective bargaining is that wage settlements
not exceed 75 percent of the rate of inflation. Between 300
and 400 collective bargaining agreements are registered with
the Government every year and cover most of Kenya's
nonagricultural wage sectors. Most public sector workers are
covered by collective bargaining agreements but not the large
numbers of civil servants (and some university professors
defined as "management"). Although no statistics are
available, it is estimated that over 50 percent of Kenya's
wage workers fall under a collective bargaining agreement,
though less than 20 percent are union members. Kenya does not
permit closed shops, and unions have been complaining for
years over the problem of "free riders." Although no export
processing zones exist at the moment, the Government plans to
open two in the near future. No restrictions on worker rights
are planned in these zones.
The Government promotes voluntary negotiations between
employers' and workers' organizations and encourages workers
to join unions. Both in law and practice, union officials are
protected against discrimination or penalties based on their
union activities. There is an industrial court that would
hear such complaints, although there have been none in recent
years .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Under the Chief's Authority Act, a local authority can require
the performance of limited communal activities for the benefit
of the local community. While this provision is rarely
invoked, the ILO Committee of Experts has called on the
Government to bring this Act into conformity with ILO Forced
Labor Conventions (to which Kenya subscribes) and has noted
that talks are continuing for the introduction of the
necessary amendments. There are a number of provisions in
other legislation (e.g.. Penal Code, Public Order Act,
Prohibited Publications Order, Merchant Shipping Act, and the
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Trade Disputes Act) which the Committee has found to be
inconsistent with the Conventions.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum age for employment is 16. Employment and
working conditions in some occupations are limited for those
under 18. The minimum age regulations do not apply for
agricultural employment, where many children work on family
farms, or for domestic work. Although enforcement of child
labor laws is lax, child labor is not a problem in the
industrial sector or in dangerous occupations given Kenya's
high unemployment rate. The Ministry of Labor has difficulty
enforcing minimum age laws.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Over 80 percent of the Kenyan work force does not hold jobs in
the wage sector and is not covered by minimum wage law. For
those covered, there is a complicated minimum wage scheme
which is divided by age, locale, and occupation. Currently
the minimum wage (last revised June 1, 1989) ranges from
$14.50 per month for a rural unskilled worker under age 18 to
about $82 dollars per month for a cashier in Nairobi or
Mombasa. Wage earners get additional benefits including a
15-percent supplement for housing which is not included in the
above minimum wages. A Nairobi wage earner making $50 per
month would have a great deal of trouble providing for his
f ami ly--which most likely is very large since Kenya has one of
the highest birth rates in the world. Many families
supplement a wage earner's salary by selling agricultural
produce or by having additional family members in the work
force .
The standard legal workweek in Kenya as defined by the
regulation of wages order is 52 hours over 6 days, except for
night duty workers who can be employed for up to 60 hours per
week. Agricultural workers are exempt from this order.
Kenyan labor law requires weekly (not daily) rest periods,
full payment for public holidays, 21 days of paid annual leave
per year, sick leave (7 days of full pay and 7 additional days
of half pay) and 2 months at full pay of maternity leave,
though women using maternity leave lose their annual leave for
that year. Observance of these regulations is mixed and the
Ministry of Labor, which has the obligation to enforce them,
acts on the basis of complaints, which are few.
The Government does set health and safety standards for
factories, the construction industry, and docks. However, the
law does not cover the large agriculture work force where many
workers are exposed to dangerous pesticides. The Government
is considering a revision of the "factories act" which will
expand the act's coverage into the agricultural sector and
will update its standards to include regulating the use of new
chemical products.
Enforcement of health and safety standards remains a problem.
Safety and health inspectors have the legal power to "enter,
inspect, and examine, by day or night" a factory where he or
she has "reasonable cause" to believe there may be a
violation. Inspectors usually respond to worker complaints
and try to enforce standards, but rarely do they make surprise
inspections of factories. The "factories act" does not
contain any language protecting workers who file complaints.
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LESOTHO
A six-member Military Council, led by Major General J. M.
Lekhanya, has ruled Lesotho since seizing power in a coup
d'etat in 1986. The Military Council is firmly in control of
the State, but it formally conferred all legislative and
executive power on Moshoeshoe II, the previously powerless
King of Lesotho. The Military Council and the King rule by
decree; however, a predominately civilian appointed Council of
Ministers administers the day-to-day operations of
government. During 1989, while local elections were held, the
military regime continued its ban on genuine political
activity and gave no indication of its intention to restore
constitutional rule, which was abolished by former Prime
Minister Jonathan in 1970.
The Royal Lesotho Defense Force (RLDF) of about 2,000 troops
is responsible for internal and border security. The RLDF is
assisted by a small police force of roughly equal size.
Public security stabilized in 1989, and the Government ended
in August its 1988 state of emergency (SOE) against crime.
A landlocked country completely surrounded by South Africa,
Lesotho is almost entirely dependent on its neighbor for
trade, finance, employment, and access to the outside world.
Approximately 60 percent of the adult male labor force is
employed in South Africa's mines, and remittances from workers
(more than $230 million in 1988) are a critical factor in
financing imports.
Human rights in Lesotho in 1989 remained circumscribed. Major
concerns included: the use of preventive detention without
trial to blunt opposition political activity and restrictions
on freedom of speech, assembly, and the right of citizens to
change their government through democratic means. In 1989
Military Council Chairman Lekhanya was exonerated for shooting
to death a 20-year-old university student who was allegedly
fleeing from the campus scene of an attempted rape of a local
woman (see Section I.e.). In a significant development, the
Government in February permitted the return of Basutoland
Congress Party (BCP) leader Ntsu Mokhehle, following nearly 15
years of political exile, together with hundreds of his
followers who were peacefully reintegrated into the local
society.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The Government made no progress in identifying the
perpetrators or their motives for the brutal 1986 murders of
former Ministers of Information and Foreign Affairs, Desmond
Sixishe and Vincent Makhele, and their wives. However, a
judicial inquiry to investigate the killings was convened in
November 1989. Amnesty International has also continued to
press for inquiries into the suspicious 1988 deaths, while in
custody, of Samuel Hlapo, a hijacker, and Mazizi Maqokesa, a
South African exile member of the African National Congress.
During 1989 a number of apparently politically motivated
murders took place in several rural areas of southern Lesotho,
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LESOTHO
along the border with the South African homeland of Transkei.
On June 9, a passenger bus traveling from Xixondo to Quthing
was attacked by five unknown gunmen. Three people were
killed, four injured, and the bus was set on fire. In early
August, a military vehicle was attacked along the
Quthing-Mount Moorosi road by three unidentified gunmen,
although no one was killed or injured. Later in the year, at
least seven people, mostly merchants and shopkeepers, were
killed by unidentified gunmen in the Mohale's Hoek district.
Authorities believe that a Transkei-based renegade faction of
the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) , which broke with the BCP
and repudiated the leadership of Ntsu Mokhehle, was
responsible for the killings. This is the same group held
responsible for a 1988 Maseru bus hijacking in which five
people — three hijackers and two hostages — were killed.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically related disappearances in
1989. Independent and church-affiliated newspapers reported
several abductions by South African authorities in Lesotho.
Victims reportedly included both criminal suspects and
political targets. The Government neither condones nor
collaborates with South Africa in these alleged operations.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
SOE powers were exercised arbitrarily in some cases; in 1988
there were frequent reports of police beatings, ill-treatment,
and even death of some suspects in custody. The police were
granted immunity under emergency regulations against
prosecution for any acts committed in the course of their
duties. Excesses by law enforcement agencies continued to
occur in 1989, including false arrests and ill-treatment of
suspects. These excesses, however, did not occur with the
same frequency as during the early period of the SOE. Several
police officers were tried and convicted for human rights
abuses during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Lesotho declared the SOE in February 1988 as a measure to
combat rising crime. In April 1988, the High Court annulled
the SOE on the basis that the emergency had been illegally
declared. Eleven days later, however, the Government renewed
the SOE, and the SOE remained in force until August 1989. The
Government briefly considered renewing the SOE in December.
The SOE gave the police extensive powers of arrest, search,
and seizure without a warrant. Persons suspected of armed
robbery and certain other criminal offenses could be detained
for up to 14 days and for longer periods on order of the
Minister of Defense and Internal Security. Under the
emergency regulations, an arrest without a warrant could be
made on grounds of "reasonable" police suspicion of the
commission of a specified crime. The regulations provided no
standards for determining reasonableness, however, and the
lack of early judicial review left open the possibility of
essentially arbitrary detention.
Even during the SOE, established procedures remained in effect
for normal civil and some criminal cases, including the right
of 3 detainee to an early determination of the legality of his
detention. The 1981 Criminal Procedures and Evidence Act, as
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LESOTHO
amended in 1984, makes provision for the granting of bail.
Under the Act, the High Court is the only judicial body
empowered to grant bail in cases of armed robbery or suspected
homicide.
In political cases, the Internal Security (general) Act (ISA)
of 1984 applies. This Act provides for so-called
investigative detention without charge or trial for up to 42
days (the first 14 days on order of the police; the second 14
days on order of the police commissioner; and the final 14
days on order of the Minister of Defense and Internal
Security) . Detainees may be held incommunicado up to 14
days. During the second stage of the detention, ministerially
appointed "advisers" (all government employees to date) report
on the health of the detainee, investigate whether the
detainee has been involved in subversive activities, and
advise the Minister of Defense and Internal Security of the
need for continued detention. Detainees under the Act may
make representation about their own treatment only through the
adviser. The Act also allows for detention of witnesses in
security cases.
In addition, a 1986 amendment to the ISA allows the Minister
of Defense and Internal Security to "restrict" a person, who,
in the opinion of the police commissioner, is conducting
himself in a manner prejudicial to public order, security,
administration of justice, or obedience to the law or lawful
authority. A restriction order limits the movements of a
restricted person to a certain location and to certain hours
of the day and may prohibit association or communication with
other persons.
The Government twice invoked the ISA against perceived
political opponents during 1988-1989. One case involved
Johnny Wa Ka Maseko, a South African-born editor of the
independent newspaper. The Mirror, who was deported from
Lesotho in December 1988 after publishing a series of articles
on alleged government corruption. Maseko, who had lived in
Lesotho since 1980 as a political refugee, was first arrested
on October 27, 1988, on charges of criminal defamation. He
was released on bail the same day but was rearrested on
November 14, held for 4 weeks under the ISA, and then deported
for alleged subversion and espionage.
The second case involved Joel Moitse, a university lecturer
and former cabinet minister in the previous government, and
Majora Molapo, a civil servant in the previous government,
nephew of the late Prime Minister Jonathan, and active in the
banned Basutoland National Party. The two were detained in
May following the publication of a highly critical political
tract against the King and his Government. Moitse was
released from detention on June 7, just as his detention was
being challenged in the High Court. On his release, Moitse
was immediately issued with a restriction order and confined
to his family residence. The order was lifted after 6 days,
but it was the first known restriction order issued by the
military Government. Malapo was subsequently released without
restrictions .
The military Government's general amnesty for exiled Basotho
remained in effect. Following secret negotiations in late
1988, BCP leader Ntsu Mokhehle returned to Lesotho in February
1989. The core element of the BCP military wing, the LLA, was
disbanded, except for a small dissident group reportedly based
in the Transkei . The return of Mr. Mokhehle and most of his
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LESOTHO
followers represented a major achievement for the Government's
policy of national reconciliation. There was no indication in
1989 whether Mokhehle would be permitted to engage in
political activity.
with regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary consists of the Court of Appeal, the High Court,
magistrate courts, and customary or traditional courts, which
exist largely in rural areas to administer customary law.
Court decisions and rulings are respected by the authorities
and are generally free of interference by the executive.
Accused persons have the right to counsel and public trials.
The courts have acted to limit infringements of law on
numerous occasions in past years, e.g., its April 1988
annulment of the SOE on procedural grounds (but which the
Government quickly reinstituted) . Under the system of
Roman-Dutch law applied in Lesotho, there is no trial by
jury. Criminal trials are normally adjudicated by a single
High Court judge who presides with two assessors, who serve in
an advisory capacity. In civil cases, judges normally hear
cases alone. The High Court also provides procedural and
substantive advice and guidance on matters of legal procedure
to military tribunals; however, it does not participate in
arriving at judgments. Military tribunals have jurisdiction
only over military cases.
A judicial inquest is initiated by the Attorney General on the
authority of the Judicial Inquest Proclamation Number 32 of
1954. In the Lekhanya case, the Chairman of the Military
Council shot and killed a 20-year-old university student as
the student was allegedly fleeing from the scene of an
attempted rape of a local woman. After a controversial
2-month judicial inquest into the circumstances of the death,
during which General Lekhanya testified and submitted to
cross-examination, the Chairman was exonerated following a
judicial finding of justifiable homicide.
There were no known political prisoners in Lesotho at the end
of 1989.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Both the 1988 SOE regulations and the ISA provide police with
wide powers to stop and search persons and vehicles and to
enter homes and other places for similar purposes without a
warrant. In 1989 there were some reports of violations of
individual privacy by state authorities, but these were
greatly reduced from the number reported during the 1988 SOE.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Human Rights Act of 1983 provides for freedom of
expression but subordinates this freedom to the needs of
national security. Following the 1986 coup, a formal ban on
politics was announced with stringent restrictions on freedom
of speech and political assembly. In particular. Government
Order No. 4 prohibits persons and groups from making political
speeches and from publishing or distributing political party
materials .
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LESOTHO
Despite the ban on organized political party activity,
political activists met privately in 1989, and leaders of
Lesotho's five principal political parties made individual or
joint statements criticizing the military Government and
calling for a restoration of civilian rule. Except for the
cases of Moitse and Molapo, the Government made no attempt to
inhibit such political discussion or activity.
The Government controls the official media (one radio station
and a weekly newspaper) and ensures that they faithfully
reflect government views. However, the Government rarely uses
them to attack its critics, and opposition viewpoints were
routinely expressed in 1989 in two Sesotho-language weekly
newspapers published by the Roman Catholic Church and the
Lesotho Evangelical Church. Also, despite deportation of the
editor of The Mirror, it continued to be published in 1989,
and was sometimes critical of the Government.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The military Government's ban on "politics" was not
interpreted to require the dissolution of existing political
parties, but the ban does preclude political gatherings and
rallies. Nonpolitical organizations and professional groups
are freely formed, even encouraged, and are allowed to hold
public and regular meetings.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor organizations, see Section 6. a,
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion in Lesotho. Free and open
religious practice is permitted and encouraged. Christianity
is the dominant faith of the majority of Basotho, and Roman
Catholicism is preeminent. There is a significant Protestant
minority composed of the Lesotho Evangelical Church, the
Anglican Church, and a number of other smaller denominations.
Conversion is permitted, and there is no apparent social or
political benefit or stigma attached to belonging to any
particular church. There are no bars to missionary activity
or work by foreign clergy.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens generally are allowed to move freely within the
country and across national boundaries. There were instances
in recent years, however, in which the Government restricted
passports for political reasons, but none occurred in 1989.
Liberal emigration policies exist, and the Government places
no obstacles in the way of its own citizens who wish to
emigrate.
The refugee flow from South Africa slowed dramatically in
recent years to only a few refugees per month. In 1989 there
were only 56 refugee cases, 45 of which were South African.
In these cases, persons have been treated fairly, consistent
with Lesotho's international obligations. Refugees affiliated
with South African liberation movements, however, were given
expeditious transit to third countries for resettlement. More
than 300 refugees without this affiliation have been allowed
to resettle in Lesotho.
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LESOTHO
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens of Lesotho currently do not have the freedom to
change the existing government, nor do they play a role in
national decisionmaking. The military Government, which
assumed power in 1986, announced that it intends to remain in
power until peace and national reconciliation are fully
restored. Neither a time frame for this process has been set,
nor has any schedule been announced for constitutional
discussions, elections, and a return to civilian rule.
Elections for local development councils were contested by
persons not officially affiliated with political parties.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government has been unresponsive on human rights issues,
particularly when the call for outside investigation emanates
from the domestic political opposition. Representations by
several influential human rights and media organizations in
the Maseko deportation case had no effect, but similar
appeals, including from the National University of Lesotho
staff association, may have been a factor in the decision to
release professor Joel Moitse.
There are no internal human rights organizations, either
official or nongovernmental. Reports of alleged human rights
abuses are sometimes carried in the local press, particularly
the church newspapers and Lesotho's sole independent weekly.
The Mirror.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Most citizens of Lesotho speak a common language and share
common historical and cultural traditions. Nonindigenous
citizens have generally married into the Basotho nation, which
tends to be inclusive and assimilative. Expatriate
communities are small and are not considered to be a major
factor in the country's political life. Asians (primarily
ethnic Chinese and Indians) and South African whites are
active in the country's commercial life. In 1987 the military
Government formulated a policy aimed at "localization" of
Lesotho's commercial retail trade, and, under the trading
enterprise order, called on foreign owners to enter into joint
ventures with Basotho nationals. Equity transfers would
entail compensation. To date, the "localization" order has
not been strictly enforced, due largely to difficulties in
identifying local entrepreneurs to take over expatriate-owned
businesses and in financing such take-overs, and to concern
over foreign reaction.
Political exiles from SoutJi Africa, who are often viewed as
magnets for South African political or military intervention
in the country, are sometimes allowed to remain in Lesotho on
condition that they neither engage in political activities nor
speak openly and critically about the political situation in
South Africa .
The Government has still not seriously addressed the issue of
woman's rights. In Lesotho these rights are severely limited
by both law and custom, including in the area of property,
inheritance, and contracts. Under Lesotho's customary law, a
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LESOTHO
married woman is considered a minor during the lifetime of her
husband, with all of the legal limitations that this status
implies. She cannot enter into any legally binding contract,
whether for employment, commerce, or education, without her
husband's consent. A married woman has no standing in court
and cannot sue or be sued without her husband's permission.
Despite their second-class status, women in Lesotho
traditionally have been the stabilizing force in the home and
in the agricultural sector, given the absence of over 100,000
Basotho men who work in South Africa. More female than male
children complete primary and secondary schools.
Domestic violence, including wife beating, occurs, but, as
statistics are not available, the extent of the problem is not
known. In Basotho tradition a wife may return to her
"maiden-home" if physically abused by her husband; in common
law, wife beating is a criminal offense and defined as assault
under the 1981 Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. A 1976
High Court case successfully reversed a Roman-Dutch legal
tradition which recognized a husband's right to chastise his
wife at will. While the Government has made some attempts to
enhance the economic prospects of women, very little direct
action has been taken to improve their subordinate status in
the society.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Lesotho is a party to the International Labor Organization
(ILO) Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and Convention
98 on Collective Bargaining. At least one new union was
formed in 1989 to organize construction workers for the
mammoth $2-billion Highlands Water Project.
Roughly 60 percent of Lesotho's active male labor force
between the ages of 20 and 44 work in the Republic of South
Africa, mainly in gold and coal mines. At least 70 percent of
the remainder are engaged in traditional agriculture. The
rest are employed mainly by the Government and in small
industries in Lesotho. A majority of Basotho mineworkers are
members of the South African National Union of Mineworkers
(NUM) . Because the NUM is an extraterritorial worker
organization, it is not permitted to engage in union
activities in Lesotho.
There are two trade union federations in Lesotho, the Lesotho
Congress of Free Trade Unions (LCFTU) and the Lesotho
Federation of Trade Unions (LFTU) . The much larger LCFTU
encompasses 24 affiliated independent trade unions; the LFTU
has 4. Like its predecessor, the current Government supports
the formation of a single, umbrella trade union center, and
since 1988 has stepped up its efforts to broker a merger
between Lesotho's two competing federations. The immediate
catalyst for this renewed interest was the embarrassing
dilemma faced by the Government recently in deciding which
federations should represent Lesotho at international
conferences. More fundamentally, the Government believes that
the size of Lesotho's work force does not warrant the more
than 30 existing labor unions and would like to see these
consolidated. A merger would also eliminate competition among
unions in their negotiations with employers, and enhance the
bargaining power of the work force. There are, however, deep
philosophical, political, and ideological differences between
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LESOTHO
the two federations, reflecting the historical differences of
the two political parties with which they are affiliated. As
the federations were unable to reach agreement in 1989, the
Government is considering legislation to force the desired
merger .
While a legal right to strike exists for workers in
nonessential services, in practice the procedure for calling a
strike is so lengthy and cumbersome that it discourages legal
strike actions and accounts for the prevalence of wildcat
strikes. The 1964 Trade Union and Trade Disputes Act
enumerates lengthy procedures which must be followed before a
strike is called. The last general strike was in 1961. There
were several wildcat strikes in 1988 and 1989 against both
foreign and domestic companies, mostly over wages and
conditions of work. Usually, wildcat strikes have been of
short duration and ended in compromise, although a 1988 strike
at the government-owned Lesotho flour mills ended with the
dismissal of more than 300 employees. In 1989 workers went on
strike against a South African construction firm building an
access road to the Highlands Water Project. The workers were
protesting differential wage and working conditions and the
employment of large numbers of South African workers; the
action turned violent and resulted in serious injury to two
workers .
The LCFTU is a member of the Southern African Trade Union
Coordination Council, the Organization of African Trade Union
Unity, and the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions. The LFTU has fewer international affiliations but is
becoming more active internationally. Aside from a 1987-1988
prohibition on the travel of LCFTU Secretary General Jonathan,
the Government has placed no obstacles to international
affiliations or foreign travel for labor union-related
purposes .
In its 1989 report, the ILO Committee of Experts (COE) asked
the Government to report if the SOE was still in effect, and
whether any regulations had been adopted under this
legislation. The Committee also reiterated its objection to
provisions of the Essential Services Arbitration Act which
restricts the right to strike and applies compulsory
arbitration to disputes in the banking industry.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
All trade unions in Lesotho enjoy the right to organize and
bargain collectively. These rights were established in the
1964 Trade Union and Trade Disputes Act and in the 1967
Employment Act, as amended in 1977. There is also an unfair
labor practices tribunal whose m.andate is to investigate
unfair labor practices and safeguard worker rights. A
government-appointed labor commission is also charged with,
inter alia, monitoring wage and working conditions and
accepting, reviewing, and investigating worker complaints.
There is clear recognition in Lesotho, however, that its
industrial relations system is outmoded. The Government has
been working for several years with the ILO to formulate a
comprehensive new labor code. In September, following
extensive local tripartite consultations, the Government gave
preliminary approval to a draft labor code, which includes 242
separate provisions aimed at briiiging the country's labor laws
into full conformity with ILO standards promoting collective
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liESQTHO
bargaining and greatly simplifying the worker's right to
strike.
Lesotho has several industrial estates grouping together
companies, mostly textile and apparel firms, engaged in
manufacturing for export. There are no prohibitions against
organized labor in these industrial zones, and labor laws are
applied uniformly throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by the 1987
Employment Act and is not practiced in Lesotho.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Fourteen is the legal minimum age for employment in commercial
or industrial enterprises. In practice, however, children
under 14 may be employed in family-owned businesses. There
are prohibitions against the employment of working age minors
in commercial, industrial, or nonfamily enterprises involving
hazardous or dangerous working conditions. Basotho minors
under 18 years may not be recruited for employment outside of
Lesotho. Enforcement of all laws is lax.
In Lesotho's traditional society, life and working conditions
for the country's young "herdboys" tend to be much more
rigorous and demanding than conditions in the modern sector.
Their quasi-pastoral life, however, is considered a
prerequisite to eventual manhood and is a fundamental feature
of Sotho life, tradition, and culture.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Lesotho's 1967 Employment Act spells out basic worker rights,
including a 45-hour workweek, a weekly rest period of at least
24 hours, 11 to 12 days' paid leave per year, and pay for
public holidays. Employers are required to provide adequate
light, ventilation, and sanitary facilities for employees, and
to install and maintain machinery to minimize the risk of
injury. In practice, these regulations are generally followed
only within the wage economy, and enforcement mechanisms are
weak.
Wages in Lesotho are extremely low. The Government, through
the mechanism of a tripartite wages advisory board, raised
minimum wages in 1989 for various types of work. These ranged
from $72 a month for light unskilled labor to about $100 per
month for semiskilled jobs. The vast majority of wage earners
supplement their monthly income through subsistence
agriculture and/or remittances from relatives employed in
South Africa. Many employers in Lesotho now pay more than
minimum wages in an effort to attract and retain motivated
employees. Government salaries were raised in 1988 at a
percentage increase greater than the 1989 increase for minimum
wages. A number of government employees were dismissed in
1989 under the Government's International Monetary Fund
structural adjustment program.
In collaboration with the ILO, the Government will begin a
3-year project in 1990 to upgrade its national occupational
and health safety standards. This is a regional project which
will also include Botswana and Swaziland.
182
LIBERIA
The Liberian Constitution provides for an American-style
democratic system of government and guaranteed rights and
freedoms for the individual. However, in practice, Liberia is
ruled by Samuel K. Doe, who came to power in a coup d'etat in
1980 and transformed his military regime to a civilian
government after being elected President in 1986 in elections
widely believed to have been rigged in his favor. He and his
ruling party, the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) ,
with strong backing from the military, increasingly dominate
Liberian political life. Three opposition parties are legally
recognized and permitted to function, but they continue to
protest the Government's conduct of the 1985 elections and
decided not to participate in the 1989 by-elections.
The army continues to be a bulwark of the current
administration and has major responsibility for internal
security functions. Military indiscipline continues to result
in harassment of civilians. A small police force is used for
maintaining domestic order. At the end of the year, a small
group of regime- opponents crossed the Liberian/Cote d'lvoire
border into Nimba county, assassinating local officials and
killing unarmed civilians. In responding to these attacks,
elements within the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) are credibly
reported to have ignored orders to avoid attacks on innocent
civilians, an unknown number of whom were killed. Both
dissidents and AFL troops have largely concentrated their
actions against civilian members of ethnic groups not their
own. This conflict also resulted in tens of thousands of
Nimba County residents seeking refuge in the Cote d'lvoire.
Liberia's mixed economy is based primarily on traditional
agriculture and exports of iron ore, rubber, and timber. It
continues to suffer from foreign exchange shortages,
widespread corruption, a heavy debt burden, and governmental
mismanagement. Nonetheless, in 1989 the private sector
rebounded after a long decline that finally bottomed out in
1988. The modest recovery was due in large part to higher
world prices for Liberia's two main exports, iron ore and
rubber. Prospects for the future of the economy remain
clouded by the Government's failure to implement a meaningful
structural reform program and uncertainty about export prices.
Despite constitutional guarantees, there were extensive human
rights violations in 1989. In addition to the year-end
violence in Nimba county, major concerns included the use of
arbitrary arrest and detention, military and police abuse and
harassment of citizens, and tight restrictions on freedom of
speech and press, association and assembly, the right of
citizens to change their government, and women's rights. Of
particular concern was the slow, steady erosion in press
freedom. In June the Government closed another independent
media outlet, the Catholic Radio Station, ELCM, which, alone
among the independents, had sometimes criticized the
Government. Despite the success of a joint government-private
accreditation agreement for journalists, the possibility of
further government interference with the press was raised by
the creation of a government-dominated Communications
Commission with the power to revoke media operating licenses.
The combination of government/NDPL pressures, which brought
opposition defections to the NDPL, and opposition boycotts in
both the legislature and in 1989 by-elections moved Liberia
closer to a de facto one-party system. In these
circumstances, the Elections Commission (made up of former
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hlBE&Ih
NDPL members) has made little effort to engage in substantive
dialog with opposition parties to meet their legitimate
concerns. The leader and legal counsel of the banned Liberian
Unification Party, William Kpoleh and Ceasar Mabande, jailed
after a controversial trial in 1988, remained in prison at the
end of 1989; at the beginning of the year, the Supreme Court
granted them a new trial.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of politically motivated killings in
1989 but both dissidents and government forces killed innocent
civilians in the year-end violence in Nimba County.
Additionally at least one person died after a beating
administered by soldiers, and two persons died in official
custody in suspicious circumstances (see Section I.e.). The
Government did not undertake any form of official inquiry into
the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Major General
Podier, a former vice head of state, and several others
killed, allegedly in combat, by security forces in 1988.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Criminal suspects are treated harshly and often receive severe
beatings from the police. The constitutional rights of the
accused are often ignored. In August several dozen people in
Nimba County were reported to have been beaten and robbed by a
group of soldiers under the direction of an official of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. At least one person, a woman,
died from the mistreatment and several others needed medical
attention. The beatings were allegedly carried out at the
behest of a local clan chief as part of an investigation into
alleged occult activities in the area. Although an
investigation found the chief to be culpable. President Doe
released him at the end of 1989 as a result of the incursion
into Nimba County which allegedly lent credibility to his
claims of subversion in the area.
Prison conditions, which have long been dangerous to life and
health, did not improve in 1989. Cells are often small and
without windows or ventilation. Food, exercise opportunities,
and sanitary facilities are grossly inadequate. The maximum
security prison at Belle Yella in remote Lofa County is
notorious for its harsh regimen, including incommunicado
detention. There have been credible reports, including in
Amnesty International's (AI) 1989 Report, that a number of
prisoners have died at Belle Yella in past years under
unexplained circumstances. AI reports indicate that at the
Post Stockade, a military detention center in Monrovia,
civilian detainees have been held illegally for months and
forced to sleep on the floor, without bedding, often covered
in excrement. In some circumstances, detainees have had to go
without water and food for several days. Although the
Constitution states that civilians may not be confined in any
military facility, this provision is frequently ignored.
24-flnfi n_Qn_
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LlSE&Ih
Two defendants in the General Allison trial (see Section
I.e.)/ Augustine Fanga and Henry Walker, died in custody under
unexplained circumstances. Officials attributed their deaths
to their "poor health" on arrival at the prison.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Although police are supposed to have a warrant for arrest, and
persons should be charged or released within 48 hours, these
constitutional provisions are frequently ignored in practice,
particularly in cases involving alleged security threats or
violations. Three students were detained without charge for 2
weeks for attempting to revive a student organization (see
Section 2.a.). A county superintendent was held without being
charged for over a month before being released and
reinstated. Members of a jury were jailed for a few days by a
judge in a Bong County Criminal Court for bringing in the
"wrong" verdict.
In many cases* prolonged detention of persons without charge
occurs as a result of judicial inefficiency and administrative
neglect. Reports appear from time to time that many of those
in Liberian prisons have been "forgotten" by the judicial
system and continue to remain in prison although they have
never been tried. In May a local lawyer succeeded in gaining
freedom for over 30 people so detained in Monrovia Central
Prison. A writ of habeas corpus was filed on behalf of a list
of 205 persons alleged to have been held without charge, some
for as long as 2 years, although some were later found to have
been released previously or properly charged. In a series of
hearings before a judge, more than 30 prisoners were ordered
released unconditionally after it was determined that they had
never been properly charged in accordance with their
constitutional rights. Reliable sources indicate that at the
same time, and possibly because of this case, as many as 50
inmates of Monrovia Central Prison were released by prison
authorities, because they too had never been charged.
A number of well-known Liberians, such as Professor Amos
Sawyer, who chaired the National Constitutional Commission and
headed the now banned Liberian People's Party, remained in
exile in 1989, many of them in the United States. Human
rights organizations have pointed to the case of Nathaniel
Nimley Cholopy, who, after returning to Liberia in December
1987, was immediately arrested and held in incommunicado
detention for almost a year in both the Post Stockade and
Belle Yella. He was released uncharged in November 1988.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Liberia's civilian court system is based on Anglo-American
jurisprudence and features similar judicial bodies, with the
Supreme Court at its apex. The Constitution provides for
public trials and states that there shall be no interference
with the lawyer-client relationship. Nonetheless, the
judicial system is often subject to manipulation, and reports
of financial or political pressure on the courts are common.
Corruption in the judiciary has become almost
institutionalized: bribes are often paid to delay cases
indefinitely, thousands of which are currently "pending"
before the courts. Like government agencies, the judiciary
suffers from a severe shortage of the basic tools it needs to
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LI££EIA
do its work, such as office supplies, stenographers, and
records of precedent cases.
Despite constitutional provision for separation of powers, the
judiciary has a history of succumbing to the wishes of the
executive, as in 1987 when President Doe insisted on, and
received, the resignation of the entire Supreme Court.
Moreover, court orders are not always implemented by executive
agencies including the military. In 1988, when a leading
political figure and nine other conspirators came to trial
before the Criminal Court in August, the military authorities
continued to deny them access to legal counsel, in defiance of
a court ruling. In cases of persons alleged to have been
improperly jailed, prison authorities refused to transport
them to the courthouse. In many instances executive
authorities often demand fees for performance of judicial
duties such as serving subpoenas, collecting witnesses, and
executing warrants.
Persons have the right to legal counsel and to bail in
noncapital offenses. Where the accused is unable to secure
his own lawyer, the court is required to provide legal
services, although a lack of resources limits this practice to
those accused of "serious" offenses. Litigants have the right
to appeal. Traditional courts, presided over by tribal
chiefs, are bound neither by common law nor by conventional
judicial principles; they apply customary and unwritten law to
domestic and land disputes as well as petty crimes. These
decisions may be reviewed in the statutory court system or
appealed to a hierarchy of chiefs. Administrative review by
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and, in some cases, a final
review by the President may follow. Allegations of corruption
and incompetence in the traditional courts are common.
Several prominent political figures convicted of statutory
crimes remained in prison at the end of 1989. The leader and
legal counsel of the banned Liberia Unification Party, William
Gabriel Kpoleh and Ceasar Mabande, convicted of treason in
1988 after a controversial trial, appealed their sentences to
the Supreme Court and remained in prison at year's end pending
the Court's decision; they have been granted, however, a new
trial.
In the major trial of 1989, a military court sentenced Defense
Minister Gray D. Allison to death for ritual murder, although
at year's end the sentence had not been carried out. Two of
the 10 defendants died in prison as a result of lack of
medical attention. They had been delivered to the prison
after having been severely beaten by unknown assailants.
Allegedly Allison and nine others attempted to obtain human
blood for a witchcraft ritual that would enable them to
overthrow President Doe. Allison claimed that the accusations
were politically motivated. The trial did not meet
internationally accepted standards of fairness, even though
Allison was allowed defense counsel of his own choosing, and
both he and his counsel were allowed to make lengthy
statements to the court-martial board. The trial was closed
to the public and press, only edited transcripts and
television footage of court proceedings were released to the
public, and questions were raised about possible coercion of
witnesses .
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LIBERIA
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
In 1989 the political and military leadership took action
against at least 30 soldiers accused of harassing or
mistreating civilians. These included a private who was
discharged for striking an American citizen at a checkpoint in
April, and Major John Solonteh, the Deputy Provost for the
AFL, who was sentenced to a year at hard labor for extorting
bribes from local businessmen. The number of disciplinary
cases increased from 1988 to 1989. Nevertheless, military
harassment and intimidation of civilians at checkpoints
remained a continuing problem in 1989. There were random
shakedowns of civilians, including outside checkpoints, and
occasional episodes of violence. During a municipal clean-up
campaign in March, soldiers were observed commandeering
vehicles, forcing people to work at gunpoint, and occasionally
beating those who resisted. In these instances, no action was
taken against the soldiers.
Interference bycivil and military authorities in the lives of
ordinary citizens occurs on a wider scale in rural areas,
where local officials wield considerable power over the
day-to-day activities of citizens and proper police and
judicial procedures are even less likely to be followed.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
While the Constitution includes provisions for freedom of
expression, including freedom of speech and of the press these
freedoms were substantially set back in 1989. The Government
closed the major private radio station; and two newspapers
closed in 1988 (Footprints Today and The Sun Times) remained
closed in 1989. The Constitution also stipulates that persons
be held "fully responsible for the abuse" of these rights.
Decree 88a, passed by the Military Government in 1984,
declares the spread of "rumors, lies, and disinformation" to
be a felony. This Decree has not been revoked or challenged
in court and is therefore still in force. Government
authorities have not invoked the decree in the past 5 years,
and no one has ever been convicted of violating it. However,
human rights activists point out that this Decree has a
chilling effect on freedom of expression and of the press and
that the Government has not needed to use it to achieve its
objectives.
The Liberian press practices self-censorship. All media
refrain from direct attacks on the President and certain other
senior government officials. As many as five independent
newspapers appeared in Monrovia in 1989, though seldom did
more than four publish on any given day. The one
government-owned newspaper appears twice weekly. The
government-controlled radio and television outlets dominate
the news and provide almost no coverage of opposition views,
despite constitutional guarantees of access.
In 1989, as in the past, government harassment of journalists,
ranging from scuffles with police and confiscation of
reporter's film to the overnight detention of one newspaper
editor, continues to be a constant theme. In a major
development, in June the Ministry of Information, Culture, and
Tourism (MICAT) shut down Catholic Radio Station ELCM (one of
three independent radio stations in Liberia) for reporting
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LIBERIA
that several people had died in a crowd stampede at a local
soccer stadium. MICAT originally demanded a transcript of the
report and, when none was forthcoming, closed the station.
After some public comments by Catholic Archbishop Michael
Francis, President Doe made a speech castigating politically
active clerics and decreeing that the station would remain
"forever closed," a decision the Church declined to contest.
Since the closing of ELCM, there has been a marked decline in
the airing of opposition views in either the independent or
government broadcast media. The banning of ELCM has left two
religiously affiliated, largely apolitical, radio stations:
the Sudan Interior Mission-sponsored ELWA and Radio Baha ' i .
In practice, sessions of the Liberian legislature remain
closed to the public, a restriction of the constitutional
right of citizens to be informed about their government. In
the waning days of the 1989 legislative session, a bill was
passed creating a national "Communications Commission" to
"monitor and control" the Liberian media. Although the
Commission will have a few members representing private
entities, and all of the Board's decisions may be appealed to
the courts, the independent press believes the Commission
could be used as a censorship tool. The Board will have the
power to impose fines and revoke operating licenses; its
members will be presidentially appointed, mostly from the
ranks of government officials, and its head will be the
Minister of Posts and Telecommunications (PTT) . One of the
organizations to be represented on the board, the Press Union
of Liberia (PUL), has already declared that it will not
participate due to what it considers to be the
unconstitutional mandate of the Commission.
The PUL has been outspoken on a number of media-related issues
but also has cooperated with the Government. An agreement
between the PUL and MICAT for the joint accreditation of
journalists has been in place since May, and at the end of the
year there had been no reported problems with attempts to
revoke or deny credentials. In May the PUL sponsored a
seminar on "The Rule of Law in a Democratic Society" in which
speakers discussed frankly the need for strict adherence to
the rule of law and specifically criticized the Government for
various failures to do so.
Academic freedom is limited. The firing last year of a
University of Liberia professor for political statements has
inhibited some other academics. All student politics were
banned in 1988 by Executive Order Number Two of that year, and
the ban on student politics has been incorporated into the
University of Liberia's handbook of rules and regulations.
Although technically that executive decree has expired, two
students were suspended from the University of Liberia in
October, and three students were detained without charge for 2
weeks for attempting to revive a student organization. There
are no functioning student political organizations, and there
has been virtually no open political activity on the
University of Liberia campus. The Government initiated an
investigation when an NDPL official alleged that opposition
United Peoples Party (UPP) teachers had "infiltrated" the
schools in rural Rivercess County for political purposes.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
"The Constitutional right to peaceful assembly and association
is observed more often in urban areas than in rural areas.
Permits must be acquired for public marches and
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demonstrations; however, no political party or other group
attempted to organize any significant demonstrations in 1989.
In 1989 legal opposition groups did conduct public and private
meetings and other organizational activities in the Monrovia
area without interference from the Government. Freedom of the
opposition to organize and operate in the rural areas is
largely dependent on the tolerance of local officials who have
considerable discretion in dealing with strictly local
issues. The opposition UPP party held several rallies in
rural areas in July, with no immediate interference from the
Government, although some participants later reported
harassment. According to Human Rights Watch, the Government
employs intermittent surveillance of opposition figures and
the harassment, including arbitrary detention, of many
political party members to limit the effectiveness of
opposition activity. The U.S. Embassy has no record of party
activists being detained in 1989.
A 1986 Supreme Court ruling banned the "Grand Coalition," an
ad hoc coalition of the three opposition political parties,
claiming it was not organized in accordance with the Election
Commission's (ECOM) rules. In July 1989, the heads of the
three major opposition parties announced plans to hold a joint
meeting, and the elections commission declared that any such
meeting would constitute an illegal revival of the banned
"Grand Coalition." President Doe, however, reversed the ECOM
decision, and the meeting went ahead with no further
government interference. Leaders of the various political
groupings meet on an informal basis without overt government
interference. Opposition activists complain of government
harassment, including dismissal from employment, but some
prominent opposition members hold government jobs. Civil
servants are not forced to join the NDPL, but it is highly
advantageous for career advancement.
The Government initiated in 1988 a check-off system for party
dues to be deducted from civil servants' paychecks, but
participation has thus far been voluntary and erratically
conducted. Opposition politicians complain that the
Government's ability to award jobs and other patronage gives
the NDPL an unfair and unconstitutional advantage. The
opposition UPP has demanded that NDPL organizers desist from
solicitation of funds from local businessmen, an activity
prohibited by the Constitution. ECOM has supported the UPP
position, although solicitation may still occur under other
guises .
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution states that freedom of religion is a
fundamental right of all Liberian citizens, and in practice
there are no restrictions on this right. No religion has
preference over others, and there is no established state
religion. Christianity, brought by 19th-century settlers and
spread through the interior by missionaries, has long been the
religion of the political and economic elite, and many public
figures refer to the "Christian principles" on which Liberia
was founded. The majority of the rural population continues
to practice traditional religions. Approximately 25 percent
of the population is Muslim. The Liberian Council of
Churches, an organization composed of most of the Christian
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LIfi££IA
denominations in Liberia, occasionally plays a prominent role
in national affairs.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution provides every person the right to move
freely throughout Liberia and to leave or enter the country at
any time. Domestic movement, however, is still impeded by a
network of internal checkpoints. The number of such
checkpoints decreased sharply in late 1987 but rose again in
reaction to alleged coup plots in 1988 and large-scale rice
smuggling in 1989. Police and military personnel at these
checkpoints routinely search vehicles and often solicit bribes
from passengers.
Exit visas are required for all Liberians and most
non-Liberians leaving the country. These are routinely
issued. A prominent Liberian dissident living in the United
States asserted in 1989 that the Government had denied her a
passport. There were no reported restrictions on the foreign
travel of Liberians in 1989. Despite allegations by human
rights groups that the Government maintains a "black list" of
persons who may be denied permission to travel or who may be
arrested upon their return, there is no evidence of the
existence of such a practice.
There are 247 refugees in Liberia. Refugees are not forced to
return to the countries from which they have fled. In a few
cases in past years, however, the Government sought to deport
refugees who became involved locally in political activities.
As a result of year-end violence in Nimba County, tens of
thousands of residents fled to neighboring countries.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Despite universal suffrage and constitutional guarantees of
free and fair elections, there is serious doubt that Liberian
citizens are free in practice to change their government
democratically. The only national election since the 1980
coup perpetuated the rule of President Doe and was widely
believed to have been fraudulent. The Liberian Government is
structured along the lines of the American model, with three
separate but theoretically equal branches of government,
including a bicameral legislature. In practice, the executive
branch, and the President in particular, has a preponderant
share of power. In recent years the number of military men in
government has declined, but the military remains a major
force in support of the Doe Government.
The legislature (26 senate seats, 62 house seats) is subject
to inordinate executive influence, and lacks the
assertiveness, resources, and political will to play its
constitutionally mandated role of coequal in governance. In
1989 it passed a number of executive-sponsored bills with
little or no debate, confirmed virtually all presidential
appointments sent before it, and failed to promote any
significant legislative initiatives of its own. The
executive, moreover, regularly took budgetary and other
actions which the Constitution gives exclusively to the
legislature. Opposition parties formally continue to boycott
the legislature. A small number of legislators, elected in
1985 on opposition tickets, but taking seats as independents,
functions as an informal opposition grouping. Its
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LIBERlh
effectiveness was undercut in 1989 due to the death of its
most prominent member and numerous defections to the NDPL.
The Constitution provides for an Elections Commission to
monitor all political activities in the country. The
elections law empowers the Commission to certify parties,
conduct all elections, and count election ballots. The five
commission members are appointed by the executive for life and
currently are all former members of the ruling NDPL. Citing
the widespread fraud that occurred during the 1985 elections,
the opposition has in the past called for an independent
vote-counting mechanism. When the deaths of two legislators
necessitated by-elections in two counties in October 1989, the
opposition UPP asked ECOM to amend elections procedures as a
de facto condition for participation in the by-elections.
ECOM denied any need for changes, and all opposition parties
boycotted the by-elections where two NDPL candidates ran
virtually unopposed.
The Constitution prohibits creation of a one-party state.
Four political parties are officially recognized by the
Elections Commission — the ruling NDPL, the United Peoples
Party (UPP), the Liberia Action Party (LAP), and the Unity
Party (UP). The level of activity of the three opposition
parties varies, but in the last 2 years each held conventions
or other large party gatherings and expressed its views freely
in the press and at public forums. A lack of financial
resources crippled their activities, however, and prevented
the publication of newsletters on a regular basis. Although
the UPP expressed willingness to participate in electoral
politics for a few years after the disputed election of 1985,
and did participate in one by-election, it abandoned its
policy of seeking cooperation in late 1988 and joined with the
other two opposition parties in 1989 to boycott the 1989
by-elections .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In recent years the Government has permitted representatives
of various organizations, including Amnesty International (AI)
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to
visit Liberia and investigate alleged human rights
violations. While it did not respond directly to inquiries
from AI about the conduct of General Allison's trial, it
permitted a visit by representatives of the Lawyer's Committee
for Human Rights at the end of the year.
Although no Liberian organizations currently exist for the
express purpose of monitoring human rights developments, the
Press Union of Liberia, the Liberian Bar Association, and the
Liberian Council of Churches have spoken out on human rights
issues in recent years. The Liberian Red Cross routinely
visits prison facilities, mostly in the Monrovia area, and in
1988 was permitted for the first time in recent memory to
carry medical and sanitary supplies to the isolated maximum
security prison at Belle Yella.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that "only persons who are Negroes or
of Negro descent" shall qualify by birth or naturalization to
be citizens of Liberia. The Constitution further states that
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LIBERIA
only Liberian citizens can own real property. These
provisiTjns discriminate against many nonblack residents who
were born in Liberia and consider it their home. Otherwise,
there is no officially sanctioned discrimination on the basis
of race, religion, language, or social status. However,
members of President Doe's Krahn ethnic group hold a
disproportionate share of high posts in the Government and
military and are widely believed to receive preference in
competing for lower level jobs.
The status of women varies by region, but sexual
discrimination is widespread. In urban areas and along the
coast, women can inherit land and property. In interior
areas, where traditional ties are stronger, a woman is
normally considered the property of her husband and his clan
and is not usually entitled to inherit from her husband. In
newly urbanized areas, many women are subject to both
customary and statutory legal systems.
Violence against women, including wife beating, occurs, but as
there are no statistics available, the extent of the problem
is not known. Police do not normally intervene in domestic
disputes, and cases rarely come before the courts. Female
circumcision is widely practiced by the majority of Liberians
who follow traditional religions and is tolerated by
government authorities.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution states that workers have the right to
associate in trade unions. Over 20 labor unions are
registered with the Ministry of Labor, representing roughly 15
percent of the monetary sector work force. Ten national
unions are members of the Liberian Federatibn of Labor Unions
(LFLU), an affiliate of the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions. The Government does not recognize the
right of civil servants or employees of public corporations to
unionize or to strike. Many such employees, including
teachers and port workers, are represented by employee
associations. The American Federation of Labor and Congress
of Industrial Organizations maintains that the invalidation of
the teachers' union charter constituted government
interference with members rights to establish organizations of
their own choosing.
Although organized labor historically has not had great
influence in national politics, in recent years it has begun
to assert itself on issues affecting workers' interests.
During 1989 the LFLU was again active in lobbying the
legislature to pass the new labor code. The code, drafted in
1986 with the cooperation of Liberian unions and the
International Labor Organization (ILO), would repeal PRC
(military) Decree 12 outlawing strikes. It had been awaiting
legislative action for 3 years. The House passed the bill in
the last week of the 1989 session, and the Senate was
scheduled to take it up early in 1990. Labor unions are
constitutionally prohibited from participation in party
politics .
In July the Supreme Court put an end to a dispute over the
LFLU's May 1988 elections that had been running for more than
a year. The losing candidates in those elections had appealed
to a civil magistrate and then to the Supreme Court in an
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LIBERIA
attempt to have the election overruled. The Supreme Court
eventually rejected the appeal on technical grounds, leaving
in place the magistrate's decision that the matter was an
internal union affair that the Government had no reason to
judge.
Promulgated in 1980, PRC Decree 12 outlawing strikes and any
other type of labor unrest is technically still in effect,
although there were no significant strikes in 1989 to test the
Government's December 1988 assertion that unions are free to
strike .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
With the important exception of civil servants and employees
of public corporations, workers have the right to organize and
bargain collectively. In contrast to 1988, there were no
reports of government interference in union organizing
activities in 1989. The Government promotes union/management
negotiations and sometimes provides mediation for disputes
arising out of such negotiations. Associations represent
worker interests with government and management.
The ILO Committee of Experts (COE) has noted that current
labor legislation provides insufficient guarantees against
antiunion discrimination and supports the passage of the new
labor code as a partial remedy.
Labor laws and practices are applied uniformly throughout the
country, including in the unique export processing zone.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced labor, and the practice is
firmly condemned by the Government. The COE, among others,
has raised questions abgut the degree of enforcement of that
prohibition, especially on rural community development
projects. In a broader context, the Government has indicated
that the draft labor code will provide for penal sanctions in
cases of illegal use of forced or community labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Government prohibits employment of children under the age
of 16 during school hours. Enforcement, which is limited, is
primarily aimed at the wage sector. There is no enforcement
for the many children engaged in the large subsistence farming
sector. Only a minority of children regularly attend school.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The labor law provides for a minimum wage, paid leave,
severance benefits, and safety standards. The minimum wage
for agricultural workers is approximately $0.90 cents per day
at the unofficial exchange rate. Industrial workers generally
receive three or four times this amount. The minimum wage
would not, by itself, be sufficient to insure an adequate
standard of living for a worker and his family, but many
families have other sources of income or receive support
through an extended family system. The maximum hours of work
which an employer can require are 8 hours per day or 48 hours
per week. Safety standards are not rigorously enforced. A
new national pension scheme was implemented in 1988 in which
most workers and employers are required to participate.
193
MADAGASCAR
The Democratic Republic of Madagascar, the fourth largest
island in the world, is governed by a president and a
parliament (National Popular Assembly), both elected by direct
universal suffrage. The President selects the members of the
Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), the highest policymaking
body. President Didier Ratsiraka, in power since 1975, has
broad constitutional powers, and his position is further
strengthened by the influential role of his political party,
the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (AREMA) , which holds
an overwhelming majority in the National Popular Assembly.
Prior to December 1989, only the eight parties making up the
National Front for the Defense of the Revolution were
permitted to engage in political activity. The Front,
established in 1976 by the Malagasy Constitution, was
conceived as a unifying framework — a form of single confederal
party — for building socialism and protecting the "Socialist
Revolution" in Madagascar while allowing for party diversity.
The political orientation of the eight parties in the National
Front ranges from moderate and pro-Western to radical and
pro-Soviet. The President and his party gained major
victories in bitter 1989 elections, which resulted in further
sharp divisions between party leaders of the Front and called
into question the future of this unusual institution. As a
result on December 20 the National Assembly amended the
Constitution to remove the Front's special status.
The Malagasy internal security system is composed of the urban
police force and the National Gendarmerie, the latter having
jurisdiction in the provinces. On occasion, the National
People's Army is also used for internal security purposes.
Agriculture dominates the Malagasy economy, employing some 85
percent of the population and providing about 80 percent of
the country's export earnings. Since 1982 the Government,
with the assistance of the International Monetary Fund, began
to introduce a long-term austerity reform program, inter alia,
to stimulate declining agricultural production in basic
commodities, especially rice. Despite some progress, economic
growth (1.8 percent in 1988) has not kept pace with population
growth (3 percent), real incomes have declined, and
unemployment remains high, especially among youth (60 percent
of the population is under age 25). As a result, the
Government's reform program became a major issue in the 1989
presidential and parliamentary elections.
Although a wide range of fundamental liberties and individual
rights are called for by the Constitution, there continued to
be human rights abuses including extrajudicial killings and
mistreatment of prisoners, significant restrictions on
freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, and questions as to
the ability of citizens to change their government through
free and fair elections. However, in February the President
did suspend censorship of the media. While there were
numerous charges of voting irregularities following the hotly
contested presidential race, which was won by the incumbent
President with 63 percent of the vote, these elections
probably were less subject to manipulation than earlier ones
due to the monitoring role played by several independent
organizations. Still, there were large demonstrations against
the outcome, which resulted in violent clashes with police.
Officially, 5 persons died, 70 were wounded, and 64 people
arrested. In 1989 the Government scaled back its rural
security campaign against bandits after extensive charges
emerged in 1988 of summary executions by security forces.
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RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There have been recurring rumors of politically motivated
killings in recent years, but little evidence to substantiate
them. During a press conference in August 1989, the President
stated that there had been a bomb attempt on his life and that
there had been a plot to kill Monja Jaona, an aging opposition
leader, and cast blame on the President. However, there was
no known followup investigation of these charges.
In 1988 military and police forces undertook a major campaign
to eradicate the well-armed and burgeoning cattle rustling and
banditry endemic to the southern areas of Madagascar,
resulting in on-the-spot executions of captured bandits. In
July 1988, Interior Minister Ampy Portos announced that 205
bandits had been killed in government-directed security
operations. A number of human rights groups, such as Amnesty
International (AI), criticized the summary execution of
bandits by the security forces, but there appeared to be no
major domestic opposition to the government policy of taking
forceful actions against the bandits. However, in 1989 the
Government sharply reduced the scope of these operations,
although reports of banditry increased at the end of 1989. A
1989 trial brought to the surface allegations of military
involvement in cattle rustling operations and connected arms
trafficking (see Section I.e.).
b. Disappearance
There were no known cases of politically motivated
disappearance. However, press reports in August 1989 raised
questions about the whereabouts of a university student leader
arrested in June and detained at the prison of Tsiafahy.
Reportedly, he opposed a proposed Government reform plan for
the university. The student, Cyrille Rasambozafy, may have
escaped in a major prison break at Tsiafahy in July. The
student's parents claim that they have not heard from him
since his arrest and fear he may still be held by the
authorities. The Government has not responded in any way
regarding the missing student.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
While there were no documented cases of physical torture
occurring in Madagascar, some organizations in the security
apparatus, notably the state secret police, have a reputation
for ruthless methods. There have also been credible reports
that the armed forces used torture in the Government's
campaign against outlaw bandits in Madagascar's southwest.
Malagasy prisons are increasingly inhumane in terms of living
conditions. Some prisoners are not fed regularly, hygiene is
totally lacking, and medical care is not provided. As a
result, prisoners suffer a range of medical problems from
malnourishment and infections to malaria and tuberculosis.
The death toll rises significantly among prisoners during the
cold winter months. The Minister of Justice has appealed for
foreign assistance to ameliorate these conditions by making
prisons self-supporting agricultural and small industrial
units .
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d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
In a normal criminal case, the accused must be charged or
released within 3 days after arrest. Generally, defendants in
ordinary criminal cases are charged formally within the
specified time frame and, upon being charged, are allowed to
obtain an attorney. Counsel is readily available, and
court-appointed counsel is provided for indigents.
Under Malagasy law, persons suspected of activity against the
State may be detained incommunicado for 15 days, subject to
indefinite extension if considered necessary by the
Government. In particular, the Government has held detainees
in security cases for extended periods, as with 37 kung fu
adherents held from 1985 until their trial and eventual
release in 1988. (In 1984-85, these martial arts enthusiasts
had been involved in street fighting with a paramilitary youth
group and the army.) Also, certain defendants involved in
coup-plotting cases have been held in pretrial detention for
periods ranging from 20 months to over 5 years.
Since the release of the kung fu defendants, there has been no
evidence of other arbitrary political detentions. The
Government briefly detained a number of persons after massive
demonstrations held in April to protest the presidential
electoral outcome and government economic policies.
Exile has not been used as a means of control in the recent
past.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Malagasy Constitution provides for an independent
judiciary, and in practice the judiciary seems to function in
most cases vjithout outside influence from the executive. The
judiciary has three levels of courts: lower courts for civil
and criminal cases carrying limited fines and sentences; a
court of appeals which includes a criminal court for cases
bearing sentences of 5 years or more, and a Supreme Court.
The judiciary also has a number of special courts designed to
handle specific kinds of cases under the jurisdiction of the
higher courts. A Constitutional High Court, with a totally
separate and autonomous status, may review the
constitutionality of laws, decrees, and ordinances and ensures
the legality of elections.
A Military Court has jurisdiction over all cases involving
national security. The definition of national security is
largely a matter of interpretation by the authorities but
includes acts constituting a threat to the nation and its
political leaders, invasion by foreign forces, and riots that
could lead to an overthrow of the Government. In exceptional
cases, civilians may be tried in the Military Court if they
are charged with having broken military laws.
Military courts, like civilian courts, provide for an appeals
process. Furthermore, military courts are presided over by a
civilian magistrate. The rank of the four military officers
comprising the court is determined by the rank of the accused.
In 1989 two bandits accused of the mass-murder of 11 persons
for the proceeds from a cattle sale were tried and sentenced
to death by a military court. While the death penalty is
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legal in Madagascar, it has not been carried out since 1947.
The particular viciousness of this crime and the popular
outrage it evoked may result in these death sentences being
carried out. The trial, known as the "keliberano affair,"
also brought to the surface allegations of military
involvement in cattle rustling operations and connected arms
trafficking. The presiding judge called for an investigation
and a hearing on these charges. On November 15 the court of
Fianarantsoa rendered light sentences of 6 months to a year
for those involved in supplying the weapons used in the
keliberano killings.
There are currently no known political prisoners in Madagascar.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The State does not generally intervene in nonpolitical aspects
of the lives of the people. The home is traditionally
inviolable under Malagasy law. However in December 1989,
Article 42 of the Constitution was amended to permit
authorities to enter the home in cases of persons caught in
the act or where the occupants explicitly consent to a
search. In their suppression of cattle rustlers and bandits
the military have entered some homes without court orders and
ransacked them.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These freedoms remain significantly restricted despite the
loosening of press censorship. Private citizens who criticize
government officials or policies must choose their words
carefully; direct criticism of the President or the "Socialist
Revolution" is not tolerated.
The broadcast media are under state control and provide
positive coverage of the Government's activities. While the
opposition received some coverage in the presidential and
legislative elections of 1989, many observers felt that it was
dwarfed by the nightly reports on the activities of the
President and his AREMA Party.
In past years, the Ministry of Interior has reviewed and
censored the content of newspapers prior to printing. On
February 19, 1989, the President suspended censorship
restrictions on the print media, and journalists have
cautiously been testing their newfound freedom. To become
permanent, this suspension still requires passage of a law by
the National Assembly. Thus, there is a moratorium on
censorship, and the President's ability to restore controls at
a moment's notice continues to moderate press criticism and
comment of Government policies. The press, in contrast to
television and radio, did give broad coverage to the election
campaigns and related demonstrations.
In 1988 the Government allowed previously barred journalists
from a foreign newspaper to visit Madagascar, and it lifted an
8-year-old ban on the Paris-based weekly Jeune Afrique. There
is one government-owned newspaper and two major independent
dailies. Several other dailies and weeklies are published by
party groups and independent publishers, including the
outspoken and candid Catholic newspaper, Lakroa.
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Academic freedom is restricted by a constitutional prohibition
on any public lectures or teachings which condemn Madagascar's
Charter of the Socialist Revolution.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The rights of assembly and association are restricted.
Permits are required to hold public meetings and can be denied
by the Government if officials believe that the meeting poses
a threat to the State or endangers national security. Those
denied a permit can appeal these decisions before the
administrative chamber of the Supreme Court. Persons and
groups belonging to parties of the National Front are
permitted to organize and assemble. Nevertheless, since
political activity by groups outside the National Front was
prohibited, dissenting political opinion has been limited. In
1988 the Government banned an organization affiliated with the
Catholic Church (the CEADAM) from holding a national political
debate on the state and future of the nation.
Madagascar's campuses continue to constitute a major source of
instability for the Government. The range of problems runs
from inadequate finances and logistics to overcrowding, ethnic
tensions, and squatters. While the widespread student unrest
which took place in 1987 has not recurred, the University of
Antananarivo campus became the site for popular demonstrations
against President Ratsiraka's reelection in April 1989.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Government is secular, and there is ho official religion.
There is no discrimination on the basis of religious
affiliation, and people are free to follow the faith of their
choice. Over half of the population is Christian, with the
remainder following traditional Malagasy religious beliefs or
other faiths. Missionaries and clergy are generally permitted
to operate freely.
During the visit of Pope John Paul II to Madagascar in late
April, several days of violent political demonstrations,
protesting the presidential election results, were suspended
by the opposition to ensure a peaceful visit.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Officially there is no restriction on travel within the
country. However, since May 1988, the start of the campaign
to eradicate cattle rustling, villagers in the southwest
reportedly must get permission to leave their villages. For
all Malagasy, official approval must be obtained for trips
outside the country. Foreign travel is impeded by the
difficulty of obtaining foreign currency. The Malagasy franc
is not convertible abroad, and the Government limits the
amount of hard currency that can be obtained for foreign
travel. There is no refugee population in Madagascar.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The right of citizens to change their government was called
into question by widespread allegations of fraud in the
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presidential elections. Moreover, the electorate's choice had
been constrained by the nature of the political system since,
prior to December 20, 1989, the only political parties allowed
to operate had to be members of the National Front. The
situation is, however, expected to change when new
implementing decrees are elaborated to define political
activity outside the Front (see below). The electoral process
provides the voters a chance to choose among candidates
expressing differing views in local and regional elections, as
well as in the parliamentary and presidential campaigns. The
137 members of the National Popular Assembly are elected by
universal suffrage for 5-year terms. The President is elected
to a 7-year term. The President's party has total political
control of the apparatus of government. This is partly due to
political apathy and a sense of defeatism as expressed in
increasing voter absenteeism which reached over 50 percent in
the last round of local elections. The President controls all
major policy decisions. Most legislation is initiated by the
executive branch.
On March 12, 1989, some 4.7 million Malagasy went to the polls
to choose from among four presidential candidates. According
to the official results, pronounced a month later by the
Constitutional High Court, President Ratsiraka won a third
consecutive 7-year term with an absolute majority of 63
percent of the votes cast. There was widespread
dissatisfaction with this outcome. Opposition leaders claimed
fraud and organized rallies protesting the election results,
violent demonstrations erupted and claimed four or five
lives. The election results were subsequently contested in
the Constitutional High Court, which sustained voter
irregularity appeals in 43 cases of the several hundred
brought before it. Most of the challenges were denied on
technical grounds (e.g., improper filing procedures). The May
28 legislative elections reinforced the President's hand as
his AREMA Party consolidated its already preponderant hold on
the Assembly with a 120-seat victory. The legislative
elections were peaceful. However, due to widespread voter
dissatisfaction as evidenced in the earlier presidential
elections, there was a low voter turnout. In September local
government elections were marked by an even lower voter
turnout and led to further AREMA party consolidation.
On December 20, 1989, the National Assembly amended the
Constitution. Tt rescinded Articles 9 and 29 concerning the
Front which results in this institution no longer being an
official institution of the Malagasy Government but rather a
simple alliance of parties which support the President and his
Socialist policies. New parties may also now apply to join
the Front. Furthermore, an amendment to Article 8 allows for
opposition parties to exist outside the Front. However,
opposition parties must not have as their objective the
undermining of the unity of the nation or as their platform a
separatist ethnic, tribal, or religious character. Moreover,
a revised Articie 16 states that opposition parties cannot
oppose Malagasy socialism by illegal or violent means.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongoverrunental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government has not officially cooperated with groups,
either externally or internally based, wishing to investigate
alleged human rights violations and has denied visas to AI
representatives. In 1989 the President ruled out the
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suggestion that international observers be present at the
polls on March 12, saying that the Malagasy are quite capable
of managing their own electoral affairs. Originally, the
Union of Malagasy Opposition in Exile (based in Paris) made a
public call in 1988 for the presidential elections to be
overseen by U.N. observers.
Human rights organizations are considered to be political
groups under Malagasy law and must therefore be sponsored by
one of the parties belonging to the National Front. Under
these circumstances, only one human rights organization is
currently operating in Madagascar: The Malagasy National
Committee for the Defense of Human Rights which was founded in
1988 and is affiliated with the VITM Party, one of the smaller
parties. Some of its members are also on the National
Committee for Election Observation which monitored
electioneering in 1989.
The Christian churches in the country have taken the lead in
advocating human rights and play an important supplementary
role in monitoring human rights concerns. The Christian
Council of Churches in Madagascar (FFKM) is a major
organization in this regard. In February 1988, the FFKM
monitored the celebrated kung-fu trial to assure that due
process was provided to the 245 accused. It also provided
lodging and food for the defendants. In 1989 this
organization provided a monitoring role, where possible, in
the presidential and legislative elections. It also
publicized and condemned tho.se irregularities which it
witnessed.
Madagascar is a member of the United Nations Human P.ights
Commission.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Madagascar is inhabited by an estimated 10.3 million people of
both Malayo-Polynesian and African origin. While there
appears to be no customary practice of institutional or
systematic discrimination on the basis of ethnic grouping in
Madagascar, a serious outbreak of violence and plunder of
Indo-Pakistani-owned property occurred across Madagascar in
March 1987. This prosperous community, estimated at some
24,000 persons of Indo-Pakistani origin and referred to
locally as "karana," is primarily engaged in commerce. While
no Indo-Pakistanis died in these riots, several looters were
killed, many were wounded, and property damage was great. The
simultaneous outbreak of these riots in cities across the
island and the relative absence of damage outside the
Indo-Pakistani community gave rise to some speculation that
these incidents had been carefully coordinated and organized
by the Government. The Chinese and French communities also
have experienced some resentment from the Malagasy, mainly
because of their success in commerce.
Women have traditionally played a prominent role in the
business and economic life of the country, with many of them
managing or owning business concerns or filling management
positions in state industries. Education at all levels is
open to women. However, women in rural areas and among the
urban poor face a greater degree of hardship. In addition to
the responsibilities associated with raising a family, the
realities of subsistence agriculture force these women to
engage in farm labor and related activities.
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While women are not discriminated against in the workplace,
discrimination does exist in marriage and property rights. In
the case of divorce or the death of the husband, the wife
inherits only one-third of their joint wealth. On the other
hand, the wife receives a pension if her husband dies, but the
reverse is not true. Women's rights groups do not exist, but
groups of professional women and women within the political
parties are working to change these aspects of family law. On
December 12, 1988, Madagascar became a signatory of the U.N.
Charter on Eliminating Discrimination Towards Women.
According to various sources, including magistrates,
journalists, and women doctors, violence against women, such
as wife beating, is not widespread, and neither the Government
nor party womens ' organizations have addressed this issue
specifically. The society frowns on marital confrontation.
Married couples generally prefer to avoid divorce and, if
necessary, to live separate lives under one roof. In very few
divorce cases is there an allegation of physical abuse that
could be construed as wife beating. In the rare cases where
this condition is detected, police and legal authorities do
intervene. However, there is no law dealing specifically with
violence against women. Female circumcision is not practiced
in Madagascar.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Malagasy have the right to establish and join labor
unions. However, the labor force of 4.9 million is mostly
agrarian (85 percent), and unionized labor accounts for less
than 5 percent of the total. Seven of the national labor
organizations in existence are affiliated with the eight
political parties within the National Front for the Defense of
the Revolution. Two independent unions in 1979 signed a
protocol of agreement with the dominant political union
belonging to the President's party, pledging support for the
Malagasy "Socialist Revolution." The primary focus of the
unions is party politics, and they are usually active only
during election campaigns. Overall, labor unions play an
insignificant role in national life.
Public servants may not form independent trade unions but may
join "Malagasy Revolutionary Organizations" (ORM's) under the
supervision of the Government. Under the Charter of Socialist
Undertakings of 1978 workers' committees are established, but
preferential access to these is extended to the members of
trade unions belonging to one of the ORM's of the National
Front for the Defense of the Revolution. In 1989 the
Committee of Experts of the International Labor Organization
(ILO) asked the Government to take appropriate measures to
ensure that public servants can establish organizations
without prior authorization or other restrictions. It also
asked the Government to introduce legislation explicitly
guaranteeing the trade union rights of seafarers.
Workers have the right to strike, but in reality, strikes in
Madagascar are a rarity because of the severe unemployment
problem and the politicization of the labor federations.
However, there are occasional wildcat strikes. In these, the
Government generally sides with management for the restoration
of order. The Labor Code, which covers all workers except
civil servants and merchant marine employees, prescribes an
arbitration procedure which must be followed in
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labor/management disputes. Should this procedure not lead to
a settlement, workers individually, or as represented by a
union, may call a strike.
In 1989 the SECES, a labor union comprised of university
professors and researchers, went on a major strike over its
dissatisfaction with general working conditions at the
nation's six universities. It used the withholding of
examination results from students as leverage in its dealings
with Ministry of Higher Education officials. On August 26, a
communique issued by the SECES explained that the freeze on
examination results had been lifted because some of its
demands had been met.
Several of the unions are members of the Communist-controlled
World Federation of Trade Unions or of the World Confederation
of Labor. One union, the Confederation of Malagasy Workers,
has links with the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Union activity is governed by the Malagasy Labor Code of May
18, 1975, which guarantees free unions and the right to
bargain collectively. Article 4 of the Labor Code formally
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against union
members and organizers. According to Article 132 of the Labor
Code, collective bargaining may be undertaken between
management and labor at either party's behest. When there is
failure to reach agreement, the Ministry of Labor convenes a
nonconciliation committee which attempts to resolve
differences. If this process fails, the committee refers the
matter to the chairman of the First Circuit Court for final
arbitration.
There are no export processing zones in Madagascar, although
legislation providing for such zones was approved by the
National Popular Assembly at the end of 1989.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is explicitly prohibited by Article 2 of the
Malagasy Labor Code. There is no forced or compulsory labor
in Madagascar within the definition set forth by the ILO.
Madagascar is a signatory to ILO Convention 29 prohibiting
forced labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Malagasy Labor Code describes a child as any person,
regardless of gender, under the age of 18. The minimum age
for employment is 14, but the use of child labor is prohibited
in those areas where there is apparent and imminent danger.
The Government enforces these child labor laws in the small
wage sector through the Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and
Social Law. However, in the large subsistence agricultural
sector many young children work with their parents on family
farms at much earlier ages. Similarly, in the urban areas
many children earn a living as parking attendants, newspaper
vendors, etc.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Malagasy Labor Code and its enforcing legislation describe
the working conditions for employees. Malagasy law
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MADAGASCAR
distinguishes between agricultural and nonagricultural work.
There is a 44-hour workweek in nonagricultural and service
industries. There are also provisions for holiday pay, sick
and maternity leave, and insurance. There are several minimum
wage rates in Madagascar according to categories of work. The
lowest (for unskilled workers) is approximately $20 per month
and is inadequate to ensure a decent standard of living.
Accordingly, most workers must supplement their incomes
through subsistence agriculture or reliance on the extended
family structure.
The Labor Code has rules concerning building safety, machinery
and moving engines, operational safety, and sanitation
standards. It appears that, in practice, the rules and
regulations of the Code are adhered to by employers and are
enforced by the authorities. Labor inspectors from the
Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and Social Law carry out
regular visits to industrial work sites. Violations of
safety, sanitary, operational, and other Work Code laws are
the subject of reports by these inspectors. If the violations
are not remedied within a specified time frame, the violators
are legally charged and subject to various penalties.
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MALAWI
Virtually every aspect of Malawi's first 25 years of
independence — political, economic, and social — has been
dominated by Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, who led the country to
independence in 1964 and was proclaimed "Life President" in
1970. The sole legal party is the Malawi Congress Party
(MCP) , to whose Central Committee the Cabinet and Parliament
are subordinate. Only candidates selected by the MCP and
approved by the President are allowed to run in parliamentary
elections, last held in 1987. Constitutional amendments and
laws passed by the Parliament mirror decisions already taken
by the President and his close advisers.
Military, police, and party security organs closely monitor a
wide range of activities, particularly opposition to the
Government .
Malawi, a small, densely populated, landlocked country with
few exploitable resources and a high population growth rate,
possesses no significant mineral resources or industrial
sector. It is heavily dependent on agriculture for export
earnings and employment. Sound agricultural policies have
produced a food surplus, despite an influx of 800,000 refugees
in recent years, high transportation costs resulting from
closure of the rail routes through Mozambique (owing primarily
to the Mozambican civil war), and earthquakes and floods in
1989. Its fiscally sound policies have enabled it to qualify
for special International Monetary Fund assistance.
Malawi's human rights performance is the reverse of its
economic achievements and its exemplary handling of one of the
world's largest refugee feeding programs. In 1989 the
observance of human rights deteriorated as a leading political
dissident was murdered, and arbitrary detention continued to
be used to suppress any sign of dissent. Other major abuses
included: mistreatment of prisoners and life-threatening
conditions in prisons; lack of fair trials; interference with
privacy; severe restrictions on freedom of speech and press,
assembly and association, and the right of citizens to change
their government; and serious discrimination against
northerners .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Some human rights organizations claim that a journalist named
Osborne Mkandawire died in prison in November 1988. After
extensive research, the U.S. Embassy was unable to identify
such a person, although a retired journalist named Mkandawire
did die of natural causes in his native village. In another
incident, Fred Sikwese, a Ministry of External Affairs
officer, was detained in February 1989, reportedly for
espionage or embezzlement. He died the following month.
Amnesty International (AI) alleges torture. Government
sources claim natural causes but denied the family access to
Sikwese 's body.
Dissident Mkwapatira Mhango, Publicity Secretary of the
Malawian Freedom Movement (MAFREMO) , and most of his family
were murdered on October 13 when his home in Lusaka, Zambia,
was firebombed. It followed by a few weeks President Banda 's
public complaint that Mhango was among those responsible for
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MALAWI
an alleged foreign press campaign against the official
hostess, C. T. Kadzamira. This, and the fact that an earlier
dissident leader was murdered in Harare in 1983 following
similar criticism from the President, led many to believe that
the act was directed by Malawian authorities. The Zambian
Government's investigation has not been conclusive, and
allegations continued to circulate. Before he died, Mhango
told a reporter that the real target may have been Edward R.
Chirwa Yapwanthwa, MAFREMO chairman, who planned to slip into
Malawi clandestinely and had been staying at Mhango ' s home.
b. Disappearance
There were no known political disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Beatings by police during arrest or detention are illegal but
occur. Responsible officials are rarely disciplined. Terms
of hard labor are the norm for common criminals. AI ' s 1989
Report focuses on harsh conditions in several prisons. AI
also reported a number of deaths in Nsanje and Dzeleka Prisons.
In 1987 Orton and Vera Chirwa were transferred from Mikuyu
prison to Zomba Central Prison where conditions were
reportedly worse. Margaret Marango Banda, an Anglican women's
leader (and Aleke Banda ' s cousin--see below) who was detained
that same year, is imprisoned with Vera Chirwa. They are not
permitted to speak with one another and are denied access to
visiting clergy. Their diet is insufficient, and Ms. Banda is
believed to be in poor health with inadequate medical
attention. The Chirwas have not been able to speak with one
another for at least 4 years and are not allowed to receive
mail from their children.
Frackson Zgambo, an airport official and football referee, was
detained with Fred Sikwese. While there have been reports of
his death, Zgambo is believed to be under detention in Mikuyu
Prison.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under the Preservation of Public Security Act, the Minister of
Justice (a position held by President Banda) may order the
arrest, search, and detention of persons considered a threat
to the preservation of public order. The Act was amended in
1977 to eliminate a 30-day limit. Persons arrested under this
law can be, and often are, detained indefinitely without
charge and without trial. The President must review such
cases every 6 months, but this safeguard has had no noticeable
effect .
Still in detention at the end of 1989 were: Brown
Mpinganjira, Deputy Chief of Information, detained in 1986 for
providing information to foreign journalists; Dr. Goodluck
Mhango, a veterinary surgeon with the Malawi Young Pioneers,
detained in September 1987 because his brother (killed in
1989) wrote articles critical of the Government; Jack Mapanje,
a prominent professor and poet, also detained in September
1987 for planning to publish a volume of poetry deemed
critical of the President; Mr. Mbeye, a senior Ministry of
Finance official, detained in August 1988, reportedly for
revealing to the foreign press the cost of a presidential trip
to Great Britain; Dr. George Mtafu, Malawi's only native
neurosurgeon, arrested in early 1989 after making a
disparaging remark in a private gathering about the condition
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MALAWI
of the aging President's brain. Kalusa Chimombo, a prominent
member of the teachers' association of Malawi before his
arrest in 1978, remains imprisoned as the country's longest
serving "prisoner of conscience," according to AI .
Other persons detained in early 1989 for unknown reasons
included: Tozer Khonje, a government agronomist; Dave Mumba,
an employee of a private company; and George Thindwa, an
employee of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Mtafu,
Khonje, and Thindwa may have been victims of an antinorthern
campaign (see Section 5). Aleke Banda, once a presidential
confidant and high-ranking official, was quietly released from
Mikuyu Prison in late 1988 and is currently under house arrest
nearby. Detained in 1980, Banda has never been charged.
AI estimates that at least 30 persons were detained in the
first half of 1989. Although Malawian secrecy makes an
accurate estimate impossible, most observers consider this is
a reliable estimate. Detentions continued, albeit at a
reduced rate, late into the year. While forced exile has not
been used as means of control, there is a small politically
motivated outward flow of persons from the country. In late
1988, the Chairman of the Malawi National Education Board,
Donton Mkandawire, was dismissed for allegedly packing the
education system with fellow northerners. Reportedly fearing
imprisonment, he subsequently fled to Botswana.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Malawi has both traditional and modern court systems. Lawyers
are not permitted to assist defendants in regional traditional
court cases, but legal counsel is permitted in the modern
court system. The right of appeal exists in both court
systems. The judiciary is not independent, and the executive
does not hesitate to intervene in cases of interest to it,
particularly those of political or security import.
The modern court system consists of the magistrate courts, the
High Court, and the Supreme Court of Appeal. The President
appoints the Chief Justice of the High Court and, after
consultation with the Judicial Service Commission, other
modern court justices. Most are well qualified. Due to much
lower salaries, however, magistrates tend to be recent law
school graduates with no experience. This is the level at
which most poor persons (who cannot afford legal counsel)
first come into contact with the modern court system. The
latter is open to the public, and defendants are charged
publicly. Due process, however, is frequently ignored. In
1989 several municipal officials including the town clerks of
Lilongwe and Blantyre, were summarily fired. Some were
detained, then released without ever being charged. None was
permitted to defend himself in court. Several attempted to
sue the Government for wrongful dismissal, only to be informed
that their files had been closed by presidential decree.
The three traditional courts at the regional level deal with
most capital offenses, including treason (the Chirwas were
tried in a traditional court). Police officials handle the
prosecution, and defendants conduct their own defense.
Traditional court justices are appointed directly by the
President. Of the five members of each regional traditional
court, three are chiefs without formal legal training, one is
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a trained lawyer who advises the court, and the fifth, the
chairman, has had a course in law. There is little executive
interference in traditional court cases dealing in
nonpolitical matters of customary law.
The Forfeiture Act permits the Government to revoke the
property rights of those suspected of economic crimes, such as
illegal currency transactions. These revocations sometimes
have political overtones and are almost always directed
against the Asian community. When the Forfeiture Act is
invoked, the person loses all worldly possessions, including
business, financial, and personal assets. Revocation of
property rights is carried out by executive fiat with no
judicial review. The Forfeiture Act was not invoked during
1989, suggesting a government moderation in applying its
draconian measures. The courts several times tried illegal
currency cases instead. Punishments generally fit the crime.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Police can enter houses of suspects at will under special
entry authority to conduct searches for suspects or
incriminating evidence. It is generally understood that
telephones are routinely tapped and that a network of
informers reports private statements and actions to the
Government. Authorities open some domestic and international
mail .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Government does not tolerate criticism of any kind of its
policies. It is an offense (5 years' imprisonment) to publish
anything likely "to undermine the authority of, or public
confidence in, the Government." Life imprisonment applies to
"false information" sent out of the country which is "harmful
to the interests or good name of Malawi." In practice, giving
critical information to foreign journalists results in
detention without trial. Any discussion of Malawi's political
future or speculation about the President's age is prohibited.
Local media do not submit their news and programs to the
Government beforehand, but self-censorship "guidelines" are
generally understood. Journalists, including senior editors,
have been jailed for extended periods for overstepping these
"guidelines." Malawi's two newspapeVs and government-owned
radio station exist primarily to catalog the Chief of State's
words and activities. Nevertheless, criticism of the
efficiency of some government departments occasionally appears
in the media and often in parliamentary debate.
Foreign journalists must request permission to enter Malawi
and must specify in advance the topics they intend to cover.
Correspondents from the New York Times, Washington Post, and
Financial Times visited Malawi in 1989 and wrote articles
which would have been unheard of in past years. In a major
breakthrough, two Western journalists were allowed to set up
residence in Malawi. Although a spate of critical foreign
press articles (of which they may have been innocent)
temporarily compelled the two journalists to leave the country
in October, they were allowed to return 2 weeks later.
All publications, recordings, and movies entering Malawi are
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screened by the Censorship Board. The current list of banned
items includes well over 1,000 titles.
Limited freedom of inquiry into the natural and social
sciences exists at the University and may include some
examination of radical political ideologies, provided this
does not extend to criticism of the Government.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Political meetings are not permitted outside the framework of
the Malawi Congress Party. Persons may be imprisoned if they
further the aims of an "unlawful society," defined as "any
group considered to be dangerous to the good government of the
republic." In the nonpolitical sphere, individuals and
organizations generally are free to meet and associate.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state or preferred religion, but religious groups
are required to register with the Government. Jehovah's
Witnesses, whose religious convictions prevent them from
joining political parties, have been banned since 1967. The
Government considers the Witnesses' activities to be
disruptive of "the prevailing calm, law, and order."
Witnesses continue to be arrested and charged. In 1989 a
Jehovah's Witness representative claimed that entire families
were arrested in the period 1986-88 and are still in Dzeleka
prison.
Other religious groups generally may establish places of
worship and train clergy. Religious publications, like all
others, may not criticize the Government or the party. Most
religious groups are free to establish and maintain links with
coreligionists in other countries, and members are free to
travel abroad. Malawi's sizable Muslim minority conducts its
religion and builds mosques freely. President Banda has
publicly stressed the importance of providing the same civic
services to Muslims which the Christian majority enjoys.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are few restrictions, in practice, on movement within
Malawi for most citizens, though legal provisions exist for
restricting movement of those convicted of political or
criminal offenses. However, Asian residents and citizens,
while free to travel within the country, must reside and work
in one of four urban areas (Lilongwe, Zomba, Mzuzu, and
Blantyre/Limbe) . Denial of passports on political grounds
frequently extends to family members of persons in political
disfavor and to those persons the Government suspects may
criticize it if allowed to travel abroad. Civil servants and
employees of state-owned enterprises must obtain written
permission to travel abroad, even on vacation. Obtaining such
a clearance can take from a few days to several months.
Formal emigration is neither restricted not encouraged.
Malawi hosts the largest refugee population in Africa. Nearly
800,000 Mozambicans, located in heavily populated areas with
little available land, have seriously strained the economy as
well as transportation and social services networks. The
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Government has shared its own scarce resources and has
encouraged and cooperated with international and private
voluntary organizations to operate relief efforts. The latter
are coordinated by a committee chaired by the Ministry of
Health. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and
other international assistance groups travel freely to assess
relief needs and to investigate allegations of protection
problems .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens of Malawi do not, in practice, have the ability to
change their government. Major political decisions are made
by the President or his close associates. Opposition
political parties or movements are not permitted. Membership
in the Malawi Congress Party is not legally mandatory, but it
is frequently coerced. Based on the 1987 census, over 70
percent of the adult population holds at least nominal party
membership. Membership is expected of those who aspire to
government positions (including the civil service) or
professional success. Party membership is often required of
schoolchildren and of those who seek access to government
services or entrance to local markets. The annual renewal fee
is only about 35 cents, but this can be nearly half a day's
pay for a minimum wage earner. When the President visits an
area, financial contributions from individuals and businesses
are also levied.
The party structure provides for some choice among candidates
for party, parliamentary, and other offices. All nominees,
however, are selected by the party and approved by the
President. Active political campaigning is not permitted.
The National Assembly, consisting of both elected and a few
appointed members, is mainly concerned with ratifying
government policy. Its powers are broadly based in law but
highly circumscribed in practice.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government does not permit organizations such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty
International to visit prisons or conduct human rights
investigations in Malawi. It does not respond to their
appeals. Local nongovernmental human rights organizations are
not permitted to exist. Expressions of interest in alleged
human rights problems by outside groups or persons are not
welcomed. Repeated diplomatic efforts to discuss the case of
Vera and Orton Chirwa with the Government have been rejected.
Separate efforts in 1989 by representatives of the U.S. and
West German Governments to discuss directly with President
Banda the Mapanje and Dr. Mtafu cases, respectively, resulted
in his angry rejection of what he termed interference in
Malawi's internal affairs.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Asian residents, whether Malawian citizens or not, have been
compelled to transfer ownership of rural shops and trucking
businesses to ethnic Africans. Strict rules governing where
Asians may own property effectively limit where they may
reside. Changes in the citizenship law in 1986 eliminated a
Lsm
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provision whereby persons who held foreign passports could
reside indefinitely in Malawi. These changes in the law,
together with actions under the Forfeiture Act (which has been
applied in large measure against Asians), have led many in the
small Asian community (about 5,000 persons) to leave Malawi
and others to question their long-term future there. Some
Asians began to return, however, in 1989.
Regionalism as a divisive domestic issue resurfaced during the
President's annual crop tour in February 1989. Although the
Life President evidently supported antinorthern campaigns in
years past, this was the first time that President Banda
allowed the full weight of his office to sanction regionali:
openly. Prominent northerners who lost their jobs included;
John Phiri, the Secretary for Trade and Industry. Hastings
Chunga, General Manager of Sedom (the Government's small
enterprise development scheme); and James Chatupa, the
Government's Chief Geologist. Other northerners, notably
Police Commissioner G. G. Mtawala and Chief Magistrate S.F.C.
Munyenyembe, were "retired" and stripped of their pensions.
Several lesser officials were transferred to other jobs.
Perhaps to compensate, the President highlighted unity (from
Malawi's four doctrinaire cornerstones) at the annual party
congress in September, during Mothers Day in October, and at
the closing of Parliament in November. It is unlikely that
regional sensibilities were assuaged since few northerners who
were detained, lost their jobs, or felt compelled to leave the
country in 1989 have obtained remedial relief.
Most women are limited to roles defined by a traditional
African society and do not have opportunities equal to men,
although the President takes a special interest in advancing
their status. Violence against women is not tolerated. At
the annual party conference in 1989, the President made the
entire Central Committee stand and acknowledge that any wife
beaten by her husband could approach them directly for
redress. Responding as well to a report of telephone
harassment gainst a European woman, the President directed
the police to tap phones, find the culprit, and send him off
to prison for life without a trial.
Women enjoy access to maternal health services and to
extension programs designed to improve their homemaking
abilities. Such programs, while benefical, have not given
full recognition to the importance of women as agricultural
producers in the rural sector (roughly 70 percent of all
smallholder farms and over 50 percent of subsistence holdings
are headed by women) and the potential role women can play in
the modern sector. Males still have an advantage in education
and employment, but the Government has initiated broad-scale
programs to reverse existing discrimination. A third of the
positions in the public education system, for example, have
been reserved for women. Malawi's traditional tribal
leadership structures remain primarily matrilineal. Several
small ethnic groups grant few rights and privileges to women
and occasionally continue to practice female circumcision.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Nongovernment workers have the legal right to associate, form,
and join unions, and labor unions do exist in the small wage
sector. However, their activities are highly circumscribed by
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the Government, and they are generally ineffective in
achieving gains for workers. Most wage workers are unskilled
laborers on large agricultural estates. Labor unions must
associate under the Trade Union Congress of Malawi (TUCM) .
Malawi law provides for the right to strike, but strikes do
not occur in practice. Ministry of Labor officers are quick
to intervene at the first hint of labor unrest, with
government supervision, the TUCM associates with international
organizations and is affiliated with The Organization of
African Trade Union Unity and the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions.
The Government allowed the Southern African Trade Union
Coordination Council to open a permanent office in Malawi in
1988. It is headed by a former Malawian labor leader who was
once detained for several years on political grounds. The
Chamber of Commerce's general manager is also a former
political detainee, illustrating that some persons are
occasionally permitted to make a comeback in Malawi.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers have the legal right to organize, and the law
prohibits antiunion discrimination by implication. Complaints
are resolved by the Ministry of labor. Collective bargaining
is protected by law, but its use is limited. The Government
has set a minimum wage and regulates working conditions, but
it does not intervene overtly in the collective bargaining
process. Labor legislation is applied uniformly throughout
the country. There are no export processing zones in Malawi.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by law and is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum working age is 14, but this applies only t<) the
small urban wage sector where it is enforced by labor
inspectors from the Ministry of Labor. In the large
subsistence agriculture sector, the minimum age is not
enforced, and children work on family farms at a younger age.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Less than 15 percent of the work force is employed in the
formal wage sector. For those fortunate enough to hold paid
jobs, wages and working conditions are generally adequate, and
paid holidays and safety standards in the workplace are
required by law. However, enforcement of these standards is
limited. Malawi's low wage levels reflect the abundance of
unskilled labor and the Government's policy of limiting the
urban-rural income gap to stem migration into the towns. Wage
earners fare slightly better in living standards than the vast
majority of workers engaged in subsistence agriculture. The
minimum wage reflects the fact that Malawi is one of the
poorest countries in the world.
New minimum wage rates, the first in 3 years, were implemented
in May 1989. Mimimum daily wages nearly doubled in Malawi's
three cities, to 80 cents per day; and wage rates in rural
areas increased 125 percent, to 30 cents per day. Wages for
experienced skilled workers are increasing sharply as the
supply of such workers diminishes, and large numbers of them
find better paying jobs in S.A. and Botswana.
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MALI
Mali is a single-party state in which effective authority is
exercised by General Moussa Traore, President of the Republic
and Secretary General of the Democratic Union of the Malian
people (UPDM) , the country's only legal political party and
supreme political entity. President Traore assumed power
through a military coup in 1968, and under his leadership the
military Government adopted a new Constitution in 1974. Since
then, the military have retained a privileged position, but
civilians have an increasingly important role in daily
government operations and in the party. Military men continue
to occupy 4 of the 7 regional governorships, 11 of the 46
districts, and an important number of lower level
administrative posts, particularly in the border areas.
Mali maintains an army and air force, which provide both
external and internal security. The gendarmerie (paramilitary
police) assists in maintaining internal security.
With an annual per capita gross national product of
approximately $190, Mali is among the world's poorest
countries. Mali is landlocked and lacks major mineral
resources. Its economy rests on subsistence farming and
animal husbandry. Good rainfalls for the second year in a row
increased agricultural production and permitted some export of
grains. However, it is too soon to say whether the cycle of
drought and economic depression that has affected Mali in
recent decades is over. Malnutrition, poor food distribution
systems, and widespread unemployment remain persistent
problems. Throughout 1989 the Government continued its
efforts to modernize the economy, particularly through fiscal
reform and privatization of state enterprises, but Mali
remains heavily dependent on external aid.
Human rights remained circumscribed in Mali in 1989. The
Government did permit publication of an independent newspaper
and the establishment of a nongovernmental human rights
organization. The infamous Taodenit prison remained closed.
However, security authorities mistreated several students and
held them incommunicado for several months for distributing
pamphlets. Significant human rights problems included
arbitrary detention, abuse of detainees, and restrictions on
fair trial, freedoms of speech, press, and association, the
right of citizens to change their government through
democratic means, and worker rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No politically motivated killings were reported.
b. Disappearance
No incidents of disappearance, abduction, or hostage-taking
were reported.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Government has issued specific instructions prohibiting
brutality against suspects. However, physical abuse of
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MALI
suspected persons sometimes occurs during police interrogation
or in confronting demonstrations. In 1989 authorities accused
eight students of distributing political tracts and held them
in incommunicado detention for 2 months. According to
credible sources, they were seriously mistreated, and at least
one of the students was tied and suspended by his hands for a
prolonged period while undergoing interrogation. No officials
were prosecuted or even reprimanded for these actions.
Prison conditions are harsh and characterized*by inadequate
medical facilities and food supplies. Mali's most infamous
prison--Taodenit — was closed in 1988. In the past, the
abysmal conditions at Taodenit contributed to the deaths of
prisoners, including political prisoners held there. Amnesty
International has called for a full and independent inquiry
into the Taodenit deaths.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Malian judicial system is based on the French model.
Detained persons do not have the right to a judicial
determination of the legality of their detention, but arrests
cannot be made without formal charges. In political cases,
the authorities do not always follow this practice, and
incommunicado detention is sometimes utilized, as in the case
of the eight students. Malian law does not provide for
release on bail, but detainees are sometimes released on their
own recognizance. Administrative backlogs often cause delays
in bringing people to trial. Detainees are usually allowed
access to a lawyer of their choice.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
A part of the executive branch, the judiciary is not
independent. The Ministry of Justice supervises both law
enforcement and judicial functions. The Supreme Court is the
highest court, with both judicial and administrative powers.
The National Assembly can convene a high court of justice to
hear cases against state ministers, but this court did not
meet during 1989.
The eight students mentioned above were finally charged in
August under a statute prohibiting the distribution of
politically inflammatory material. When their case came to
trial, seven were acquitted, and the court suspended the
sentence of the one student who was found guilty.
Corruption remains a major political issue, and trials against
corrupt officials continued in 1989, notably in the Special
Court of State Security, a military court. The Special Court
met in June and heard 47 cases. Of the 72 persons found
guilty of corruption, 30 were sentenced to life imprisonment
and 7 received death sentences. In the Special Court,
defendants usually admit guilt in the hope of receiving a more
lenient sentence and allow their lawyers to argue mitigating
circumstances. The verdict and sentence are rendered by a
panel of three judges, including civilian judges and armed
force officers. The death penalty is mandatory under the law
for anyone convicted of embezzling more than $36,000.
However, in most embe^zlement trials restitution by the
accused can decrease the severity of the sentence. Once
convicted, a person can appeal for a presidential pardon or
request a new trial. The right to request a presidential
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MALI
pardon or a new trial exists in mandatory death penalty cases.
As far as is known, there were no political prisoners being
held at the end of 1989.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Inviolability of the home is provided for in the Constitution
and generally respected in practice. Police searches are
infrequent, and warrants are issued and recorded, though
sometimes after the fact. Local authorities sometimes seize
and open mail extralegally . Under the law, private letters
can be opened only if the country is facing political crisis.
In such cases, the only organization which may legally open
personal mail is the "Securite d'Etat," a special intelligence
service responsible to the Presidency.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Malian Constitution does not expressly provide for freedom
of speech and press. Malians take care to express criticism
of the Government in accepted forums. In theory, criticism is
permitted within the councils of the sole political party,
which all citizens are encouraged, but not forced, to join.
Questioning of government authority outside party
deliberations is rare, although not expressly forbidden.
The Government controls most Malian media, which reflect
official positions. In some instances media and public
criticism of specific programs and of the performance of some
government officials is allowed. An independent biweekly
newspaper, Les Echos, which often contains sharp political
commentary, began publication in 1989. Independent specialty
magazines such as Jamana (a cultural publication) and Podium
(a sports journal) also contain some political commentary and
circulate freely. International publications, including those
having articles critical of Mali and its Government, are
available. Satire and social criticism, sometimes with a
political cast, are occasionally evident in Malian government
publications. Government authorities generally seize
political tracts printed by organizations not formally
recognized by the Government.
Academic freedom does not include the right to criticize the
Government, nor is this right extended to the only recognized
labor union, which is considered an arm of the Government.
The union has, however, occasionally been critical of
government policy.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to form
organizations to protect their professional interests, but in
reality only selected nonpolitical organizations such as urban
professional associations qualify. The primary groups which
assemble freely are the women's, youth, and similar
associations of Mali's single political party. In 1989 a
number of apolitical "amicales" or friendship groups
sponsoring exchanges with foreign countries were established,
but these associations do not have an overt political agenda.
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MALI
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Mali is a secular state. The Government generally does not
discriminate on religious grounds. Although 90 percent of
Malians are Muslim, most other religions may practice their
faiths freely and are permitted to establish houses of worship
as well as schools. Christian missionaries of various faiths
enjoy government cooperation. Proselytizing and conversion
are permitted, except in the case of the Baha ' i , who may
practice at home but may not proselytize or establish houses
of worship. The Government prohibits publications in which
one religious group defames another.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement in Mali is generally unimpeded, although
police checks sometimes occur in which Malians and foreigners
alike are stopped, particularly at night. These checks are
used ostensibly to restrict the movement of contraband goods
and to check vehicle registrations. In practice, some police
probably supplement their frequently delayed salaries by
assessing ad hoc fines or confiscating goods. Malians are
free to change residence or workplace. Foreign travel
requires an exit visa, which is easy to obtain. Repatriation
is not restricted.
In the past drought years, Mali both accepted and generated
displaced persons. Several thousand Malians were repatriated
from Algeria in 1986 and 1987. In 1989 Mali agreed to accept
additional repatriates from Algeria. Mali also permitted
entry to a number of persons who were expelled from
neighboring Mauritania.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have no ability to change their government and only
limited and infrequent opportunity to influence it. Important
policies and decisions are made by a small group--the
President, the 19-member Central Executive Bureau of the UDPM,
and the Council of Ministers. The memberships of these groups
overlap. The military role in governing Mali remains
important, but civilian participation in the leadership groups
has been growing. Party congresses are called by the
President to consider special issues.
Within the one-p^rty system, multiple candidates often contest
party elections at the local level, but for National Assembly
elections, which are held every 4 years, only one carefully
selected party candidate runs for each seat. Proposed
legislation is debated and endorsed in the National Assembly
after its acceptance by the Council of Ministers and review by
the Supreme Court. Party membership is a prerequisite for
voting and for holding a civil service appointment or other
government position. All citizens are encouraged to join for
a nominal fee.
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MALI
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government is generally responsive to inquiries by
recognized human rights groups, although it apparently has not
replied to Amnesty International's call for an inquiry into
Taodenit prison. In 1989 the Government permitted the
establishment of a nongovernmental human rights organization.
The Malian Association for Human Rights. This organization
sponsored a number of seminars on human rights issues in 1989
and is attempting to encourage Malian participation in
international human rights meetings.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Mali does not practice religious or ethnic discrimination, nor
does it have the civil and racial strife evident in many other
multiethnic countries. Virtually all of Mali's ethnic groups
are represented at the highest state and party levels.
Although some nomadic groups such as the Tamashek are not
completely integrated into the economic and political
mainstream, Mali is relatively free of ethnic tensions.
Social and cultural factors place men in the dominant position
in Mali. However, women play an important economic role, both
in market life and in farming. There are a number of women in
the professions, but economic opportunity for educated women
is limited. Women live under harsh conditions, especially in
the rural areas.
Violence against women, including wife beating, is accepted in
Malian society, but there are no statistics to indicate how
widespread it may be. Malian society generally does not
tolerate spousal abuse that results in physical injury, but
legal action for redress of injury is not normally available.
The issue of spousal abuse has not been addressed by the
Government. Nor is the National Union of Malian Women (UNFM)
actively engaged in this issue. The UNFM focuses primarily on
establishing cooperatives, improving health programs, and
fostering education. It also campaigns against female
circumcision, which is still widely practiced in Mali,
including the most extreme form of genital mutilation,
inf ibulation. The Government has taken no public position on
this issue.
Traditional practice and existing Malian laws place women at a
disadvantage with regard to family law and property rights. A
group of female jurists is seeking improved legal protection
for women. One issue being addressed by this group pertains
to rights of widows. Currently, a widow has no right to her
husband's property or custody of children conceived during the
marriage.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution specifically provides for the liberty of
citizens to form organizations to protect their "professional
interests." However, workers' right of association is limited
to the National Union of Malian Workers (UNTM) . The UNTM
24-900 O—
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MALI
comprises 12 unions and is Mali's only recognized workers'
organization. At present, there are no unions not affiliated
with the UNTM. The UNTM claims to maintain a degree of
autonomy from the Government, and unlike the women's and youth
associations, it is not officially part of the party. It has
on occasion offered limited criticism of certain government
programs. Nevertheless, it is subject to considerable
government influence and control, and the UNTM Secretary
General is a party member, although not a member of the
Central Executive Council of the UDPM.
Strikes are rarely permitted, and those deemed to be taken for
political reasons are illegal. Given Mali's high level of
unemployment, most workers are reluctant to strike for long
periods of time. By law, any union planning to go on strike
must notify the UNTM and obtain prior approval. In the case
of student and teacher strikes which took place in 1988, no
approval was given, but the strikes still took place and many
participants suffered reprisals. The International Labor
Organization's (ILO) Committee on Freedom of Association
concluded that the resulting government-directed transfers,
dismissals, and arrests of teachers constituted an infringement
on their freedom of association. Malian teachers continue to
have grievances, specifically over the nonpayment of
salaries. There were no teacher strikes in 1989, but there
were work slowdowns. In September drivers of minibuses in
Bamako protested government attempts to impose stricter
regulations on their activities. When there was no response
to a complaint lodged through the transport union, drivers
organized a 1-day protest strike. There were no government
reprisals .
The UNTM maintains contacts with international labor
organizations, both public and private. The UNTM is affiliated
with two international labor bodies: the Organization of West
African Workers and the Organization of African Trade Union
Unity.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There are no specific constraints by the Government or
employers on workers attempting to organize, but in practice,
Mali's unitary party system effectively inhibits the workers'
right to organize. True collective bargaining does not take
place. The UNTM has a policy role in the agreements
negotiated by the individual member unions, and the
Government, through the Minister of Labor, must approve all
wage and related agreements.
There are no export processing zones in Mali.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and
this prohibition is generally observed in practice. There
have been reports that a form of traditional slavery is still
practiced in some isolated parts of the country.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 14, but with parents'
permission children can be apprenticed at 12. In practice,
children in rural areas join the family farming work force at
a much younger age. As workers in the informal sector, they
are not protected by laws against unjust compensation.
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excessive hours, and capricious discharge.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Mali has a detailed labor code specifying conditions of
employment, including hours, wages, and social security
benefits. The normal workweek is 44 hours. The minimum wage
is approximately $42.50 per month, which could provide a
decent standard of living if it went to support only one
person. However, most wage earners support extended
families. Health and safety standards vary, depending upon
the category of work, but there is limited enforcement due to
the lack of inspectors. Employers are required to pay into a
national social security fund.
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The Islamic Republic of Mauritania has been governed since
1978 by the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN) .
Colonel Maaouya Ould Sid'ahmed Taya, President of the
Committee and Chief of State, assumed power in 1984 after the
bloodless ouster of the former president, Lt . Col. Mohamed
Khouna Ould Haidalla. All 19 members of the Military
Committee hold ministerial portfolios or occupy other key
military or government positions. The Committee functions as
a legislative body, while the President, assisted by his
Council of Ministers and a few close advisers, wields the
executive power. Political parties are not allowed in
Mauritania .
The security forces number about 16,000 and, in addition to
the regular armed forces, include the National Guard, the
gendarmerie (a specialized corps of paramilitary police) and
the police. The National Guard and police come under the
Minister of Interior and all have internal security
functions. Over the past 3 years, the Government purged
security forces of hundreds of suspected dissidents,
particularly non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians and
Pan-Arab Baathists.
Mauritania continues to face massive economic and social
problems: drought, desertification, insect infestation, the
Western Sahara conflict, extensive unemployment, one of the
highest per capita foreign debts in Africa, poor infra-
structure, inadequate health and education systems, and exodus
from rural areas. Although adequate rains fell in 1988 and
1989, the prior drought years forced large numbers of nomads
into towns, with a consequent weakening of traditional Maur
nomadic culture, and a severe strain on government resources.
In addition, mutual expulsions and repatriations between
Senegal and Mauritania after April 1989 resulted in the
movement of more than 100,000 people, placing an unprecedented
economic and social strain on Mauritanian society. Many of
the Mauritanians who returned had been prosperous merchants in
Senegal, and important sources of foreign exchange earnings.
At the same time, many of the black Africans who departed had
held important technical and skilled positions in Mauritania.
The human rights situation in Mauritania deteriorated
dramatically in 1989. In April Mauritania experienced one of
its most serious crises since independence, when anti-
Senegalese rioting in Mauritania and anti-Mauritanian rioting
in Senegal left hundreds dead. In the aftermath of the
rioting, tens of thousands of Senegalese citizens as well as
Pulaar-speaking Mauritanian citizens were expelled to
Senegal. Tens of thousands of Mauritanians and Senegalese of
Maur origin similarly fled or were expelled from Senegal.
Subsequently, the Mauritanian Government dismissed many
Halpulaar civil servants and employees of state-owned
enterprises from their positions. Although the Mauritanian
authorities argued that the expellees were not true
Mauritanians, but rather Senegalese with false identity
papers, the fact remains that in all cases persons were
forcibly removed, often without being allowed to retain their
possessions, and without due process of law. Reports of
unlawful detention and torture also surfaced during 1989, and
most other human rights, including political freedoms,
remained tightly circumscribed.
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RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There have been no substantiated cases of members of the
Government or security forces perpetrating politically
motivated killings. However, serious questions remain
regarding the role of the Mauritanian security forces in the
initial riots on April 24-25. During the early stages of the
rioting, some police officers stood by without intervening, or
may even have goaded on the rioters. The Mauritanian army was
called in to quell the disturbances only on April 25. Whether
these incidents reflected official government policy, or were
isolated instances of individuals acting on their own, is
unknown. The net results of the violence were numerous deaths
and extensive property damage. The Government conceded a
death toll of several scores, while other sources contended
that several hundred persons may have died.
b. Disappearances
There were no substantiated reports of politically motivated
disappearances .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Mauritanian law specifically precludes the use of torture.
There were, however, recurring reports during 1989 that the
security forces used torture against dissidents and against
some non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians.
On February 27, five leaders of the December 1988-January 1989
student strike at the university of Nouakchott released a
report describing their 4-day interrogation and torture at the
hands of the police in December 1988. The students said they
were deprived of food and sleep, forced to stand without
clothes outdoors in the chill of night, kicked and beaten with
rubber hoses, and suspended by their hands and feet from a
steel beam until they became unconscious. Several also had
their heads kept immersed in water until they feared
drowning. According to their report, upon their release,
several of the students could not walk and remained bedridden
for over a week. The students provided the names of several
of their alleged police torturers in their report. The
Government is not known to have acted against the alleged
torturers; neither, however, did it retaliate against the
students, although the report was circulated widely.
In the aftermath of the April rioting, there were recurrent
unsubstantiated reports of police detention and torture of
non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians, particularly in the
regions along the Senegal river. These reports generally
involved incidents in small villages or remote areas and were
thus difficult to verify. The recurring nature of these
reports, however, lends credence to the overall impression
that incidents of torture did in fact take place.
One report issued by Amnesty International (AI) involved the
headmaster of a school in Tetiane, who was allegedly detained
and tortured by the police in Kaedi in early June. The
headmaster reportedly died as a result of this treatment. The
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same report alleged that four Pulaar-speaking black
Mauritanian herdsmen were detained, tortured, and possibly
killed by the police in the Kaedi and M'bout region, also in
June. Numerous other unsubstantiated allegations of torture
surfaced, often involving efforts by the local security forces
to intimidate or force Pulaar or Wolof-speaking black
Mauritanians into leaving their homes and going to Senegal.
Responsibility for such alleged activities is difficult to
determine; there may have been incidents in which local
security forces acted independently, without orders from their
superiors. Furthermore, in several areas along the river
local militias of mostly Hassaniya-speaking white and black
Maurs were formed, ostensibly to guard against cross-border
incursions from Senegal. Since some of these civilians were
armed, it is possible that some cases of torture were carried
out by these militias. On balance, even though some senior
members of the regime continued to voice opposition to the use
of torture, reports suggest that its use increased during
1989, especially in the aftermath of the April intercommunal
violence, and there were no known instances of the Government
punishing those responsible.
Prison conditions in Mauritania are harsh. Four political
prisoners died from disease and malnutrition at Oualata Prison
in 1988, in part because the prison commandant was
systematically withholding food. As a result of these deaths
and the international pressures they caused, the remaining
prisoners were subsequently removed from Oualata, and the
commandant was dismissed and reprimanded.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Mauritanian law in principle assures expeditious arraignment
and trial, access to legal counsel, and the right of appeal.
The courts must review the legality of a person's detention
more than 72 hours after his or her arrest. Compliance with
this law, however, is inconsistent. For example, the five
leaders of the University of Nouakchott student strike were
detained for 4 days in December 1988 without a hearing. AI
has also reported that one of these students, Abdallahi Ould
Bah Nagi, was subsequently detained by the police on May 29
and held without a hearing. The apparent reason for his
detention was his role in the distribution of a leaflet
criticizing the expulsion of non-Hassaniya-speaking black
Mauritanians by the Mauritanian Government.
In the aftermath of the April riots, there were widespread
stories — often from persons in refugee camps in Senegal — of
detention by local officials of Pulaar-speaking black
Mauritanians living in the Senegal river valley. For example,
three high school teachers were reportedly arrested and
detained by gendarmerie in Bababe and eventually expelled to
Senegal. There were numerous reports of intimidation,
arrests, prolonged detention, and expulsion centering on
security forces in Kaedi and Rosso.
AI also reported that a number of Pulaar-speaking black
Mauritanian civil servants, including Oumir Tall, Amidou
Tidiane Ly, Memkoudou Diop, Abdanlage Wane, were arrested and
detained incommunicado in May 1989 in Nouakchott. These
detainees were not charged with any offense, although
unofficial sources suggested that they were held because of
suspected involvement in movements opposed to the Government.
no
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MAURITANIA
In mid-November, there were widespread, credible reports of
the arrest, detention, and possible torture of a number of
Halpulaar teachers in the town of Kaedi . As many as 50
persons may have been detained without being officially
charged, and by year's end their status remained unresolved.
Internal exile is a method of removing opposition figures from
the public eye. Former President Haidalla and five of his
associates, who were arrested during the 1984 coup but never
charged, reportedly still remain in internal exile in remote
locations. There were credible reports of the detention and
exile without charges of several black Mauritanian civil
servants and military personnel since May 1989. Many more
were expelled to Senegal, in lieu of internal exile.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The legal system functions primarily under the Shari'a
(Islamic law) put in place during the Haidalla regime. The
Ministry of Justice plays the major role in administering the
Shari'a and selecting judicial personnel. The Shari'a applies
to most crimes and offenses, with the exception of commercial
and banking offenses, traffic violations that cause bodily
harm, and offenses against the security of the State. These
three categories of offenses are all handled by the Special
Court, which renders its judgments on the basis of laws
modeled after French law. The Taya administration has urged
the Islamic judges not to use extreme physical punishments,
such as amputations, which occurred during the Haidalla
regime. The Taya Government is slowly eliminating a number of
unqualified Shari'a judges who were appointed during the
Haidalla years. By virtue of a recent government decision,
judges cannot be tenured before 7 years of service.
While trials in the ordinary courts are public, the State
Security Court, which tries offenses against state security,
may conduct secret trials. All defendants, regardless of the
court, have the right to be present with legal counsel during
the proceedings. If necessary, the accused is provided
counsel at public expense. Defendants may confront witnesses
and present evidence. They may appeal the sentences of the
ordinary courts but not those of the Security Court. While
the judiciary is nominally independent, some knowledgable
observers have claimed that judges take their cue from the
Government when sentencing opponents of the regime.
The right to a fair public trial in Mauritania was, by any
standard, severely abused during 1989. After April, thousands
of non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians, particularly in
the Halpulaar community, were expelled to Senegal without any
recourse to judicial proceedings. Those expelled often had no
advance warning of their expulsion and no time or opportunity
to carry any possessions with them. According to reports from
refugee camps in Senegal, many were forced across the frontier
river at gunpoint.
The Mauritanian Government contended that many, if not all, of
the persons expelled were in fact of Senegalese nationality,
and that their Mauritanian identity documents were fraudulent.
Even if this were the case, an arbitrary determination of
nationality seems to have been made without according due
process to those affected. Furthermore, the Mauritanian
Government appears to have ignored its own law, which
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MAURITANIA
specifies that all persons, including foreigners, have a right
to the protection of their property and possessions and cannot
be deprived of them except by a court decision. The
widespread and credible reports of confiscation and
destruction of identity papers by security forces indicated a
conscious and concerted effort to circumvent the legal process.
The number of political detainees and prisoners held at the
end of 1989 was unknown. In December the Government released
19 political prisoners, including the head of the outlawed
Baathist Party arrested in 1988, and 18 non-Hassaniya-speaking
black political activists convicted in October 1986 following
antigovernment political agitation.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
In the past, government surveillance of individuals was
generally limited to patrols on major highways and customs
checkpoints, occasional nighttime inspections of vehicular
traffic, and inspections of mail suspected of containing
currency or prohibited items. Under Mauritanian law, the
police require warrants to perform home searches.
The right to privacy was severely abused in Mauritania after
April 1989. Expulsions of Pulaar-speaking black Mauritanians
involved systematic entry of homes by security forces and
forcible removal of families, without search warrants or any
legal proceedings. These activities occurred predominantly in
villages along the river, and thus it is unclear to what
extent they were officially sanctioned by the Mauritanian
Government, and to what extent they were the the work of
overzealous local officials. After repeated diplomatic
protests, the expulsions appeared to slow dramatically after
mid-July, and there were reasons to believe that the
Government was making efforts to control the situation.
Nevertheless, there were continuing reports of government
surveillance of suspected dissidents, as well as intimidation
and harassment of Pulaar-speaking black Mauritanians in the
Senegal River valley.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is restricted. While Mauritanians
may criticize government policies in conversations with
friends and relatives, they are somewhat more inhibited in
speaking with foreigners. Military personnel are under tight
surveillance, and expression of views that could be construed
as even mildly critical of the Government is likely to result
in close questioning by military security officers. The
Government is quick to react to any public comments it thinks
pose a threat to the security of the State. Many of those
persons detained without a trial during 1989, including the
five student strike leaders as well as many civil servants,
were targets, it is believed, precisely because they voiced
opposition to the current regime and its policies. In
particular, the Government appeared to be sensitive to any
expression of ethnic dissatisfaction or criticism of its
ethnic policies.
Mauritania's only daily newspaper and the radio and television
stations are government owned and operated. During the past 3
years the Government has allowed a limited amount of
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MAURITANIA
discussion of government policies within the context of
interviews with government officials. In early 1988, the
Government authorized the publication of two privately owned
monthly magazines, Mauritanie Demain and L'Evenement. These
publications periodically carried articles on mildly
controversial social issues, but they refrained from any
direct criticism of the Government.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Mauritanian law recognizes the rights of assembly and
association, but since the 1978 coup the Government has banned
all political movements and generally prohibited meetings of a
political nature. Any formal grouping must be registered with
the Minister of Interior. The Government usually does not
interfere with assemblies and associations as long as they
avoid political activity.
c. Freedom of Religion
Islam is the official religion of Mauritania; virtually all
citizens are Muslim. Mauritanian Muslims are prohibited from
entering non-Islamic houses of worship and from converting to
another religion. Proselytizing by non-Muslims and the
construction of Christian churches and other non-Islamic
houses of worship require government permission. The Roman
Catholic community in Mauritania has five churches which
operate freely as long as they restrict their services to
resident foreigners.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Traditionally, there have been few restrictions on movement
within Mauritania, where nomadism has long been a way of
life. Travelers, however, are subjected to routine police and
customs checks along all major roads and at the country's
international and domestic airports. During the riots of
April 1989, dusk-to-dawn curfews were imposed in Nouakchott,
Nouadhibou, and some other cities but were reduced and finally
lifted as the situation calmed. During the final months of
1989, as cross-border incidents from Senegal increased,
curfews were imposed in a number of villages in the Senegal
river valley as well. Since 1985 Mauritanians no longer need
an exit visa to travel abroad, although there were reports of
some persons being denied passports.
During 1989 large numbers of Mauritanians had their
citizenship effectively revoked and were subsequently expelled
to Senegal. The revocations of citizenship, which may have
involved as many as 50,000 people, appear in many cases to
have been based entirely on ethnicity. Only non-Hassaniya-
speaking Mauritanians, particularly Halpulaar and, to a much
lesser degree, other black African ethnic groups, were
affected. Many of these displaced persons were not accorded
Senegalese citizenship and thus in effect became stateless
persons. At year's end, the Mauritanian Government had not
taken specific steps to permit access to the courts by
expellees who wished to obtain confirmation of their
citizenship and right to return home. However, there was a
small but indeterminate number of cases of acknowledged
Mauritanians being allowed to return, apparently as a result
of individual extrajudicial petitions or intervention by
officials .
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As many as 80,000 displaced persons arrived in Mauritania from
Senegal during April and May of 1989. While many of these
were Mauritanian citizen repatriates, many others were
Senegalese citizens of ethnic Maur origin. The arrival of
these repatriates and refugees placed a heavy additional
burden on the Mauritanian economy. Although hard pressed for
resources, the Mauritanian Government made commendable and
largely successful efforts to assist all those arriving from
Senegal. The Government also permitted the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to establish temporary
offices in Nouakchott to provide aid to displaced persons.
There were no reports of refugees being returned forcibly to
Senegal .
As a result of the ongoing conflict in neighboring Western
Sahara between Morocco and the Polisario Front, a small number
of refugees from the Western Sahara have settled in Nouadhibou
and other northern towns. They have been successfully
absorbed into Mauritanian society.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens of Mauritania are unable democratically to change
their government at the national level. All political power
rests in the hands of the military regime. The Military
Committee for National Salvation (CMSN) remains the "custodian
of the nation's sovereignty," and all executive and
legislative functions reside with it. Membership is limited
to military officers who occupy ministerial positions or
important military and security posts. The CMSN is
predominantely comprised of Hassaniya-speaking Maurs, although
members of other ethnic groups are members. However, non-Maur
membership on the CMSN, as well as among those holding senior
government or military positions, decreased in 1989 in the
wake of ethnic tensions.
In early January, the Government held elections in 164 rural
communes. All Mauritanians , aged 21 years or older and
residing in these localities, were entitled to vote, and the
ballot was secret. In most localities, two or more slates of
candidates competed for the electorate's vote.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Taya Government in the past has been generally responsive
to human rights concerns. For example, it cooperated with the
U.N. Human Rights Commission Working Group on slavery by
allowing a representative to come to Mauritania to obtain
information on this issue. In 1987 the Government permitted
representatives of AI to visit Nouakchott for discussions on
racial and ethnic tensions in Mauritania. In 1988 a
delegation from the International Commission of Jurists and
the Chairman of the African Jurists Association visited
Mauritania to review human rights practices.
As a result of President Taya's public support for basic human
rights, the Mauritanian Human Rights League was formed in
1986. The League, which is affiliated with the Paris-based
International Federation of Human Rights, is staffed by
volunteers who address such concerns as eradicating remaining
vestiges of slavery, ensuring the uniform application of
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MAURITANIA
Shari'a law, promoting the status of women, and preventing
abuses such as arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture. In
1988, the League hosted the first conference on Maghrebian
human rights.
In the wake of the ethnic disturbances of 1989, the League
experienced serious difficulties in its efforts to remain a
viable and independent human rights organization. On May 3,
1989, League Director Ghali Ould Abdel Hamid was arrested for
"threatening state security" at Nouakchott airport after he
publicly faulted the Governments of Senegal and Mauritania for
failing to address ethnic problems. Ghali was released after
34 hours of detention.
In the weeks following Ghali 's arrest, the League continued to
speak out on the subject of human rights abuses, and on July
21, 1989, issued a statement critical of government expulsions
of non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians. The League
continued to face considerable pressure from the Government,
however, and on July 31, 1989, issued a statement critical of
AI ' s declaration condemning Mauritania's expulsions of its
citizens .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Mauritania is situated geographically and culturally on the
divide between traditionally nomadic Arabic-speaking Maurs of
the north and the sedentary black cultivators of the African
south. The interaction of these two groups produces the
complex cultural diversity as well as the ethnic tensions
inherent in Mauritanian society. Historically, the
Hassaniya-speaking white Maurs have dominated the political
and economic system. Taken together, the Hassaniya-speaking
black Maurs — members of the former slave caste — and
Mauritania's non-Hassaniya-speaking blacks outnumber the white
Maurs by a considerable majority. This racial majority is by
no means cohesive, however, since black Maurs identify in many
ways more closely with the white Maur population.
Many non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians have long
contended that since independence, white Maur domination in
government, state enterprises, business, and religious
institutions is a result of ethnic and linguistic
discrimination. Their grievances have included a reduction of
the numbers of non-Hassaniya-speaking black Mauritanians at
all levels of government, and the increasing use of Hassaniya
rather than French in many sectors of Mauritanian government
and business. They have also pointed to the Government's new
land reform law as a means to allow white and black Maurs to
take control of fertile land in the Senegal river valley that
had been traditionally the preserve of non-Hassaniya-speaking
black Mauritanians. Recent movements of nomads into the
Senegal river valley as a result of the decade-long drought in
the north further exacerbated tensions.
The violence in April that resulted in many deaths was in
general more the result of an eruption of underlying ethnic
tensions rather than an officially sanctioned government
policy, but the expulsions of non-Hassaniya-speaking black
Mauritanians that followed were largely orchestrated by
Mauritanian security forces.
Both white and black Maurs were resettled into the villages in
the Senegal river valley from which Halpulaar residents were
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MAURITANIA
forcibly expelled. While many of those resettled were
themselves refugees from Senegal, others had moved from
northern Mauritania in search of richer farmlands. These
resettlements have set the stage for future disputes over land
tenure and a continuation of ethnic tensions in the Senegal
river valley.
Women in Mauritanian Muslim society are often limited to
traditional roles, which may encompass considerable financial
and civil autonomy, especially outside the few urban areas.
The Government is encouraging the entry of women into the
professions, government, and business. In late 1988, the Taya
Government created a new Ministry of Women's Affairs, Arts,
and Tourism, and appointed a woman as the first Minister. The
Government has also been instrumental in opening up new
opportunities for employment traditionally reserved for men,
such as in hospital work. According to Mauritanian law, men
and women must receive equal pay for equal work, and
Mauritania's two largest employers, the civil service and the
state mining company SNIM, respect this law. In smaller
private enterprises, wages are often determined by informal
bargaining, leading to sometimes significant discrepancies in
what two persons are paid for the same work.
While data are very limited, violence against women does not
appear to be prevalent in Mauritania. Female genital
mutilation (circumcision) is a widespread, traditional
practice. The Government has taken no position nor issued any
statements on violence against women or on genital
mutilation. In some areas of southern Mauritania, the most
extreme form of mutilation, inf ibulation, is practiced. Some
evidence indicates that the incidence of female excision is
diminishing in the modern, urbanized sector, and for an
Islamic country, women are allowed a relatively great degree
of freedom.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers are free to establish unions at the local and national
level. There are currently 36 trade unions in the country.
All, however, must be affiliates of the Union of Mauritanian
Workers (UTM) , by law the country's only central labor
organization. The trade unions and the UTM elect their
leadership democratically, and they are free to determine
their programs and policies, provided these avoid political
issues. The UTM is an active member of the International
Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the Organization of
African Trade Union Unity.
Mauritanian law grants workers the right to strike. In
practice, however, the Government discourages strikes, and
they rarely occur. Under Mauritanian law, tripartite
arbitration committees, composed of union, business, and
government representatives, may impose binding arbitration
that automatically terminates any strike.
In recent years, the UTM had been paralyzed by bitter
factional disputes. In early 1989, elections and a national
congress were held, and a new leadership moved quickly to
revitalize the UTM. It did not, however, voice any opposition
to the Government's dismissal of numerous non-Hassaniya-
speaking black civil servants that occurred after April.
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MAURITANIA
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions are free to organize workers without government or
employer interference. According to the UTM, close to 90
percent of industrial and commercial workers in Mauritania are
members of unions. The laws providing worker's protection
against antiunion discrimination are regularly enforced.
Collective bargaining, notably to set wages, occurs informally
between individual unions and employers but also involves the
Government and the UTM. In addition, employees or employers
may bring labor disputes to three-person labor courts that are
overseen jointly by the Ministries of Justice and Labor.
Labor leaders regard these courts as unbiased and effective.
There are no export processing zones in Mauritania, and labor
laws are applied uniformly throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The subject of forced labor is tied to the vestiges of slavery
which exist in some areas of Mauritania. Slavery was
abolished officially only in 1980, and some persons whose
ancestors had worked without pay for generations for a
particular family still occupied positions of servitude in
1989. This was due in part to the economic hardships they
would have encountered if they had left. There were reports,
however, that in some remote areas persons were sometimes held
against their will and forced to perform unpaid labor. The
authorities stop such practices when they come to their
attention. The Taya regime is making a systematic effort to
appoint members of the former slave caste to high government
and military positions as a visible indication of the end of
slavery,
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Education is not compulsory in Mauritania, but Mauritanian law
specifies that no child may be employed before the age of 13
in the agricultural sector without the permission of the
Minister of Labor, nor before the age of 15 in the
nonagricultural sector. The law provides that employed
children aged 14 through 16 should receive 70 percent of the
minimum wage, and those from 17 through 18 should receive 90
percent of the minimum wage. In practice, much younger
children in the countryside pursue herding, cultivation, and
other significant labor in support of their families'
traditional activities. Although there are no data available,
child labor in the nonagricultural sector is not widespread.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
In 1989 the guaranteed minimum wage for adults was equivalent
to roughly $70 per month. These wages barely enabled the
average family to meet its minimum needs. The standard,
nonagricultural workweek in Mauritania cannot exceed either 40
hours or 6 days without overtime compensation, which is paid
at the following rates: 41-48 hours — 115 percent; 49-54
hours — 140 percent; 55 plus hours — 150 percent of the base
wage. Reliable data on actual wage levels is scanty and
unreliable. Enforcement of the labor laws, the responsibility
of the Labor Inspectorate, Ministry of Labor, is limited by
the shortage of qualified personnel.
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MAURITIUS
A small, densely populated island country, Mauritius is a
parliamentary democracy and a member of the Commonwealth of
Nations. It is governed by an elected prime minister, a
council of ministers, and a legislative assembly. The
Governor General, with largely ceremonial powers, represents
Queen Elizabeth II, the titular Head of State. Elections at
national and local levels take place at regular intervals.
There are four major political parties, which reflect a range
of ideological views, and several smaller parties. Executive
power has changed hands twice in the last 7 years through fair
and orderly elections supervised by an independent
commission. Prime Minister Jugnauth's coalition had its
mandate renewed in general elections in August 1987.
Mauritius has no purely military forces; a paramilitary
700-man Special Mobile Force and a 240-man Special Support
Unit are responsible for internal security. These forces,
under the command of the Commissioner of Police, are
apolitical, well trained, and backed by a general duty police
force of approximately 4,000 men.
The economy, based on export-oriented manufacturing (mainly
textiles), sugar, and tourism, experienced an economic boom
during 1984-88, with an average real growth rate of 7 percent
annually. Per capita income, in current terms, almost
doubled, rising from $1,065 in 1984 to $1,921 in 1988.
Unemployment fell from 21 percent in 1983 to 3.6 percent in
1988, essentially a full-employment situation. With the
assistance of the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, Mauritius has made remarkable progress in implementing a
program combining adjustment, growth, and modernization.
Prospects for 1989-90, however, are less optimistic. The
emergence of labor and skills shortages, rising inflation,
environmental issues, and other physical constraints are
expected to slow down economic growth to around 4 percent.
The Government continued to demonstrate respect for human
rights. Political and civil rights, including the freedoms of
speech and press, are protected under the Mauritian
Constitution and respected in practice. The August 30, 1987
elections for Parliament were preceded by intense campaigning,
including regular public rallies. The controversial Dangerous
Drug Act of 1986 calls, among other things, for the death
penalty for traffickers. Under the Act, the defendant is
tried by a judge without a jury, which is contrary to
established practice.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of government-inspired political or
extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance of persons for
political causes.
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MAURITIUS
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and inhuman punishment are prohibited by law, and
there were no reports of degrading treatment or punishment.
Vigorous enforcement of the Dangerous Drug Act has led to a
decline in drug demand. Drug-related arrests declined in 1988
and 1989.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There have been no reports of arbitrary arrests or detentions
since the early 1970's. Detained persons have the right to a
judicial determination of the legality of their detention. In
practice, this determination is usually made within 24 hours.
Bail is commonly granted. The Supreme Court ruled invalid in
1986 a section of the Dangerous Drug Act of 1986 which had
provided for detention without bail.
Exile is legally prohibited. With regard to forced or
compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Mauritius' judicial system, modeled on that of Great Britain,
consists of the Supreme Court, which has appellate powers, and
a series of lower courts. Final appeal may be made to the
Queen's Privy Council in the United Kingdom and is routinely
made in the cases of death sentences. There are no political
or military courts. The judiciary is independent. The
Governor General, in consultation with the Prime Minister,
nominates the Chief Justice and, in consultation with the
Chief Justice, nominates the senior puisne (associate)
judges. The Governor General nominates other judges on the
advice of the Judicial and Legal Service Commissions. The
legal system has consistently provided fair, public trials to
those charged with crimes. Defendants have the right to
private or court-appointed counsel. The judiciary is also
charged under the Constitution with ensuring that new laws are
consistent with democratic practice. There are no political
prisoners in Mauritius.
The Dangerous Drug Act, which includes a mandatory death
sentence for any person convicted of importing dangerous
drugs, has been controversial. Some human rights
organizations in Mauritius, as well as individual Mauritians,
have criticized the provisions of the law that call for the
death penalty and that provide for trial by a judge alone; all
other serious offenses are heard by a nine-member jury. At
the end of 1989, there were six persons in prison convicted on
drug charges and under the death sentence.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The sanctity of the home is guaranteed by law and generally
respected in practice. The search of personal property or
premises is allowed only under clearly specified conditions by
court order or by police decision if an illegal act has been
committed. There have been reports from reliable sources that
the Government's intelligence apparatus occasionally opens
mail and carries out surveillance of local opposition leaders
and other major figures.
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MAURITIUS
In October 1986, following the Rault Commission on Narcotics,
the Legislative Assembly amended the Mauritian Constitution
with regard to drug traffickers and drug trafficking in
Mauritius. The legislation increased the powers of any
commission of inquiry to look into personal finances,
including bank accounts; provided for fines of persons who
refuse to testify; provided for fining a bank and revoking its
license if it refuses to cooperate in a financial
investigation; and provided for the seizure of all assets of
convicted drug traffickers who cannot prove that their assets
were obtained legally.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is protected by the Constitution
and by local tradition. Sixteen privately owned daily,
weekly, and monthily newspapers present varying political
viewpoints and freely express partisan views. Newspapers are
subject only to the legal constraints of libel laws. The
Government owns the one television and two radio stations (one
strictly educational), broadcasting in five languages. The
television and radio are reasonably objective in news and
entertainment presentation, although opposition politicians
occasionally accuse the broadcasting corporation of political
bias in its news coverage. Television and radio broadcasts
are also easily received from the nearby island of Reunion (a
French Department) and are not subject to interference by the
Government. However, any foreign satellite broadcasts, or
programs from foreign sources, which are deemed controversial
are subject to approval by the Council of Ministers before
transmission on local television or radio.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Mauritians enjoy the right to form associations, including
political parties, trade unions, and religious organizations.
Mauritius has a multitude of such private organizations.
Political, cultural, and religious assemblies are
commonplace. Although police permission is required for
holding demonstrations and mass meetings, such permission is
rarely refused. The registered political parties freely held
large public rallies during the campaign for the August 1987
general elections, the October 1988 municipal elections, and
the June 11, 1989, La Caverne/Phoenix by-election.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no official state religion in Mauritius, although
Hindus are a majority. Hindus, Christians, Muslims,
Buddhists, and others openly practice, teach, and proselytize
their religions v^ithout prejudice. All religious institutions
receive state subsidies in proportion to their memberships.
There is no state-sanctioned discrimination against any ethnic
or religious community. The Government facilitates the travel
of Mauritians who make the hajj. Foreign missionaries are not
allowed to enter the country without a prior request from a
local religious organization.
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MAURITIUS
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on full freedom of movement within
the country. Foreign travel and emigration are also
unrestricted. There is no blanket guarantee of repatriation,
nor general criteria for processing applications for
repatriation; applications from the thousands of Mauritians
abroad are handled on a case-by-case, and sometimes arbitrary
basis.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change, and do change their
government through democratic means. Mauritius is governed by
a freely elected, unicameral Legislative Assembly, with
executive direction coming from a Council of Ministers,
currently headed by Prime Minister Sir Aneerood Jugnauth whose
Alliance coalition won elections in 1983 and 1987. The
Governor General has the right to designate the person charged
with forming a new government following parliamentary
elections or in a parliamentary crisis. Parliamentary,
municipal, and village council elections are held at regular
intervals. Voting and running for office are rights of all
citizens 18 years of age and over.
In the Legislative Assembly, 8 of the 70 members are appointed
through a complex "best loser" system designed in part to
ensure that all ethnic groups are adequately represented. The
governing (3-party) Alliance coalition controls 41 of the 70
seats. Political parties often match the ethnicity or
religion of their candidates to the composition of particular
electoral constituencies. In the August 1987 parliamentary
elections, 89 percent of the 553,364 eligible voters cast
ballots. Only 9,512 votes separated the winning and losing
coalitions. The opposition controls the five major
municipalities, and government parties did not contest the
October 25, 1988, municipal elections. The governing Alliance
won a June 11, 1989, by-election for the Legislative Assembly
in the constituency of La Caverne/Phoenix.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There have been no known requests by international
organizations to investigate human rights violations in
Mauritius. Several local human rights groups monitor
devlopments without governmental restriction.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Although Mauritius has a Hindu majority, the country's active
press and strongly egalitarian traditions militate against
discrimination in all forms. However, tensions based on
ethnicity and caste do exist.
Women in Mauritius participate in all types of political,
business, and social activities, and a few hold important
positions. Nonetheless, traditional ethnic and religious
attitudes hamper women in achieving true parity. The
Mauritian Government seeks to improve the status of women, and
recent amendments to laws ranging from emigration to
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MAURITIUS
inheritance have removed sex discriminatory sections. An
interministerial committee, headed by one of the female
ministers, was appointed in 1985 to address remaining
discriminatory elements in local laws and practices. In its
report in 1988, the committee, which was subsequently
disbanded, found that there was little legal discrimination
against women. One notable exception, that women cannot serve
on juries, may be amended in 1990. The Government decided in
July to appoint "desk officers" in the major ministries to
oversee women's activities and ensure that the promotion of
the interests of women are taken into account.
According to the Ministry of Women's Rights and Family
Welfare, physicians, attorneys, and religious and charitable
organizations, the problem of violence against women exists
and appears to be fairly prevalent, although no reliable
statistics are available. There are no special provisions in
Mauritian law concerning family violence; there are virtually
no institutions that attempt to deal with the problem. The
Government's concern about the issue of violence against women
has been evident, however. This concern was officially
manifested in June 1989 when the Ministry of Women's Rights
and Family Welfare established a family counseling service,
managed by the National Council of Women, whose mandate is to
provide family counseling and legal advice. Some 300 persons
have availed themselves of counseling in the intervening
period. This counseling has run the gamut of family problems,
of which spouse abuse is only one of the issues. However, no
specific campaign against spouse abuse has been undertaken.
Police authorities are generally reluctant to get involved in
instances of wife beating; penalties are rarely imposed and
tend to be light. Spouse abuse is not publicly discussed in
Mauritius.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Mauritius has an active trade union movement. Almost 300
unions represent about 100,000 workers, more than one-fourth
of the work force. Unions are free to organize workers in all
sectors, including the export processing zone (EPZ) which
employs about 90,000 workers. Less than 10 percent of EPZ
workers are believed to be unionized. Unions can press wage
demands, establish ties to domestic political parties and
international organizations, and address political issues.
Three of the five trade union activists who ran in the August
30, 1987, general elections were elected to the Legislative
Assembly on the government slate. Wages have become a major
issue in recent years as inflation has accelerated.
In theory, unions have the right to strike. However, in labor
disputes, the British-modeled Industrial Relations Act (IRA)
of 1973 requires a prestrike, 21-day cooling-off period
followed by binding arbitration, which has the effect of
making most strikes illegal. Refusal to follow IRA procedures
in a mid-1988 textile plant strike led to the imprisonment of
three union leaders for several days. Government supported
labor/management negotiations ultimately led to the
reemployment of most of the striking workers. A general
strike called by the trade unions for July 4, 1989, received
far less support than expected.
One leading federation actively supports the opposition party
and is affiliated with the Communist-controlled World
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MAURITIUS
Federation of Trade Unions. The largest confederation, the
Mauritian Labor Congress, is a member of the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
While the right of association is guaranteed by law, there is
no legal provision for collective bargaining, which is neither
protected nor promoted by the Government. In fact, the
Government has imposed restraints on the collective bargaining
system which render it ineffective.
The Government has established a National Remuneration Board
(NRB) whose chairman is appointed by the Minister of Labor,
The NRB establishes minimum wages for 26 categories of private
sector workers (sugar, tea, transport, etc.) which apply
equally to export processing zone workers. Although
originally established to set minimum wages for nonunion
workers, the NRB has broadened its powers and now issues
remuneration orders that establish minimum wages, bonuses,
housing and transportation allowances, and other benefits for
almost all private sector workers. About 85 percent of all
private sector workers (including unionized workers) are
covered by NRB orders. Employers and unions are free to
negotiate wages and benefits above the minimums established by
the NRB, but this is rare. Wages and benefits for civil
servants are established by the Pay Research Bureau (PRB) on
the basis of the annual Chesworth Report recommendations. NRB
remuneration orders set minimum wages by sector but also
establish a wage structure based on length of service and job
classification. NRB orders thus set wages for skilled and
experienced workers whose earnings are well above the minimum
wage. The PRB functions in a similar way for the civil
service.
The Government has also established a Tripartite Committee,
including employer and trade union representatives, which
meets once a year and is chaired by the Minister of Finance.
It can only recommend wage increases to the Government based
on inflation. Its recommendations are not always unanimous,
however, and the Government makes its decision on the basis of
all the information it receives.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of
Experts (COE) has for some time noted that the Industrial
Relations Act does not give workers' organizations sufficient
protection against acts of interference as provided for by ILO
Convention 98 on the right to organize and bargain
collectively.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law and is not
practiced. The COE, however, has noted that sections of the
IRA, which empower the Minister to refer any industrial
dispute to compulsory arbitration, enforceable by penalties
involving compulsory labor, are in conflict with ILO
Convention 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum work age is 15. The Ministry of Labor is
responsible for enforcing child labor laws. In practice,
there is minimal enforcement of these laws, especially in
EPZ-related industries where a labor shortage exists.
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MAURITIUS
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Conditions of employment, including wage and leave conditions,
are generally sufficient to afford an acceptable standard of
living for workers in the agricultural, service, and
manufacturing sectors. However, the current rate paid for
unskilled labor, $8 per week during the first year and $10 per
week thereafter, is barely sufficient for a worker to have a
minimum standard of living, and much depends in this respect
on the type of additional benefits offered. The Government
mandates minimum wage increases each year based on inflation.
A maximum workweek of 45 hours is allowed. Excessive overtime
continues to be a problem in the EPZ . The Government
addressed this issue in 1987 due to complaints that EPZ
employers imposed long hours of overtime on employees — about
10-20 hours per week making for a 55-65 hour workweek. In
addition, some EPZ employers still require women to work at
night .
The Government sets health and safety standards, and
conditions are inspected by Ministry of Labor officials.
Enforcement is limited due to the small number of inspectors.
235
MOZAMBIQUE
Mozambique is a one-party state in which effective power is
concentrated in the hands of President Joaquim Chissano and
top officials of the party, the Front for the Liberation of
Mozambique, or FRELIMO. The Constitution gives the President
extensive powers to appoint and dismiss top officials in the
ministries, courts, military and security organizations, and
provincial governments.
Since the late 1970 's, the FRELIMO Government has been under
attack from an insurgent group, the Mozambican National
Resistance, or RENAMO. Despite agreements between Mozambique
and South Africa in 1984 and 1989, and the revival of a joint
Mozambican-South African security commission aimed at
investigating and ending support to RENAMO, most Mozambican
policymakers believe aid from South African and other foreign
groups continues.
The security forces include the armed forces of Mozambique
(FPLM) , numbering about 60,000 soldiers, a people's militia,
and the Mozambican National Security Service (SNASP) . For its
part, RENAMO claims to have 25,000 men under arms and an
additional 3,000 trainees. More than 7,000 Zimbabwean troops
are assisting government forces, primarily in central
Mozambique, with the objective of keeping the Harare-Beira
railroad open. Approximately 700 to 800 Malawian troops are
assisting in keeping the Nacala rail line open.
Mozambique has a mixed economy, consisting of state-owned
enterprises, cooperatives, and private enterprises. Up to 85
percent of the population, however, is employed in small
scale, semisubsistence agriculture. Once a self-proclaimed
Marxist-Leninist party, the FRELIMO Fifth Party Congress in
July removed the reference to Marxism and endorsed the
2-year-old economic reform plan which has fostered currency
devaluations, budgetary cuts, and reductions in the areas of
the economy reserved exclusively for state enterprises. While
growth in 1989 was projected at 4 percent, the continuing
civil conflict has undercut many of the benefits of the
reforms. RENAMO deliberately attacks economic targets; in
some areas, the prevailing anarchy has led to the total
breakdown of internal trade. A combination of war and
unfavorable weather has disrupted food production to the point
that a third of the nation's population is thought to be
dependent on international food aid.
Human rights were tightly circumscribed in 1989. Major human
rights concerns were harsh prison conditions; the use of
arbitrary, incommunicado detention, especially by SNASP; the
denial of fair trials; restrictions on freedoms of press,
assembly, and association, and the right of citizens to change
their government; and serious limitations on worker rights.
However, it became more possible during the year for people to
voice their views, including in people's assemblies and public
meetings. The Government and party, especially at the Fifth
Party Congress in July, continued to address some of the
abuses, reorganizing the legal system to reduce SNASP and
military dominanace of the judiciary. A new constitution
which included a bill of rights was discussed in party forums
at the end of the year and proposed to the public on January
9, 1990. Publication and ratification are expected in 1990.
The most blatant abuses of basic human rights occurred as a
direct result of the conflict. Widespread reports of
massacres directed against civilians, kidnapings, torture, and
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MOZAMBIQUE
looting continued throughout the year. Most of these
atrocities were attributed to RENAMO, but some were also
attributed to government forces. Seeking an end to the civil
war, which has cost 600,000 lives, the Government launched a
peace initiative in January, using Mozambican religious
leaders and Kenyan and Zimbabwean mediators to explore
contacts. Despite these efforts, at the end of 1989 fighting
had intensified. An estimated 2 million people were
displaced, half of them living in refugee camps in neighboring
countries, the remainder living in "accommodation centers"
throughout the country.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Both sides were again responsible for the deaths of civilians
in the course of their conflict (see Section l.g.). Most of
the killings are attributed to RENAMO forces. Deplorable
prison conditions resulted in some deaths (see Section I.e.).
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of government-perpetrated disappearances
in 1989. However, there are thousands missing due to the
conflict, including as a result of kidnapings in areas
affected by the war. RENAMO, in particular, regularly holds
civilians against their will, often employing them as porters
or forcibly impressing them.
Amnesty International (AI), in a special 1989 report,
expressed its concern about several disappearance cases,
including those of Uria Simangi and Joana Simeno, and sought,
without success, information from the Government on the
whereabouts of a number of political opponents of the
Government who disappeared from detention in the mid-1970's.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Both government and RENAMO forces have been accused of
torturing prisoners and civilians. Journalist William
Finnegan described one 1989 incident in which FPLM soldiers
severely beat a farmer they suspected of collaborating with
RENAMO. RENAMO's systematic practice of beating or mutilating
civilians continued unabated in 1989. According to many
reports, RENAMO has cut off lips, ears, breasts, and limbs,
burned or buried people alive, and forced family members to
witness or participate in the tortures of their relatives.
Former RENAMO soldiers claimed that threats of beating and
torture were used to keep forced recruits from escaping.
In September the National People's Assembly repealed, for both
military and civilian courts, Mozambique's controversial
"flogging law" which allowed people convicted of certain
offenses to be punished by whipping. In practice, very few
courts have imposed the flogging penalty, although military
courts sentenced two soldiers to flogging in the final weeks
before the law was repealed. In February charges were brought
against an agent of the popular police in Maputo, because he
had ordered two women flogged without due process.
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MOZAMBIQUE
Prison conditions in Mozambique remain life threatening. In
June the local press reported that 15 prisoners had starved to
death in a prison in Manica Province. Prison officials failed
to purchase adequate food. The officials said severe budget
cuts and inflation had deprived them of sufficient resources.
In the aftermath of the scandal, provincial authorites
launched an investigation of prison conditions and increased
the prison budget.
Since 1988 the Government has allowed the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to the prisons where
national security prisoners, both those already convicted and
those awaiting trial, are held. RENAMO does not permit ICRC
access to areas under its control, claiming that it holds no
prisoners .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The law requires that in most cases detainees be charged or
released within 30 days. However, persons accused of the most
serious crimes can be detained for up to 84 days without being
formally charged or investigated. With court approval, such
detainees can then be held for two additional periods of 84
days while the police complete their investigation. While
detained, persons have the constitutional right to counsel and
to contact relatives and friends. In some cases, detainees
may be released from prison while the investigation proceeds,
but the bail system in Mozambique remains ill-defined. The
law provides that if the prescribed period for investigation
has been completed and no charges have been brought, the
detainee must be released. In practice, however, this is
often overlooked, in part because of the severe lack of
administrative resources and trained lawyers.
The security police (SNASP) organized under the Ministry of
National Security, have the power to arrest persons accused of
political and economic crimes against the State, such as
espionage or sabotage. In September the Government restored
the right of political prisoners to submit habeas corpus
petitions. These detainees now have the same rights as other
prisoners: to contact a lawyer and to be charged or released
within a set period of time. In practice, these guarantees
are also often overlooked due a lack of administrative
resources. The SNASP can also order preventive detention, for
indefinite periods, and many persons are never brought before
a court. These detainees are often held incommunicado and do
not have the right to challenge the legality of their
detention.
The number of political/security detainees awaiting trial as
distinguished from those that had been convicted was unknown
at year's end. An estimated 600 prisoners were held in SNASP
military prisons at the end of 1989. In August under the
authority of the amnesty law, the Ministry of Justice ordered
the release of 1,600 prisoners from civilian prisons,
including 100 security prisoners convicted under the defunct
Revolutionary Military Tribunal.
There were no reports of anyone being exiled from Mozambique
during 1989. The law of amnesty, first promulgated for a
12-month period in 1987, remained in force throughout 1989.
The Government maintains that this amnesty permits any RENAMO
member to return to civilian life and participate in the
political life of the country. Over 3,000 ex-RENAMO members
reportedly returned in 1988. The Government claimed that
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MOZAMBIQUE
thousands more accepted amnesty in 1989, although many of
these were probably civilians living in RENAMO-cont rolled
areas rather than actual fighters. There have been few
reports of mistreatment of amnestied RENAMO members.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Mozambique now has two complementary justice systems: the
civil/criminal, composed of the judiciary under the Ministry
of Justice and a police force under the Ministry of Interior;
and the military justice system, under the Ministry of
National Security. The latter has jurisdiction over most
cases involving crimes committed by military personnel and
cases of crimes by civilians which adversely affect the
military. A separate court system for national security
crimes, the Revolutionary Military Tribunal, was abolished in
December 1988. The Minister of Justice appoints judges at the
district and provincial level, while the President appoints
judges to the newly formed Supreme Court.
With the establishment of the Supreme People's Court and the
appointment of Supreme Court justices in the final months of
1988, the Mozambican legal system took on the final form
envisaged in the 1976 judiciary organization law. Persons
accused of crimes against the security of the people and the
State (i.e., the majority of political prisoners) are now
tried by the provincial courts under standard criminal
judicial procedures, with the right of appeal to the Supreme
Court. This represents a significant improvement over trials
conducted by the former Revolutionary Military Tribunal.
Nonpolitical trials conducted by the regular civil and
criminal court system are generally fair, are held in public,
and carry the right of appeal. However, a large backlog of
pending cases has resulted in long waiting periods before
cases are brought to trial. Political trials can be held in
public; but SNASP can order that a specific trial be closed.
In theory, SNASP' s influence over the judicial process has
been greatly reduced, although its extensive detention powers
are apparently unchanged. Whether provincial courts will be
able to resist executive and military influence in political
and security cases has yet to be tested. As far as is known,
there were no such cases tried at the provincial level in 1989.
In addition to the regular people's courts at the provincial
and district levels, there are at the local level customary
courts which handle matters such as estate and divorce cases.
The proceedings are usually conducted in public by a trained
representative of the Ministry of Justice, assisted by two or
four popularly elected lay judges instructed to exercise
common sense and to apply locally accepted principles.
The Military Crimes and Military Tribunal law which took
effect in 1988 established a nationwide system of brigade
courts and provincial military courts and specified
military-related crimes.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.
In areas of active insurgency, homes are entered at will by
security or police forces. It is widely assumed that
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MOZAMBIQUE
surveillance devices are employed to monitor local and
international telecommunications systems and that mail is
periodically inspected.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
In 1989 RENAMO staged a series of attacks in every province of
the country. The Government responded with a July offensive
on RENAMO' s headquarters in central Mozambique. Both
government (FPLM) and RENAMO forces were again responsible for
violations of humanitarian law in 1989, although RENAMO abuses
continued to be much more widespread and systematic. Attacks
against civilians were reported almost daily, and, given the
remoteness of much of the countryside, many more attacks
undoubtedly went unreported.
In January refugees crossing into Malawi from Tete Province
said that in several separate instances FPLM forces had herded
suspected RENAMO sympathizers into their huts, which were then
set ablaze. Although the refugees were vague about numbers,
scores of people died. In general, however, FRELIMO abuses,
especially summary executions, have declined since the
implementation of the Government's heavily publicized amnesty
program. Government forces occasionally forced rural people
into guarded villages, especially in areas where local
sympathies for RENAMO were thought to be high. A Maputo daily
newspaper reported that civilians, mainly in rural areas,
complain of living in fear of FRELIMO soldiers' misconduct,
especially in their abuse of women. AI reports that in May
and June 1989 six soldiers and militia members were charged
with various offenses. The local media have published
accounts of punishments for such abuse.
Numerous credible sources report that RENAMO still executes
noncombatants after attacks on villages, often hacking or
burning people to death, apparently to intimidate would-be
resisters. Such assassinations are especially aimed at any
representative of the Government, including party officials,
school teachers, and health workers. In one such attack on a
communal village in Gaza Province in the south, 54 civilians
are said to have died. In March RENAMO killed three Italian
Capuchin priests and held one captive briefly after attacking
their mission. In July, apparently timed for the Fifth Party
Congress, RENAMO forces attacked a suburb 6 miles north of
Maputo, killing four civilians, and, according to government
sources, torturing four others, including an 8-year old child,
by cutting off their ears. Also in July RENAMO guerrillas
reportedly killed more than 80 civilians in an attack on
Ressano Garcia, a town close to the South African border.
Numerous other refugee accounts accuse RENAMO of
systematically kidnaping civilians, including children, some
in their early teens, who are forced to bear arms for
RENAMO. RENAMO also forces civilians, after an attack on
their settlement, to carry confiscated items back to RENAMO
camps; those prisoners too weak to keep up are sometimes
killed. Prisoners allegedly are forced to cultivate food for
the insurgents, and violence against women, including rape, is
common. RENAMO' s policy of deliberate destruction of economic
targets, including factories and land transportation
facilities, has touched off famine conditions in some areas,
particularly Zambezia Province. Relief convoys, health
workers, and clinics were frequently targeted for attack.
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MOZAMBIQUE
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
In 1989 Mozambicans were allowed to speak freely on many
issues, but press freedom was restricted. The Constitution
provides for freedom of speech and opinion and citizens are
officially encouraged to express their views in grassroots and
higher level party meetings. The FRELIMO Fifth Party Congress
in July was the culmination of a year-long debate on
wide-ranging policy matters in party assemblies nationwide.
The national media remain small and controlled. The two radio
stations and one television station are government owned; the
print media are owned by private entities, but the Government
makes key management decisions and provides subsidies. There
is no prior censorship, but it is understood that the press
must follow certain guidelines; it cannot contradict
government policy, and it must support the general goals of
FRELIMO. Within these limits the media can engage in vigorous
investigative reporting. In 1989 the media featured freguent
press exposes of incidents of official abuse of power,
bureaucratic mismanagement, and government and military
corruption.
Given the problems of poverty, illiteracy, and shortage of
hard currency, the market for books and publications is
small. However, some foreign publications, including
independent Western news magazines, do occasionally appear in
bookstores. Church groups circulate newsletters and pastoral
letters. Western journalists (including Americans) are
welcome in Mozambigue, and the Government assists in their
visits. Regular foreign radio broadcasts and South African
television are received without interference or restrictions.
Academic freedom is circumscribed. Some attempt is made to
encourage teachers to promote pro-FRELIMO patriotism and to
provide texts with a similar bias. In fact, resource
limitations render these attempts ineffectual. Students at
the university level complain of "elitism" on the part of
senior professors which discourages the full interchange of
ideas more than they complain of ideological limitations on
debate.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
No political organization is permitted outside the party. The
Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and association,
but it also makes FRELIMO, the "guide of the organs of state
power," the only legal political organization. All mass
organizations, such as the women's and youth's organizations
and the sole labor union, are associated with the party.
Nonpolitical association is uncommon, but permitted (e.g.,
leading private businessmen formed an association in 1988) .
Organized protest and demonstrations are rare. One major
exception was a student strike in May at Eduardo Mondlane
University. Students, while carefully stressing that theirs
was not a political movement, demanded improved living
conditions, scholarships, and a more representative student
organization than that provided by the FRELIMO- linked
organization of Mozambican youth. Eventually, high government
officials addressed some of their demands, and the students
returned peacefully to their classes, without penalty.
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MOZAMBIQUE
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution mandates strict separation of church and
state and guarantees individuals the freedom to "practice or
not practice a religion." Religious institutions, however,
are required to "conform with the State's laws." The
Government does not require religious organizations or
missionaries to register, and foreign missionaries are readily
granted visas.
In the early postindependence period, relations between the
Government and religious organizations were frequently tense
and characterized by numerous expropriations of church
property and official criticism of religious activities and
beliefs. In recent years, however, the Government has
attempted a rapproachement with religious institutions that
intensified in 1989. The Government and party leaders praised
major denominations for their contribution to Mozambican
social development, and the Fifth Party Congress decided to
allow private entities, presumably including religious
institutions, to operate schools. In December the Government
returned the Maputo synagogue to the local Jewish community.
In the formal dialog between the Government and leaders from
several religious denominations, the discussions centered on a
comprehensive law to resolve such issues as the extent to
which religious groups can print and distribute publications,
the ownership of some expropriated church properties, and
whether Muslim women can be exempt from obligatory military
service. However, the Government has not yet returned a
Maputo church seminary or passed legislation on religious
freedom, as it had indicated it would do.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
As an emergency security measure and to prevent evasion of
conscription, the Government requires all citizens to obtain
travel permits from the local authorities. In practice, this
directive is often ignored because of the lack of
administrative control and resources in parts of the
countryside. However, many religious leaders complain that
government security regulations requiring missionaries and
others to seek permission for interprovincial travel
interferes unduly with their work. The Government also
requires people to move from areas designated as security
zones. There is no exile or revocation of Mozambican
citizenship for political reasons.
Presently, some 385 refugees of various nationalities,
including South African, have successfully sought refugee
status in Mozambique. These refugees receive material aid
from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
with the full cooperation of the Mozambican Government. There
are no reported cases in which refugees have been forced to
return to countries where they have a well-founded fear of
persecution.
Security conditions have forced many Mozambicans to leave
their homes. An estimated 1 million are internal refugees,
living mainly in displaced persons camps scattered throughout
the country. In these camps, they receive emergency aid from
the Government and from the international community. Many
242
MOZAMBIQUE
thousands more have taken refuge in neighboring countries.
According to recent estimates, 627,700 Mozambican refugees are
in Malawi alone. Other receiving countries include Zimbabwe,
with 74,000 refugees; Tanzania, 72,000; Zambia, 24,000; and
Swaziland, 10,000. Another 38,000 are thought to be in South
Africa, although this estimate is only an approximation, given
the difficulty in distinguishing economic migrants from
displaced persons and refugees.
While Mozambican law does not address the issue of emigration,
in practice the Government does not interfere with those who
wish to leave. The Government readily accepts and aids
repatriates. An estimated 116,000 refugees have returned to
Mozambigue, some on their own initiative and some through
UNHCR voluntary repatriation programs coordinated with
neighboring governments. South Africa routinely repatriates
undocumented Mozambicans, although in recent well-publicized
instances, they have allowed the temporary entry of villagers
who are fleeing RENAMO attack. The Government has protested
these involuntary repatriations, including from Zimbabwe, but
is unable to prevent them.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government or
the laws that govern them. In practice, the President and the
Council of Ministers control policymaking and implementation.
The President has extensive appointive powers in both his
government and party roles. He sets policy guidelines in
consultation with the 12-person Politburo and the 164-member
Central Committee of FRELIMO, whose members are elected at
party congresses at 5-year intervals. The Constitution does
not allow the formation of new or dissenting parties.
Non-FRELIMO party members, however, may and do participate in
the Government, including at the ministerial level.
People may choose delegates to a series of hierarchically
organized peoples' assemblies, including the National People's
Assembly, from a slate of candidates prepared by FRELIMO. The
peoples' assemblies have been the scenes of occasional
spirited debates, but they function largely as advisory
bodies, with little real power to initiate policies not
sanctioned by high-level authorities.
Following the contacts between church leaders and RENAMO
groups in Kenya, the Government and party publicly backed
peace talks with RENAMO. The Fifth Party Congress endorsed a
negotiated settlement but stipulated that RENAMO must agree to
renounce violence and support the current Government, its laws
and Constitution. President Chissano also asked the
Presidents of Kenya and Zimbabwe to help mediate the
conflict. For its part RENAMO demands free elections and a
multiparty system. However, there is considerable variance
between RENAMO' s demands and its practices in its areas of
operations. RENAMO has not established any recognizable
administrative machinery that might provide a more concrete
indicator of its plan of government.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government was increasingly receptive to international
human rights monitoring groups in 1989. An AI delegation
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MOZAMBIQUE
visited Mozambique in September, at the Government's
invitation, and AI ' s subsequent report commanded favorable, if
selective, comment by the Government. The decision to repeal
the law on flogging may have been influenced by concern
expressed by various international groups.
The ICRC now has access to security prisons nationwide and is
likely to begin visits to civilian prisons, where some
security prisoners are reportedly held. The Ministry of
Justice and the ICRC organized a conference on human rights in
March to discuss the application of human rights principles in
international human rights conventions and the problems of
refugees and asylum in Mozambique. U.N. agencies, such as the
UNHCR and the International Labor Organization (ILO), also
have programs in the country.
There are no internal Mozambican human rights organizations,
either official or independent. Current restrictions on
freedoms of speech and press would make it difficult, if not
impossible, for any group to report fully and objectively on
the Government's human rights policies.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
According to official government policy and pronouncements,
Mozambique is a multiracial, nondiscriminatory society. There
does not appear to be any systematic persecution on the basis
of ethnicity or race. There are no ethnic or racially based
quotas on government employment or benefits, nor is the
Government controlled by any one of Mozambique's 10 major
ethnic groups.
Nonetheless, the FRELIMO Government tends to include a
disproportionate number of southerners, mostly from the
Shangaan ethnic group, at all levels. Members of the northern
Makonde tribe are well represented. White, Asian, and
mixed-race Mozambicans are also heavily represented relative
to their numbers in the population, causing a certain degree
of resentment. However, whites, Asians, and those of mixed
race are not allowed in the military. Most observers, both
Mozambican and foreign, believe that ethnic imbalance results
from the greater educational opportunities available to
southerners and nonblacks under the former colonial
administration and not from deliberate government policies.
In 1989 the disproportionately high number of Shangaan
speakers in higher education was cited by university and
government officials as an injustice requiring priority
action. It is widely believed that the personnel changes
following the Fifth Party Congress were intended to promote
greater regional balance. The Government has also been
undertaking a little publicized "Africanization" program of
moving black Africans into positions formerly occupied by
whites .
The leadership of the RENAMO insurgents is predominantly from
the Shona-speaking ethnic groups who live near the Zimbabwean
border .
The Constitution forbids discrimination on the basis of sex
and mandates equal rights and responsibilities for women.
Family law requires that women have equal property rights and
rights over the children in any marriage. FRELIMO' s mass
organization for women, the Organization of Mozambican Women
(OMM) , has made a long-term project of studying the
244
MOZAMBIQUE
traditional practices of the various ethnic groups and
challenging, through grassroots education programs, those
practices that are determined to be detrimental to women.
According to medical and other sources, violence against
women, especially wife beating, is fairly widespread in
Mozambique, especially in the rural areas. The police do not
normally intervene in domestic disputes, and cases are rarely
brought before the courts. Official government policy is
against such violence, but it has not addressed the issue
specifically, and its influence is weak, especially in many
rural areas affected by the civil war. The FRELIMO women's
organization has a campaign to change public attitudes. Other
practices, such as female genital mutilation (circumcision)
and bride-price payments, also continue in some rural areas.
Female circumcision is found most frequently in coastal areas,
particularly among Muslim groups.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
All workers are free to join or not to join a trade union.
However, all trade unions must belong to a central labor union
association, the Organization of Mozambican Workers (OTM) ,
which is loosely affiliated with FRELIMO. Trade unions
independent of the OTM are prohibited by law, and there has
been no known effort to form another federation. In past
years, over half of the salaried workers in Mozambique
belonged to OTM-af filiated unions. However, press reports
indicate that union membership in Maputo Province, where a
disproportionate number of Mozambique's salaried workers are
located, actually decreased in 1989. Many factories have been
destroyed in the conflict with RENAMO, forcing OTM members who
lost their salaried jobs to turn to subsistence agriculture.
Other workers have become too impoverished to pay union dues.
Unions do not have the right to strike in practice, and there
was no known strike activity in 1989. High unemployment makes
strike action ineffective. In mid-1988, a wildcat strike by
dockworkers ended when the Government fired the strikers and
replaced them with newly hired workers.
The OTM considers its relations with international trade union
organizations to be an important element of its mission, and
it frequently serves as a conduit for foreign assistance to
Mozambican trade unions. The OTM is not affiliated with any
non-African international trade union organizations. It is a
member of the Organization of African Trade Union Unity and
the Southern African Trade Union Coordinating Council. The
OTM participates in exchange and training programs with the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations and with unions from several Western European
nations. The OTM also has extensive ties to Soviet and East
European unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers are only allowed to organize and negotiate with
employers within the OTM structure. Union membership is
voluntary, but the Government encourages workers to join and
actively participate in unions. The Government sets wage
rates, so collective bargaining, as such, does not exist.
However, the Government consults the OTM on labor and economic
policies which affect unions, and the OTM monitors
245
MOZAMBIQUE
occupational safety conditions.
One of the OTM's primary activities is to represent workers at
disciplinary action hearings and during labor disputes. The
OTM sponsors a number of training programs for workers and
operates a canteen service to provide low-cost meals at work
sites and factories.
Some professional organizations, such as the Association for
Journalists, Writers, and Musicians, have attained quasi-union
status following a 1988 agreement that allowed them to
petition the National People's Assembly for improvements in
members' working conditions. The Association of Mozambican
Journalists received a significant wage increase for its
members as a result.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law; there have
been no reports of such labor practices by the Government.
RENAMO reportedly forces kidnaped civilians to perform various
support functions, including portering arms and supplies, and
growing food for combatants.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Child labor is regulated, and in the wage economy the minimum
working age is 16. Because of high adult unemployment, there
are few children in regular wage positions. However, minor
children commonly work on family farms or in the urban
informal sector, where they perform such tasks as watching
cars or collecting scrap metal.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The minimum wage is set at about $27.50 per month at the
current official exchange rate, although it is less than half
that amount in dollar terms at the black market rate of
exchange. This salary is not adequate to sustain an average
worker's family, especially under the ongoing economic reform
plan which reduced or removed government subsidies on many
basic goods. Given the 40 percent unemployment rate and the
occasional lack of effective government enforcement, many
salaried workers are probably receiving less than the minimum,
and workers must turn to second jobs, if available, or more
likely to subsistence agriculture to survive. An estimated 85
percent of the work force is engaged in semisubsistence
agriculture, which is not covered by minimum wage legislation.
The standard legal work week is 44 hours. Women workers are
guaranteed 2 months paid maternity leave, although it is
difficult to ensure compliance with these regulations. If
firms have day-care facilities, women reportedly have the
right to two breaks of 30 minutes duration daily for a year to
feed their children.
Most of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture
and is not affected by the wage economy and government
regulations regarding working conditions. In the small,
modern sector, the Government has enacted health and
environmental laws to protect workers. On occasion, the
Government has closed firms for noncompliance with these laws,
but enforcement is difficult in the current economic situation.
246
NAMIBIA
Formerly German South West Africa, Namibia -since 1915 has been
ruled by the Republic of South Africa. Under the terms of the
Tripartite Agreement signed in New York on December 22, 1988,
by the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and
the Republic of South Africa, South Africa agreed to implement
the U. N. Plan for the independence of Namibia in accordance
with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 435.
Implementation of the UN Plan began on April 1, 1989, and will
continue until Namibia becomes independent, which is scheduled
to occur by April 1, 1990. Until independence the South
African Government through its Administrator-General (AG) will
continue to administer the territory under the supervision and
control of the Special Representative of the U.N.
Secretary-General (SRSG) and the United Nations Transition
Assistance Group (UNTAG) .
The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) won
Namibia's first free election in November for a Constituent
Assembly which will prepare a new constitution, but it failed
to gain the two-thirds majority needed to have a free hand in
in drafting the constitution. SWAPO, primarily an African
nationalist organization with previous ties to Eastern Europe,
Angola and Cuba, had waged a 23-year bush war against South
Africa for Namibia's independence. Until recently, SWAPO
advocated a Marxist-oriented economic and political system in
Namibia, but since implementation of the U.N. Plan it has
espoused the importance of a free market economy and
democratic principles. At SWAPO' s suggestion, the Constituent
Assembly adopted the framework for the Constitution which will
embody the basic principles governing the organization and
powers of the government, the holding of elections, and
protection of human rights agreed to in July 1982 by the
parties involved in the U.N. Resolution 435 negotiation
process .
The Transitional Government of National Unity installed by
South Africa in 1985 was disbanded in March 1989 and its
functions absorbed by the Administrator-General. A general
cease-fire took effect in the guerrilla war in the north in
September 1988 and held until April 1, 1989. On that date,
SWAPO sent hundreds of armed members of its military wing, the
People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), across Namibia's
northern border, violating the cease-fire and its obligations
under UNSCR 435. Widespread fighting erupted throughout
northern Namibia, in which over 300 PLAN fighters and about 30
members of the reactivated special counterinsurgency unit
known as "Koevoet" (which means crowbar in Afrikaans) and
other security forces were killed. Following vigorous
diplomatic efforts by the countries concerned, on May 19,
1989, South Africa, Angola, and Cuba agreed that the situation
was under sufficient control so that implementation of the
U.N. Plan could proceed.
After mid-May, implementation of the U.N. Plan radically
changed the political atmosphere. The South African Defense
Force (SADF) withdrew on schedule, and a residual 1,500 SADF
men, who were confined to base under UNTAG monitoring,
departed shortly after the elections in November. The South
West African Territorial Force (SWATF) was disbanded, and its
weapons placed under UNTAG control. Over 40,000 exiled
Namibians, mostly SWAPO members, were repatriated. Exiled
SWAPO leaders, including SWAPO President Nujoma, returned and
openly campaigned in the elections. Under the terms of the UN
Plan, on July 20 after talks with the SRSG, the AG released 24
247
NAMIBIA
political prisoners. SWAPO had called for the release of
another 8 being held in Windhoek jail, but the SRSG was
advised by an independent jurist that they should not benefit
from the political prisoner amnesty program. At year's end,
three were still being held: one was serving a 20 year
sentence for sabotage and murder as a result of a bomb blast
in Oshakati in 1987; the other two were serving lesser
sentences for bombings in 1987 and 1988. In addition, amnesty
was granted to persons born in Namibia who chose to return
under the auspices of the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) .
Many of the detainees held by SWAPO in prisons in Angola were
released, although 256 remained unaccounted for, and 115 were
presumed dead. Many were allegedly murdered by SWAPO while
being held in SWAPO prisons in Angola. South West African
laws deemed by the SRSG to be prejudicial to holding of free
and fair elections — including many security laws used to
suppress political activity — were repealed. The AG disbanded
Koevoet on September 30. The AG also created the O'Linn
Commission, a special commission under a respected human
rights advocate with broad powers to investigate charges of
intimidation and election malpractice. This commission made
two judgments against instances of police and political party
misconduct. It found alleged former members of Koevoet guilty
of assaulting SWAPO supporters on their way to a police
station in Ovamboland to obtain permission to hold a political
rally. The Commission also found against a policeman in
Caprivi who attempted to cover up an assault on a SWAPO
supporter.
Certain persistent problems plagued the implementation
process. Reports of misconduct by the South West African
Police (SWAPOL), such as intimidation at political rallies and
harassment of pro-SWAPO supporters, continued through
September. SWAPOL was also accused of being pro-Democratic
Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) . In addition, former members of the
SWATF were reportedly responsible for many incidents of
anti-SWAPO harassment and intimidation. Press reports issued
during the election period from UNTAG and the AG's office
indicated that both SWAPO and the DTA practiced intimidation
against each other and the smaller parties. Responding to an
increase in incidents through August, the SRSG called on the
leadership of the political parties in September to agree on a
code of conduct aimed at reducing violence and ameliorating
the atmosphere of mutual suspicion and tension.
Unfortunately a terrorist incident marred the implementation
process. Extremist whites were allegedly responsible for a
bombing attack in August on an UNTAG office in Outjo in which
a Namibian citizen was killed. Three suspects, members of the
"White Wolves," a self-proclaimed white supremacist
organization, were arrested and arraigned on charges of arson
and murder in September. Press reports citing police
investigations alleged that the White Wolves had ties to other
extremist groups in South Africa. On December 5, the suspects
escaped from police custody and were still at large at year's
end. Also in September a prominent white official of SWAPO
was assassinated. SWAPOL arrested a suspect 2 days later, who
remained in police custody in Windhoek prison at the end of
1989 charged with murder. Anonymous callers identifying
themselves as White Wolves claimed responsibility for the
murder and threatened other white activists with death.
Except for the April 1 incursion, SWAPO has not been linked to
terrorist incidents.
24-900 O-
248
UhUlSlh
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were several charges of politically motivated killings
during 1989. In Rundu in August, two policemen shot and
killed a former Koevoet member who had joined SWAPO. While
the policemen claimed they fired in self-defense, local human
rights advocates suspected the former Koevoet member was
murdered. Also in August, Petrus Joseph was murdered,
allegedly because he had complained of police narassment for
some time. Petrus, along with Paulus David and four other
ex-Koevoet members, had obtained a court order in March 1989
to restrain members of the security forces from intimidating
and harassing them. David testified in court cnat senior
officers had ordered Koevoet members to arrest and intimidate
people suspected of being SWAPO supporters. Between March and
August 1989, Petrus Joseph continued to complain of police
harassment, and in early August he was shot dead in his home
by police. Police claimed Petrus had threatened them with a
pistol, forcing them to shoot in self-defense. The police
also said they had found hand grenades in Petrus' home. A
formal inquest into the case was convened in Rundu in
September, with members of Namibia's Legal Assistance Center
acting for the victim's family. The results of the inquest
were scheduled to be heard in December, but the accused
policemen did not appear in court. The inquest hearing was
rescheduled for February 1990. The Legal Assistance Center
said the policemen had not been properly subpoenaed.
In mid-August several persons, reportedly white extremists
with links to South African extremist groups, launched an
attack with guns and incendiary grenades against UNTAG
facilities at Outjo; one Namibian security guard was killed.
Three men were arrested in September and October and charged
with arson and murder in this attack. The three men escaped
from police custody December 5 and were still at large at
year's end. A policeman shot during the escape died on
December 19. In late September, a DTA member was beaten to
death by a group of SWAPO supporters in Ovamboland; the DTA
claimed that the attack was motivated solely because the
person was a member of the DTA. The murder sparked interparty
fighting between DTA and SWAPO supporters, leading to the
deaths of several SWAPO members. In mid-September a policeman
was killed while in hot pursuit of a criminal who sought
refuge in the town of Otjiwarongo in northern Namibia. A mob,
reportedly of SWAPO supporters, sought to protect the
fugitive. The policeman wounded two attackers from the mob
before he was overpowered and beaten to death. Also in
September, a senior white official of SWAPO, Anton Lubowski,
was assassinated in front of his home by unknown gunmen;
police arrested a suspect 2 days later, who at year's end was
in detention and charged with murder. In each instance of
killing the South African authorities convened an inquest. In
most of these cases, various perpetrators have been arrested
and charged, though none had come to trial by the end of
1989. Local human rights groups expressed dissatisfaction
with these proceedings. No security force member has been
prosecuted, although a case is still pending for security
force members held for the 1986 murder of Immanuel Shifidi at
a political rally. Several of the killings did not appear to
249
have been directly motivated by politics, but because of the
tense atmosphere preceding the elections, every confrontation
between the local population and the police took on political
overtones .
Former detainees of SWAPO forces who returned to Namibia in
July alleged that many detainees had been executed without
trials or hearings in the SWAPO prisons in Angola. The
detainees produced a list of 74 persons believed to have been
killed by SWAPO security personnel. The deaths dated from
1976 to 1988; none was alleged to have occurred in 1989.
SWAPO spokesmen said the movement did detain persons whom it
identified as spies for South Africa but had released all of
them.
b. Disappearance
The former SWAPO detainees released a list of 449 names of
persons believed to be still held by SWAPO in prisons in
Angola. The former detainees claimed that several hundred
others, whose names they did not know, were also being held.
SWAPO leaders said they had released all of their detainees.
The U.N. Special Representative, who has a mandate under the
U.N. Plan to ensure the release of all political prisoners
held by both sides, sent a team to Angola and Zambia in
September to investigate the fate of those reported to be
missing. Subsequently, from a list of 1,100 names, the team
accounted for over half of the reported missing and detained.
By mid-December the number unaccounted for stood at 256. At
that time Namibians were still coming forward to identify
themselves as persons on the "missing" list. The UNTAG
mission continued to meet regularly in Windhoek (capital of
Namibia) to resolve the remaining cases.
Prisoners released by the South Africans in June and July
alleged that a number of prisoners had died while in custody
or been taken into the bush and killed. Under previous
security laws police were not required to notify their
superiors or relatives of the detainees of detentions, and
detainees could be held in any location desired by the
detaining officers. Amnesty International (AI), in its August
1989 report on Namibia, noted that it remains impossible to
say exactly how many people disappeared while in South African
custody.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
Allegations of security force abuses declined in 1989, but the
events of April 1 led to a sudden resurgence of charges of
brutality by the police and members of the SWATF 101
battalion. Allegations against Koevoet and SWATF surged
dramatically following the April 1 SWAPO incursion. There
were 400 complaints against SWAPOL elements from April 1 to
August 1. Many of these incidents stopped short of armed
violence. There were also a number of reports of civilians
beaten by members of the security forces, particularly by
members of Koevoet, although many acts of violence attributed
to Koevoet were committed by active or demobilized members of
SWATF. By August 1989 continuing reports of misconduct and
harassment, including beatings, of civilians by former Koevoet
members reached such a point that the Special Representative,
supported by the Security Council, demanded that they be
withdrawn from the police force. This was accomplished in
October.
250
Former SWAPO detainees, on their return to Namibia, stated
they had been beaten and tortured by their SWAPO guards while
imprisoned. Some claimed they had been tortured because they
were intellectuals or better educated than the SWAPO inner
circle. Many, including women, displayed extensive scars.
Men were commonly beaten on the back, buttocks, and legs; a
number said they were hung upside down from trees or roof
beams and beaten. Women were burned on their breasts with
lighted cigarettes. Several detainees said they knew
personally of victims who were beaten or tortured to death.
AI also cited, in its report on Namibia, allegations by
detainees of torture and deplorable conditions of imprisonment
in SWAPO-cont rolled camps in Angola.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Although security legislation which permitted detention
without trial has been repealed in accordance with the U.N.
Plan, and while security forces are now obliged to notify the
UNTAG police monitors when they make an arrest, reports and
allegations of SWAPOL misconduct continued to be a serious
problem into September. SWAPOL was accused of making arrests
without warrants, and there were a few cases of incommunicado
detention. As the election drew near, political tension
between DTA and SWAPO supporters increased which resulted in
more reports of SWAPOL misconduct. With DTA and SWAPO
confrontations on the rise, SWAPOL' s role in handling the
confrontations increased and so did reports and allegations of
misconduct. SWAPOL also conducted the investigation of
allegations against itself, since UNTAG served in a monitoring
and not investigatory capacity. While UNTAG police monitors
have been unable to prevent all abuses, few of SWAPOL 's
arrests resulted in formal charges, and most of those arrested
were released within a few hours. Relatives of people who are
arrested often appeal directly to UNTAG police monitors for
assistance. UNTAG monitors cannot overturn arrests, but they
can confirm the identities of those arrested, monitor
investigations of police behavior, and report abusive behavior
or police misconduct.
There were no reports of, new detentions by the security forces
in 1989. Police must now present the accused before a
magistrate within 24 hours and lay a formal charge. The
accused has the right to be represented by an attorney,
although the police do not always facilitate access. The
Government stopped funding in 1989 a legal aid program. On
capital offense charges, however, the State still is required
to provide and pay for an advocate.
Former detainees of SWAPO claimed that no judicial procedures
were observed in connection with their detention. They
publicly stated to the press and international organizations
that they were often not even informed that they had been
arrested. Many claimed they were simply thrown into dungeons;
they were not advised of any rights or of the charges against
them. None was tried or brought before any hearing; the
purpose of the torture cited above, according to some
detainees, was to extract confessions and to force the victims
to implicate others, who would be arrested and tortured as
well. Some of these confessions were allegedly videotaped and
shown to senior SWAPO leaders as "evidence" of the detainee's
guilt; most were accused of spying for South Africa. Many of
the detainees believe that they were the victims of a party
purge, singled out because of political differences, tribal
affiliation, or because they were "intellectuals."
251
with regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is independent of the executive branch (now the
AG) , and the Supreme Court in Windhoek is widely respected for
its integrity. There are only two court levels in Namibia,
magistrate and supreme. The Supreme Court is the high court.
For appeals, cases are subject to appellate review by the
South African Court of Appeals in Bloemfontein. Although
Namibia was in transitional status, the State's Attorney could
still appeal politically sensitive cases to Bloemfontein,
because the SRSG had neither jurisdiction over the legal
system nor any relationship with the Namibian courts. Trials
are public, and defendants have a right to counsel. There is
little criticism of the courts themselves, which administer a
Roman-Dutch legal system, whereby cases are heard by a
magistrate or a panel of judges. Former criticism of the
legal system concerned the widespread use of detention without
trial, notably under AG 9 of 1977 or Section 6 of South
Africa's Terrorism Act of 1967. Those brought to trial now
can expect a fair hearing based on the legal merits of their
case, and there is a right of appeal. Defendants are
considered innocent until proven guilty.
In March 1989, a full bench of the Supreme Court of Namibia
invalidated South African President P.W. Botha's decision in
March 1988 to halt the trial of six security force members
charged with the murder of Immanuel Shifidi at a political
rally in 1986. An appeal to the South African court in
Bloemfontein is still pending. Since implementation of the UN
Plan, legal rights groups have noted the light sentences that
the Supreme Court has given for crimes caused by or related to
political motives of political party supporters or members of
the police.
The Namibian courts, supreme and magistrate, also have been
careful not to involve themselves in cases which might
threaten the implementation of the UN Plan. In May, 11
so-called "headmen" (9 from Ovamboland, 1 from Caprivi and 1
from Kaokoland) brought a case against the Special
Representative, UNHCR, SWAPO, the Council of Churches, the AG,
and the South African Defense Minister. The headmen were
trying to stop the refugee repatriation process from Angola
until adequate protection could be provided to them and their
communities. They argued that the refugees — who the headmen
claimed were really ex-PLAN fighters — represented a threat to
their safety. The Supreme Court issued an interim order that
the AG provide protection for the headmen but later reversed
its decision.
Traditional tribal courts continued to operate in the tribal
areas. These courts deal mostly with minor criminal offenses,
such as petty theft and infractions of traditional customs.
Cases are heard by a village or tribal headman or chief, who
may receive advice from a traditional council or civil
servant. Procedures are informal and vary from tribe to
tribe; observers report that the system can work well to
resolve minor problems by communal consensus but, because of
the lack of review and the strength of traditional authorities
in the rural areas, is also subject to abuse.
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f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Security legislation before implementation of the U.N. Plan
allowed almost unlimited powers of search and seizure.
Invasion of the home was commonplace in the northern areas.
Press reports during the April fighting indicated that
security forces drove their heavily armored vehicles through
the homes of persons suspected of supporting the guerrillas.
Allegations of warrantless searches, threats against
civilians, and intrusive interrogation to establish the
whereabouts and identities of returnees (including PLAN
fighters repatriated as refugees) continued to concern UNTAG
and other observers until late in the year.
Outside the north, surveillance and monitoring of mail and
telephones of political activists appeared to decline.
However, legislation pertaining to the gathering of security
information. Post Office Act No. 44 and National Security Act
No. 19, remained in force throughout 1989 and gave the AG the
right to intercept telephone calls and mail without a
warrant. There is no evidence that the AG invoked these
powers after April 1.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
There were many instances of the use of excessive force and
violations of humanitarian law by both South African security
forces and SWAPO military units in the course of the 23-year
bush war. Over the years, many innocent civilians were killed
in the conflict. However, the de facto cease-fire which came
into effect in August 1988 led to a lessening of tensions
along the border and the reports of violations declined
through the rest of 1988 and into 1989.
The events of April 1 led to a resurgence in accusations of
serious violations. During the fighting and for many weeks
afterward, many reports and allegations surfaced of security
forces beating civilians during interrogation in their efforts
to locate SWAPO infiltrators.
The fighting itself in April produced lopsided casualty ratios
of 10 to 12 SWAPO infiltrators killed for every 1 taken
prisoner. Sources who claimed to have examined some of the
bodies state that many of the dead appeared to have been shot
through the head at close range. Photos of roughly 18 PLAN
members taken by a photojournalist from the London-based
Sunday Telegraph and shown on the U.S. program "South Africa
Now" were examined by a forensic expert from Guys Hospital in
London and and a U.S. forensic expert. The two claimed that
the bodies appeared to have been shot at close range. Local
police claimed that their investigations failed to confirm
these allegations. The buried bodies were exhumed in July and
autopsies performed on each. Most of the forensic facilities
and experts were South African. Several inquest hearings were
scheduled then postponed. Since the elections no apparent
follow-up of the status of the investigation or rescheduling
of the inquest have been made.
SWAPO as a guerrilla movement was accused of serious
mistreatment of its detainees (See Sections I.e. and l.d.).
As a political party it, along with the DTA, was responsible
for acts of intimidation and violence against voters during
the election campaign.
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Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Many laws circumscribing freedom of speech were repealed in
1989 as part of the U.N. Plan. The SRSG ensured that all laws
which would prevent free and fair elections were repealed, in
particular those relating to political expression.
Restrictions on obscenity remained in effect, but the press
reported freely on political, security, and economic matters.
The daily newspapers, which are generally party organs, were
guite vigorous in their criticism of the AG, UNTAG, the U.N.
Plan, and each other.
In late September, a Namibian publisher, two newspaper editors
and an American journalist, Scott Stanley, were arrested on
the "criminal" charge of defaming the O'Linn Commission, a
Namibian government commission charged with investigating
allegations of election fraud and malpractice. Stanley had
interviewed its chairman, Bryan O'Linn, in July and wrote a
commentary for his news organization critical of O'Linn. The
piece charged that O'Linn was pro-SWAPO and not fit to head
the Commission. O'Linn called the allegation contemptuous,
and the State brought charges against Stanley and two Namibian
newspapers that published the commentary. The trial judge
found that Stanley had misquoted and otherwise denigrated
O'Linn. On November 21, all defendants were found guilty on
some of the counts against them and received fines. Stanley
was found guilty on one of two counts and fined the equivalent
of $96.
The South West African Broadcasting Corporation (SWABC)
operates under a board appointed by the Administrator-General.
SWABC newscasts on radio and television have traditionally
been biased in favor of the status quo and against SWAPO,
referring to it prior to April 1 as a terrorist organization.
Following April 1, 1989, SWABC modified its news policy to
permit mention of SWAPO as a political party like the others
but continued to be highly biased against SWAPO. Three
reports issued at intervals in 1989 by an independent
monitoring group, NPP-435, documented instances of SWABC
bias. The SRSG insisted that improvement in the broadcast
media's performance was essential to creating the conditions
for free and fair elections. SWABC's bias did diminish
somewhat during the year, but the network's newscasts still
had relatively low credibility among many listeners and
viewers .
With the repeal of most security legislation related to
political offenses, academic freedom is now respected in
Namibia. Local scholars are free to publish, travel, speak,
and participate in local politics for the first time in many
years without fearing loss of employment or prosecution.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Namibians generally enjoy the freedoms of peaceful assembly
and association. The repeal of pertinent security legislation
has resulted in greater freedom of assembly and unprecedented
political rallies were held throughout the country.
Political rallies do not require approval, but parties must
provide prior notice of meetings under proclamation AG 23 of
1989, and must conform to certain guidelines relating to
safety and traffic. In August a SWAPO rally was peacefully
254
dispersed for failing to conform with the requirement that the
police be notified 3 days in advance; party organizers had in
fact notified the local magistrate, as was required under old
legislation. In late September, the DTA held a march through
Windhoek's black township of Katutura. Although the party had
received permission from the AG's office in August to use a
loudspeaker truck to do political campaigning, it did not have
prior permission to hold a march. The AG's office ruled that
the march was illegal under the terms of AG 23.
A SWAPOL commander in the north was accused before the AG's
Commission on Intimidation (the O'Linn Commission) of having
deliberately staged a police attack on a peaceful assembly of
SWAPO supporters in Ovamboland in June. In September police
in Windhoek used plastic bullets to disperse a group of
striking workers (see Section 6. a.). Students and government
workers in northern Namibia staged a walkout in July to
protest continued police abuses. The aim of the 1-month long
school boycott, involving 160,000 students in 518 schools, was
to urge the Government to remove ex-Koevoet members from the
police force. A number of spontaneous demonstrations
occurred, which led to some minor clashes.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Namibians enjoy the free practice of religion. Almost all
Namibians are Christian, with the Evangelical Lutheran Church
in Namibia (ELGIN) being the single largest denomination.
Roman Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Dutch Reformed, and the
African Methodist Episcopal Churches are also active. There
is one Jewish synagogue in Windhoek, and a small community of
Muslims .
Church leaders, who consistently condemned the use of violence
in the past, also spoke out against the use of violence and
intimidation by the political parties and urged reconciliation.
Past travel restrictions against church leaders have been
lifted. Foreign church visitors have without exception been
granted visas, although some after delay or protest, to travel
to Namibia.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Under the terms of the U.N, Plan, all Namibian refugees who
fled the country during the conflict were entitled to register
with UNHCR for repatriation. More than 42,000 Namibians who
wished to return registered, and 42,736 had returned to
Namibia by the end of 1989. This included the senior
leadership of SWAPO, other exiled politicians, and several
thousand PLAN fighters who repatriated as civilian refugees
after their units in Angola were disarmed and disbanded. The
former SWAPO detainees who returned were also repatriated
under UNHCR auspices. Many of the non-SWAPO returnees accused
UNHCR and its implementing agency in Namibia, the Council of
Churches in Namibia (CCN) , of partiality towards SWAPO, of
attempting to cover up or ignore SWAPO human rights abuses,
and of disregarding the legitimate needs of non-SWAPO
returnees. The non-SWAPO political parties also accused UNTAG
of failing to seek out vigorously persons detained by SWAPO
whose repatriation SWAPO wished to prevent.
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NAMIBIA
UNHCR's and UNTAG ' s inability to locate these SWAPO detainees
in SWAPO or Angolan custody came under particular criticism.
SWAPO and the Angolan authorities either could or would not
account fully for those believed to be missing.
The dusk-to-dawn curfew in the northern operational area was
lifted in early 1989, then reimposed during the April
fighting. It was lifted again in May. During the voter
registration process several observers claimed that Namibians
living in Walvis Bay and traveling to Swakopmund were subject
to delays and harassment at the border. UNTAG intervention
with the authorities alleviated the problem.
South Africa, through the Administrator-General, still
provided travel documents to Namibians. These, however, were
provided routinely to all Namibians not charged with or wanted
for a criminal offense. Several senior SWAPO leaders have
traveled to and from Namibia on South African passports. If
denied a passport, a Namibian could apply to the Minister of
Home Affairs in South Africa. However, the Minister did not
have to provide a reason for denial, and there was no right of
appeal through the courts.
There were no known deportations in 1989. The portions of the
South West Africa Regulations Act which permitted deportation
of aliens who threatened public order were repealed in June.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change their Government
In 1989, for the first time in their history, Namibians of all
ethnic groups exercised this right over 5 days, November 7 to
11, electing a Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution
for an independent Namibia. Ten registered political parties
contested the U.N. -supervised elections. SWAPO won the
election, receiving 57 percent of the 670,830 votes cast — a
turnout of more than 97 percent of the eligible voters. SWAPO
gained 41 seats in the 72-seat Constituent Assembly, a
majority, but not the two-thirds majority needed to adopt a
constitution within the 1982 guidelines. The DTA, which
dominated the Transitional Government since 1985, won 28
percent of the vote and 21 seats in the Assembly. The
remaining parties were: United Democratic Front, 4 seats;
Action Christian National Party, 3 seats; Namibia National
Front, 1 seat; National Patriotic Front, 1 seat; and Federal
Convention of Namibia, 1 seat. The SRSG certified the
elections as "free and fair," and the competing parties
agreed.
All parties cooperated in the initial work of the Constituent
Assembly, which, in late December, adopted the Standing
Committee's report on the outlines of a Namibian
constitution. The report reflected the ideas on which all
parties have agreed in principle: a 5-year term executive
presidency; a bicameral legislature; protection of fundamental
human rights; and national elections based on proportional
representation. The Standing Committee was preparing a draft,
in consultation with legal experts, which would be presented
to the full Assembly in early 1990. The majority party along
with others in the Assembly will determine how the government
will be formed. The Constituent Assembly will likely
transform itself into a national assembly, and no other
nationwide elections are scheduled for the near future.
256
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The attitude of the South African Government and the AG has
undergone a dramatic change with the implementation of the UN
Plan. Many observers from international human rights and
humanitarian and religious organizations visited Namibia in
1989 and traveled extensively throughout the country,
conducting their own investigations of the independence
process, police abuses, and the stories of the SWAPO
detainees. Several human rights and information services
established full-time offices in Namibia to monitor
implementation.
The Namibian Legal Assistance Center (LAC), which operates
five offices in Namibia, assisted indigent defendants and has
played an important role in political and security cases since
its founding in 1988. The Center faced a court challenge from
the AG's legal staff in mid-1989, but the Windhoek Supreme
Court dismissed the AG's case in August, forcing an
out-of-court settlement which fully recognized the right of
the LAC to continue its work.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Much of the discrimination based on race built into the
structure of the Namibian Government created by South Africa
remained in place in 1989. Although the ethnically based
second-tier executive and legislative authorities were
abolished and their functions transferred to the AG, the
separate second-tier civil services and schools were
retained. As required by the U.N. Plan, only those laws
prejudicial to the holding of free and fair elections were
repealed, though many parties and observers demanded the
complete abolition of all ethnic classifications,
institutions, and authorities. The AG resisted this on the
grounds that administrative chaos would ensue and that the
complete restructuring of the Government should be left to the
country's first independent government.
Pending restructuring, the system of racial classification
remained essentially the same as in 1988. Most Namibians
carried an identity document under the Identification of
Persons Act of 1979. This document identified them as members
of one of the following ethnic groups: Ovambo, Whites,
Damara, Herero, Kavango, Kama, Colored (mixed race),
Kaokovelder, Bushmen, Rehoboth Baster, Caprivian, and Tswana.
A large proportion of the taxes collected from a particular
ethnic group stayed with that group, resulting in a gross
disparity in the distribution of government revenues. The
second-tier administration for the country's 80,000 whites had
a budget of $23 million while the authority for the 650,000
Ovambos (from which SWAPO derives its political base) had a
budget of $350,000.
Social facilities were generally open to all races, although
private businesses could — and on occasion did — restrict
clientele based on race, and a few refused to admit members of
UNTAG. The law did not require segregation in housing, but
economic factors produced essentially the same effect, with
separate townships for blacks and coloreds remaining part of
the structure of local municipalities. Some hospitals, such
as the state hospital in Windhoek, admitted all patients but
257
had separate wings for different races.
Nonracial private schools have operated in the territory for
several years; most are affiliated with the churches. The
public schools were under the ethnic second-tier structure and
were segregated. All of the political parties declared that
upon independence public education would be integrated but
some, such as the National Party, insisted that different
ethnic groups should be allowed to maintain segregated private
schools .
Women continue to face discrimination in both the traditional
and modern sectors, particularly in regard to financial and
legal matters. The coming of independence is not likely to
change this situation soon; discrimination is almost as deeply
entrenched in the "liberation movement" as it is in the
current Government. Under traditional practice, which was
still in effect for a majority of the population, a woman is
not independent. She is usually a ward of her father until
she marries; then she is a ward of her husband. There is
still de facto discrimination against women in employment in
the modern sector.
Family violence appears to be a deep-rooted and common
problem. The courts treated cases of wife beating as
assaults, but because of traditional attitudes regarding the
subordination of women, most such cases did not get to court.
The police do not normally interfere in domestic disputes.
Some community groups and government bodies were targeting
women in their development programs. Among these were the
Council of Churches' Namibian Women's Voice, the Women of
Namibia, and the Namibian Women's Organization in Ovamboland.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The legal right to associate in labor unions, long enjoyed by
white and colored workers, was extended to blacks only in July
1978. Black union membership has grown markedly over the last
3 years. About 70 percent of all workers in the largest
private sector of the economy, mining, are unionized. Union
officials in 1989 claimed a membership of 50,000 out of a
private sector work force of at least 230,000. The total work
force is estimated at 400,000. The country's 20,000 to 30,000
farm workers employed on white-owned farms remain unorganized,
and many are subject to a regime of paternalistic
authoritarianism that gives them little say regarding their
conditions of employment and little access to outside
assistance.
Labor issues and politics are closely related; most of the
unions with a majority of black workers are sympathetic
towards SWAPO, and many union leaders are also SWAPO
officials. For example, until his murder Anton Lubowski,
SWAPO' s sole white senior official, was Secretary of Finance
and Administration of the National Union of Namibian Workers
(NUNW) . Unions are allowed to publicize their views and did
so in the November elections.
Namibian workers have and exercise the right to strike. With
the approach of independence, politically motivated industrial
action abated somewhat, but labor-management relations remain
turbulent. Workers often stop work before observing all the
required steps for the settlement of disputes which are
258
mandated by local labor codes. Employers, in turn, have the
right to dismiss legally or illegally striking employees, and
in the past have done so with relative impunity. No sanctions
are applied against the employer. During a legal strike an
employer can try to reach an agreement with workers by means
of a conciliatory board composed of management and union
members. However, the employer is not compelled to reach a
resolution, and in the case of an illegal strike, the employer
has the right of lockout. Proclamation R. 101 of 1985, which
contained a "bill of fundamental rights" that sought to
restrict the advocacy and organization of work stayaways and
boycotts, was repealed as part of the settlement process in
July.
In 1989 workers continued to strike individual firms over pay
and other issues. The firing of a labor organizer from a
local brewery resulted in a walkout of sympathetic workers in
September. The brewery then dismissed the strikers. When the
strikers gathered peacefully outside the brewery, reportedly
to get their final paychecks, the police ordered them to
disperse and then opened fire with plastic bullets, injuring a
number of workers. This excessive use of force led to
sympathy strikes against other firms owned by the holding
company which owned the brewery; it also produced a boycott
against the brewery by local black businessmen.
Namibia has been a member of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) since 1978. Trade unions are free to
affiliate with international trade union organizations. The
ban on the NUNW, a SWAPO-af filiated body which operated from
exile in Angola, has been lifted, and it is now operating
publicly in Namibia. The NUNW is affiliated with the
Organization of African Trade Union Unity and with the
Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Namibian Supreme Court recognized the right of collective
bargaining without intervention by a government agency in
1985. The Wiehanan Commission created in 1986 to revamp
Namibia's outdated labor laws released its comprehensive
report in February 1989. A second report was completed in
December 1989 and outlines recommendations on changes in labor
practices which may be considered by the independent
government. The report covers international labor standards,
conditions of service, labor relations, employment, training
and development, social security, and labor administration and
suggests the establishment of a special judicial body to deal
with labor disputes. It also establishes a system of
industrial courts. None of the commission's recommendations
will automatically become policy; it will be up to the new
government to draw up strategies and national labor policies.
Namibia in 1989 used a method of resolving labor-management
disputes through conciliation boards under the Wage and
Industrial Council Ordinance. Under this approach, employees
or employers have been able to apply to the South
African-appointed Administrator-General (AG) to appoint a
conciliation board composed of members of both management and
the unions, whose decisions in principle become binding on
both sides. The decisions in principle are binding if
publicly declared so by the AG on the recommendation of the
conciliation board. The board is composed of both management
and union members with no independent arbitrator, a fact that
can make it difficult to reach agreement. The conciliation
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NAMIBIA
board operates essentially on the basis of a gentlemen's
agreement, because no law evokes sanctions against an
employer. If a dispute cannot be resolved by the conciliation
board, unions can seek the advice of an independent mediator.
Should this option fail, the two parties could turn to an
arbitrator whose recommendations would be binding.
General unions, i.e., unions representing workers in more than
one industry, are permitted in Namibia. A major issue remains
the recognition of unions by individual companies and whether
these unions can then be registered with the AG. Unregistered
unions can bargain on behalf of their members if they are
recognized by management, but they do not have access to
conciliation boards. Disputes also have arisen, sometimes on
political lines, over which union is entitled to represent the
workers at a particular company. New wage concessions and a
minimum wage were negotiated in the building industry in 1989.
There are no export processing zones or offshore processing
facilities in Namibia.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by law. The implementation of the
U.N. Plan threw additional light on labor practices in the
white farming sector. Reports by 17 former SWAPO fighters who
were released from a police-run farm in September indicated
that conditions amounting to forced labor existed in 1989.
Illiterate and isolated farm workers in some instances
received little compensation, were unable to leave the farm
without the owner's permission, were forbidden to speak to
outsiders, and were, in some cases, subject to physical
punishment by their employers. In one court case in
September, evidence given by witnesses revealed that workers
on one farm were being paid as little as 30 cents a day; the
farm workers resorted to poaching game to feed their families.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment across the board is 15.
Minimum age regulations are generally enforced in the wage
sector pursuant to the Employment Act of 1986, Section 12.
However, children below the age of 15 often work on family
farms and in the informal sector.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no statutory minimum wage in Namibia. Several unions
adopted a "living wage," i.e., one adequate to provide a
worker and his family with basic shelter, food, and clothing,
as a theme in 1988 and 1989. However, trade union leaders
have not settled on a figure. An unskilled worker in the
mining sector earns an average $275 per month.
Government-mandated occupational health and safety standards
are similar to those found in South Africa, but enforcement of
these standards outside the formal sector is slack. Improved
safety conditions remained a strong union demand in the mining
sector, particularly in the wake of an accident in November
1988 which killed seven miners at the Kombat mine near
Tsumeb. The inquest proceedings found the company had been
negligent and was culpable for the deaths. Namibia also has
legislation mandating leave (including maternity leave) and
overtime standards. An employer cannot require a female to
work in a factory 4 weeks before the expected birth date or 8
260
NAMIBIA
weeks after delivery.
The standard legal workweek is 46 hours under the 1986
Conditions of Employment Act, which also allows for 10 hours
of overtime per week, at time and a third. The employee must
freely agree to work overtime. Legally, an increase of more
than 10 hours of overtime per week has to be approved by the
Manpower Commission.
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HlfiEE
Niger is ruled by an authoritarian military regime headed by
General Ali Saibou, who took power following the death of
former President Seyni Kountche in November 1987. In 1989 the
military remained firmly in control, but President Saibou
promulgated a new Constitution, approved in a September 24,
1989 referendum, which established a secular one-party state
and replaced the Supreme Military Council with a joint
civilian and military Superior Council of National Orientation
as the nation's highest political body. Presidential and
legislative elections in December 1989 offered voters only a
yes or no choice on the nominees selected by the sole
political party, the National Movement of the Development
Society (MNSD) .
The Nigerien armed forces number about 2,600 members plus 800
gendarmes (paramilitary police). Other security organizations
are: the Directorate of State Security, which reports
directly to the President; the National Police, which is
responsible for maintaining public order and countering
antigovernment activity; and a unit for presidential
protection.
Niger is one of the world's poorest countries. The economy is
based on subsistence farming, livestock raising, and some of
the world's largest uranium deposits. However, cycles of
drought, desertification, a 3.1 percent population growth
rate, and declining world demand for uranium since the early
1980 's have had a serious negative impact on the economy.
Niger has a mixed economy with a number of government-owned
enterprises and diverse private firms. The Government is
attempting to reduce the number of these state firms and to
encourage a greater role for private business.
Basic human rights continued to be circumscribed in 1989, but
there were significant advances, including the advent of a new
Constitution and the release of almost all political
prisoners. The new Constitution contains extensive guarantees
of citizens' rights, including freedom of speech and press,
which, if fully implemented, would represent a considerable
step forward. However, significant restraints on freedom of
speech and press remain.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of such killings in 1989.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated abductions or
disappearances .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no reliable reports of systematic torture of
prisoners or detainees in Niger. While occasional abuses by
individual law enforcement or prison officers occur, the
Government's policy banning physical abuse of prisoners and
detainees appears to be applied in most cases. This
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represents a significant improvement from the situation which
prevailed prior to 1988. In two incidents in July 1989, law
enforcement officers were punished for mistreatment of
detainees. A total of five law enforcement officials were
convicted and served 3-month jail terms each.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Article 84 of Niger's new Constitution specifically prohibits
arbitrary detention, but its application in practice has yet
to be tested. Police do not always need a warrant to arrest a
suspect. Once an arrest is made, the law requires that the
suspect be either charged or released within 48 hours. This
period can be extended for an additional 48 hours by the
public prosecutor, who is also the head of the judicial
police. In practice, delays beyond those established periods
occur, and prisoners often spend months in jail awaiting trial.
Preventive detention is permitted under Nigerien law but must
be ordered by an examining magistrate. Suspects are held in
preventive detention for the duration of the magistrate's
investigation of the case, which in some cases has taken as
much as a year. Defendants are allowed access to a lawyer of
their own choosing. There is a functioning system of bail for
crimes carrying a penalty of less than 10 year's
imprisonment. In 1989 President Saibou publicly called on
judicial authorities to speed the process of bringing accused
persons to trial.
There were no reports of incommunicado detention. Also, there
were no reports of arrest, detention, or punishment for
expression of views critical of, or different from, those of
the Government. As far as is known, there were no political
detainees awaiting trial at the end of 1989. Exile is not
used as a means of political control in Niger.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Niger's legal system is an amalgam of French, Islamic, and
customary law. Civil and criminal cases not involving
security-related acts are tried publicly. Defendants have the
right to be present at their trials, to confront witnesses,
and to present evidence. The new Constitution reaffirmed the
judicial principle that the accused are presumed innocent
until proven guilty. Defendants have the right to counsel at
public expense if they are minors or if they are indigent and
face the prospect of a sentence of 10 years or more. Both the
defendant and the prosecutor can appeal verdicts, first to the
Court of Appeals and then to the highest court, the State
Court. Both courts are obliged to hear appeals. The Court of
Appeals reviews both questions of fact and questions of law
while the State Court limits its review to questions of law.
Under the new Constitution, tne Supreme Court, once
established, will replace the State Court as the highest court
and will review the decisions of the Court of Appeals.
The Constitution calls for an independent judiciary tut makes
the President of the Republic, as Chief of the Executive
Branch, the guarantor of this judicial independence. The
President has the right of pardon in criminal cases and
invoked this right on frequent occasions in recent years. At
the village level, matters such as property disputes are
frequently resolved by traditional courts.
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In June 1985, the Kountche Government formed a special court
to investigate Civil Service corruption. This court meets
regularly and now only deals with embezzlement cases involving
over $6,000. Another recent modification allows the accused
to be released provisionally upon repayment of the sum
embezzled.
Security-related cases are tried in the State Security Court,
which operates outside the normal legal framework. This
Court, which has no permanent organization, was established by
presidential decree in 1974. Its deliberations are held in
secret. According to the Ministry of Justice, a military
officer presides, but this Court includes civilian
magistrates. It affords the defendant the same legal rights
as he would receive in a criminal case, with the exception of
the right to a public trial. There were no known cases
brought before this Court in 1989. Amnesty International, in
its 1989 Report, criticized the Court's secrecy in retrying
(at government request) and convicting 19 persons (4 in
absentia) in 1988 for involvement in an unsuccessful coup
attempt in October 1983. The Report concluded that a
defendant's right to trial by an independent and impartial
court had not been respected.
At the end of 1989, there were no political prisoners in
Niger. On December 18, President Saibou released the last two
prisoners incarcerated for participation in the 1983 coup
attempt against former President Kountche.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The police need a search warrant to enter homes except in
cases involving major crimes, when they can enter at any time
without a warrant. Search warrants do not permit searches
between the hours of 9 p.m. and 6 a.m. There is no forced
membership in any political organization, including the one
legal political party. Violations of privacy, such as
interference with correspondence, are illegal but are known to
take place.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The new Nigerien Constitution affirms the citizen's right to
freedom of opinion, thought, expression, press, publication,
and publicity but does not specifically prohibit government
action banning offensive material. President Saibou has said
repeatedly in his public speeches that free expression of all
viewpoints and political opinions will be allowed within the
sole political movement, the MNSD. In practice, there are
definite restrictions on freedom of speech and press. Major
print and electronic media are government owned and
controlled. Limited criticism of certain government officials
and some policies is allowed, but attacks on the Chief of
State, his major policies, or the legitimacy of the regime are
not tolerated. As a practical matter, journalists are
familiar with these guidelines, and there were no known cases
of journalists being sanctioned in 1989.
There were no reports in 1989 of censored or banned magazines
or other publications. Foreign films are subject to
censorship by the Ministry of Interior on grounds of public
morality and political content.
264
h. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Niger is a one-party state which does not permit the assembly
or establishment of rival political groups. Permits must be
obtained from the Ministry of Interior or local police
authorities for public gatherings. Permission is routinely
granted only to recognized groups, e.g., trade unions and
churches. The Government requires the registration of private
associations with the Ministry of Interior and grants such
registration only to organizations which operate within the
framework of the Government's policy. Ethnic or racial
associations as well as associations v;hich the Government
believes threaten national unity are prohibited.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Niger is a secular state. While the population is over 90
percent Muslim, -the Government permits the practice of other
religious beliefs. Foreign missionaries can live, work, and
travel in Niger but must obtain permission from the Ministry
of Interior for all of their operations. Religious groups are
allowed to maintain links with fellow believers in other
countries. Religious groups may maintain places of worship,
train clergy, publish religious material, provide religious
education, and participate in charitable activities.
The Government, concerned by the Islamic fundamentalist
violence that erupts periodically in nearby northern Nigeria,
monitors Muslim religious activity through the Islamic
Association. This Association is funded by the Government and
assists in an informal screening process of local religious
leaders. Islamic services that go beyond strictly religious
subjects are not permitted.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Travel within Niger is closely monitored, although there was
further relaxation during 1989. Police checks, often
entailing thorough searches, take place upon entering or
leaving major towns and cities. The former requirement for an
exit visa to leave Niger has been abolished. Neither
emigration nor repatriation are restricted. By law, married
women must have the permission of their husbands to travel
abroad.
Niger is a party to the U.N. Convention and Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees and has cooperated with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees in handling the few registered
refugees currently in Niger. There was no forced resettlement
in 1989.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The armed forces, under President Saibou, continue to dominate
the State leaving no realistic means for the citizens to
change the Government. Niger's new Constitution calls for a
one-party state and a strong presidency. Legislative and
presidential elections are held every 5 and 7 years
respectively. They offer voters only a yes or no option on a
slate of candidates selected by the sole legal political body.
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the MNSD, created as part of Niger's return to constitutional
government after 15 years of direct military rule.
Other new institutions include the Superior Council of
National Orientation (CSON) and a National Executive Bureau
(BEN) . The President appoints most of the members of both the
CSON and the BEN as well as all of the members of the
Cabinet. The top three positions in the National Executive
Bureau are held by military officers as are a third of the
seats on the CSON. President Ali Saibou heads both the CSON
and the BEN and appoints all regional governors, who are
military officers. Through these new institutions, the former
military regime hopes to improve consultation with, and
participation by, civilians in government while protecting the
political interests of the military and avoiding competition
from alternative political organizations.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government is cooperative in answering inquiries on the
status of political prisoners of interest to international
human rights groups. There are no domestic groups which
monitor the human rights situation in Niger. Niger is not
active in regional and international human rights
organizations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Four major ethnic groups, each with its own language, make up
the bulk of the population. The two primarily nomadic groups,
Tuaregs and Fulani (Peul), have less access to government
services, partly because their transient lifestyles make it
difficult for the Government to supply them with services.
By tradition and practice, women occupy a subordinate place in
Nigerien society. Males have considerable advantages in terms
of education, employment, and property rights. In cases of
divorce, custody of all children under 8 years of age is given
to the husband.
Conscious of the adverse situation of women, the Government
has begun work on a new family code, tried to provide better
employment opportunities to women, and supported a national
women's association. Women are paid comparable wages to that
of men and are active in the business community, although
commerce is dominated by men. The first professional
associations of women traders, educators, and bankers were
formed in 1988. About one-third of Nigerien doctors are
women, and many of the nation's magistrates are women. The
Government continues to encourage family planning and in 1988
formally legalized the use of contraceptives. Female genital
mutilation (circumcision) occurs but is not believed to be
widespread. It has not received extensive attention from the
Government, but during 1989 government media covered in detail
campaigns by the U.N. Children's Fund and the World Health
Organization to abolish this practice.
Violence against women and children, including wife beating,
occurs, but the extent of the problem of violence is unknown.
However, it is considered antisocial behavior in Nigerien
society, and women often turn to both traditional and modern
judicial authorities in cases of abuse. The new family code
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HIiiEfi
now under preparation specifically addresses domestic violence
and is reported to strengthen existing legal provisions in
this area. In 1989 a Ministry of Women's and Social Affairs
was created which has a broad mandate to improve the lot of
women in society. The Association of Nigerien Women focused
on the topic of violence against women at several of its
conferences, which received substantial publicity in the
government media.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Approximately 90 percent of Niger's work force is employed in
the rural, largely subsistence sector. In the small modern
economy, workers have the right to establish and join trade
unions, which are organized under an umbrella group, the
National Union of Nigerien Workers (USTN) . The USTN is
nominally independent but is partially funded by the
Government and is usually responsive to government policies.
The USTN has an- observer in the MNSD but is not part of the
party structure. The head of the USTN is elected by its
members. The USTN represents about 30 percent of the
approximately 60,000 salaried workers in Niger.
Strikes in Niger are legal if conciliation and mediation
procedures have been exhausted. During 1989 there were
strikes by bank employees, miners, and airline employees, all
of which were resolved by negotiation.
The USTN is a member of the Organization of African Trade
Union Unity and abides by its policy of having no formal
affiliations outside the African continent.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is legally authorized, but the
Government is deeply involved in the process. Individual
unions are permitted to bargain for more favorable agreements
at their work sites. The Government promotes voluntary
worker-employer negotiations but does not sit at the
bargaining table in private sector negotiations. If these
negotiations fail, the Government becomes the arbitrator.
There is a basic framework agreement which has been in force
since 1972 between the USTN, employers, and the Government.
The agreement covers wages and benefits and is extensively
applied to all sectors of the urban wage economy. This
agreement protects workers against antiunion discrimination.
Labor legislation is applied uniformly throughout the country,
and there are no export processing zones in Niger.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Niger's labor code prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and
it is generally not practiced. The last reported instance of
forced labor was during the 1985 drought emergency when
displaced herders, primarily ethnic Tuaregs and Fulanis, were
in some instances required to work on food-growing projects.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children between the ages of 12 and 18 may be employed, but
there are strict provisions concerning the hours of employment
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and types of employment for children in this age group. All
labor provisions, including those concerning child labor, are
applied in practice only in urban areas. In the subsistence
agricultural sector, which employs most Nigeriens, children
work on family plots under conditions which are not in
compliance with the provisions of the labor code. Education
is by law free and compulsory from age 7. However, only about
a quarter of Nigerien children of primary school age actually
attend schools, with an even lower proportion attending middle
school and high school.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The legal minimum wage for salaried workers is approximately
$66 per month. According to union officials, this wage is not
sufficient to provide a decent living for workers and their
families. Because of the country's depressed economy, the
Government has increased salaries by only 6 percent since
1980, despite tfie rising cost of living.
The legal workweek is 40 hours. However, according to the
labor code, certain occupations requiring irregular hours are
authorized longer workweeks, with a maximum of 72 hours. The
labor code also provides occupational safety and health
regulations which are enforced by the labor inspectors in the
Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and Professional Training.
Because of staff shortages, this office focuses mainly on the
mining, building, and industrial sectors for safety
violations. According to a Ministry official, compliance is
often difficult to enforce because of the attitude of the
workers who are relatively uneducated and are therefore not
fully cognizant of the safety risks posed in their jobs. They
often complain and refuse to wear protective clothing because
of Niger's hot climate. For the most part, employers have
been responsive in providing safety equipment.
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Nigeria is ruled by a military regime headed by President
Ibrahim Babangida, who came to power by a military coup in
August 1985, overthrowing a previous military regime which in
turn had seized power from civilians in December 1983. A
19-member Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) is the country's
main decisionmaking organ, while a mixed military/civilian
cabinet presides over the Federal Military Government's (FMG)
executive functions. Military governors head each of the 21
states, while a minister heads the Federal Capital Territory,
Abuja. The 1979 Constitution remains partially in effect, but
significant provisions, namely those guaranteeing free
elections, political parties, due process, and habeas corpus
are suspended. Federal and state legislation, promulgated by
decree, is largely exempt from challenge in the courts. The
FMG continues to plan a transition to democratic, civilian
rule with a prescribed two-party system by 1992 (postponed
from 1990) .
The Constituent Assembly, consisting of 450 locally elected
members and 111 FMG-nominated members, submitted its revisions
to the 1979 Constitution to the AFRC in March 1989. The AFRC
in May approved the draft constitution, which is influenced by
the U.S. Constitution; it remains substantially similar to the
1979 Constitution and is scheduled to become law on October 1,
1992. In October, however. President Babangida abolished
newly emerged political associations for failing to meet
guidelines for registering national parties. Then in December
the AFRC established two national parties, one "slightly to
the left" and the other "slightly to the right." It also
delayed local and state level elections to allow the new
parties to become organized but maintained the October 1992
date for the return to civilian rule.
The FMG enforces its authority through the Federal security
apparatus — the military, the State Security Service (SSS), and
the national police--and through the courts. Deficiencies in
organization, management, and control often lead to ongoing
human rights violations: arbitrary arrests, detention without
trial, and excessive use of force by law enforcement officers.
Most of Nigeria's 100-million-plus population still lives in
rural areas, engaging in small-scale agriculture. Nigeria is
dependent upon its oil exports (90 percent of all export
revenues in 1988) to pay for needed imports and service its
massive foreign debt ($33 billion at the end of 1988). The
decline in world oil prices caused a drop in Nigeria's oil
revenues from $26 billion in 1981 to $6 billion in 1985. To
address the massive contraction of the economy. President
Babangida imposed in 1986 a Structural Adjustment Program
(SAP), which required radical adjustments to economic
policies. These factors taken in combination have led to a
substantial decline in the standard of living over the past
decade.
Human rights continued to be subject to limitation in 1989.
While the Government frequently voiced its commitment to human
rights, it took a harder line with its critics following riots
in Lagos and other southern cities in May and June. These
disturbances, triggered in part by increasing prices,
encompassed allegations of corruption against top leaders,
including President Babangida, and criticism of the SAP. The
security apparatus responded with force, killing at least 22
persons according to official reports, injuring many others.
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NIGERIA
and arresting hundreds, many of whom remained imprisoned at
the end of 1989. Many universities and several newspapers
were closed temporarily, and journalists and activists were
detained for alleging corruption of certain high officials and
challenging the SAP. In December, however, the Government
abolished "wandering" as a criminal offense (akin to vagrancy),
which could benefit hundreds of Nigerians held without formal
charge. Furthermore, on December 31, 1989, the FMG announced
an amnesty of prisoners to alleviate overcrowded prisons.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There was no evidence of politically motivated killing at
government or private instigation in 1989.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
A portion of the 1979 Constitution still in effect outlaws
torture and mistreatment of prisoners, and Nigerian law
provides penalties for excesses. There was no evidence of the
systematic use of torture by Nigerian authorities in 1989,
although in April a High Court Judge ruled against the
defendant in one police torture case. Moreover, there were
persistent, though unsubstantiated, allegations that capital
punishment of convicted armed robbers is sometimes carried out
in an inhumane way. Other public allegations and evidence of
police brutality surfaced periodically in 1989 in connection
with the treatment of common criminals and with relation to
the Ketu incident (Section l.g.).
There are also frequent charges of police brutality or
arbitrary treatment at police checkpoints. Ostensibly to
combat the high crime rate, these checkpoints are set up
throughout the country, and police are often accused of
demanding bribes or producing false arrests. Human rights
activists and other observers claim that police make arbitrary
arrests and attempt to extract small bribes during transport
to detention facilities. There have also been cases of
military personnel harassing citizens or taking the law into
their own hands over personal disputes without being
disciplined or punished. The Government has spoken out
against these practices, but there have been few prosecutions
for them.
The press reports that prison conditions remain poor and that
the prison system is operating at 200 percent of capacity.
Conditions likely worsened from the large influx of new
detainees following the riots in May and June. The Government
has acknowledged overcrowding and has announced a program to
build new prisons, although little construction began in
1989. The combination of overcrowding, disease, and
malnutrition in prisons has resulted in a heavy death toll.
According to reputable press sources, the Ikoyi prison in
Lagos, housing 2,500 though designed for 800, recorded 42
deaths in the first 3 months of 1989 and over 300 deaths in
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NIGERIA
1988. Most Nigerian prisons have no toilet facilities and no
water in the cells. Press sources report that the Benin
prison has one water tap Cor its 800 prisoners. They are
often forced by overcrowding to sleep in shifts, crouched on
the cell floor. Prisoners often accuse underpaid prison
wardens of stealing food supplies. The insane, the diseased,
juveniles, convicts, and suspects are all housed in the same
cells .
The existence of a secret government prison on Ita Oka Island
was revealed in 1988 by the Nigerian Civil Liberties
Organization and was publicized by a leading Lagos newspaper.
The Government announced 10 days later that the facility had
been closed, but in 1989 there were new allegations that the
facility still houses prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Cumbersome administrative procedures and bureaucratic
inefficiency can result in persons suspected of criminal
offenses being held for extended periods without charge or
trial. This is so even though provisions of the 1979
Constitution still in force guarantee persons charged with
crimes a fair public trial in civilian courts within 3 months
of the date of arrest. Criminal justice officials, however,
freely admit that the system is so overburdened that the
3-month time limit is rarely met. A report was submitted to
the Attorney General in 1989 which included unpublished
recommendations for correcting these abuses. In December,
however, the Government abolished the criminal offense of
"wandering," a hold-over from colonial statutes designed to
exclude Nigerians from government-restricted areas. The
statute had been misused as a vagrancy law and an excuse for
police officers to detain persons without charge. On December
31, 1989, the FMG announced a broad amnesty of convicted
prisoners to alleviate greatly overcrowded prison conditions.
Certain high court chief judges continued in 1989 to exercise
their right to release detainees who have already spent more
time in prison than they would serve if convicted of the
crimes of which they are accused. However, human rights
activists claim that 60 percent or more of a prison population
of 58,000 are awaiting trial — often for many years--for
offenses that carry a sentence of 2 years or less.
The Babangida Government has retained the authority to detain
without charge persons suspected of acts prejudicial to state
security or harmful to the economic well-being of the country,
as well as those suspected of being a threat to the Government
under Decree 2 of 1984, the State Security (Detention of
Persons) Decree. This Decree suspends sections of the 1979
Constitution guaranteeing citizens the right to fair trial,
due process, and judicial determination of the legality of
detention (habeas corpus). While it imposes no time limit and
disallows challenges of the detention in a court of law, the
Decree provides for administrative review of such cases every
3 months .
Arrest authority under this Decree was expanded in 1989 and
was shared by the Chief of General Staff, the Minister of
Internal Affairs, and the Inspector-General of Police. The
Government showed a penchant for using Decree 2 arbitrarily to
detain persons it considered a threat to "public order"--which
critics charged too often meant simple opposition to key
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NIGERIA
government policies — for an indefinite period of time. Human
rights activists and lawyers groups sharply attacked the
Government on the issue of Decree 2 throughout 1989. The
Government, through its civilian Minister of Justice, publicly
defended the security merits of Decree 2 and claimed that the
Babangida regime has invoked it less often than the Buhari
regime or other previous military regimes using similar
decrees. Human rights observers, however, accused the
Government by its stance on Decree 2 of paying only lip
service to human rights. They claimed in late August that
there were currently about 90 persons detained under Decree 2,
80 of whom were in Lagos prisons.
The most celebrated Decree 2 case of 1989 was that of
outspoken government critic and Lagos lawyer. Chief Gani
Fawehinmi. Fawehinmi, with several other persons, was
arrested soon after the May/June riots, ostensibly for
attempting to organize a conference on alternatives to the
SAP. Soon after his arrest, Fawehinmi was transferred
clandestinely to a prison facility in Borno State. In
September, after 3 months of public outcry, Fawehinmi was
brought back to Lagos, charged with disrupting the transition
to civilian rule, granted bail, and immediately rearrested
under Decree 2 and returned to Borno State. In October 1989,
however, the FMG released Fawehinmi while awaiting trial.
Since he continued to speak out on political issues, there
were apparently no restrictions on his freedom of speech, and
his passport was restored to him.
In another highly publicized Decree 2 case, the FMG released
Alhaji Balarabe Musa, former governor of Kaduna State on
October 10 after 155 days of detention for unauthorized
political activity. Musa launched the People's Liberation
Party in May, even though he is banned from pplitics until
1992 (see Section 2.b.).
Many detainees are held on grounds other than Decree 2. Human
rights activists claim that detainees being held without
charge in connection with the May/June riots and as a result
of shortcomings in the administration of the criminal justice
system still numbered in the hundreds at the end of 1989 and
that the families of those still in jail or who have
"disappeared" in the system refuse to go public for fear of
arrest .
Tn 1989 the Government continued a process, begun in 1986, of
reviewing the cases of persons detained or convicted under
various decrees during the previous military administration
(1984-1985), many of whom have already been released. In
addition, all of those arrested as a result of the 1985 coup
which brought Babangida into power have been released,
including former Head of State Muhamadu Buhari and his
second-in-command, Tunde Idiagbon.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The 1984 Decree modifying the 1979 Constitution left the
judiciary relatively intact, but it shifted judicial
responsibility for certain specified offenses to special
military tribunals established outside the regular judicial
system. The latter is composed of both federal and state
courts and includes procedures for appeals from courts of
first instance to appeal courts at state levels, then to the
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NIGERIA
Federal Court of Appeal, and finally to the Federal Supreme
Court. Courts of first instance under the 1979 Constitution
include magistrate or district courts, customary or area
courts, religious or Shari'a courts, and, for some specified
cases, the state High Courts. In some instances, the nature
of the case determines which court has jurisdiction. In
principle, customary and Shari'a courts have jurisdiction only
if both the plaintiff and the defendant agree to it, though in
practice fear of legal costs, delay, and distance to other
alternative courts push a number of litigants into these
courts. Under the 1989 draft constitution (which is scheduled
to come into force in 1992) Shari'a (Islamic) courts are
limited to followers of Islam and effectively confined to the
11 northern states of Nigeria.
Trials in the regular court system are public and respect
certain constitutionally guaranteed individual rights. These
include a presumption of innocence, the right to be present at
a public trial, to confront witnesses and present evidence,
and to be represented by legal counsel, if so desired. In
capital cases, the Government provides counsel for indigent
defendants. In other cases, indigents must rely for counsel
on the Nigerian legal aid council, which has limited
resources. Assistance is extended under the Legal Aid Act of
1976 to persons with incomes of up to about $200 (at the
current official rate of exchange) per year. There is legal
provision for bail, though the Nigerian Bar Association
charges that bail is underutilized with the result that many
accused persons remain in jail while awaiting trial for petty
offenses. Bail is denied to those charged with murder and
armed robbery.
The AFRC has weakened the regular court system through decrees
promulgated by the previous military government that are still
in effect. Under these decrees, the AFRC has transferred
jurisdiction over cases involving corruption, currency
violations, armed robbery, and a variety of miscellaneous
offenses, such as drug trafficking and illegal oil bunkering,
from the civilian judicial system to special military
tribunals. In these cases, those charged have access to legal
assistance, bail (except in the case of armed robbery), and
the right to appeal (except in the case of armed robbery and
conviction under the civil disturbances decree). In contrast
to the previous regime, however, civilian judges now head all
special tribunals. Military and police officers sit on these
tribunals as coequals with the judge. Sentences by these
special tribunals are generally severe. Convictions for armed
robbery by the Special Robbery and Firearms Tribunals carry
the death sentence and no right of appeal, although the
sentence must be confirmed by the state's military governor
before it is carried out. Conviction under the Treason and
Other Offenses Tribunal (formed in 1986) also carries the
death sentence and provides for appeal only to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The Special Appeal Tribunal began its first
hearing in September 1987. Its recommendations cannot be
appealed but are subject to AFRC confirmation.
Legal observers have been particularly critical of the
mandatory death penalty without right of appeal, especially
for convictions for armed robbery where the sums involved are
minor and there appear to be irregularities in procedure.
Armed robbers have been sentenced to death for stealing sums
as small as about $40. Amnesty International, in its 1989
Report, asserted that these special courts do not meet
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international standards for a fair trial, especially because
they do not allow the right of appeal.
Judicial convictions for political offenses (as opposed to
detentions) are rare in Nigeria. Some observers claim that
there are political prisoners in Nigerian jails, but can give
no numbers and often make no distinction between those
detainees held without charge and those convicted of political
offenses .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Nigerian society is generally free of arbitrary interference
by the State in the private lives of its citizens. Provisions
of the 1979 Constitution still in force provide for rights of
privacy in the home, correspondence, and oral electronic
communications. While there have been isolated instances of
unauthorized forced entry by security elements, the State does
not carry out general surveillance of the population.
However, in the aftermath of the May/June riots, the wife of
the editor of The Republic newspaper was arrested in her home
and the dwelling unlawfully searched when security forces
failed to locate him for arrest. Human rights observers also
alleged that government security forces intimidated potential
witnesses after the May/June riots to prevent them from giving
details on human rights violations by threatening arbitrary
search and arrest. Such allegations, however, were
unsubstantiated.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The issue of police brutality was a major focus of the press
and human rights activists in the aftermath of the May/June
1989 riots in many parts of Nigeria. Security forces
responded with force, killing at least 22 persons nationwide
according to official reports. Human rights observers claim
the death toll was much higher--over 200 by some estimates.
In one highly publicized incident, police forces allegedly
rounded up several hundred persons on the street in Ketu, a
Lagos borough, and transported them to the nearby police
station where many were forced into a small cell. Up to 50
persons reportedly died from suffocation and being crushed.
Despite the widespread publicity, no source could verify these
claims. The Government conducted an investigation, placing
the station's superintendent on administrative leave. He was
later cleared and transferred.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The modified 1979 Constitution continues to provide for
freedom of speech and the press, but it also reserves for the
federal and state governments the exclusive right to own and
operate radio and television stations. There are no
restrictions on ownership of print media and Nigeria has a
lively press. Among the many Nigerian daily newspapers are
seven privately owned national dailies with large
circulations, one daily owned by the federal Government, and
another in which the federal Government owns a majority
share. Many states operate their own daily or weekly
newspapers. In some states privately owned dailies compete
274
with state papers. Six weekly news magazines vie for national
readership.
Broad criticism of the Government is tolerated, and there is
open discussion of political, social, and economic issues.
However, officials frequently caution journalists, both
publicly and privately, on their responsibility and the limits
on press activity. Although there are no published guidelines
or decrees that limit freedom of speech and the press, most
journalists make a well-considered decision in advance of
publication before they step over what they sense to be the
Government's line. The issues considered most sensitive by
the Government are normally associated with naming top
government officials in connection with corruption,
publication of subjects the Government believes will incite
the public to riot or otherwise undermine state security, and
subjects which fall under "disrupting the transition to civil
rule program." As a result, journalists maintain that
self-censorship is common.
In 1989 federal and state governments continued to arrest,
interrogate, and detain individuals who made, or were
preparing to make, public statements the Government considered
threatening. The arrest in June 1989 of Chief Gani Fawehinmi
and several others (noted in Section l.d.) is an example.
Also in June, The Republic newspaper editor and 12 staff
members were arrested and the newspaper closed to prevent
distribution of an issue reportedly containing an expose of
the illegal financial transactions of the Chief of General
Staff. All copies of the issue were confiscated on the
grounds that it included material which was "offensive to the
nation." All detainees were subsequently released and the
newspaper allowed to resume publication within several days.
Other journalists were detained and several newspapers
temporarily closed throughout 1989; all have subsequently been
released and the affected newspapers have resumed publication.
Academic freedom is generally respected by the Babangida
Government. There were no reports of censorship of books or
other academic publications in 1989 or of intimidation of
university faculty. Some observers allege that the State
Security Service maintains an active undercover presence on
university campuses and reports directly to the Government on
acts or attitudes deemed to threaten state security.
The National Association of Nigerian Students and the Academic
Staff Union of Universities remain banned for "radical
activities." However, the Government has tolerated formation
of new organs of student government on individual campuses.
University vice-chancellors are held directly responsible for
maintenance of public order on campuses and are given broad
authority to close universities. Such closures were
commonplace in 1989 in response to a spate of violent student
demonstrations over campus conditions. In May and June 1989,
the focus of student protests turned to government corruption
and the SAP. In response, the Government announced the
closure of six southern universities for a full academic year,
then later reversed itself, allowing the campuses to reopen on
October 31.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Nigeria's 1979 Constitution assures all citizens the right to
assemble freely and to associate with other persons in
political parties, trade unions, or other special interest
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NIGERIA
associations. Permits are not normally required for public
meetings indoors, unless administrative approval is needed to
use a government facility. Permits are required in many areas
for outdoor gatherings, but the requirement is routinely
ignored by both the authorities and the organizations holding
the meeting or rally. In a few isolated incidents in 1989
security forces broke up public meetings for lack of a permit
when the Government found the subject matter of the meeting
objectionable or threatening — namely criticism of the SAP. In
most states, open-air religious services outside a church or a
mosque continue to be prohibited.
The provision regarding the right to form and join political
parties was suspended by Decree 9 of 1984. The decree-imposed
ban on political activity was lifted in May 1989 in the run-up
to registration of the two national political parties in
October 1989. However, hundreds of present and former
government officials and politicians remain banned from
running for elective office in the local, state and federal
elections scheduled for 1990-1992. Nevertheless, the
Government often turns a blind eye to their participation in
political events, provided they remain discreet and do not
openly challenge the government Decree.
Before the ban was lifted in May 1989, the police broke up
several gatherings suspected to be political in nature.
Several persons, including former Kaduna State governor
Balarabe Musa, were arrested for violating the ban on
political activity and held under Decree 2. In Musa's case,
the Government also claims that he is a banned politician by
virtue of his former office, though no comprehensive list of
all banned politicians has been published, and the definition
of "banned politicians" is vague. After a prolonged court
battle over both accusations against Musa (violation of the
ban on political activity and status of a banned politician),
the case was dropped, apparently on a technicality, although
the FMG continues to maintain that Musa is a banned politician.
Nigerians form and participate in a wide variety of special
interest organizations, including religious groups, trade
groups, women's organizations, and professional associations.
Organizations are not required to register with the Government
and are generally permitted free association with other
national and international bodies. Following the March 1987
religious disturbances, however, the Government required that
religious groups be sanctioned by either the Christian
Association of Nigeria or the Supreme Council for Islamic
Affairs .
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Nigeria's 1979 Constitution prohibits the federal and state
governments from adopting any state religion. This is adhered
to in practice, though some Christians have maintained in the
past that Islam or northern origin have provided a political
advantage. Constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of
religious belief, religious practice, and religious education
are generally respected. Reports are common that various
ethnic groups (including local and state officials belonging
to that group) discriminate against minorities (both ethnic
and religious) . Such actions often take the form of
employment discrimination and bureaucratic obstacles to church
276
NIGERIA
or mosque construction that delay projects, sometimes
indefinitely. There are no restrictions on the numbers of
clergy trained nor on contacts with coreligionists in other
countries. Religious travel, including the hajj, is permitted
and is even subsidized by the Federal Government.
Publications in Arabic and the teaching of Arabic are freely
allowed, even in predominantly Christian areas. Missionaries
and foreign clergy, though limited by quotas, are permitted to
work in Nigeria. The Government places no obstacles in the
way of Nigerian missionaries working in other countries.
Tensions between the Muslim and Christian communities remain
high in some parts of Nigeria. Though scattered incidents
continue to be reported, religious violence on the scale of
the rioting which took place in the northern state of Kaduna
in 1987 has not been repeated. In the aftermath of those
disturbances, the Government instituted a ban, still in
effect, on all religious organizations on postprimary
campuses, while reaffirming the right of individual students
to practice their religion in recognized places of worship.
Several state governments temporarily banned religious
preaching and playing of religious cassettes outside places of
worship, without the written permission of police.
Publication of advertisements paid for by religious
organizations remains banned, although the ban is not strictly
enforced as such advertisements occasionally appear in the
press. Religious programming on radio and television, both
controlled by the FMG, remains limited in some areas. The
1982 ban on the Maitatsine Muslim sect, the source of bloody
disturbances in 1982 and 1983, also remains in effect. The
group still exists but is closely monitored by the police.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Nigeria's Constitution entitles citizens to move freely
throughout Nigeria and to reside where they wish. The same
provision prohibits expulsion from Nigeria or the denial of
entry to or exit from Nigeria to any citizen. In general,
these provisions have been observed. Following the elections
in December 1987 and March 1988, chairmen of local government
areas were ordered in June 1988 to inform their respective
state governors of travel outside of their areas. Traditional
rulers are also obligated to inform local government chairmen
of their travel. Nigerians travel abroad in large numbers,
and many thousands are studying abroad. Exit visas are not
required. But passports of editors and reporters have been
seized to prevent them from traveling after their publications
have printed stories offensive to the Government. Also, under
Nigerian law, wives--including expatriate wives--must have the
permission of husbands to take children out of the country.
Security officials in the past have prevented wives from
leaving the country with children, but there were no reports
of such interference in 1989. Citizens who leave Nigeria have
the right to return. Citizenship cannot be revoked for any
reason, including political reasons. No known penalties have
been levied on Nigerians who have emigrated, settled abroad,
or acquired another nationality. However, Nigeria does not
recognize dual nationality, and naturalization in another
country does not exempt Nigerians from Nigerian laws.
Nigerians are free to change their place of work within
Nigeria, but local laws and custom sometimes disadvantage
citizens not indigenous to the area. For example, access to
limited places in elementary and secondary schools is more
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NIGERIA
difficult for children of residents of other areas who must
also pay higher school fees than the children of local
residents. There has been no forced resettlement of Nigerian
citizens .
Nigerian law and practice permit temporary refuge and asylum
in Nigeria for political refugees from other countries.
Nigeria supports and cooperates with the Lagos office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) .
Repatriation of refugees is normally conducted in accordance
with UNHCR standards. In 1989 several hundred Chadian
refugees were repatriated at their request. No refugees were
expelled in 1989.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The 19-member AFRC headed by President Babangida is the
highest political authority in Nigeria. There is no elected
legislative body. In 1989 citizens did not have the right to
change their national or state governments through the
electoral process.
President Babangida has repeatedly stated that 1992 is the
date for returning Nigeria to complete civilian rule. An
appointed civilian Constitutional Review Commission completed
its work in early 1988 and in April presented a draft
constitution to the AFRC. In June 1988, the Constituent
Assembly, made up of representatives elected by Local
Government Areas (basic government units) and including
representatives of special groups (labor, women, religious
leaders) appointed by the Government, began the process of
refining and ratifying the Constitution in Abuja. The
Constituent Assembly presented its recommendations and a
revised draft to the Government in March 1989. Following AFRC
approval of the new draft constitution, the FMG lifted the ban
on political activity in May 1989 to allow political groups to
form and compete for registration of two national political
parties. Thirteen political associations emerged to compete
for party registration.
In August 1989, the FMG by decree removed from office all
elected chairmen of Local Government Areas to prepare for the
new local government elections originally scheduled for
December 1989. This decree established that during the period
of transition to civilian rule, the Federal Military
Government may suspend elected officials without reference to
the judicial system.
In October 1989, the National Electoral Commission (NEC)
reported to the AFRC that the emerging political structure was
riddled with irregularities and that none of the 13 political
associations met the guidelines for party registration. The
NEC concluded that the party registration competition had
failed to meet its objective of transforming Nigeria's
political culture by creating a "new breed" of politicians
free from control of the "moneybags" and regional, ethnic, and
religious bias. On October 7, President Babangida abolished
all 13 political associations and announced that the FMG would
create two new political parties: one "slightly to the left"
and one "slightly to the right." In December 1989, the FMG
enacted a decree establishing the new political parties and
signaling its intention to maintain strict control over the
transition process. Another December decree upheld com.pletion
of the transition by October 1992 but altered its timetable by
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NIGERIA
allowing the two new parties to coalesce and identify
candidates during the first 9 months of 1990, postponing local
elections from December 1989 until the last quarter of 1990
and delaying gubernatorial and state legislative elections
from 1990 until the fourth quarter of 1991.
Thousands of former Nigerian government officials, both
civilian and military, are prohibited from participating fully
in the transition process, although they remain eligible to
vote. In September 1987, the Government significantly
extended a ban announced in 1986 on partisan political
activity for a large number of former politicians from the
last civilian regime (1979-83) to include many political
figures from the first civilian republic (1960-66) and past
and present high-ranking military leaders. These persons,
including President Babangida himself, will be barred from
contesting any election until after the transition is
completed in 1992. Also, former politicians who were officers
of the previous parties will be forbidden to hold office in
any political party or to run for elected office until that
time. Furthermore, any person convicted or removed from
office for various misdeeds at any time since 1960 will be
banned for life from contesting elections or holding any
political party office.
Along with the July 1987 announcement of the political
transition program, the Government promulgated Decree 19 of
1987, which makes persons who might in any way forestall or
prejudice the transition program liable to a prison term of up
to 5 years. The Special Tribunal authorized to try offenses
under Decree 19 was formed in October 1987. Its decisions may
be appealed to the Special Appeal Tribunal.
The composition of the AFRC and Cabinet reflects greater
ethnic and religious diversity than any government in the
recent past.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
As far as is known, there were no visits or requests for
investigations of alleged human rights violations in Nigeria
during 1989 by any international human rights group. The
Babangida Government repeatedly renewed its pledge to uphold
basic human rights and to tolerate criticism from local human
rights advocates in 1989. The Human Rights Committee of the
Nigerian Bar Association monitors the domestic human rights
situation and characteristically speaks out against human
rights abuses. At least four major local groups are active in
human rights matters: the Committee for the Defense of Human
Rights, led by a prominent Lagos physician; the Nigerian
Council for Human Rights, chaired by a leading Senior Advocate
of Nigeria (SAN); Human Rights Africa, led by a prominent
Lagos lawyer and President of the Nigerian Trial Lawyers
Association; and the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) , led
by several Lagos attorneys and a prominent journalist. Nobel
laureate Wole Soyinka also frequently speaks out on human
rights issues. The Nigerian Bar Association, Soyinka, and
leaders of all four human rights groups all made strong public
statements criticizing the Government's continued use of
Decree 2 and other forms of detention without charge. A
former president of the Nigerian Bar Association, who also
served as the chairman of its Human Rights Committee,
continues to hold the post of Attorney General and Minister of
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NIGERIA
Justice. He has been severely criticized by human rights
activists for his defense of Decree 2.
While most human rights monitors were relatively free from
government interference in 1989, four officers of CLO were
briefly questioned by police in January 1989 about a CLO
report on the status of human rights in Nigeria, but no action
was taken against them. The CLO continues to investigate
prison conditions and monitors developments at the Ita Oko
Island detention center, in addition to speaking out against
Decree 2. Nigeria is a member of the U.N. Human Rights
Commission.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no official policy of discrimination against any of
Nigeria's 250 ethnic groups, and laws do not overtly favor one
group over another. The Government generally makes a
conscious effort "to strike a balance among different groups in
its decisionmaking and in appointments to key government
positions, and ethnic and regional hiring quotas are observed
in most public sector employment. However, Nigeria has a long
history of tension among its diverse ethnic groups, and
tradition continues to impose considerable pressure on
individual government officials to favor their own ethnic or
religious group. Religious and ethnic favoritism or
harassment persist and are widely perceived to persist.
Persons not indigenous to their state of residence frequently
experience difficulty in jobseeking, school enrollment, and
other areas.
Women have always had economic power and have exerted
influence in Nigerian society through women's councils or
through their family connections. As primary school
enrollment increases, women are gaining greater access to
education. There has been a dramatic increase in the number
of women who have university degrees and who have become
professionals, including teachers, lawyers, doctors, judges,
senior government officials, media figures, and business
executives. Despite a degree of economic independence, women
suffer discrimination in employment and other areas, and
experience social prejudice. The pattern of discrimination
against women varies according to the ethnic and religious
diversity of Nigeria's vast population. In some states,
husbands can prevent their wives from -obtaining employment or
passports. In many states, a widow cannot inherit her
husband's property, which in the absence of children usually
reverts to the husband's family. Women do not receive equal
pay for equal work, and male professionals receive fringe
benefits not extended to their female counterparts.
While violence against women, especially wife beating, exists,
there are no statistical data to help determine the extent of
the problem. Police do not normally intervene in domestic
disputes. Reports of wife beating tend to come from rural
areas, where women are generally uneducated and the use of the
legal system to protect themselves is a foreign concept and
unlikely to be used because of pressure from traditional
authorities. The Government has neither actively addressed
nor sanctioned this practice, which is subject to the
provisions of criminal law if brought to the courts. There is
no reason to believe that the legal system would not intervene
to protect women from wife abuse if a husband were formally
accused. In the case of female circumcision, the Government
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mOEElA
publicly opposes this practice, which reportedly affects about
50 percent of the female population. The most dangerous form,
inf ibulation, is practiced in some areas. However, because of
the deep cultural roots of this practice, the Government has
relied primarily on education through women's and public
health organizations to help induce change in attitudes,
rather than trying to criminalize the practice. The
Government also opposes the selling of young girls for
marriage by poor rural families, again primarily through
education.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Nigerian workers may join trade unions, with the exception of
members of the armed forces and employees of government
services designated essential by the FMG . Employers are
obliged by law to recognize trade unions and must pay a dues
checkoff for employees who are members of a registered trade
union. In 1981 organized labor claimed 3 million members out
of a total work force of 30 million. Since then, the
available work force has increased as the population has
grown, while trade union membership has probably declined due
to low economic growth.
While the trade union movement has had, within limits,
considerable latitude for action, it is subject to government
oversight, which has increased during the past 2 years.
Despite provisions in the 1979 Constitution and Nigeria's
ratification of 28 International Labor Organization (ILO)
conventions, government decrees and policy continue to
restrict labor freedoms. A 1978 decree established a single
central labor body, the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) , created
42 industrial unions through forced mergers and deregistered
all other unions. Since then the Government has publicly
announced its intention to merge the present 42 unions into
19. The Government has not acted upon an ILO Committee of
Experts' finding, first enunciated in 1979 and subsequently
repeated, that this 1978 decree violates ILO Convention 87 on
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organize, to which Nigeria is a party. Nor has the Government
accepted the Committee of Experts' recommendation that the
decree be amended.
In December 1988, elections were held for NLC national and
state councils to replace the councils which had been
dissolved by the Government earlier in the year. The
Government permitted only a single slate of candidates
acceptable to the Government, comprised of members of the two
major NLC factions, to run in the national council election.
The other candidates who attempted to run were disqualified.
The right to strike is recognized by law, except in the case
of essential services as defined by the Government. Work
stoppages, strikes, and protests during 1989 were relatively
few and focused primarily upon pay issues. In February
railway workers went on strike, for the second time in 3
months, to collect back wages and allowances owed them; the
strike ended when the railway authorities paid the arrears.
At about the same time eight civil service unions threatened
mass rallies to support their demand for restoration of fringe
benefits which had been canceled or reduced by the 1989
budget. The Government responded by making funds available to
restore the benefits.
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NIGERIA
Since 1975, government policy has permitted international
labor affiliation only with the Organization of African Trade
Union Unity and affiliated Pan-African labor federations.
Government policy does permit, however, informal "fraternal
relations" with foreign unions and international trade
secretariats as long as there is no formal affiliation.
Eleven senior employees of the National Electric Power
Authority remain in prison, their life sentences reduced to 10
years, for conspiracy in connection with the October 1988
disruption of the national electrical power grid. For a
number of years the ILO Committee of Experts has urged the
Government to amend its legislation to cover various
categories of workers excluded from protection against acts of
antiunion discrimination.
Labor unions did not participate in the May 1989 protests and
riots against the Government's Structural Adjustment Program.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The labor laws of Nigeria permit both the right to organize
and the right to bargain collectively between management and
trade unions. Collective bargaining is, in fact, common in
many sectors of the economy. Nigerian law further protects
workers against retaliation by employers for labor activity
through an independent arm of the judiciary, the Nigerian
Industrial Court.
The FMG, however, retains broad authority over labor matters.
In many areas of contention, the unions often take their
demands directly to FMG authorities rather than to the
employers. At the same time, the FMG can intervene forcefully
to end debate on issues which its feels contravene the
Government's essential political or economic programs. (The
dispersal of the labor-organized conference on alternatives to
the SAP, which led to the arrest of Gani Fawehinmi--Section
l.d., is a case in point.) Moreover, decisions which have a
major impact on labor are often taken unilaterally. NLC
President Bafyau complained, for example, that his
organization was excluded from the formulation of the 1989
budget, which, in effect, mandated continued austerity for
most workers and included a variety of cost cutting measures
of concern to the unions.
There are no export processing zones in Nigeria.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Nigeria's 1979 Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory
labor, and this prohibition is generally observed. The
Government does operate a National Youth Service Corps under
which all youths or young adults who have completed college or
university training and are under the age of 30 must complete
1 year of work in jobs ranging from agriculture to office work
and teaching. The Government also has an environmental
clean-up campaign in which all citizens are required to spend
the morning of the final Saturday of each month tidying their
house, yard, and neighborhood and to refrain from moving about
during this period. Both programs enjoy widespread public
support .
The ILO Committee of Experts has noted that various provisions
of the Labor Decree of 1974, the Merchant Shipping Act, and
the Trade Disputes Decree of 1976 impose sanctions that
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NIGERIA
obligate work for breaches of labor discipline or for taking
part in a strike. The Committee has urged the Government to
adopt the necessary measures to bring these laws into
compliance with ILO Convention 105 on Forced Labor to which
Nigeria is a party.
d. Minimum Age of Employment of Children
Nigeria's 1974 Labor Decree prohibits employment of children
under 15 years of age in commerce and industry and restricts
other child labor to home-based agricultural or domestic
work. The Labor Decree does allow the apprenticeship of
youths aged 13 to 15, but only under specific conditions.
Apprenticeship exists in a wide range of crafts, trades and
state enterprises. With respect to apprentices over the age
of 15, their activity is not specifically regulated by the
Government. These laws are enforced only sporadically,
particularly in the rural areas where most Nigerians live.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Nigeria's 1974 Labor Decree also established a 40-hour
workweek, prescribed 2 to 4 weeks of annual leave, and set a
minimum wage for commerce and industry of about $17 per month
at the current official rate of exchange but at the time of
enactment worth nearly $200 per month. This wage is now
sufficient only for the most minimal standard of living in the
cities, and the Nigeria Labour Congress has called on the
Government to increase it. The 1974 Decree contains general
health and safety provisions, some aimed specifically at young
and female workers, enforceable by the Ministry of Employment,
Labour, and Productivity. Employers must compensate injured
workers and dependent survivors of those killed in industrial
accidents. The ineffectiveness of the Ministry in enforcing
these laws in the workplace is regularly criticized by labor
unions .
283
RWANDA
Rwanda is a one-party state which has been ruled by Major
General Juvenal Habyarimana since his accession to power in a
nonviolent coup in 1973. Founder of the single party, the
National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) ,
Habyarimana was reelected for another 5-year term as President
in December 1988 by nearly 99 percent of the electorate. The
President sets government policy after consultation with the
Council of Ministers. The National Development Council (the
legislature), established in 1982, votes on and adopts laws
but is not independent from the MRND. Legislative candidates
must be approved by the party, which normally approves two
candidates per seat.
The major organizations responsible for administration of
justice include the Ministry of Justice, which organizes and
administers the prison system, the judicial police, which is
composed of employees of several ministries who are
responsible for apprehending criminals, collecting evidence,'
and maintaining case records, and the gendarmerie, a special
branch of the Rwandan armed forces. In addition, the Central
Intelligence Service in the office of the President can make
certain decisions, such as denial of passports to Rwandan
citizens or the extension of visas and residence permits to
foreigners. These decisions may be appealed directly to the
President .
The overwhelming majority of Rwandans are poor subsistence
farmers. There is little industry, and imports are expensive
because of the high cost of transport to this landlocked
country. Food production has managed to keep pace with the
high population growth rate. Rwanda's economy depends
heavily on foreign aid and on exports of coffee and tea. The
Government has a liberal policy toward trade and investment.
Although human rights continued to be restricted in 1989, some
progress was made: the Government held a national conference
of magistrates and judges to discuss improving the
administration of justice; and organized an international
conference on the observance of human rights in Africa.
President Habyarimana released nearly 25 percent of the 13,000
prisoners in Rwandan jails, reduced many sentences, and
changed all death sentences to life imprisonment. Prisoners
guilty of crimes against national security, corruption, or
multiple offenses were not included. In 1989 there remained
several major human rights concerns, including the use of
long-term detention in political and security cases without
charge or trial and restrictions on the freedoms of religion,
speech, association, and the right of citizens to change their
government .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There was no evidence of politically motivated killing at
government instigation in 1989. In May 1988, an army sergeant
accused of the murder of a prominent colonel reportedly died
during interrogation by military and security authorities.
Subsequently, three officers were arrested in connection with
the case. These officers remained in prison at the end of
1989 awaiting the outcome of an ongoing judicial inquest.
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RWANDA
b. Disappearance
There were no unexplained disappearances in 1989.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no reports of torture or other cruel, inhuman
treatment in 1989. Prison conditions continued to improve in
1989 as part of a major reform program instituted by the
former Minister of Justice.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Except for suspects caught in the act of committing crimes,
arrests are normally made with a warrant following an
investigation. Persons may be detained for no more than 48
hours without a warrant. There were no known exceptions in
1989 to the legally mandated warrant procedures. In most
cases, charges must be stated formally in the defendant's
presence within 5 days of arrest. Failure to meet this
requirement constitutes grounds for dismissal of the charges.
In practice criminal offenders arrested by judicial
authorities are not imprisoned without arrest warrants and
formal arraignment. Persons arrested by Rwandan security
forces for political crimes may in fact be detained
indefinitely without being formally charged (see Section 1 e.).
Under broad preventive detention provisions, persons may be
held for 30 days if public safety is believed to be
threatened, if the accused might flee, or if the penalty
carries a minimum sentence of 6 months. At the end of that
period, judicial review is mandatory. Detention may be
prolonged indefinitely for 30-day periods. Persons charged
with serious crimes often wait 6 months before trial.
Detainees may appeal their incarceration, and the appeal must
be heard within 24 hours by a competent judicial authority.
Ministry of Justice personnel conduct daily official visits to
prisons to assure that proper documentation exists for each
detainee. These officials can order detainees released if
arrest conditions do not conform to the law.
Rwandan security forces occasionally employ arbitrary arrest
and detention on political or security grounds. Most
detentions are short-term, often for less than 24 hours. In
January 1988, two associates of a Rwandan exile who had been
implicated in a 1980 coup attempt were arrested and held
without charge or judicial review. They remained in prison
without charge in 1989. The security authorities arrested in
May another Rwandan accused of involvement in the 1980 coup
attempt and held him throughout the year pending completion of
an investigation.
Exile is not practiced. With regard to forced or compulsory
labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Rwanda has three separate court systems for criminal/civil,
military, and state security cases. All but security cases
ultimately may be appealed to the Court of Appeals. Convicted
criminals must file an appeal within 3 months of the date of
judgment. The State Security Court has jurisdiction over
national security charges such as treason. Decisions of this
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Court may not be appealed before the Court of Appeals. If
procedural violations are alleged in security cases, these may
be brought before the Court of Cassation. If the Court of
Cassation finds that procedural violations occurred, the case
is sent back to the State Security Court and tried by a
different panel of judges.
The judiciary is statutorily independent and expected to apply
the penal code impartially, but in practice the Government
exercises influence in political and security cases. The
President appoints and dismisses magistrates. Laws passed in
1982 strengthened the independence of the judiciary by
improving the process of selecting judicial personnel and more
closely defining their functions. The administration of
justice has been hampered by poor management and a generally
low level of education among civil servants. The Ministry of
Justice conducts training programs for officials and judges
and plans to establish a magistrate training center. In 1989
approximately 70 of the top judges and prosecutors attended a
magistrates' workshop organized by the Ministry of Justice.
All defendants are constitutionally entitled to counsel, but
because of a shortage of lawyers (there are only about 20
private lawyers in Rwanda, most of whom work in Kigali),
defendants normally are not represented at trial. Family and
other nonprofessional advisors are permitted. Trials are
public, and those which arouse extensive public interest are
often broadcast to the street to permit persons who cannot be
seated in the courtroom to follow the proceedings. Persons
charged with minor crimes usually are released on their own
recognizance pending trial.
Bail is not available in Rwandan law. The majority of
Rwandans awaiting trial or sentencing enjoy "liberte
provisoire," or provisional release, which is routinely
granted provided that the defendant is not likely to flee
justice, has a fixed residence, and is not likely to harm or
be harmed by the public. A Rwandan awaiting trial or
sentencing in prison may petition the court for provisional
release. In the Kigali court district, approximately 85
percent of all prisoners awaiting trial or sentencing receive
provisional release.
At the end of 1989, Rwanda was holding three political
prisoners who allegedly are close to an exiled minister
implicated in a 1980 coup attempt. Dr Aloys Sebiziga, a
medical doctor, has been detained in Kigali prison since May
1989 for allegedly supplying medicines and funds to Col.
Alexis Kanyarengwe, a former Minister of the Interior, who is
currently in self-imposed exile in Tanzania. Dr. Sebigiza has
not been formally charged with any crimes, nor has a date been
set for trial. In addition to Sebigiza, Callixte
Sinaruhamagaye and Claude Bahitansi, the brother and a close
friend of the former Minister, have been detained in Kigali
prison without charges since January 1988.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Although Rwandan law forbids arbitrary searches, Rwandans are
subject to occasional interference in their private lives.
Police normally are required to have warrants before entering
a private residence, but, using the pretext of checking
required documentation, authorities in practice gain entry
into homes without warrants. There is no evidence that the
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Government monitors private correspondence, and the receipt of
foreign publications is permitted.
All Rwandans are required to be members of the MRND and to pay
party dues.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The law theoretically guarantees freedom of speech and press,
but these statutory assurances are not observed. Open
criticism of government policies and officials is rare,
although in 1989 published criticism of state-managed
industries was not uncommon. Candidates in the 1988
legislative elections were restricted to expressing opinions
and advocating policies consistent with party doctrine.
Members of the National Development Council in the past have
criticized government policies from the floor of the Council.
The Government controls radio broadcasting (the most important
medium in reaching the public since there is no functioning
television system in Rwanda) and produces a daily press
bulletin and a weekly newspaper. Two Catholic church
publications sometimes print muted criticism of political and
economic conditions. Such criticism is tolerated and
occasionally even encouraged by the Government. There is no
record of any journalist having been arrested for what he has
written. The Government has cautioned the press to avoid what
it regards as "harmful" criticism of leaders. It maintains
that the press should devote its efforts to "promoting
development." Books and imported publications are not
censored. Academic freedom is limited, but there were no
known incidents in 1989 involving restrictions on academic
freedom of inquiry and research at the university.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly is limited. No public meetings or
demonstrations are permitted if there is any chance they will
result in expressions of overt opposition to government
policies. The Government permits private associations, but it
requires that they be registered officially and accorded legal
recognition.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in the Constitution, but
the Government continues to discriminate against, and local
officials harass, several small groups, including the
Jehovah's Witnesses. The Government denied the Witnesses'
request for legal recognition in October 1988 on the grounds
that they constitute a threat to law and order and disturb the
peace. Government officials have said that the Witnesses'
right to practice their religion will not be otherwise impeded
(see Section 5) .
Foreign clergy are able to practice their religion and
organize missionary activities. Worship is freely permitted,
and Christian churches are numerous. There are several
mosques in the capital and elsewhere; Muslims are permitted to
practice their religion throughout the republic.
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The population is 70 percent Christian and approximately four
percent Muslim, with the remainder following traditional
African or no religious practices. Probably 80 percent of the
Christians are Roman Catholic, but Protestant denominations
are active. The Government depends upon church-sponsored
schools for a considerable portion of education in Rwanda
(over 85 percent of secondary schools are church-sponsored).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement and residence within Rwanda is restricted
by laws and regulations which require all residents to hold
national identity cards and residence and work permits.
People who wish to spend more than 3 days in a township other
than their own must obtain permission from the authorities of
the area they will be visiting. Police conduct periodic
checks, especially in urban areas, and return all those not
registered in the locality to their own township. Property
owners who do not require tenants to show valid documentation
are subject to fines and even imprisonment. Undocumented
tenants are subject to expulsion.
A major deterrent to foreign travel was eliminated in 1987,
when the Government abolished the requirement for posting
substantial deposits (as much as $600) with passport
applications. Citizens now need only pay a $20 nonrefundable
fee for a passport, but they still must apply for and receive
an exit visa before undertaking foreign travel. The exit visa
process involves a security check conducted by the Central
Intelligence Service. Unexplained refusals appear to be less
frequent than in the past. Properly documented Rwandans may
emigrate.
There are an estimated 225,000 Rwandan refugees in neighboring
countries. Most are ethnic Tutsis who fled Rwanda during the
revolution of 1959 and subsequent ethnic violence associated
with independence in 1962. Official policy permits these
people to be repatriated on a case by case basis if the
refugee does not represent a security risk, and if land is
available in Rwanda. The lack of land in this tiny and
heavily populated country effectively precludes any
significant repatriation. The Government's stated view is
±hat demographic pressures and strained economic resources
preclude any large-scale return of these refugees. It has
encouraged countries hosting the refugees to naturalize them;
±his has not been well received by Rwanda's neighbors.
Despite these difficulties, in 1989 approximately 50 refugees
returned to Rwanda from Burundi, although many more reportedly
returned outside official channels.
Rwanda hosts 19,000 Burundi refugees (mainly Hutu) who fled
the 1972 massacres. In mid-1988, 47,000 Burundi nationals
fleeing ethnic violence again sought refuge in Rwanda. The
Rwandan Government refused to accord official refugee status
to this latest group but did grant temporary asylum. Rwanda
has received widespread praise for its efforts to meet the
temporary humanitarian needs of these refugees. Most of them
returned voluntarily to Burundi by the end of 1988 as the
result of a procedure negotiated by a quadripartite group
composed of Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees. In late 1989, there were
approximately 1,200 Burundi refugees remaining in Rwanda.
Nine hundred were from the August 1988 influx, and about 300
arrived from the same area of Burundi in October 1989,
apparently as a result of an isolated incident.
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Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Rwandans have no opportunity to change their government
through democratic means. The MRND, the sole body permitted
political activity, makes all policy decisions and nominates
all candidates for public office. It, in turn, is dominated
by the President who also holds the position of president of
the MRND. He chooses the Central Committee members and is the
only constitutionally recognized candidate for President.
Every citizen is automatically a party member and is required
to pay party dues representing 2 days' pay per year.
Delegates are both elected and appointed to the Party's
governing national congress, which meets every 2 years. The
essential function of the congress is to endorse the programs
presented by the party leadership. The 1988 congress rejected
calls for the election of local party officials by secret
ballot rather than the raising of hands.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Rwanda cooperates with visiting delegations from such human
rights groups as Amnesty International (AI) and the
International Committee of the Red Cross. U.S. Embassy
officials visited Kigali prison to inspect conditions and
interview political prisoners on several occasions in 1989.
There were no reports of requests for outside investigations
of alleged human rights violations in 1989. The Ministry of
Justice hosted an international conference on human rights in
March which was attended by representatives from all
neighboring countries as well as representatives from the
United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and AI .
The conference focused on the observance of human rights in
central Africa.
There are no local organizations monitoring and reporting on
human rights practices in Rwanda.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
In 1959 the majority Hutu ethnic group (89 percent of the
population, according to the 1978 census) overthrew the Tutsi
monarchy. In 1962 Belgium granted internal autonomy and then
independence to a Hutu-led government which overwhelmingly won
a U.N. -supervised election. These developments marked the end
of the traditional, feudal society in which the Hutu had lived
in subjugation under the Tutsi for centuries, and the
beginning of a more modern society that places greater
emphasis on individual rights.
The Constitution states that "all citizens are equal before
the law, without any discrimination, notably that of race,
color, origin, ethnicity, clan, sex, opinion, religion, or
social position." The legal requirement that ethnic origin be
listed on identity documents serves to ensure that informal
quotas corresponding to the Hutu/Tutsi ratio in society are
not exceeded. This system tends to limit the access of Tutsis
to education and important positions in the Government and
military. Private business is the only aspect of society in
which the Tutsis wield any significant influence.
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The Government actively prosecuted Jehovah's Witnesses in
Rwanda from 1984 to 1986. In 1986, 296 Witnesses had been
convicted of penal code violations including disrespecting the
national flag, and 400 Witnesses were being held in custody
pending trial. Under growing international pressure, the
Government reversed its position on Witnesses in 1988,
released all Witnesses held in prison, and ended its legal
campaign against them. Since then, the Minister of Justice
has held meetings with local officials to sensitize them to
the Government's policy regarding Jehovah's Witnesses.
Jehovah's Witnesses occasionally are arrested by local
officials acting in ignorance of government policy, but they
are normally released immediately when their cases are brought
to the attention of the general prosecutor in Kigali, who has
jurisdiction over all such cases. Despite this revised
policy, there was renewed harassment of Witnesses in 1989 and
incidents based on religious discrimination; one businessman
lost his position for reasons related to his Jehovah's Witness
religion.
Women perform most of the agricultural labor and have
benefited less than men from social development. Despite the
language in the Constitution, women's rights to property are
limited, and women are not treated equally in divorce
proceedings. Moreover, women have fewer opportunities for
education, employment, and promotion. Family planning
services are inadequate but are improving, and the President
has been an outspoken advocate of family planning efforts.
There are few organizations promoting women's interests.
URAMA, a women's association which is an adjunct of the sole
political party, was formed in 1989. The Government has
completed revision of the Rwandan family code, which was
awaiting at the end of 1989 the President's signature to take
effect. The new code modernizes Rwandan laws concerning
marriage, divorce, the status of children born out of wedlock,
child custody, and other elements of family law.
Violence against women is socially accepted, especially in the
countryside, but it is neither encouraged nor permitted by
law. In public places, women are often observed to be subject
to low level aggression: shoving, pushing, etc. wife beating
exists, but there are no studies available which show the
extent of the problem. When reported, wife beating is
punished by the courts, but rarely do these cases come to
litigation. The Government has not addressed the issue of
violence directly, but it has acted to improve the situation
of women, largely by encouraging family planning and
appointing women to positions of responsibility in the
Government. The President has publicly advocated greater
rights for women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Rwandan economy consists predominantly of small scale
subsistence farming. There is very little industry, and hence
few workers in the modern wage economy, which accounts for
perhaps 7 percent of the work force in both private and public
sectors. Labor organizations have only recently begun to
develop, and the Government is guiding this evolution through
a sole labor union, the Central Union of Rwandan V>Iorkers
(CESTRAR) . The Union is integrated into the sole political
party, the MRND. Other workers' associations no longer have
the right to exist independently but must affiliate with
CESTRAR. Union membership (open to all salaried workers) is
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Optional. CESTRAR's leadership is focusing on nonwage-related
work conditions and on providing training opportunities and
credit union facilities to its members.
In theory, CESTRAR members have the right to strike, but only
with the approval of the Executive Committee--in effect, the
Government. There was one strike in 1989. On October 21-22,
a number of employees struck at the Bralirwa brewery in
Gisenyi, apparently over a dispute with a fellow employee.
The CESTRAR director played a pivotal role in mediating the
dispute. As part of the settlement, the employee in guestion
was transferred to Kigali.
CESTRAR is affiliated with the Organization of African Trade
Union Unity and the Organization of Central African Workers.
It maintains friendly ties with foreign trade union
organizations, including the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations. Rwanda has been a
member of the International Labor Organization since 1962, but
has ratified neither Convention 87 regarding freedom of
association nor Convention 98 on collective bargaining.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize "professional organizations" and to
engage in collective bargaining with employers granted by the
labor code is exercised within the framework of CESTRAR.
Government control of CESTRAR combined with the small size of
the wage economy is a significant constraint on the collective
bargaining process. In practice, collective bargaining for
wages does not occur in Rwanda. There are no export
processing zones in Rwanda."
c. Prohibition of Forced and Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by Rwandan law and does not occur
in practice (see Section 6.e.).
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Except in the subsistence agriculture sector, which is the
area of employment of most Rwandans, children under 18 are not
permitted to work without their parents' or guardian's
authorization, and they may work at night only under
exceptional circumstances on a temporary basis. The Minister
of Labor may grant work permission to a child under 14. Child
labor outside the agricultural sector is uncommon.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wage rates in the small modern economic sector are set
by the Ministry of Labor. The current minimum wage is
approximately $1.50 per day; higher minimum wages apply to
certain professions. The minimum wage is inadequate to
provide a decent standard of living for urban families and is
often supplemented by work in petty commerce or agriculture.
Hours of work and occupational health and safety in the modern
wage sector are controlled by law and enforced by labor
inspectors from the Ministry of Labor. Government offices and
most private sector companies have a 43-hour workweek, which
includes Saturday morning community service. Rwandan wage
earners in both the public and private sectors are accorded
1 weekday afternoon free for participation in sports and
leisure activities. Saturday morning community service hours
are counted as part of the regular work service hours, and
therefore supplemental wages are not required.
291
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE*
Sao Tome and Principe is a one-party state which has been
headed by President Manuel Pinto da Costa since its
independence from Portugal in 1975. He also leads the sole
legal party, the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and
Principe (MLSTP) , whose Central Committee is the country's key
policymaking body. Most of the Ministers and Ministers-
Delegate in the 15-member Cabinet (headed by the Prime
Minister) are members of the Central Committee. The country's
legislative body, the Popular Assembly, acts only to ratify
bills proposed by the President.
A series of radical political reforms was endorsed by the
MLSTP Central Committee and a widely attended national party
conference in December 1989. The recommended changes include
the establishment of a multiparty democracy, liberalization of
the economy, direct election of the President by universal
suffrage, the creation of an independent judiciary, and a
guarantee of the right to strike. To be enacted, these
reforms would require a rewriting of the party manifesto and
national Constitution.
The police power is held by a 300-member paramilitary Security
Police Force which reports to the Chief of Security Police in
the Ministry of Defense. Sao Tome's small armed forces are
supplemented by 450 Angolan soldiers, who have been present on
Sao Tome since a 1978 invasion threat and who help guard the
airport and other strategic locations. There are approximately
40 Cuban technical security advisers. Sao Tomean armed
forces, acting with the help of the Angolan troops,
successfully repulsed a March 1988 invasion attempt by 43
mostly unarmed "commandos," part of an exile group located in
Portugal .
Since 1984 the Government has moved away from Marxist-Leninist
economic practices and sought help from Western nations and
international institutions to help reinvigorate the economy.
Previous inefficient, state-directed agricultural practices
and policies, combined with a birth rate of about 3 percent,
had resulted in serious need for international food
assistance, primarily from the United Nations' World Food
Program. President Pinto da Costa reorganized his Government
in January 1988 to try to cope more effectively with the
continuing economic crisis and to implement reforms being
negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank. One key aspect of the economic reforms is a land
distribution plan which will allow individual farmers and
cooperatives to obtain multiyear leases to farmland.
Human rights are tightly circumscribed in Sao Tome and
Principe. Principal problem areas include: the use of
incommunicado detention; restrictions on freedom of speech and
press, assembly and association, and the right of citizens to
change their government; and limitations on worker rights.
The Government publicly committed itself in 1988 to permit due
process, including an open trial, for the 41 commandos
detained after the coup attempt. The trial ended in September
with four of the accused acquitted and the remainder sentenced
to jail terms ranging from 2 to 22 years.
*There is no American Embassy in Sao Tome and Principe.
Information on the human rights situation is therefore limited.
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SAO TOME AND PR IMC I PE
KESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of such killings by the Government in
1989,
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There is little information available on this subject. Prison
conditions are known to be severe. Amnesty International (AI)
made a special appeal to the Government in 1988 expressing
concern about possible mistreatment of the arrested
commandos. AI reported that the detainees were held
incommunicado for a lengthy period, without access to family
or legal counsel, although families ultimately were allowed
access to the prisoners. The authorities claimed that none of
the detainees had been ill-treated while in custody.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There is very little information available on the laws
regulating arrest and detention or the manner in which the
authorities carry out these powers. Political/security cases
normally come under the jurisdiction of the Special Court for
Counterrevolutionary Acts established in 1975. In these
cases, suspects may be held for 30 days for interrogation
before being released or charged. In actual practice, the
Government can detain security suspects for much longer
periods, without charge and usually incommunicado, as in the
case of the commandos arrested in 1988.
At the end of 1989, the number of political detainees still
being held was unknown but was believed to be small. It is
known that in addition to the commandos, several other people
were arrested in the wake of the coup attempt and presumably
they were tried in 1989 with the others (see Section I.e.).
Fears that the Government might use the "invasion" as an
excuse for wide-scale arrests of suspected government critics
did not materialize.
Carlos da Graca, former Minister of Health, accepted President
Pinto da Costa's standing invitation to return home in 1988
and subsequently was named Foreign Minister. Former Prime
Minister Miguel Trovoada and several lesser known government
opponents still remain in self-exile.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Justice is administered at the highest level by the Supreme
Tribunal, named by and responsible to the Popular Assembly.
Thus the judiciary's independence is limited. Lower tribunals
are appointed to try military cases. In most cases, common
criminals are given a hearing and are sentenced by a judge.
There is no tradition of independent defense counsel or jury.
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SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
The Constitution does not address the right to a public trial,
but there have been instances of public trials in recent
years. Criminal trials occasionally are reported by the local
media .
The trial of 41 persons accused of involvement in the 1988
coup attempt took place in 1989 before the Special Court for
Counterrevolutionary Acts. The defendants had access to legal
counsel, and the trial was open to the public, including the
government-controlled press. In September the Court acquitted
four persons and sentenced the others to prison terms from 2
to 22 years. There was no information available on appeal
procedures .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government seeks to identify potential dissidents through
a loosely organized system of informers and monitoring of
political activities.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The national party conference in December was broadcast live
by national radio and television and showed wide-ranging
debate and at times sharp criticiam of the party and
Government. Previous to this event, little public criticism
of, or opposition to, the Government was tolerated.
Sao Tome media, consisting of a television station, a radio
station, and occasionally a newspaper, are government
controlled and reflect faithfully the government and party
line .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are strictly limited. Historically, political
assembly and activity have been legal only within the context
of the MLSTP and its mass organizations. Since 1987, when the
MLSTP Central Committee authorized a constitutional amendment
permitting nonparty groups to propose candidates for election
to the Popular Assembly, there has been an easing of assembly
and association restrictions. Functions sponsored by cultural
and social organizations require government authorization. In
another recent development, cooperative and professional
associations are now permitted with government approval.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Religious freedom is provided for in the Constitution, and the
three major religious communities — Roman Catholic, Protestant,
and Seventh-Day Adventist — are allowed to practice freely.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The geographic isolation and poverty of this country severely
limit foreign travel by its citizens. The Government closely
controls exit visas for the few people who travel--almost
exclusively those on government missions or medical evacuation
294
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
trips. Citizens move freely around and between the island of
Sao Tome and the smaller island of Principe, 90 miles away.
Because interisland transport is only by slow ferry or twice
weekly propeller airplane, such travel is difficult. Many Sao
Tomeans live in Gabon and Angola, due mostly to the lack of
employment opportunities on the islands.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: the Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citzens did not have the right to change their government
through democratic means in 1989. However, prospects for a
pluralist democracy appeared to be enhanced by the December
1989 recommendations of the Central Committee and national
party congress to establish a multiparty system. To maintain
his leadership position, the President requires the support of
a majority of the MLSTP Central Committee, a group which
represents diverse economic and political ideologies.
Government policy is formulated by President Pinto da Costa in
consultation with the Prime Minister and other key cabinet and
security officials.
Following changes in the party constitution proposed in
October 1987, the MLSTP now encourages multicandidate
elections for Popular Assembly seats and direct election by
secret ballot of the President of the Republic (previously,
election was by vote of the members of the Popular Assembly).
All candidates must still be approved by the MLSTP, although
they need not be party members. Elections of the President
and the members of the Popular Assembly are held every 5
years, most recently in September 1985.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Sao Tome and Principe is an isolated nation with little
outside contact. The Government reacted positively--proraising
and delivering an open trial for the perpetrators of the coup
attempt — to Amnesty International's 1988 appeal for the
well-being of, and due process for, those arrested invaders.
No groups in the country are known to monitor human rights
developments. Sao Tome is a member of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Sao Tomean population (94,000 on Sao Tome, 20,000 on
Principe) is relatively homogeneous in a common Luso-African
culture. There have been no reports of political
discrimination on a tribal, regional, sexual, or religious
basis. Sao Tome citizens of Cape Verdean origin are regarded
as overly ambitious, and there is resentment of them by the
rest of the populace. The inhabitants of Principe often feel
neglected by the central Government, an attitude accentuated
by the current economic crisis.
Like men, women face drudgery and low wages on the large cocoa
plantations. Only a small number of women have gained access
to professional positions. Violence against women in Sao Tome
and Principe is believed to be infrequent and is not part of
the traditional social context. The few incidents reported
from time to time generally are presented within the context
of domestic disputes. There is no information on the
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SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
frequency of wife beating or other forms of domestic
violence. As far as is known, the Government has not
addressed this issue publicly.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of association is restricted. The sole trade union
exists mainly on paper. The National Organization of Workers
of Sao Tome and Principe was formed in September 1989, but
little is known of it apart from the fact that it is
affiliated with the MLSTP. Most salaried workers in the
country are on the large state-owned empresas (plantation-like
agricultural enterprises) and do not often leave the estate,
which includes all community facilities.
There is no explicit legislation forbidding strikes, but no
strikes have been held, although the new political reforms,
when implemented, would legalize the right to strike. Sao
Tome and Principe joined the International Labor Organization
in 1982 but has not yet ratified either Convention 87 on
Freedom of Association or Convention 98 on the Right to
Organize and Bargain Collectively. The sole trade union
organization is nominally affiliated to the Organization of
African Trade Union Unity.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There is no information currently available on whether
collective bargaining is legally permitted, but the Government
is the determining force in setting wages and working
conditions. Because of mismanagement, neglect, and
unproductivity of state-run empresas, workers are sometimes
not paid salaries for up to 6 months. Labor legislation and
practice are uniform throughout the country, and there are no
export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The.re is no forced or compulsory labor, which is prohibited by
law.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
A legal minimum employment age of 18 years in the modern wage
economy is generally respected in practice. However, in the
subsistence agricultural sector, children work on family plots
at all ages.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The beginning basic salary for an empresa worker is about $34
per month, with the median salary about $50 per month. These
wages are not sufficient to provide a decent living for
workers and their families. The empresa workers survive by
running up debts at the company store, which are deducted from
their "paper" wages. Workers are provided free (but very
poor) housing, rudimentary medical care, and access to the
subsidized company store. The standard workweek is 40 hours.
The implementation of a structural adjustment program (backed
by the World Bank) has led to measures such as a sharp
devaluation of the currency and reductions in food subsidies
which have caused short-term economic hardships for empresa
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SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
workers and others. A few state-owned farms are now under
private management, and the conditions of workers on these
estates is slowly improving as cocoa production increases and
modern management techniques replace Socialist collective
farming .
Basic occupational health and safety standards are contained
in the Social Security Law of 1979. It is not known to what
extent they are enforced.
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Senegal is a republic with an elected president, unicameral
legislature, and governmental institutions modeled on French
lines. Although Senegal has 17 legal political parties, the
Socialist Party has dominated the political scene and
controlled the Government since independence from France in
1960. Prime Minister Abdou Diouf automatically succeeded the
retiring President Leopold Senghor in January 1981. Diouf was
elected President in his own right in the regularly scheduled
elections 2 years later, and his Socialist Party won 111 of
120 National Assembly seats. In the hotly contested
presidential elections of February 1988 (the results of which
continue to be disputed by the opposition), Diouf was declared
reelected with 73 percent of the vote. In the concurrent
National Assembly elections, the Socialist Party took 103
seats and the opposition Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) 17
seats .
The Senegalese armed forces (about 15,000 men, including the
paramilitary gendarmerie) are a professional, disciplined
organization which traditionally maintains an aloofness from
politics and is respected by the population. Due to
heightened tensions with Mauritania, the armed forces assumed
a higher profile in 1989, e.g., in restoring order in the
Dakar area under the state of emergency declared in
April-May. Civilian security forces are fairly well trained
and generally respect the laws they enforce; those who do not
face criminal prosecution.
Senegal has a mixed economy with a substantial private
sector. Since June 1983, Senegal has actively pursued a
structural adjustment program, with the support of the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and major
bilateral donors, designed to liberalize the economy and
stimulate economic growth. There is concern, however, about
the short-term political impact of the austerity reforms,
particularly in Dakar, where high unemployment and
deteriorating social conditions contributed to marked
opposition gains and civil unrest in the 1988 elections. The
economy remained fragile at the end of 1989.
Events in 1989 subjected Senegal's democracy and its generally
creditable human rights record to its most sustained test
since independence, particularly the mass violence against
ethnic Maurs origin. Strikes plagued the education sector
during the first quarter of the year. The leader of the
Senegalese Democratic Party, Secretary General Abdoulaye Wade,
returned to Senegal in March after a long absence abroad.
Wade, who disputes the legality of President Diouf 's
reelection in 1988, held party rallies and called for mass
antigovernment demonstrations, which were promptly banned by
the authorities. Some demonstrators turned out anyway, and
street violence and vandalism broke out in Dakar on March 14
and on National Day, April 4. Subsequently, touched off by a
fatal border shooting on April 9, there were several waves of
violence directed against Mauritanians resident in Senegal and
the declaration of a state of emergency. The violence
resulted in scores dead in Senegal (and a similar rash of
killings in Mauritania), the destruction of the greater part
of Senegal's Maur-dominated small retail trade sector, a
massive repatriation of populations by both countries, and
both armies arrayed along their 500-mile border. Differences
with other neighbors — a maritime border dispute with
Guinea-Bissau and the breakup of the confederation with The
Gambia — further raised the political temperature.
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SENEGAL
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There was no evidence of any killings for political motives.
However, government actions in both Senegal and Mauritania
fueled the April unrest involving citizens of both countries.
Senegalese authorities were slow to comprehend the scale of
the violence directed against Maurs and their property. There
has been no definitive public accounting of casualties, but
senior Ministry of Justice officials estimated the number of
dead at 80. Order was not restored until the army was called
out, and a state of emergency imposed in the Dakar region.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Government and police officials in Senegal generally respect
the section of the Criminal Code prohibiting physical abuse.
Nevertheless, there are periodic accounts of occasional abuse
(including beatings and denial of food, water, and clothing to
prisoners) under interrogation during the period of custody
("guard a vue") between arrest and appearance before a
magistrate.
Amnesty International (AI), with the consent of the
Government, sent a team to Senegal in October to discuss
charges of alleged torture of suspected Casamance separatists
during the period 1982-1988. The Government refused to accept
the delegation's suggestion that a special committee be
established to investigate human rights abuses, saying that
existing legal mechanisms were sufficient. The Government,
however, publicly reaffirmed its opposition to torture and
promised to improve oversight procedures in the courts and
security forces to prevent abuses. AI ' s 1989 report notes
that ill-treatment of prisoners by police in 1988 resulted in
at least one death.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The constitutional prohibition against arbitrary arrest or
detention is generally respected in practice. The Senegalese
legal system is patterned after the French. A person
suspected of a crime may be legally held without charge for 48
hours after arrest and may be held up to 72 hours if ordered
by a public prosecutor. In fact this period of detention,
during which the prisoner has no access to family or attorney,
may be much longer.
Temporary detention or custody is permitted when civil
authorities determine that there is a threat of civil
disturbance or that a person is a threat to himself or
others. Temporary custody is valid for a maximum period of 6
months, but it may be renewed for additional 6-month periods
if the investigating magistrate certifies that this time is
required to complete the investigation. There is no limit to
the number of times it may be renewed. These laws are
generally respected by law enforcement officials, and charges
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SENEGAL
are formally and clearly drawn. By law, every person has
access to legal counsel during every step of the legal process
from the time his case is presented to a magistrate. Persons
with means will have private attorneys. The court may appoint
public defenders for indigents charged with felonies; in
practice, however this rarely happens. The Association of
Young Senegalese Attorneys provides free legal counsel to
accused indigents.
During the state of emergency from April 28 to May 19, the
Government had the authority to order house arrests and
administrative internment for up to 2 months and to hold
suspects for up to 8 days before charging them. However, with
the exception of the curfew, no extraordinary powers were
exercised, and such arrests as were made (all for crimes
against property) were under the ordinary penal code.
However, the Government used its detention and other legal
powers broadly in 1988 and 1989 to strike at critics,
including journalists (see Section 2. a.). In judicial cases
which are tried before the State Security Court, 23 persons
remained under indictment for membership in an illegal
organization, the Movement of Democratic Forces of the
Casamance (MFDC) , which advocates violent means to secure the
independence of Senegal's southernmost region. All but five
of these were free at year's end while awaiting trial; those
still incarcerated are also accused of plotting against the
security of the state. The five were arrested after having
tried to solicit money and arms from Guinea-Bissau security
officials to support guerrilla operations in the Casamance.
Three men remained in detention awaiting trial for involvement
in the fire-bombing of an official vehicle, allegedly for
political motives, in December 1988. Seven members of the
opposition PDS also were arrested, on the basis of an
anonymous tip, in connection with the same incident. They
soon were granted provisional liberty, and, although charges
had not been formally dropped, the case appeared to be
inactive at the end of 1989. In addition, 11 Maurs were being
held at the end of 1989 for alleged espionage.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Senegal has an active and well-trained judiciary, which is
constitutionally independent of the executive, the
legislature, and the armed forces. Court officials are
lawyers who have completed a number of years of required
apprenticeship. Trials are public, and defendants have the
right to a defense attorney from the time the case is
presented before an examining magistrate. Ordinary courts are
presided over by a panel of judges which in criminal cases
includes a panel of citizens as a form of jury. Magistrates
are appointed by decree and in principle are not subject to
government supervision; however, low pay, poor working
conditions, and family and political ties may make magistrates
vulnerable to outside pressures.
There are four categories of special courts: the High Court
of Justice, the State Security Court, the Court for the
Repression of the Unlawful Accumulation of Wealth, and the
military courts. The High Court of Justice, created for the
sole purpose of trying high government officials for treason
or malfeasance, has never met. The State Security Court,
consisting of a judge and two assessors, has jurisdiction over
cases involving politically motivated crimes. The "illegal
enrichment" Court, which has only judged three cases since it
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SENEGAL
was created in 1981, is not presently active. The military
'court system has jurisdiction over offenses committed by
members of the armed forces during peacetime. Civilians may
not be tried by military courts.
There were no reports of political prisoners in Senegal at the
end of 1989. However, a military Board of Enquiry in April
1989 disciplined three officers, including the former armed
forces chief of staff, for allegedly plotting a coup during
the turbulent events surrounding the 1988 elections. Early in
1989, the Government indicated its intention to appeal a
judge's decision of November 1988 in Louga which dismissed
charges against members of two opposition political parties
for unlawful assembly and inciting a riot; no appeal, however,
had been entered at the end of 1989=
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There is relatively little government interference in the
private lives of Senegalese citizens, particularly in rural
areas. There are constitutional safeguards against arbitrary
invasion of the home. Search warrants are required and under
normal circumstances may be issued only by judges and in
accordance with procedures established by law. In practice,
searches without warrants occasionally take place. There is
no evident pattern of monitoring the private written or oral
communications of Senegalese citizens. There are reports,
however, of active supporters of the political opposition
being subject to wiretaps, unusually close scrutiny of tax
records, and other forms of petty harassment.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is protected in the Constitution
and is generally respected in practice. Subject to
restrictions relating to public order, a wide variety of
political expression is possible. While Senegal's only daily
newspaper is controlled by the ruling Socialist Party, there
are many regularly published magazines and newspapers
reflecting a broad range of political opinion from
conservative to Marxist. The independent press often breaks
stories ignored by the establishment daily newspaper (e.g.,
the trial of military officers accused of planning a coup
d'etat) and the opposition newspaper, Sopi, regularly
denounces the Government as illegitimate and calls on
President Diouf to resign.
Notwithstanding this diversity, the official media (including
the government-controlled radio, which is by far the most
important medium of news dissemination) , are subject to
controls over their news coverage. Activities of the ruling
party are always covered, while the opposition parties are
mentioned only occasionally and selectively, e.g., communiques
are not read in their entirety, or certain factions are
excluded in favor of others less hostile to the Government.
More equitable access to the media emerged as a principal
opposition demand during and after the 1988 elections. The
National Assembly in October enacted a new law, which must
still be implemented by decree, regulating access to
television and radio by "regularly constituted political
parties." It is not yet clear whether the law will result in
more transmision and air time to the Government's opponents.
301
There are laws prohibiting personal attacks against the Chief
of State or the institutions of the Republic, and a 1965 law
prohibiting the dissemination of "false news" has been
criticized for having a possible chilling effect on
journalists. The Government used these legal powers in 1989.
A university professor, who wrote an article in an independent
newspaper on January 5, 1989, on the Senegalese police strike
of 1987, was threatened with charges that he tried to
discredit the institutions of Senegal; the case was dropped by
the end of the same month. The publication director for Sopi
was convicted on December 16 of spreading false news and
discrediting public institutions. The charges arose from an
article he had written in the spring claiming that agents of
the Government had falsified the 1988 presidential election
returns — certified as authentic by the Supreme Court--and
publishing what were purported to be the true figures, showing
PDS candidate Wade a clear winner. The director appealed the
verdict and was released from custody until the appeal is
heard. On September 12 and 13, four Sopi journalists and the
chairman of the PDS parliamentary delegation were indicted for
a series of Sopi articles attacking a senior member of the
Government and exposing alleged equipment deficiencies in the
armed forces. Immediately after charges were filed, all were
granted conditional liberty (requiring the accused to keep the
authorities advised of their whereabouts). The cases were
still pending at year's end.
Publishers are required to register with the Central Court
prior to starting publication, but such registrations are
routinely approved. Publications, including foreign
publications, are almost never censored or banned in Senegal.
An exception occurred in February 1989 when Salman Rushdie's
"Satanic Verses" was banned. The action came after the
Organization of Islamic Conference (of which Senegal is a
member) called on member states to ban the book and all others
published by Viking/Penguin until the publishers withdrew the
offending title. However, no other Viking/Penguin books were
withdrawn, and foreign periodicals reporting on the Rushdie
affair and quoting the book's controversial passages continued
to circulate freely in Senegal.
In general, academic freedom is enjoyed by the schools and
Senegal's sole university.
A National Commission reviews all films prior to public
showing. Movies deemed offensive to Senegalese moral
sensibilities are censored or banned. No instances are known
of films being banned because of offensive political content.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
In general, Senegalese freely exercise their constitutional
rights of assembly and association. However, prior
authorization for public demonstrations is required, and
demonstrations or protest meetings against government policies
are closely monitored by security services. The Ministry of
Interior refused permission for the opposition PDS to hold
mass demonstrations in Dakar March 14 and April 4 (National
Day) on the grounds that public safety was threatened by the
vandalism and random street violence which increasingly has
accompanied such political demonstrations. Senegalese wishing
to form associations must register them with the Ministry of
Interior (except for business-related associations, which are
registered with the Ministry of Commerce) . By law and in
practice, the Ministry is obliged to register such groups, so
302
long as the objectives of association are clearly stated and
not in violation of the law.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Senegal is constitutionally a secular state, and freedom of
religion is a legal right which exists in practice. Islam is
the religion of over 85 percent of the population, but no
attempt has been made by the Government to introduce Shari'a
(Islamic) law. Other religions, the major one of which is
Roman Catholicism, are freely practiced. Missionary activity
is permitted, and foreign Protestant missionaries are active
in several regions of the country. Conversion is permitted,
and there is no discrimination against minority religions.
Adherence to a particular religion confers no official
advantage or disadvantage in civil, political, economic,
military, or other sectors. Both Islamic and Christian
organizations publish periodicals. Koranic and Catholic
schools exist alongside the public schools system, and the
Mouride Brotherhood is constructing an Islamic University in
its headquarters city of Touba .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution states that all citizens have the right to
move and establish themselves freely anywhere in Senegal, a
right that is respected in practice. Exit visas are not
required for travel outside the country. There is no
restriction on emigration, and repatriates are not officially
disadvantaged on return to Senegal. A nighttime curfew was
imposed throughout the Dakar region during the state of
emergency which lasted from April 28 to May 19. A Senegalese
citizen by birth may not have his citizenship annulled for any
reason. A naturalized citizen may have his citizenship
revoked if it is proved in a court of law that he obtained his
citizenship fraudulently or--if he has been a citizen less
than 15 years--if convicted of a crime.
Although Senegal's tolerant political and economic environment
has attracted Africans from other countries, Senegal has
hosted few official refugees. According to the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) , there were less than
200 registered and assisted refugees in the country at the
beginning of 1989. However, in 1989 the refugee/displaced
person situation changed dramatically with the ethnic violence
which erupted in Senegal and Mauritania in April and May.
Unable initially to protect Maurs resident in Senegal, the
Government — in agreement with the Government of
Mauritania — began repatriating many of them by air and by
land; and eventually some 100,000 persons were returned to
Mauritania. Many of these lost their property in Senegal, and
some were stripped of personal belongings and papers by
Senegalese authorities — allegedly in retaliation for similar
treatment dealt to Senegalese departing Mauritania. Prior to
the unrest, some estimates placed the number of Mauritanians
living in Senegal at 300,000, although no firm figures are
available.
These civil disturbances in turn led to a massive return to
Senegal of persons from Mauritania. By September
approximately 90,000 Senegalese, mostly skilled and
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SENEGAL
semiskilled workers and fishermen, had been repatriated from
Mauritania. In addition, some 44,000 black African
Mauritanian citizens and 16,000 Senegalese uprooted from their
traditional homes on the right (Mauritania) bank of the
Senegal River had taken refuge in Senegal. Some had been
forcibly expelled from Mauritania, while others fled a
climate of intimidation and violence. Almost overnight,
Senegal faced a massive and unanticipated refugee/displaced
persons problem, but by the end of 1989 most of the 90,000
repatriated Senegalese had been absorbed into their families
and communities throughout the country, although their
integration into Senegal's fragile economy remained a serious
problem. In contrast, the 60,000 Mauritanian and Senegalese
uprooted from their communities in Mauritania have been
sheltered in refugee camps and in Senegalese villages near the
river frontier. For the most part the Senegalese, working
with the UNHCR and other international agencies,
organizations, and donor countries, have been generous in
assisting these refugee/displaced persons, many of whom have
strong ethnic and family ties in Senegal.
There were no known instances of refugees or displaced persons
being refused entry into Senegal or forcibly returned to
Mauritania. However, the Government admitted that some
Senegalese citizens might have been inadvertently transferred
to Mauritania during the exchange of populations and has said
Senegal will take back any citizens who wish to return.
According to UNHCR estimates, up to 22,000 Senegalese citizens
may have been among those transferred to Mauritania. The
Mauritanian Government claims that upwards of 200,000 of its
citizens are still being held hostage in Senegal. The
Senegalese Government disputes this charge. However, a
mechanism for identifying such Mauritanians in Senegal and
Senegalese among the displaced population in Mauritania and
facilitating their return to Mauritania and Senegal had not
been established by year's end.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Senegal is a functioning multiparty democracy, but the
legitimacy of its 1988 election results was sharply challenged
by the opposition. The Socialist Party has dominated
Senegalese political life since independence. Presidential
and legislative elections, with universal suffrage for all
citizens over 21, are held concurrently every 5 years.
Following the 1988 elections, opposition leaders claimed
widespread fraud and continued in 1989 to dispute publicly the
legitimacy of the announced results. Sixteen of the 17
elected opposition deputies did take their seats in the
National Assembly and participated in parliamentary
activities. Opposition leaders demand electoral reforms,
including a tightening of the voter identification card system
and protection of the secret ballot. Legislation along these
lines was enacted by the National Assembly in October. The
new electoral law failed to address the opposition demand for
a neutral national commission to supervise elections, a task
now carried out by civil servants and the Supreme Court.
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SENEGAL
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government allows human rights groups such as Amnesty
International to investigate allegations concerning human
rights abuses in Senegal and responds to reguests for
information about those allegations. The ICRC, with the
approval of the Government, opened an office in Dakar in May
1989 with a mandate to monitor prisoner conditions.
Senegal is a leader among African countries in the promotion
of international standards for human rights practices. For
example, it sponsored the African Charter on Human and
People's Rights of the OAU and was a founder of the OAU's
African Human Rights Commission in 1987. Its officials serve
in a variety of pertinent bodies; its representative was
chairman of the U.N. Human Rights Commission in 1988 and
played a key role in organizing and leading a mission to
investigate the human rights situation in Cuba. Dakar is the
headquarters of several institutions which foster human rights
and democratic pluralism in Africa and frequently is the site
of conferences related to human rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
While officially there is no discrimination in Senegal based
on race, religion, or language, the country is predominantly
Muslim, and Islamic customs, including polygamy and the rules
of inheritance, generally prevail, especially in the rural
areas. Article 7 of the Constitution states, "men and women
shall be equal in law." The status of women has steadily
improved under government encouragement and through increased
educational opportunities. Modifications of the family code
adopted by the National Assembly in 1988 reinforced women's
rights to divorce, alimony, and child support.
However, Islamic and Senegalese customs persist, and women are
still confined largely to traditional roles, notably in the
large subsistence agricultural sector. Women usually marry
young (the majority by age 16), average about 7 live births,
and die relatively young. Sixty-seven percent of women aged
40 to 45 live in polygamous unions.
Violence against women, usually wife beating, occurs,
particularly in rural areas, but there are no accurate
statistics, and the extent of the problem is not known.
Police do not normally intervene in domestic disputes, and
women are reluctant to go outside the family for redress.
Inf ibulation, the most severe and dangerous form of female
genital mutilation, frequently is performed on girls aged 10
to 14 in the Fleuve, Casamance, and Senegal Oriental regions;
the practice is deeply rooted in ethnic tradition and cuts
across religious lines. There are no laws or regulations
prohibiting this practice. However, the Minister of Social
Development (a female dentist) has taken a personal interest
in the issue and has formed a group to study the practice and
warn village women of its hazards. The semiofficial daily
newspaper Le Soleil carried a lengthy World Health
Organization report in December about the harmful physical and
psychologicial effects of excision and inf ibulation .
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SENEGAL
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
A minimum of seven people, each having worked within their
profession for at least 1 year, are free to form a union by
submitting a list of members and a charter to the Ministry of
Interior, A union can be disbanded by the Ministry if the
union's activities deviate from the charter. Even though they
represent a small percentage of the overall population, unions
wield a significant amount of political influence, primarily
because of their ability to disrupt essential services.
At least 75 percent of the working population are engaged in
rural activities such as cultivation, herding, and fishing.
There are approximately 323,000 workers in the formal wage
sector, of which approximately 100,000 belong to various
unions. Of these, approximately 70,000 workers in 61 unions
belong to the National Confederation of Senegalese Workers
(CNTS), which is affiliated with the ruling Socialist Party.
Although the CNTS was established in 1969 as the sole trade
union central, with affiliation to the sole legal party,
political and trade union pluralism was reestablished after
1976. The principal rival organization to the CNTS is known
as the Democratic Union of Senegalese Workers (UDTS) and
various independent unions exist in health, education, and
transportation sectors.
While ostensibly an independent umbrella organization, the
CNTS has supported government policies. During 1989 strains
developed in this relationship, and the CNTS leadership has
publicly opposed government policies on structural adjustment,
modification of the labor code, and liberalization of the
economy. Although CNTS remains Senegal's largest and most
powerful labor confederation, it faces increased competition
from independent unions.
Unions have the right to strike, and 1988/1989 saw strikes by
the teacher/professor, electrical, banking, and health worker
unions which were resolved in bargaining with the Government.
Senegalese unions are active in international labor
organizations. The CNTS and the small Union of Free Workers
of Senegal (UTLS) belong to the Organization of African Trade
Union Unity. The UTLS is also listed as an affiliate of the
communist-controlled WFTU.
For several years the Committee of Experts of the
International Labor Organization has requested an amendment to
the Senegalese law covering seditious associations to ensure
that the Government cannot dissolve a trade union which it
regards as disrupting the constitutional order by unlawful
means .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Senegalese unions have the right by law to organize and to
bargain collectively, and these rights are protected in
practice. There are no known instances of workers being
forcibly discouraged from exercising these rights. In recent
years, as the economic situation worsened and factories and
businesses closed down, collective bargaining has succeeded in
several instances in ensuring extended benefits for laid-off
workers, e.g., the airline workers' union in negotiations with
the Government and the new management of Air Afrique
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SESEQ&L
respectively. The CNTS has been a major force in pressuring
employers and the Government to establish regulations and
guidelines for the well-being of workers. The Government will
intervene in labor/management disputes when requested and
plays a mediation and arbitration role in private and
state-enterprise sectors.
An export free zone exists in Dakar into which goods may be
imported for manufacture and reexported without payment of
duty. Senegalese labor laws apply uniformly throughout the
country, including in this zone.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There were no reports of forced labor in Senegal, which is
prohibited by law.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment in Senegal is 16 for
apprenticeships and 18 for all other types of work. These
restrictions are closely monitored and strictly enforced
within the formal wage sector, that is, the area of the
economy over which the Government can exercise some
supervision such as state agencies, large private enterprises,
or farmers gathered into cooperatives. On the other hand,
children under 16 are employed in the traditional sector, and
minimum age and other workplace regulations on family farms in
rural areas and in small, privately owned businesses are not
seriously enforced.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The CNTS has been very successful, within the formal economic
sector, in obtaining acceptable conditions of work, including
standard workweeks (40 to 48 hours per week for most
professions), holiday/annual leave benefits (usually 1 month
per year), and a variety of health and safety regulations.
These regulations are incorporated into the Labor Code
approved by the National Assembly and are supervised by
Ministry of Labor inspectors. Enforcement, however, appears
to be uneven, especially outside the formal wage sector.
Recent CNTS efforts have concentrated on raising the minimum
wage, currently approximately $0.82 an hour, which, according
to Senegalese unions, is not considered sufficient to maintain
a decent standard of living. Workers must frequently
supplement incomes through second jobs and reliance on the
extended family.
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SEYCHEI^tiES
President France Albert Rene, who took power in June 1977 in a
military coup d'etat, heads the Government and the only
authorized political party in the Seychelles. In 1979 the new
Government adopted a Constitution which abolished all
political opposition to the ruling Socialist party, the
Seychelles People's Progressive Front (SPPF), and established
a strong presidency which appoints ministers, and a People's
Assembly of 23 elected party members and several appointed
members. In the 1987 Assembly elections more than one
candidate vied for some seats, but all candidates were
members of the SPPF. President Rene was the only candidate in
the June 1989 presidential election, winning more than 96
percent of the vote for a third 5-year term.
Seychelles has a defense force of about 800 army personnel, a
300-man presidential protection unit, a 200-man navy, a 50-man
air force, a uniformed police force of 500, and a people's
militia of about 2,000. Collectively, these units amount to 5
percent of the total population.
The Government, through the Seychelles marketing board, other
state organizations, and banking regulations, controls the
importation, licensing, and distribution of virtually all
goods and services and exercises significant control over all
phases of the economy. Tourism is the most important sector,
accounting for 11 percent of gross domestic product.
Approximately 80,000 tourists visited Seychelles during 1989.
Seychelles has made progress toward diversifying its economy
by granting fishing licenses to a number of foreign fishing
vessels, and it services this fleet at expanded port
facilities in Victoria, which were financed by foreign donor
assistance.
Human rights, including political rights, continued to be
circumscribed in 1989. The Constitution does not provide for
fundamental human rights, but rather includes them in a
preamble as the goal of the people of Seychelles. The threat
of the President invoking the Public Security Act, which
allows for indefinite detention in security cases, serves to
intimidate real and potential opposition elements. The
Government also uses exile as a means of suppressing dissent,
and it has continued a program for acquiring real property
belonging to Seychellois residing overseas and known to be
opposed to the Government. There were no reported instances
of political arrests or detentions in 1989.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no confirmed instances of killing for political
motives in 1989.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance.
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c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution explicitly forbids torture. However, there
were credible reports of abusive practices on the part of the
Seychelles police, particularly its Police Mobile Unit (PMU) .
These activities primarily involved severe beatings, often
with wooden batons (hence the PMU's local nickname, the Garde
Baton), and occurred with disturbing frequency during 1989.
The objects of these beatings are, for the most part,
suspected drug users, unemployed youths, and the like. The
beatings themselves generally do not occur in connection with
detentions. Criminal complaints brought against individual
officers for such practices are invariably dismissed, and no
policemen have been discharged as a result of these activities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Penal Code provides that persons arrested must be brought
before a magistrate within 48 hours. In nonpolitical cases
this provision is applied in practice. Bail is available in
most cases. The Government, however, has used criminal
charges such as drug possession to hit at perceived opponents,
e.g., the case of Royce Dias.
There were no confirmed reports in 1989 of persons being
arrested and detained under the Public Security Act (PSA),
which was passed in December 1981 in the aftermath of an
attack by mercenaries. The Act allows for indefinite
detention in security cases and has been used in the past
under questionable circumstances, e.g., the arrest of
Phillippe Boulle, the leading human rights activist in the
country in June 1986. Under the authority of the Penal Code,
police sometimes hold persons for 24 hours for "questioning"
regarding alleged antigovernment activities. In particular,
persons who seek to mobilize public opinion against the
Government run a serious risk of being held for
"questioning." In late 1989, the Attorney General determined
that the period of initial detention could be extended to 48
or even 72 hours, provided that an active investigation was
being conducted "with reasonable dispatch." The defense
attorney has excellent access to the detainee and to the
police and can readily ascertain whether there is an active
investigation. At the end of 1989, there were no known
political detainees or prisoners.
In the past, the Government has directly urged opponents to
emigrate, an option that many have chosen over the years. It
has also taken other actions to encourage potential opponents
to leave the country, including dismissals from government
service and social and economic harassment against businessmen
and professionals.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system is patterned on English common law (e.g.,
public trial by jury) but is also influenced by the Napoleonic
civil law (e.g., torts and contracts). The judiciary includes
the Supreme Court and an Appeals Court. Judges are provided
under arrangements with the British Commonwealth and, except
for past security cases, they have exhibited considerable
independence from both the executive and legislative
branches. Defendants in nonpolitical (both civil and
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criminal) cases have access to counsel and enjoy speedy and
fair trials. The Chief Justice, who is appointed by the
President, has stressed on several occasions that it is the
judiciary's responsibility to impose sentences as required by
law and that it should reflect the will of the legislature.
The President exercises quasi-judicial powers. He not only
has appointment authority but also has broad detention
authority where public security is involved. Seychelles law
requires that a member of the armed forces be tried by
court-martial unless the President decrees otherwise.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The authorities have broad powers of search and seizure
without a warrant, and the Mobile Police Unit is particularly
active in excercising such power. During 1989, for example,
an MPU force in excess of 12 members (all male), acting
without a warrant, smashed down the door of a local woman's
home, strip-searched her in her own home, and ransacked that
home in what was alleged to be a search for drugs. No drugs
were found.
Legislation exists which allows the Government to open mail,
domestic as well as international, and it is widely believed
that it does so regularly. Many persons complain that
applications for immigration to other countries are
confiscated.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although theoretically protected under the 1979 Constitution,
freedom of speech is exercised sparingly. There is no
criticism of the President or the Government in Parliament,
although specific issues are debated and reported in the media.
The Government controls the major newspaper in the country, as
well as all radio and television broadcasting. Legislation
provides up to 3 years' imprisonment for anyone "who with
intent to bring the President into hatred, ridicule, or
contempt, publishes any defamatory or insulting matter whether
in writing, print, or by word of mouth, or in any other
manner." This same legislation authorizes a 2-year sentence
for anyone who "prints, supplies, distributes, reproduces, or
has in his possession or control" any publication banned by
the Government for security reasons. The Government has
sought to prevent the importation of pamphlets printed by its
opposition abroad. There were no known arrests for
distribution or importation of "seditious literature" in 1989.
In general, foreign publications are imported and sold without
hindrance .
The President has kept his promise not to interfere with the
right of religious groups to speak out freely on religious and
social matters. The Catholic Church publishes a lively paper.
Echo Des Isles, which is not subject to government censorship
and which carries some articles obliquely critical of the
Government. The two largest religious denominations in the
country, the Roman Catholic and the Anglican churches, are
each provided 2 hours of free, uncensored broadcasting time a
month. Both churches have taken advantage of the monthly
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broadcasts to comment on social and political issues. In 1988
the Government issued a new, 25-year broadcasting license to
the Far East Broadcasting Association (FEBA) , a radio
missionary organization which has broadcast the Christian
gospel to Asia and Africa from Seychelles for the past 18
years .
Foreign broadcasts are widely listened to and are uncensored.
However, the Government has increased its range of available
controls over broadcasts and telecommunications originating in
Seychelles through the Broadcasting and Telecommunications Act
of 1988. This Act authorizes the Government to restrict the
transmission of messages, to prohibit the broadcast of any
material which in the Government's opinion is objectionable,
and to permit the entry of government officials onto any
premises and to examine any apparatus in connection with
provisions of the Act.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
While there were no incidents in 1989, the Government has in
the past been quick to move against unauthorized
demonstrations and has made arrests under an old British
colonial law which prohibits unlawful assembly without a
government permit. All associations, clubs, and other
organizations require government permission to organize, which
is usually granted for nonpolitical groups only.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no religious persecution in Seychelles, and church
services are widely attended. The Roman Catholic, Anglican,
and other Christian denominations thrive, and Muslims and
Hindus are unrestricted in their religious practices.
There is a clear separation between church and state, and
religious instruction in public schools has been limited.
Responding to religious institutions' complaints, the
Government now permits children (ages 14-17) in the National
Youth Service (NYS) to attend church by allowing services to
be held at the NYS camps.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on internal travel. Passports may
be acquired by any citizen, although Seychellois traveling
abroad for study at government expense are required to sign a
bond which enables the Government to recoup the cost of their
education if they fail to return. Persons who are "bonded"
must obtain government permission to travel abroad following
their return. There are no known cases in which passports are
currently being withheld. There are no restrictions on
voluntary repatriation for Seychellois willing to accept the
present one-party political system, though it is widely
assumed that former President James Mancham and certain former
members of his government will not be permitted to return to
Seychelles .
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Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Since 1979 there has been only one legal political party, the
Seychelles People's Progressive Front (SPPF) . Citizens cannot
legally and peacefully change this one-party system, and
therefore cannot change the party in power. President France
Albert Rene, both as President of the country as well as the
Secretary General of the party, wields considerable power and
influence. During the last SPPF Congress held in December
1987, the President was again unopposed and was elected
unanimously to a fourth 3-year term as Secretary General of
the Party. Opponents of the party can neither organize nor
express public opposition. The party has 23 regional offices
called "branches," which are responsible for organizing and
supervising discussion about current government policies. The
party encourages these branches to report public opinion in
their regions, but this does not often result in policy
changes .
The Government uses various means to stifle political
opposition. In June 1983, it embarked on a campaign to
nationalize private land, ostensibly to claim unused
agricultural acreage. On March 13, 1987, the Government
implemented a vigorous program of acquiring many parcels of
Seychelles real estate owned by Seychellois abroad known to
oppose the Government. The acquisitions are made under the
Land Acquisition Act of 1977. Compensation, supposedly at
market value, is usually in the form of bonds and paid to the
owners over a period of 20 years. Under the law, it is
impossible to challenge the acquisition itself — it is only the
amount of compensation which can be applealed in court.
Acquisitions continued at a high rate during 1989, not only of
properties belonging to nonresident Seychellois, but also of
properties belonging to foreign nationals, including one
American citizen, and of resident Seychellois not known to
oppose the Government .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Requests for information are sent to the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, who acts as an interlocutor between human
rights groups, such as Amnesty International, and the
Government. In the past, inquiries have led to the release of
some detainees. However, the Government has not been
responsive to a report of the U.N. Human Rights Commission
concerning three outstanding disappearance cases dating back
to 1977 and 1984. There are no private human rights groups in
Seychelles .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no discrimination in housing, employment, education,
or other social services based on sex or on racial, ethnic,
national, or religious identification. Women enjoy high
status in this essentially matriarchal society. They have the
same legal, political, economic, and social rights as men.
Violence against women, particularly wife beating, does occur
in Seychelles, but, according to medical personnel, it is not
widespread and is not tolerated by the Government or the
courts. Under Section 31 of Seychelles Criminal Procedure
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Code, a private civil complaint may be brought before a
magistrate, free of charge, to impose a bond "to keep the
peace" of up to approximately $200 against someone using or
threatening violence against another. This provision in the
Code is used by women against their harassers, and it is quite
effective. Married women can easily obtain exclusion orders
against abusive husbands and frequently do. On the criminal
side, violence against women is prosecuted as assault cases to
the full extent of the law, including spouses if that is the
case. Police have no hesitation in intervening in domestic
disputes where violence has occurred or is threatened.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers do not have the right to form or join unions of their
own choosing in Seychelles, nor are they independent of the
Government or the ruling party. All workers (except for some
temporary workers) belong to the National Workers Union (NWU)
by virtue of the fact that a percentage of their social
security contributions is given to the NWU. The SPPF controls
the NWU's funds and appoints its leaders. Workers and their
leaders have no legal right to strike or initiate any
industrial action except with the permission from the SPPF
Central Committee. There were no strikes in 1989. In August
1989 party Deputy Secretary General James Michel said that the
SPPF viewed the NWU as a "transmission belt which links the
party with the working people."
Workers are permitted to elect their shop stewards (also
called Works Committee Members), but all candidates are
screened by the NWU Executive Secretariat, which has the power
to dismiss an elected shop steward.
The Committee of Experts of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) expressed again in 1989, as in previous
years, its concern over the Government's unwillingness to
implement ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association, which
Seychelles has ratified. The NWU's only international
affiliation is with the Organization of African Trade Union
Unity, but it maintains close relations with the
Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions. While
not prohibiting the NWU or the Employers' Federation from
participating in regional ILO conferences, the Government does
not encourage participation in the annual ILO conference in
Geneva, which occurs at the same time as national "liberation"
(coup anniversary) celebrations in Seychelles.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
In the one-party, one-trade union confederation structure,
there are serious limitations on worker rights to organize.
The NWU constitution does protect union members "from
victimization in the carrying out of legitimate trade union
activity" and requires its executive board to investigate shop
steward dismissals so as to verify that the dismissal is not
based on union-related activities. In the event of a
disagreement between the NWU and a company over a shop
steward's dismissal, the party would make the final
determination.
Free collective bargaining generally is not practiced in
Seychelles. The Government has the right to review and
approve all collective agreements from the private and public
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sectors. Authority for establishing and enforcing employment
terms, conditions, and benefits is vested in the Ministry of
Employment and Social Services by the Employment Act of 1985,
Seychelles' basic labor law. While revision of the 1985
Employment Act is expected soon, no modification of the
Government's dominant role in setting terms and conditions of
employment is expected.
There are no export processing zones in Seychelles, and labor
laws are applied uniformly throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law and does not
exist in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 15. Children are required
to attend school until the age of 15. The Government
encourages children to attend 2 years of National Youth
Service (NYS) before entering the work force at the age of 18
or going to the polytechnic for vocational training, and it
discourages public or private sector employment of workers
under 18 years old. The Government offers voluntary
short-term (up to 6 months) work employment programs for
school leavers not participating in the NY'S. Children in
these programs receive a training salary which is below the
minimum wage. The Government effectively enforces its child
labor laws through regular inspections by the Ministry of
Employment and Social Affairs (see below).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Seychelles has a complicated minimum wage scale which depends
upon job classifications. The legislated minimum wages range
from over $190 per month for an unskilled laborer to over
$1,000 per month for a high-level civil servant. Given the
free public services that are available, primarily in the
areas of health and education, a single salary at the low end
of the pay scale does provide a family with a decent, if
Spartan, standard of living. Many families deal with
Seychelles' high cost of living through two or more incomes.
The Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs has
responsibility for enforcing minimum wage regulations. Due to
a labor shortage, the de facto minimum wage is considerably
higher than what is legally required. It is unlikely that
anyone would accept less than the minimum wage, and the
Ministry counts on the workers themselves to complain should a
prospective employer make such an offer.
The maximum workweek is 48 hours (or 9 hours per day) .
Included in this is a mandatory half-hour's break per day.
All full-time workers are legally entitled to a minimum of 21
days of paid annual leave per year. Workers are permitted to
work overtime up to 12 hours a day. These ceilings are
enforced by the Government, though it is possible that some
occasional abuses do occur. Under the 1978 Occupational
Safety and Health Decree, the Ministry of Employment and
Social Affairs is responsible for enforcing the Government's
rigorous occupational safety and health standards. In March
1989, the decree was amended to cover government workplaces.
These standards are rigorously enforced by inspectors who make
regular workplace visits. In 1989 there were 1 work-related
fatality and 40 work-related injuries in Seychelles.
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Sierra Leone has a one-party system of government with the
President, Major-General Dr. Joseph Saidu Momoh, exercising
predominant executive authority. The 1978 Constitution
established the All People's Congress (APC) as the country's
sole legal political party. The unicameral Parliament is
subservient to the party and is largely an advisory body.
The security structure includes the Defense Force (between
1,500 and 2,000 men), the regular police (3,000 to 5,000), and
a paramilitary branch of the police, the Special Security
Division (1,000 to 1,500). The Defense Force is responsible
for preventing external aggression and wide-scale civil
disturbances. The police are responsible for law and order
and internal security. The Special Security Division's role
is not well defined, but, under the previous regime, was used
to enforce the political decisions of the President.
About 70 percent of Sierra Leone's 3.9 million population is
engaged in agriculture, mainly subsistence farming. The
Constitution recognizes a person's right to own private
property, but the Government controls mineral exports. For
many years the economy has been in a steady decline, in part
due to falling world diamond prices and to reduced rice
production. Mineral exports, notably titanium ore, gold, and
diamonds, are the principal sources of foreign exchange. In
1989 the Government introduced new measures designed to
improve control over the mining sector, e.g., it reintroduced
gold and diamond licenses and required exporters to deposit 60
percent of their proceeds in foreign currency to the central
bank.
Human rights remained significantly circumscribed in 1989.
Principal human rights concerns were mistreatment of detainees
and harsh and degrading prison conditions; arbitrary and
excessively long detentions; restrictions on freedom of speech
and press, assembly and association, and the right of citizens
to change their government; and de facto discrimination and
violence against women. Favorable developments included the
lifting of a 1987 state of economic emergency that had
augmented government power to detain and control people's
movements and initial government efforts to improve prison
conditions. In addition, observers generally agreed that
correct judicial procedures had been followed in the State's
handling of the controversial treason case of former vice
president, Francis M. Minah and 11 others.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of such killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Harsh physical treatment of suspected criminals, especially by
police during interrogation, is common. In recent years.
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attention has been focused on prison administration and harsh
conditions. Amnesty International (AI) has in particular
called attention to reports of deaths in prisons, such as
Pademba Road Prison in Freetown. In September 1987, the
President appointed a special Commission of Inquiry to
investigate prison conditions, including persistent reports of
harsh conditions and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of
prisoners. The Commission completed its inquiry in 1989, but
the Government had not made its findings publicly available by
year's end. Nevertheless, according to reliable reports, the
Commission found a number of specific cruel practices,
including the stealing of food from prisoners. The Government
reportedly levied severe fines against the responsible
officials and initiated steps to improve conditions,
including, according to former prisoners, sparse, but adequate
food suplies. Prisons remained, however, seriously
overcrowded.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Judicial review of arrests is part of Sierra Leone's common
law, but even under normal circumstances, detainees may be
held for 28 days before being charged with an offense. There
are reports, however, that judicial review, including the
28-day limit, is not always observed. Attorneys and others
have often alleged that police, to harass or to exact personal
gain, sometimes detain persons without charge or judicial
review and that those too poor to hire a lawyer are often held
for years without trial, particularly when the accuser has
paid law enforcement or judicial officials to violate the law.
Under the Constitution, the President may take measures to
detain any person who is, or is reasonably suspected of being,
dangerous to the security of the Republic. The now expired
economic emergency law extended the definition of "dangerous"
to include a range of "economic" activities. During a state
of emergency, the Public Emergency Act comes into effect, and
persons detained under its provisions can be held indefinitely
and are not guaranteed a hearing unless charged with a capital
offense .
There were no known political detainees or prisoners being
held at the end of 1989.
Exile as a political weapon is not practiced in Sierra Leone.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Sierra Leone's judicial system is composed of the Supreme
Court, an intermediate Court of Appeals, a High Court of
Justice, and magistrates' courts. Judges are appointed by the
President. Local courts, presided over by indigenous ethnic
leaders, administer customary law and are especially important
in the rural areas.
The judiciary has generally maintained its independence,
although some critics charge that the legal system can be
subject to political manipulation, often before cases reach
the courts, and that it has also been penetrated by
corruption, particularly at the lower levels. Defendants are
allowed counsel of their choice, but many cannot afford them.
Public defenders are provided only in capital offense cases.
Convictions may be appealed; the appeal courts generally have
a reputation of being less susceptible to corruption.
316
In September the Supreme Court rejected the appeals of the
former first Vice President, Francis M. Minah, and 11 others.
Minah and the others were convicted of attempting to
assassinate the President in a March 1987 coup attempt in
which two policemen were killed. The defendants appealed to a
clemency board chaired by the first Vice President and then to
the President, who upheld the decision to execute six of the
defendants. Six others had their sentences commuted to life
imprisonment. On October 7, Minah and the five others
condemned to death were executed by hanging. The trial was
judged by most observers to be procedurally correct and fair.
The 1987 coup case — from arrest to trial to appeal--moved
slowly but steadily, but most court cases are not rapidly
completed. Sierre Leone's legal system is heavily
overburdened and lacks resources, especially in trained
personnel. This results in an average delay of 2 years before
a case actually comes to trial. Additionally, often the
official records of court proceedings are handwritten notes
taken by the judges. This practice limits lawyers' access to
written documentation and puts in question the impartiality of
the official record.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government does not generally interfere with the rights of
privacy and family, and legal safeguards against arbitrary
invasion of the home are usually observed. In security cases,
however, the Government has the authority to enter homes
without a search warrant.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although freedom of speech is legally guaranteed, the
Government can abridge this right under the Constitution if
the security of the State is considered at issue. Debate in
the APC-controlled Parliament is often lively, and some
"backbenchers" have gained prominence through their
interventions criticizing government policy. In practice, the
Government generally tolerates some public criticism by
citizens and academics. Harsh direct criticism of the
President and other senior officials and of the one-party
system is rare. Opposition groups based in Western Europe or
the United States occasionally circulate critical materials in
Sierra Leone but must do so clandestinely.
There is a lively, privately owned press. Of 12 active
newspapers, only 2 are considered government controlled.
However, the press is subject to government restrictions.
Mindful of latent government power, journalists customarily
exercise self-censorship and avoid publishing articles
personally attacking the Head of State. The Newspaper
Registration Act of 1983 in particular gives the Government
extensive authority over the press. It specifies
qualification standards for editors and sets a fee for
registration of newspapers. That Act was used for the first
time in late April when five newspapers were closed for
failing to register. There were allegations that the closings
were in fact due to criticisms in the newspapers of the
Minister of Information. The Government denied the charges
and allowed the newspapers to resume publication by late May.
In a subsequent speech, the President strongly defended the
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right of a free press without qualification, but there was no
indication by year's end that the parameters of acceptable
press commentary had been widened appreciably.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and permits
the formation of trade unions and other economic, social, or
professional associations. These rights, however, are limited
in practice, most significantly in the political sphere.
Permits must be obtained from the police for public meetings
and demonstrations, and in general public demonstrations are
not allowed. The Government banned in 1987 a once active
student union at the principal university and continued the
ban in 1989 despite student requests to rescind it. Groups of
citizens can and do make orderly representations to the
Government on policy issues and are not subject to reprisals.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
A tradition of religious tolerance is practiced in Sierra
Leone. Muslims, the largest religious group. Christians,
adherents of other faiths, and animists practice their beliefs
freely and publish and distribute religious documents without
government interference. The hajj is an annual occurrence in
which a wide cross section of Sierra Leoneans participate; it
is partially subsidized by the Government. Employment within
the civil service and appointments at high political levels do
not appear to be religiously biased. There appears to be no
favored religion under the country's one-party system.
President Momoh, who is Christian, has Muslims as his chief
adviser. Foreign Minister, and Chief of the Armed Forces.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The only official control on travel within the country has
been in the diamond-mining areas where restrictions are
intended to control smuggling. There are no official
regulations restricting foreign travel, but government-decreed
limitations on the amount of foreign exchange a person may
take out of the country could have this effect if enforced,
which generally is not the case.
Sierra Leone, a party to the U.N. Convention and Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, is host to approximately
100 refugees. A number of Namibian refugees were voluntarily
repatriated in early 1989.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change the government
through democratic means. The Constitution proclaims Sierra
Leone a one-party state (the All People's Congress or APC) ,
and no other parties are legally permitted. Since
independence in 1961, the clear trend in political development
has been to increase executive power and decrease
constitutional checks on that power.
Parliament has 116 seats: 97 popularly elected, 12 paramount
chiefs elected by traditional councils, and 7 members
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appointed by the President. Candidates for Parliament, which
is largely an advisory body, are chosen in each constitutency
by the party's local executive committee, which may select up
to five candidates from a list of multiple party candidates.
However, the Central Committee of the APC can override the
nomination of any candidate if it chooses to do so.
Parliamentary elections are held every 5 years by universal
adult suffrage. Party leaders contend that dissent and strong
challenges exist within the single party and that local party
members have some influence in the designation of
parliamentary candidates.
In addition to the national political system, a traditional
system of local government operates in the provinces.
Paramount chiefs are elected for life by the members of the
local Chiefdom Councils, and they wield considerable authority
in local affairs and in resolving local civil disputes.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government generally has taken a positive attitude toward
international and nongovernmental groups involved in
monitoring human rights violations. In response to the 1987
AI report. President Momoh convened a special Commission of
Inquiry to investigate possible human rights violations in the
prisons. Additionally, an AI representative attended part of
the 1987 treason trial.
The Government has not interfered with the activities of the
Sierra Leone Bar Association's Society for the Preservation of
Human Rights. This active human rights group, founded in
1985, is supported by a wide cross section of educated
citizens. The Society won its first major court case in 1985,
obtaining the acquittal of persons arrested for demonstrating
peacefully. Since then the Society has obtained the release
of several persons who were detained without judicial review.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no officially sanctioned discrimination on the basis
of sex, religion, language, or social status. Although
allegations have been made of favoritism in political
appointments and the military based on ethnic origin, ethnic
participation in public and private service appears to be
broadly based and well-integrated. However, citizens of
non-African descent do face political restrictions, e.g.,
citizens of Lebanese origin may hold Sierra Leonean passports
but cannot hold membership in the APC.
Women in Sierra Leone are guaranteed equal rights by the
Constitution, but their status varies widely in different
parts of the country and depends heavily upon the cultural
values and traditions of their ethnic group. These values
affect women's access to education. In most rural areas,
women are farmers.
Violence against women, especially wife beating, is widespread
and is accepted among the more traditional elements of
society. The police are unlikely to intervene except in cases
of severe injury or death. The Government has never addressed
this issue specifically. Few cases of violence against women
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ever come to the courts. Female genital mutilation
(circumcision) is widely practiced and is allowed by law.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of association is provided for in the Constitution
and workers have the right to join trade unions of their own
choosing. Unions are independent of the ruling APC party, but
they must join the single trade union confederation, the
Sierra Leone Labor Congress (SLLC) . Under the Trade Union Act
any five persons can form a trade union by applying to the
Registrar of Trade Unions which has statutory powers under the
Act. If the Registrar rejects an application, the applicants
can appeal against the decision in the ordinary courts. Since
wage negotiation is industry-wide, the Sierra Leone Labor
Congress is endeavoring to organize unions according to
industry and not the trade of workers. At present, there can
be as many as six trade unions in one industry. In recent
years, the unions have organized more workers, especially
among lower wage earners. They have been less successful in
organizing workers in the agricultural and mining sectors.
Approximately 60 percent of the working population in urban
areas is now unionized.
Unions have the right to strike in Sierra Leone. During 1989
workers staged several strikes, mainly against the Government
to protest salary problems. In the case of striking hospital
workers and teachers, the Government eventually paid overdue
salaries .
Sierra Leone has ratified the International Labor Organization
(ILO) Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right to Organize. Unions maintain affiliation with the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the
Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions. There
are no legal restrictions on regional, national, or
international affiliation or on international travel and
contacts .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The law prohibits any discrimination against union members.
Com.plaints of discrimination against unions are made to the
Industrial Court for Arbitration. Individual trade unions
investigate alleged violations of work conditions and ensure
that employers take necessary steps to correct abuses. In
1989 one issue between unions and employers concerned the use
of temporary workers but the SLLC did not make a formal
complaint .
The legal framework for collective bargaining is the
Regulation of Wages and Industrial Relations Act. Collective
bargaining must take place in trade group negotiating councils
each of which is comprised of an equal number of employees and
workers representatives. Most enterprises are covered by
collective bargaining agreements on wage and working
conditions. The SLLC provides assistance to unions in
negotiation preparation. It is basically a bilateral
negotiation, and the Government only intervenes in case of a
deadlock.
Labor legislation is applied uniformly throughout the country.
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SIERRA LEONE
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law and is not
practiced. Since 1964 the ILO Committee of Experts (COE) has
asked the Government to repeal or amend a section of the
Chiefdom Councils Act under which compulsory labor may be
imposed. The Government has indicated that the pertinent
section of the Act is not enforceable, but it has not yet
replied to COE requests for an official declaration to that
effect .
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment of children is officially 18
years, but in practice, there is no minimum age. In the
interior of the country, children at early ages work
seasonally on subsistence family farms. Because the adult
unemployment rate is as high as 60 percent, there are few
children involved in the industrial sector. However, children
often engage in street trading, and some children work with
small fishing groups.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Currently, there is no legislated minimum wage. In 1987 the
Constance Davis Commission recommended the establishment of a
mimimum wage and social security program, but to date, the
Government has not passed implementing legislation. The
standard legal workweek is 38 hours (8 hours on Monday through
Thursday and 6 hours on Friday) . There is no limit on
overtime. The rate of overtime pay for public holidays is 2.5
times the basic rate. For other days the overtime rate is
double the normal rate of pay.
Within the Ministry of Labor there is a moribund Health and
Safety Division. Health and safety regulations are included
in collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the trade
unions. However, there is no evidence of systemic enforcement
of these safety standards. Trade unions provide the only
protection for workers who file complaints about hazardous
working conditions. Initially, the unions make a formal
complaint to the Ministry of Labor. When this fails, the
unions can issue a 21 day strike notice. As a last resort the
unions can strike to achieve their demands.
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SOMALIA
Somalia is a one-party state ruled since 1969 by President
Mohamed Siad Barre. He presides over the Somali Revolutionary
Socialist Party (SRSP) , the sole legal political party, and
the Government through the presidentially appointed Council of
Ministers. The President's clan, the Marehan, holds key
positions, e.g., the President's eldest son, Abdurahman
Mohamed Siad "Maslah", is Commander of the Armed Forces. A
National People's Assembly, last elected on a single slate in
1984, is subordinate to the executive. Civil conflict
continued during 1989, with an outbreak of rioting in the
capital, Mogadishu, followed by official reprisals. Troops
mutinied in the southern, central, and northern regions, and
political ferment intensified.
The Somali Armed Forces (SAF) number over 35,000 troops.
Internal security responsibilities, including for coping with
the civil conflict, are shared by the National Army, the
military police (MP), the Defense Intelligence Security Agency
( "Hangaash") , the National Police, and the National Security
Service (NSS) . During 1989 army combat units and military
police resorted to attacks on civilian villages, roundups, and
summary executions as means of combating the antiregime Somali
National Movement (SNM), other dissident groups, and rioters.
Reformist groups made efforts during 1989 to curb the security
services' arbitrary powers of detention, but were only
partially successful.
Clans continued their age-old competition for waterholes and
grazing lands, and at the national level the governing elite,
based on the Marehan subclan, struggled with other clans for
control of the country's few resources. Most of Somalia's
estimated 8 million people manage a bare subsistence as
herdsmen or farmers. The modern sector of the agricultural
economy consists mainly of banana plantations located in the
south. The chief exports are livestock and bananas.
Mogadishu now has a population exceeding 1.5 million, many of
whom are unemployed migrants from the countryside.
Increasingly straitened conditions in the capital contributed
to an increase in crime and to the potential for civil
disorder, while life in the north has been severely disrupted
by the civil conflict.
Despite som.e limited progress in the first half of the year,
human rights in Somalia suffered sharp setbacks during 1989.
A State Department-sponsored study (the Gersony report)
documented massive human rights violations, committed by both
government and, to a lesser extent, SNM forces in the 1988-89
fighting; the SAF murdered at least 5,000 unarmed civilians
between May 1988 and March 1989. In the first half of 1989,
the Government did release most political prisoners, including
those whose cases had been publicized in the West, and
strengthened the constitutional prohibition against arbitrary
detention. However, on July 9, an unknown gunman shot and
killed the Roman Catholic Bishop of Mogadishu. The Government
detained for investigation several prominent Islamic leaders
and other critics. On July 14, rioting broke out in Mogadishu
as a result of the detentions, and several police officers
were killed. The police and MP's responded to the killings by
firing on the crowds. At least 100 people were killed and
hundreds more injured in fighting throughout the city. (One
human rights group claims 450 were killed.) On subsequent
days and nights military units detained about 2,000 people,
searched and looted houses, assaulted and sometimes shot
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SOMALIA
people in their homes, and summarily executed at least 46
young men, mainly Isaaks, at a nearby beach. In response to
the growing political discontent, the President announced that
multiple political parties would be allowed to organize and to
contest elections to a new People's Assembly within 16
months. He offered to negotiate with dissident organizations,
but his initial attempts had been rebuffed at year's end.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
During 1989 extrajudicial killing was employed as a method of
warfare in Somalia's civil conflict. Government forces were
the worst though not the only offenders. While some incidents
could be attributed to poor leadership and training, the
pattern of raids on civilian villages, reprisal killings, and
summary executions suggested that extrajudicial killing had
official sanction (see Section l.g., for details). Following
the extensive July disorders and killings, the President
formed an investigating committee, but at the end of 1989 the
committee had not released its findings, and the Government
had not brought those responsible to justice. There have been
persistent reports that the perpetrators were members of the
Marehan subclan (Rer Koshin) to which the President and his
family belong.
b. Disappearance
Disappearances continued to occur in Somalia during 1989.
They were hard to distinguish from arbitrary arrests and
detentions (see Section l.d.) and extrajudicial killings,
because these are not acknowledged by the authorities. For
example, an interpreter employed by the U.S. Office of
Military Cooperation has been missing since July 17 and is
presumed to have been among the victims of the shootings at
the beach.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is forbidden by Article 27 of the Constitution.
Senior government officials repeatedly deny that it is
practiced as a government policy and, in fact, instances of
torture appeared to decrease in response to a governmental
reform effort and international pressure. Some recently
released short-term detainees complained, however, that they
were subjected to forms of torture such as the "Mig," in which
their hands and feet were tied together behind their backs
with a rope, which was pulled tight so that the body was
arched backwards, to resemble the swept-back wings of a Mig
aircraft. The Canadian Centre for Victims of Torture
continued to report seeing torture victims from Somalia.
Harsh prison conditions do not provide sanitation, adeguate
water, or medical care. Prisoners receive the absolute
minimum of food necessary for survival because it is customary
for food to be supplied from outside by their families.
Amnesty International (AI) stated that the conditions at the
maximum security prisons of Lanta Bur and Labatan Jirow, where
political prisoners are often held incommunicado, were
particularly life-threatening.
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SOMALIA
Mistreatment of detainees sometimes results from negligence.
In October, for example, at least 11 youths died of
suffocation and dozens of others were hospitalized after
police locked them in a steel shipping container. The
authorities arrested the police official allegedly responsible
for this incident.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Although Article 26 of the Constitution accords citizens the
right to be formally charged and to receive a speedy trial,
the Criminal Code was modified in 1970 to exempt crimes
involving national security from time limits and rules of
procedure. The Government has repeatedly shown an
exceptionally broad interpretation of what constitutes
national security and has used its powers in an arbitrary
manner to detain, often incommunicado, suspected political
opponents or critics. In the first half of 1989, in response
to growing criticism of such abuses, the Government revised
Article 26 of the Constitution to limit arbitrary detention.
As a result, the security services in the early months of 1989
detained fewer persons and usually released them if evidence
against them was lacking. (Normally, the National Security
Court--see Section I.e. --gives investigators a fixed time
limit, with necessary extensions, to complete an
investigation. )
Following the disturbances in July, however, mass detentions
were resumed under a presidential decree (as provided for in
Articles 82 and 83 of the Constitution) imposing emergency
rule throughout the country. Many detentions seemed to have
only an incidental investigative purpose, the main aim being
to frighten possible opponents of the regime and silence
criticism. Most of the detainees were released after a few
weeks in military camps.
Prominent Somalis arrested in the investigation of the
Bishop's assassination in July included the lawyer Dr. Ismail
Jimale Ossoble, chief counsel for the defense in the February
1988 national security trial; Abdulkadir Aden Abdulle Osman,
son of Somalia's first president; Sheikh Abdirahman Sheikh Ali
Sufi, a senior religious leader; and three other imams. Dr.
Jimale Ossoble and Mr. Osman were released in October 1989.
The sheiks remained in detention at the end of the year.
Also under detention were former cabinet ministers Aden Nur
and Ba'adleh, who were arrested in July.
The number of detainees is difficult to estimate because the
Government does not disclose such information, detainees are
often held incommunicado, and at least 9 entities (National
Police, NSS, Hangaash, military police, SRSP, the militia, the
Custodial Corps, regional governors, and district
commissioners) have the power to detain. The number probably
fluctuated considerably during 1989, as the Government first
released most detainees, then arrested about 2,000 people in
July, and then released most of them after a few weeks. In
conjunction with the October 21 national day celebrations, the
President amnestied over 1,160 detainees and prisoners. Most
of these detainees had been held on criminal charges, but some
!nay have been detained for minor political offenses such as
making "tribalistic" remarks.
The Somali security forces also practice the taking of
hostages in interclan conflicts. In disputes between rival
clans, the Government may order the arrest of senior members
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SOMALIA
of both clans in order to compel an end to the violence. The
most recent example of this practice occurred in June when a
minority Darod clan began attacking members of the Hawiya clan
in and around Mogadishu. The Government arrested members of
both clans and dictated peace terms between the parties; when
peace was assured the hostages were released.
The Government does not practice exile as a means of political
control. With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see
Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Somali judicial system includes civil and criminal courts,
and a separate National Security Court. Lawyers are permitted
to represent suspects before the National Security Court, but
proceedings are usually held in camera. Although nominally
independent, the judiciary is in fact not distinguishable from
the executive, which reviews and controls judicial decisions.
All judges in the Supreme Court and lower courts are appointed
by the President with the advice of the higher judicial
council, of which the President is chairman. Judges of the
National Security Court generally are military officers posted
to the Court.
Law No. 54 of 1970 provides the death penalty for political
offenses "against national security," defined as behavior
"which may be considered prejudicial to the maintenance of
peace, order and good government." Among the 20 offenses
punishable by death are "organizing a subversive association"
(Article 3), "exploiting religion for creating national
disunity" (Article 12), and "publishing antistate propaganda"
(Article 18) .
In the civil and criminal courts, legal assistance is
provided, and there are established rules of evidence. There
are no religious courts in Somalia. In civil proceedings
relating to family matters, such as marriage and inheritance,
the judge may cite prevailing Islamic Shari'a law in rendering
decisions. The right to appeal exists in criminal and civil
cases but not in cases heard by the National Security Court.
For persons convicted by the National Security Court, the only
avenue for clemency is through the Politburo of the SRSP.
Only one trial before the National Security Court received
publicity in 1989. This was the November conviction and
sentencing to death of five persons accused of embezzling
funds from the Commercial and Savings Bank. These were the
first death sentences announced in Somalia in over a year. It
appeared that some of those convicted were still at large. At
year's end none of the death sentences had been carried out.
By midyear most political prisoners had been released. Most
of the thousands of persons detained in July were also
released. Few if any detainees were tried and convicted of
political offenses.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Under the umbrella of the National Security Act, the security
forces routinely search the homes of citizens for weapons and
printed material critical of the Government. These searches
are carried out without a warrant or the consent of the
searched. No probable cause is required (see Section l.g.).
The telephone conversations and mail of suspected persons are
325
monitored, and anyone in the country suspected of political
activity is subject to surveillance.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
About 500,000 people fled the outbreak of fighting in northern
Somalia in 1988. A U.S. Government-sponsored 1989 study (the
Gersony Report), based on 300 interviews with displaced
persons and refugees (many of them eyewitnesses to killings),
"conservatively estimated that at least 5,000 unarmed
civilians were purposefully murdered by the SAF between May
1988 and March 1989," when the civilians no longer represented
a threat to the Somali Armed Forces (SAF) forces. The study
also found that the SNM combatants killed hundreds of unarmed
civilians in similar indiscriminate fashion. Further, the
study found that both sides systematically engaged in grave
violations of the internationally protected status of
Ethiopian refugees in the refugee camps administered by the
United Nations in the area. The Government forcibly
conscripted Ethiopian refugees from the camps into the SAF
after May 1988. The SNM conducted systematic violent attacks
against these camps, killing 400 or more refugees in the
process (see also Section 2.d.).
Some of these abuses, apparently sanctioned by the opposing
leaderships, were consistent with traditional patterns of clan
warfare in an arid land. One of the basic tactics of Somali
army forces, for example, was to control the waterholes and
deny their use to the SNM. The SNM similarly prevented the
Government from repairing the pumping station which once
supplied water to Hargeisa. When combating rebels, mutineers,
and bandits in the central regions of the country, Somali
troops took reprisals against certain villages by driving off
livestock and burning houses.
Documented incidents included:
SNM members of the Isaak clan, in fighting around the
northern town of Erigavo in March, killed a number of
unresisting civilians. Progovernment militias then drove the
SNM out of Erigavo and killed about 200 Isaak civilian
inhabitants of the town.
Marehan soldiers carried out reprisal killings of about
30 Isaak civilians after a landmine explosion on the
Burao-Berbera road in May.
Reacting to rioting in Mogadishu on July 14, military
police fired into crowds, killing bystanders as well as
rioters. Some innocent persons were killed in their homes by
stray rounds. During searches of Mogadishu neighborhoods on
subsequent nights, security forces looted houses and
assaulted--and occasionally shot--their inhabitants.
In retaliation for the killing of some of their comrades
in the July 14 riots, members of the Armed Forces abducted 47
Somali men, took them to an isolated section of beach, and
shot them. Reports from witnesses and one survivor indicate
that the targets of this execution were members of the Isaak
clan, randomly selected and identified by their accents.
In late September, when government forces attacked rebels
of the Ogadeni clan near the Kenyan border, troops overran the
village of Dobli and killed many of the inhabitants.
326
In November, when government forces attacked several
villages near Galkayo in central Somalia in reprisal for a
mutiny there, troops reportedly killed a number of civilians
outside of immediate combat zones.
There have been other unverified reports of summary executions
of rebels in the northern and southwestern regions of the
country and of massacres committed by SNM fighters against
non-Isaak villages in the north.
The situation remained volatile at the end of 1989. According
to the Gersony report, the Government has armed clan-based
civilian militias which are not under the effective command of
either the SAF or clan elders. These militias were an
additional element of continuing instability and lawlessness.
Information is lacking on the fate of prisoners taken in
Somalia's civil conflict. In general, it seemed that few
prisoners were taken. Rebel forces welcomed deserters from
government ranks.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Constitution,
that right continued to be severely abridged in practice. NSS
informants frequented public places listening for expressions
of antigovernment sentiment; persons were sometimes held
responsible for opinions expressed in personal conversations
as well as in public forums.
The Government continued to own and operate the radio and
television as well as the country's six newspapers. No
publications other than those authorized by the Government
were legally distributed, and possession of unauthorized
newspapers and journals has brought prison sentences of from 5
to 15 years. All printed, taped, and filmed material entering
Somalia must be approved by the National Censorship Board.
The material is checked for "obscene" as well as politically
objectionable content. Academic freedom was not permitted; a
Somali law professor with an evident interest in the local
human rights situation was detained for several months in 1988
and 1989".
Information on the situation in Somalia was difficult to
obtain because throughout the first half of 1989 the
Government refused to issue visas to foreign journalists.
Several European journalists were permitted to enter the
country in the latter part of 1989. An American journalist
arrived in Mogadishu in December for a 1-week visit.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Although politics is a common topic at informal gatherings of
Somalis, and although Article 24 of the Constitution
guarantees the right to participate in or organize an assembly
or demonstration, in practice the Government only permitted
meetings which it sponsored to advance government purposes.
Political protest meetings were not permitted.
Freedom of association, though not specifically mentioned, is
implicitly provided for in the Constitution, which entitles
every citizen to participate fully in political, economic,
social, and cultural activities. In practice, however, there
was no freedom of association in Somalia in 1989. Having a
1
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SOMALIA
business relationship with a person under suspicion was enough
to attract the attention of the security services. In March a
restaurant owner was detained by the NSS when his restaurant
was host to a party for former political prisoners. The only
organizations allowed to exist are those approved by the
Government and the SRSP.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Islam is the state religion and nearly 100 percent of the
population is Muslim, predominantly of the Sunni sect. The
Constitution states, however, that every person shall be
entitled to profess any religion or creed. In practice this
means that members of religions other than Islam may practice
their faiths but may not proselytize. Mogadishu has a Roman
Catholic community numbering about 2,000, which was
established during the period of Italian colonial rule. Both
Protestant and Catholic houses of worship operate openly. No
other religious group has significant representation in
Somalia. Christian charitable organizations operate in
Somalia but confine their activities to technical assistance.
There is no evidence that the July 9 killing of the Catholic
Bishop of Mogadishu was religiously motivated. Nevertheless,
the assassination inflamed Muslim-Christian relations.
Tension between the communities increased in the first half of
1989, as a revivalist spirit spread within the Muslim
community, and some imams accused Christians of
proselytizing. During the July disturbances in Mogadishu,
there was some violence against Protestant medical
missionaries and other persons perceived to be Christians.
Many in the Muslim community attribute Somalia's difficulties
to lax observance of Islam. Such views, in addition to
raising popular anxiety over Christian proselytizing, also
tend to set the Islamic community in opposition to the
Government, which has secular roots and a long history of
antagonism toward religious leaders. The Government is
sensitive to this trend, because it threatens to unite
disparate opposition groups under the banner of Islam.
Therefore, since 1985 the Government has licensed all mosques
and Koranic schools, and since 1986 it has approved all imams
and paid them a salary. Tensions between the Government and
the Islamic community came to the fore in July, following the
Catholic Bishop's assassination. In the investigation of that
crime, security forces detained several outspoken imams.
These acts provoked more antigovernment criticism within the
mosques. The police, alerted to expect trouble on Friday,
July 14, ringed the mosques, entered some, attempted to
prevent antigovernment sermons, and tried to arrest additional
imams. Widespread rioting and many deaths ensued.
Ethiopian Christian refugees sometimes claim that they face
persecution in Somalia, but apparently that persecution is
based more on nationality than religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Police and military checkpoints control travel between towns,
in border areas, and in areas of interclan violence. There
is, however, no requirement to report residence to the police
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SOMALIA
or other government authority. Many Somalis'are nomads, and
the nomadic tradition remains strong. Travel within Somalia
is a freely practiced right. In general, there are no
restrictions on international travel for those who can afford
it. Passports are available to all citizens and to ethnic
Somalis who reside abroad; they generally are not denied on
political grounds.
However, the Government restricted the travel of some former
detainees and political prisoners by denying them passports or
stopping them at the airport. Former political prisoners
Suleiman Nuh Ali and Abdi Ismail Yunis were prevented from
attending the Muslim pilgrimage. Their passports were
confiscated when they tried to depart Somalia at Mogadishu
airport. At the end of 1989 their passports had not been
returned.
Somalis who have emigrated are generally permitted to return;
in 1989 President Siad repeatedly promised amnesty to
antigovernment Somalis returning from foreign countries.
Nevertheless, based on the experience of previous years, some
Somalis remained abroad because they feared possible
imprisonment for opposition activity if they returned.
There have been massive displacements of persons as a result
of the civil conflict. Many persons have fled to Mogadishu
where the population has swollen to over 1.5 million. The
Isaak population of northern Somalia has been driven into
remote rural areas, and many hundreds of thousands are living
in exile in Ethiopia and Djibouti, and fewer in Kenya. Within
Hargeisa, about 90 percent of the Isaak homes, businesses, and
property have been destroyed or severely damaged. The
economic life of northern Somalia has been profoundly
disrupted. At the end of 1989, the best estimates indicated
that there were 324,000 displaced persons and refugees from
Somalia (mainly Isaaks) in Ethiopia and 30,000 in Djibouti.
The Government reports that there are 837,000 Ethiopian
refugees in Somalia, but outside observers, including from the
United Nations, indicated that about half that number remained
in refugee camps at the end of 1989. Conscription of refugees
into the Somali army continued in 1989, in violation of
international covenants. Spontaneous repatriation of refugees
to Ethiopia continued throughout the year, and tripartite
negotiations involving Somalia, Ethiopia, and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) made progress
on arrangements for officially sponsored voluntary
repatriation. In addition to the UNHCR, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) agreed to participate.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have neither the legal right nor the ability
peacefully to change their government or the form of their
government. The SRSP is the only legal party; opposition
groups and criticism of the Government are illegal. However,
in August President Siad Barre announced that multiple
political parties would be allowed to contest elections to a
new People's Assembly by the end of 1990. In November a
committee of lawyers began drafting proposed changes in the
Constitution that would remove the SRSP from its leading role
in state and society, permit the operation of multiple
parties, and allow operation of a free press and other
institutions of an open society. At the end of 1989 no
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SOMALIA
practical steps had been taken to implement these proposals.
In the present governmental structure, the National People's
Assembly has very limited powers.
For many Somalis the traditional clan system is the accepted
vehicle of political expression. President Siad Barre and
other officials consult frequently with clan elders. Since
1982, however, President Siad has been widely perceived as
relying on and furthering the interests of his family and his
Marehan subclan by playing off other clans aginst one
another. This reliance on the Marehan accelerated in 1989, as
the President appointed his son as head of the Armed Forces,
another family member as Chief of Police, and Marehan officers
as commanders of most military units.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
During the first half of 1989, the Government showed a
willingness to cooperate with international and other human
rights organizations. A visit by Amnesty International,
proposed by President Siad in 1988, took place from June 24 to
July 2. Officials arranged the meetings requested by the
two-man delegation, including with former political prisoners.
Prime Minister Samantar, and President Siad. However, a week
after the AI delegation's departure, the Bishop of Mogadishu
was killed and civil unrest and summary executions followed;
and AI has not been invited to return.
The Government has continued cooperation with the ICRC, which
is now operating an emergency hospital in Berbera and making
preparations to aid in refugee repatriation.
Although there are no human rights organizations as such in
Somalia, the Association of Somali Lawyers concerns itself
with human rights issues.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Because Somalia is racially homogeneous, there is little
racial discrimination as such. Animosities and rivalries
based on bloodline and clan affiliation, however, are a
fundamental problem at the root of the country's continuing
civil conflict. Many persons have capitalized on their clan
and family affiliations to gain economic advantage or
privilege. The clan differences also have a north versus
south aspect. Members of the Isaak clan, who form the bulk of
SNM supporters, are increasingly discriminated against because
most of them are perceived as opponents of the Government.
Although not all Isaaks are persecuted, a disproportionate
number of political detainees and victims of extrajudicial
executions (e.g., almost all of the 46 in Mogadishu in July)
were of that clan.
By tradition Somali women suffer discrimination in education,
work, and family matters. Female enrollments in school remain
far below those for males at all levels of education for
traditional and cultural reasons. The payment of dowry and
bride wealth are common marriage customs. Divorce laws and
practices strongly favor the male partner.
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The Siad Barre Government has historically supported women's
rights. In the face of conservative opposition, it rewrote
laws to increase women's rights to inherit and own property,
made women the legal equals of men, and perhaps most
importantly it outlawed female circumcision. The Government's
campaign against female circumcision, led by the Somali
Women's Democratic Organization of the SRSP, continued to make
progress in 1989. Although the practice remained common,
especially in rural areas, pharaonic circumcisions (the most
extreme and dangerous form of female genital mutilation)
became less common.
Domestic violence against women is not a significant social
problem in Somalia. There are several interlocking cultural
and economic reasons why such practices as wife beating are
relatively uncommon. One is that Somalis, being Muslims, do
not generally drink alcohol. A second reason is that Somali
marriages are contractual, with the wife's relatives prepared
to enforce the agreement that she will be treated with
dignity. Wife beating carries a stigma which makes it
difficult for divorced wife beating males to remarry. Finally
economic conditions, which have made it increasingly difficult
for men to have more than one or at most two wives, also tend
to curtail violence against women. (A veteran police officer,
asked whether wife beating was a problem, said that in the
days before independence it was common for men to have three
or four wives and to treat the less favored of them as beasts
of burden, beating the ones who faltered or were lazy. He
said that young men of the present generation cannot afford
more than one wife, and therefore they are constrained to
treat her with respect.)
The civil conflict has, however, had a profoundly negative
impact, and it appears that rape by government forces and
others has occurred fairly often.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers are not free to form independent unions. There is a
single labor confederation, the government-controlled General
Federation of Somali Trade Unions (GFSTU) , is run by
government-appointed officials. The GFSTU' s main function is
to monitor the work force and provide a conduit for worker
grievances. The GFSTU is a member of the Organization of
African Trade Union Unity and the International Confederation
of Arab Trade Unions. Somalia has been a member of the
International Labor Organization (ILO) since 1960, but has
ratified neither ILO Convention 87 regarding freedom of
association nor Convention 98 on collective bargaining.
Strikes are outlawed, and organizing a strike is legally
punishable by death. Nevertheless, there was a short
transportation strike in 1987, and strikes by quarry workers
in 1989. The Government took no action against the striking
workers .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize does not appear to be infringed by
employers. Because the GFSTU speaks for the Government, its
dealings with employers on wages, hours, and working
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SOMALIA
conditions tend to resemble binding arbitration rather than
collective bargaining. Some negotiation between employers and
employees goes on outside the union framework. Given the
official status of the GFSTU, antiunion discrimination appears
to be a moot question. Labor courts adjudicate
employer-employee disputes with relative impartiality. There
are no export processing zones in Somalia.
c. Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law, but the
Government and party occasionally organize campaigns of
"voluntary labor" to clean streets or boost production of
state-owned factories.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for the employment of children is 15, and
persons under 18 are not permitted to work at night or in
certain hazardous occupations. The law imposing the
requirements, however, is not effectively implemented, and
there is considerable child labor on the margins of the wage
economy. Children sell cigarettes on the street, carry bags
in the market, and watch and clean cars to support themselves
and to supplement family incomes.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Somalia has comprehensive labor legislation setting minimum
safety and health standards for the workplace. These are
applicable to the small, modern wage sector of an economy that
is predominantly pastoral and agricultural and are not
normally enforced. In theory the workday is 8 hours per day,
6 days per week, with limits on overtime hours. There is no
legal minimum wage. Workers are entitled to paid holidays,
annual leave, holiday bonuses, and a variety of fringe
benefits. In reality, however, the salary scale is extremely
low, especially in the public sector. The average salary of a
civil servant is equivalent to about $10 per month and is not
adequate to maintain a decent standard of living.
Productivity in the public sector is correspondingly low, and
many civil servants make only minimal appearances in their
offices. Workers resort to second jobs, corruption,
assistance from other family members, and remittances from
abroad to support themselves and their families.
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SOUTH AFRICA
Despite encouraging moves by the South African Government
since the September elections, the main legislative pillars of
apartheid remained in place in 1989. South Africa's laws
codify the doctrine of apartheid, which prescribes the basic
rights and obligations of people according to their racial or
ethnic origin. The country's black majority (74.7 percent of
its population) suffers from pervasive, legally sanctioned
discrimination based on race in political, economic, and
social aspects of life. The "colored" (mixed race) and Asian
minorities (8.7 percent and 2.6 percent of the population,
respectively) also suffer from extensive racial
discrimination, although to a somewhat lesser degree than
South Africa's black population. While the Government claims
that South Africa is a parliamentary democracy, whites (14
percent of the population) retain a monopoly of political
power. Blacks continue to be denied the right to vote in .
national elections and to be represented in Parliament. A new
Constitution in 1984 replaced the previously all-white
Parliament with a tricameral one with separate chambers for
whites, "coloreds," and Asians. However, whites retain
parliamentary control over key affairs, and the executive
branch (headed by a State President with extraordinarily
strong powers) remains firmly under white control.
Since 1948 the Afrikaner-dominated National Party, presently
led by recently elected State President F.W. De Klerk, has
developed the complex legislation and institutions comprising
the apartheid system. Central to the policy of separate,
racially based political institutions was the creation,
beginning in the 19b0's, of 10 "homelands" to which blacks
were assigned on the basis of ethnic background. These
homelands comprise only 13 percent of South Africa's area and
are generally fragmented parcels of land in impoverished rural
areas. Since 1976 the Government has granted "independence"
to four homelands, thereby stripping an estimated 8 million
South African blacks of their South African citizenship.
South Africa is the only country that has recognized the
"independence" of these homelands. Outside the homelands, a
growing black urban population of more than 10 million persons
lives under apartheid regulations in massive, segregated
townships on the periphery of large cities.
In the late 1970's, the South African Government began to
introduce piecemeal reforms to ameliorate some aspects of
apartheid without threatening continued white control of the
nation's key political structures. In 1989 the white
electorate again returned the National Party to power (albeit
with a distinctly reduced majority due to whites defecting to
both the liberal Democratic Party and the Conservative Party)
on a platform promising limited reform and dialog with the
extrapar liamentary opposition.
White control of the Government is backed by a powerful
defense and police establishment, especially the South African
Defense Force (SADF), with more than 100,000 active duty
personnel and nearly 400,000 reservists, and the multiracial
South African Police (SAP), with 56,000 members. The SADF has
been used to assist the SAP in patrolling the black
townships. Through most of the year, the security
establishment, including the military, police, and the
intelligence services, played a key role in domestic and
foreign policymaking through the State Security Council (SSC) ,
a supracabinet body, which includes a small number of
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SOUTH AFRICA
"civilian" ministers and security chiefs. Under the SSC, the
National Security Management System (NSMS) performed
administrative functions in the townships through joint
management centers (JMC's) and undertook extensive
intelligence operations through a network of informers.
However, in 1989 State President De Klerk announced a major
reconstruction of the security system. Under the new system,
the JMC's were replaced by bodies which are managed at the
local level, with ultimate accountability to the Cabinet.
South African security forces are active in the "independent"
homelands, and human rights observers believe elements of the
SAP continue to give at least tacit support to conservative
black vigilante groups, in both the homelands and the
townships. The Government extended on June 9 the state of
emergency (SOE) for the fourth consecutive year, which greatly
increases state power in many areas, including detentions.
South African's economy features a highly developed industrial
sector and extensive agricultural and mineral resources. In
1989 gross domestic product growth fell below 2 percent.
Sanctions and lack of confidence in South Africa's situation
on the part of foreign investors also restrict the potential
for economic growth. Since the mid-1970's, black unemployment
levels have increased significantly, and per capita income
among blacks has stagnated. Local economists estimate that an
annual real growth rate above 5 percent is necessary for the
economy to absorb the roughly 350,000 black entrants to the
labor market each year. An even higher rate of growth would
be necessary to reduce present black unemployment, which many
private observers estimate at 25 to 30 percent, and as high as
50 percent in the homelands. Despite the high level of black
unemployment, more than 211,000 migrant workers from the
neighboring southern African states were employed in South
African mines in 1988. Apartheid laws discriminate against
blacks in housing, employment, and education, serving to
perpetuate a gross income disparity between whites and blacks.
While the fundamental, highly restrictive human rights
situation in South Africa remained unchanged in 1989,
government repression of antiapartheid opposition, including
nonviolent peaceful protest, eased after the September
election of State President De Klerk. He took a series of
positive steps which, although not yet accepting full
political participation by blacks, included the release of
seven African National Congress (ANC) senior leaders and one
Pan African Congress (PAC) leader and movement toward dialog
with the ANC. In 1989 contact between the exiled ANC and
internal political pressure groups became increasingly
common. Unofficial meetings also occurred between the ANC and
members of the influential Afrikaner Broederbond. Other
positive steps included the President's announcements that
beaches were now desegrated and that the Separate Amenities
Act would be repealed during the 1990 parliamentary session.
The President's December meeting with Nelson Mandela, the most
senior imprisoned ANC leader, fueled hopes for Mandela's
imminent release. Former State President P. W. Botha also met
with Mandela shortly before stepping down.
Inkatha, a black organization with 1.7 million members, the
majority of which are Zulu, has a wide agenda of political,
social, and economic issues. The Chief Minister of the
KwaZulu homeland, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, heads the
organization. In early 1980, relations soured between the ANC
and Buthelezi 's movement over strategy and tactics in the
antiapartheid effort.
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SOUTH AFRICA
Black groups continued to resist apartheid in 1989. At the
beginning of the year, detainees held under the SOE began a
series of nationwide hunger strikes against the questionable
reasons for, and unclear duration of, their incarceration.
The Government abandoned initial efforts to break their strike
and released, with serious restrictions in many cases,
approximately 800 detainees between February and April,
according to statistics released by the Minister of Law and
Order.
In early August the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM)--a
coalition made up of leaders from banned antiapartheid
organizations such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and
the largest black trade union, the Congress of South African
Trade Unions (COSATU) , which, like the ANC, subscribe to the
Freedom Charter--launched a civil disobedience campaign
against restrictions, bannings, and petty apartheid. The
protests spread throughout South Africa, as individuals and
organizations defied their restrictions and demonstrated
against a plethora of other apartheid issues--such as press
restrictions and the Labor Relations Act. The National Party
Government, facing a difficult September election, responded
with increased intimidation and a wave of detentions. Key
leaders of the peaceful protest movement especially were
targeted. Political tensions exploded on the eve of the
September 6 national elections. Police used buckshot and tear
gas against black and "colored" youths in tlie Cape Town area.
Archbishop Desmond Tutu and other church leaders blamed the
police for the 23 (some reports claim as many as 25) resulting
deaths, one of the highest, unrest-related death tolls in a
single day in South African history. Police vigorously
disputed these charges; the new State President called for an
investigation. One of the first steps of the De Klerk
administration after September 6 was to allow large-scale
demonstrations. On September 14, 30,000-35,000 people marched
to protest apartheid and police brutality in Cape Town, with
similar rallies occurring later in other major cities.
Violence in South Africa is multifaceted — including by black
against black — although overall levels seemed below those of
1988. Factional fighting — which cannot be easily explained in
tribal or urban versus rural terms--continued in Natal/KwaZulu
on an unprecedented scale betv/een Inkatha and UDF/COSATU
groups, claiming 593 deaths in the Durban area and 651 in the
Pietermaritzburg area in 1989. Violence in Natal seemed to
increase as peace initiatives between the two sides faltered
in late 1989.
The spector of vigilante (both white and black) and rightwing
terrorism grew in 1989, illustrated by the assassination of
prominent human rights activist David Webster on May 1. An
extremist white group, calling itself the "Wit Wolwe" (White
Wolves), claimed responsibility for a spate of attacks on
antiapartheid targets. The conflict between the Government
and the ANC, on the other hand, quieted considerably as ANC
armed attacks inside South Africa diminished markedly.
The Government has used its emergency powers to arrest more
than 32,000 people since June 1986. Prior to the
parliamentary elections on September 6, SOE detentions
increased sharply from 24 on August 20 to 234 by September 4,
and human rights organizations' statistics indicate close to
1,600 persons were arrested for defiance campaign activity
between August 1 and September 4. By the end of the year,
there were 18 persons detained under the SOE, 24 under the
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SOUTH AFRICA
Internal Security Act (ISA), and an estimated 2,000 to 3,000
serving prison terms for unrest-related offenses.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Political violence continued to plague South Africa in 1989.
Accurate statistics on the number of deaths related to
political violence remained difficult to obtain due to
restrictions on reporting unrest incidents. The Government
claimed that the level of unrest continued to decline under
the SOE. According to the SAP, there had been over 15,000
unrest incidents in the year prior to the proclamation of the
first SOE, and about 5,000 a year since the SOE was imposed.
Incidents of violence in 1989 remained below 1988 levels.
Unrest monitoring groups estimated that at least 846 people
died between June 1987 and June 1988, compared to some 695
during the same period a year earlier. Statistics compiled
from various media sources indicate 444 died in unrest-related
incidents between January and October.
Political violence was worst in Natal. Factional clashes
between UDF/COSATU supporters and members of KwaZulu Chief
Mangosuthu Buthelezi's Inkatha movement continued with an
estimated 1,244 people killed in 1989. Total deaths since
September 1987 are 2,300 with thousands wounded and thousands
of homes burned and damaged. The violence abated towards the
middle of the year, but flared again in late 1989 when peace
negotiations between the two groups faltered. Tensions in and
around Durban townships rose to new levels as the internecine
violence which engulfed the area in 1988 became entrenched.
The causes of this violence are many, including the power
struggle between Inkatha and the UDF/COSATU; desires for
personal revenge; attempts to save family and possessions from
harm; frustration over inferior schools and other facilities
for blacks; and resentment of police, black and white.
Outside Natal, townships remained mostly quiet relative to the
1984-86 period, with the notable exception of violence in Cape
Town on September 6, election eve.
There was a marked decline during 1989 in bomb attacks
throughout South Africa. However, mysterious killings,
attacks, and threats against antiapartheid groups and trade
unions increased as the spector of vigilante rightwing
terrorism grew. On May 1, lawyer/researcher and antiapartheid
activist David Webster was assassinated in Johannesburg. The
body of the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) East Rand
leader Bafana Sigasa was found floating in a dam after he was
last seen alive on July 19. In August hand grenades caused
extensive damage to the home of well-known Soweto poet Mzwakhe
Mbuli, narrowly missing his wife and child. In late August,
persons suspected to be rightwing vigilantes firebombed
vehicles and shot at homes of Pretoria antiapartheid activists
during a peaceful church-sponsored desegregation campaign.
There were no reports of incidents of "necklacing" in 1989.
(The victim is executed by a burning tire placed around the
neck.) In January members of Mrs. Winnie Mandela's informal
bodyguard were implicated in the abduction of four youths.
One of the four, 14-year old Stompie Moeketsi, was killed, and
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SOUTH AFRICA
Mrs. Mandela personally came under criticism over the
incident. Police investigations were continuing at year's end.
Two restricted Natal detainees, Chris Ntuli and Eric Gumede,
were assassinated in April and August 1989, shortly after
their release from detention. Like a majority of detained
antigovernment activists, they were released with harsh
restriction orders which forced them to keep predictable
routines and physically remain in stipulated areas, making
them easy targets for assault and assassination.
Vigilantes, especially in Natal, seem to operate with impunity
or tacit official sanction. According to well-placed human
rights sources, very few crimes of suspected vigilante origin
have been solved by the police. In September Warmbaths
activist David Kutu was taken by three men to a nearby dam and
beaten. Kutu recognized one of his assailants as a black
sergeant in the local police force. The assailants identified
themselves as belonging to the White Wolves. In October a
former black police officer on death row alleged that he had
been part of an SAP hit squad which assassinated a prominent
Durban activist in 1984. Another former policman claimed to
be a part of a squad which stabbed to death Griffiths Mxenge,
a civil rights lawyer, in Durban in 1981. These allegations,
further corroborated by the voluntary statements of at least
two other former policemen--including a white former security
police captain--seemed to confirm long-held (but never proven)
suspicions within antiapartheid circles of death squads
operating within the Government. Despite the arrests of at
least two suspected death squad members. President De Klerk
decided not to call for an independent judicial investigation
into the matter, leaving the investigation in the hands of the
South African police and prosecutors.
The existence of the White Wolves first came to public view
during the trial of Barend Strydom, sentenced to death in May
for gunning down eight black persons in a central Pretoria
square. Human rights observers express concern that the White
Wolves might in fact be composed of rogue elements within the
security forces. Also of concern were disclosures of
secretive paramilitary components of rightwing extremists
organizations such as the Afrikaner Resistance Movement
(AWB) . Several members of these hate groups were apprehended
by South West African police in connection with a fatal attack
on a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) office
in Namibia.
There was also political violence in the homelands. On July
1, nine Bophuthatswana policemen and two civilians died in the
rural village of Leeuwfontein in violence protesting
incorporation into the "independent" homeland. Bophuthatswana
police, including seconded South African Government security
officials, responded with arrests and repression that left the
village a virtual ghost town.
Conflict between the ANC and South African security forces
abated in 1989 in comparison to the numerous bombings and
casualties that occurred in 1988. There were few reports of
clashes between government forces and ANC forces, either due
to attempted guerrilla infiltration or to cross-border raids
by the SADF . Although the ANC has not renounced the armed
struggle, it appeared to shift its emphasis from armed
confrontation to development of a new diplomatic offensive.
However, the ANC external organization appears to have limited
control over its operatives once they enter South Africa.
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SOUTH AFRICA
There were no reports of of any ANC-caused fatalities in
1989. While the ANC in 1989 appeared to be downplaying
violent confrontation with Pretoria, PAC spokesmen called for
the continuation of the armed struggle. The PAC and other
organizations have also been involved in attacks in South
Africa. In 1989 the Government sentenced PAC member Vusumuzi
Mandoyi to 10 years' imprisonment for a hand grenade attack on
police in 1988.
b. Disappearance
There were no known cases of antiapartheid leaders
disappearing while in police custody in 1989. However, in
recent years many activists have disappeared into police
custody for long periods. Some are suspected by friends and
associates to have been killed by security forces. South
African law and SOE regulations do not require notification of
a person's family, lawyer, or any other person in the event of
detention, and prohibit the unauthorized publication of the
name of any person detained for "the prevention of, or
combating of, terroristic activities." The June 1988
disappearance case of Maisha "Stanza" Bopape, a Community
Research and Information Center (CRIC) staff member and
township activist, remains unsolved. Police claim that Bopape
escaped from custody, but his associates fear that he may have
been killed. Also unsolved are the cases of Port Elizabeth
Black Civic Organization leaders Sipho Hashe, Champion Galela,
and Qaqawuli Godolozi, who disappeared in May 1985.
Following the June 1986 emergency declaration, and in the wake
of subsequent crackdowns on various opposition organizations,
many black activists left the country surreptitiously or went
into hiding to avoid detention. These circumstances further
complicated the task of accounting accurately for the many
persons who reportedly have disappeared. Government press
curbs imposed in December 1986 prohibited news reporting on
detention cases and on unresolved litigation concerning
detentions without prior government clearance, which rendered
the task of accounting for missing persons still more
problematic .
Since August 1986, the Minister of Law and Order periodically
has tabled lists of SOE detainees in Parliament. These lists
included only detainees held for at least 30 days and appeared
to be incomplete. Human rights monitoring groups estimated
that substantial numbers of detainees have not been named in
the Government's lists and maintained that in most cases
family members were not informed of emergency detentions.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Security legislation, in particular the ISA, allows police
generally unsupervised discretion to arrest and detain
suspects and to interrogate detainees. People detained under
the ISA may receive visits from their attorneys and families
only at the discretion of the Commissioner of Police. This
permission is often denied. The ISA allows for lengthy
periods of incommunicado detention during which authorities
are not obliged to present formal charges, a situation which
provides considerable potential for police abuse of detainees.
Laws exempting law enforcement officials from both criminal
and civil liability for so-called good faith acts undertaken
in enforcing the SOE have been cited by many observers as
giving police a license to engage in abusive conduct.
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SOUTH AFRICA
During 1989, as in 1988, court testimony and sworn affidavits
increasingly documented the claims of lawyers and human rights
activists that severe beatings and torture are still used
against security detainees. Though the number of incidents
overall seem to be declining, torture of detainees in the
so-called homelands continued. There were numerous
allegations of police assaults and torture during widespread
discontent in Venda on the anniversary of "independence." In
Bophuthatswana , there were mass detentions following clashes
between police and residents of Braaklagte and Leeuwfontein
who were resisting forced incorporation into Bophuthatswana.
The police used excessive force, including beatings, in
containing the situation and confined detainees in
overcrowded, unsanitary conditions. The presence of South
African security officials "seconded" to these homelands and
seemingly connected to these incidents of torture belies
government claims of noninvolvement in homeland affairs and
these homelands' claims of independence.
Commonly used methods of torture include prolonged solitary
confinement and suffocation by placing bags over detainees'
heads. Sick or wounded detainees and hunger strikers are
sometimes handcuffed to their beds, regardless of their
condition and even, on occasion, the presence of armed guards
at their bedside. Denial of medical attention has been
reported. In one case, a detainee alleged police tortured him
by pulling on his thigh, previously shattered by gunshots, for
6 hours before providing medical treatment.
Police brutality increasingly came to light, especially in
connection with repression of peaceful antiapartheid
demonstrations in the latter half of 1989. Police Lt . Gregory
Rockman became a cause celebre by severely criticizing riot
police behavior against demonstrators in Mitchells Plain, Cape
Region, during preelection unrest. The magistrate hearing a
case arising from Lt. Rockman ' s claims found the riot squad
actions "utterly despicable" but acquitted two riot police
officers under the immunity accorded to police under the SOE.
In connection with Rockman' s complaint, a magistrate cleared
two riot police officers of police brutality when dispersing a
crowd at Mitchells Plain, despite finding police conduct
"reprehensible." Police also came under critical public
scrutiny in September for their use of stun guns in prisons.
To counter the negative image police and security force
members have among many South Africans, the Government has
initiated in-house investigations of alleged abuses and
misconduct, but these have failed to stem public criticism.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The ISA authorizes detention without trial for varying--in
many instances unlimited--periods of time. Under Section 29
of the ISA, the Minister of Law and Order may issue preventive
detention orders allowing for detention of up to 180 days in
"unrest situations." Access to ISA detainees is severely
restricted. Under Section 29, senior police officials have
broad powers to detain people for interrogation when offenses
such as terrorism, sabotage, or inciting a revolution are
suspected. Many people in detention under Section 29 were
held for long periods of time without any questioning taking
place .
Under the SOE, SADF members and police officers down to the
rank of constable are empowered to detain persons for up to 30
days. Police station cells may be used as the place of
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SOUTH AFRICA
detention for the first 14 days after which detainees must be
transferred to cells in prisons unless the Commissioner of
Police grants an exception. After 30 days the Minister of Law
and Order may extend the detention indefinitely, limited only
by the duration of the SOE. Emergency detainees may be denied
access to lawyers and have no right to a hearing before the
Minister extends the detention.
The Government has effectively used SOE laws to hold political
activists in long-term detention without trial, e.g., Obed
Madonsela, detained for over 10 months in 1988-89. However,
the number of detainees held during 1989, especially under the
SOE, declined dramatically. Hunger strikes beginning in
January appear to have been a factor in the SAG ' s decision to
release large numbers of SOE detainees. As of late December
there were 18 being detained under SOE regulations, 24
detained under the ISA (press reports in September indicated
another 470 may be detained in Venda under its own ISA), and
about 2,000-3,000 were serving criminal sentences from
convictions stemming from incidents of political unrest.
There were no children under 18 reported as detained at the
end of 1989. The Government's refusal to provide specific
statistics or complete lists of those being held made it
difficult to confirm the actual number of detainees.
Statistics on detentions failed to account fully for what
appeared to be a common police tactic of detaining political
activists, especially youths, and holding them for a few hours
or overnight, during which time they were interrogated,
threatened, and sometimes beaten. In addition, many people
have been arrested on criminal charges during incidents of
political unrest.
The Government imposed restrictions on approximately 65
percent of the detainees released. While the Government
appears to have abandoned the practice of formally banning
persons under the ISA, effective banning has returned under
the guise of SOE "restrictions." Regulations published in
1988 allow the Government to restrict people simply by
publishing their names, with no need to ser%'e the orders on
the restricted person. SOE regulations promulgated in June
prohibit quoting any individual "commonly known" as a
spokesperson for a restricted organization, even if that
person is not restricted. Restrictions vary greatly but
generally prevent ex-detainees from engaging in antigovernment
activity. In one extreme example, Baba Dlamini was restricted
to his home for 20 hours a day and had to report to a police
station twice during the other 4 hours. An estimated 900
former detainees have been restricted upon their release.
Prominent restricted antiapartheid activists include UDF
Co-President Archie Gumede, UDF Treasurer Azar Cachalia,
Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) national organizer
Charles Mabitsela, and UDF activist and lawyer Yunus Mahomed.
The Government at the end of 1989 lifted the restriction
orders for former political prisoner and ANC leader Govan
Mbeki . Restrictees describe life under restrictions as having
been released from prison into a larger form of jail, and for
some there is the increased, potential danger from assault and
assassination by vigilantes (see Section l.a.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The South African judiciary is headed by the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court in Bloemfontein and six regional
Supreme Courts. All judges of South Africa's higher courts
are white, as are the vast majority of its magistrates. They
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SOUTH AFRICA
are appointed to the bench by the State President. Their
service is until age 70, and they cannot be removed from
office except by impeachment by Parliament. By tradition,
judges of the Appellate Division and the Supreme Courts are
appointed to the bench from the ranks of the elite corps of
South African Supreme Court practitioners ("Advocates").
South Africa has an adversarial system of criminal justice
drawn from a mixed heritage of Roman-Dutch and English
jurisprudence. Trials of lesser offenses are heard by
magistrates, who are career employees of the civil service in
the executive branch. More serious offenses, including
capital crimes, are tried in the Supreme Courts.
Determinations of guilt or innocence are made by the presiding
judge or magistrate. Juries were abolished in 1969. Judges
in capital and other serious cases are empowered ro appoint
two assessors who serve as fact finders and who have the power
to overrule the presiding judge on questions of fact but not
on questions of law.
Defendants in criminal cases, including political cases, may
retain legal counsel, but recent studies showed that 50
percent of those convicted in ordinary criminal cases had no
representation. The Natal Supreme Court in July held that
legal representation was not vital to the fairness of a trial
and that accused persons did not have the right to
representation if they could not afford it. In 1989 Lawyers
for Human Rights continued a major pro bono project begun in
1988 which aims to have 2,000 participating lawyers donating 5
days a year each, the first large-scale effort of its kind to
be undertaken in South Africa. As a matter of practice,
courts usually appoint counsel in capital cases where the
defendant cannot afford a lawyer.
Persons charged with common crimes are presumed innocent until
proven guilty, although Parliament has modified the general
presum.ption of innocence for many security offenses. The ISA
effectively places the burden of proof of innocence on the
accused for a number of offenses enumerated in the Act. Both
security-related and common crimes cases are tried in civilian
courts, although security trials are sometimes held in remote
locations. Because of case backlogs, postponements, and the
practice of hearing cases concurrently, criminal trials, and
particularly security cases, can sometimes take months, even
years, to complete.
A new Chief Justice of the Appeals Court was appointed in
1988, and fears about the Court's politicization have eased
somewhat. However, the power of the South African judiciary
at all levels is circumscribed by stringent security
legislation and by the principle of parliamentary sovereignty,
under which judges possess no authority to alter, strike down,
or refuse to enforce properly drafted and enacted laws of
Parliament. Nevertheless, the courts have been the focal
point for much litigation against human rights abuses. In
some instances, the Government has admitted abuses and reached
out-of-court settlements.
Since its declaration in June 1986, there have been a number
of legal challenges to the SOE and detention without trial.
In the initial months, courts ordered a small number of
detainees freed and declared some SOE regulations unlawful.
But in most cases the Government rewrote and reissued the
regulations to prevent further court challenges. Moreover,
the courts have consistently stated that the SOE itself was
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lawfully declared. An Appeals Court decision in 1988 held
that an emergency regulation could not be invalidated for
being "unreasonable" or "vague", a ruling which could severely
limit further legal challenges to the SOE.
Long political trials serve to keep prominent activists out of
circulation for extended periods of time. Many defendants are
eventually acquitted. Partial HRC statistics indicated that
there were some 99 trials under the ISA and other statutes in
1988 involving 317 people of whom 165 were acquitted. There
were 258 persons facing charges of treason in 8 trials during
1988. Only 2 of those were concluded by the end of 1988, with
4 of 27 defendants convicted for treason — all from the Delmas
treason trial. From October 1988 to August 1989, 861 people
were charged in 248 political trials, with 350 convicted, 172
acquitted, and 341 with charges withdrawn.
In June, 14 defendants of the "Upington 25" court case were
sentenced to death for the murder of a policeman in 1985.
Although only one person was found to have actually struck the
victim, the others were convicted using the "common purpose"
doctrine where a person may be guilty of a crime for sharing a
common purpose with those who commit the actual crime.
According to the South African Journal of Human Rights
(SAJHR), this is one of the largest numbers of simultaneously
passed death sentences in South African legal history.
In November 1988, 11 of 22 defendants (including 3 prominent
UDF officials) were found guilty in the Delmas Treason
Trial — considered the most important political trial in recent
times. All the defendants, members of the UDF, AZAPO, and
various black civic associations, were convicted for their
antiapartheid activity during the 1984-86 upheavals. The
court accepted the State's claims that the UDF and other
antiapartheid organizations had followed the dictates of the
ANC and promoted the violent overthrow of the Government. In
an unprecedented move, the presiding judge dismissed one
assessor in March 1987 for having signed a UDF petition. In
September the Appeals Court decided, in the interest of saving
time and expense, to hear an appeal on the procedural issue of
the assessor's dismissal, and if necessary, later hear an
appeal on substantive grounds. In December the Appeals Court
declared a mistrial and ordered the defendants released. As
of the end of the year, all the original defendants remained
free and unrestricted.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The system of apartheid involves the Government in extensive
regulation of social, personal, and family life. A person's
identification as a member of an ethnic group or race is based
on definitions and decisions of the Government under the
Population Registration Act. Under this law, every child born
in South Africa must be registered and classified according to
race. In cases of dispute, such as when the parents' racial
classification is not known, a racial classification board is
empowered to weigh pseudoscientif ic evidence and to issue a
verdict on a person's race.
Under apartheid, association in many social settings is not a
matter of free choice. The Separate Amenities Act allows
public premises to be reserved for the exclusive use of
persons of a particular race, and a substantial degree of
social segregation, petty apartheid, still legally exists in
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South Africa. In recent years, however, the Government has
expanded the scope of administrative exceptions to apartheid
laws and has allowed local option decisions on some social
apartheid issues such as segregation of business districts and
beaches. In 1989 some local authorities, notably in the urban
centers of Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and East
London agreed to scrap segregated public transportation,
libraries, and swimming pools. Other areas refused to
desegregate. Pretoria's transportation system remained
segregated, for example, while the Durban City Council refused
to integrate the city's remaining "whites only" beaches until
President De Klerk issued an executive decree in December
desegregating beaches throughout the country. Some of the
localities controlled by Conservative Party groups, such as
Boksburg and Carletonville, continued to enforce apartheid
regulations which they had reimposed after the October 1988
municipal elections. Carletonville business groups brought a
successful court action against the city council forcing them
to reopen municipal facilities. "Whites Only" signs were
removed in Boksburg, but blacks attempting to use recreational
facilities remained subject to intimidation by rightwing
groups. The black consumer boycott in Carletonville came to
an end after the court decision, and the Boksburg boycott was
called off when De Klerk announced he planned to scrap the
Separate Amenities Act.
The Group Areas Act (GAA) of 1950 reserves all land in South
Africa for whites, except for those areas designated for
blacks, Asians, and "coloreds," and requires residential areas
to be segregated by race. Blacks are disqualified from owning
and occupying land in urban areas not designated for them and
from owning land in rural areas outside the 10 homelands, with
the minor exception of "black spots" — land owned by blacks or
religious missions prior to the enactment of the Land Acts.
Interracial couples must reside in the area designated for the
less advantaged racial group, vitiating the benefits of the
repeal of the miscegenation laws in 1985. Notwithstanding the
GAA, a number of so-called gray areas exist in some major
cities, where blacks, "coloreds," and Asians reside in
technically white areas, often without government
interference. Some private schools in white-designated areas
admit black, "colored," and Asian students.
In late 1988 the Government tabled a new group areas statute,
the Free Settlement Areas Act, described as "reform" but seen
by many as a major step backward. While providing that
certain residential areas might eventually be opened to all
races, the legislation further restricts rural and periurban
squatting, heavily penalizes illegal squatters and their
landlords, and allows for compulsory summary eviction of
squatters and effective confiscation of their land. Asian and
"colored" houses of Parliament called for the outright
abolition of the GAA. In 1989 the Minister of Constitutional
Affairs suggested the creation of a complicated "nongroup"
classification, whereby persons presumably would be allowed to
opt out of their current classifications and become part of
the "nongroup." The Government was roundly criticized by
apartheid opponents for a policy of encouraging people to
report to the authorities any neighbors residing in an area
not assigned to their racial group.
For black Africans, the right to reside permanently in a
segregated black urban township is not available if one is
deemed a citizen of one of the so-called independent
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homelands. Such persons are regarded as aliens in white South
Africa, and, notwithstanding their birth in South Africa, are
technically subject to restrictions similar to those for any
foreigner. They must obtain work permits in order to reside
in urban areas of "white" South Africa, and if they succeed in
obtaining a work permit, they may not be accompanied by their
spouses and children. Hundreds of thousands of such persons
are forced to reside away from their families in urban areas,
often in overcrowded single-sex dormitories.
The Government owns virtually all urban black township
property and subsidizes a program of rental housing. Local
authorities in the black townships administer the program and
collect rents. In 1986 Parliament granted blacks the
opportunity to acquire permanent land tenure in the
townships. By 1989, however, only an estimated 817 freehold
houses had been sold to blacks on a permanent tenure basis — up
from 42 sold in 1988. Of nearly 500,000 housing units
available for sale, only approximately 2,500 currently are
able to be sold because of bureaucratic problems.
Many urban townships without electricity and running water are
becoming more crowded as rural poverty drives people to seek
jobs in urban centers. In South Africa (excluding the
"independent" homelands) an estimated 18 to 20 million people,
most of them black, do not have electricity. The Government
reports that only 9 of the 259 African townships are fully
electrified. The restricted amount of land available in the
townships has driven up prices for housing lots and led to
corruption among township officials controlling their
allocation. Some townships are little more then permanent
shanty towns with housing constructed of fiberboard and
corrugated iron. The shortage of housing for blacks — which
some estimates place as high as 1.8 million units — also has
led to the development of large squatter communities.
Townships are often extraordinarily long commuting distances
from cities, where most employment opportunities are found. A
1985 President's Council's report found that 70 percent of
black commuters spent more than 3 hours daily traveling
between home and work.
The Black Sash, the most prominent women's antiapartheid
organization, estimates that 5 million South African blacks
are without adequate shelter. An 8-year Carnegie-sponsored
study, based on interviews with 400 South Africans, documented
"appalling" depths of South Africa's poverty. Half of all
households have incomes below the minimum living level.
Infant mortality among blacks is eight times that of whites.
The Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 limit land ownership in rural
areas to whites. Blacks are allowed to live in nonhomeland
rural areas only with the permission of white landowners;
nearly all are farm laborers whose numbers and freedom of
movement are regulated by a number of other statutes. The GAA
and these statutes are the bases for the Government's practice
of "forced removals." For 3 decades, the Government has
forcibly relocated black South Africans from land reserved for
whites, often to areas in the homelands with hopelessly
inadequate infrastructure and insufficient land and water for
profitable (or even subsistence) agriculture. The South
African Council of Churches (SACC) has estimated that since
1961, the Government has forcibly resettled approximately 3.5
million blacks, "coloreds," and Asians. Government figures
issued in 1984 asserted that 2 million blacks had been
resettled since 1960.
24-flnn o— an-
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In early 1985, the Government announced a suspension of forced
removals in favor of a policy of negotiating with affected
communities on relocation issues. However, in July 1987, the
State President qualified this "no forced removals" pledge,
stating that there would be no forced removal "unless it is
accompanied with the provision of better living conditions."
In some situations, the Government has engaged in effectively
coercive removals by refusing to maintain the limited
infrastructures of black communities and by engaging in
physical threats and aggressive actions aimed at convincing
reluctant people to move.
In August a court ruling set aside a 1988 government decree
declaring the 60-year-old black community of Oukasie an
"emergency camp." The declaration had been seen as the
prelude to forced removal of the 6,000-person community to
Letlhabile township near Bophuthatswana . The community
opposed removal on the suspicion that Letlhabile would
eventually be incorporated into Bophuthatswana, stripping its
members of their South African citizenship. Vigilantes
continue to attack activists opposed to the removal in an
effort to coerce them to abandon their village. In December
residents of East Peelton were driven from their homes by
Ciskeian authorities because of their continued opposition to
their community's August 1988 incorporation into Ciskei
without their having been consulted. In the first concession
of its kind in incorporation cases, the residents were granted
the use of land for resettlement (at least temporarily)
"inside" South Africa after unsuccessful mediation between
South African and Ciskeian authorities.
Studies completed during 1987 indicated that the Government's
policy of settling blacks on arid land far from population
centers has serious consequences in regard to nutrition. In a
malnutrition survey. Operation Hunger reported severe
impoverishment among South African rural blacks, particularly
in the so-called independent homelands. Malnutrition is also
a serious problem in congested and depressed periurban
resettlement areas such as Botshabelo, near Bloemf ontein.
Various laws give police the authority in specific
circumstances to enter homes without a warrant, including
situations where an officer has reason to believe a warrant
would be issued but that the delay caused by first obtaining
the warrant would defeat the purpose of the search. In
practice, police often enter and search homes of black
activists as a means of intimidation, often in the early
morning hours.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
While South Africans speak freely on most issues, the SOE and
security legislation limit discussion of certain political
themes. Segments of South Africa's almost totally white-owned
press continued to engage in vigorous criticism of the
Government and its policies. However, SOE regulations
severely impair freedom of expression and of the press by
making reporting of "subversive statements" (e.g., encouraging
strikes, boycotts, or the promotion of disinvestment) a
criminal offense. The regulations also ban television
coverage, still photography, sketching, and radio recording
from areas covered by the SOE. Media may not report on police
or security force operations in "unrest situations," except as
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inf ormation--always limite(3--i3 released by the Government.
Penalties for infractions include fines of up to $8,000 and
imprisonment for up to 10 years. It is a criminal offense to
publish material on political unrest, detention cases,
treatment of detainees, and various types of political
activity without prior government clearance.
In 1989 the press in South Africa remained under pressure.
Regulations published in 1987 streamlined the method by which
publications can be censored and gave the Minister of Home
Affairs the power to close a publication for up to 3 months
without explanation. In February 1989, the Minister exercised
this power, closing the periodicals Grass Roots and New Era
for 3 months.
Throughout 1989 a variety of regulations were used to charge
editors and publications. In May the former editor of the
magazine South was charged with contravening the SOE by
publishing an article on a school boycott. In June the editor
of the newspaper Vrye Weekblad was found guilty of charges
brought against him under the ISA and given a 6-month
suspended sentence; the same editor late in the year faced six
charges under the SOE for publishing an article allegedly
undermining the system of military conscription. The editor
of Saamstaan was charged in July under the Prisons Act for
publishing a photograph of Nelson Mandela (and with seven
other charges related to contravening the SOE and the ISA) .
Also in July, the editor and two former journalists of the
Weekly Mail were summoned under the SOE for articles on the
conditions and treatment of political detainees. In August
the editors of the Sunday Times, New Nation, Sowetan, and
Weekly Mail were charged under the ISA for quoting a listed
person; Times Media (the publishers of the Sunday Times)
received a $800 fine. The Natal Mercury, Star, Daily News,
and Sunday Tribune were informed by the police in September
that they were being investigated. In October the editor of
the South African Press Association (SAPA) was subpoenaed
under the Criminal Procedure Act to answer questions and
produce documents in connection with an investigation of
changes that he had distributed a trade union press release.
The SOE media regulations are sufficiently vague to create an
atmosphere of uncertainty among editors, resulting in a
situation where self-censorship is coriimon, and opposition
newspaper editors often surrender ultimate editing
responsibility to their lawyers. Opposition publications pay
expensive legal fees for advice prior to publishing stories,
testing the limits of the regulations and for the defense of
their actions in court. By late August, journalists and
editors began consistently testing the media regulations in
their coverages of the defiance campaign. The Government,
adopting a new tactic, began obstructing journalists at the
scene of unrest by immediately ordering them out of the area,
detaining them, or arresting them. Over 100 journalists had
been detained by the middle of September, including the
American Broadcasting Corporation bureau chief, who was
charged under the SOE with "attending an illegal gathering."
Since De Klerk's administration has been in power, media
regulations have gone largely unenforced. There is
speculation that many media restrictions will be lifted in
1990.
Under the Publications Act (applicable to most periodicals,
with the exception of newspapers), the importation,
possession, and publication of politically or morally
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"undesirable" works is prohibited. Materials subject to
censorship include those found to be "indecent or obscene,"
"blasphemous," or "prejudicial to the safety of the state."
Decisions of the Publications Appeal Board are not subject to
judicial review, except in rare instances, and can be
quixotic. The antiapartheid movie, "Dry White Season," was
shown at a film festival with only minor cuts; in 1988 the
antiapartheid movie, "Cry Freedom," was banned after one
showing .
The Government exercises a near monopoly on television and
radio broadcasting through the state-owned South African
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) . With some exceptions, SABC
reflects progovernment viewpoints in both its news reporting
and editorial policy. While the Government professes that
SABC is politically independent, a wide range of the political
spectrum, including the liberal Democratic Party and the
rightwing Conservative Party, characterizes the SABC as an
editorial arm of the ruling National Party. The appointment
of Christo Viljoen as the new Director General of SABC may
have inaugurated a more evenhanded approach; in the weeks
leading up to the September 6 election, SABC offered a
wide-ranging political debate on election issues.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The ISA seriously obstructs freedom of assembly, giving
magistrates the power to ban or impose conditions on the
holding of public meetings and to close off areas to the
public to prevent prohibited gatherings. Police can also ban
meetings under the SOE regulations. A ban on all outdoor
gatherings except sports events or specially authorized
meetings, in effect since 1976, was renewed again in 1989.
Restrictions on funerals of political activists or victims of
political violence also remain on the books. Throughout 1989
police frequently arrested persons in the townships on charges
of participating in illegal gatherings and used the powers
conferred on them by the SOE to repress peaceful
demonstrations and gatherings.
On September 20 over 30,000 people marched against apartheid
in Cape Town in one of the largest peaceful demonstrations in
South African history. In what many observers viewed as a
watershed event, the Government, headed by recently elected
F.W. De Klerk, allowed the march even though official approval
was never requested or given. The antiapartheid movement,
represented by the MDM, proved its commitment to peaceful
protest. The Cape Town march led to a series of large
antiapartheid demonstrations in urban centers throughout South
Af rica--40, 000 in East London on October 4 and 20,000 in
Durban on September 29. On October 16 the media reported that
approximately 150,000 persons demonstrated peacefully against
apartheid and a regressive labor law in 17 places across South
Africa with minimum police interference.
c. Freedom of Religion
South Africa has a wide variety of religious denominations,
and the Government generally respects freedom of worship.
Religious organizations are allowed to hold meetings and other
activities without interference as long as they do not
seriously challenge government policies. As with other
aspects of South African life, churches are often organized
along racial lines, but many churches (including a growing
number of white churches) challenge apartheid on moral
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grounds. In 1989 the white branch of the Dutch Reformed
Church in South Africa went as far as calling apartheid a
"sin."
The Defense Act provides alternative service options for
pacifist religious objectors to national military service.
(Only white males are obliged to do military service.)
Members of mainstream churches are granted alternative service
only in rare instances. Conscientious objectors on
nonreligious grounds continue to be subject to a 6-year prison
sentence. Charles Bester was sentenced to 6 years in 1988 for
refusing alternative service, apparently without being given
the normal one-third remission of sentence. Dr. Ivan Toms was
released on bail in 1989, pending an appeal for the same
offense. Douglas Torr, an Anglican deacon, refused to report
for military service in August and was scheduled for an
initial hearing in January 1990. An estimated 15 percent of
those called up for their 2-year military service fail to
report, with the incidence of no-shows reportedly increasing.
In 1989 reports indicated that the military intended to halve
the required military service time from 2 years to 1. In
September, 780 youths publicly stated their intentions not to
do their military service.
Because of the restrictions on virtually all black opposition,
church leaders have found themselves in the forefront of the
antiapartheid movement. This resulted in growing tension
between the Government and churchm.en such as Anglican
Archbishop of Cape Town Desmond Tutu; Rev, Allan Boesak,
President of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches; and Rev.
Frank Chikane, Secretary General of the SACC. Nevertheless,
in 1989 church leaders continued to lead demonstrations and
launched an interdenominational "standing for the truth"
campaign.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Since the repeal of the pass laws in 1986, black South African
citizens have no longer been required to carry
government-issued passes in urban areas. While repeal
represented a significant reform, some government critics
charge that a de facto system of influx control has been
maintained through urban housing shoj-tages, antisquatting
laws, and sanctions against employers who hire illegal aliens
from the four independent homelands. Regulations requiring
citizens of so-called independent homelands to obtain work
permits for employment in the rest of South Africa could
provide a basis for future deportations of large numbers of
people to the "independent" homelands.
Assignments of blacks to homelands take place regardless of
their wishes or the fact that they may not have been born in,
lived in, or even visited, their putative hom.elands. When a
homeland is granted so-called independence by the Government,
blacks assigned to that homeland lose their South African
citizenship and ostensibly receive the citizenship of the
homeland. An estimated 8 million blacks have lost South
African citizenship under this policy by legislation granting
independence to: Transkei (1976); Bophuthatswana (1977);
Venda (1979) and Ciskei (1981). A 1986 law provided for
restoration of South African citizenship to a limited class of
blacks who were denationalized as a result of homeland
independence grants — those with permanent residence rights in
South Africa. The Government believes that this reform will
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apply only to about 1.75 million of the estimated 4 million
citizens of "independent" homelands residing outside those
homelands .
South Africans must possess valid travel documents to travel
abroad or emigrate legally. These documents generally are not
difficult for v;hites to obtain, although some white
antiapartheid activists have been denied passports. Blacks
assigned to an "independent" homeland usually cannot obtain
South African passports because they are not considered by the
Government to be citizens of South Africa. The refusal of
some blacks to travel on a homeland passport has the effect of
deterring them from traveling abroad. In 1982 the Rand
Supreme Court ruled that the Minister of Home Affairs has the
absolute discretion to revoke or refuse to issue a passport.
The Government regularly refuses passports to persons whom it
regards as critical of the status quo. The Ministry of Home
Affairs stated that in 1988, 169 people were refused
passports — 112 blacks, 20 "coloreds", 24 Asians, and 23 whites.
Although South Africa is not a party to international
conventions on refugees, monitoring groups estimate that more
than 250,000 Mozambicans displaced by civil strife have
entered South Africa, including about 68,000 children.
Approximately 205,000 of these refugees live in the homelands
of Kangwane and Gazankulu or work as farm laborers in the
Eastern Transvaal. Mozambicans apprehended outside these
areas without permission are forcibly repatriated without an
interview to determine whether they are refugees who can
safely be returned. South African private and voluntary
organizations as well as the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) provide relief assistance in the homelands.
The Government permits access by international observers to
refugee areas.
The Government has taken harsh measures to prevent the entry
of more Mozambicans by erecting an electrified fence along the
South African border with Mozambique. On several occasions
during 1989, the Government turned off the fence to allow
refugees to cross safely into South Africa during clashes
along the border between guerrillas and Mozambican forces.
However, the refugees were promptly repatriated once the
immediate danger was considered to have passed.
The number of South Africans who are officially registered as
refugees in neighboring countries and benefit from assistance
from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has not
grown significantly since 1985 and remains approximately
22,000. Most of these "refugees" are affiliated in some way
with one of the antiapartheid organizations in exile.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The extent to which South African citizens have the right to
change their government democratically depends on race. The
majority of them, the blacks, have no such right. The 1983
Constitution created a tricameral Parliament with separate
chambers for whites, "coloreds," and Asians. Officially
registered political parties may operate freely. The
respective groups are represented in the tricameral Parliament
on a racial ratio of 4 white /2 "colored"/! Asian, thus
ensuring white dominance. Members of each house are elected
from separate, racially based voter rolls. Each house has
primary responsibility for its "own affairs," i.e..
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legislation affecting its own racial constituency. The State
President has complete discretion to decide which issues are
of general concern and are therefore to be treated by all
three chambers. Matters that are usually considered general
affairs include foreign policy, defense, national security,
and black affairs. Education is normally dealt with as an
"own affair" subject to general laws prescribing norms and
standards for salaries, curriculum, and examinations.
The terms of the 1983 Constitution and the existence of a
white majority in Parliament ensure control by the white House
of Assembly over general affairs. While there is opposition
in the House of Assembly, the majority National Party has
controlled South African political power and legislative
affairs since its first parliamentary victory in 1948. Within
the National Party, opinions on reform of the apartheid system
range from moderate to reactionary. Internal differences are
in theory resolved in party caucuses, but in practice the
State President, who is also the National Party leader,
resolves disputes.
In the September 1989 general election, the National Party won
a reduced majority with 93 of 166 seats (down from 124 in the
1987 election), and 48 percent of the popular vote. The
Conservative Party grew in strength (though not by as much as
had been generally expected), increasing its elected
representation from 22 seats to 39 and winning 32 percent of
the popular vote. The liberal opposition, the Democratic
Party, performed more strongly than expected, winning 33 seats
and 20 percent of the vote. State President F.W. De Klerk
interpreted the election results as a "mandate for reform."
Political participation for blacks, who have no representation
in Parliament, remains limited to the franchise in their
respective homelands or, in the case of urban blacks, in their
townships. While remaining committed in principle to the
grand apartheid scheme of granting independence to more
homelands, the Government seems to accept that no more are
likely to accept independence. Transkei's desire to remain
independent came into question in 1989, when its leader.
General Holomisa, publicly spoke of allowing a popular
referendum on the issue. Other homeland leaders, such as Enos
Mabuza (Kangwane) , Mangosuthu Buthelezi (KwaZulu) , and
Mogoboya Ramodike (Lebowa) continue to reject so-called
independence .
More than 10 million blacks live in townships near white urban
areas. The only voting rights they are able to exercise are
those granted under the Community Councils Act of 1977 and the
Black Local Authorities Act of 1982. The latter Act elevated
the formal status of black municipal authorities to that
enjoyed by white municipal governments. However, black local
governments still face critical problems of limited powers,
inadequate financial resources, and lack of political
credibility. In 1989, in Soweto, well-known black
nationalists took over from the elected council, and South
African provincial authorities negotiated with them an end to
the 3-year rent boycott.
The Government has proposed some formulas to give blacks a
limited role in the political process, including in 1985
multiracial Regional Services Councils and in 1986 a National
Council to serve in an advisory capacity regarding a new
constitutional structure for South Africa. These efforts have
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been viewed by critics as devices to give the appearance but
not the reality of power sharing.
In 1989 the Government appeared to recognize that such limited
steps were pointless and that new political structures for
South Africa would have to come through negotiations. In the
unfolding political process, ANC leader Nelson Mandela,
assumed a new importance. Imprisoned in 1964 after his
conviction for sabotage in the 1964 "Rivonia" trial, Mandela
was moved from Robben Island Prison in 1988 to Pollsmoor
Prison and subsequently to a cottage on a prison farm near
Cape Town. In July then-State President P.w. Botha had an
unprecedented meeting with Mandela, and in December State
President De Klerk also met with Mandela. There was no
information available on the substance of these meetings, but
after each there was increased speculation that Mandela might
be released soon.
In the first months of the new administration. President De
Klerk met with other black leaders, including Bishop Tutu,
Reverend Alan Boesak, and Reverend Chickane, who presented a
list of demands believed to be close to ANC positions. These
included: ending the SOE; lifting all restrictions on
political activists; and releasing all prisoners detained
without trial. De Klerk, in signaling an interest in
negotiations, rejected an ANC demand for an interim
multiracial government while a new constitution was being
worked out. At the end of 1989, contact between exiled ANC
and various internal political pressure groups had become
increasingly common. Unofficial meetings reportedly also
occurred between the ANC and members of the Afrikaner
Broederbond. De Klerk also made a number of visits to African
countries, including Mozambique, to stress publicly his
interest in improving relations with these countries.
In October State President De Klerk announced the
unconditional release of eight prominent long-term security
prisoners. Among them were five of the original Rivonia
defendants, including former ANC Secretary-General Walter
Sisulu and Commander-in-Chief of the ANC military wing,
Umkhonto We Sizwe, Raymond Mhlaba, as well as Ahmed Kathrada,
Elias Motsoaledi, and Andrew Mlangweni. Also released were
Oscar Mpetha, South Africa's oldest political prisoner, who
has been described as the "father of trade unionism" in South
Africa; Jafta Masemola, a PAC activist and South Africa's
longest-serving political prisoner following his conviction of
high treason in 1963; and Wilton Mkwayi , also a former
Commander-in-Chief of Umkhonto We Sizwe.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government extends little cooperation to various United
Nations bodies or private organizations attempting to
investigate its human rights record. Since an October 1986
vote by an ICRC conference in Geneva to expel a South African
Government delegation, the Government has permitted the ICRC
to maintain only a reduced staff in South Africa. The
Government has been willing to allow the ICRC to visit only a
small percentage of those jailed for political reasons,
because of its restrictive definition of precisely who is a
political prisoner--generally those convicted under the ISA.
The ICRC continues to negotiate with the Government for access
to all prisoners convicted of security-related offenses.
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SOUTH AFRICA
including those detained under the SOE. In 1989, to protest
the Government's lack of response on this issue, the ICRC did
not visit any category of prisoners for the fourth consecutive
year .
Despite continued official and extraof f icial harassment, many
South African organizations continued to observe, report, and
contest human rights violations. Lawyers for Human Rights,
the Black Sash, the Human Rights Commission, the Legal
Resources Center, the South African Council of Churches, the
University of the Witwatersrand Center for Applied Legal
Studies, the Human Rights Trust in Port Elizabeth, and other
groups are actively involved in a wide range of human rights
issues and assist persons who are aggrieved by the apartheid
and security laws.
Activists involved in these and other human rights monitoring
organizatinns are often subjected to personal harassment,
including office break-ins, sabotage of automobiles,
threatening phone calls, opened mail, and loss of jobs. A
number of human rights monitors and lawyers have been
detained. Acts of violence against some of these groups have
resulted in their being asked to vacate office premises or
venues for their activities. Some of these acts are probably
carried out by rightwing groups outside of the Government.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
South Africa's black majority and, to a somewhat lesser
extent, the "colored" and Asian communities, suffer from
pervasive, legally sanctioned discrimination based on race in
political, economic, and social aspects of life. For example,
per capita expenditure for education is about six times
greater for whites than for blacks. Black enrollment at white
universities has been growing slowly. In 1989 security forces
relaxed their strong presence around some universities, though
they continued targeting student activists in secondary
schools in many of the major townships ^or detention and
intimidation.
Women of all races in South Africa suffer varying degrees of
legal, cultural, and economic discrimination, most of which is
based on tradition rather than codified in law. Women
traditionally earn lower wages than men. Rita Venter, who
occupies the portfolio of Minister of National Health and
Population Development, became the first woman named to serve
as a minister in the Government. Women generally have
achieved more success in electoral politics at the local than
at the national level.
Black women suffer not only from discrimination under
apartheid, but also from legal disabilities based on sex.
Parliament passed legislation in 1988 which brought the
marriage laws for blacks into line with those for whites.
Black women married subsequent to the legislation have legal
rights to community property accumulated during the marriage.
Maternity benefits are not guaranteed to women of any race
under South African law, and pregnancy is a legal basis for
dismissal from a job. A women's rights movement has taken
hold in South Africa, and women's organizations, often
multiracial, have been at the forefront of the struggle
against both race and sex discrimination.
Women activists believe that violence against women in South
Africa is on the increase. Though the Government has enacted
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legislation to help protect women, in practice police are
unresponsive to complaints against domestic violence. Cases
often are not pursued nor investigated properly. A major
problem for women in South Africa has been collecting
financial support from former spouses in cases of divorce.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
South Africa's Labor Relations Act entitles all workers in the
private sector freely to join labor unions of their own
choosing. Although reliable statistics are unavailable, it is
likely that more than 2 million workers were members of trade
unions in 1989, and probably more than 1 million of those
members were black. Black union membership has increased
around ten-fold since legislation a decade ago granted blacks
full status as employees with the right to form free and
independent trade unions. According to South Africa's
Ministry of Manpower, total union membership in 1989
represented approximately 24 percent of the nonagricultural
work force.
South Africa's unions are independent of direct government
control. The system of apartheid, however, impinges on all
nonwhite workers and unionists, limiting their rights of
political protest, access to legal process, and freedom of
expression. As unions have increasingly assumed the role of
voicing black worker demands for political rights, the
Government has imposed restrictions on their political
activities. The Government in February 1988 issued an order,
often ignored, which officially prohibits the country's
largest trade union confederation, COSATU, from engaging in
political activities. The Government also has banned numerous
trade union gatherings or restricted their agendas to
"nonpolitical" issues.
In that connection, police have raided union offices
throughout South Africa. In a raid on COSATU headquarters in
August 1989 they seized a number of union documents. A South
African court later ruled the seizure illegal and ordered the
documents returned. Police then corrected their previous
procedural violation and reseized the same documents. On the
same day they raided COSATU headquarters, police raided the
headquarters of the Food and Beverage Workers Union, an
affiliate of NACTU, also seizing union documents.
In addition, although reliable statistics are unavailable,
scores of trade unionists have been detained for varying
periods by the police during the past year under SOE and ISA
regulations. Just prior to national elections in early
September, seven out of nine of COSATU' s regional secretaries
were either detained or went into hiding in fear of being
detained. Shortly thereafter, police detained an official of
the National Union of Mineworkers, the nation's largest union,
whom they held for 5 days.
South Africa extended the right to strike, long enjoyed by
white workers, to all private sector workers regardless of
race in 1979. Since then work stoppages triggered by
collective bargaining disputes, and occasionally political
issues, have been commonplace. The number of strikes in 1989
appeared to be on the increase, but was still far less than in
1987, a particularly turbulent year. A survey of 168 strikes
in the first 9 months of 1989 revealed that almost 65 percent
involved disputes over wages.
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In September 1988 the Government amended South Africa's Labor
Relations Act in a way regarded by workers' organizations as
favoring employers over unions. Seen as particularly damaging
to union strength is a section of the Act that imposes
responsibility on unions to compensate employers financially
in the case of an illegal strike. The Act also limits unions'
right to conduct strikes, especially sympathy and intermittent
strikes, as well as undermining established rights in the area
of unfair dismissal and making it easier for racially
exclusive (white) minority unions to preserve access to the
official bargaining forums. Trade unions have focused major
efforts against this and other sections of the Act since it
was enacted, and COSATU has filed a complaint with the
International Labor Organization (ILO) claiming that the law
abridges the right to strike and gives preference to racially
based unions.
South African law prohibits public employees from, striking. A
commission makes annual wage estimates for public employees,
and legislation governing each public service sector
establishes machinery for collective bargaining with staff
associations and dispute resolution. In most public service
sectors, disputes are referred to the appropriate minister and
then to arbitration or mediation if necessary. Public sector
conciliation machinery is currently being reviewed to see if
it is adequate.
South Africa does not restrict union affiliation with regional
or international labor organizations. The country's two
largest confederations, COSATU and NACTU, however, have chosen
not to seek such affiliations. Many of their affiliates as
well as independent unions, though, have affiliated with trade
secretariats and developed contacts with their counterparts in
North America and Western Europe. It is not unusual, however,
for the Government to deny passports to trade unionists for
international travel and to deny visas to Western trade
unionists for travel to South Africa. A member of the ILO
from its inception in 1919, South Africa withdrew from the
organization in 1964 but remains bound by the ILO conventions
which it has ratified.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
South African law prohibits discrimination by employers
against union members and organizers. The Government does not
interfere directly with union organizing in the private sector
and has generally not intervened in the collective bargaining
process. Excluded from the statutory system of industrial
councils for 50 years, black unions developed a collective
bargaining tradition of their own. Unassisted by statute,
collective bargaining relations were established by agreement
(called "recognition agreements") at the level of the
enterprise on the basis of majority representation. Private
mediation services are available and have been voluntarily
resorted to by management and the black trade unions to
resolve industrial disputes. The Labor Relations Act
establishes an industrial court to rule in labor-management
disputes, and its decisions appear to be balanced. The most
common complaints filed with the court concern dismissals,
followed by unfair labor practices. Many observers believe,
however, that the amendments made to the Labor Relations Act
last year have skewed the Act, and therefore the industrial
court, to favor employers. A new labor appeals court now
oversees the industrial court and can overturn its decisions.
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Nevertheless, collective bargaining is freely practiced
throughout the country with the major exceptions being public
servants, farm workers, and domestic servants, who are not
covered by the Labor Relations Act. In addition. South
African labor law does not cover the so-called independent
homelands which for the most part do not have labor
legislation to match that of the Labor Relations Act. There
are also reports that the "independent" homelands discourage
trade union organizing. Excluding the homelands, labor laws
and practices are applied uniformly throughout the country.
There are no export processing zones or special labor regimes
for export processing firms in South Africa.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
South Africa does not constitutionally or statutorily prohibit
forced labor; however, the country's system of Roman-Dutch
common law does not permit it, and it is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act prohibits the
employment of minors under age 15 in most industries, shops,
and offices. The Mines and Works Act prohibits minors under
16 from working underground. There is no restriction,
however, on the age at which a person may work in agriculture.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no legal minimum wage in South Africa. The Labor
Relations Act instead provides a mechanism for negotiations
between labor and management to set minimum wage standards
industry by industry. At present over 100 industries covering
most nonagricultural workers come under the provisions of the
Act. A recent survey by the Institute for Industrial
Relations found the average minimum wage in negotiated
settlements with unions in 1989 to be approximately $260 per
month. The same survey indicated that union-negotiated wage
increases are running ahead of inflation. In comparison, a
different survey estimated the minimum monthly household
subsistence level for a black family of six in the
Johannesburg area to be approximately $230. It should be
noted that the current exchange rate understates the domestic
purchasing power of the rand.
Attention to health and safety issues has increased in recent
years. The Occupational Safety Act sets forth minimum
standards for work conditions and employment. The Act
mandates minimum standards for workplace environment and
machinery which are enforced by inspectors from the Ministry
of Manpower. Although its statistics are disputed by some,
the State-funded National Occupational and Safety Association
claims that the number of workers suffering disabling injuries
annually has dropped from 2.4 percent to 1.6 percent over the
last 10 years. Most industries have a standard workweek of 46
hours, as well as vacation and sick leave. Overtime is
voluntary and limited to 10 hours a week. Work conditions in
the homelands appear to be less advanced than in the rest of
South Africa.
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On June 30, 1989, in a bloodless coup d'etat, a group of
brigadiers and colonels in the Sudanese People's Armed Forces
(SPAF), led by Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, overthrew Sudan's
3-year-old democratic government, then headed by Prime
Minister Sadiq al Mahdi . The new regime controls all the
territory controlled by the Sadiq Government, but much of the
south remains in the hands of the Sudanese People's Liberation
Army/Movement (SPLA/M) , led by John Garang. The coup leaders
arrested over 300 leading figures (most of whom were freed by
year's end), imposed a strict curfew, suspended Sudan's 1986
transitional constitution, abrogated press licenses, and
dissolved all political and trade union institutions. The
leaders then instituted a "National Salvation Revolutionary
Command Council" (RCC) of 15 members, drawn exclusively from
the military. The RCC justified the coup by condemning
Sadiq's Government for corruption and ineffectiveness,
especially in economic areas and in its failure to end the
civil war with the SPLA/M.
The SPAF numbers about 75,000 men and is largely responsible
for Sudan's internal and external security. Martial law has
been in effect in government-controlled areas of the south for
some time, and now extends to the north as well. A state of
emergency (SOE) that permits various arbitrary government
actions has been periodically renewed outside the south since
1985 and has been jointly enforced by the military, the
police, and the Ministry of Interior.
Sudan's economy is primarily agricultural. Although the
country is trying to diversify its cash crops, cotton and
cottonseed still account for more than 50 percent of export
earnings. The economy has been devastated by the expensive
civil war (which costs perhaps $1 million per day), high
inflation (100 percent in the first 6 months of 1989), high
unemployment, up to 700,000 refugees from neighboring
countries, and perhaps 3 million displaced persons among the
Sudanese.
Many of the serious human rights violations previously noted
in Sudan continued in 1989 under both the Sadiq and Omar
Governments. The RCC abolished Sudan's largely free press,
dissolved Sudanese labor organizations, and suspended legal
due process by instituting arbitrary arrest, detention without
charge, and trial of civilians by military courts. The
continuation of Islamic law (Shari'a) throughout Sudan
remained a major cause of southern disaffection, although the
implementation of its more severe punishments has remained in
abeyance since 1985.
Government forces and government-armed militias committed many
human rights abuses, especially in the south, as did the
SPLA/M (although reports from SPLA/M-controlled areas are more
fragmentary). Military operations by both sides have left
large areas of Sudan largely unpopulated and opened
opportunities for banditry, especially along the Ugandan
border. Few of the 3 million displaced persons (including 1
million near Khartoum) were resettled. Many still lack proper
food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.
Both before and after the coup, the SPAF, its affiliated
militias, and the SPLA/M interfered with relief efforts and
attacked civilians. Various cease-fires were accepted but
then broken by one party or the other throughout the year. At
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SUDAN
times, both sides adopted a more responsible policy toward the
passage of relief supplies, but both sides also continued to
block such supplies from time to time. In November the
Government closed Sudanese air space to all relief flights,
and the SPLA/M imposed a 72-hour advance notice requirement
for relief flights. At year's end relief donors were
apprehensive that the suffering of tens of thousands of
civilians would continue and perhaps even worsen.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Government forces under both Sadiq and Omar were directly
implicated in some instances of extrajudicial killing. In
Meiram (Southern Kordofan) in April, soldiers beat to death a
Dinka stopped at an army roadblock. Two of his companions
were left bound for many hours and eventually had their arms
amputated as a result. No charges were filed. In July a
soldier in Omdurman shot a young boy who had apparently
annoyed him selling cigarettes.
The Sadiq Government appeared to condone human rights abuses
by the military. General Burma Nassir, reportedly the
architect in the mid-1980s of the policy of arming the
militias (which committed widespread human rights abuses), was
appointed to high positions under Sadiq. Major General Abu
Gurun similarly received career-enhancing promotions, although
his tenure as commander in the Wau area was marked by abuses
ranging from starvation to crucifixions.
Some actions by the Omar Government suggested a somewhat
different attitude. General Burma Nassir was detained and Abu
Gurun was forced to retire from government service. Soldiers
recently accused of the revenge killings of 10-15 civilians
and other atrocities in Wau were at least relieved, although
not disciplined. The abolition of Sudan's formerly vigorous
press hampered reporting of human rights abuses. Under the
Sadiq Government, reports of extrajudicial killing appeared
with some frequency in Sudanese newspapers.
b. Disappearance
Reports of disappearances were fragmentary, but numerous
witnesses suggested that the army, security police, and
militias in the Nuba Mountains region of Southern Kordofan
were responsible for disappearances in 1989. One report
alleged that Nuba tribesmen arrested for suspected SPLA/M
affiliation were removed from holding areas and "disappeared,"
allegedly to provide space for new detainees. Tribal militias
were also accused of abductions for forced labor and of
practicing slavery, especially upon displaced Dinkas.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Both government and SPLA forces were accused of ill-treatment
of civilians, (see Section l.g.).
In 1983 under President Nimeiri, the Sudanese Government
adopted a version of Shari'a (Islamic) law that prescribes
harsh corporal punishments called "Hudud," also known as the
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"September Laws." Similar provisions were proposed to the
former constituent assembly in 1988 by Hassan al Turabi,
Secretary General of the National Islamic Front (NIF) , after
the NIF's inclusion in the Government. The assembly set aside
the proposal without rejecting it.
Hudud punishments include amputation, hanging, and beheading,
and such sentences were handed down in 1989. As in 1988,
however, no Hudud sentences were carried out under either the
Sadiq or Omar Governments. Some 400 convicted prisoners still
await execution of Hudud sentences. The Omar Government had
not clarified its position on Hudud, and the SPLA/M strongly
rejected suggestions of a national plebiscite on Shari'a.
General Omar declared that the September Laws, which the
SPLA/M strongly opposed and are a major barrier to peace, are
negotiable, but the Government also reportedly recalled two
architects of the September Laws to draft a new Islamic
constitution.
By contrast, sentences of flogging were routinely passed and
carried out before the coup. Reports indicated that the
standard sentence for drinking alcohol was 40 lashes. Such
punishments are often inflicted summarily. In August Khartoum
police allegedly arrested two factory workers and a baker for
curfew violations and immediately gave each 20 lashes.
Other reports since the coup suggest brutality by some
soldiers, police, and security and prison officials. Boys
selling items in the Khartoum markets were rounded up and
beaten. Official sources acknowledged the floggings and
roundups and promised closer supervision of the police.
Although reported police brutality declined after this
commitment was made, unnecessary harassment by security forces
continued in 1989. There were also persistent reports of
beatings and other forms of torture inflicted on detainees and
others in government penal institutions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Sudan's Criminal Code continued substantially unchanged in
1989. Arrests must be followed by a statement of charges
within a prescribed time, and the accused is to be brought
before a court within 48 hours of arrest, informed of the
charges, and allowed legal counsel. Bail is permitted except
in some capital cases. But the state of emergency and martial
law after the coup permit the Government wide powers of arrest
and preventive detention for an indefinite period. Although
most prisoners were allowed visitors, there were a few reports
of prisoners held incommunicado, mostly trade unionists and
Communists considered by the authorities to be troublemakers.
Military authorities in southern and western areas may detain
people without charge on suspicion of cooperation or sympathy
with the rebellion. As the incident at Meiram indicates
(Section l.a.), this power is sometimes abused.
Under the Sadiq Government, there were few political prisoners
in northern Sudan. Fifteen persons were arrested, however, in
December 1988 following an alleged coup attempt. They
included a number of top politicians and former military
officers who allegedly supported former President Nimeri.
They were subsequently released after the June 30 coup.
The situation with regard to political detainees/prisoners
changed dramatically with the coup on June 30. The Omar
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Government suspended legal due process and declared a
nationwide state of emergency (SOE) that gave the Government
wide-ranging arbitrary powers. The Government initially
detained without warrants more than 300 people, including many
of Sudan's prominent political and academic figures. They
were later joined by academics who had petitioned against the
regime's actions and by about 60 judges. Many detainees,
including Sadiq al Mahdi, remained confined without charge in
Kobar and other prisons at the end of 1989. At least 35 trade
unionists were transferred to Shala Prison in El Fasher,
approximately 400 miles from Khartoum. In September several
Communists were detained, allegedly for instigating a protest
against the Government by students at Khartoum University.
When eight labor union leaders petitioned in August against
the Omar Government's decree abolishing unions, they were also
detained. Government officials later claimed that the unions
had been a major source of Sudan's problems, and that the RCC
would tolerate no challenge to its authority. These actions
were condemned by other labor organizations, including the
Organization of African Trade Union Unity and the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations.
When the doctors' union staged a nationwide strike in late
November-early December, the Government detained about 30
physicians, at least one of whom was severely beaten. Several
physicians were later tried, and two convicted, for
"instigating discord and war against the State."
Conditions of imprisonment for the detainees in Kobar prison
are relatively mild, and many were freed over the months
following the coup. Sarra al-Fadil al-Mahdi, wife of Sadiq,
was detained in September and confined under more rigorous
conditions in Omdurman Women's Prison. Sadiq's other wife,
Hafia Hussein Sherif, was also briefly detained but released.
During this period the Government began to file charges,
usually related to wrongful expenditure of public funds,
against former officials of the Sadiq Government. Although
summary arrest and detention procedures continued to be used,
the Omar Government began to reconstruct a functioning if more
politicized system of justice, and detentions on political
grounds in northern Sudan became infrequent.
There were approximately 150 political detainees held without
charge in Sudan at year's end.
There were no known cases of involuntary exile in 1989. With
regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Under the Sadiq Government, the Sudanese legal system was
controlled by tlie transitional constitution of 1985 and
Sudanese legal codes, including the penal code adopted in
September 1983 (the September Laws). In addition, the SOE law
of December 1987 gave authorities extensive emergency powers.
The legal system involved a variety of courts, including the
Supreme Court, civil, criminal, and Shari'a (Islamic) courts.
Abolition in 1986 of the executive power to form special state
security courts ensured that the regular criminal courts would
try all prisoners. Such proceedings involved extensive
guarantees of due process, including arrest pursuant to a
warrant, public trials before a three-judge panel, the right
of defendants to speak and present evidence on their own
behalf and to obtain counsel, and appeals through a series of
359
courts to the high court of appeals. Christian law graduates
were and are required to pass a proficiency examination in
Islamic law to practice law in Sudan. Tribal law continues to
be important in rural areas, where disputes largely involve
land, water, and family concerns. Courts also exist to
monitor the activities of merchants and can impose prison
sentences for fraud and operating without a business license.
Both the judicial system and the judiciary have changed since
the coup. One of the RCC's first decrees on June 30 abolished
the 1986 transitional constitution and transferred all power
over Sudan's constitution and laws to the RCC. The same
decree also provided that existing laws remained valid and
that nonpolitical constitutional institutions continued,
although they would be required to enforce any changes in the
laws approved by the RCC. The RCC removed and detained some
60 judges, about one-tenth of the Sudanese bench. The
judiciary was transferred to the Ministry of Justice, and the
Chief Justice, formerly elected by sitting judges, was
appointed by General Omar.
In place of the former system, a dual court structure based on
three sources of law developed in 1989. Civilian courts
continued to exist, albeit short of staff and less independent
of the executive. Such courts continued to handle the large
backlog of cases dating from before June 30. They applied the
1983 Criminal Code (the September Laws) to try ordinary
criminal offenses, including theft and even some capital
crimes; civil cases continued to be handled largely according
to previous laws, generally derived from British colonial
models. Other courts were established to monitor conformity
with government-established prices for certain goods.
The RCC also established numerous special military tribunals,
typically comprised of three field-grade officers. These
courts were used extensively to try officials from the Sadiq
Government. In each case, the defendants were charged with
crimes against the 1983 Criminal Code, usually corruption.
The defendants were allowed counsel of their choice. In the
first such case, however, involving former Supreme Council
member Idris al Banna, the defendant's attorney was not
allowed to present a defense. Defendants subsequently were
formally granted the right to counsel, and it was announced
that Idris al Banna would be allowed to appeal the denial of
effective counsel in his case. The trials were televised and
open to the public.
The military courts also tried nonpolitical civilian
defendants accused of offenses specified in the SOE. Such
crimes included possession of hashish and currency-exchange
violations. The military courts also try offenses against the
decrees of the RCC, which, along with the 1983 Penal Code and
the SOE law, comprise the current Sudanese criminal code.
Sentences given convicted defendants, both political and
nonpolitical, have been severe by Sudanese standards,
including long prison terms and confiscation of property.
An RCC decree on June 30 allowed the seizure of land, money,
or commodities for the public welfare without reimbursement
and for the seizure of the property of businesses under
suspicion of resisting the Omar Government (pending legal
determination of the case) . These decrees were used to
enforce price controls.
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Late in 1989 the military courts, which tried a limited number
of cases, were discontinued in favor of state security courts,
each staffed by three civilian judges. Like the military
tribunals, these courts constitute a separate group of
security courts parallel to the regular criminal and civil
system. They are intended to try persons accused of
violations of constitutional decrees, emergency regulations,
and some sections of the penal code, but defendants in these
courts receive greater benefit from due process provisions
than did those in the former military courts, including the
assistance of counsel empowered to address the court and
access to a court of appeals.
In November the Government created another new set of security
courts. According to the Special Courts Act of November 29,
the military governors of the regions and the commissioner of
the national capital can form special courts with jurisdiction
parallel to that of the state security courts. The special
security courts can be formed of three military officers or
any three competent persons, and those created had both
military and civilian judges. Attorneys can sit with
defendants as "friends of the court" and advise them, but
cannot themselves address the court. Sentences given by the
special security courts are to be implemented immediately,
except that death sentences must be approved by the Chief
Justice and the Head of State. Defendants can file appeal
briefs with the Chief Justice. The Government referred most
security cases to these courts, leaving the civilian state
security courts largely without a docket.
The special security courts quickly became noted for their
severe sentences. In December two defendants convicted of
illegal possession of foreign currency and a third defendant
convicted of currency smuggling were sentenced to death, as
was a physician convicted of involvement in an illegal strike
by doctors. Another physician involved in the strike was
sentenced to 15 years in prison; two other physicians were
acquitted. Despite international protests, on December 17 one
of those convicted of currency violations was hanged, along
with a drug traffcker convicted earlier.
In practice, the military courts and the succeeding special
revolutionary courts applied a mix of precoup laws and
postcoup decrees. The Attorney General's Office allegedly
monitors the trials of political prisoners, but its influence
is unclear.
The military courts convicted less than 100, perhaps even
fewer than 50 defendants during their 3-month existence.
Large areas of the south are controlled by the SPLA/M.
Reports indicated that a rudimentary system of justice based
on village leaders was being used in some of these areas, and
a similar system of justice was authorized by the Government
late in 1989 for the war-torn province of South Kordofan.
Under this system, a trusted village elder is appointed to
adjudicate disputes, as well as to collect taxes and recruit
soldiers and labor for the SPLA/M. SPLA offenders can be
tried and have reportedly been severely punished. Other
portions of these areas are outside effective judicial
procedures, and those accused are often not provided
recognizable due process. Some reports suggest that army
units summarily try and punish those accused of crimes,
especially offenses against civil order.
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f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Government surveillance in Sudan, outside the combat zones,
was rare before the coup. After June 30, security agencies
considerably expanded both the scope and intensity of their
activities throughout Sudan. Reports were received of petty
harassment of civilians and surveillance of church services by
security officers. After their release from detention in
December, leading political figures Mohamed Osman al Mirghani
and Hassan al Turabi were confined to house arrest, their
families were kept under surveillance, and all visitors other
than family were required to obtain government permission.
Complaints about searches of homes without warrants also
increased. In one case, armed police or soldiers without
warrants reportedly entered homes in the Khartoum area
occupied by displaced persons from southern Sudan. They
allegedly confiscated equipment used for home brewing (a
traditional if illegal moneymaking sideline for southern
Sudanese women), marked the homes with red paint, and forbade
the families to reenter them.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Both government forces and government-affiliated militias as
well as the SPLA/M used excessive force and acted contrary to
humanitarian law. Allegations of chemical weapons use by the
SPAF, however, appeared unfounded.
In January witnesses reported that in Allubi (Southern
Kordofan) in December 1988 some 150 SPAF soldiers and 5
officers engaged in a spree of looting, rape, and torture of
civilians. Other reports suggested similar activities by the
SPAF in the area of Tira El Akhdar that resulted in the
burning of seven villages and the killing of eight villagers.
Other reports of such activities, including in the west, were
received following the coup. In several cases, army units
reacted to perceived SPLA/M attacks by ferociously attacking
the Dinka sections of nearby towns, killing substantial
numbers of villagers. In one case, the unit commander
reportedly was transferred, but no reports were received of
disciplinary action against the soldiers who committed the
atrocities. Government forces in Malakal forbade civilians to
leave the town with enough rations to return to their villages
and plant crops, effectively making the civilians prisoners in
the town. East of Wau, the SPAF reportedly established a
"free-fire zone" to discourage settlement. Army officers have
also admitted rape and theft of relief supplies by soldiers in
southern garrisons.
A particularly notable violation of humanitarian law occurred
in the eastern Equatoria town of Torit, a center for relief
activities. On June 1 an SPAF bomber appeared over the
airport at Torit, which had recently been occupied by the
SPLA/M. The plane made two runs on the airport, dropping
several large bombs that narrowly missed a German Air Force
transport, loaned to a relief agency and appropriately
marked. Representatives of several donor nations protested
the attack, which also caused a temporary suspension of German
airborne relief in the area. A similar bombing was reported
at about the same time on a village near Torit, resulting in
several wounded civilians. After the fall of Kurmuk to the
SPLA/M in October, SPAF planes bombed the SPLA-held towns of
Yirol and Waat. The attack on Yirol killed 4 civilians and
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wounded 10, and bombs narrowly missed a clearly marked ICRC
hospital. The Government subsequently denied responsibility
for these two incidents.
Information on SPLA/M violations of humanitarianm law has been
more difficult to obtain. SPLA/M forces, however, reportedly
raped displaced persons fleeing besieged towns and were
accused of planting land mines indiscriminately in the war
zone. There are reports that during the siege of Juba the
SPLA fired rockets into the town on several occasions. These
attacks reportedly killed more than 20 people, most of them
women and children. In the Juba area, the SPLA also stole
relief food from the inhabitants. When the SPLA/M took the
town of Torit in February, SPLA fighters reportedly pillaged,
raped, and killed civilians there. In late December, a relief
plane of the French organization Medicins Sans Frontieres was
shot down while taking off from the government-held town of
Aweil. The Government stated that the SPLA/M was responsible,
but there was no independent confirmation of that claim.
Government forces and government-armed militias were accused
of attacking groups fleeing the widening area of the conflict,
preventing civilians from growing their own food through
indiscriminate planting of land mines, and confiscating relief
supplies intended for civilians for sale on the black market.
The government-armed tribal militias (especially members of
the Misseriyyah, Fertit, Taposa, and Ruzeigat tribes) made
many attacks on their longstanding tribal opponents,
particularly the Dinka, the most important source of support
for the SPLA/M. In late December, Arab militia of the Sabha
tribe killed over 200 Shilluk tribesmen in El Jebelein in
reprisal for the murder of an Arab landowner. The Government
announced several arrests and an investigation of the
incident. Militia activity was especially vicious in the Nuba
Mountains region of Southern Kordofan. The Sadiq Government
routinely ignored abuses of human rights by the militias. In
July the Omar Government brokered a settlement in El Fasher
that reduced strife between the Fur tribe and government-armed
groups that had been attacking the Fur.
However, the Omar Government was not able to disarm the
militias, which also received weapons through neighboring
states, including Chad. In November a government decree
establishing "Popular Defense Forces" substantially
implemented a controversial proposal, initially made under the
Sadiq government by the National Islamic Front and parts of
the Umma party, to legitimate the militias. Government
control over the militias remained limited in 1989, although
the decree suggested means for closer government supervision.
A portion of one militia group, the Anyanya II, turned against
the Government and now supports the SPLA/M; another faction
remained loyal to the Government. In one case, the portion of
the Anyanya II militia loyal to the Government reportedly
visited villages near Abyei and engaged repeatedly in pillage,
torture, killing, and rape of civilians who they alleged were
SPLA/M supporters. Instances of enslavement of displaced
persons and refugees were also reported (see Section 5). One
observer found these areas ruled by "the law of the gun."
Despite these limitations of control, the Government's
historic policy of providing weapons to the militias and
failing to investigate or punish atrocities committed by them
associates the Government with the militias' actions. The
SPLA/M also reportedly armed tribal militias in the Nuba area,
although on a smaller scale.
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Both sides in the civil war took prisoners, although the SPAF
reportedly held only SPLA/M officers. The ICRC was able to
visit 8 SPLA/M prisoners held by the Government and 150
government prisoners held by the SPLA/M. The total number of
prisoners visited is only a small number of the prisoners held
by both sides.
Both sides interfered with relief operations in 1989. Before
the coup. Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi acknowledged the
unauthorized distribution of relief supplies by a local
official from stocks at Aweil. The SPLA/M reportedly attacked
some relief convoys moving through SPLA/M-controlled
territory. Other convoys were held up by negotiations between
the Government and the SPLA/M over the proportion of supplies
to be left in SPLA/M hands. Heavy mining on some southern
roads greatly obstructed movement of relief convoys by land.
Civilians suffered from mistreatment by some local
townspeople, attacks by armed militias, occasional military
harassment of relief workers, and lack of humanitarian
assistance from the army and SPLA/M themselves. Movement of
food supplies by land to Juba, the largest town in the south,
was blocked by the SPLA/M, forcing the 300,000 residents to
rely on the uncertainties of airlift.
While civilian deaths in the civil war and tribal fighting
were again high in 1989, interference or failure of both sides
in the civil war to cooperate with food relief efforts and the
subsequent closure of airspace to relief flights, government
corruption and inefficiency, and lack of medical treatment
continued to be the major causes of death in the areas
affected by the civil war in 1989. Overall in 1989 there were
fewer deaths than in 1988, due in part to massive humanitarian
efforts and intermittent cooperation. This improvement was
threatened in November by the Government's closure of Sudanese
air space to relief flights following the fall of Kurmuk, to
which the SPLA/M responded by imposing a 72-hour notification
rule for flights over SPLA/M-held territory.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Under the Sadiq Government, Sudanese citizens had substantial
freedom of speech and press, at least outside the war-torn
southern areas. Parliamentary debate was free and criticism
of the Government intense. Print media were lively and
expressed a wide variety of Sudanese opinion. Political
parties published their own newspapers, and independent
journals presented a full range of opinions. Human rights
abuses were often, if not always reliably, reported on,
especially by English-language newspapers. Radio, television,
and the Sudanese News Agency (SUNA) were under government
control and tended to reflect government policies. Academic
freedom was generally respected, and student groups held free
elections for their leaders.
Despite this substantial freedom of the press, there were
limitations. In early 1989 the Sadiq Government fired the
SUNA management, reportedly for not being sufficiently Islamic
in their reporting. At the same time, the Cabinet began
reconsideration of a new press law that would have imposed
substantial limits on reporting, including banning attacks on
religions and on Sudan's foreign policy. In March the Sadiq
Government used the SOE law to arrest the editor of a biweekly
newspaper, producing a protest from the Sudanese Journalists
Association.
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The coup on June 30 radically changed this situation. Public
expression of opposition viewpoints was banned; the broadcast
media were tightly controlled; and licenses for all
nongovernment publications were cancelled. For some time the
only internal news sources were the SPAF organ Armed Forces,
SUNA, and radio and television--all government controlled. In
August the Omar Government authorized a second daily
newspaper. Modern Sudan. In September a third journal.
National Salvation, appeared. Modern Sudan and National
Salvation became the general daily papers, and Armed Forces
returned to its previous situation as an irregularly published
organ for the armed forces. All three journals reflect
government views and are in Arabic only. Also in September
Sudanow, an English-language government magazine, reappeared
in a limited press run.
Although a new press law under discussion could permit
independent publications in the future, early return to the
previous conditions of press freedom is unlikely.
Academic freedom in Sudan has generally been respected, but
many university professors felt less secure after the coup. A
few professors and other leading intellectuals were detained
or taken in for questioning, although most were soon
released. An early decree of the RCC forbade universities to
shut down in protest.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Despite the banning of demonstrations under the SOE law by the
Sadiq Government, protests and marches periodically occurred.
The National Islamic Front (NIF) held numerous demonstrations
against the Sadiq Government in April, some of which became
violent. The SOE and banning of political activity decreed on
June 30 effectively eliminated the right to protest, and a
large student demonstration at the University of Khartoum
December 6 was firmly controlled by police forces, killing two
students .
Before the coup, Sudan had many political organizations and
parties. Professional and business associations met
regularly. They were routinely given the required permits and
licenses, and, outside the war zones in the south and west,
the Government usually did not become involved in their
proceedings .
On June 30, the RCC decreed that the registrations of all
nonreligious groups were canceled, and the groups were
effectively disbanded. In September the Government put
forward a program for reregistration of voluntary
organizations. As long as political activity remains banned,
it is unlikely that such organizations, even if reregistered,
would play the active role in politics that some did before
the coup.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Sudan is a multireligious country in both fact and law. Islam
and Christianity have both been formally recognized as
religions of Sudan, but adherents of other beliefs are not
legally restricted. Muslims are a majority in the five
northern regions and the capital, although the presence in
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these areas of over 3 million displaced persons from the south
(an area predominantly Christian and animist) is affecting
this balance. Foreign clergy may enter Sudan with certain
restrictions. They are most likely to be admitted if they
have certain technical skills, such as publishing, that are
difficult to obtain in Sudan; clergy without special skills
are less likely to be admitted. In general, clergy are
admitted to serve their own religious communities.
Proselytizing by Muslims is allowed, as is proselytizing by
Christians of non-Muslims; but proselytizing of Muslims is
discouraged and can provoke reactions. Religious believers
are free to engage in religious education and to participate
in religiously related charitable activities.
Despite these provisions, Islam has traditionally been favored
by the Government. Under the Foreign Missionary Society Act
of 1962, public Christian religious activity is subject to
close government supervision. Among other provisions, the Act
forbids the construction of churches without government
permits, which have not been issued for more than 10 years.
The Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference and the Sudan Council
of Churches both protested in 1989 against the Act, whose
broad provisions were often capriciously interpreted by local
officials .
Several incidents exacerbated sectarian tensions in 1989.
Before the coup, government officials in the south reportedly
seized property belonging to Christian churches, refused to
return it, and threatened those who protested the seizure. In
April the NIF, then in opposition, called for a "holy war"
against the Government and its supporters. Local groups
inspired by this appeal apparently interpreted it as an
incitement to attack Christian establishments. In the last 2
weeks of April, attacks were made against Christian churches,
centers, and schools in En Nahud (Northern Kordofan Province),
Port Sudan (Red Sea), El Kamlin (El Gezira), and two
establishments in Omdurman. In one of the Omdurman incidents,
a charity center operated by the Sisters of Mother Teresa of
Calcutta was attacked by a mob incited by the imam of a nearby
mosque. One of the nuns was severely beaten and the center
was stoned. The imam was arrested and sentenced to 2 months
in jail for disturbing the peace. In En Nahud, a Catholic
Church compound was invaded by a mob of NIF supporters, who
looted and ransacked the nuns' quarters and the parish
offices. No one was reported arrested for this attack. The
Sadiq Government discouraged participation in the NIF-led
demonstrations but did not use its emergency powers to ban
them.
In another incident, a Catholic catechist was reportedly
jailed and robbed by security forces in El Daein in Southern
Darfur. Personal papers he was carrying were also allegedly
destroyed, and one of the officers reportedly demanded that he
say Muslim prayers in order to be freed, which he refused to
do. After holding him for 11 days in custody without charge,
they released him at Umm Ruwaba in Northern Kordofan. No
reports were received of disciplinary actions against the
security officials involved.
When the SPLA/M captured Torit in February, its fighters
reportedly ransacked the home of Archbishop Paride Taban,
taking religious articles, vestments, books, and other
property. They also took the Archbishop and three Catholic
priests into custody and held them incommunicado for 2
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months. After international protests to the SPLA/M, they were
released in mid-May.
The coup on June 30 did not substantially affect religious
activities in Sudan. Religious organizations continued to
function essentially as before, and the decree revoking the
registration of other voluntary organizations exempted
religious bodies.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement in Sudan is hampered by the civil war, a
very limited transportation infrastructure, and government
restrictions. Exit visas are required to leave Sudan, a
requirement th' t has been used to restrict travel abroad. A
married Sudanese woman must have the permission of her husband
or another male relative to travel abroad, and regulations
specify that unmarried Sudanese women must travel with a
family member or other sponsor. The travel restrictions for
women vjere generally ignored before the coup, but after June
30 they were increasingly strictly enforced. Reports were
received of several women refused permission to board at
Khartoum airport because security officials did not believe
they had the required perm.ission or escort. Foreigners must
register with the police on entering the country, obtain
permission to move from one location to another, and register
again at the new location within 3 days of arrival.
After the coup, the Omar Government imposed additional travel
restrictions. A curfew was instituted in much of Sudan, and
suspected curfew violators are subject to detention or summary
floggings. Initially the Omar Government heavily restricted
travel abroad by Sudanese, and immediately after the coup
closed the Khartoum airport except for travel to Mecca in
Saudi Arabia by Muslim pilgrims. A government spokesman
stated in August that travel abroad (other than to Egypt) for
medical treatment was forbidden, explaining these measures as
necessary for improving production in Sudan. In practice,
Sudanese have experienced little difficulty in leaving the
country since the coup. Although Sudanese could move about
the country freely both before and after the coup, the Omar
Government tightened travel restrictions on foreigners
(especially diplomats), principally by requiring travel
permits that are sometimes difficult to obtain. These
restrictions sometimes hampered relief efforts.
The situation of displaced persons and refugees improved in
1989 by comparison with 1988. Natural catastrophes were less
severe, and under the umbrella of Operation Lifeline Sudan
relief supplies moved more easily than in 1988. Although mass
resettlement plans for the summer of 1989 were not carried
out, some forced resettlement reportedly occurred in the
Khartoum area in November and December, as well as in areas
affected by the civil war. The SPAF reportedly forced farmers
south of Kadugli to move from their villages, causing a major
influx of families into the town of Kadugli. Reports of
widespread starvation declined, but refugees and displaced
persons continued to lack medicines and other necessities.
Overall, Sudan's inability to resolve the civil war left the
number of displaced persons at about the 1988 level of some 3
million. Many of these people were concentrated in
shantytowns and squatter huts in and around Khartoum.
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Sudan's foreign refugee population (largely composed of
Ethiopians, Ugandans, and Chadians) was about 700,000. Sudan
has not forced the repatriation of refugees and has generally
accorded good treatment to refugees, although years of influx
have nearly exhausted the meager available resources for
refugees. Administrative problems halted almost all
resettlement of refugees to third countries from May 1988 to
April 1989, but the Omar Government seemed to have corrected
these problems by the end of 1989.
Large numbers of refugees have settled in the cities,
especially the capital area. Refugees are restricted in their
freedom to travel and own property, as are most non-Sudanese.
They also are not permitted to become resident aliens or
citizens of Sudan, regardless of the length of their stay.
An exception to the generally good treatment of refugees in
Sudan was the situation of Falashas (Ethiopian Jews) in
Umrakoba Camp. This group of 54 has been sequestered since
1984, has often been denied access to United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) protection officers, and
receives minimal support from the Sudanese Government, which
runs the camp. They are denied permission to travel and
isolated from the general population of the camp, and they
reportedly do not receive adequate health care.
Urban refugees face considerable problems. Reports of
harassment and petty thievery by police against refugees,
beatings for minor infractions of the law, administrative
obstruction and delays, and the need for small bribes to
obtain everything from work permits to food-ration cards are
common in urban areas. Refugees seldom have recourse to the
legal system when attacked by policemen. The UNHCR Protection
Officer reported that one group of refugees was imprisoned
without charge when found at the scene of a murder. Although
the murderer was promptly identified as Sudanese, the refugees
remained in prison for 8 weeks.
The Omar Government did not change the policy of the Sadiq
Government, instituted in 1987, of accepting genuine political
refugees but refusing refugees from famine.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
At the end of 1989, a military regime ruled, and the people of
Sudan had neither the right nor the ability peacefully to
change their government. A government spokesmen declared that
this situation will not change soon. In September the RCC
issued its "Third Constitutional Decree" establishing a new
governmental system for Sudan. It featured a head of state
(General Omar) with sovereign powers. The all-military RCC
continued as the legislative authority. A cabinet was
established consisting of a prime minister and other
ministers, all appointed by the RCC. The Cabinet was given
essentially administrative authority subject to the Head of
State and the RCC. The courts were brought under the Head of
State's supervision, and courts were specifically forbidden to
review acts of the RCC or the Head of State.
Under the Sadiq Government, Sudan had a multiparty
parliamentary system that guaranteed the right of citizens to
change their government. The system did not extend to large
parts of the south, where the civil war prevented the holding
of elections in 1986 in about half the electoral districts in
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southern Sudan, leaving empty 41 of the 301 seats in the
constituent assembly. The democratic Government could not end
the civil war as it was repeatedly deadlocked on the
political/religious issue of the constitutional basis of
government. A strict Islamic-based criminal code including
Hudud punishments was proposed in 1988 but never passed,
although the Shari ' a-based provisions of the September Laws
were never repealed and constituted a major issue in the civil
war. The Sadiq Government was never able to meet its goal of
holding a national constitutional conference.
When they assumed power on June 30, the military leaders
justified their action largely by citing the ineffectiveness
of the democratic government. Claiming sectarian bickering as
harmful to Sudan, they abolished all political parties, seized
(and later distributed) the parties' assets, and detained
(albeit in relatively mild conditions) the leaders of many
precoup parties. RCC decrees banned all political activity
and political parties. Under both the Sadiq and Omar
Governments, local and provincial officials were appointed by
the authorities in the capital. Most local officials
appointed after the coup were military officers.
The military Government publicly assigned a high priority to
ending the civil war. However, by the end of 1989 there had
been very little movement. John Garang, the leader of the
SPLA, has called for a "restructured, unified Sudan, a
multinationality country."
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government has traditionally been acutely sensitive to
local or foreign criticism of its human rights performance.
Several international human rights groups work actively in
Sudan. General Omar also invited a group of Western
ambassadors to examine the conditions of detention for
political detainees in Kobar prison, and the visit took place
on August 12. In September the Dinka intellectual, Francis
Deng, who is based in Washington, was also permitted to see
many political detainees in Kobar, including Sadiq al Mahdi,
Mohamed Osman Mirghani, and Hassan al Turabi.
Local human rights activists in Sudan have complained of being
regarded as subversive, and many reportedly were called in for
questioning by security officials both before and after the
coup. Neither the Sadiq nor the Omar Government instituted
any public investigations of alleged human rights abuses in
1989. In late November, however, the Government received a
delegation from Am.nesty International to discuss detention
without trial and other human rights concerns.
Until June 30, Sudan had several active organizations
monitoring human rights in the country, including the Sudan
Human Rights Association (SHRA) , the Sudan Bar Association
(SBA), and the Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference. Neither of
the first two produced in 1989 detailed studies of human
rights abuses in Sudan, and their status since the coup is
uncertain. The Bishops' Conference still exists and actively
monitors human rights concerns; its bimonthly newsletter
publicizes violations of human rights, especially those
involving religious discrimination. In late 1989, both the
Bishops' Conference and the Sudan Council of Churches drafted
public letters protesting religious discrimination.
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Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Sudan's population of 24.5 million (1989) is a multiethnic mix
of over 500 Arab and African tribes, with scores of languages
and dialects. In general, Sudan is composed primarily of two
cultures--Arab in the north and central areas and black
African in the south. Sudanese governments have historically
been dominated by northern Muslims (about 16 million). Some
southern tribal groups, especially non-Arabs and non-Muslims,
have demanded greater economic and political power and greater
recognition of Sudan's cultural diversity.
Discrimination in the north by the Muslim Arab majority
against displaced persons from the south is common, and many
reports were received in the past of attacks by Arab tribes in
the south against non-Arab southerners, especially members of
the Dinka tribe. Residents of Arabic-speaking areas who do
not themselves speak Arabic are discriminated against in
education, jobs, and other opportunities. University of
Khartoum entrance examinations also favor Arabic speakers.
Widespread popular attitudes in these areas also stereotype
dark-skinned non-Arab southerners as inferior and lazy,
leading to much informal discrimination against them.
Sudanese laws continue to favor men, and men and women
traditionally have segregated roles. Islamic laws of
inheritance award additional property to men, while
concurrently assigning them the duty of caring for their
extended families. Although education is freely open to both
sexes and many women obtain university education, women
traditionally receive less education and have fewer
opportunities than do men. Some women, however, have been
active in the professions, the media, education, and politics,
and at least one female presides over a court. Although not
numerous, women are found in both the police and the
military. Labor laws allegedly do not adequately protect the
self-employed, the bulk of the female work force. However,
one of the relatively few women's rights activists in Sudan
noted at an international conference in 1989 that Sudanese
women often did not avail themselves of the rights and
opportunities available to them, including access to the court
system.
Female genital mutilation (circumcision) is prevalent in
Sudan. Reports indicate that this practice, although
officially illegal, is very widespread, especially in the
north. Some reports suggest that over 90 percent of northern
women have been circumcised, with consequences that include
severe urinary problems, infections, and even death. The
so-called Pharaonic circumcision, the most severe of the three
forms of circumcision, is the most common and is usually
performed between the ages of 4 and 7 years. Few physicians
will perform the operation, which is most often done by
paramedical personnel in improvised, often unsanitary
conditions. The operation reportedly is expensive--
approximately $111 at the legal exchange rate — for a 10-minute
procedure. Southern women displaced to the north are
increasingly visiting circumcision on their daughters, even if
they themselves are not circumcised.
Women refugees are particularly vulnerable to harassment and
sexual abuse. Sexual favors are reportedly demanded of them
by some Sudanese officials in exchange for performance of
official duties. Stories of rape of women refugees by
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policemen are common, and women refugees without a male
provider are sometimes forced into prostitution to earn a
living .
Among certain southern tribes, forcible sexual intercourse is
common. No blame attaches to the practice, although the man
involved must pay a price (often in livestock) to the woman's
family if she becomes pregnant. In the same area, wives are
often received on a trial basis lasting up to 4 years. The
husband may dissolve the marriage during this time by
returning the wife to her family, although he must pay a price
for each child born during this time. Returned wives are
reportedly often able to contract further marriages and are
not stigmatized by having been returned.
The extent to which wife beating occurs is unknown; it is not
discussed as a public issue, and police do not normally
intervene in domestic disputes. There were no known reports
of wife beating in 1989, and no court cases involving either
circumcision or violence against women. However, for a
variety of reasons, many women would be reluctant to file a
formal complaint of such abuse.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Sudan had a strong labor union movement during the period of
the Sadiq government. Prominent labor organizations included
the Sudanese Workers Trade Union Federation (SWTUF) , which
represented blue-collar workers, the white-collar Sudanese
Employees and Clerks Federation (SFETU), the Sudanese Teachers
Federation, and a number of professional associations.
Sudanese unions lobbied actively and participated in
international, African, and Arab labor organizations. Except
for some government employees, strikes were legally
permissible after exhausting other measures to resolve
disputes. Technically illegal strikes were common and usually
tolerated .
The RCC's constitutional decree number 1 of June 30 abolished
all labor unions and forbade strikes. Labor union offices
were closed, and union assets were frozen. Many (probably
over 100) union officials, especially those active in
political parties, were detained or placed under house arrest
between July and September, some for protesting the
Government's action. Many were quickly released, but at least
35 union officials remained imprisoned in Shala Prison in late
1989, and others. were detained elsewhere. In September
General Omar announced the legalization of preliminary
committees to manage union affairs, pending the drafting of
new laws on union organization. Under this rubric, the SWTUF
was restored, with its leadership unchanged, and its assets
returned. Two other labor groups were also reinstated, and
efforts were under way to legalize the remaining unions at the
end of the year. Union officials were promised substantial
participation in the process of developing new labor
legislation.
Although the Government pledged to respect all labor rights
required by the International Labor Organization (ILO), it
continued to forbid strikes, as well as all labor activity by
unreinstated unions. The doctors' union, which had not been
reinstated, staged a nationwide strike in late November and
early December to protest the firing of government-employed
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physicians and to demand removal of the Omar Government and
restoration of democracy. In December a special security
court convicted two doctors of leading the strike. One was
sentenced to death, the other to 15 years in prison. Reports
also indicated that several members of the engineers union
were detained in December to prevent a suspected strike.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Under the 1985 transitional constitution, suspended on June
30, workers had the right to organize and to bargain
collectively, and unions did so actively. There were no
official constraints on union membership, and labor laws were
applied uniformly throughout the country (although with little
effect in the war areas) . Job creation and union membership
were limited primarily by Sudan's shattered economy.
On June 30 the RCC suspended the right to organize and bargain
collectively. These rights were restored to legalized unions
in September. Labor laws and practices are uniform throughout
the territory controlled by the Government.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Sudanese law strictly prohibits forced or compulsory labor.
Allegations of slavery, however, persisted in Sudan in 1989,
and the issue remained controversial. Although the Government
frequently denies the existence of slavery. Prime Minister
Sadiq al Mahdi acknowledged that Dinka children were enslaved
by Arab tribes and claimed that Arab children were taken by
Dinka tribes. He described the practice as a longstanding
one, involving mutual raiding and taking of captives, but
condemned it as "illegal" and "immoral." Slavery reportedly
exists primarily in remote parts of Sudan, especially those
where government control is weak and where displaced persons
fleeing the war zones come into contact with armed groups.
Informed sources suggest there could be many slaves in Sudan,
largely women and children doing agricultural and domestic
work and serving as concubines.
The revival of slavery is often blamed on economic pressures
and the civil war, especially the practice of arming tribal
militias. Most of the slaves allegedly are Dinkas abducted by
Arab militias, especially the Rizeigat and Misseriyah. One
report by a former army officer indicated that his entire
family had been killed or taken into slavery after a Rizeigat
attack on their village in 1987. Reports have also been
received in the past of Dinka children sold into slavery by
their parents to prevent their possible starvation.
Reports suggested that the SPLA/M often forced southern men to
work as laborers or porters or forcibly conscripted them into
SPLA ranks. In disputed territories this practice was
implemented through raids, while in SPLA/M-controlled areas it
was done through the SPLA/M-appointed village leader.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum age for workers is 16. This law is enforced
in the official or wage economy, but poverty in Sudan produces
widespread child labor in the informal economy. In rural
areas, children from a very young age assist their families
with agricultural work.
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e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Although Sudanese laws prescribe health and safety standards,
working conditions are generally poor and enforcement of
environmental standards is minimal. Unemployment and
underemployment are major problems in Sudan, especially among
young people. Even graduates of prestigious schools have
difficulty finding employment after graduation.
Sudan limits the legal opportunities for employment for
refugees to menial or marginally skilled jobs. Fortunate
refugees find employment with an international organization,
but most are forced to take jobs far below their training or
abilities. Rural refugees often find work as field laborers,
earning the eguivalent of a few pennies a day. Urban refugees
find employment as day laborers or domestic help. The lack of
legal opportunities to earn a living wage forces many into
illegal activities such as smuggling, black-marketeering,
moonshining, and prostitution.
The workweek is currently limited to 6 days and 48 hours, with
1 day of rest on Friday. After the coup, the Omar Government
announced it was considering adopting a 5-day workweek.
Laborers receive an extra month's pay for each year's labor.
Most workers are given allowances for transportation, and some
receive housing allowances. Labor standards are enforced in
the public and private official economies but not in rural
areas or in the informal economy. The minimum wage remains at
the 1988 level of $67 per month at the official exchange
rate. This salary is far from sufficient for subsistence in
urban areas, and workers often must rely on farming, second
jobs, or help from the extended family. Salaries in private
industry are generally higher than those in the public sector.
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Swaziland is governed as a modified traditional monarchy with
all executive, legislative, and judicial powers ultimately
vested in the King. Advised by the Queen Mother, traditional
figures, and cabinet ministers, he rules according to Swazi
law and custom, never codified but ultimately determined by
himself and his advisors. Swaziland's Government features
both "modern" and "traditional" branches--a cabinet,
parliament, and courts which follow Western law, and a tribal
hierarchy with "national" courts which follow traditional
Swazi law and custom. The Cabinet is appointed by the King
from among Members of Parliament and is responsible to him.
While Swaziland obtained a constitution containing a bill of
rights at independence, it was repealed by King Sobhuza II in
1973 on the grounds that it introduced political practices
which were incompatible with the Swazi tradition of
decisionmaking .
National defense is provided by the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense
Force, consisting of fewer than 3,000 troops. The Royal
Swaziland Police is the primary internal security
organization. These forces must cope with the spillover from
southern African regional conflicts. The use of Swaziland by •
the African National Congress (ANC) as a transit corridor into
South Africa has led to occasional confrontations involving
ANC members. South African security forces, and Swazi
authorities. The influx of Mozambican refugees has placed an
additional strain on the Swazi security apparatus. Both the
police and the defense force answer to civilian authorities.
Swaziland has a free-market economy, with relatively little
government intervention in the marketplace. The majority of
Swazis are engaged in subsistence agriculture. The success of
the economy depends largely on the export sector, which is
composed primarily of large, foreign-owned firms. Most
imports come from South Africa.
While human rights are generally respected in Swaziland, there
are important restrictions on free speech, assembly, and
political rights. Other human rights problems include abuse
of prisoners, arbitrary detention, and discrimination
(including violence) against women.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports or allegations in 1989 of such killings
by agents of the Swazi Government. However, in February three
South Africans, believed to be ANC-af filiated, were shot to
death in what was thought to be a politically motivated
killing. There were unsubstantiated charges, that agents of
the South African security forces were responsible; the
murders remain unsolved. In June an ANC member was convicted
of murdering a Swazi citizen. The ANC member claimed he had
shot in self-defense, mistaking the victim for a South African
Defense Force agent.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance in 1989.
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SWAZILAND
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture, as a rule, is not practiced in Swaziland. However,
there are occasional allegations made by prisoners of police
and military threats and beatings. Complaints generally come
from criminal, not political, prisoners. Police have also
been accused of transporting persons they have arrested in the
trunks of their cars. Defendants occasionally claim that
confessions have been extorted by the police and that these
confessions are sometimes accepted by the courts. Caning can
be administered to youths involved in either petty or violent
crimes .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Swazi law requires warrants for arrests in all but certain
-exceptional circumstances. These exceptions, however, are
poorly defined and, in practice, police who have strong
suspicions about a suspect do not normally seek a warrant.
Detainees are allowed to consult with a lawyer of their own
choice, and provision for bail exists. A 1978 law permits the
Government to detain any person without charge for a renewable
period of 60 days. Detention under this law cannot be
appealed to the courts, though it may be appealed directly to
the Monarch. The law, invoked several times in 1988, was
again used in 1989.
In February nine persons were detained under 60-day orders for
their suspected involvement in a prison escape plot with
political overtones. Six of the detainees were released after
60 days, while three had their detentions renewed for an
additional 60 days before being released. Two of the
detainees were subsequently charged for assisting in the
escape and brought to trial.
In July a 60-day detention order was invoked against the
Secretary General of the Swaziland Union of Financial and
Allied Workers. He was released after 4 days in detention
following a public outcry against his arrest.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The modern judiciary consists of the Court of Appeals, the
High Court, and various subordinate magistrates' courts which
are independent of executive and military control and free
from intimidation from outside forces. Some members of the
judiciary are not Swazi but are appointed from the bars of
other countries with compatible legal systems. In
magistrates' courts, the defendant is entitled to counsel at
his or her own expense. Court-appointed counsel is provided
in capital cases or where difficult points of law are at
issue. There are well-defined appeal procedures up to the
Court of Appeals, the highest judicial body. The right of
appeal, however, is not guaranteed to persons held under the
1978 detention law or to those charged with sedition or an
offense against the King.
The right to a fair public trial is provided for by law and is
honored in practice, although the court president can order a
trial to be held in camera in certain (e.g., rape) cases. The
Prime Minister can also require that a trial be held in
private, but this is rare. In sedition cases, the Prime
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SWAZILAND
Minister may order that proceedings be held in camera before a
special tribunal appointed by the King. The special tribunal
may, if it deems it appropriate, adopt rules and procedures
apart from those applied in the High Court. In 1987 King
Mswati III issued the tribunal decree, which permitted the
formation of a special tribunal to try offenses committed
against the King and Queen Mother. This decree permits in
camera sessions and forbids the accused from having legal
representation. The decisions of the tribunal cannot be
appealed. There were no trials by special tribunal in 1989.
Amnesty International's 1989 Report criticizes the 1987-88
treason trial of 10 persons before the special tribunal on the
grounds the defendants were not permitted legal representation
and were denied any right of appeal. Nine of the 10 persons
were given royal pardons in 1988, but one. Prince Mtanasibdi
Dlamini, remained in prison at the end of 1989, serving an
earlier sentence imposed for obstructing justice.
In traditional courts, where ethnic Swazis may be brought for
relatively minor offenses and violations of Swazi traditional
laws or customs, legal counsel is not allowed, but defendants
may speak on their own behalf. Sentences are subject to a
review system and appeal to the High Court and the Court of
Appeals. Accused persons who desire counsel can insist that
their case be transferred from the traditional courts. There
are occasional disagreements over which court system should
have jurisdiction in a particular case. By law, the public
prosecutor has the authority to determine which court should
hear the case. However, there have been instances of the
police determining where a case should be tried. Unless the
defendant, who may be unaware of his or her legal rights,
protests the decision, cases may be tried in the wrong court
system, and this fact never comes to light.
Prisoners frequently complain of undue delays in their cases
coming to trial. Such delays are generally the result of
bureaucratic inertia rather than a deliberate policy. A
prisoner charged with motor vehicle theft went on a hunger
strike in April to protest a 6-month delay in his case being
tried. He was tried and sentenced 2 weeks later.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Cor respondence
The law generally requires that a warrant be issued by a
magistrate before police may search homes or other premises.
However, the law also provides police officers with the rank
of subinspector or higher the right to search without a
warrant if they have reasonable cause to do so. Generally,
this provision is meant to allow the police to obtain evidence
that might otherwise be lost through delay in obtaining a
warrant. While searches without warrants do occur relatively
frequently in Swaziland, the issue of legality of evidence, or
of the method by which evidence is obtained, rarely arises in
court. While there is no evidence that the Government
actively monitors private correspondence or conversation, the
Swazi police have been known to apprehend and interrogate
persons reported to have made objectionable statements about
the King during the course of private conversation or in
telegraphic correspondence.
In response to an increase in criminal activity, police
occasionally erect roadblocks and conduct generalized,
unannounced house searches in attempts to seize weapons and
24-900 O— 90-
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SWAZILAND
illegal immigrants. One such sweep in April resulted in some
248 arrests on charges ranging from illegal immigration status
to possession of weapons and drugs.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech is limited. A Swazi's main traditional
forum for expressing discontent is through his or her Chief,
and public condemnation of certain policies and people is not
permitted. Criticism of the royal family and of national
security policy is forbidden. The media, both
government-controlled and private, practice self-censorship,
refraining from criticism of sensitive government activities
or commenting on controversial issues involving the royal
family. Swazi radio and television stations are government
controlled, and there is also a semiofficial newspaper.
Private companies and church groups publish several newspapers
and magazines.
In March four persons were arrested for possession of
allegedly seditious literature published by an illegal
political party, the People's Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) .
They included the outspoken leader of the defunct Ngwane
National Liberatory Congress (the sole opposition party before
the abolition of political parties in 1973) and a trade
unionist. The four denied membership in PUDEMO and maintained
that they had received the pamphlets unsolicited. Charges
against the four were eventually dismissed.
The Government has occasionally proscribed publications,
including foreign publications, deemed to be prejudicial to
the interests of defense, public safety, or public health.
Two major South African publications, banned in 1985 because
of critical articles on Swazi domestic politics, remained
excluded in 1989. No new bannings occurred in 1989.
Academic freedom is also limited; direct attacks against the
royalty or government ministers are not permitted, and certain
aspects of government policy (i.e., security) may not be
discussed.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The King's 1973 proclamation prohibits meetings of a political
nature and demonstrations in any public place without the
consent of the commissioner of police. In practice, no permit
is required for most gatherings. Nevertheless, in 1989 police
used this power to stop meetings which were embarrassing to
the Government. In March, citing failure to obtain a permit,
police broke up a meeting which had been called by residents
of a government housing project to protest rent increases.
Also in March, the police closed a meeting of the Swaziland
National Association of Civil Servants because the
organization had not obtained a permit to hold the meeting.
Freedom of association is generally permitted, provided that
the organization has no political agenda. Trade associations
and professional bodies exist in Swaziland and maintain
relations with recognized international bodies in their fields.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
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SWAZILAND
c. Freedom of Religion
Swaziland is hospitable to all religious beliefs, informally
considers itself to be a Christian country, and permits a wide
variety of foreign missionary activity. Organized religions
are free to establish places of worship and train clergy. No
licenses are required for such organizations or in order to
publish religious texts, nor are there any bars to religious
travel outside the country. At the same time, the authorities
promote the observance of Swazi customs. When these customs
conflict with religious beliefs, problems occasionally arise.
Church condemnation of traditional Swazi ceremonies in the
past has led to the arrest and deportation of church figures.
In 1989 there were several cases of individual chiefs in the
rural areas creating difficulties for Jehovah's Witnesses. In
one case, a chief ordered the eviction of two families of
Jehovah's Witnesses from his territory, claiming that they had
sown dissent among his people.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Swazis may travel and work freely within Swaziland. Those who
have left the country may freely return, and citizenship is
not revoked for political reasons. Swazis generally can
obtain a travel document to travel in the region, but the
Government occasionally refuses to issue a passport if the
applicant does not appear to have adequate means of support
while abroad. Citizenship for nonethnic Swazis and persons of
mixed heritage can be difficult to establish, creating
problems in obtaining passports and other civil documents.
Swaziland treats displaced persons from neighboring states
well. About 7,000 primarily ethnic Swazis from South Africa,
who fled Zulu administration in the black South African
homeland of Kwazulu, reside in Swaziland. The last few years
have seen a large influx in the number of Mozam.bican refugees
living in Swaziland. While approximately 16,000 were
officially registered by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) , it is believed that an additional 30,000
or more may have been in Swaziland illegally. Swaziland
permits the UNHCR to interview those who seek refugee status
and grants asylum if the person can establish that he or she
will face persecution if repatriated. Illegal aliens who
cannot establish their refugee status, however, can be
deported. In practice, many of those refugees indentified for
deportation end up serving extended time in detention while
arrangements for their repatriation are made. This delay is
due to the absence of an agreed repatriation procedure with
Mozambique, rather than a policy to penalize illegal
immigrants .
As in previous years, the Swazi police arrested a number of
ANC activists (primarily South Africans) in 1989. They were
turned over to the local UNHCR representative for transfer to
countries (usually Zambia or Tanzania) willing to receive them.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Swazi citizens do not have the right to change their
government through democratic m.eans. Political parties are
outlawed, and an organized political opposition does not
exist. The King rules in conjunction with the Queen Mother.
Traditionally, decisionmaking has been by consensus, with the
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SWAZILAND
King soliciting advice from the royal family, the senior
chiefs, the Cabinet, Members of Parliament, and other
interested parties. Still, the King's power is absolute, and
he can accept or dismiss advice as he sees fit. Public debate
of political matters under consideration by the Monarch is
rare. Legislation is passed by the Parliament and is then
submitted to the Monarch for assent--which may be withheld.
The King can also legislate by decree.
Swazis participate in the selection of Members of Parliament.
Parliamentarians (50 in the house and 20 in the senate) are
chosen in a complex process involving the interaction of a
7-member electoral committee, 40 traditional districts, 80
electors, and the King's appointive powers. The King can
dissolve the Parliament and call new elections, normally held
every 5 years. The Parliament serves as a forum for
examination and criticism of government policies, but matters
are seldom pressed to a vote and, when they are, unanimity is
usually the result.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Swaziland prefers to keep a low profile in dealing with
nongovernmental human rights organizations. There are no
organizations which exclusively promote human rights in
Swaziland. The Government was not the subject of any
resolutions by official international organizations in 1989.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Unique Swazi governmental and social traditions unavoidably
create differences between ethnic and nonethnic Swazis. For
example, ethnic Swazis from South Africa seeking political
refuge in Swaziland are treated much like Swazi citizens and
are often given work permits. Those who are not ethnic Swazis
are treated as foreigners, and permits are given more
reluctantly. A significant expatriate community exists,
composed primarily of businessmen and missionaries.
Traditional values are a major influence on the role of women
in Swazi society, and the dualistic nature of the legal system
complicates the issue of women's rights. A wife's legal
rights, for example, differ substantially depending on whether
she is married under traditional or civil law. In a
traditional marriage, a woman is treated as a minor under the
law. She is not responsible for contracts she signs, and she
cannot, except in rare instances, hold real estate or inherit
property in her own name. She must normally obtain her
husband's permission to borrow money, to leave the country,
and, in some cases, to take a job. A woman divorced in a
traditional court has no right to the legal custody of her
children. In traditional marriages, a man can take more than
one wife. In some cases, women are compelled by family
pressure to marry without their consent, although this
practice is decreasing over time. Women who are forced to
marry do have legal recourse, but few resort to it, both out
of ignorance of their rights and out of fear of ostracism by
family members. Wives chosen by the King do not have legal
recourse. Because traditional marriage is governed by
uncodified Swazi law and custom, women's rights are often
unclear and change according to where and by whom they are
interpreted.
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SWAZILAND
Even under civil law, marriage is governed by Swazi law and
custom unless the parties to the marriage sign a prenuptial
agreement. With a prenuptial agreement, property can be
separately maintained, anji the wife can enter into contracts
and legal proceedings without her husband's consent. A man
who marries a woman under civil law legally cannot have more
than one wife, although in practice this restriction is
sometimes ignored. Divorce does not automatically lead to
loss of custody of children for the wife. Rather, custody is
awarded according to the interests of the child, and
maintenance for wives granted custody is generally provided.
Marriage is further complicated by the fact that a man can
legally marry a woman in both civil and traditional
ceremonies, creating problems in determining which set of
rules applies to a marriage. The Svjaziland Council of
Churches opened a legal aid center in 1988 which provides free
information on issues such as marriage and maintenance laws
Physical abuse of women, particularly wife beating, is
frequent. Customarily, a Swazi man has the right and duty to
beat his wife and children. Women have the right under the
law to charge their husbands with assault, but few know that
they can resort to legal remedies. The traditional courts are
generally unsympathetic to "unruly" or "disobedient" women.
The modern courts are more likely to convict wife beaters, but
sentences, even when beating results in death, are frequently
light.
In the workplace, the Employment Act of 1980 forbids employers
to discriminate among employees based on race, religion, sex,
or political affiliation. It requires equal pay for equal
work. Even so, around 75 percent of all private sector jobs
are held by men, and their average wage rate by skill category
is in some sectors three times that of women (1986).
The Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions announced in August
that it would be forming a special women's wing to address
issues of discrimination in the workplace. This wing will
focus on the issues of wage discrimination and maternity
benefits, as well as other sex-based discriminatory practices.
In August the Ministry of Labour and Public Service announced
a new housing policy disadvantageous to women. It stated that
married women occupying government houses would have to vacate
the houses and live with their husbands, if the husband was
not a government employee. Women challenged the regulation as
discriminatory, and no effort has yet been made to enforce it.
Discrimination on the basis of religion, language, or social
status does not occur to any significant degree in Swaziland.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Industrial Relations Act (IRA) of 1980 affirms the right
of trade unions to exist, organize, and associate freely.
Persons in all sectors of the economy, including the public
sector, are permitted to join unions. Employers are obliged
to recognize a union when it achieves 40 percent membership
among employees. Unions are able, within limits, to operate
independently of government or political control. This
independence is contingent on their acting as economic, rather
than political, organizations.
Unions are free to draw up their own constitutions within the
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SWAZILAND
framework of the IRA. The Act specifies a number of
provisions which must be addressed in a constitution. These
include provisions for election of officers by secret ballot,
annual meetings open to all members, fees, grounds for
suspension of members, and expenditure of union funds. The
constitution must be approved by the labor commissioner, who
can strike out or amend provisions which violate requirements
of the law. Unions cannot be dissolved as long as they adhere
to the regulations of the IRA. Unions which fail to maintain
proper registration with the labor commissioner can be
dissolved.
For several years, including in 1989, the International Labor
Organization's Committee of Experts (COE) has noted
discrepancies between ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of
Association and the IRA. The several concerns of the COE
include the broad powers accorded government officials to
control union activity and the strictures on the ability of
workers to form unions and associate with other unions at home
and abroad. The COE has called on the Government to bring its
legislation into conformity with the Convention it ratified in
1978.
The IRA details the steps to be followed when disputes arise,
including what determines a legal or illegal strike. The Act
provides for an industrial court, presided over by a High
Court judge, for the settlement of employment disputes. The
industrial court is empowered to hear and give judgment on
disputes and grievances and to enjoin a union from striking.
Historically, strikes have been rare in Swaziland. However,
consciousness of workers' rights is growing rapidly. When
disputes arise, the Government tries to intervene to reduce
the chances of a strike, which may not be legally called until
all avenues of negotiation have been exhausted. The labor
commissioner can then issue a 14-day postponement of a strike,
which can be extended upon presentation of further
documentation. In October 300 employees of the Manzini town
council were fired after going out on strike in contravention
of the Industrial Relations Act. Where the national interest
is concerned, the Minister of Labor can outlaw a strike or
refer the dispute to the industrial court.
In June the Swaziland Union of Financial and Allied Workers
(SUFIAW) announced its intention to strike for a salary
increase after negotiations had failed to result in an
agreement. The industrial court issued an injunction against
the strike which the union accepted. Shortly after the
injunction order, however, the Secretary Genera] of SUFIAW was
detained under 60-day detention orders. A public outcry
against his arrest led to his release 4 days later. The
industrial court eventually helped negotiate an agreement on
wages between SUFIAW and the bankers' organization. In August
500 workers at an agricultural operation were fired when they
refused to abandon an illegal strike. There were several
wildcat strikes during the year which were resolved without
recourse to the industrial court.
The Swaziland Federation of Trade Union (SFTU), the union
umbrella organization, is a member of the Organization of
African Trade Union Unity. The SFTU also represents Swazi
labor in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
and the Southern Africa Trade Union Coordinating Council.
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SWAZILAND
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Industrial Relations Act of 1980 provides for the right to
organize and bargain collectively. While collective bargaining
does occur, it is not widespread. The IRA has provisions
outlawing interference and antiunion discrimination. Disputes
in this area are referred to the labor commissioner and the
industrial court, if necessary. Employers can prohibit
employees from attending union meetings if the union has not
achieved the 40-percent membership level required for
recognition. However, members of legally recognized unions
must be allowed to attend union activities. Although many
employers habitually resist recognition and force the issue
into the industrial court, the court generally rules in favor
of the unions. The Government wishes to avoid labor
confrontation and encourages voluntary negotiations between
employers and unions. While not antiunion, the Government
publicly expresses its concern that labor unrest threatens
Swaziland's image as a stable and attractive place for foreign
investment .
The ILO COE has remarked on discrepancies between national
legislation and Convention 98 on the Right to Organize and
Bargain Collectively which Swaziland also ratified. The COE
specifically noted the absence of provisions respecting the
protection of workers' organizations against acts of
interference by employers and the compulsory registration of
collective agreements by the industrial court, which may
refuse registration in the event of nonobservance of
government directives on wages.
There are no export processing zones in Swaziland. Labor
legislation is applied uniformly throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced labor in Swaziland, and such labor is
legally prohibited.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Employment Act of 1980 prohibits the hiring of a child
below the age of 15 in an industrial undertaking, except in
cases where only family members are employed in the firm, or
in technical schools where children are working under the
supervision of a teacher or other authorized person.
Legislation limits the number of night hours which can be
worked on school days and limits such work overall to 6 hours
per day or 33 hours per week. Employment of children in the
formal sector is not customary in Swaziland.
e. Acceptable Conditions of work
There is extensive legislation, notably in the Employment Act
of 1980, protecting worker health and safety in Swaziland.
There is a maximum 48-hour workweek in the modern sector,
except for security guards, who work up to six 12-hour shifts
per week. There is no overall minimum wage, but rather a
sliding scale of minimum wages depending on the type of work.
A casual laborer must legally make $9 a week, while a security
guard must be paid at least $15 per week. The minimum wage
for a clerk is $19, and for a laboratory technician, $62.
Employees receive time and a half for overtime worked.
Employees who work on Sundays or public holidays receive
382
double pay. Workers receive a minimum of 14 days' annual
leave after each period of 12 months of continuous service (21
days for security guards) . These standards are generally
upheld in the formal sector.
While wage levels in Swaziland are low by Western standards,
by African standards most Swazis employed in the formal sector
do relatively well, although this is certainly not the case
for persons on the lower end of the scale, such as security
guards or casual laborers. Most Swazi families also farm and
graze cattle on Swazi national land on which their homesteads
are erected and from which family income also derives. When
this source of income is taken into account, most Swazis can
be said to earn a decent living.
The Government sets safety standards for industrial operations
and encourages private companies to develop accident
prevention programs. Recent growth in industrial production
has necessitated more government action on safety issues. In
1986 only 20 safety inspections took place, none in
manufacturing industries. By 1988 this figure had risen to
83, with 11 inspections of industrial operations. There were
1,070 industrial accidents reported to the Ministry of Labor
in 1988, higher than the figure for 1986 (923), but lower than
the 1,275 reported in 1984. Given the rapid growth in
industrial employment, the relatively static level of
industrial accidents is a sign that safety measures are
generally observed.
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TANZANIA
The United Republic of Tanzania, formed in 1964 when mainland
Tanganyika united with the newly independent island of
Zanzibar, is a one-party state. Political direction for the
party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) , and the Government comes
from a party-chosen elite headed by party chairman Julius K.
Nyerere, who served as Tanganyika/Tanzania's first President
until 1985, and President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who formerly
served both as Zanzibar's President and Tanzania's First Vice
President. The CCM under Nyerere lays down fundamental
political and economic policies and monitors their
implementation. The party attempts to control activity at all
levels of society through its system of 10-family cells. The
offshore islands of Zanzibar and Pemba are integrated into the
Union's governmental and party structure, but the Zanzibar
Government exercises a considerable degree of autonomy.
The police have primary responsibility for maintaining
internal security. They are supported in this role by the
Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF) , with some 30,000
personnel, and by paramilitary forces and a large citizens'
militia. The Government has tolerated, and has granted
quasi-legal status to, vigilante forces in rural areas to
counter lawlessness, especially cattle rustling. While the
armed forces traditionally have not been a source of human
rights abuses, there have been problems with the police. In
1989 they were accused of engaging in severe beatings and
torture in the course of interrogations.
Tanzania is one of the world's poorest countries and has one
of the highest rates of population growth. Its overwhelmingly
agricultural economy has suffered from unfavorable trends in
international trade and inefficient economic policies.
Reforms undertaken in 1986, including increased prices paid to
farmers, rescheduled foreign debt payments, and a sharply
devalued currency, stimulated growth rates to an estimated 4
percent in 1989.
A bill of rights promulgated in 1988 provides for, inter alia,
freedom of movement, speech, religion, and association, but
there has been criticism that it has never been explained
fully to the populace. In any event, civil rights are still
severely restricted by the Government. All political activity
outside the single party is tightly Circumscribed. Direct
criticism of the party and its chairman is not tolerated. For
example, after openly criticizing the party's leadership and
policies, former Zanzibar Chief Minister Seif Shariff Hamad
was arrested in May 1989 for participating in an illegal
demonstration and was held in detention throughout 1989. Six
policemen were arraigned for alleged brutality and torture in
a suburban police station; by year's end, the Government had
not yet brought formal charges against them, and all remained
on duty.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
In January 1989, a local newspaper reported that three women
were killed near Shinyanga in north-central Tanzania on
suspicion of practicing witchcraft. Such mob justice occurs
from time to time in both urban and rural areas. The
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Sungusungu and Wasalam, traditional defense groups in
north-central Tanzania, are encouraged by both government and
party officials to help eliminate cattle rustling in areas too
remote for the police. These vigilante groups often execute
rustlers and also turn on villagers accused of witchcraft.
The Government and the party regularly send officials to this
region to try to instill some discipline, but the problem
continues. Ironically, the January 1989 killings took place
the same day that the regional CCM secretary decried such
summary "justice."
The Government has proposed legislation to Parliament which
would give formal status to these traditional security/defense
groups. Known as the "People's Militia Laws (Miscellaneous
Amendment)", the bill seeks to endow the people's militia with
powers of arrest and to provide for compensation of militia
members for injuries sustained while on duty.
b. Disappearance
There were no reported cases of disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits the use of torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment, and government officials condemn such
practices whenever cases are made public. Police, however,
routinely "soften up" arrested suspected criminals just after
apprehension in order to obtain quick confessions. Further
beatings and torture continue if the suspect does not break
down. In September 1989, the Dar es Salaam press reported
extensively on the death during torture of a suspect whom
policemen of the suburban Oyster Bay police station had
arrested for stealing a tractor part. A suspected accomplice,
tortured in the same room as the deceased, was so badly maimed
(by electric cables wrapped around his body like bullwhips
which pulled off chunks of flesh when the cables were jerked
off) that he had to be hospitalized. He is a witness to the
torture killing. Six policemen were charged with assaulting
the accomplice; there had been no judicial action in this
alleged torture death, however, at the end of 1989.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Criminal Procedure Code, amended in 1985, requires that a
person arrested for a crime, other than a security charge
under the Preventive Detention Act, be charged before a
magistrate within 24 hours. The new amendments, however, also
restricted the right to bail, reduced the number of bailable
offenses, limited judges' discretion in granting bail, and
imposed strict conditions on freedom of movement and
association when bail is granted.
Under the Preventive Detention Act, the President, upon
written order, can direct the arrest and indefinite detention
without bail of any person considered dangerous to the public
order or national security. The Act was amended in 1985 to
require the Government to release detainees within 15 days of
detention or to inform them of the reason for their
detention. The detainee was also allowed to challenge the
grounds for detention at 90-day intervals.
Zanzibar was the scene of large demonstrations in May 1988
during which two persons were shot dead by the police. The
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authorities arrested 23 persons following the demonstrations
and charged them with participation in an illegal assembly.
The 23 were tried in July 1988; 15 were found guilty and
sentenced to 18 months in jail, while the other 8 were
released.
The most celebrated current Tanzanian detention case is that
of former Zanzibar Chief Minister Seif Shariff Hamad, who fell
from grace with the CCM for criticizing the party chairman and
CCM policies, was stripped in 1988 of his party membership and
his job, and was arrested in May 1989, charged with
participating in an illegal demonstration, and held without
bail. He was later also charged with illegal possession of
secret government documents. A hearing in magistrate's court
commenced on September 27. The trial continued through the
end of the year, with some sessions held in camera at the
Government's request so that the secret documents allegedly
found in Hamad's possession could be presented. Most of the
trial has been public; the defense had yet to present its case
at the end of 1989.
In August two student leaders were abducted from the Dar es
Salaam University campus center in broad daylight, reportedly
by special security services. The students were hustled off
to a distant safe house and detained in humiliating
circumstances for almost 3 weeks. Under threat of a student
strike on university graduation day, the students were
released on August 24 and returned to campus. Never
officially charged with any offense, it is generally accepted
that they were abducted and detained because they criticized a
CCM Central Committee member's handling of funds of the
Tanzanian delegation to the 13th World Youth and Students'
Festival held in Pyongyang, North Korea.
James Mapalala and Mwinyijuma Othman Upindo had been sent into
"internal exile" on remote islands in July 1987, having been
detained in October 1986 under the Preventive Detention Act
(and later redetained under the 1921 Deportation Ordinance)
for advocating a multiparty system. They were released in
April 1989. The Deportation Ordinance which permitted the
President to order the internal exile of these "undesirable"
persons was declared unconstitutional by the High Court of
Tanzania in 1989. The Court ruled that this Ordinance
restricted freedom of movement and thus violated the Bill of
Rights. On September 30, the press reported that the
Government intended to propose amendments to the Ordinance
which would enable a deportee to challenge the deportation
order in court in the event requisite procedures were not
followed.
Joseph Kasella Bantu, a prominent dissident, was released from
house arrest and was reported to be living quietly in southern
Tanzania .
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Tanzania's legal system is based on the British model, with
modifications to accommodate customary and Islamic law in
civil cases. Criminal trials are open to the public and the
press; courts must give reasons on the record for holding
proceedings in camera. Criminal defendants have the right of
appeal. Military courts do not try civilians, and there are
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no security courts. Defendants in criminal and military
courts may appeal decisions to the High Court.
While an independent judiciary is constitutionally mandated
and usually operates independently from the executive branch,
the Government exerts influence in some cases. Members of the
legal community, including judicial officers, have complained
that the legal system is being corrupted through bribery.
Police and lower court officials are often bribed to delay the
process of investigation and trials. There are reports that
the court trying Zanzibar's former Chief Minister Hamad was
under pressure to render a conviction. Although the 1985
amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code were supposed to
lessen court congestion, an average case still takes from 2 to
3 years to come to trial. Effective May 1989, laws were
amended to impose more severe penalties for offenders of the
law, including not less than 30 years for armed robbery.
The Government provides legal counsel to those charged with
treason and murder. In Dar es Salaam, the Legal Aid Committee
of the Tanganyika Law Society and the Legal Aid Committee of
the faculty of law at the University of Dar es Salaam offer
legal services to indigents, but their resources are limited.
Under the Detention Act of 1983, political prisoners have the
right to be represented by a defense attorney.
Zanzibar's court system generally parallels the mainland's
legal system, but retains Islamic courts to handle Muslim
family cases such as divorce, child custody, and inheritance.
Cases concerning Zanzibar constitutional issues are heard only
in Zanzibar's courts. All other cases may be appealed to the
Court of Appeals of the United Republic of Tanzania.
According to knowledgeable observers, there were no political
prisoners at the end of 1989.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Although party membership is voluntary (an estimated 2.5
million Tanzanians are CCM members), the party structure
permeates the private lives of all citizens. The CCM has
party cadres at all levels of society. Individual cells vary
in size from single family homes to large apartment buildings,
and may contain from 10 to several hundred persons. Unpaid
"lO-cell" leaders are the party officials responsible for
resolving problems at the grassroots level and reporting any
suspicious behavior or event within their neighborhoods to
authorities .
Various ordinances allow the removal of undesirable or
destitute persons from one area to their prior place of
residence or origin if no work is found for them (See Sections
2.d. and 6.C.). It is generally recognized that Tanzanian
security services monitor the telephones of several categories
of Tanzanian citizens and expatriates and scrutinize
correspondence .
The Criminal Procedure Code Act of 1985 authorizes magistrates
to issue search warrants to police officers, enabling them to
enter premises for the purpose of search and seizure. In
practice, however, police and other security services enter
private homes and business establishments without the
requisite warrant.
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Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although freedom of speech and press is provided for under the
Constitution, in practice it has continued to be restricted,
given the substantial government and party ownership and
control of the media. Tanzanian citizens show few inhibitions
about criticizing the Government and its officials in private
conversations but are extremely cautious in what they say in
public forums.
The mainland Government owns the only English-language daily
newspaper, the national press agency, and the mainland radio
facility. The Zanzibar Government operates a radio station
and a television station. The Swahili-language newspaper
Uhuru, which has a daily circulation of 100,000, is owned by
the party. The Newspaper Act, which allows government seizure
of any publication without a warrant and withdrawal of the
license to publish at any time, makes the launching of a
private newspaper or magazine risky. Despite these
restrictions, a privately owned weekly business newspaper and
two special interest magazines started publication in 1988.
The official media present the Government's point of view on
policy matters. Journalists are expected to understand and
support the party's ideological underpinnings of socialism and
self-reliance in order to publicize and defend party and
government policies. The news media are periodically exhorted
to step up their efforts to educate, mobilize, and entertain
the public. Formal censorship is not exercised, but
individual journalists employ self-censorship in criticizing
government and party policy and officials.
Visiting foreign journalists are required to register with the
Government and obtain a government permit. Permits and visas
are not easily obtained, however, and application is a
time-consuming process which often requires intervention from
a high level official.
Academic freedom is officially guaranteed, but, in practice,
academicisns , most of whom are employed in government-run
educational institutions, refrain from broaching sensitive
subjects in their classrooms and publications.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Given the nature of Tanzania's one-party system, the freedoms
of public assembly and association are limited. Permits must
be obtained through the Government for any public meeting,
political or otherwise, and are normally granted. Student
organizations are controlled by the party. Under the
Societies Ordinance, all associations must be registered with
and approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Candidates for
office in major sports clubs and cooperatives are screened by
the appropriate government ministry, which also supervises
their elections. No organizations which would compete with
party organizations are approved.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
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c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in the Constitution and is
respected in practice. Missionaries are allowed to enter the
country freely to proselytize, and Tanzanians are allowed to
go abroad for pilgrimages and other religious purposes. The
Jehovah's Witnesses, who have been banned in Tanzania for many
years, have been allowed to return and to register as an
organization and have been permitted to proselytize since
1988. The population of the mainland is roughly 30 percent
Christian, 35 percent Muslim, and 35 percent adherents of
traditional religions. Zanzibar is overwhelmingly Muslim.
While there appear to be no social or political advantages or
disadvantages attached to membership in any given faith on the
mainland, this is not the case on Zanzibar, where there has
been some controversy regarding state support of certain
mosques.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Apart from the Zanzibari requirement for documentation for
travel between Zanzibar and the mainland, short-term travel
generally is not restricted within Tanzania, but citizens must
follow national employment directives stipulating the nature
of employment and location of residence. For years city
dwellers unable to show proof of employment during police
checks have been forced to return to rural areas in an effort
by the Government to control increasing pressure on urban
resources. The Human Resources Deployment Act of 1983
requires local authorities to ensure that every resident
within their areas of jurisdiction engages in productive or
other lawful employment. Those not so employed are subject to
transfer to another area where employment is available. The
Government remains concerned with the continuing migration of
young people to the cities from rural areas. However, in
contrast to earlier years, there were no massive roundups of
unemployed youths under the Act in 1989.
Passports are required for foreign travel and can be difficult
to obtain. Tax clearances and approval from the Central Bank
are required in order to buy airline tickets, and, in
practice, those planning to travel or emigrate are subject to
intense scrutiny by police and tax authorities. Tanzanians
who leave the country without authorization are subject to
prosecution on their return. The Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act empowers the courts to try Tanzanians who
commit offenses outside the country. Although it is legally
possible for citizenship to be revoked, there have been no
reports that this has been done in recent years.
Parliament passed a bill in 1986 requiring the registration
and identification of everyone over the age of 10 resident in
Tanzania, apparently in an effort to control foreign
businessmen.
Tanzania generally has a liberal policy towards refugees and
displaced persons. As of the end of 1989 there were believed
to be about 266,000 refugees in Tanzania. A more accurate
count will be available when the results of a recent census
are published. The largest group of refugees is from
Burundi. In 1989 the Government jailed 15 Burundian refugees
whose repatriation was requested by the Burundian Government
for allegedly plotting against it. They were served with a
letter of expulsion and by year's end remained in detention
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while the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) sought an alternative country willing to resettle
them. It is estimated that Tanzania harbors some 5,000 to
7,000 refugees from the African National Congress (ANC) of
South Africa.
Tanzania accepts refugees from almost all countries, except
for South Africans who have left their liberation movements
and Kenyans associated with the opposition in Kenya. However,
according to the UNHCR, refugees from Mozambique are subject
to intense scrutiny at the border. A number of opposition
groups and alleged political refugees have found Tanzania a
relatively open haven and maintain contact with the UNHCR,
even though chances of finding permanent third-country refuge
are remote.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Tanzanian citizens cannot legally remove the party in power or
change the one-party system. Political activity is forbidden
except within the one legal party, the CCM. Ex-President
Julius Nyerere continues to direct the affairs of the CCM
through its Central Committee. There are no overt opposition
groups. The persons arrested in 1986, sent into internal
exile in 1987, and then released in 1989 (see Section l.d.)
were advocates of a multiparty system. Their offense was
distributing leaflets calling for a change in the political
system.
All candidates for Parliament must be party members; any
Member of Parliament stripped of party membership loses his or
her seat in Parliament. A 1985 amendment to the Constitution
allows voters to choose between two CCM-selected candidates
for 75 percent of the 244 seats in the Union Parliament. The
remaining 25 percent are appointed by the Government and the
various mass organizations associated with the party. The
one-party system does not permit political participation
through the open nomination of multiple candidates. All CCM
candidates are vetted and approved by the all-powerful Central
Committee. Voters can and do register dissatisfaction with
individual Members of Parliament by voting incumbents out of
office and choosing the alternate candidate offered by the
CCM. Elections for both the Presidency and Parliament are
held every 5 years; the next elections are scheduled for
1990. Voting is by secret ballot.
While membership in the party is voluntary, overzealous CCM
functionaries have been known to require proof of membership
for individual citizens to receive basic government services
or employment, a practice which has been publicly deplored by
CCM Chairman Nyerere.
Zanzibar's Constitution provides for a Zanzibari House of
Representatives consisting of 50 elected members, 10 members
nominated by the President of Zanzibar, 5 regional
commissioners, 5 seats reserved for women, and 5
representatives from the party's mass organizations. Those
members directly elected (for the first tim.e in 1985) were
chosen from a slate of candidates selected by the CCM.
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Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government traditionally has spoken out in international
forums against human rights abuses. Tanzania is a party to
the United Nations covenants on human rights and in 1984
ratified the Organization of African Unity Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights. Nevertheless, the Government resents
inquiries into alleged human rights abuses. There were no
outside investigations of human rights violations in Tanzania
in 1989, but the Amnesty International Secretary General
discussed with the present Zanzibar Chief Minister, Omar Ali
Juma, in London in September the question of Zanzibaris in
detention without trial. Juma responded that no one was in
detention without trial, adding that the Government, however,
would not tolerate detractors bent on disrupting the peace. A
local legal aid committee provides legal services to indigent
clients and conducts educational workshops around the country
on Tanzanians' legal rights, but it has conducted no
investigations and issued no reports critical of the
Government's human rights practices.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Official government policy is one of promoting equal rights
for all citizens, but tribalism is a factor in Tanzanian
politics and, to a lesser extent, social interaction. The
African population consists of more than 130 ethnic groups, of
which only the Sukuma has more than 1 million members. All
ethnic groups have their own language, but the national
language is Kiswahili. That tribalism is not a destructive,
destabilizing force is in no small measure because of party
and government encouragement of ethnic toleration and national
unity.
The Asian community has c'-clined by 50 percent in the past
decade to about 40,000 (plus 4,000 in Zanzibar). A
business-oriented minority in a society historically committed
to Socialist policies and remaining both culturally and
economically exclusive, the Asians are regarded with
considerable antipathy by many African Tanzanians. This
antipathy is due in part to the Asians' disproportionate
influence in key sectors of the economy. Despite this, there
are no laws or official policies discriminating against them.
As the Government's economic policies evolve and greater
stress is given to the private sector, Asians are encouraged
to invest in areas previously reserved for the public sector
and are a forcf in the reawakening economy. Accordingly,
there has been a gradual movement of Asians to Dar es Salaam
from interior regions, and their presence is more noticeable
in the country's political and economic capital.
Although the Government has endeavored to ensure equality for
women, and both party and government constitutions endorse
equal opportunity in the workplace, society still clings to
traditional norms that divide labor along sexual lines with
strong biases against women, who work primarily in the
informal agriculture sector. Statistics for 1979 showed that
over 97 percent of economically active women were engaged in
agriculture. Only 5 percent of wage-earning agricultural
employees were women, indicating that most women were working
on family-level, small-holder farms.
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Progress has been more noticeable in urban areas, where
traditional values have a weaker hold on the population, but
even there and in the public sector (which employs nearly 80
percent of the entire Tanzanian labor force), certain statutes
exist which either prohibit the hiring of women in certain
jobs or restrict them to certain times of the day when they
are allowed to work. According to a 1986 estimate, women
constituted less than 14 percent of the wage employment sector
and in 1989 most were still concentrated in lower salaried
civil service positions such as clerks, secretaries, and
telephone operators. A manpower survey showed that 20.1
percent of high and midlevel positions were occupied by women;
they have little access to powerful decisionmaking positions.
The overall situation of women is considered even less
favorable in heavily Muslim Zanzibar.
Women in many parts of the country continue to suffer from
discriminatory restrictions on inheritance and ownership of
property because of concessions by the Government and the
courts to customary and Islamic law. The Marriage Act
provides that women's domestic services are a marital asset to
be considered in divorce settlements. Women have no rights to
ownership of land or house and are, therefore, hindered in
obtaining bank loans for their own business projects, for want
of collateral. The Government has established in each
ministry a section to promote women's development, and the
Union of Tanzanian Women (UTW) , a wing of the ruling CCM, has
as its declared policy the eradication of inequality for women
in all spheres of society. Nonetheless, women continue to be
discriminated against in educational opportunities.
The problem of violence against women is widespread. Legal
remedies exist but in practice are only available with
difficulty. This applies to both rural and urban areas, where
traditional customs subordinating women remain strong and are
upheld by local magistrates. The husband has a free hand in
treating his wife as he wishes, and wife beating occurs at all
levels of society. There were no egregious cases reported in
1989, and the Government has no program to inhibit this
practice or to induce restraint on the part of husbands.
The practice of female circumcision continued to decline in
1989, according to health authorities. However,
nongovernmental sources maintain the practice is on the rise,
especially in central Tanzania. It was still performed within
approximately 20 of the country's 130 mainland ethnic groups.
The health department in the northern region of Tanzania
requested the party to intervene to suspend female
circumcision rites until those performing them had received
medical training on hygiene. This concern apparently stemmed
from an overall government program to prevent the spread of
AIDS.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers do not have the right to form or join organizations of
their own choice. The right of association is limited to one
labor union organization, Juwata, which is an organ of the
ruling party and to which all unions must belong. Juwata
represents about 60 percent of the workers in industry and
government, but in reality it has limited influence on labor
policy.
I
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TANZANIA
The right of workers to strike exists in law but only after
complicated and protracted mediation and conciliation
procedures have been followed. There is a process of appeals
in labor disputes which leads ultimately to the Permanent
Labor Tribunal, which receives its direction from the Ministry
for Labor and Manpower Development. If the union is not
.satisfied with the Tribunal's decision, it can then conduct a
legal strike. However, these procedures can prolong a dispute
for months without resolving it. Pending a resolution,
frustrated workers go on strikes, but the strikes are
technically illegal. Small-scale walkouts occur fairly
frequently, and large ones less often. Several strikes took
place in 1989. These were settled by worker-management
discussions, with government and government-controlled union
officials intervening in stubborn cases. Although most
strikes are in effect illegal, there have been no reports of
prosecutions or jailing of strikers.
Although Juwata is a party organ, a degree of independence and
choice in leadership has recently evolved. In 1989 the Juwata
Secretary-General, Joseph Rwegasira, for the first time was
elected by the party. Juwata limits its international
affiliations only to regional organizations, such as the
Organization of African Trade Union Unity and the East African
National Trade Unions Consultative Council.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is limited to the private sector. Wages
for employees of the Government and state-owned organizations,
who comprise the vast bulk of wage-earners, are set by the
Government; Juwata does not bargain collectively on behalf of
government employees.
At the local union level, Juwata promotes employee welfare by
filing grievances against employers, usually over pay
disputes. Union rights are incorporated into law,
specifically the Security of Employment Act. The law is
enforced, but the line between the Government and the
government union can be difficult to discern. Grievances
which cannot be settled in the workplace are taken to the
Permanent Labor Tribunal. The Committee of Experts of the
International Labor Organization (ILO) has observed that the
current provisions requiring the Permanent Labor Tribunal to
approve collective agreements are not in conformity with ILO
Convention 98. The Government has indicated that a draft
Labor Code is under study with the technical assistance of an
ILO expert.
There are no export processing zones in Tanzania.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Employment Ordinance prohibits forced labor. For a number
of years the ILO Committee of Experts has observed that
provisions of various Tanzanian laws are incompatible with ILO
Conventions 29 or 105 on forced labor. The Human Resources
Deployment Act (1983), for example, requires every local
government authority to ensure that able-bodied persons over
15 years of age not in school engage in productive or other
lawful employment. Previously, there were massive police
sweeps in Dar es Salaam's streets to round up persons who had
no evidence of employment. The legislation has been
interpreted more leniently recently, however, and no such
roundups of urban unemployed occurred in 1989. The dialog
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between the ILO and the Government on the alleged use of
forced labor continued in 1989, with the ILO seeking
modification of particular legislation (such as the 1983 Human
Resorces Deployment Act) .
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children under the age of 15 are prohibited from working under
Section 77 of the Employment Ordinance. This provision
applies only to the formal wage sector in both urban and rural
areas, however, and not to children working on family farms or
herding domestic livestock. A young person between the ages
of 15 and 18 may be employed provided the work is safe and not
injurious to health, and young people are not allowed to work
between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. Enforcement is sporadic at best.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Tanzanian workers work a 40-hour, 6-day week. In general,
women may not be employed between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Several
laws regulate safety in the workplace, including the Factories
Ordinance, the Accidental and Occupational Diseases
Notification Ordinance, and the Workmen's Compensation
Ordinance. With the assistance of the ILO, an occupational
health and safety factory inspection system is in place
managed by the Ministry of Labor and Manpower Development.
According to Juwata, this Ministry makes inspections and
enforces safety regulations.
The minimum wage for government workers on the mainland is the
equivalent of $14.31 a month. Juwata recently negotiated with
the Association of Tanzania Employers an increase in the
salaries of employees of the private sector of between 12 and
28 percent. The agreement signed by the two organizations
benefits workers whose companies are members of the
Association. Current salaries, even though increased from
time to time, are not sufficient for a worker to sustain an
adequate standard of living. Housing and transport
allowances, food subsidies, and other benefits help, but
government and public corporation salaries at all levels are
very low. Current economic conditions, particularly with the
devaluations of the shilling in June and December 1989 (which
drove up the price of imports) , a large and unproductive civil
service, and a Government with limited, even diminishing
resources, all militate against a meaningful and adequate rise
in the minimum wage.
There is no legal discrimination in wages on the basis of sex,
but in practice discrimination occurs. Enforcement of labor
laws and regulations is erratic, impeded by corruption and the
inefficient functioning of government machinery. The vast
majority of Tanzanians are subsistence farmers and are not
affected by current government labor regulations and
safeguards .
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TOGO
Since seizing power in a military coup in 1967, President
Gnassingbe Eyadema has molded Togo into a single-party,
authoritarian state. The Prtsident dominates all branches and
functions of government. In addition to serving as Head of
State, President Eyadema is Chief of Staff of the armed forces
and head of the only political party, the Rassemblement du
Peuple Togolais (RPT) . All Togolese are considered members of
the RPT and are obligated to vote, but only active party
members can gain high government posts. The Eyadema
Government rules by decree and considers its legal authority
to be based on the Constitution of 1979 which was formally
adopted by referendum. This Constitution established a
National Assembly whose role, while continuing to evolve, is
still primarily to adopt all governmental decrees sent to it.
One-candidate presidential elections held every 7 years have
reconfirmed President Eyadema ' s rule.
The Government's authority is reinforced through control of
the state security apparatus: the armed forces, the National
Police (Surete), and the Special Police (gendarmerie). All
these forces have domestic security responsibilities.
Approximately 80 percent of Togo's 3.3 million people are
involved in agriculture. In 1989 excellent rains produced an
abundant food crop, and prices for two of Togo's major
exports--phosphates and cotton--were higher. Cocoa and
coffee, however, continued to suffer from depressed prices,
and overall government receipts were lower than projected,
leading to a budget deficit. Nevertheless, by continuing to
control expenditures and comply with performance criteria
under a World Bank-sponsored third structural adjustment
program, Togo remained attractive to foreign donors for
essential grants and loans.
Human rights in Togo remained tightly controlled in 1989.
Major concerns included abuse of prisoners and detainees,
arbitrary detentions, lack of fair trial procedures in
security cases, and restrictions on freedom of speech, press,
and assembly and the right of citizens to change their
government. Amnesty International (AI) raised the issue of
torture in several cases, and the Government again forcibly
repatriated several persons. On the other hand, the
2-year-old Togolese Human Rights Commission, with the
President's support, continued its high-profile campaign to
familiarize all Togolese with their rights under the law and
the limitations on official authority. In addition, the
Commission continued to receive and investigate individual
complaints (115 cases in 1989, though many did not pertain to
human rights issues), with most being resolved after the
Commission's intervention, including cases involving police
brutality. President Eyadema also continued his personal
campaign against high-level corruption and abuse by dismissing
the Justice Minister and his security chief for malfeasance.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of such killings in 1989.
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b. Disappearance
In 1989 there were no reports of disappearances. Prior to
1989 there were several abductions of persons opposed to the
regime in neighboring countries who were forcibly returned to
Togo, presumably by Togolese security agents. The 1988 case
of John Pass has never been clarified. The Government claims
he was killed by Ghanaian border guards. AI has received some
reports that he was returned to Togo and tortured.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture of suspected opponents of the Government has been a
serious problem. AI • s 1989 Report details several 1988 cases,
including the case of Celestin Zekpa who had been sentenced to
death in absentia in 1986 for security offenses and who had
been forcibly returned to Togo in October 1988 from Benin.
Under the continuing campaign by the Togolese Human Rights
Commission against official abuses, reports of beatings of
detainees (once considered normal practice) have dropped to a
few isolated cases. With President Eyadema ' s backing, the
Commission now reports well-founded allegations to security
commanders who reportedly actively investigate the cases and
punish officers found guilty through methods such as loss of
pay or reprimand in front of colleagues. No formal procedures
for the punishment of abusive officers have yet been
established. Conditions probably have not improved
significantly for detainees in rural areas or for detainees in
military facilities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under Togolese law, persons arrested may be held for 48 hours
incommunicado without charge, with an additional 48-hour
extension if the case is deemed serious or complex. Most
detentions follow this requirement. However, persons accused
of "political crimes," such as defaming the President, can be
arrested and detained incommunicado without limit. Such
persons have been routinely charged as "administrative
detainees," a status not permitting recourse to normal legal
remedies .
After being charged, prisoners are often held for long periods
of time — in some cases 6 months or more — before being brought
to trial, owing more to a shortage of judicial personnel than
an intent to evade required judicial procedures. Although not
guaranteed a right to counsel under law, detainees are
routinely permitted to retain counsel, if they can afford it.
Prefects (governors) continue to have the de facto authority
to order detention at will. Security officers also continue
to have unrestricted arrest and detention powers in cases
involving national security.
Arrested and detained members of the military and Special
Police are processed through the military judicial system.
While in the past this system had no outside appeal mechanism
(aside from the President), military detainees now have the
right to bring their cases before the Togolese Human Rights
Commission.
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The number of political detainees was unknown but believed to
be small at the end of 1989. There are a number of political
exiles in neighboring countries and in Europe.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Procedural safeguards needed to ensure fair trial are lacking
in security/political cases. The regular judicial system for
criminal and civil cases uses both African traditional law and
the Napoleonic Code. In rural areas, the village chief or
council of elders can try minor criminal and civil cases.
Those who do not accept the traditional ruling can take their
cases to the regular court system, which is also the starting
point for urban cases. The Supreme Court stands at the apex
of the court system, but decisions can be appealed to the
President, who is the final arbiter.
The judicial process includes pretrial investigation
undertaken by a special judge who must examine the adequacy of
the evidence and decide on bail. While the number of judges
is inadequate, the system functions well and in as timely a
manner as possible for routine cases. Trials are public, and
judicial procedures are followed. Defendants have the right
to counsel, but only in potential capital punishment cases
will the Government appoint a counsel for those unable to
afford it. Lower court decisions can be appealed to two
higher courts, then to the President.
Special courts exist to handle cases related to public
security (State Security Court), embezzlement of public funds
(Tribunal for Recovery of Public Funds), and violent crimes
(Court of Assizes). While the State Security Court has not
met in 3 years, a 1989 case involving malfeasance by Togo's
ex-police chief may be tried there. Persons who embezzle
money in large sums are generally not released from jail, even
after serving their sentence, until the money is repaid.
Togo's judicial system is not independent of the executive, as
the President can and does intervene in cases of special
interest and determine outcomes. For example, before the
judicial process could be completed, Pre:;ident Eyadema gave a
full pardon to the ex-Minister of Justice who had been
sentenced by a lower court to 2 years' imprisonment for taking
part in a scheme to rig the national lottery.
Togolese exiles in Ghana claim that there are a number of
political prisoners in prison. The 19 prisoners, who had been
kept incommunicado at a military base since their alleged role
in trying to overthrow the Government in September 1986, were
transferred to the civilian prison in Kara in October 1989.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
In routine criminal or civil cases, searches of private
residences are authorized in advance by a judge or senior
police official. In national security cases, searches are
undertaken without prior authorization. The authorities
continue to open mai] and monitor telephones. A" Government
network of informants keeps a check on actual or perceived
opponents. Religious publications of the Jehovah's Witnesses
often disappear in the mail. All Togolese are automatically
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members of Togo's sole political party and required to vote,
but no one is forced to take an active party role.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Direct criticism of the Government, and especially of the
President, continues to be perceived as serious antigovernment
activity and is not tolerated. However, there is an
increasing tendency for academicians, jurists, and human
rights advocates to discuss in open meetings (usually
sponsored by Western embassies) such once-forbidden topics as
limitations on executive power, single-party politics, and
freedom of expression. In addition, the President's
high-profile anticorruption campaign, which felled several
high-ranking officials, has permitted a very vocal and
widespread public discussion about official abuses and
government corruption.
The Government continues to dominate the print media and
control radio and television. A new, privately published
periodical appeared in Lome in November. This was made
possible by the acquiescence of the Government and the
high-profile campaign by the Togolese Human Rights Commission
for broadening freedom of exression. The Government contines
to use its media to project a positive image of the President
and Togo, while at the same time participating fully in
condemning public corruption and abuse of public trust.
There is government censorship of all films, video cassettes,
books, plays, and other writings published in Togo. Some
bookstores, however, sell a wide range of books, including
those containing veiled criticism of the system of
government. Foreign publications are offered for sale openly
in bookstores and street corners, and even editions which
criticize Togo or portray negative images of the Government or
Head of State are sold.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly is strictly controlled in Togo.
Government approval must be obtained for the formation of any
official groups and for large group meetings. This process is
an effective means for preventing any antigovernment groups
from meeting. Government permission for nonpolitical events
and the formation of professional or charitable societies is
given routinely and expeditiously.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Government's policy is to permit Togolese to participate,
if desired, in religious activities. To operate officially,
religious groups must receive permission from the Ministry of
Interior by qualifying under one of seven broad categories.
Qualifying groups are not restricted in their religious
practices. They are free to publish religious material,
conduct services, and teach their faith. Non-Togolese clergy
are welcome to reside in Togo, proselytize, and engage in
other religious activities.
Currently, the Jehovah's Witnesses and several small
Apostolic/Celestial groups have been denied official
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permission to practice their beliefs. While this has
prevented these groups from publicized, open worship, they
continued in 1989 to exercise their faith in private without
government interference. Based on a complaint from the
Jehovah's Witnesses, the Togolese Human Rights Commission was
involved at the end of 1989 in discussions with the Government
regarding the certification process.
One publisher was prevented from selling calendars which used
Christian names instead of African names.
Local religious groups are free to -maintain contacts with
coreligionists in other countries, and no restrictions exist
on travel for religious purposes. Ail official religious
services are ecumenical in nature. The Government does not
favor any specific religion, and membership in any authorized
religious group is neither a benefit nor a hindrance in civil
service promotions.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Free movement, including domestic and foreign travel,
emigration, and the right to change residence or workplace, is
generally allowed. However, the Government controls the
issuance of passports and exit visas to discourage the
emigration of professional Togolese and to keep known
political dissidents under close scrutiny. The Government
maintains customs and security checkpoints throughout the
country on all major routes. Except for the few political
exiles, Togolese who have chosen to reside in other countries
may return at will.
Togo has traditionally welcomed refugees, and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) currently
recognizes some 420 refugees in Togo. However, some refugees
from countries with which Togo enjoys good relations are
reluctant to register with the UNHCR for fear that their
government will receive information about them. In 1988 the
Government forcibly returned a Chadian recognized by the UNHCR
as a refugee. According to AI ' s 1989 Report, he was
extrajudicially executed shortly after return to Chad.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Togolese cannot change their government through democratic
means. While all Togolese are members of the single political
party, and active party members may debate minor issues at
party meetings and raise complaints against local officials,
no challenges are permitted to the Government's programs.
Presidential elections were held in 1986, the second since
1979. President Eyadema, the only candidate, was elected for
another 7-year term with 99.7 percent of the votes cast.
The National Assembly, created pursuant to the 1979
Constitution, has 77 members and has the right, in theory, to
accept or reject laws originated by the executive branch. In
fact, the Assembly has never rejected any proposed
legislation, and most laws are by acclamation. Nevertheless,
members of the Assembly see their institution in evolution,
with a gradually increasing national role. In the 1985
National Assembly elections and in elections held in January
1987 for municipal and prefectural councils, multiple
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candidates were permitted to run, but each candidate had to
obtain party authorization and submit campaign literature for
approval .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government has shown increased awareness of human rights
issues in recent years, largely by facilitating the
establishment of the Togolese Human Rights Commission. The
Commission continued in 1989 to increase the scope of its
activities and the range of its investigations with the
support of President Eyadema . The Commission is composed of
13 members, one each elected by 13 private and public bodies,
e.g., judges, doctors, teachers, trade union officials. It is
authorized by law to receive complaints from any Togolese
citizen or foreign resident, to investigate such complaints,
and to have access to government and police files. If a
violation is found to exist, the Commission is also authorized
to negotiate with the responsible governmental authority
either to bring about rectification or to submit the case to
the courts or to the President. Commission members enjoy
immunity from arrest or prosecution during their term of
office and for 1 year afterwards. The Commission is careful
not to criticize the Government as such, but it has been
helpful in specific cases (see Section I.e.).
International human rights organizations have been able to
communicate directly with the Commission concerning individual
cases. In 1989 the Commission received three inquiries from
AI — one concerning an alleged disappearance in 1986 and two
allegations of torture during 1989.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Before President Eyadema ' s seizure of power in 1967, all
influential groups within Togo were dominated by southern
ethnic groups. The President, himself a northerner, has
advocated a strong affirmative action policy within the
Government — ministers, governors, and other high-level
officials are appointed proportionally to the ethnic mix of
the population. The exceptions are the security forces, which
are dominated by northern ethnic groups, and commerce and the
professions, which continue to be the preserve of
southerners. There is no known discrimination on grounds of
religion.
Togolese women have formal equality with men under the law,
and women's economic and social rights are spelled out in the
"Family Code" which was adopted in early 1980. In the
economic sphere, women dominate local market activities and
commerce with Togo's neighbors and often amass considerable
wealth. Unlike civil law, however, customary or traditional
law gives all property to the male in the event of separation
or divorce. Similarly, although women are legally allowed to
acquire contraceptives and undertake family planning, custom
and tradition prohibit women from access to contraception
without the permission of their husbands or fathers.
Far fewer women than men receive university education, and the
number of women graduates from secondary schools is low. In
addition, the pensions of working women who die do not go to
their families, unlike those of working men. Although working
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women pay into the pension fund in the same proportion as men,
their children receive no funds in case of death, creating a
special hardship for families with no father. Economic
conditions in rural areas often leave women little time for
anything other than carrying water, finding firewood, cooking,
childbearing, caring for the family, and helping to raise food
crops .
Violence against women, including wife beating, is outside the
bounds of accepted behavior, and mechanisms exist within both
the traditional extended family and formal judicial structures
for redress. Female circumcision is practiced by a few
northern ethnic groups but is gradually diminishing. While
the Government has undertaken a campaign to make women
throughout Togo aware of their expanded opportunities under
the new family code, it has not specifically addressed the
issue of violence against women or female circumcision. The
UNFT, the government-sponsored women's organization, is the
principal means of publicizing women's health, educational,
and welfare issues.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Togolese are not free to form or join unions of their own
choosing since such organizing is permitted only under the
auspices of Togo's sole official labor union, the National
Confederation of Workers of Togo (CNTT) . The CNTT is one of
the three components of Togo's only political party and unites
various independent trade unions into one national labor
organization. All wage earners are automatically members of
the CNTT, and all pay dues through an automatic check-off
system. At the end of the year, this automatic dues payment
was still suspended; and the account remained frozen while the
Minister of Finance investigated financial mismanagement by
the CNTT.
The International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee of
Experts (COE) for a number of years has criticized the fact
that Togolese law names the CNTT as the exclusive beneficiary
of the compulsory deduction of trade union dues. While
recognizing that the Labor Code places no obstacle in the way
of trade union pluralism, the COE conluded that the effect of
the compulsory dues provision for the CNTT is to establish a
trade union monopoly. The COE has requested that the
Government remove this exclusivity so as to bring its
legislation into conformity with ILO Convention 87 on Freedom
of Association, which Togo has ratified.
Strikes are authorized only as a means of last resort but
rarely, if ever, take place. The Government acts as
arbitrator in cases where labor and management cannot settle a
dispute. The few strikes which have occurred in the past have
been short and ended as a result of government arbitration.
The Government has not had to use coercion, force, or arrests
to end strikes.
The CNTT is a member of the Organization of African Trade
Union Unity and the Organization of Trade Unions of West
Africa. It is not otherwise affiliated internationally
although it maintains ties with international and national
trade union organizations in both East and West. Individual
Toglese unions are affiliated with Western-oriented
international trade secretariats.
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b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers do not have the right to organize outside the CNTT.
The CNTT is not an independent union and basically conveys the
Government's views and requirements to workers. It does have
a role in the wage bargaining process and does, on certain
issues, present the workers' economic interests to the
Government. It also takes the workers' side in disputes with
private employers. Labor legislation and practice is uniform
throughout the country. There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Although the law is silent on the question, forced or
compulsory labor does not exist. There are, however,
occasional early morning mobilizations of the populations in
larger towns and cities to clean streets and pick up trash.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Under the Togolese Labor Code, the employment of children
under the age of 14 in any enterprise is prohibited. Some
types of industrial and technical employment require a minimum
age of 18. These age requirements are generally enforced in
urban employment by inspectors from the Ministry of Labor.
However, in rural areas even very young children traditionally
help their families with agricultural work or animal husbandry.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Labor practices in Togo are regulated by the 1974 Labor Code.
The Code stipulates that there should be equal pay for equal
work regardless of sex. Working hours of all employees in any
enterprise, except for agricultural enterprises, should not
normally exceed 40 hours per week; at least one period of 24
hours of rest per week is compulsory; and workers should
receive 30 days of paid leave each year. Minimum wages are
set by the Government after discussions with CNTT and
officials of the Ministry of Rural Development. These
discussions cannot be characterized as true bargaining
agreements. The minimum wage in the agricultural sector is
about 20 cents per hour, and in the nonagricultural sector
about 25 cents per hour. The amounts are not sufficient for
workers to maintain a decent standard of living, and minimum
wage workers supplement their incomes through second jobs or
through some subsistence farming. Larger enterprises must run
a regular medical service for their employees.
Health and safety standards in the workplace are determined by
a technical consulting committee at the Ministry of Labor, and
there are penalties for employers who do not meet the
conditions. Ministry enforcement of the various provisions of
the Labor Code is limited. These provisions are respected by
large enterprises, but smaller firms and the large
agricultural sector do not maintain them. Due to Togo's
significant unemployment, few workers complain about
conditions .
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UCAHPA
The National Resistance Movement (NRM), led by Yoweri
Museveni, took power in 1986 following a 5-year guerrilla war
against the Obote and Okello regimes. The NRM declared that
it would rule as an interim government for 4 years and then
turn power over to an elected government. In October 1989,
the National Resistance Council (NRC) extended the interim
period for an additional 5 years, citing delays caused by a
3-year old insurgency. President Museveni, backed by the
military, serves as chief executive. Minister of Defense, and
Chairman of the NRM and NRC. Thirty-eight unelected members
of the NRC exercise a strong influence on the body and
dominate the Government's policy organ, the National Executive
Committee (NEC) .
The security apparatus is composed of the National Resistance
Army (NRA) and the police. The 65,000 strong NRA, a
disciplined force during its earlier days, absorbed thousands
of soldiers from previous regimes as part of the Government's
policy of reconciliation with former opponents. Consequently,
discipline declined, particularly in the contested areas in
the north and east where several serious incidents of NRA
abuse of authority were reported in 1989. NRA soldiers and
deserters committed hundreds of burglaries, automobile
hijackings, and other crimes throughout the country. The
police force now numbers over 13,000 and is expected to rise
to over 20,000 by the mid-1990's. Meanwhile, the military
continues to perform many police tasks. The Internal Security
Organization (ISO) and military intelligence, both entirely
staffed by the NRA and both involved with combatting internal
subversion, have been accused of human rights violations.
Uganda is dependent on coffee for over 95 percent of its
export earnings and was seriously affected in 1989 by the
further collapse of coffee prices and the demise of the
international coffee quotas. In fiscal year (FY) 1988/89,
Uganda received over $550 million in foreign grants and
concessional loans — twice what it earned from exports.
Producer prices for farmers and wages for salaried workers are
extremely low. Uganda has participated in International
Monetary Fund structural adjustment programs since 1987. In
1989 the NRM leadership reaffirmed its goal of privatizing a
number of state enterprises and promoting the private sector.
Although gross national product grew by an estimated 7.2
percent in FY 1988/89, per capita income and production
remained well below levels reached in the late 1960's.
Disrespect for the rights of civilians by all parties to the
military conflict in the north and east remained pervasive in
1989. Credible reports of civilian casualties, illegal
detentions, and torture by the NRA continued. The rebel
Ugandan Peoples Army continued to assassinate local Resistance
Council officials while remnants of the Holy Spirit Movement
(Section l.g.) continued their practices of forced
recruitment, kidnaping, and summary executions. Other
abridgements of human rights in Uganda included laborious
trial procedures, restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly
and association, and the inability of citizens to change their
government. The Government formed a Constitutional
Commission to prepare a draft constitution by 1992, but later
extended the NRM's interim period through 1995. President
Museveni announced a personal commitment to end the problem of
illegal detention of suspected rebel opponents or sympathizers
("lodgers") (see Section l.d.). Although an estimated 1,500
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lodgers remain in custody, over 1,000 were released in
August. Nationwide elections to the National Resistance
Council and local resistance councils were held in February
and March using the queuing method in lieu of the secret
ballot. The Government also established two commissions of
inquiry to investigate egregious incidents of NRA atrocities
against civilians. At year's end no results had been
announced.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Most political and other extrajudicial killings occurred as a
consequence of military conflict between the NRA and
opposition elements, and there was clear evidence that all
parties engaged in such killings (see Section l.g. for
details). As fighting in the north and east declined in the
latter part of 1989, the number of killings fell.
b. Disappearance
Reports of disappearance, common under previous regimes,
markedly declined under the NRM Government. Many persons
thought to be missing turned up as lodgers (see Section
l.d.). The lack of an institutionalized process of
identifying prisoners held as lodgers seriously hampered
efforts to account for missing persons.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and inhuman treatment are not sanctioned by Ugandan
law, but for many years extreme forms of torture took place at
detention centers, particularly military barracks where
political prisoners were often held illegally. There are
credible reports that the NRA engaged in inhuman treatment and
torture in its own detention centers which remained outside
the effective jurisdiction of Ugandan law. In quarterly
reports for 1989, the Ugandan Human Rights Activists (UHRA)
stated that military interrogators routinely administer
torture in Room 68 of the central police station. The UHRA
quarterly report for April through June 1989 offered the names
of persons who allegedly were tortured to death by military
interrogators at Makindye barracks, Mbuya barracks, and Basima
House in Kampala. An Amnesty International (AI) report on
Uganda also documented instances of torture in military
barracks, at the Kampala headquarters of military
intelligence, and at the offices of the Internal Security
Organization.
The "three-piece tie," a form of torture which entails tying a
person's arms behind the back until the elbows meet, is still
used by military interrogators, even though President Museveni
has declared it to be against official government policy.
This painful procedure can lead to gangrenous infections of
the hands and arms as well as rupture of the breastbone and
asphyxiation. A variant on the three-piece tie, called the
"suitcase" or "briefcase," in which, following a three-piece
tie, the feet are tied back, is also used. The victim is then
dragged on the ground or suspended in the air by a rope.
Human rights activists report that the three-piece and
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suitcase ties are employed on prisoners held by the NRA in
military barracks, by the NRA-staffed ISO and by military
intelligence. In October 1988, six members of the ISO were
arrested in connection with the death by torture of a civilian
in their custody. The six were released in early 1989 for
lack of evidence. No NRA soldier or security official was
known to have been charged for torturing prisoners in 1989.
Unlike the situation in military barracks, physical abuse in
civilian prisons is relatively rare, but chronic shortages of
resources and overcrowding have resulted in substandard
conditions. The Government permitted the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit prisons throughout
the country and took a number of steps to improve conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The problem of "lodgers" — persons from the insurgent areas who
are suspected of being rebels or rebel sympathizers and held
indefinitely without charge or benefit of due process of
law — continued in 1989. The number of lodgers declined from
nearly 3,000 in January 1989 to fewer than 1,500 by the end of
the year, however. In June President Museveni called upon the
NRA and the local resistance committees in the insurgent areas
to speed up the screening of lodgers. In August over 1,000
lodgers were released. The Government has detained among the
lodgers a number of children between the ages of 13 and 15.
Many were released in 1988 and 1989 but an estimated 100 were
still being held at the end of 1989.
Persons may be detained in political and security cases under
the Public Order and Security Act of 1967, which permits
unlimited detention without charge. In 1989 no one was
charged under this law.
Exile is not used as a means of political control. The
Government announced a general amnesty in June 1988 which
remains valid for rebels not guilty of crimes against
civilians. In 1989 several thousand rebels who surrendered to
local authorities in accordance with amnesty provisions were
treated humanely, confined to reeducation camps, and
screened. Many were subsequently released, although several
hundred remain in rehabilitative detention.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The court system consists of magistrates courts, the High
Court, and the Supreme Court. The Ugandan judicial system
contains procedural safeguards modeled after British law,
including the granting of bail and the right to appeal a
verdict to a higher court. Members of the legal profession
are highly educated, and are generally committed to giving the
accused a fair public trial. A systemic shortage of resources
and manpower ensures that the process is slow and inefficient,
however. Criminal investigators lack everything from
transport to forensic aids to pens and paper. Judges are too
few in number to handle the huge backlog of cases and are
hampered by a lack of such basic tools as equipment for
recording court proceedings. In most cases, evidence at
trials is recorded in long hand by the presiding judge or
magistrate. The result of the investigative and judicial
delays is that individuals charged with capital offenses
typically wait 2 to 3 years or more for a verdict.
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In June the NRC passed a controversial bill which would bypass
the normal judicial processes in regions declared to be under
a state of insurgency. The bill is designed to end the
detention of lodgers by creating special magistrates courts in
areas of insurgency which would expedite verdicts on suspected
rebels or rebel sympathizers. The new courts would consist of
five persons: a magistrate, two persons appointed by the
district RC chairman, and two NRA officers. They would be
empowered to hear capital cases and impose the death penalty.
If implemented, the new law would considerably erode many
legal guarantees to a fair trial. Search and seizure of
evidence by the NRA or police would be permitted in insurgent
areas without a warrant. Suspects would be held indefinitely,
without formal charges, while their cases are being
investigated. Bail would not apply. Hearsay and
uncorroborated evidence would be admissible. The burden of
proof could be shifted to the accused at the discretion of the
court. As fighting in the north and east dropped off during
the latter half of 1989, the new law was not put into effect.
But it remains on the books should the President officially
declare a region to be an insurgent area.
Other than the lodgers, Uganda is currently holding no
prisoners for purely political offenses. The trial of Charles
Kagenda-Atwooki , former Secretary for Information of the
Uganda People's Congress (former president Obote's party) is
still pending. Atwooki was granted bail in September 1988.
When arrested in 1987 Atwooki was charged with engaging in
acts of terrorism and possessing seditious materials. The
terrorism charge has since been dropped. Joel Walehwa,
arrested and held incommunicado by security officials in 1988
prior to being formally charged with treason, was released in
September after all charges against him were dropped.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Under the NRM, interference by authorities with personal
privacy and family life has greatly diminished. Roadblocks,
which had been places of terror under previous regimes when
unruly soldiers could rob and extort at will, are far fewer in
number and no longer sites of abuse. Criminal elements are
present in the NRA, but they must act in secret because theft
is strictly punished under the NRA code of conduct.
Nonetheless, NRA soldiers are commonly implicated in such
crimes as the hijacking of private vehicles and armed
robbery. In the contested areas of the north and east, NRA
soldiers turned to stealing, looting, and other abuse of their
authority. Although required by law, search warrants are
rarely obtained.
There was no indication that the Government interfered with
private correspondence in 1989.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The civil conflict between the Government/NRA and disparate
rebel groups in the north and east continued throughout 1989
(although at a reduced level late in the year) and resulted in
massive violations of humanitarian law by all parties. In the
north, remnants of General Basilio Okello's army have waged
guerrilla war in the countryside, and, in the east, the rebel
Ugandan People's Army (UPA) has conducted terrorist operations.
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AI cited a report from a Resistance Council (RC) chairman in
Gulu which described the deaths of 88 civilians at the hands
of the NRA between December 7 and 25, 1988. According to the
report, in one incident 45 civilian prisoners were forced into
a grass hut and then burned to death. Both AI and the UHRA
concluded that the incidents were not isolated but part of a
larger pattern of similar abuses which took place in Gulu
during the period under review. The then Army Commander,
Major General Elly Tumwine, condemned the incident and
announced that a commission of inquiry had been formed to
investigate it. No results had been announced by the end of
1989. In July NRA Major Kategara ordered cordon and search
operations in Kumi District. Kategara's Special Brigades
committed widespread abuses, including the burning of farms
and the indiscriminate killing of civilians. The rampage
through Kumi culminated in the death by suffocation of 69
suspected rebels who had been detained in railway cars in
Mukura. The then NRA Commander Salim Saleh accepted blame for
the railway deaths and admitted that the civilians killed in
the railway cars had been innocent. Fourteen soldiers
involved were placed under arrest pending the findings of a
commission of inquiry. Again, no results had been announced
by year's end. President Museveni subsequently toured the
region and offered his condolences to the families of the
victims .
Another 50 civilians were killed in Soroti during similar
cordon and search operations in July. In the village of
Tubur, 30 kilometers south of Soroti, 18 people were reported
killed at the home of a man named Emesu. Most were cut to
death with long blades known as pangas. While residents
blamed the NRA, the army has been willing to admit only that
some civilians may have died in a crossfire.
The UPA rebels continued their program of terror and
assassination against members of local government Resistance
Councils in eastern Uganda which has claimed the lives of
dozens of RC officials in recent years. Similarly, remnants
of the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) rebels continued their
practices of kidnaping, forced recruitment, and summary
executions of opponents. A common HSM tactic was to raid
secondary schools to force boys to serve as rebels or porters
and girls to serve as sexual captives. Those who refused to
cooperate were often hacked to death. Victims of
insurgent/bandit forces were most often rural civilian
inhabitants rather than military forces. At least several
hundred persons died in such raids and ambushes. On Ugandan
Independence Day, October 9, the Rwenzururu rebel group, which
advocates independence for the Bakonjo people of the Rwenzori
mountains, attacked a subcounty headquarters in Kasese killing
several civilians including a subcounty chief and the chairman
of the subcounty Resistance Council.
During 1988 and early 1989, NRA policy in Gulu and Soroti was
to burn granaries and intentionally displace civilians to deny
support to the rebels. As a result, there were over 100,000
dirsplaced persons in northern and eastern Uganda in January
1989. As security improved later in the year, the NRA
reversed itself and encouraged farmers to return to their
villages .
The ICRC provided considerable emergency food aid to the
displaced, but assistance to 25,000 displaced persons in
Soroti was cut off early in 1989 after an ICRC relief convoy
was ambushed by rebels. A Ugandan worker employed by ICRC was
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killed, and three others were injured in the attack. Rebels
also attacked the United Nations High Conunissioner for
Refugees' (UNHCR) Sudanese refugee camp at Ajumani in an
effort to loot food stores. Transportation of relief supplies
in the north and east was seriously impeded by sporadic
rebel/bandit ambushes.
In September President Museveni hosted a 4-day meeting of the
National Resistance Army Council at State House. As in the
past, the President stressed that soldiers are expected to
obey all laws and that violators of the NRA code of conduct
would be severely punished. Hundreds of NRA soldiers are
detained in Luzira prison in Kampala and at various military
barracks for a wide variety of crimes, with armed robbery
being the most common. NRA soldiers guilty of gross
indiscipline face the death penalty. Three soldiers convicted
of rape in Atiak were executed by firing squad in February.
Two soldiers were executed by firing squad in June for armed
robbery and murder of civilians committed in Gulu. In
November three soldiers were executed in Kumi district after
being found guilty of committing murder and rape in Ngora town
3 days before. The total number of such executions in 1989 is
not known but is estimated at 15 to 20.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech in Uganda is restricted by the ban on
partisan political activity and government sensitivity about
press reports covering the activities of armed opposition
groups and allegations of NRA abuses. Political parties may
not hold press conferences or organize rallies and other
functions at which party officials would speak. Party-
originated criticism is more freely expressed in the press.
The Democratic Party (DP) maintains a party newspaper. The
Citizen, which is often critical of government policy as is a
DP-af filiated magazine. The Exposure. Throughout the interim
Government's rule, DP leaders have tried to sidestep the ban
on party activity by issuing circulars describing the party's
positions. Three such circulars were released in 1989 without
incident .
Over 15 newspapers publish a wide range of viewpoints covering
the political spectrum. This coverage includes reporting of
human rights violations, the ongoing civil war, and alleged
corruption by government and army officials. The Government
supports an official paper. The New Vision, which, despite its
affiliation, has reported accurately and at times aggressively
on allegations of human rights abuses by the NRA. While
criticism of government policies is common, journalists know
that direct, personal criticism of the President is
forbidden. Journalistic standards tend to the sensational,
and some papers show little regard for accuracy.
In 1989 the authorities did not detain or charge any
journalist for criticizing the Government. The Government has
attempted, however, to intimidate critical journalists in
previous years, e.g., Francis Odida, editor of the Sunday
Review in 1988 on charges of treason, apparently for writing
an article sympathetic to the Holy Spirit rebels. In 1989 it
continued with new attacks against journalists accused of
false reporting intended to cause harm to the Government. In
August Tony Awano, reporter for the newspaper Focus, was
arrested and charged with publishing libelous information
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UGANPA
against NRA Col. Kyaligonza. Awano was released on bail
pending trial. The editor of the newspaper Citizen, Joseph
Kigundu, faces four such libel cases, one of which was
incurred in 1989, and is also free on bail. In March the NRM
Political Commissar urged journalists to develop a code of
conduct to improve journalistic standards. In August the
Minister of Information called newspaper editors to his office
to warn them to desist from reporting "alarmist and seditious
stories . "
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Permits for public gatherings must be obtained from police
authorities, who have the right to deny the permit in the
interest of public safety. The ban on the activities of
political parties has greatly restricted their ability to
congregate. In October the Government denied permission to
the Democratic Party to celebrate its 35th anniversary in a
public meeting.
Private, trade, labor, religious, professional, and ethnic
associations are not impeded.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion in Uganda. Christianity, Islam,
and African traditional religions are freely practiced.
Conversion between religions is not obstructed. There is no
government control of religious publications, even those with
an antigovernment bias. Foreign clergy are welcomed in Uganda
and are not discriminated against by the Government.
President Museveni met with religious leaders of various
denominations several times during 1989 and assured them that
the NRM respects the separation of church and state.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
In theory, Ugandans may work or live anywhere in the country
and move about freely within it. In practice, travel in areas
of northern and eastern Uganda in 1989 remained difficult due
to sporadic attacks by rebels and armed bandits. Freedom of
movement improved in the latter half of the year as security
was restored to more regions. More than 100,000 formerly
displaced persons in Gulu and Soroti district have returned to
their villages (see Section l.g.). There are no restrictions
which prevent Ugandans from emigrating or from engaging in
foreign travel. Mismanagement in the immigration department
resulted in a complete shutdown of passport issuance in
September and October, however.
In the early 1980 "s Uganda was the second largest generator of
refugees in Africa. Virtually all of the more than 300,000
Ugandan refugees who fled to Zaire, Rwanda, and Sudan have
returned. Indeed the trend has reversed. Because of rebel
activity by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, over 50,000
Sudanese refugees fled across the border to refugee camps in
northern Uganda, the majority in early 1989. There were no
instances of forced repatriation or resettlement of refugees
with asylum in Uganda in 1989. When a group of 238 Ugandan
refugees were forcibly repatriated from Kenya in April 1989,
the Government detained some 60 of them. About half of the 60
persons were screened by the Government and released within a
month. The others participated in a political
reeducation/rehabilitation course and were released before the
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end of the year. In December several dozen ethnic Somalis,
many of whom claimed to be Kenyan citizens, sought political
asylum in Uganda. As of the end of the year neither the UNHCR
nor the Government had decided their cases.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Ugandans do not have the right to change their government by
democratic means. The current form of government, known as
the Resistance Council system, was instituted by the NRM after
it took power in 1986. Having originally pledged to restore
elected government by 1990, the NRM has now said it will give
up power to an elected government under a new constitution in
1995. In the interim. President Yoweri Museveni, who has
sought no electoral mandate to legitimize his rule, exercises
control by virtue of his chairmanship of the NRM/NRA and his
control over the military. He has appointed a large and
broad-based Cabinet which includes leaders from all major
ethnic, religious, and political groups.
In 1986 the NRM established the National Resistance Council as
its Parliament. Until 1989, it was exclusively made up of
appointees: 38 historical members (the vanguard of the NRM,
who are popularly known as the "bushmen") and government
ministers. In February and March 1989, the NRM held
nationwide elections to the local resistance councils (except
in Gulu where no elections were held for security reasons) and
to the National Resistance Council. While elections at all
levels were competitive and all citizens were eligible to vote
or stand for office, voting was by queuing, i.e., citizens
indicated their preference by lining up behind their
candidate. The new NRC thus consists of 258 persons: the 190
elected members; the 38 "bushmen;" 10 appointees from the NRA;
and 20 additional presidential appointees. Effective power,
however, continues to be exercised by the President.
Representatives from many tribal, religious, and political
factions, including prominent individuals from previous
governments, were elected to local and regional resistance
councils as well as to the expanded National Resistance
Council .
A 21-member Constitutional Commission became operational in
1989 and embarked on a series of constitutional seminars which
will take it to all of Uganda's 702 subcounties by 1991. The
stated goal is to involve all Ugandans in the constitution-
writing process. Constitutional issues were prominently
discussed in the press throughout 1989, with a wide variety of
views on the future system of government being expressed.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Respect for human rights is one of the cardinal principles on
which the NRM came to power and continues to serve as a basis
of the regime's legitimacy. As a result, the Government is
sensitive to international public opinion and has shown a
willingness to discuss human rights problems with
international human rights organizations. AI representatives
visited Uganda in January and subsequently issued a report,
Uganda: The Human Rights Record 1986-1989, which received
considerable attention in the local press. Government leaders
felt that the report was overly critical in some areas. In
May President Museveni met with AI representatives to discuss
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it. In July the Minister of Justice met with diplomats to
answer publicly charges made by AI and explain the
Government's human rights policy. The attention given to the
problem of lodgers by domestic and foreign human rights groups
and by diplomatic observers may have influenced the
Government's pledge to end the lodger problem.
The ICRC continued to operate in Uganda in 1989. ICRC
delegates visited prisons, traced missing persons, and
assisted in family reunification as well as providing relief
in conflict areas. In late 1988 and early 1989, ICRC was
permitted to visit military barracks where many political
detainees are held. ICRC also conducted human rights seminars
for the NRA.
The Office of Inspector General of Government (IGG) was
established by the NRM in 1986 to investigate government
corruption and human rights abuses in the current
administration. The IGG focused its efforts more on the
former than the latter in 1989. Investigations into abuses
alleged to have been committed by the NRA in the insurgent
areas are conducted by the NRA itself. The IGG has no role or
investigative machinery to conduct investigations in this
crucial area. An independent human rights organization, the
UHRA, also monitors human rights developments in Uganda.
While the Government had been hostile to the group in previous
years and imprisoned its Secretary General in 1987-1988,
relations improved significantly in 1989. Government
officials, including several ministers, participated in the
two human rights seminars that the UHRA sponsored in 1989.
UHRA publishes a magazine. The Activist, and produces
quarterly reports on human rights without government
interference. The Uganda Human Rights Commission, appointed
in 1986 by Museveni to investigate human rights abuses under
previous regimes, continued its information-gathering
activities in 1989.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Africans of three ethnic groups--Bantu (south), Nilotic
(north), and Nilo-Hamitic (east) --constitute most of the
population. Ethnic cleavages, tribalism, and religious
intolerance underlie much of the cycle of war and political
strife that has plagued Uganda for decades. The NRM
Government has publicly repudiated tribalism and has
introduced policies to prevent discrimination in housing,
employment, education, and social services based on race, sex,
religion, language, or social status. It has advocated
national reconciliation, stating that all citizens are
Ugandans first and foremost. This goal is symbolized by
efforts to include at least 1 representative from almost every
major tribal, regional, and religious group in the NRM's 76-
member Cabinet.
Women played an important role in the NRA's bush war, serving
as soldiers, intelligence operatives, and support personnel.
The NRM created a Women's Development Secretariat charged with
educating and politicizing Ugandan women, as well as a
National Council of Women which is part of the Ministry of
Local Government with responsibility for coordinating the
activities of women's groups throughout Uganda. Women's
overall status shows significant variations between ethnic
groups. Women are not legally discriminated against or
officially restricted from seeking education or employment.
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Even in urban areas, however, their access to education
declined disproportionately with the deterioration of the
educational system and economic stagnation. There are
significant wage differences in favor of men in similar
positions held by men and women.
The NRM has committed itself to the protection of women's
rights. Domestic violence against women is a relatively
common practice in Uganda, however, and the Government has not
comprehensively studied the issue. Women seldom report such
abuse to the authorities. Traditionally, problems such as
wife beating are adjudicated by tribal or village elders.
Women in cities can turn to the courts but very few do. The
Ugandan Association of Women Lawyers is an affiliate of the
International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) . It founded
a legal clinic in Kampala in 1988 to provide counseling and
advice to poor women. The Association is working to promote
respect for the rights of women and has formed a committee to
study the issue of domestic violence. Female circumcision is
not practiced by most Ugandan ethnic groups and has been
actively discouraged by the Government where it does occur.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Under Ugandan law, all workers, with the exception of skilled
employees in the civil service, have the right to form
unions. The National Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU) ,
Uganda's independent national labor federation to which all
unions are by law affiliated, held its first free elections in
5 years in early 1986 and began rehabilitating regional union
structures. Membership in NOTU-af filiated unions numbers
approximately 100,000 out of 240,000 workers employed in
private and state-owned industries. Relations between the
Government and NOTU are cordial. President Museveni met with
the NOTU leadership in May and expressed his support for the
labor movement. NOTU's influence on the overall economy
remains marginal since over 90 percent of the Ugandan work
force consists of peasant farmers. Even among industrial
workers, high inflation and lack of transport have made it
difficult for individual unions to organize, especially
outside the major commercial centers of Jinja and Kampala.
The Government recognizes the right of workers to strike but
prefers that they first exhaust more conciliatory methods of
resolving labor disputes. Several strikes took place in 1989
including actions by bank employees, workers at Lugazi sugar
works, and the employees of Ugil textiles. All were settled
peacefully.
The most notable strike of 1989 was by the faculty and staff
of Makerere University. As skilled civil service employees
they may not unionize or strike. When their employee
association nonetheless called a strike in May to highlight
their demand for a "living wage," the Cabinet threatened to
dismiss them and evict them from university provided housing.
At the last minute. President Museveni intervened and arranged
a settlement.
NOTU is affiliated with the Organization of African Trade
Union Unity.
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USMUh
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is recognized
by law and established in practice. Union officials are not
harassed, and unions have access to the industrial court.
Under the Trade Disputes, Arbitration and Settlement Act, the
industrial court hears and arbitrates trade disputes referred
to it by either the Minister of Labor or the parties to the
dispute. Through this mechanism disputes involving unions
representing textile, postal, and railway workers were
resolved in 1989. For some years the ILO Committee of Experts
(COE) has noted that employees of the Bank of Uganda, "who
cannot be considered to be public servants engaged in the
administration of the State," do not enjoy the rights
guaranteed by ILO Convention 98 on the Right to Organize and
Collective Bargaining which Uganda has ratified. The COE has
requested that the Government take steps to rectify the
situation. There are no export processing zones in Uganda.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law. Under the
NRA code of conduct, soldiers tried by military tribunals can
be sentenced to forced labor as part of their punishment.
There have been reports of forced labor at NRA camps where
captured rebel soldiers are "rehabilitated."
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Most of Uganda's 16 million people live in rural areas on
subsistence farms. In the modern wage sector the legal
minimum age for employment is 12 years except for light work
which the Minister of Labor may exempt. There are legal
restrictions on employing persons under 16 years of age in
mining and night work, except in the case of apprenticeship.
Enforcement of minimum age restrictions is limited, but few
children are employed in the wage sector due to the scarcity
of jobs and the large pool of unemployed adults. Many
children, however, work as market boys, car washers, and
street vendors in the towns.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The normal workweek is 48 hours. Time and a half must be paid
for each additional hour worked. Wages are unrealistically
low compared to the cost of living. An entry level clerk in a
government ministry could expect to earn about $9 per month at
the parallel market exchange rate, which is the rate at which
goods are priced. The nominal minimum wage is $4 per month at
this rate. A large bunch of matoke bananas (a staple crop)
costs $2 and a pair of leather shoes costs $60. Anything that
has to be imported is prohibitively expensive for the average
wage earner. Thus, workers must either find a second job or
grow their own food to be able to feed their families and pay
primary and secondary school fees. Medical care is supposed
to be provided by employers but is generally lacking.
Occupational safety and health standards have been legislated,
but in practice labor laws are seldom enforced.
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In 1989 President Mobutu Sese Seko completed 24 years as
President of Zaire, a huge, poor country with widely disparate
ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups, whose transition to
independence in 1960 was marked by extensive civil strife. He
is founder-president of Zaire's sole legal party, the Popular
Movement of the Revolution (MPR) . Legislative power is in
principle vested in the elected unicameral Legislative
Council, but the President has the constitutional power to
promulgate laws by decree, which he did on several occasions
in 1989. The party doctrine is defined by the Constitution as
"Mobutuism." All citizens are members of the MPR from birth.
The Executive Council (Prime Minister and Council of
Ministers), the Legislative Council, the judiciary, and the
only legal labor union are all considered organs of the
party. Legal political activity is limited to the party and
its affiliates. The focal point of the party and the
Government is the party's Central Committee (148 members)
which meets semiannually.
An overlapping array of security organizations, notably the
civilian National Documentation Agency (AND), the National
Immigration Agency (ANI), the gendarmerie, the civil guard,
and the armed forces (especially military intelligence — SARM)
share responsibility for identifying and controlling potential
internal and external threats. Their broad powers and uneven
discipline have resulted in arbitrary harassment, physical
mistreatment, and unauthorized detention of ordinary citizens
as well as political opponents of the Government. In May the
Government placed four of the security services (AND, ANI,
SARM, and the civil guard) under the authority of the State
Commissioner for Territorial Security and gave that position
to a highly respected general. Late in 1989, this official
took preliminary steps toward implementing effective
coordinating mechanisms which could enhance the discipline of
these forces.
Zaire has a mixed economy involving an active private sector
and an extensive but declining number of state enterprises.
Major mining, transportation, and communication activities are
still largely state owned. About 70 percent of the population
is rural, engaged in subsistence agriculture using traditional
methods of farming. Per capita income is approximately $180
per year, among the world's lowest, and is declining further
as population increases faster (3 percent per year) than
economic growth (2 percent per year). Zaire's communications
and transportation infrastructures are greatly eroded, making
communication between the institutions of government in the
capital and distant outlying regions increasingly difficult.
Inflation reached high levels in 1988 and early 1989 due to
government deficit spending. The implementation of new
economic policies, aided by high copper prices, had brought
inflation down from over 20 percent per month to about 3
percent per month. In June 1989, Zaire launched a new
International Monetary Fund stabilization program. The first
half year review by the World Bank and the Fund showed
positive performance within their guidelines. Still, the
economy remains vulnerable to changes in world market prices
of its commodity exports; mining industry income is crucial,
and the sharp 1989 drop in coffee earnings hurt the structural
adjustment effort.
Human rights in Zaire continued to be circumscribed in 1989 in
such basic areas as freedom of speech, press, assembly, and
integrity of the person. The Government continued to take
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ZAIBE
actions, including arrest and internal exile, to quash
activities of members of the principal internal opposition
group, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) , who
advocate the establishment of a second legal political party.
In 1989 police and military personnel frequently abused their
authority and arbitrarily arrested, detained, and extorted
money from civilians. To demonstrate its concern over the
problems of indiscipline and criminal activity within the
police and military, the Government held separate, highly
publicized trials in September, in which soldiers as well as
civilians were convicted of violent crimes and condemned to
death, a most unusual sentence in Zaire.
Through the Judicial Council and the Department (Ministry) of
Citizens* Rights and Liberties (DCRL) , the Government
continued in 1989 its efforts to prevent human rights abuses.
The Judicial Council (a super-ministry of justice also charged
with administration of the court and penal systems) continued
successful efforts initiated in previous years to moderate
prison conditions, regularize arrest authority and procedures,
and hear public grievances. The stated mission of the DCRL,
which is directed personally by the senior Vice Prime
Minister, is to defend citizens' rights when all other legal
recourse has been exhausted. It was able in 1989 to resolve a
number of cases of a civil nature (titles to land and contract
disputes) but has exhibited little capability for systemic
redress of human rights abuses, and its role in the judicial
process is increasingly unclear.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings
There were no reported cases of politically-motivated killings
in 1989. However, while quelling student-led disturbances in
February, security officials killed a number of students (see
Section 2.b.). Three officials subsequently were tried and
convicted for using excessive force.
b. Disappearance
There were no confirmed reports of disappearance of persons
for political causes, but at year's end the whereabouts of
Mangala Ngolu-Ndaki, a UDPS activist, were unknown. Mangala
traveled with President Mobutu to the United States in
October. He has not been seen by his family since the trip,
but human rights observers believe he was being held
incommunicado by the Government. There were unconfirmed
reports that some students arrested after January-February
demonstrations were flown to unknown destinations in the
interior, and either imprisoned or released. The security
services often hold detainees incommunicado for varying
lengths of time. Observers sometimes hear of a person s
disappearance, but less often or eventual reappearance. The
number of those who may have disappeared, for political or
other reasons, is unknown.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Innuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although torture and physical mistreatment of detainees are
against the law and contrary to officially stated po^I.c: , in
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practice beatings and other physical mistreatment of prisoners
and detainees continued during the year, some involving UDPS
members held at high security prisons. Nonpolitical prisoners
are also subject to abuse, and private citizens are often
beaten and robbed by security officials. A 1989 ordinance
issued by the President suggested that the Government intends
to take legal action against members of the security services
in instances of inhumane treatment or torture, which it has
rarely done in the past. By year's end it was too early to
tell how effectively the new measures would be implemented,
particularly in cases involving abuse of political dissidents.
Hunger and disease have been common in Zaire's prisons in past
years. The Judicial Council continued to introduce measures
to improve conditions in Zaire's prison and judicial systems,
including the establishment of a special commission to
supervise prison administration. In those prisons under the
Council's jurisdiction, funding was increased to provide
prisoners two meals a day, beds, blankets, and medical
supplies. These measures, in addition to those taken earlier,
have brought improvement in Kinshasa and in other major
cities. Their effectiveness in outlying areas is less
certain, and they have no effect on the military prison system
where political detainees are likely to be held.
The International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) also has
helped to improve conditions in civilian prisons by providing
basic medical supplies and clothing. They funded the
establishm.ent of a dispensary at one prison. Throughout 1989,
the ICRC was allowed access to most prisons. An exception was
the prisons controlled by the Special Presidential Division
(DPS) .
d. Arbitary Arrest, Detention, Exile or Forced Labor
By law, those arrested by a judicial police officer must be
brought before a magistrate within 48 hours for an initial
hearing and determination of sufficient grounds for arrest.
If this determination is positive, the magistrate can order
bail or preventive detention for up to 15 days. The case must
be brought up for review by a three-magistrate body within 5
days of the defendant's preventive detention. If the decision
is upheld, the case is ordered to trial when the investigation
is completed. The law stipulates that these periods of
detention may be extended only in exceptional cases. In
practice, arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention without
charges are common occurrences, affecting many people who come
into contact with the criminal justice system. Suspects are
often arrested and held for months without a hearing, often
incommunicado. In an effort to reduce the frequency of these
occurrences. Judicial Council personnel are in principle
supposed to visit prisons and detention centers each night to
take detainees before a magistrate within the required 48
hours. Because of the lack of personnel and communications
and transportation problems, it is not always able to achieve
this objective.
Police and military personnel continued to abuse their
authority in 1989 and frequently harassed, arrested, and
extorted money from civilians. The civil guard arrested a
number of local" and foreign businessmen on false charges or
for questionable, albeit common, Zairian business practices.
They were held in detention until bribes were paid.
Persons with financial resources are known to buy their way
out of detention without charges ever being filed. Moreover,
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a person with money or strong political ties is often freed
before serving his sentence, regardless of the gravity of the
crime committed. On the other hand, detainees and prisoners
without financial means or political influence often remain in
custody indefinitely without ever going to trial.
The President of the Judicial Council pursued efforts to
enforce a series of presidential ordinances enacted in 1988 to
rein in corruption and abuses by police and security
officers. These ordinances regulate arrest authority and
procedures and cover all officials with arrest powers from
police or security agencies. The Council has attempted to
require all arresting officials to take an oath to uphold the
law and to act solely within legal authority. After taking
the oath, each is assigned a number and given a photographic
identification card that must be presented when carrying out
an arrest, search, or seizure. Citizens have the theoretical
right to see the identification card. The ordinances specify
the powers and duties of these officers, including limits on
arrest authority, and requirements to arraign detainees within
48 hours. Thus far, the impact of these ordinances has been
limited. Judicial police officers under direct Judicial
Council control and the gendarmerie have taken the oath. The
civil guard and ANI have not. The AND administrator general
has notified the Judicial Council that AND officers, while not
signing the oath, recognize the legal obligations contained in
it.
Most persons detained for political reasons are held by means
of nonjudicial sanctions ranging from administrative detention
and house arrest to internal exile and restriction of movement
and travel. They are not formally charged or tried, remaining
in detention or internal exile until the President or one of
the security service officials chooses to release them.
Although such arrests and detentions are not usually a matter
of public record, the whereabouts of the more important
detainees are usually known, although sometimes not
acknowledged by the Government.
In recent years, the Government has engaged in actions (using
both internal exile and prison detention) to both curb and
co-opt the members of the primary banned internal opposition
party, the UDPS, back into the MPR. Fifteen UDPS members were
understood to have been arrested in January. The Government
appeared especially sensitive to UDPS activity during and
after the February student demonstrations. In August the U.S.
Embassy gave the DCRL and Judicial Council a list of 10 UDPS
members or associates believed arrested in July and still
held. No response was received by the end of 1989 despite
several follow-ups. The number of UDPS or other political
detainees remaining in that status was unknown at the end of
1989. In November, Amnesty International (AI) estimated that
there were about 100 UDPS dissidents being held in all of
Zaire.
As in past years, UDPS leader Tshisekedi wa Mulumba was kept
under various degrees of arrest, house arrest, or surveillance
during most of 1989. On July 7, for example, he was arrested
while attempting to travel to his brother's consecration as a
bishop in central Zaire. He was released on July 11, but has
been under de facto house arrest since then, his access to
visitors frequently has been denied.
A delegation of the New York-based Lawyers* Committee on Human
Rights visited Zaire at government invitation in August. The
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delegation visited a number of Zairian government officials
and, though denied permission to see Tshisekedi, did talk to
numerous other critics of the Government. During and after
their visit, security forces arrested a half dozen of the
dissidents with whom the delegation met. Four of those
arrested have been released. One of them, Omene Samba
Gauthier, has addressed a complaint about his treatment to the
United Nations.
A small number of opponents of the Government live in
self-exile in Europe, including the former chief of staff.
General Mukoba, who, according to AI ' s 1989 report was
expelled from Kinshasa without a formal banishment order.
There were no known cases of external exile or expulsion of
Zairians from the country in 1989. Political opponents in
exile probably could return safely to Zaire if they were
prepared to keep their political views to themselves.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Zaire's highly centralized Government exercises control over
the judiciary, principally through the Judicial Council. The
legal system is rooted in Belgian and customary law. The
modern court system includes the Supreme Court, Courts of
Appeal in each region, and the Court of State Security.
Defendants are entitled under the Constitution to a public
trial and defense counsel. Counsel must be engaged (at public
expense if necessary) in all trials before the Supreme Court
and before lesser courts (including courts martial) in capital
cases. Free legal aid may also be provided in other cases at
the request of the court concerned.
The availability of counsel is limited in many lesser civil
and criminal cases by the poverty of the defendants and by the
fact that there are less than 500 lawyers in all of Zaire. A
number of attorneys in Kinshasa, in conjunction with the bar
of Kinshasa, provide pro bono defense, and two government-
subsidized offices in Kinshasa were established in 1989 to
provide legal advice to the poor. When available, defense
counsels generally function freely and without coercion. Most
defendants who are aware of their rights avail themselves of
the right to appeal. Decisions of the State Security Court
involving national security, armed robbery, and smuggling are
not subject to appeal; but all other procedural protections of
the criminal code apply. While courts-martial generally try
only cases involving military personnel, in time of emergency
or during military operations the President can suspend
civilian courts and transfer jurisdiction over all cases to
them. In practice many security-related cases never come to
trial.
At the political level, all judges are members of the MPR and
are subject to party discipline. Thus, while judges in fact
perform their functions without political interference in the
great majority of cases, in sensitive or highly politicized
cases they operate under implicit or explicit constraints from
the executive or security forces. At the daily operational
level, some magistrates and lawyers accept bribes, applying
the full rigor of the law only to those who are unable to
pay. The salary received by magistrates, as in the case of
members of the security services, is so low as to foster this
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corruption. At the end of 1989, the Government raised
magistrates' pay significantly in an effort to stem corruption.
There is an ongoing effort by the President, the Judicial
Council, and leaders of the legal profession to improve the
judicial system, and extend its effectiveness beyond
Kinshasa. In October President Mobutu signed a decree
dismissing four judges of courts of first instance, a
counselor of the court of appeals, and a public attorney, for
refusing to work in the interior of the country as ordered.
The Department of Citizens' Rights and Liberties (DCRL) ,
created in 1986 to redress citizens' rights when all other
legal avenues had failed, began operation in 1987. It has a
central office and district offices in all of Kinshasa's 24
urban zones and has 32 offices throughout the rest of the
country. During 1989 the DCRL Minister completed a series of
highly publicized visits to these regional offices and
personally participated in hearings of the grievances of
individual citizens. DCRL representatives noted that lack of
adequate transportation and other resources had hampered their
effectiveness in outlying areas, and the Minister has sought
financial support from Western donors with some success.
The great majority of cases handled dealt with such subjects
as labor conflicts, title to land, execution of judgments, and
inheritance. Perhaps one-quarter to one-third concerned human
rights abuses, such as arbitrary arrests, prolonged
detentions, illegal seizures, and abuses by security forces,
but few results have been achieved to date in such cases. In
September President Mobutu issued two ordinances, one
authorizing the DCRL to bring civil suits against security
services or their representatives on behalf of alleged torture
victims, and a second forbidding the Supreme Court from
considering appeals of DCRL decisions. The second ordinance,
while apparently designed to strengthen the DCRL ' s power to
redress individual grievances, also circumscribed the Supreme
Court's power of judicial review, with uncertain consequences
for the operation of the Zairian judiciary.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
All Zairians automatically become members of the MPR at
birth. Party and state security organizations extend down to
the neighborhood level, and they maintain liaison offices in
all government agencies (including military units,
universities, the legislative council, and ministries). Party
officials, civil servants, armed forces personnel,
parliamentarians, and employees of state enterprises are taxed
to support the activities of the party's major organs (cadre
training, mobilization, propaganda, women's affairs, and
youth). These party cadres are required to attend the party's
training institute. Absence can result in reprimands and
suspensions. Government employees, market vendors, and
blue-collar workers are often required to participate in
public events — parades, official arrival and departure
ceremonies, etc. --or risk losing their jobs. In line with the
party-state's ideology of Zairian authenticity, Zairian men
are forbidden to wear ties. Zairians also are forbidden in
principle to use non-African names, although this provision is
not normally enforced.
Except in cases of threats to national security, the law
requires the police to have a judicial warrant before they can
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ZAIRE
search a home. In practice, police and security authorities
often enter and search homes without such warrants. Zairians
widely believe that the security services sporadically open
mail and tap telephone conversations.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
While the Constitution provides for the right of all citizens
to express their opinions and feelings freely, it subordinates
that and all other rights to the need to ensure "public order
and good conduct." Since Zairians are automatically members
of the sole political party (MPR) , the ideology of the MPR is
the only legally acceptable political thought. The MPR
ideology comprises the views and policies of the party's
chairman and founder. President Mobutu Sese Seko, but is not
necessarily defined in great detail.
The Government continued to make arrests in 1989 for
possessing or distributing political literature or documents
that it found objectionable, including those outlawed under a
Zairian law forbidding the distribution of "pamphlets of a
foreign origin or inspiration and of such a nature as to
damage the national interest" (see Section l.d.).
Radio and television are owned and operated by the State. The
major newspapers are privately owned but depend upon
significant government subsidies for survival. In addition,
they receive most of their news from the Zairian National
Press Agency (AZAP) , a state organization. The media are
expected to promote the ideals and principles of the party and
praise its leadership. Generally, publishers and editors are
active party members. Commentary on domestic or foreign
issues which the Government considers sensitive generally is
discouraged, and direct criticism of the President is
forbidden. While journalists are circumspect in their
criticism of other high officials as well, criticism of
incompetent officials or inadequate government services and
corruption frequently appears in print.
Media censorship tends to be self-imposed. Zairian
journalists must be members of the press union in order to
practice their profession. The threat of ouster from the
union and consequent loss of livelihood are strong inducements
toward self-censorship. In some instances involving national
interests, reporting is directed by the Government. For
instance, the Department of Information at one point
circulated a memorandum directing the media not to
editorialize on Zaire's political and economic differences
with Belgium. In March Makoko Musheni was dismissed from the
government-owned Radio and Television Agency for quoting a
Jeune Afrique article on Zaire's difficulties with Belgium.
Kafuka Rujamizi was dismissed from the Agency for reporting on
the evolution of fuel and transport costs. Both men and
another journalist fired for critical reporting, Mikiti Kombi ,
have been rehired, but none is currently in a broadcasting
position.
The Government also uses other techniques to control the
media, including detention. In early 1989, Lumpungu Kanyinda,
the editor of a regional paper, was arrested, though criminal
charges against him later were dropped in favor of a civil
suit. No closings of newspapers were reported in 1989. There
are several clandestine presses that operate sporadically,
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ZAIEE
printing flyers and handbills critical of the Government and
various Zairian leaders.
Foreign journalists wishing to visit Zaire must receive prior
permission from the Department of Information. Artistic and
academic freedom of expression are subject to the same
restrictions and self-censorship as the press. Mandatory
membership in professional organizations and well-developed
informer networks serve to discourage dissent. Some books are
prohibited, and films, newspapers, and magazines are subject
to banning. Imported publications, including books and
periodicals, are subject to censorship if they criticize Zaire
or its Government, although articles criticizing aspects of
the Government's economic policy have circulated uncensored.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Groups other than the party and its affiliates may hold public
meetings only with government authorization. The Government
permits the existence of nonpolitical associations, but in
principle they must notify authorities when they plan meetings
or activities involving more than 5 people. In practice this
is rarely enforced. Meetings of nonofficial organizations
have been disrupted by government agents because of suspected
political activities. UDPS leader Tshisekedi, in a letter to
the Commissioner of State for National Defense and Territorial
Security, complained that at 10 p.m. on January 17 military
intelligence had arrested nine persons at a reception which he
had just departed.
In February student demonstrations in Kinshasa, which had
begun with complaints over transportation, and Lubumbashi took
on a more political tone. After the students resorted to
violence, including stoning and burning cars and buses, the
Government responded with a massive deployment of security
forces. Some units reportedly fired on demonstrating
students. Reports of the number killed ranged from 2 to over
20, with scores of students injured, but these figures could
not be confirmed. The Government itself criticized the
excessive security force reaction against the student
demonstrations in Lubumbashi. On April 24, the press reported
that two army officers and a noncommissioned officer had been
convicted (a major for "allowing troops under his command to
open fire on students," and a corporal for "murder") for their
roles in putting down the Lubumbashi demonstrations. It was
unknown if the sentences had been carried out by the end of
1989.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is recognized in the Constitution, the
Government officially sanctions most major world religions,
and religious practice is generally free. Zaire's population
is overwhelmingly Christian, though indigenous beliefs and
religious traditions exert a major influence. Catholics make
up 50 percent of the population, and Protestants, including
the local Kimbanguist Church, 36 percent. Five percent of
Zairians are Muslims. Officially recognized religions are
free to establish places of worship and to train clergy. Most
churches maintain active links with coreligionists outside the
country, and expatriate missionaries are allowed to
proselytize and to serve both Zairian and expatriate
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ZAIRE
congregations. Affiliation with a recognized religion confers
neither advantage nor disadvantage with respect to secular
status .
Despite the general freedom of religion, the party-state
ideology on occasion has been interpreted as requiring the
individual to place loyalty to the State ahead of religion.
In 1989 President Mobutu canceled church services one Sunday
to assure attendance at a political event. New churches are
required to obtain government recognition to operate freely,
and that recognition has been difficult for less well-known
churches to obtain. Adherents to sects not officially
recognized by the Government can find themselves at the mercy
of local officials.
Traditional African religious groups are allowed to practice
their beliefs, but are not officially recognized. The
Jehovah's witnesses and a number of other religious groups and
sects, banned in 1986 on charges of fraud or subversive
activities, remained banned in 1989. These groups are
considered antigovernment because of their refusal to
recognize national symbols, such as the flag and the national
anthem, or to participate in political ceremonies.
A government report issued in April 1988 indicated that 357
sects and churches were operating illegally in Zaire. The
Government ordered them closed until such time as the
authorities give them permission to function. The report
noted that the Constitution recognized the rights of religious
associations as long as their activities were not contrary to
the law or public order. A year later, in July 1989, the
Kinshasa municipal government ordered closure of "over 400
religious groups," according to press reports.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government at times imposes special documentation
requirements for travel to areas of unrest or security
concern. As noted earlier, the Government also restricts a
few dissidents to villages of origin or other locations in the
interior. Foreign residents must have special permits to
travel into certain regions such as diamond-producing areas.
All citizens, refugees, and permanent residents must carry
government-issued identity cards, and police and military
personnel often set up checkpoints along major roads to
inspect papers. Those whose documents are not in order must
pay a fine or go to jail. In principle, any Zairian citizen
may obtain a passport and exit visa, although on occasion
government and security officials have impeded issuance in
order to prevent or disrupt the travel of persons suspected of
political opposition. A married woman must have her husband's
permission before obtaining a passport.
In 1989 there were estimates of 50,000 officially registered
Zairians living as displaced persons or refugees in
neighboring countries. In 1989 Zaire signed an agreement with
Angola providing for the return of up to 5,000 refugees, and a
majority had returned by year's end. A small number of
political refugees also reside in the Congo and Tanzania.
There are continuing reports in the east of refugees fleeing
for Uganda, in one case after the killing of a Zairian soldier
and subsequent reprisals against local villagers. It is
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ZAIRE
likely that many Zairian displaced persons could return to
Zaire if they wished.
By mid-1988, Zaire was providing safe haven to approximately
345,000 refugees, of whom 314,000 are Angolans. Refugees
generally are allowed to pass freely into Zaire, but upon
entry they are first processed by military and state security
officials. Refugees are sometimes detained or closely
monitored on suspicion of illegal political activity. The
Government provides land for resettlement and camps. Outside
agencies, especially the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) , provide food, housing, transportation, and
medical care.
Forced repatriation is contrary to official government policy
and rarely occurs, but there was at least one such case in
1989.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government
through democratic means. Political power in Zaire is highly
centralized and controlled by the President, who, while
normally consulting widely, makes all important decisions.
Policies are executed by the Prime Minister and Cabinet, both
appointed by the President. Advocacy of a multiparty system
or opposition to the party-state are contrary to the
Constitution and laws, as are actions that question the
authority of the President and the political system.
Suffrage is universal beginning at age 18, and voting is
mandatory, enforced in theory by penalties including fines or
arrest. The national Parliament, municipal councils, and
rural and urban zone councils are chosen by direct popular
elections that also take place every 5 years. All candidates
are carefully screened by party committees at the appropriate
level, but voters generally have a choice among several
candidates. In the 1987 parliamentary elections, over half of
the incumbents were defeated. President Mobutu was reelected
unopposed in 1984 to a third 7-year term in office.
Countrywide local elections — annulled in 1987 because of
government charges of fraud and postponed twice since February
1988--were held in late May. Just before the scheduled vote.
President Mobutu ordered postponement of elections in north
and south Kivu because of growing ethnic tensions over voter
eligibility. The Zairian press reported only a few incidents
of voting irregularities or fraud. Many voting places lacked
voting booths, forcing voters to drop their ballots in urns
with the candidate's name on it in front of local officials.
Some estimates put voter turnout at considerably lower than 50
percent .
Since 1980 members of the UDPS (see Section l.d.) have been
involved in efforts to establish a second political party.
Their efforts have been rebuffed both by the official party
and by the President, and UDPS leaders have suffered arrest
and detention at various times over the past 7 years. The
UDPS leaders released from internal exile in June 1987 have
taken two different routes. some UDPS activists have accepted
government positions; others remain outside the MPR and were
arrested and detained on several occasions in 1989.
423
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government's attitude toward external investigations has
been inconsistent, as with the 1989 visits from the Lawyers'
Committee on Human Rights (see Section l.d.)- The ICRC has
been allowed to maintain a permanent office in Zaire since
1978, although at times its access to prisons has been
restricted. AI asked the DCRL about numerous detainees in
1989 and received responses to some of its queries. A
delegation from AI visited Zaire in November. There are no
independent human rights monitoring organization in Zaire.
The Government maintains that Zaire's human rights practices
meet international standards and denies charges of systematic
and serious violations. It participated in the 43rd, 44th,
and 45th sessions of the U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) ,
and Zaire's representative, the Minister of Citizens' Rights
and Liberties, again defended his Government's concern for
human rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Home to several hundred disparate ethnic groups, most with
their own tribal languages, Zaire has a population of over 33
million. The Government has sought to defuse disputes based
on linguistic or ethnic differences by adopting French as the
official language of government and education.
Though many residents of the President's home region of
Equateur, and especially of the President's own Ngbandi tribe,
occupy high positions, the Government strives to counter
ethnic divisions by recruiting ministers and other high
government officials from all regions and major ethnic
groups. There are no significant ethnic or racial groups that
have suffered official discrimination in the past 10 years.
Custom, tradition, and existing law constrain women from
attaining social equality. Women generally hold lower
positions and earn less than men in the same jobs. However,
women's rights to own property and participate in the
political and economic sectors are protected by law, including
the 1987 family code. This code expressly provides for women
to inherit their husband's estates and strengthens their right
to manage personal property and their right to a property
settlement upon divorce. Nonetheless, it retains provisions
requiring a married woman to obey her husband and obtain his
permission for all legal transactions (to open a bank account,
accept a job, obtain a passport, rent or sell real estate,
etc.) The party's office of women's affairs promotes greater
participation by women in the nation's economic, social, and
political life and has worked with other organizations to
publicize the provisions of the family code. A growing number
of women work in the professions, the universities, and
government service, but few are in senior, policymaking
positions .
Reliable information is not available on violence against
women, including wife beating. The police do not normally
intervene in domestic disputes, and few cases come before the
courts. Violence against women is not a topic of public
discussion, and therefore not seen as a major social problem.
Neither the Government nor women's groups have addressed this
issue.
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ZAIRE
Women, like men, often suffer from the indiscipline of the
security forces, and there are unconf irmable charges from the
villages of rape by locally based soldiers. Female
circumcision is not generally practiced in Zaire, though
unconfirmed reports suggest it may exist in scattered remote
areas of northern Zaire.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The labor movement in Zaire is limited by law to one national
union, the National Union of Zairian Workers (UNTZa) , which is
an integral unit of the sole political party. The Secretary
General of UNTZa is a member of the party's Central Committee,
and union officials at the regional level serve on regional
party committees.
Membership in UNTZa is compulsory for civil servants,
employees of state enterprises, and employees of private firms
with at least 20 employees. The union claims about 1 million
workers as dues-paying members, for whom there is a check off
system. The overwhelming majority of the work force is
self-employed, either in the unofficial sector or in
subsistence agriculture.
UNTZa participates actively in the Organization of African
Trade Union Unity and maintains ties with a number of foreign
labor confederations.
The right to strike is included in the labor law, but because
the law establishes lengthy and mandatory arbitration and
appeal procedures which result in the resolution of most labor
disputes, in practice lawful strikes do not occur. Workers,
nevertheless, conduct frequent unauthorized strikes against
employers. In these circumstances, UNTZa is called in to
attempt to resolve the dispute, though in some instances
employers and workers have reached a settlement without
UNTZa's participation.
b. Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
While UNTZa has the right to bargain collectively with
employers, as part of Zaire's party-state structure, it is
unable to protect worker interests or defend worker rights
that run counter to government policies. It provides social
and educational services to members and their families and is
charged with implementing government programs to improve
worker benefits.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of
Experts (COE) has noted the Government's assurances that, as
part of the revision of the labor code, measures are to be
taken to strengthen the provisions protecting workers against
acts of antiunion discrimination by imposing fines on
employers committing such acts.
Workers are uniformly covered by labor legislation throughout
the country, including in the proposed new export processing
zone .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution and labor code forbid forced labor. The sole
political party in the past organized a labor supply for
425
ZAIRE
public works projects by strongly encouraging neighborhood or
community participation once a week. This practice of
"salongo" has now been generally abandoned, but is still at
least sporadically implemented in some limited areas of the
countryside.
Zairian legislation providing for compulsory civilian service
for graduates from pedagogical and technical institutes was
repealed in March 1987.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legislated minimum age for employment is 18, although
those between ages 14 and 18 can legally engage in "light
work" if a parent or guardian consents. Due to high levels of
unemployment, many children under 14 years of age work in the
informal economic sector, especially in subsistence
agriculture, to supplement family income. Minimum wage,
safety, and health standards are not observed for them.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Workers are entitled to a minimum daily wage (currently less
than 50 cents), paid holidays, and vacations; they receive at
least 1 rest day per week; fringe benefits usually include a
housing allowance, medical care, uniforms, transportation, and
a midday meal. Working hours are limited to 48 hours a week.
Workplaces are legally required to meet minimum safety and
health standards. Most workers in the organized wage sector
know their rights, and the UNTZa is charged with monitoring
employer compliance with labor laws. This covers only the
roughly 1 million organized workers out of a potential work
force of 17 million. The majority of the population is
engaged in subsistence agriculture and small-scale commerce
outside the formal sector.
In recent years income in the modern economy has not kept up
with inflation, and the minimum wage does not provide a decent
living for workers and their families. As a result, in the
private sector, fringe benefits, which are not subject to
income tax, often constitute more than half the total wage
package. With these benefits, workers are able to maintain a
modest standard of living. In the spring, the Government
committed itself to a 20 percent salary increase for
government employees, and as of October workers had begun to
receive their raises. Public sector remuneration remains low,
however, and workers are often driven to corruption or to take
second jobs in the private sector.
426
ZAMBIA
In Zambia's one-party system of government. President Kenneth
Kaunda exercises predominant executive authority. He is
advised by a central committee of party leaders and governs
through a cabinet and a parliament. There is strong
competition for parliamentary seats within the single-party
structure. All candidates for political office at any level
must be members of the United National Independence Party
(UNIP) and must be screened by its Central Committee in
advance. Under a state of emergency in effect for the past 25
years, the President has broad discretion to detain or
restrict the movements of people, and law enforcement
personnel have extraordinary powers to detain suspects and
search homes.
The Zambian police, operating under the Ministry of Home
Affairs, have primary responsibility for maintaining law and
order. Divided into regular and paramilitary units, it
supervises a volunteer vigilante force composed primarily of
party activists. The Zambian Intelligence and Security
Service is charged with intelligence and counterespionage
responsibilities while the armed services are used for
internal security, especially at checkpoints and roadblocks.
Although Zambia's economy grew in real terms for the second
straight year (after years of steady deterioration) due to
high copper prices and bumper corn crops, per capita income
continues to decline because of rapid population growth. Over
the near and medium term, the country will continue to be
burdened with an overvalued currency and beset by high
inflation, high unemployment, and chronic underutilization of
industrial production. The Government undertook economic
reforms late in 1988 with stiffer measures in 1989 designed to
stimulate market forces by ending subsidies and price controls
and by significantly devaluing the currency. With more
reforms required, Zambia will be hard pressed to cushion the
blows on its poorest citizens.
Positive human rights developments in Zambia in 1989 included
judicial action against officials accused of mistreating
prisoners; release of detained opposition political party
members; the return of shops seized in an earlier crackdown on
"black marketeering ; " and spirited, widely reported,
parliamentary debate over Zambia's one-party state and State
of Emergency, issues that were previously not discussed
publicly.
Areas in which human rights problems occurred in 1989 included
mistreatment of prisoners and detainees, including evidence of
torture; arbitrary and excessively long detentions; lack of
fair trials in security cases; restrictions on freedoms of
speech, press, assembly, and association; the right of
citizens to change their government; and traditional, often
illegal, discrimination against women. In 1989 the
deteriorating economic situation and increased authority
granted by the 1988 Emergency Powers Act led police to use
excessive force in their efforts to curb smuggling and illegal
trading and to stem the influx of illegal aliens. In
assisting the police, overzealous party militants and
vigilantes also used illegal means or excessive force.
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ZAMBIA
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing
In 1989 no killings occurred which could be attributed to the
Zambian Government. Ten people were killed when a household
of Malawian dissidents was bombed in October. Zambian press
reports hinted that Malawian government agents were to blame.
b. Disappearance
There were no known cases of government-inspired disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture, but there are credible
reports that police and military personnel have resorted to
excessive force when interrogating detainees or prisoners. In
January 1989, a Lusaka High Court judge expressed concern over
the torture of people under the custody of law enforcement
officers. Those who are maltreated by authorities can and do
appeal to the judicial system for redress.
In 1989 Zambian courts tried some cases charging police or
prison officers with mistreatment of prisoners. In one case,
a man was awarded damages for pain, suffering, permanent
damage to his eyesight, false imprisonment, and general
damages when he was assaulted by police. In another case, a
commanding officer of a regional prison and two senior
subordinates were acquitted on charges of failing to feed a
prisoner. Militant vigilantes were accused of publicly
beating and humiliating citizens suspected of black
marketeering . During 1989 two vigilantes were jailed for
beating a suspected cattle rustler to death.
The vigilantes (volunteer party activists) are tasked with
assisting the police in combating crime, black marketeering
and smuggling. These units are frequently overzealous, and,
in 1989 there were many ciLizen complaints of harsh
treatment. The Human Rights Committee of the Law Association
of Zambia (Copperbelt branch) appealed to the party to check
harassment of the people by vigilantes.
Conditions in Zambian prisons are harsh with limited medical
facilities. Several foreigners imprisoned for brief periods
in Zambia have reported substandard food, overcrowding, and
the absence of beds. According to Amnesty International's
1989 Report, covering 1988, these conditions have resulted in
a number of deaths. The Report noted in particular the extent
of overcrowding in the Central Remand Prison.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Preservation of Public Security Act (PSA) gives the
President broad discretion during a state of emergency, which
has been in effect since 1964, to detain or restrict the
movements of persons and to order that persons be arrested and
detained for indeterminate periods. Presidential detainees
are entitled to formal notification of the reasons for their
detention within 14 days of arrest; publication of their
detention in the Government Gazette; access to counsel;
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frequent visitation by family and colleagues; immediate right
to petition the detaining authority for release; and the right
to seek judicial review of the detention order by an *
independent and impartial tribunal after 1 year. However, the
President is not legally bound to accept a tribunal's
recommendation of release if he still believes that the
detainee poses a threat to national security. In practice,
detainees have been released if the judicial tribunal so
recommended. Some detainees have been held for years without
coming to trial; for example, Faustino Lombe, who was arrested
in 1981 for plotting the escape of detainees held on treason
charges. He was not released until 1988.
In March one detainee successfully sued the State for unlawful
detention and false imprisonment.
Approximately six people detained under presidential order
were released in 1989. These included three alleged members
of an opposition political party, the People's Redemption
Organization (PRO), which is illegal under Zambia's
Constitution. Four army officers, who were detained under
presidential order and charged with coup plotting in 1988,
were formally charged with treason and committed to the High
Court for trial. According to the Government Gazette,
approximately 18 persons were detained under the PSA. Four
are suspected of involvement in the petrol-bombing murder of
10 Malawian exiles. Most of the remaining 14 are being held
on suspicion of drug-related activities.
The 25-year state of emergency gives law officers and defense
personnel extraordinary powers. Police officers of assistant
inspector rank and above may arrest without a warrant and
detain a person for up to 28 days if the officer has reason to
believe that grounds exist to justify a presidential detention
order. In theory, police must provide the detainee with
reasons for his detention within 14 days of arrest. In July a
magistrate summoned two police officers who in separate
incidents had kept two accused persons for 7 days without
detention orders. By the end of 1989, there was no
information available on whether or not they were punished.
Police can use a 1989 law supplementing the Dangerous Drugs
Act to secure forfeitures of property or proceeds earned or
suspected to have been earned through drugs. A Drug
Enforcement Commission was created in 1989 under the same Act.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Zambian judicial system consists of the Supreme Court with
appellate powers and a series of lower courts of which the
High Court is the most important. Although presidential
detainees are not guaranteed public trial, such trials are
usually public when they occur. In most cases, presidential
detainees are eventually released without having been tried.
The trial of Lt . Gen. Christian Tembo and three other military
officers charged with plotting a coup was scheduled to be held
in public in early 1990.
In ordinary cases, the law protects suspects' rights during
the conduct of interrogations and provides for the right to
legal representation at one's own expense or through legal
aid; the right to give evidence under oath in criminal
procedures; the right to give an unsworn statement; and the
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ZAMBIA
right to remain silent. The Zambian judiciary traditionally
has maintained its independence from executive branch
influence. Although the President has the power to appoint
and transfer judges, there appears to be no evidence that such
power has swayed court decisions.
The number of political prisoners held at the end of 1989 was
unknown. There are five prisoners serving life sentences for
coup plotting in 1980.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The inviolability of the home is generally respected, except
in cases relating to the state of emergency or to roundups of
illegal aliens and black marketeers. In such cases, security
forces have broad powers and often enter the homes of suspects
without search warrants.
In May 1989, 120 persons were picked up in Mongu and, in June
the Flying Squad (an antirobbery unit) raided homes in a Kitwe
residential area, allegedly to flush out illegal aliens. Such
raids were extended in July to Chililabombwe where some
persons were rounded up, allegedly for attempting to smuggle
goods to Zaire.
Early in the year many businessmen, whose trading licenses
were revoked in a 1988 clampdown on black marketeering, were
given back their licenses and shops. They were also promised
compensation for their losses.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These freedoms are restricted. Parliament debates a wide
range of political, economic, and social issues but within a
controlled one-party context. Direct negative comments
concerning the Head of State, or the national philosophy
("Humanism") generally may not be expressed in public, the
Parliament or the media. A Kitwe resident was sentenced to 2
years hard labor in June after he was found guilty of defaming
the President.
Toward the end of 1989, Members of Parliament questioned the
usefulness of the one-party state and the state of emergency.
These parliamentary debates were widely covered in the
newspapers .
Since the beginning of 1989, the two national dailies have
been owned by a new public corporation, the National Media
Corporation, headed by an advisor to the President.
Television and radio are also state owned under the Zambia
National Broadcasting Corporation. In spite of its
quasi-government ownership, the press generally carries a
substantial amount of commentary critical of party and
government performance but within the parameters of dissent
tolerated by the Government.
Academic freedom is respected in Zambian society, and
educators are outspoken in their opposition to government
influence over the educational system. However, university
teachers and researchers are subject to the same broad
restrictions on criticism of the President and his philosophy
that apply to other Zambians.
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ZAMBIA
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
All political activity outside the one-party structure is
banned. Police permits are issued routinely for meetings,
rallies, or marches unless the Government believes the
proceedings are likely to be contrary to its interests. There
are a number of unofficial pressure groups for various
economic, political, and social subjects. The most
influential in affecting government policy are the Zambia
Industrial and Commercial Association and the Commercial
Farmers Bureau.
For discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in the Constitution and
respected in practice. Zambia has no state religion, and
adherence to a particular faith does not confer either
advantage or disadvantage. The Government has prohibited the
Jehovah's Witnesses from proselytizing. Nevertheless, the
sect functions openly, and its freedom to refrain from
participating in various secular activities such as voting,
singing the national anthem, and saluting the flag has been
upheld in the courts and supported by senior party leaders.
Christian missionaries from a wide variety of faiths operate
in the country. Lay associations and religious youth groups
operate independently of party control or influence.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Police roadblocks are common, and vehicles and passengers are
commonly searched. Under the longstanding state of emergency
legislation, the President may restrict the movement of
persons within Zambia although this authority is seldom used
and was not used in 1989. The Government withholds or
withdraws passports to prevent foreign travel by persons whose
activities are considered inimical to Zambian interests. In
August junior doctors, who went on a "go-slow" demanding
better conditions of service, were dismissed and their
passports taken by police. The doctors were subsequently
reinstated and their passports returned.
While the majority of Zambians are subsistence farmers, about
47 percent of the people live in urban areas, and migration to
cities is increasing. In November 1989, President Kaunda
announced that unemployed urban Zambians have until June 30,
1990, to return voluntarily to work the land in rural areas.
The President warned that failure to respond to his call for
voluntary resettlement would result in the imposition of an
involuntary resettlement program next year. The Government
has promised to provide the resettlers with land and food for
1 year to assist in the resettlement process.
Zambia hosts a large refugee/displaced persons population,
particularly from Angola and Mozambique in several refugee
settlement centers. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are approximately
143,000 refugees and displaced persons in Zambia. The largest
group of refugees is from Angola, totaling more than 97,000
persons. Nearly 30,000 Mozambican refugees have also entered
in recent years. In 1989 the Government cooperated with the
UNHCR in the repatriation of over 4,000 Namibian refugees.
431
There have been repeated press reports of Mozambique National
Resistance (RENAMO) guerrilla bands from Mozambique entering
eastern Zambia and killing civilians while raiding villages.
Zambian security forces reportedly pushed most of the rebels
back across the border, killing 272 and capturing 117 as of
June 1989.
Some dissidents who have left exile groups such as the African
National Congress have been subject to harassment and
abduction by their former associates, causing some
embarrassment to the Government. The Government has
cooperated with the UNHCR which has been active in intervening
to provide protection and/or resettlement on a case-by-case
basis. It also supported the U.N. Secretary General's Special
Representative in Namibia in his efforts to investigate the
question of Namibians allegedly detained by the South West
Africa People's Organization.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government:
Zambian citizens do not have the right to change their form of
government. Under the Constitution, UNIP is the sole legal
political party. It has an estimated membership of less than
10 percent of the adult population. Power is concentrated in
the hands of the President as leader of the party and Head of
State. He plays a dominant role in determining the membership
of Zambia's top executive institutions, including the party
Central Committee and the Cabinet, which traditionally contain
a general regional and tribal balance.
Candidates for political office at any level must be members
of the party and are subject to close examination by the
Central Committee. In practice, the political system is open
to persons of somewhat divergent opinions, provided they are
willing to work within the one-party structure and do not
challenge the President's preeminent position.
Theoretically, the National Assembly is equal to the President
in power and importance. However, following the October 1988
general election, the President moved to curb the independence
of the newly elected National Assembly. In a break with
tradition, members were sworn in by the President at the State
House instead of by the Speaker at the National Assembly
buildings, as had been the practice. At the ceremony, the
President stated that unwarranted criticism in Parliament
would not be tolerated and stressed that the National
Assembly's principal purpose is to implement party policy
through the drafting of legislation. Despite the President's
warning, there was extensive criticism of party and government
policies during the second 1989 session of Parliament. These
debates were well covered in the press.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government neither encourages nor hinders inquiries or
visits by human rights organizations.
In August 1989, the press carried an Amnesty International
report which expressed concern over detained persons and urged
the Government to release them without further delay. The
Government, through the Minister of State for Home Affairs,
has indicated that it is studying the report.
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ZAMBIA
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status:
The population of 7 million comprises more than 70
Bantu-speaking tribal groupings. Economic and social needs
are met on a generally nondiscriminatory basis. In 1989
compensation was promised to both black and Asian businessmen
whose licenses and shops had been seized in 1988 (see Section
l.f .).
By law, women are entitled to full equality with men. In
practice, while they participate increasingly in Zambia's
social, economic, and political life and are gaining
representation in the professions and higher education, they
remain in a subordinate position in many ways. Zambian women
are a major component of the rural work force. Customary law
and practice, in contradiction to Zambia's Constitution and
codified laws, place women in subordinate status with respect
to property, inheritance, and marriage. Until 1989, under
traditional customs, all rights to inherit property rested
with the deceased man's family. The widow and her children
were entitled to nothing. The Intestate Succession Act passed
in 1989 guarantees widows a 20 percent share and children a 50
percent share in the inheritance of a deceased man's
property. Divorce laws are applied to men and women equally.
There are no reliable statistics on the extent to which
violence against women, including wife beating, occurs.
Domestic assault is a criminal offense, but, in practice,
police are often reluctant to pursue reports of wife beating
or other forms of abuse. According to women's rights
advocates, nondomestic violence against women is not generally
tolerated by traditional or civil authorities. Victims
usually report attacks, and legal action is taken. In crimes
against women where rape, serious injury, or death occurs,
men--including husbands--can receive sentences up to, and
including, the death penalty.
According to the 1980 census, the percentage of literacy among
Zambians above the age of 15 is 75.4 per cent for males and
53.1 per cent for females. In employment, Zambian men and
women receive equal pay for equal work. However, there is no
legal redress for women who are refused employment on the
basis of their sex. Within the workplace, regulations often
deny married professional women the fringe benefits (cars,
housing etc.) provided to their male colleagues.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Zambia has a history of strong labor union organizations,
dating from the establishment of the copper mines during the
1930's. Zambia's 18 large national unions, organized by
industry or profession, are all members of the Zambia Congress
of Trade Unions (ZCTU) , the sole legal confederation.
The ZCTU is not controlled by the party or the Government, and
union leaders frequently criticize government policy on such
subjects as wages, economic policy, conditions of service, and
labor representation in party and government organs. The ZCTU
is democratic and regularly conducts open elections to select
its leadership.
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ZAMBIA
With the economic downturn and implementation of stringent
reform measures, there has been an increase in labor unrest.
Under existing legislation, strikes are permitted only after
all other recourse has been exhausted. In practice, virtually-
all strikes are illegal, since they almost always commence
before the mandatory process of mediation has run its course.
The Government normally has relied on persuasion and continued
mediation to end strikes once they have begun.
Deteriorating economic conditions have resulted in widespread
labor unrest. Throughout the year, teachers, bank workers,
air traffic controllers, foresters, railway workers, sugar
refinery workers, miners, and junior doctors were among the
groups that mounted boycotts, "go-slows," and strikes. The
Government instructed education officers to compile lists of
teachers involved in class boycotts so disciplinary action
could be taken but later backed down in the face of protests
from the ZCTU and the teachers union. Twenty-six air traffic
controllers were arrested and charged with taking part in an
illegal strike. President Kaunda declared in 1989 that he
would not tolerate any more wildcat strikes and would insist
on total industrial peace. The Minister of Labor warned that
trade union leaders abetting strikes would be deregistered and
cease to hold office at any level while offending unions would
be dissolved.
The ZCTU is a member of the Organization of African Trade
Union Unity.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
ZCTU's right to organize and bargain collectively with
employers is codified under regulations in the Industrial
Relations Act (IRA). These rights are respected in practice.
The IRA provides a mechanism for initiating and settling
worker-employer disputes and provides for the establishment of
an industrial relations court. Union rights against
management interference or discrimination have been readily
upheld by the industrial relations court. There are no export
processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Slavery, involuntary servitude, and forced labor are
prohibited by the Constitution. Generally, these prohibitions
are observed. In its 1989 report, the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts reiterated its
longstanding request to the Government to modify various
legislative provisions which it finds incompatible with
Convention 105 on forced labor. The provisions in question
impose imprisonment, involving forced labor, for expressing
certain political views and/or for engaging in political
activities outside the UNIP as a means of labor discipline or
as a punishment for having participated in strikes. The ILO
Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
also considered this issue at the ILO conference in June and
requested the Government to take urgent action.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum age is 16. This and other age restrictions
apply to the industrial sector, where, because of adult
unemployment, there are few employees under age 16. However,
persons under age 14 are often employed in the commercial and
subsistence agricultural sectors. In 1986 (the most recent
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ZAMBIA
year for which statistics are available), 163,216 children
aged 12 to 14 were employed--mainly on family fartns--out of a
total population of 464,809 in that age group.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Zambian law regulates minimum health and safety standards in
any industrial undertaking. Enforcement of these laws is
carried out by the Ministries of Mines and Labor. The Office
of the Investigator General exists to redress the excessive
use or abuse of power by government officials against their
subordinates .
There is no general minimum wage in Zambia. However, each
industry has its own minimum wage determined through the
process of collective bargaining. In industries where
collective bargaining is not effective, the Minister of Labor
and Social Services has determined a lowest wage of an amount
equivalent to about $1.00 a day for cleaners, office
orderlies, and watchmen. An average wage for shopworkers is
about $32 per month which is insufficient to provide an
adequate standard of living. Most Zambian workers must
supplement their incomes through second jobs, some subsistence
farming, or reliance on the extended family. The normal
workweek is 40 hours. There are legal requirements for .annual
leave (2 days per month of service) and maternity leave (90
days). Women are legally excluded from night work and a
variety of hazardous occupations.
435
ZIMBABWE
Zimbabwe is governed by President Robert Mugabe and his
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), who have dominated the
legislative and executive branches of government since
independence. In late 1987, Mugabe signed a unity accord with
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) leader Joshua Nkomo
intended to merge the two parties and fulfill the President's
publicly stated intention to establish a one-party state. In
1989 the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) , a new opposition
party, emerged with former ZANU stalwart Edgar Tekere as its
chief. The new party contested seats in 1989 by-elections and
pledged to run candidates for all 120 parliamentary seats in
the expected 1990 general election. The Government has
attempted to restrict ZUM's rise through the arrest and
detention of its members and restrictions on its ability to
campaign and have access to the media.
The armed forces, which number about 50,000 members, are
primarily deployed to combat Mozambican National Resistance
(RENAMO) incursions into villages along the eastern border and
protect various transportation corridors in Mozambique. The
Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) is responsible for maintaining
law and order. The Central Intelligence Organization (CIO),
attached to the President's office, has police powers and can
arrest, detain, and interrogate suspects in internal security
cases. The CIO has often been accused of human rights abuses,
including the use of torture.
Zimbabwe's economy has strong agricultural and mining sectors
and a diversified manufacturing base. The economy is
vulnerable to drought and falling commodity prices and is
hampered by high taxes, price controls, restrictive labor
regulations, and a chronic shortage of foreign exchange. With
its important export-import capacity heavily dependent on rail
links that pass through South Africa, Zimbabwe has undertaken
a major effort, with Western donor support, to revitalize the
rail-port system through Mozambique to the town of Beira.
The unity agreement led to a marked decrease in the number of
human rights abuses by the Government; a significant exception
has been the detention of ZUM followers, union members, and
student leaders. The major incidents of 1989 included RENAMO
attacks into Zimbabwe which resulted in the murder, kidnaping,
and disappearance of Zimbabwean citizens, the bombing of a
house formerly occupied by the African National Congress
(ANC) , the closure of the University of Zimbabwe and the
arrest of student leaders, the detention and firing of workers
striking for better wages, and the detention without bail of
the head of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions for alleged
subversive activities. In a mandatory relocation program, the
Goverment moved over 9,000 villagers into protected areas to
shield them from RENAMO attacks. The Government used these
attacks to justify continuing the state of emergency (SOE)
which the Parliament routinely ratifies every 6 months.
Principal areas of human rights abuse in 1989 included
torture, arbitrary detention, harassment of lawyers and human
rights monitors, continued restrictions on freedom of speech
and press, assembly and association, the right of citizens to
change their government, and societal violence against women.
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ZIMBABWE
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political killings or summary
executions by government security forces in 1989. RENAMO
forces operating across the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border
continued to commit atrocities, including arbitrary killings
of innocent civilians in both Zimbabwe and Mozambique. In
February 1989, the Minister of Home Affairs reported that
there had been 420 RENAMO attacks in the preceding 6 months,
with 93 Zimbabwean civilians killed.
b. Disappearance
Human rights observers in both Harare and Bulawayo reported
that in 1989 there were no new cases of disappearance
attributable to the Government. There has been, however, no
progress in locating any of the people, almost all of whom
were from Ndebele tribal regions, who disappeared in
1982-1985. Estimates of the number of disappeared ranged from
at least 80 to as many as 400. The Government has never made
a serious effort to account for these missing persons. Human
rights organizations have pointed out that the ZANU-ZAPU unity
accord has meant that the Government has not been called to
account for past abuses.
Credible reports indicate hundreds of Zimbabweans continue to
be abducted by RENAMO from the eastern border areas, and many
never return from Mozambique where it is believed they are
killed or forced to work for RENAMO.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Human rights organizations, including Amnesty International
(AI), have stressed the problem of torture in Zimbabwe,
especially by officials of the CIO. Detainees in security
cases are often held incommunicado in the initial stage, and
it is at this point that torture most often occurs, according
to human rights observers. Firsthand reports in 1989
indicated that torture continued to be employed in some
security cases, especially cases involving suspected South
African and RENAMO agents. The case of Leslie Lesia, a South
African trader who had been beaten so severely in 1988 that
both of his legs were broken, again commanded international
attention in 1989. Senior government officials strongly deny
that torture is condoned but admit that isolated unauthorized
instances have occurred. Local human rights officials claimed
that security officials on a routine basis physically abused
displaced Mozambicans suspected of being RENAMO supporters.
Police brutality in political and ordinary criminal cases is
also a problem. In June baton-wielding riot police used
excessive force in breaking up a university meeting addressed
by Edgar Tekere. Black Zimbaweans often appear not to report
instances of police brutality out of fear of reprisals and the
perception that they will not receive much public attention.
Occasionally, police are prosecuted on charges of brutality
but rarely are severely punished. In one 1989 case, the
authorities harassed and then detained an attorney defending a
victim of police brutality.
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ZIMBABWE
The Supreme Court abolished the use of whipping as a form of
punishment in June 1989.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The police must inform an arrested person of the charges
against him before he is taken into custody. After completion
of police questioning, the accused is asked to sign a
statement which lists his replies to all the queries. The
accused has the right to answer all questions in the presence
of an attorney. The police (the arresting detail) must then
decide if the accused should be released on bail or on his own
recognizance. A Gweru magistrate has recently complained that
many people are needlessly detained for petty crimes because
police often fail to exercise their right to grant bail.
However, respected Harare human rights observers opine that
pretrial rights are generally respected, but occasionally
inexperienced magistrates and overzealous police officers do
not inform defendants of their rights.
Zimbabwean criminal law requires that a person arrested on a
criminal charge must have a preliminary hearing before a
magistrate within 48 hours, and the law is respected in
practice. At that hearing, the magistrate decides whether the
arrested person should be released on bail or held in custody
until trial. However, in cases involving the SOE, the
Minister of Home Affairs can issue a certificate which denies
bail to a person under arrest even if the court has approved
it. The Government has often used this prerogative in
security-related or exchange control violations.
The Government has extensive detention authority in political
and security cases. The SOE has been in continuous effect in
Zimbabwe since 1965, and it permits indefinite detention
without trial "in the interests of public safety or public
order." The Minister of Home Affairs, who has broad powers
under the SOE, has presented a motion every 6 months since
that time calling for extension of the SOE. The Parliament
has passed the motion 21 times, and on each occasion, the
President then signed a proclamation extending the SOE.
Under the SOE implementing legislation, the Emergency Powers
Act (EPA), persons may be detained without an arrest warrant
and held for up to 7 days before being informed of the reasons
for detention. The law states that a detainee has the right
to see a lawyer "without delay" after arrest, must receive
enough specific detail of the charges to make meaningful
representations, and after 30 days must appear before an
independent review tribunal. This tribunal can recommend to
the Minister of Home Affairs that the detainee be released if
evidence is insufficient to warrant continued incarceration.
The Minister may, however, recommend to the President that the
detainee continue to be held. In practice, due to procedural
delays, a detainee may have to wait several months before
appearing before the review tribunal. In the past, the
President has generally followed the tribunal's
recommendations to release, but in 1988 twice he overruled the
tribunal. In one of those cases the Government finally
released, in August 1989, four whites (including Leslie Lesia)
who had been held for 2 years for allegedly spying for South
Africa .
Every defendant has the right to select a lawyer of his or her
choosing. In civil cases, the indigent can apply to have the
Government supply an attorney. Unfortunately, this right is
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ZIMBABWE
not widely known, which prevents the majority of the poor from
taking advantage of it. In capital cases, the Government will
provide an attorney to all defendants unable to afford one.
In certain cases that pertain to the SOE, the Catholic
Commission for Justice and Peace will often provide an
attorney at no cost to the defendant.
The most common reasons for detention under the EPA are
suspected dissident activity and spying for foreign powers,
particularly South Africa. In 1989 the authorities detained
and charged a ZUM supporter with using South African supplied-
funds to purchase arms from a military installation in Mutare,
a city it turned out he had never visited. In another case, a
repatriate from South Africa was charged in 1989 with
attempting to spy on African National Congress houses in
Bulawayo and Harare. Although the Government initially held
him but did not formally charge him under emergency powers, it
subsequently denied him bail and then charged him under the
Official Secrets Act for attempted espionage. The
professionalism of police investigations has been eroded
because of the ease with which persons can be detained under
EPA regulations without any solid evidence of wrongdoing.
In most cases, after the initial detention the Government
ultimately orders the arrest and charging of persons under the
Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) , which provides sanctions
for political crimes. (Sometimes the charging comes under the
Official Secrets Act.) Such action then becomes part of a
judicial process with recourse to a court trial. In 1989, 22
ZUM activists were arrested under the Act and charged with
engaging in political activity without first obtaining
permission. Fifteen university student leaders were arrested
for publishing antigovernment documents, and another 4 were
arrested during the 1989 campus demonstrations (see Section
2.b.). In addition, a senior trade union official was
arrested for speaking in support of the students. The
students and union leader were subsequently released, although
the union leader spent 42 days in solitary confinement (see
Section 6 . a . ) .
The Government used its prerogative to deny bail in these
cases. However, the students petitioned the High Court which
subsequently ordered their release on the condition that they
report to the police once a week. This condition has since
been removed. None of the persons charged under LOMA had been
tried by the end of the year.
It is not known exactly how many persons are currently
detained on politically related charges. Although the
Minister of Home Affairs denied that any Zimbabweans are being
detained on the basis of political activities, reliable
estimates point to 10 long-term detainees. Approximately 200
Ndebele arrested and convicted prior to the 1988 amnesty
remained in detention. Human rights observers report,
however, that there are far fewer detainees in 1989 than there
were in 1988. There is also very little information available
on numbers of persons being detained by military forces in the
conflict with RENAMO.
A number of persons, including Reverend Ndabiningi Sithole,
remain in exile. With regard to forced or compulsory labor,
see Section 6.c.
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Z IMBABWE
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Zimbabwe's legal system is based on a mixture of Roman-Dutch
and English common law practices and procedures and consists
of magisterial courts, a High Court, and a Supreme Court. In
most instances, defendants must retain their own legal counsel
because there is limited provision for public defenders.
Defense counsel can present evidence and confront witnesses.
Approximately 90 percent of defendants are not represented by
counsel. The right to appeal exists in all cases and is
automatic in cases where a death penalty is imposed. All
trials are open to the public, except in rare cases in which
the Government orders that the proceedings be held in camera,
e.g., in certain security cases involving alleged South
African agents.
The judiciary is generally independent and persons brought to
trial can be assured of a fair public hearing. Although there
are at present 500 lawyers in Zimbabwe, there is a shortage of
experienced magistrates. Zimbabwe's judicial system is hard
pressed to cope with ordinary criminal cases. There is a lag
of 3 years in case and law reporting.
In the past, the Government has generally abided by court
decisions even when it strongly opposed the ruling. However,
security officials have recently been ignoring High Court
rulings. In October trade union leader Morgan Tsvangirai was
detained again as he departed a local police station following
another High Court order that authorities release him. In
1989 police ignored a High Court order to investigate the fate
of nine ZAPU supporters who disappeared in 1985.
In a related matter, the 1989 Africa Watch report stated that
another worrying recent development has been the use of
threats and criminal charges against lawyers acting in
important political cases. According to the report, they
experienced harassment in varying degrees of severity.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence .
The Constitution formally protects citizens from arbitrary
search or entry, but under emergency regulations a police
officer may stop and search any person or enter any area
without a warrant when the officer has "reasonable grounds"
for believing evidence of a crime may exist. It is widely
believed that the Government monitors private correspondence
and telephones, particularly with overseas partners.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Zimbabwe Constitution provides for freedom of expression
but allows for legislation limiting this freedom when the
"interest of defense, public safety, public order, state
economic interests, public morality and public health" are
involved. In practice, the Government interprets broadly its
power to discourage free speech, and at public events it is
generally assumed that speakers are under surveillance and may
be subject to follow-up questioning by the CIO if the remarks
are judged too controversial. The LOMA provides for the
prosecution of persons who make racially inflammatory
remarks. Notwithstanding the Government's efforts to limit
criticism in Parliament in 1989, there was discussion of
24-900 O— 90-
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ZIMBABWE
several controversial issues, such as corruption, military
involvement in Mozambique, and the movement toward a one-party
system.
Zimbabwe's major print media (five English-language newspapers
and one vernacular broadsheet) are influenced through the Mass
Media Trust, a quasi-governmental institution set up after
independence. There are also smaller, privately owned print
media, including a widely read economic newspaper. Television
and radio are wholly government owned. Senior media officials
follow the official government and ruling party line closely
and practice a high degree of self-censorship. Press coverage
which disputes the main lines of government policy, criticizes
the ruling party, or questions the actions of senior
government or party officials is increasingly rare.
The Government uses various methods to keep the media in
line. In 1989, following a scandal involving the Government's
purchase of automobiles (the Willowvale auto scandal), which
eventually led to the resignations of several Cabinet
ministers, the authorities transferred or promoted several
investigative reporters of the Bulawayo Chronicle in what was
widely interpreted as a government attempt to prevent
reporters from widening the probe. Similarly, government
authorities suspended two employees of the Zimbabwe
Broadcasting Corporation from their positions for reporting a
press conference by ZUM founder Edgar Tekere and interviewing
a University of Zimbabwe professor on the feasibility of new
government investment guidelines. While media coverage of ZUM
rallies and speeches is almost nonexistent, numerous articles
detailing the arrests of ZUM activists for allegedly violating
the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act regularly appear in the
news .
Academic freedom was seriously affected by events in 1989.
The University, which has an enrollment of 9,000 students, was
closed after police officers broke up a student protest
demonstration (see Section 2.b. below).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution formally provides for the right of assembly
and association for political and nonpolitical organizations,
including a broad spectrum of economic, professional, social,
and recreational activities. In practice, there are serious
obstacles to the full exercise of this right, particularly in
the case of political associations.
Police permits are required for public meetings and political
rallies. Organizations must pay the town council (usually
controlled by ZANU) to use civic centers and stadiums.
Reliable reports indicate that on many occasions town council
members changed the rules for renting public places to ZUM
members for holding election ralllies after police had granted
permission to hold the rallies.
In September University of Zimbabwe students attempted to hold
a seminar to mark the anniversary of a major demonstration
held in 1988 against corruption. The Government banned the
seminar, and security forces were despatched to disperse
students trying to conduct the meeting. The Student
Representative Council (SRC) then issued a statement
protesting the police action as a violation of academic and
intellectual freedom. In response the police arrested two SRC
leaders, Arthur Mutambara and Enoch Chikweche, for publishing
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ZIMBABWE
a statement offensive to government leaders. As news of the
arrests spread, 300 students assembled to protest. In the
course of this demonstration, the students burned an
automobile belonging to the University Vice Chancellor, and
police were again called in to quell the disturbances, using
tear gas and riot sticks. The police arrested 70 students,
and the University was then closed. It reopened briefly to
allow students to take final exams, but the Vice Chancellor
required all students to sign a document pledging not to
participate in demonstrations. The University was then closed
again and remained closed at the end of the year.
There are numerous nonpolitical business and employers'
organizations, professional associations, and recreational and
sports clubs. These are generally free of governmental
interference as long as their activities are viewed as
nonpolitical .
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6.c.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is respected in Zimbabwe. There is no
state religion. Denominations are permitted to worship
openly, pursue social and charitable activities, and maintain
ties with affiliates and coreligionists abroad. Religious
belief is neither a handicap nor an advantage in terms of
professional or political advancement. Many government
leaders received their education in mission schools, and a
number of senior ZANU officials are, in fact, clergymen.
Elective courses in religious studies are part of the
secondary school curriculum.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Travel at home and abroad is not generally subject to official
restrictions, although travel restrictions have been
occasionally applied against those whom it was believed might
criticize the Government before foreign audiences. This
practice does not appear to be widespread. A far more serious
practical obstacle to foreign travel is currency control which
severely limits the amount of foreign currency Zimbabwean
nationals can take out of the country. Travel in the areas
contested with RENAMO is not officially restricted but can be
dangerous. The Government has instituted a "villagization"
policy creating centralized villages in areas where RENAMO
attacks occur. Immigration is not restricted, although
persons who have left the country are not guaranteed the right
to return if they were not born in Zimbabwe. Applicants must
be able to demonstrate proof of livelihood. Repatriates from
South Africa are always suspected of being in the employment
of the South African intelligence community.
At the end of 1989, the registered refugee population was
estimated at 80,000, of whom 79,500 were Mozambicans located
in four rural camps along the eastern border. The remainder,
mainly South Africans, were located in Harare and Bulawayo.
An estimated 100,000 Mozambicans, many of them migrant
farmers, are self-settled in rural areas in the east. Adult
males of military age (18-35) among this population are being
relocated into the official camps. The Government fears that
RENAMO guerrillas infiltrate Zimbabwe in the guise of these
Mozambican refugees and has declared its intention to
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ZIMBABWE
repatriate most of them. While Zimbabwe has acceded to a
number of international agreements permitting the free entry
of refugees, in 1989 it sought to keep its border closed to
new refugees, thus seriously constricting the right of first
asylum. In 1989 expulsions of arriving refugees numbered some
3,000 who were the object of government suspicion as RENAMO
sympathizers .
The Ministry of Labor, Manpower Planning, and Social Welfare
is responsible for refugee affairs. Within the Ministry, a
commissioner for refugees oversees the administration of the
camps and coordinates international and other assistance
activities. Using the Zimbabwe Refugee Act of 1983 as the
legal basis for the determination of eligibility for refugee
status, a Zimbabwe refugee committee interviews applicants for
asylum. A negative decision can be appealed to the Minister,
whose decision is final. This formal process applies to
persons mainly in Harare rather than along the border. In
1989 Zimbabwe refused to grant refugee status to several ANC
members who had quit the organization. Former ANC members
were forced to seek refuge in other countries.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
In 1989 Zimbabwe was officially a pluralist parliamentary
democracy with a popularly elected House of Assembly, and
citizens still had the right to change their government
through democratic means. Elections held in the latter part
of 1989 were contested by multiple candidates from ZANU, ZAPU,
and ZUM as well as by some independents. However, there were
widely reported irregularities in these elections. With the
ZANU-ZAPU unity agreement and government efforts to limit the
growth of the new ZUM party, Zimbabwe was becoming a de facto
one-party state.
President Mugabe and his Cabinet are the preeminent political
figures, and the ruling party, ZANU (fully unified with the
former ZAPU opposition party), is the dominant political
organization in the country. Following the amendment of the
Constitution in 1987 to create a strong executive presidency,
Robert Mugabe, who previously served as Prime Minister, became
in 1988 both the Head of State and Head of Government.
Elected in 1988 by an electoral college made up of the two
houses of Parliament, in 1990 the executive President will be
selected by popular election to a term of 6 years. The
President appoints the Vice President and the rest of the
Cabinet, who serve at his pleasure.
The Parliament contains two chambers: the House of Assembly
and the Senate. Eighty of the 100 members of the House of
Assembly are popularly elected from specific constituencies to
5-year terms. Twenty members are nominated by the ruling
party and elected by the House of Assembly. Members of the
upper house (the Senate) are appointed by the President.
Since the unity agreement, which helped break down the
traditional party rivalries, there has emerged a vigorous
"back bench" in the House of Assembly which has confronted the
Government on a number of issues.
In particular, the debate over Zimbabwe's political future
sharpened in 1989 with the formation in April of the Zimbabwe
Unity Movement (ZUM), led by former ZANU Secretary General
Edgar Tekere. Tekere has criticized corruption and the size
of government as well as the movement toward a one-party
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ZIMBABWE
system. Tekere is from the east, which has been hit hard by
the RENAMO incursions and military conflict, and he has also
advocated military withdrawal from Mozambique.
President Mugabe and other senior ZANU officials have
indicated a desire for a one-party state and have taken a
series of steps to counter ZUM activities. Reliable sources
accused the ruling party of blocking free and fair campaigning
in a June by-election held near Harare to choose a replacement
for senior Minister Nyagumbo, who committed suic;Lde in the
wake of the Willowvale car scandal. During the campaign, the
authorities detained 15 ZUM leaders for 5 days, prohibited ZUM
political rallies, and denied ZUM media coverage. The ZANU
candidate won, but the ZUM candidate received 25 percent of
the vote, indicating some popular support for a two-party
system. Moreover, there were widespread irregularities
including reports of ZANU payments to people who did not live
in the constituency to vote for its candidate. In the
November by-election, there were widespread irregularities as
well in favor of ZANU candidates. Observers charged ZANU with
stuffing ballot boxes to keep ZUM candidates from winning.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government is highly sensitive to charges by international
nongovernmental organizations of human rights abuses in
Zimbabwe. The Government permits the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) to maintain a regional office in
Harare. It cooperates with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to assist Mozambican, South
African, and other refugees but does not accord UNHCR regular,
unrestricted access to Mozambican refugee camps. Admonitions
to the security services about refugee protection have fallen
on deaf ears in the border areas.
The Government often has been critical of nongovernmental
groups. For example, the Minister of Home Affairs, in
response to the October 1989 Africa Watch report on Zimbabwe,
warned the organization "to avoid meddling in our internal
affairs." In 1986 the Government declared Amnesty
International an "enemy of the people" and threatened that
anyone who supplied the organization ;.'ith information would be
detained. AI is still not permitted to operate in Zimbabwe.
Private Zimbabwean groups supporting efforts to increase
public awareness of human rights operate in Zimbabwe. In
particular, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
(CCJP) investigates complaints from private persons about
human rights abuses in Zimbabwe and conveys its findings to
the Government. Other local groups include the Bulawayo-based
Legal Projects Center and the Harare-based Legal Resources
Foundation, which operate libraries and information centers
and train lawyers in humanitarian law. The Legal Projects
Center also provides a legal aid clinic which handles matters
ranging from locating missing detainees to domestic disputes.
These groups in the past have operated without government
hindrance, but in 1989 the lawyers for the CCJP and the Legal
Resources Center were detained briefly or harassed by false
charges in cases relating to human rights (see Section I.e.).
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Section 5 Discrimination Based .on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Government services in Zimbabwe are provided on a
nondiscriminatory basis, and the Government has been able to
work with the previously "whites only" infrastructure in urban
areas to provide health and other social services to all. In
many rural areas, however, the neglect of the preindependence
period still leaves the Government struggling to provide
minimum care. Blacks on most commercial farms are still
dependent mainly on white farmers to meet basic health care
and educational needs.
In social terms, Zimbabwe remains a racially stratified
country despite bans against official discrimination. While
schools, churches, and clubs are all integrated, there is
limited social interaction between racial groups. The
"colored" (mixed race) community has complained of
discrimination in the allocation of civil service jobs, but
President Mugabe made two "colored" ministerial-level
appointments and appointed a Zimbabwean of Chinese heritage as
Minister of Education,
The status of women in Zimbabwe has advanced steadily even
though traditional attitudes and practices persist, especially
in rural areas. Since independence, the Government has
enacted major laws aimed at enhancing women's rights and
countering certain traditional practices, some of which are
based on the view of women as dependents or minors. For
example, the Legal Age of Majority Act and the Matrimonial
Causes Act recognize the capacity of women to act
independently of their husbands or fathers and to own
property. Judges on the high courts have adjudicated cases
upholding women's rights, including the right of women to
inherit property. In 1981 the Ministry of Cooperative and
Community Development and Women's Affairs was established to
facilitate the involvement of women in national development.
Nevertheless, many women remain severely disadvantaged in
Zimbabwean society. Ignorance of reforms, illiteracy,
economic dependency, and prevailing social norms prevent rural
women in particular from benefiting equally from these
changes. Women are still vulnerable to customary practices
that operate against their personal rights. Zimbabwean law
prohibits "kuzvarira," the practice of pledging a young woman
to marriage with a partner not of her choosing. However,
unless the woman is well educated and outspoken, marriages
based on "kuzvarira" still take place. The Matrimonial Causes
Act has removed the customary obligation of a groom to pay
"lobola" (a bride price) to the parents of his would-be wife,
but the practice of "lobola" continues to be widespread. The
Child Protection Society of Zimbabwe has challenged the
customary practice of offering a young girl as compensatory
payment in interfamily disputes, but it persists.
A considerable expansion of the nation's education system has
resulted in an increase in the absolute number of girls being
educated but has not altered the pattern of male domination of
the higher levels of education. Though legislation prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of gender, women are
concentrated in the lower echelons of the work force.
Domestic violence against women, especially wife beating, is
believed to be prevalent in Zimbabwe. A 1988 survey uncovered
over 1,600 police investigations of domestic assault in the
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Z IMBABWE
southern townships of Harare alone. The police often treat
violence against women as a domestic rather than a criminal
matter and are reluctant to intervene. Well-informed sources
report that most victims of domestic violence, fearing the
loss of economic support, withdraw charges or fail to report
the incidents. Although the number of reported rape cases has
increased substantially, laws dealing with assault and rape
present substantive and procedural problems for women. A
women's action group has urged police to improve their
services by giving women a full explanation of court
procedures and possible defense attorney tactics before they
appear in court. The Government has assigned community
relations liaison officers to police precincts to counsel
victims of sexual assault. These officers held workshops on
rape for their fellow officers to inform them about victims'
rights. Respected government officials and medical
practicioners report that female genital mutilation is not
widespread in Zimbabwe.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Under the Labor Relations Act, workers enjoy freedom of
association, have the right to elect their representatives,
publish newsletters, and set programs and policies which
reflect the political and economic interests of labor. The
Act specifies that workers may constitute workers* committees
in each plant and a trade union in each industrial sector and
elect appropriate officers. The Act specifies further that
workers' committees and trade unions must be registered with
the Ministry of Labor, but it also seeks to protect workers'
organizations from arbitrary government interference. The
Government does not control or restrict labor, but it has
powerful levers affecting labor, notably in the handling of
strikes and setting wages.
Since independence, the Government has encouraged trade unions
in the same industry to amalgamate. The process of
amalgamation was completed in 1987. About 17 percent of the
salaried work force is organized in 22 trade unions which are
members of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the
umbrella confederation of the trade union movement. The ZCTU
is the voice of organized labor, and its officers and members
frequently speak or comment on social issues in public
forums. ZCTU officers are elected by the delegates of
affiliated trade unions at biennial conventions, most recently
in July 1988. Neither the Government nor any political party
nor any ethnic or tribal group has a preponderant influence in
the trade union movement. Most trade unions suffer from
meager budgets which prevent them from conducting a greater
range of organizing and educational activities.
Workers have the right to strike providing that the union
advises the Government 2 weeks in advance of its intention to
do so. The right to strike is further limited by the right of
the Government to declare a specific industry to be essential
and therefore not subject to strike action. In practice, the
Government has employed a broad interpretation of what
essential industries are, and strikes in Zimbabwe have been
few and largely unsuccessful. In June 1989, after long
negotiations with the Government over the terms of their
employment, medical interns went on strike, and the Government
arrested more than 70 striking doctors. Responding to an
appeal from President Mugabe, the interns returned to work and
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ZIMBABWE
their pay was later increased. Another, more serious wildcat
strike occurred in July when 2,000 railroad mechanics walked
off their jobs. They were eventually joined by other railroad
workers. The Government declared the strike illegal but did
not attempt to arrest the workers. Instead, the Government
persuaded strikers to return to work by promising them an
additional wage increase. However, when another wildcat
strike took place 10 days after this settlement, 60 railway
workers were summarily dismissed. In September, 1,500 postal
and telecommunications technicians, seeking higher wages than
those granted by the Government, engaged in a week-long
strike. The Government used its emergency powers to dismiss
the workers but rehired them later once it was clear
indigenous replacements were not available. In October, after
issuing a press statement supporting the students' right to
protest government actions, the ZCTU Secretary General was
detained, held in solitary confinement for 42 days, and
charged with attempting to incite the public to revolt against
the Government. In November the Commonwealth Trade Union
Council (CTUC) field representative was deported after he
protested the ZCTU Secretary General's detention.
The ZCTU and its officials are active in the international
labor movement and are affiliated with the Trade Union
Coordinating Council and the Organization of African Trade
Union Unity. The ZCTU has friendly relations with the
Brussels-based International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU) and its affiliates (including the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations),
as well as with the Communist-controlled World Federation of
Trade Unions.
Zimbabwe has been a member of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) since 1980 but has ratified neither ILO
Convention 87 regarding freedom of association nor Convention
98 on bargaining collectively.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Under the Labor Relations Act, workers have the right to
organize. Workers' committees are empowered to negotiate with
the management of a particular plant the conditions of labor
in the workplace. Wages are negotiated on an industrywide
basis but are effectively limited by the Government's minimum
wage system. In the case of a union-organized industry, the
employers association meets directly with a particular trade
union. In certain cases when there is no trade union
representing a specific industry, representatives of the
organized workers meet with the employers' association under
the mediation of labor relations officers from the Ministry of
Labor .
Perceiving that workers are at a disadvantage in negotiations
with better financed and better educated managers, the
Government believes it is responsible for assisting workers
with legislation and intervention with employers. The Labor
Relations Act provides considerable job security for workers.
Under the Act, a worker may not be fired without the Labor
Ministry's concurrence that the dismissal is justified. Labor
relations officers are authorized to handle worker grievances
within the plant. Their decisions may be appealed to the
regional hearing officer of the Ministry of Labor, and finally
to a special Labor Relations Tribunal, over which the Chief
Justice presides.
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ZIMBABWE
In April 1989, Labor Minister Nkomo recommended that all labor
laws be consolidated. He also announced the intention to open
up the labor market to permit greater freedom for labor and
management to negotiate wage increases. In past years, the
Government would announce minimum wage increases prior to the
start of the collective bargaining season that became, in
effect — given the Government's refusal to ratify settlements
which exceeded the minimum wage--the target for wage
agreements. Though the Government has not completely
withdrawn from setting wage increase standards, it now sets
parameters for wage negotiations, and all collective
bargaining agreements must be ratified by the Labor Ministry.
The Government does not promote or support antiunion
discrimination. There are no export processing zones in
Zimbabwe .
c. Prohibitions of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor is prohibited by law in Zimbabwe and is not
practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Under Zimbabwean labor regulations, the minimum age for the
formal wage sector is 18, but it is possible to begin an
apprenticeship at 16. In this sector, minimum age regulations
are generally enforced. However, the Government does not
attempt to enforce these regulations for children employed in
household enterprises, e.g., family farms.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Conditions of labor are regulated by the Government according
to industry. The Government publishes labor regulations for
each of the 22 industrial sectors, based on previously
negotiated collective bargaining agreements. These
regulations specify wages, hours, holiday schemes, and
required safety measures. The average workweek is 44 hours,
and the law prescribes a minimum of one 24-hour rest period
per week. The minimum wage for the agro-industrial sector is
$96 a month. The employer also usually provides housing,
food, and medical care to workers. On commercial farms, the
employer may provide schooling for the workers' children.
Citing the results of a 1981 government-sponsored wage and
price survey, the ZCTU pointed out that current mandated
minimum wages are between 50-75 percent below the adjusted
poverty level determined by the survey. In many instances,
workers must also rely on second jobs, extended family help,
or some subsistence farming to meet a minimum standard of
living .
Labor relations officers from the Ministry of Labor are
assigned to monitor developments in each plant to ensure that
government minimum wage policy and occupational and safety
regulations are being observed.
448
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
Antigua and Barbuda is a small two-island state with a
parliamentary democracy modeled after that of the United
Kingdom. It is governed by a prime minister, a cabinet, and a
bicameral legislative assembly. The Governor General, with
largely ceremonial duties, is the titular Head of State and
serves as representative of the British monarch. The
Constitution requires general elections at least every 5
years. Prime Minister V, C. Bird and his Antigua Labour Party
(ALP) once again won a convincing victory in the March 1989
general elections, capturing 15 of the 17 seats in the House
of Representatives. One seat went to United National
Democratic Party (UNDP) candidate Baldwin Spencer, who was
named leader of the opposition in Parliament. The other
nongovernment seat represented the Barbuda constituency and
was won by Hilbourne Frank, a political independent who leads
the Barbuda faction advocating secession from the union with
Antigua. The Governor General appoints the 17-member Senate
with the advice of the Prime Minister and opposition leader.
Security forces consist of a police force and the Antigua and
Barbuda Defense Force, a 120-man infantry unit. The police
are organized, trained, and supervised according to British
law enforcement practices. The security forces have a good
reputation for respecting individual rights in the performance
of their duties.
Antigua and Barbuda has a mixed economy, with a strong private
sector. Tourism is the major industry. In 1989 the economy
registered a 6.8 percent increase in gross domestic product,
the fifth straight year of high growth. However, a large and
growing external debt continued to concern the Government.
The Constitution provides for observance of political and
civil rights, which are generally respected in practice, with
the exception that opposition political parties have little or
no access to the government-dominated electronic media.
Antigua and Barbuda's generally good human rights record
remained largely unchanged in 1989.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or other extrajudicial
ki llings .
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearances or politically
motivated abductions.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture and other cruel or inhuman
treatment of prisoners or detainees, and these prohibitions
are respected in practice.
449
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention,
which do not occur in practice. Criminal defendants are
guaranteed the right of judicial determination of the legality
of their detention. Detainees must be brought before a court
within 48 hours of arrest or detention. There were no reports
of involuntary exile.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system is modeled on that of the United Kingdom
and is part of the Eastern Caribbean legal system. Final
appeal may be made to the Queen's Privy Council in the United
Kingdom and is invariably made in the case of death
sentences. There are no military or political courts.
Criminal defendants are assured a fair, open, and public
trial. In capital cases the Government provides legal
assistance at public expense to persons without means to
retain a private attorney. There are no political prisoners
in Antigua and Barbuda.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There were no reports of arbitrary interef erence with privacy,
family, home, or correspondence in 1989. The police must
obtain a warrant before searching private premises.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech, the press,
and other forms of communication; these provisions are
generally respected. However, the Government dominates the
electronic media, the only daily source of news. The
Government owns one of the two radio stations and the single
television station, and the Prime Minister's family owns the
second radio station. Opposition politicians have not been
able to obtain adequate air time to present their positions.
ABS radio and television report regularly on the Government's
activities but rarely on those of the opposition political
parties .
In September, for example, members of the opposition UNDP
wanted to join a live broadcast on ABS radio in which
participants were discussing disaster relief efforts in
Antigua following Hurricane Hugo. They were told that,
although they could not be part of the live transmission, ABS
would prerecord an interview with them on the subject for
later broadcast. When the half-hour tape later was broadcast,
it was taken off the air before the opposition spokeman
completed his answer to the first of a series of questions
asked by the interviewer.
The opposition UNDP has also charged that, prior to the call
for general elections this year, they unsuccessfully attempted
to purchase time from the electronic media. Once elections
were called, use of radio and television for political
campaigning was prohibited by law under the People Act of 1975
(which was enacted when the currently ruling party was out of
office). The Act provides that: "Pending an election, it
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ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
shall not be lawful for any television or wireless
transmitting station to broadcast any item for the purpose of
promoting or procuring the election of any candidate or of any
political party," but exempts bona fide scheduled news
broadcasts which give fair and equitable coverage of all
election meetings, as well as any announcement, not exceeding
2 minutes, concerning the time, date, and venue of a political
meeting .
Weekly newspapers representing the opposition publish a
variety of opinions. They are free to criticize the
Government and do so regularly. Religious organizations also
publish their own newspapers.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the right of peaceful assembly.
Public meetings and organized demonstrations are held without
police interference. Required permits for public meetings are
issued by the police, and they normally grant them. Permits
for political rallies were routinely granted upon request
during the period leading up to the general elections in 1989.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is unrestricted exercise of religious freedom. The
population is overwhelmingly Protestant, but adherents of
other religious denominations practice and proselytize openly
without government interference. All groups are free to
maintain links with coreligionists in other countries.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Neither law nor practice restricts the right of citizens of
Antigua and Barbuda to move about within the country, to
travel abroad, or to emigrate.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Antigua and Barbuda has a multiparty political system
accommodating a wide spectrum of political viewpoints. All
citizens 18 years of age and older may register and vote by
secret ballot. The Constitution requires general elections at
least every 5 years. The Government is obligated by law to
hold voter registration during a fixed period each year, and
parties conduct their own registration drives free from
government interference. General elections were held in
Antigua and Barbuda on March 9. The incumbent ALP led by
Prime Minister Vere Cornwall Bird, Sr., easily won reelection,
taking 15 of the 17 parliamentary constituencies, a net loss
of one seat from the 1984 elections. The ALP has been in
power since 1951, except for a period in opposition from 1971
to 1976. The opposition charged that the ALP's longstanding
monopoly on patronage and its influence over the economic life
of the country made it extremely difficult for opposition
parties to attract membership and financial support.
Following the general elections, the opposition charged that
serious polling irregularities had occurred on election day in
seven of the constituencies and that election results in those
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ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
districts were invalid. Absence of ballots or insufficient
numbers of ballots prevented polling stations in these
districts from adhering to the prescribed voting period of
6 a.m. to 6 p.m. on March 9. The matter was taken to the
elections court for rulings on a district-by-district basis.
When the justice declared the election invalid in the initial
case to be heard, the ALP asked incumbents of the six
remaining seats to resign and planned to hold by-elections in
all seven constituencies in August. The opposition parties,
however, failed to renominate candidates to stand for
election. As a result, a by-election was unnecessary, and the
seven ALP candidates were declared automatic victors. They
were sworn back into office on August 8.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Internationally recognized human rights organizations have not
expressed concern about Antigua and Barbuda. There were no
requests for human rights investigations or inquiries during
1989.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Law and practice prohibit discrimination based on race, sex,
creed, language, or social status. The role of women in
society is not restricted by law, but tradition tends to limit
women to home and family, particularly in rural areas.
However, these traditional roles are changing. The Government
has begun programs to provide enhanced educational
opportunities for both sexes as well as family planning
services. Under the energetic prodding of the Government's
Directorate of Women's Affairs, which was upgraded in 1989,
women are moving up in government and the professions, but
progress is slower in the private sector. The Women's Desk
began almost 10 years ago with one director and a secretary
and now employs, in addition to the executive director, three
professionals and clerical and support staff. In 1989 the
Directorate continued educational programs for women in such
areas as health, crafts, and improving business skills. It
also produced a magazine on women in Antigua and carried out
research into laws affecting women.
Most violence against women in Antigua probably goes
unreported. Gauging the extent of the problem is difficult,
due to the lack of accurate data, and is compounded by the
reluctance of women in many cases to testify against their
abusers. Police may be reluctant to interfere in cases of
domestic violence, and some women charge that the courts do
not take the problem seriously enough and that sentences are
too lenient. The Directorate of Women's Affairs has scheduled
an educational campaign through the media to increase
awareness of the problem, and has also planned a workshop on
women and abuse, including child abuse, for 1990.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to associate freely and to form labor
unions. Although fewer than 50 percent of Antigua and
Barbuda's workers belong to unions, the important hotel
industry is heavily unionized. Unions are free to affiliate
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ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
with international labor organizations and do so in practice.
Antigua and Barbuda has two major trade unions: the Antigua
Trade and Labour Union (ATLU) and the Antigua Workers' Union
(AWU) . The ATLU is associated with the ruling ALP, while the
AWU is allied with the opposition UNDP. During 1989 the ATLU
did not hesitate to criticize government policies and
practices with which it disagreed.
The right to strike is recognized by the labor code. This
right can be limited in a given dispute by the Court of
Industrial Relations. Once either party to the dispute
requests the Court to mediate, there can be no strike.
Because of the delays associated with this process, in
practice labor disputes are often resolved before a strike is
called. There were no strikes in 1989.
In its 1989 report, the International Labor Organization's
Committee of Experts cited legislation which allows either
party or the Minister of Labour effectively to restrict the
right to strike, and asked the Government to reexamine its
legislation and take measures to ensure that provisions for
the settlement of disputes through conciliation do not
restrict the right to strike.
b. The Right To Organize and Bargain Collectively
Labor organizations are free to organize and bargain
collectively. There have been no allegations of antiunion
discrimination, which is prohibited by law. There are no
areas of the country, such as export processing or free trade
zones, where union organization or collective bargaining is
discouraged or impeded.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution forbids slavery and forced labor, which do
not exist in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The law provides a minimum working age of 13, which is
respected in practice. Responsibility for enforcement rests
with the Ministry of Labour, which by law conducts periodic
inspections of workplaces.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The law permits a maximum 48-hour, 6-day workweek, but in
practice the workweek is 40 hours in 5 days. Workers are
guaranteed a minimum of 3 weeks* annual leave and up to 13
weeks of maternity leave. There are no occupational health
and safety laws or regulations. Different minimum wages for
different work categories were established by law in 1981.
Some representative minimum hourly wages at the present are:
household domestics $0.50, unskilled laborers $0.61,
construction workers $0.93, and skilled workers $1.30. Most
such minimum wages would not provide a decent standard of
living for workers and their families, but the great majority
of workers earn substantially more than the minimum wage. A
committee completed its review of these minimum wages and
submitted a report to the Ministry of Labour for action.
The report recommended increases in the minimum wage levels
for various categories of workers.
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ARGENTINA
Argentina is a federal, constitutional democracy with a
president elected through an electoral college for a single
6-year term, a bicameral legislature, and an independent
judiciary. Traditionally, the executive is the dominant
branch in the Argentine Government. Since the end of military
rule in 1983, there have been four national elections. In the
most recent, on May 14, 1989, the voters elected Justicialist
Party candidates Carlos Menem and Eduardo Duhalde as the
nation's President and Vice President. A rapidly
deteriorating economic situation and an evident lack of public
confidence due to the prolonged period before the scheduled
December inauguration caused former President Raul Alfonsin to
negotiate an early turnover of the reins of government to
Carlos Menem. The inauguration of Menem on July 8 marked the
first constitutional turnover of the presidency from one
democratically elected President to another from an opposing
party since 1916. Candidates in the May elections represented
the political spectrum from conservative to far left.
The President is constitutional Commander-in-Chief, while a
civilian Defense Minister oversees the armed forces. The
federal police report to the Interior Minister; provincial
police are organized under provincial constitutions and report
to locally elected provincial governors.
Argentina is beset by inflation, which averaged well over 100
percent annually during 1986-88 and which escalated to
hyperinflation during 1989, with the consumer price index
increasing by 4,923 percent for the year. Argentina has
significant arrears on an external debt of more than $60
billion and requires fresh infusions of external capital. The
state-owned enterprises are generally unprofitable, foreign
investment is weak, and capital flight is a problem. The
Menem administration moved quickly to introduce such measures
as privatization, economic emergency legislation, and a tax
reform bill, which attempt to confront the problems of deficit
financing and lack of investor confidence. These and other
steps resulted in a rapid drop in the level of inflation
beginning in August 1989, but the trend reversed itself in
November and December as financial markets lost confidence in
the Government's ability to control deficit spending.
Human rights concerns in 1989 focused more on accounting for
abuses during military rule (1976-83) than on the policies of
the civilian Government. The courts continued the painful
task of deciding custody of the children of people who
disappeared during the military Government's rule. In October
President Menem pardoned military officials accused of human
rights violations or mutiny against the army high command, an
action widely criticized by human rights and political
organizations. An attack in January by members of the "All
for the Fatherland Movement" (MTP) against the La Tablada
military compound resulted in an estimated 38 deaths and 80
injuries. Twenty MTP members implicated in the attack were
tried and sentenced to prison by a civilian court; a separate
civilian court commenced criminal investigations into charges
that some attackers were killed or disappeared after they had
surrendered. In late May a series of attacks against food
stores and other businesses took place in several Argentine
cities. Police efforts to contain these riots resulted in 14
deaths, 80 injuries, and hundreds temporarily detained. The
Government declared a 30-day state of siege, with curfew and
other restrictions applied in those areas where rioting had
occurred. Legal challenges to this state of siege were heard
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ARGENTINA
by the courts but eventually rejected. In general, the
Government continued its efforts to protect human rights, but
the use of excessive force by the police remained a concern.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no credible reports of politically motivated
killings carried out by the Government in 1989. However,
survivors of the January attack against the La Tablada
military compound charged that several of those who carried
out this attack were killed by police and military forces
after they had surrendered. A civilian judge was assigned to
investigate these charges, and this investigation was still
under way at year's end. Human rights organizations,
political groups, and the press criticized police for several
deaths which appeared to involve excessive use of force in
dealing with criminal suspects. Critics charged that police
routinely shoot to kill. Courts investigating instances in
which police officers were charged with specific unjustifiable
killings ordered the arrest and sentencing to prison of
several police officials, reportedly for terras of from 5 to 9
years. Sources could not confirm whether any police officers
are actually serving time for such killings, as the judicial
process is slow and complicated.
Politically motivated bombings continued but on a markedly
reduced scale from last year. Most were small explosions late
at night, causing little damage and few injuries. Targets
through the year included national political parties;
military, church, press, and judicial officials; trade union
leaders; political figures of both the extreme right and left;
and public buildings. The perpetrators never claimed
responsibility for these bombings, and police have yet to make
any arrests in these cases.
b. Disappearance
There were no known abductions, secret arrests, or
disappearances linked to or condoned by the Government during
1989. A civilian judge is investigating charges by the
survivors of the La Tablada attack that three or four of the
attackers disappeared or turned up dead after surrendering to
the police.
The independent judicial system continued the painful process
of determining custody of children whose parents disappeared
during military rule (1976-1983). In a related development,
the Government of Paraguay returned to Argentina children
tentatively identified as offspring of Argentines who
disappeared during military rule. These cases remain under
court investigations. In one instance a medical examination
failed to confirm the paternity of two children.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture, and the criminal code
provides penalties for torture which are similar to those for
homicide. Argentina has ratified the U.N. Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
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ARGENTINA
Punishment. However, human rights groups and critics accuse
police of mistreatment of prisoners. They charged the police
with misuse of force and at least 18 instances of torture
linked to efforts by the security forces to control the
looting which took place in late May. According to a
publication of the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APHD) ,
charges were made before the courts in September in these 18
cases. Other complaints of mistreatment of minors were either
dropped by the courts or lost in the legal system. In one
case a court sentenced three police officers to what
reportedly were 3-year prison terms after finding them guilty
in a 1986 torture case. Investigations of claims of
mistreatment are handled by the Undersecretariat of Interior
for Human Rights and through judicial review. Several formal
claims of mistreatment were filed in 1988 before the Interior
Ministry. Human rights officials believe these are included
among the cases considered by the courts during 1989.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Argentina has a well-developed legal code containing explicit
protections of individual rights and controls on police arrest
and investigatory powers. Arrests require probable cause or a
judicial order, and the law provides for a judicial
determination of the legality of detention. However, the
penal code gives the courts authority to detain persons
without notice or charges for up to 8 days during
investigations. Even in the case of minor offenses, holding
suspects without charges for several days is not uncommon.
Involuntary exile is not permitted or practiced.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Argentina's judicial system is widely recognized as fair and
independent, albeit slow and cumbersome. The Constitution and
penal code provide for trials before judges and appellate
review of all judicial rulings, including those of military
courts. Federal courts interpret constitutional protection
against "arbitrary" trial process to permit wide-ranging
review of criminal prosecutions. As in most civil law
countries, trial by jury does not exist; judges render
verdicts .
The police have legal authority to adjudicate misdemeanors,
which are often settled by senior police officials. The legal
system provides public defenders, but 1989 caseloads exceeded
their capacity. The right to bail is provided by law and
observed in practice.
The pardon granted by President Menem provided for the release
of those few persons considered by human rights groups to be
political prisoners. Some human rights activists are
beginning to focus on some of the La Tablada defendants as
political prisoners. The Government rejects this contention,
however, on the basis that none of these persons fall within
the accepted definition of political prisoners.
The human rights community continued to criticize the Supreme
Court's broad interpretation of the "Due Obedience" Law as it
had earlier criticized passage of the law itself. Court
proceedings against several military officers not covered by
President Menem's pardons, the "Due Obedience" doctrine, or
the "Punto Final" (Final Point) continue in the federal
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ARGENTINA
appellate courts.
Retired General Orlando Agosti, who had served 3 years and 9
months of a sentence for human rights violations committed
during the period of military rule, was released in May.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There is constitutional protection against unreasonable search
and seizure. No cases of arbitrary intrusion by the State
into the private lives of persons were reported in 1989.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Under both the Alfonsin and the new Menem administration,
Argentina continued to enjoy a free and relatively independent
press, which covers a wide range of political viewpoints.
Criticism of the Government and opposition viewpoints are
vigorously expressed. The State owns 55 of 170 AM radio
stations outright and other governmental entities own 11 more,
while the Federal Broadcast Authority licenses and thus
controls the franchises of the remainder. The Federal
Government owns one of the four nationally syndicated Buenos
Aires television stations (two others were privatized in
December 1989), and two radio stations.
The Government plans to continue operating the official news
agency, TELAM, which has more than 300 clients throughout the
country and serves as the exclusive agent for all government
advertising. With more than 40-percent of the Argentine
economy in the hands of the State, TELAM wields formidable
political influence to authorize or refuse government
advertising to media outlets.
At both of its general assemblies in 1989, the Association of
Newspaper Editors of Argentina (ADEPA) declared that freedom
of the press did exist in Argentina, with only few exceptions.
The group issued a detailed report of the various legislative
and judicial acts which have impaired freedom of the press in
recent years. For example, ADEPA denounced the house arrest
of journalist Raul L. D'Altri, editor of the newspaper
La Arena, for having refused to reveal a source of information,
and deplored several provincial laws that imposed financial
burdens on the press. ADEPA also reported other cases of
judicial proceedings impairing freedom of the press, including
the prohibition of an advertisement on behalf of former
President Videla. The publicity generated by these cases
indicates that the few exceptions to the prevailing freedom of
the press received wide public attention.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
All groups and political parties are free to organize and
assemble. The law requires political parties to support the
Constitution and a democratic, representative, republican, and
federal form of government in order to register for
elections. At present, no party is denied registration.
During the campaigns leading to the presidential elections in
May, all major political parties held mass rallies without
interference. The labor movement, human rights organizations.
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ARGENTINA
ethnic communities, and other groupings held frequent
demonstrations and rallies without interference or incident.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for the free exercise of religion,
but also establishes Roman Catholicism as the state religion.
The Government provides financial support to the Roman
Catholic Church, and the Constitution requires the President
and Vice President to be Roman Catholics. Other religions
must complete a pro forma registration with the Government to
obtain legal recognition. Missionaries from any religion are
permitted to enter Argentina and proselytize, and the
non-Catholic population is growing. Argentina's Jewish
community (at an estimated 300,000, the largest in Latin
America) practices its religion without official interference
or legal restriction. In June the Government introduced
legislation which would make those found guilty of mocking or
ridiculing religious ceremonies subject to prison sentences.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
International and internal travel as well as emigration are
unrestricted. Refugees are not forced to return to countries
from which they have fled.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Since September 1983, Argentina has held four national
elections to choose federal, provincial and local officials.
The elections were free, fair, and democratic, with universal
suffrage. The Justicialist (Peronist) Party currently
controls the executive and legislative branches of
government. Political parties ranging from left to right are
represented in Congress as a result of the 1987 and 1989
elections. Additional parties hold office in individual
provinces. From the powerful Radicals to miniscule provincial
movements, Argentina's opposition parties operate without
hindrance. Women and minorities have full political rights by
law.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government cooperates fully with international human
rights organizations, which enjoy unrestricted access in
Argentina. Eleven domestic human rights organizations
operated openly in 1989, despite occasional and anonymous
bombings, death threats, and harassment. Since 1983 the
domestic human rights community has strongly and continuously
opposed all efforts to limit military accountability for
abuses committed during military rule. Despite these forceful
protests, a pardon was issued in October by President Menem
absolving most military personnel from prosecution for human
rights violations committed during the "Dirty War."
Argentina plays an active role in both the United Nations
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) , where it chairs an important
subcommittee of experts, and the Organization of American
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ARGENTINA
States' Inter-American Human Rights Commission. The
Government has facilitated efforts by domestic human rights
organizations to address both of these international bodies in
opposition to the government's judicial policies towards the
military, and has cooperated with UNHRC efforts to investigate
cases involving missing children from the 1976-83 period of
military rule. Argentina has ratified the American Convention
on Human Rights (1984) and the U.N. Conventions on Torture,
Civil and Political Rights, and Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (all in 1986) and accepted compulsory jurisdiction by
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Congress passed a law in 1988 that authorizes criminal
penalties for discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
religion, and other categories. Although there is no official
policy of discrimination against them, Argentine women have to
contend with bias rooted in the sociocultural traditions of
the country. Argentina adheres to the U.N. Convention for the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.
According to the Foreign Ministry's Undersecretary for Human
Rights and Women, violence against women is not considered to
be a major problem in Argentina. Such abuse, including
domestic violence such as wife beating, exists, but because of
inadequate statistical data, the true extent of the problem is
difficult to determine. Because victims are frequently
reluctant to file reports or to press charges, the likelihood
is that cases are significantly underreported. There is an
apparent increase in the number of cases being brought before
the courts because there are now three police stations
established to handle reports of violence against women. This
increase may also be due to greater public awareness of this
problem caused by extensive publicity given specific cases.
Enhanced media interest in the issue is credited with bringing
about a greater awareness of this type of violence, giving the
appearance that it is on the rise. Neither society nor the
Government condone violence against women.
There is a history of anti-Semitism in Argentine society,
which produces occasional anti-Semitic incidents. In the
course of 1989, the Delegation of Argentine Jewish
Associations (DAIA) , Argentina's umbrella Jewish organization,
condemned anonymous threats and anti-Semitic public statements
by public figures (none of them government officials) . For
example, an instructor at the La Plata Police School was
dismissed for distributing anti-Semitic papers to students.
Senior government and political officials have condemned such
acts. There has also been an unofficial but systematic
exclusion of Jewish Argentines from certain institutions such
as the armed forces.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
There is free right of labor association in Argentina. The
labor movement, which includes about one-third of the national
work force, is a major independent economic and political
force. Although trade unions are independent of the
Government, the vast majority of union leaders are allied to
the ruling Justicialist Party and are active in the Peronist
movement, while retaining their freedom of decisionmaking
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ARGENTINA
outside of party control. Congress passed legislation in 1987
and 1988 which reinstituted laws governing labor relations and
other trade union rights which previous military governments
had suspended. The right of association was enhanced by these
laws. Trade unions are free to associate with international
organizations, and many Argentine unions are affiliated with,
and active in, international trade union groups.
In 1989 the International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations expressed satisfaction with the legislation
passed in 1987 and 1988, but questioned whether the membership
requirements for legalizing alternative trade unions were too
stringent .
Unions have the right to strike, subject to compulsory
conciliation and arbitration by the Labor Ministry. Workers
have the right to receive their salaries while on strike until
the Labor Ministry orders compulsory conciliation. Strikes by
teachers, state-owned enterprise employees, and civil servants
dominated the strike scene in 1989.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
By law, labor and management have a binding collective
bargaining process which sets wage levels on an industrywide
basis. The State's involvement in this process is limited to
ratifying the agreements, which provides them with legal
status. The Government continues to offer wage guidelines
under its economic emergency adjustment program, and directly
sets wages in state-owned enterprises. Antiunion
discrimination is prohibited by law and well-developed
mechanisms are in place and functioning to resolve
complaints. Some provinces provide rights and obligations
additional to those in federal legislation.
There are no officially designated export processing zones in
Argentina.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is illegal in Argentina and is not
practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The law prohibits the employment of children under 14 years of
age, except in the family. Minors of ages 14 and 15 may work
in restricted types of employment, but not more than 6 hours a
day or 35 hours a week. The same law applies to minors 16 to
18 years of age, although competent authority may allow
exceptions. Violations are tried before the appropriate
courts. Enforcement of child labor laws is hampered by the
severe economic crisis in Argentina, which forces many
families to have as many members as possible working in order
to survive. Laws are enforced to the extent possible by the
authorities, but it has proven almost impossible to control
this type of illegal labor activity under circumstances where
economic necessity forces children to seek work.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Argentina offers comprehensive protection of workers' rights.
The maximum workday is 8 hours; the workweek is 48 hours.
Premiums must be paid for work beyond those limits. Rules
460
governing vacations, minimum wages, and occupational health
and safety are comparable to those in Western industrial
nations and are enforced by the Government and labor unions in
the formal economy. Argentina, however, has a large
underground economy which employs an undetermined number of
people, including children. This sector is difficult to
police, and workers can be denied basic rights and benefits
because they fear losing their jobs if they report labor code
violations. Government and labor unions find it difficult to
police small employers on the fringes of this underground
economy.
The official minimum wage in Argentina, eroded by
hyperinflation in 1989, is currently set at about $15 per
month. Government and trade union officials agree this is not
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker
and his family, but they differ on how soon it should be
changed. It was subject to monthly revision during the first
6 months of 1989, but remained steady since July as the
Government attempted to bring inflation under control.
Government officials argue that few workers are paid at the
minimum wage level and that wages have improved under the
collective bargaining process, without the necessity of
boosting the minimum wage level. Union leaders accept the
need for restraint on wages but argue for an increase in the
minimum wage, to provide protection, and a wage floor to lower
paid workers. Special salary bonuses were provided to all
workers in December.
461
THE BAHAMAS
The Bahamas is a constitutional, multiparty democracy. A
member of the Commonwealth of Nations, its political and legal
traditions are similar to those of the United Kingdom. The
Queen is recognized as Head of State and represented by an
appointed Governor General. The Progressive Liberal Party
(PL?) has governed since 1967 under the same leader. Prime
Minister Sir Lynden 0. Pindling. The last general elections
were in June 1987.
The police and small defense force generally respect the human
rights provisions of the Constitution and other statutes.
There have, however, been allegations of mistreatment of some
prisoners by the police. The Bahamas has a well-established
judicial system based on British common law and procedures.
Tourism is the mainstay of the economy, accounting for
approximately 60 per cent of the gross national product;
finance and off-shore banking is the second most important
sector. Government efforts to diversify the economy have met
with little success.
The Constitution provides for the protection of fundamental
rights and freedoms without discrimination by reason of sex,
race, religion, national origin, or political opinion, and its
provisions are generally observed. The Bahamas' human rights
record remained generally good in 1989, but police abuse of
detainees and unsafe and unhealthy prison conditions were
cause for concern.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or other extrajudicial
killing .
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated abductions or
disappearances .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits the use of torture and other forms
of cruel or degrading treatment or punishment. However, both
Americans and Bahamians detained by police continue to report
instances of police brutality during the course of arrests and
interrogations. In an incident currently under investigation,
the Bahamian Defence Force boarded a U. S. -registered power
boat to search for drugs, failed to produce identification,
and allegedly physically assaulted the captain and crew.
Prisoners at The Bahamas' one prison facility, Foxhill,
located just outside of Nassau on New Providence Island, have
reported and independent observers have confirmed, that
conditions are unhealthful and harsh. A local newspaper
article described the "initiation" rite of homosexual rape
performed on some new prisoners--a practice of particular
concern given the relatively high incidence of AIDS in the
population. Even prison officials acknowledge that
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THE BAHAMAS
overcrowding is a problem. Four to five prisoners are usually-
housed in 6-foot by 8-foot cells for 23 1/2 hours daily 5 days
a week and are not permitted to leave their cells at all the
other 2 days. Sanitation facilities are, at best, poor, with
most cells equipped only with a slop bucket or trench-type
urinals that provide breeding grounds for insects.
In the women's section, female prisoners are housed in
dormitories containing 20 to 24 bunk beds. They are given
considerably more time outside of the cells than are male
prisoners and are not generally subjected to sexual assault.
However, frequent floods caused by heavy rains sometimes leave
about 2 inches of standing water in the dormitories. As pipes
back up, human waste mixes with the water, and tarantulas and
centipedes seek refuge in the beds. Some prisoners have
alleged occasional deliberate neglect of ill prisoners by
guards .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention.
The right to a judicial determination of the legality of
detention is respected; charges are normally brought within 48
hours of arrest, and those arrested are usually allowed access
to an attorney of their own choosing.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
An independent judiciary, appointed by the executive branch on
the advice of a Judicial and Legal Service Commission,
conducts fair and public trials. The Constitution entitles
defendants to counsel, and access to defendants is freely
permitted. There have been instances, however, when persons
accused of a crime have spent periods of as much as 18 months
in maximum security facilities awaiting trial. Legal
representation at public expense is provided only for capital
cases. There are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government does not interfere in the private lives of its
citizens. The Constitution prohibits arbitrary entry, search,
or seizure, and the law requires warrants to be issued before
Tprivately owned property can be entered and searched. The
Government neither censors mail nor restricts receipts of
foreign correspondence or publications.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is restrained primarily by strict
libel laws and the government monopoly of radio and
television. The Bahamas operates under a libel law unchanged
since the 19th century. While journalists generally find the
law somewhat rigid, its supporters claim that it results in a
more dignified and courteous treatment by the press than would
be the case without it. While the two privately owned daily
and one weekly newspapers freely criticize government
policies, they also refrain from scrutinizing certain issues
for fear of libel suits; the morning daily lost at least two
major suits in 1989. The result is a form of self-censorship
463
THE BAHAMAS
which attenuates public debate on controversial issues.
Radio and television broadcasting is a government monopoly
under present legislation. The government-controlled
Broadcasting Corporation of the Bahamas (BCB) operates radio
services in Nassau and Freeport and a nationwide TV service
from Nassau. A private U.S. -based cable TV system presently
exists in Freeport, although there are reports that the
Government is pressuring the owners to sell at below free
market price. In September opposition politicians once again
introduced legislation which, if adopted, would permit the
licensing of privately owned radio stations. They argue that
the government-run BCB cannot objectively comment on
government policies, and that this is particularly important
in the case of radio, the major source of news for Bahamians.
For example, current legislation allows the government party
to purchase four 15-minute broadcasts each year and the
opposition to buy one 15-minute broadcast annually if it
constitutes less than a third of Parliament. Two opposition
broadcasts are possible if they hold more than a third of
parliamentary seats. Generally, however, the views of the
Government receive a thorough airing on radio and television
programs while those of the opposition and the Government's
other critics are given little notice. The opposition's
proposal was referred to committee after a parliamentary
debate in which even some government party members expressed
support for amending the present law. Foreign books and
publications freely enter the country and academic freedom
appears to be respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the rights of free assembly and
association, and these rights are observed in practice.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is full freedom of religion, and discrimination based on
creed is prohibited. There is no favored or official state
religion, but most church members belong to Protestant
denominations .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens are free to travel domestically and abroad, and there
are no restrictions on the right to change residence or
workplace. Large groups of Haitians continued to enter
Bahamian waters, and the Bahamian Defense Force and the U.S.
Coast Guard have cooperated in repatriating them. From April
1988 to July 1989, 20 Cuban refugees landed while attempting
to flee Cuba for Florida. Although The Bahamas is signatory
to the U.N. Protocol of 1968 relating to refugees, the Cubans
were treated as illegal immigrants and jailed for varying
periods. They were eventually released to await third-country
resettlement .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Bahamas is a constitutional democracy with a multiparty
political system. The political process is open to all
464
THE BAHAMAS
members of society, with citizens aged 18 and over eligible to
register and vote. There are two principal parties: the
governing Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) and the opposition
Free National Movement (FNM) . The PLP led the country for 5
years of internal self-government before independence in 1973
and has held power without interruption since.
General elections held in June 1987 returned the PLP to power
with a clear parliamentary majority. The FNM, however,
claiming extensive electoral violations, challenged the
results in the electoral court. The PLP responded by
challenging seats won by the FNM. The electoral court settled
nearly all of these challenges in September; the composition
of Parliament, in which the PLP holds 31 seats, the FNM 16,
and independents 2, remained unchanged.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
No international human rights organizations visited the
Bahamas during 1989. There are two local human rights groups,
the Grand Bahamas Human Rights Organization and the New
Providence Human Rights Organization. During 1989 the latter
took a strong stand^^ against a proposed National Service Bill
which would have restricted the constitutional rights of those
in National Service; the bill never came to a vote in
Parliament. The Government made no effort to restrict the
activities of either of these organizations or any
international organization investigating human rights issues.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex, race, or
religion, and The Bahamas has a generally good record in this
regard. Women participate prominently at all levels of
government and are well represented in the judiciary as well
as in professional and business sectors. There does not
appear to be a signficant wage gap. The Constitution does,
however, make several distinctions between the sexes regarding
citizenship by, for example, preventing female Bahamians from
bestowing citizenship upon their spouses.
Abuse of women, particularly spousal abuse, is a problem in
The Bahamas. However, it is unusual for a spouse to be
charged and convicted of a crime stemming from domestic
violence. In late 1989 the House of Assembly considered
legislative changes to strengthen the provisions against
spousal and child abuse. The bill was with the House of
Assembly Committee of the Whole but was expected to be passed
before the end of the session.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitutional provision for the right of free assembly
and association specifically mentions labor unions, and unions
operate freely without restriction. They are independent of
government control, have the right to strike, choose their own
delegations to the International Labor Organization (ILO), and
maintain affiliations with international and regional labor
organizations. Although construction workers at a hotel
project conducted a three-week "withdrawal of services", no
465
THE BAHAMAS
official strikes were registered in 1989.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers are free to organize, and unions engage in collective
bargaining without government interference or restriction in
any sector. Collective bargaining is extensive for the 30
percent of the work force which is organized. The Department
of Labor attempts to mediate disputes, and the law provides
for arbitration tribunals to help resolve stalled contract
negotiations. Notwithstanding the provisions of the
Industrial Relations Act of 1970 which prohibit discrimination
by employers against union members and organizers,
unionization of retail store and restaurant employees has been
discouraged over the years by employer pressure and arbitrary
dismissal practices. Allegations of antiunion discrimination
are ultimately decided by the Supreme Court. There are no
export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution specifically prohibits forced or compulsory
labor, and it is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
There is no legal minimum age for the employment of children.
Although the law does not specifically address child labor,
the requirement of compulsory education until age 14
effectively discourages child employment.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, employers cannot permit
their employees to work more than 48 hours a week. This
provision is effectively enforced. Maternity leave is
provided by law for female workers, who are guaranteed their
right to reemployment following childbirth. The Labor
Department conducts periodic inspections of workplaces to
ensure lighting, safety, and ventilation standards are met.
There is no minimum wage law in the Bahamas; however, wage
levels in this primarily service-oriented, tourist-based
economy are considered to provide a decent standard of living
for workers.
466
BARBADOS
Barbados is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations and a
constitutional democracy with a multiparty, parliamentary form
of government on the Westminster model. Its House of Assembly
is the third oldest elected body in the Western Hemisphere.
Barbadians recognize the Queen of England as Head of State;
she is represented by an appointed Governor General. The
Prime Minister is the head of government and governs with an
appointed Cabinet.
The Royal Barbados Police Force is charged with maintaining
public order; it respects constitutional and legal guarantees
of human rights. Police morale is good, and public respect
for the police force is high. The small volunteer Barbados
Defence Force is responsible for national security, but is
used for public order in times of crisis, emergency, or other
specific need.
The country's economy, based on tourism, light manufacturing,
services, and sugar, is highly susceptible to external
economic developments. Nevertheless, the economy has
registered positive growth for the past several years, led by
the tourism and construction sectors.
Barbados has a long record of respecting human rights. There
was no change in that record during 1989.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of such killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution specifically prohibits torture, and there
were no reports in 1989 of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and imprisonment,
and requires detainees to be brought before a court of law
within 72 hours of arrest. These provisions are respected in
practice. Criminal defendants have the right to counsel, and
attorneys have ready access to their clients. Exile is not
used as a punishment or means of political control.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides that persons charged with criminal
offenses be given a fair, public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial court. Defendants are
presumed innocent until proven guilty. The Government
provides free legal aid to the indigent. The judiciary acts
467
BARBADOS
independently and is free of intervention from other branches
of government. There are no political prisoners,
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government does not interfere arbitrarily in the private
lives of its citizens. The Constitution prohibits arbitrary
entry, search, or seizure, and the law requires warrants to be
issued before privately owned property may be entered and
searched. The Government neither censors mail nor restricts
the receipt of foreign correspondence or publications.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, and
these rights are respected in practice. There are five radio
stations, two of which are government owned. CBC television
service (the sole television station) is government owned.
Though CBC is not independent of government control, views
opposing government policies are regularly reported, though
opposition political figures occasionally claim their
positions are slighted or ignored. There are two independent
daily newspapers in which opposing political views are
presented. The Government regularly comes under attack in the
newspapers and on two popular daily call-in radio programs.
Barbados hosts the Cave Hill campus of the University of the
West Indies, and academicians across the political spectrum
express their views freely.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Government observes the constitutional guarantees of
peaceful assembly and private association. Permits are
required for public demonstrations, and they are routinely
granted. Political parties, trade associations, and private
organizations function and hold meetings and rallies without
government hindrance.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is full freedom of religion. While the Anglican and
Methodist faiths have traditionally predominated, there are
numerous other active religious denominations and
organizations throughout the country. Foreign missionaries of
various faiths proselytize freely. The Caribbean Conference
of Churches is headquartered in Barbados and publishes its
materials there.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens and legal residents move freely within Barbados, and
leave and enter the country without restriction, rights
provided for in the Constitution. Barbados has a small number
of applicants for admission as refugees; their applications
are processed on a case-by-case basis.
468
BARPAPQS
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have this right in law and exercise it in practice.
Political parties freely compete in fair elections by secret
ballot at least every 5 years. There are no impediments to
participation in the political process, and all Barbadians
over age 18 may vote. The present Democratic Labour Party
(DLP) Government won the May 1986 election, taking 24 of the
27 seats and replacing the incumbent Barbados Labor Party
(BLP) government. A small Marxist party, the Workers Party of
Barbados, was formed in 1985, but has attracted little
support. It participated marginally in the 1986 election and
holds no parliamentary seats. In 1989 four DLP Members of
Parliament resigned from the party and formed the National
Democratic Party, replacing the BLP as the official opposition
by virtue of its four seats in Parliament. A Cabinet of
Ministers, appointed by the Prime Minister, exercises
executive power.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There were no reports of human right violations in Barbados
during 1989, and human rights groups have not requested any
such investigations. The Government publicly advocates
strengthening the human rights machinery of the United Nations
and the Organization of American States, as well as more
investigations into alleged violations of human rights in
other countries and the increased use of fact-finding or
observer teams to monitor controversial political and
electoral situations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal treatment under the law,
regardless of race, religion, or sex. These provisions are
respected in practice. Women form a large percentage of heads
of household in Barbados and are not discriminated against in
public housing and other social welfare programs. Compulsory
education through the secondary level is enforced uniformly.
Barbados is a signatory of the 1979 Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
Women actively participate in all aspects of national life and
are well represented at all levels in both the public and
private sectors. Women's rights groups exist; they are
devoted primarily to promoting women's participation in the
professions and, to a lesser extent, to safeguarding legal
rights of illegitimate children.
The Government has not singled out violence against women as a
particular or acute social problem, and this assessment that
violence against women is not characteristic of Barbadian
society is supported by female private sector lawyers who are
active in women's issues, with the Attorney General's office,
and with the president of the National Association of Women.
Criminal penalties for violent crimes are the same regardless
of sex of offender or victim. Penalties for simple assault
are minimal for first offenders, usually a small fine. For
repeat offenders or those with a history of violent acts, jail
sentences are usually imposed. In cases of domestic violence,
courts also typically issue restraining orders if requested by
the victim, the breach of which is punished by a jail
469
BARBADOS
sentence. The penalty for rape is imprisonment for up to 14
years. In 1989 there were a number of cases in the local
courts of domestic violence involving assault or wounding,
although women's rights groups point out that there is still
some reluctance on the part of victims to report such
incidents. New legislation is under consideration by the
Government which would change trial procedures in rape cases
to provide additional protection for the privacy of the victim.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to form and belong to trade unions and
to strike, and freely exercise these rights. There are two
major unions and several smaller ones, representing various
sectors of labor. The largest union, the Barbados Worker's
Union (BWU), is historically closely associated with the
governing DLP (BWU officers hold three elected parliamentary
seats and the appointed post of President of the Senate), but
the union is not controlled by the party or Government. Trade
unionists' personal and property rights are given full
protection under law. There were no major strikes or other
industrial actions in 1989, but unions have resorted to
strikes in recent years. Strikes are illegal in public
services. Barbadian trade unions are free to affiliate to
trade union internationals and are active in a variety of
regional and international labor organizations. Barbados is a
member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and has
ratified ILO conventions 87 and 98 dealing with freedom of
association and collective bargaining.
b. The Right To Organize and Bargain Collectively
The rights to organize and to bargain collectively are
provided by law and respected in practice. Over 20 percent of
the working population is organized, and wages and working
conditions are negotiated through the collective bargaining
process. Employers have no legal obligation to recognize
unions but most do when a majority of their employees are
organized. Workers who may be subject to antiunion
discrimination have recourse to the Department of Labor, whose
chief labor officer conducts inquiries. There are no
manufacturing or special areas where collective bargaining
rights are legally or administratively impaired. Barbados has
a number of export processing zones; none of these are closed
to union organizers, and there do not appear to be any
informal strictures on unionization,
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by the Constitution
and does not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum working age of 16 in Barbados is generally
observed. Minimum age limitations are reinforced by
compulsory primary and secondary education policies.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The standard workweek is 40 hours in 5 days, and workers are
guaranteed a minimum of 3 weeks of annual leave. Minimum
wages for specified categories of workers are administratively
470
BARBADOS
established and enforced by law. The minimum wage for shop
assistants (entry level commercial workers), $75 per week, is
marginally sufficient to meet minimum living standards; most
employees earn more. All workers are covered by unemployment
benefits legislation, and by national insurance (social
security) legislation. A comprehensive government-sponsored
health program offers subsidized treatment and medication.
Legally mandated health and safety standards are enforced by
the Department of Labor, and are in keeping with normal
standards .
471
BELIZE
Belize is a parliamentary democracy organized under a
Constitution enacted in 1981 upon independence from the United
Kingdom. It is governed by a Prime Minister, a Cabinet of
Ministers, and a Legislative Assembly. A Governor General
represents Queen Elizabeth II in the largely ceremonial role
of Head of State. Both local and national elections are
scheduled on a regular, constitutionally prescribed basis, and
the two national political parties — the People's United Party
(PUP) and the United Democratic Party (UDP) — field competing
slates of candidates. The Government changed hands, for the
second time since independence in 1981, when the PUP won a
majority of National Assembly seats on September 4, 1989.
The security forces of Belize consist of the Belize National
Police (BNP) and the Belize Defence Force (BDF) . They are
responsible to and controlled by civilian authorities. During
1989, narcotics producers and transshippers in Belize
continued to tax the scarce resources of the security forces.
A developing nation with an estimated population of 203,000,
Belize has an open market economy. The Government favors free
enterprise and actively encourages increased private
investment, both foreign and domestic. In 1988 the gross
domestic product increased 7.6 percent, and per capita gross
domestic product was an estimated $1,284.
Constitutional protections for the fundamental rights and
freedoms of all Belizeans are upheld by an independent
judiciary. Persons may freely associate, hold private
property, speak freely, and pursue private interests. An
active and unconstrained press buttresses these civil and
political rights. The country's overall human rights record
remains good.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of politically motivated or other
extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no reports of torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment. Such treatment is
expressly forbidden by the Constitution.
Occasional allegations of police misconduct have led to prompt
investigations, followed, when necessary, by disciplinary
action or dismissal.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention, and
these provisions are respected in practice. A person must be
24-900 O— 90 16
472
BELIZE
informed of the cause of detention within 48 hours of arrest
and must be brought before a court within 72 hours. The
Constitutional Affairs Committee in the House of
Representatives has recommended that the maximum allowable
time for informing a detainee of the cause of his arrest be
shortened from 48 to 24 hours. In practice, all detainees are
informed immediately. Bail is granted in all but the most
serious cases. Exile is forbidden by the Constitution and
does not occur.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Persons accused of criminal activity have constitutional
rights to presumption of innocence, protection against
self-incrimination, defense by counsel, public trial, and
appeal. Trial by jury is mandatory in criminal cases.
Those convicted by either a magistrate's court or the Supreme
Court of Belize may appeal to the Court of Appeal. In some
cases, including those resulting in a capital sentence, the
convicted party may make a final appeal to the Queen's Privy
Council in the United Kingdom. In 1989 these constitutional
guarantees were respected by a judiciary which is independent
of the executive and is an effective guarantor of an equitable
system of justice. There are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Constitutional provisions for the protection of personal
property, privacy of home and person, and recognition of human
dignity are generally honored by the Government. A search of
private premises may be undertaken only if a warrant is
obtained in advance, except in the case of suspected
possession of illegal firearms, and search of the person may
be effected only with just cause.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and the press are protected under the
Constitution and by local custom. In practice, all viewpoints
are publicly presented without government interference. Five
privately owned weekly newspapers, three of them fiercely
partisan, engage in lively debate of public issues. The
opposition press is a frequent critic of government officials
and policies. All newspapers are subject to the constraints
of libel laws.
Before winning the September 4 election, the opposition PUP
accused the Government of censorship because the Belize
Broadcasting Authority (BBA), a government agency, screened
all advertisements submitted for television broadcasting and
rejected several PUP submissions on grounds that they were not
factual. The PUP played the rejected advertisements at
rallies. Other PUP ads were aired on television. The PUP
turned down an offer from the BBA to participate in a
televised debate between leading candidates of the two parties.
Fourteen privately owned television broadcasting stations,
including several cable networks, operate throughout Belize
under the authority and regulation of the BBA. The BBA bans
473
BELIZE
such programming as pornography, requires that a minimum of
2 percent of programming be locally produced, and must
authorize certain broadcasts, such as those with political
content. The BBA continues to assert its right to edit any
defamatory or personally libelous material from the political
broadcasts of both parties before these are aired. For lack
of privately owned commercial radio stations, the BBA has a de
facto monopoly on radio broadcasting.
Academic freedom is vigorously exercised.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly is constitutionally assured and is honored
in practice. Political parties and other groups with
political objectives freely held rallies and mass meetings in
1989, especially before the September elections. The
intelligence service, dissolved in 1989, at times observed and
monitored public political meetings, but no instance of
harassment or interference has been reported. Under the
Constitution Belizeans are free to form and join associations
of their choice, both political and nonpolitical . The
Government officially charters those associations which wish
to benefit from legal provisions, such as tax-free status for
charitable and nonprofit organizations, but less formal,
unchartered associations also exist. The organizers of public
meetings must obtain a permit 36 hours in advance of the
meetings, and such permits are rarely denied.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion in Belize. All groups may worship
as they choose, and all groups and churches may establish
places of worship, train clergy, and maintain contact with
coreligionists abroad. There is an active missionary
presence. In church publications and from the pulpit, church
leaders comment on government and political policies as these
affect the social welfare of the country. A broad-based
partnership of the Government and several different churches
active in education successfully operates and administers most
of Belize's primary and secondary schools. No political party
is affiliated with any particular church or religion, and no
church or religious affiliation gives political advantage or
disadvantage to its adherents.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on freedom of movement within the
country. Foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation are
unrestricted. The Constitution mandates forfeiture of
Belizean citizenship for those who knowingly and willingly
accept citizenship of another country.
While emigration is widely accepted, a wave of immigration
from neighboring Central American countries has proven
controversial. Estimates of the number of aliens living in
Belize since 1980 continue to hover around 40,000. There are
no exact numbers for alien arrivals or departures. In 1990,
however, the Government of Belize is scheduled to undertake a
census which may yield a more accurate tally of aliens. The
original government enthusiasm for, and assistance to, the new
474
BELIZE
arrivals waned as public resentment of their increasing
presence spread. The Government has worked closely with the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in
planning a wide variety of future assistance projects which
will benefit both Belizeans and aliens, thereby defusing
potential resentment toward the aliens and helping to minimize
the chance that they will suffer discrimination. In 1989 no
refugees were either forced or pressured to return to their
countries of origin. The UNHCR maintains an office in Belize,
but the Government has not ratified the United Nations
Convention on Refugees.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Belize is a parliamentary democracy governed by a fairly
elected Legislative Assembly, with executive direction coming
from a cabinet of ministers headed by Prime Minister George
Price. By constitutional mandate, the Governor General
instructs the leader of the majority party of the National
Assembly to form a Government following national elections,
which must be held at least once every 5 years. Municipal and
town board officials are elected in local contests at 3-year
intervals. Belize experienced a peaceful and orderly transfer
of power from the UDP to the PUP in the national elections of
September 1989, when the PUP won 15 of the 28 seats in the
British-style House of Representatives in an election in which
73 percent of the electorate voted.
All elections are by secret ballot, and suffrage is universal
for Belizean citizens 18 years and older. Observers of the
polling in each of Belize's six regions during the September
1989 national elections found procedural safeguards to be
fully functioning. There were no allegations of electoral
fraud despite the narrow margin of the popular vote (50.2
percent) by which the Government changed hands.
The two main parties dominate Belizean political life, and
each party's membership cuts across all segments of Belize's
diverse ethnic groupings. The ruling party's narrow
parliamentary majority suffices for setting policy, but
Belize's democratic heritage and the forces of public opinion,
an independent judiciary, and a free press ensure that public
policy m.aking remains open.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There were no known requests by international human rights
organizations to investigate human rights violations in
Belize, and no international human rights organization
maintains an office in Belize. Senior government officials
state that the Government would cooperate with any reputable,
internationally recognized human rights organization which
wished to establish an office in Belize.
The Human Rights Commission of Belize, a nongovernmental
organization that opened offices in late 1987 maintained a low
profile throughout the year and issued few public statements.
475
BELIZE
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no discrimination on ethnic or religious grounds.
All Belizeans have equal protection under the law.
Despite constitutional provisions of equality, Belizean women
face some prejudices rooted in social and economic practice.
The Government worked to overcome this problem by funding a
Women's Bureau charged with developing programs to improve the
status of women in Belize. Founded in 1981, the Women's
Bureau was upgraded in 1986 to a government department within
the Ministry of Labor and Social Services. A number of
officially registered women's groups work closely with various
government ministries in promoting social awareness programs.
Women have access to education and are active in all spheres
of national life. Women generally receive the same wage as
men for similar work.
Domestic violence against women is a chronic cultural
problem. In 1985 a group of Belize City residents began the
Belize Women Against Violence movement (WAV) which now has
branches elsewhere in Belize. The group operates a shelter
for battered wives and a hotline for rape victims, and has
obtained cooperation from the Ministries of Home Affairs and
Education. The Government is committed to increasing the
safety of women; it has imposed a minimum sentence for rape
convictions of 7 years' actual custody.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
By statute and in practice Belizean workers and employers are
free to establish and join labor organizations, and the labor
union movement is a significant factor in Belize's economy.
Eleven active unions, with an estimated 30 percent of the
labor force on their rolls, effectively represent a broad
cross-section of white-collar, blue-collar, and professional
workers, including most civil service employees. The unions
are considered official by the Ministry of Labor when they
have filed with the Office of Registry. Members are empowered
to draft the by-laws and constitutions of their unions, and
they are free to elect officers from among the membership at
large. Unions which choose not to hold elections can act as
representatives for their membership, but only unions which
hold free and annual elections of officers are permitted to
join the national Trade Union Congress of Belize (TUC) , which
is affiliated with the Caribbean Congress of Labor and,
through the Inter-American Organization of Workers, v?ith the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). By
both law and precedent, unions are effectively protected
against dissolution or suspension by administrative authority.
Unions are legally permitted to strike, but unions
representing essential services may strike only after giving
21 days of notice to the ministry concerned. Only employees
providing "essential services" must accept conciliation by the
Labor Commissioner before going on strike. In practice, the
Labor Commissioner acts as a conciliator in deadlocked
collective bargaining negotiations between labor and
management, offering nonbinding counsel to both sides.
Historically, the Commissioner's guidance has been voluntarily
accepted. However, should either union or management choose
not to accept the conciliator's decision, both are empowered
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BELIZE
to a legal hearing of the case, provided that it is linked to
some valid provision of civil or criminal law. There were no
strikes during 1989. No union is officially affiliated with
any political party, although several unions are clearly
allied to one or the other of the two main parties.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Legally, all unions may freely organize. Union activities are
protected from antiunion interference by article 13 of the
Constitution which specifically prohibits antiunion
discrimination both before and after the union is officially
registered. Cases of antiunion discrimination can be brought
to the Supreme Court for Constitutional redress. The last
such case was brought to the Court 5 years ago. Virtually
every sector of the economy has been unionized to some
degree. Established unions are effectively protected from
antiunion interference by both precedent and law, and union
officials and membership rarely, if ever, encounter
discrimination. Collective bargaining is the rule rather than
the exception in most labor negotiations, and workers are
fully represented in negotiations for the prevention or
settlement of disputes with employers.
There are no export processing zones or other areas where
union organization or collective bargaining are impeded or
discouraged.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is forbidden by the Constitution and does not
occur .
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age of employment in Belize is 14 years, or 17
years for employment near hazardous machinery. Inspectors of
the Ministries of Labor and Education enforce this regulation,
although in recent years school truancy officers, who have
historically borne the brunt of the enforcement burden, have
been less active.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
No set minimum wage covers all Belizeans, but some categories
of service employment, such as retail, restaurant, domestic,
and health care jobs have minimum hourly wage standards of
approximately $0.75 per hour. Although unemployment is
widespread, the conjunction of wage rates and hours worked has
normally been sufficient to provide employed Belizeans and
their families with an adequate standard of living. No worker
is obliged to work more than 6 days or 45 hours per week.
Payment of overtime work is obligatory, as is an annual paid
holiday of 2 weeks. A patchwork of health and safety
regulations covers numerous industries, and these are enforced
to varying degrees of effectiveness by the Ministries of Labor
and Public Health. Enforcement is not universal countrywide,
and in 1989 limited inspection and investigative resources
were committed principally to urban and more accessible rural
areas where labor, health, and safety complaints had been
registered.
477
BOLIVIA
Bolivia is a multiparty democracy with an elected president
and bicameral legislature. With no presidential candidate
receiving an absolute majority of the popular vote in the
elections of May 7, 1989, the Bolivian Congress selected Jaime
Paz Zamora to be President, in accordance with procedures
mandated by the Constitution. Paz Zamora succeeded Victor Paz
Estenssoro as President on August 6, 1989.
Police security forces and the military are generally
controlled by and responsive to the civilian Government.
Bolivia is the second poorest country in the Western
Hemisphere, and its economy only began to show consistent
growth in 1988-89 after years of severe contraction. Although
rich in mineral resources, in recent years Bolivia has
experienced high domestic production costs and low
international minerals prices. A major restructuring of the
minerals industry has contributed to already high
unemployment, currently about 20 percent.
The outgoing Paz Estenssoro administration's stringent
economic reforms ended the financial mismanagement and
hyperinflation of 1982-85 but were strongly opposed by
organized labor. Small coca-growing farmers resisted the
outgoing administration's antinarcotics campaign.
Human rights are provided for by the Constitution and are
widely respected. In response to increasingly violent street
demonstrations and a prolonged hunger strike in support of
teachers' union demands, the Government imposed a state of
siege on November 15 and detained more than 850 labor
activists; most were released within hours, nearly all within
10 days. People of European or mixed-race origin continue to
dominate the political and economic system to the detriment of
ethnic Indians. There are occasional reports of abuse of
prisoners and detainees by police, as well as concerns about
an overburdened and sometimes corrupt judicial system.
Bolivian women do not yet enjoy a status in society equal to
that of men but are gradually assuming a greater role in
business and the professions.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no political or other extrajudicial killings by the
Government in 1989. A terrorist group calling itself "Zarate
Willca" claimed responsibility for the politically motivated
machine-gun murder of two American citizen Mormon missionaries
in La Paz in May 1989. A government investigation resulted in
the arrest of four persons on charges of terrorist activities
and other crimes. No findings were announced in the
Government's investigation into the reported death of a
peasant at Achacachi last year at the hands of the military.
Late in 1989 Bolivian authorities arrested Luis Arce Gomez,
the notorious Interior Minister of the regime of General
Garcia Meza in 1980-1981. Widely despised for his role in the
tortures, kidnapings, and extrajudicial killing which
characterized that regime, Arce Gomez was also active in
narcotics trafficking. He faced charges and prosecution in
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BOLIVIA
both Bolivia and the United States.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances
in Bolivia in 1989. Judicial proceedings are continuing in
cases involving disappearances during the early 1980 "s (before
the restoration of democracy), and the courts collected
further testimony as evidence during 1989.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture, and the Government neither
condones nor practices such activity. However, there have
been occasional charges of cruelty toward or degrading
treatment of detainees by individual police officers. Police,
prison, and security personnel are rarely tried and punished
for such acts. Corruption, malnutrition, unsanitary
conditions, and drug-related problems are endemic in Bolivia's
overcrowded prison system.
Clear evidence surfaced in 1989 of serious human rights abuses
over a period of years at the Espejos Rehabilitation Farm in
Santa Crcz department. According to testimony and forensic
evidence made public in late 1989, a number of prisoners were
severely mistreated and some, perhaps 40 or more, died and
were secretly buried in a clandestine cemetery. The officer
in charge of Los Espejos has been remanded for criminal
prosecution, and other officials face sanctions of various
kinds .
The Government which took office on August 6 is publicly
committed to ameliorating conditions in the country's prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution requires a court order for an arrest, and
detainees must be charged or released within 24 hours. The
Constitution also provides for a judicial determination of the
legality of a detention, and prisoners are usually released if
a judge rules that they have been detained illegally. After
the initial detention, prisoners may consult a lawyer of their
choice. Provisions for bail exist in Bolivia except in
certain narcotics cases, and bail is generally granted.
Under the provisions of the state of siege declared by the
President on November 15, constitutional protections were
suspended and over 850 labor union activists were detained in
overnight police roundups. About 150 were transported to
small communities for internal exile, but all were released
within 10 days.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The constitutional right of fair public trial is adhered to in
most respects, but long delays in the judicial system are
common. Investigations, trials, and appeals procedures are so
lengthy that some prisoners eventually serve more time than
the maximum sentence for the crime with which they are being
charged. Defendants have the righ_ to an attorney, to
confront witnesses, to present evidence, and to appeal a
judicial decision. These rights generally are upheld in
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BOLIVIA
practice. Although the law provides for a court-appointed
defense attorney at public expense, if necessary, one may not
always be provided because of a shortage of funds and
qualified personnel. The Constitution authorizes the Supreme
Court, Bolivia's highest civilian judicial body, to review
legislative measures to determine if they are in accordance
with a citizen's "specific rights or the Constitution."
The military regime of 1976 revised the military penal code
and established the military court system. The law defined
and established military jurisdiction over actions against the
security of the State and against military personnel and
property.
Corruption of the judicial system remains a serious problem.
Narcotics traffickers often bribe judicial and other officials
in exchange for releasing suspected traffickers and their
aircraft, returning captured drugs, and purging incriminating
files. The Government has taken some steps to discipline
Bolivia's judicial system. Under provisions of the
antinarcotics legislation signed into law in July 1988, the
Government has begun creating three-judge special narcotics
control courts. They are to function as first-instance
tribunals in narcotics-related cases.
Terrorist threats against judges and other officials involved
in the cases of four detainees allegedly linked to "Zarate
Willca" (see Section l.a.) delayed the timely consideration of
the charges against the four defendants.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The sanctity of the home and the privacy of citizens' lives
are protected by the Constitution and are normally respected
in practice.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
By law, citizens enjoy freedom of speech and exercise it
widely without government interference. Both state-owned and
private radio and television stations operate in Bolivia. All
newspapers are privately owned. Since the restoration of
democracy in 1982, Bolivians have enjoyed a generally
unrestricted press representing the full spectrum of political
views .
The privately owned La Paz television channel 4 and Radio
Metropolitana, which were closed by the Government in June
1988 after they broadcast an interview with then-fugitive
narcotics trafficker Roberto Suarez, were allowed to reopen in
1989. The owner of the two closed media outlets organized a
political party in September 1988 and campaigned freely for
president, even while his stations remained off the air. His
party won a plurality in the balloting in La Paz Department.
The Government has consistently respected academic freedom.
Public universities enjoy autonomous status by law, and that
status is respected.
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BOLIVIA
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The rights of peaceful assembly and association are provided
for by law and generally respected in practice.
On November 14, however, the Government imposed a state of
siege in response to civil disturbances growing out of a
strike by the nation's teachers, and police arrested over 850
people (see Section l.d.)- Apart from the arrests, curfew
restrictions and other curbs on assembly were relatively minor.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Roman Catholicism predominates in Bolivia, and the
Constitution recognizes it as the country's official religion;
Catholic bishops receive a nominal stipend from the State.
Other religious groups, however, operate openly. The Mormons,
Baha'is, Seventh-Day Adventists, Methodists, and others freely
proselytize and operate churches, training centers, and social
welfare projects throughout the country. The small Jewish
community has not reported any discrimination. Citizens are
free to practice the religion of their choice and to maintain
links with coreligionists abroad.
The Government has issued rules designating the Roman Catholic
Church to coordinate all public ceremonies in which
governmental authorities and institutions participate. Based
on a decree issued in July 1985, the Government of President
Paz Estenssoro (1985-1989) declared all existing religious
registrations void, and required religious groups to
reregister. In 1989 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Worship reiterated that numerous religious groups were
operating in Bolivia illegally (that is, without legal
registration) and threatened to begin legal proceedings
against them. The Government of President Paz Zamora has
indicated that it may move soon to write the administrative
regulations for registration into law, a step which would
require further congressional action. Some evangelical
Protestant groups complain that they are subject to more
stringent registration procedures than the Catholic Church.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on travel within Bolivia or abroad.
The Government does not impede emigration and guarantees
departing citizens the right to return. Citizenship is not
revoked for political reasons.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Bolivia is a multiparty democracy with an elected president
and a functioning, independent, bicameral legislature.
Opposition groups function freely both in and out of the
Congress. On May 7, Bolivia held free and fair elections
which resulted in a peaceful, constitutional change of
administration on August 6.
Suffrage has been universal since the 1952 revolution.
Nevertheless, people of European or mixed-race origin are
predominant in the political system.
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BOLIVIA
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government is sensitive to the opinions of both
international and domestic organizations and is willing to
discuss human rights concerns with them. The Congress has
committees responsible for monitoring observance of human
rights. The Catholic Church, the Permanent Assembly on Human
Rights in Bolivia (APDHB) , labor organizations, and the press
have been aggressive monitors of human rights. These
organizations comment frequently on issues and developments
related to human rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Although protected in theory and sometimes in practice by
social legislation, Bolivian women do not enjoy a social
status equal to that of men. Cultural traditions, social
conditions, and limited political influence remain major
obstacles to advancement for women. In rural families, women
contribute significantly to economic activities and often
control the family finances, but nonetheless they are
considered socially and politically subordinate. In urban
settings, women are slowly achieving a greater role in
business and professional life, as their participation in
cooperatives, community affairs, and education increases.
There are no reliable and complete statistics indicating the
extent of violence against women in Bolivia. A study prepared
by a women's rights group in November 1989 cataloged 98
articles in 5 major newspapers between March and October 1989
concerning violence involving women (including such categories
as suicide, attempted suicide, and death in childbirth).
Violence against women is a criminal offense in Bolivia, and
legal sanctions are regularly applied when cases come to the
attention of the authorities. However, many women are
reluctant to bring charges in cases of domestic violence, and
the incidence of such abuse as wife beating is very likely
underreported. Legal counseling is available for women on a
limited basis through private organizations.
Although prohibited by the Constitution, discrimination
against people of indigenous background continues. The
Aymara- and Quechua-speaking Indian majority of the population
remains at the lower end of the country's socioeconomic scale
and is disadvantaged in terms of health, life expectancy,
education, income, and employment. All political leaders
acknowledge it is a problem. The Government's programs to
ease Bolivia's economic crisis, including activities sponsered
by the Social Emergency Fund, are of direct benefit to some of
the disadvantaged, within the constraints of severely limited
resources .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Bolivian workers have the right to establish and join
organizations of their own choosing, and they are free to
elect their own leaders. They possess and exercise the right
to strike. Labor law prohibits any labor contract which
denies workers' constitutional rights and freedoms. The
Bolivian Workers Central (COB), an umbrella labor organization
482
BOLIVIA
which represents the majority of unionized workers, is
independent of the Government. In past years it has
frequently paralyzed the economy with crippling strikes. In
1989, despite declines in membership and political influence,
the COB mobilized demonstrations on various social and
economic issues throughout the country.
Some COB affiliates, such as the teachers' union, went out on
strike for extended periods during 1989. Antigovernment labor
demonstrations, most of which were associated with these
strikes, were generally more peaceful than in the past, but
some occasionally resulted in violence between demonstrators
and police or military personnel. On November 15, the
Government declared a state of siege and detained over 850
labor activists including officials of the teachers' union as
well as senior officers of the Communist-led COB. About 159
of those detained were sent to internal exile in small towns
but all were released within 10 days.
The Government places no restrictions on a union's right to
join international labor organizations. The COB, which had
been independent since its founding in 1952, became an
affiliate of the Communist-controlled World Federation of
Trade Unions in 1988. As in previous years, the COB in 1989
was represented at the International Labor Organization (ILO)
convention in Geneva.
In its 1989 report, the ILO Committee of Experts (COE) cited
several provisions of Bolivian labor law which do not conform
with Convention 87 on Freedom of Association, including:
denial of the right of public workers to organize unions; the
requirement for prior authorization before forming a union;
the limit of one union in an enterprise; the possibility of
dissolving a union by administrative action; and, the power of
the executive to prohibit strikes by imposing compulsory
arbitration. The Committee encouraged the Government to adopt
legislation developed in cooperation with the ILO which would
rectify these shortcomings.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Bolivian workers have the right to organize and bargain
collectively. Tha law does not extend this right to
government workers, but the distinction is largely ignored in
practice, as virtually all government workers are unionized.
Negotiations between government representatives and freely
elected labor leaders are common.
The Labor Ministry has an established procedure for resolving
union complaints of discrimination or unfair practices by
employers and does not hesitate to involve itself in mediation
of labor disputes. In the wake of a Supreme Court ruling, a
legal dispute over the procedure by which unions select their
leaders is pending and may have to be settled by legislation.
There are no export processing zones or other areas in which
organizing or collective bargaining are impeded.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Bolivian law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and none
has been reported.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
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BOLIVIA
Bolivian law prohibits the employment of minors under 18 years
of age in dangerous, unhealthy, or immoral work. Revisions in
Bolivia's 50-year-old Labor Code, which Bolivian officials
discussed during the year with experts from the ILO, may
clarify ambiguities in the law concerning the employment of
children under 14 years of age. In practice, the legal
provisions concerning employment of children are not
rigorously enforced.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Bolivia's labor laws contain conditions for child protection,
paid vacations, and protection of workers' health and safety.
In practice these laws are not rigorously observed, and the
Government has not provided funds for adequate enforcement.
The mines, often old and operated with antiquated equipment,
are particularly dangerous and unhealthy. In urban areas,
about half the labor force observe an 8-hour day and a
workweek of 5 or 5 1/2 days.
Bolivia has a minimum wage law as well as an elaborate system
of bonuses and compensations for the private sector. In 1989
the Government fixed the minimum wage at the equivalent of
approximately $23 per month. A minimum wage earner cannot
easily support a family at an acceptable standard of living.
Moreover, labor leaders and the APDHB, while conceding the
Government's achievements in bringing financial stability out
of the chaos of 1985, continue to express concern that high
rates of unemployment are contributing to difficult living
conditions, despite the modest economic gains of 1987-89.
484
BRAZIL
Brazil held its first direct presidential election since 1960
on November 15, 1989, after returning to civilian rule in
1985. A runoff election took place on December 17 and
Fernando Collor de Mello won the presidency. Congressional
elections will take place in October 1990. The present
Congress, elected directly in 1986 to serve also as a
Constituent Assembly, finishes its term on February 1, 1991.
Internal security is provided by federal, state, and local
police. The armed forces have traditionally considered
external threats as their principal responsibility, but they
also have a constitutional responsibility to guarantee law and
order. They have been deployed internally in cases of threats
to public order and to protect critical industrial
installations during strikes and emergency situations. Brazil
was under military rule from 1964-1984.
Brazil experienced negative growth of some 2 percent per year
per capita during 1988 and 1989. The country is marked by a
wide disparity in income distribution among different income
segments and geographic regions. It has the eighth-largest
economy outside the Communist world and an external debt of
about $115 billion. The Government ended a unilateral
moratorium on most of its debt service to foreign commercial
banks in early 1988, but did not make timely payments to
commercial bank creditors in September 1989.
The new Constitution of 1988 contains a series of provisions
designed to increase the protection of human rights in
Brazil. One is the "writ of injunction," which can be filed
in court to request enforcement of a constitutional provision
which has not yet been implemented by legislation. Others
broaden the protections of individual and collective rights,
especially in the labor area.
The principal human rights concerns in Brazil are the
treatment of Indians, of peasants involved in land disputes,
and of common criminals. While the number of unauthorized
homesteadings by the landless increased in 1989, reported
killings of peasants and union organizers involved in land
disputes continued to decline. The press frequently reports
that common criminals in the custody of police are beaten and
some criminal suspects not in custody are killed by unknown
assailants. While the statistics of the government and Indian
organizations show a decline in the number of violent deaths
of Indians, the number of deaths due to disease reportedly
increased. Demarcated Indian lands are threatened by
settlers, miners, and lumber companies. The Constitution
establishes additional rights and legal protections for
Brazil's Indians, giving them full legal standing in the
courts .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Several hundred Brazilians died in 1989 at the hands of
vigilante groups, in urban gang wars, and in land conflicts.
Brazilian human rights organizations charge that policemen and
hired thugs often kill persons suspected of common crimes.
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BRAZIL
The rate of violent crime in Brazil's major urban centers has
continued to rise, and Rio de Janeiro now has one of the
highest murder rates in the world. Kidnaping of prominent
industrialists and innocent bystanders has also risen. The
growing crime rate has led to a high degree of public
acquiescence in police brutality against criminal suspects.
Resources devoted by local and state governments remain
insufficient to combat the problem.
Conflicts between rural landholders and the landless continued
in 1989. Many organizations involved in the landless movement
attribute the large number of illegal peasant takeovers of
land this year to a reported slowdown in land distribution
efforts by the Brazilian Government during 1989. Most of the
people killed in land conflicts were rural laborers or
squatters in the northeast, the south, and the interior.
Although there were fewer killings in land conflicts in 1989,
they attracted considerable publicity because the victims
included rural labor leaders, lawyers, clergy and journalists
helping to organize agricultural worker unions. According to
the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT) of the National Conference
of Brazilian Bishops, there was a 63 percent decrease in the
number of killings compared to 1988. However, officials of
the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers and the CPT
expressed concern that growing assertiveness by rural workers
will lead to further violence. The^ noted that confrontations
have become more frequent in Pernambuco, Maranhao, Rio Grande
do Sul and Santa Catarina, where rural unions are best
organized and most active.
Several prominent labor leaders were killed in 1989. Jose
Mariano Dias, the president of the Rural Workers Union of
Ribeirao, Pernambuco, was murdered in June after investigating
a sugar mill for possible labor code violations. Verino
Sossai, leader in the Sole Labor Central (CUT), was murdered
in July after his involvement in a land "invasion."
Journalist Rubens de Vabo, a leader in the landless movement,
was killed in western Rio de Janeiro state in September. In
Itaituba, Para state, city councilman Raimundo Silva de Sousa
was murdered on July 26, as was Socialist Party leader Jose
Marciao Ferreira on November 23. The CPT estimates that in
the first half of 1989 an estimated 27 people died in
land-related conflicts. As in recent years, less than 10
percent of the victims were landholders and, according to CPT,
in 1989 there seems to have been an increase in the number of
hired gunmen (working for landowners) who themselves were
killed.
Shootings, beatings, and death threats against advocates for
the landless are also common. A CPT lawyer, Antonio Eder John
de Souza, for example, was shot and injured in Manaus in
March. Clergy involved in the landless movement and reporters
who follow the stories routinely receive death threats.
Federal and state authorities have expressed serious concern
over the violence, but the national Government asserts that it
does not have the legal authority to intervene unless asked to
do so by a state government. State governments tend to
neglect the issue until forced to respond to a land
"invasion." The number of convictions for these murders and
other crimes remains minimal, although the persons accused of
murdering Francisco "Chico" Mendes Filho in 1988 for his
efforts to preserve the Amazon rain forest were indicted in
1989.
Brazilian human rights organizations charge that federal,
state, and local authorities have failed to take legal action
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BRAZIL
against those responsible for such killings. These groups
charge that police often fail to conduct complete
investigations and frequently cooperate with either the hired
gunmen themselves or their employers. Officials at the CPT
estimate that, of more than 1,200 murders in recent years,
fewer than 40 have resulted in convictions.
While many urban murders result from narcotics gang wars,
there are reports also of widespread killings of alleged or
suspected criminals by unidentified vigilante groups. Often
the corpses showed signs of torture or brutality. Vigilante
groups tend to operate in working-class neighborhoods and in
the shantytowns ("favelas"). The killings are viewed by some
as the actions of hired thugs or policemen employed by
shopkeepers who have either been robbed or are taking
preventive action. These vigilante actions were cited as a
major problem by Amnesty International and by most human
rights groups in Brazil. Investigations into these incidents
are hampered because witnesses hesitate to cooperate with
authorities for fear of retribution or because they sympathize
with the actions of vigilantes.
On December 28, 1988, journalist Luis Otavio Monteiro was
murdered in Manaus by a vigilante group apparently linked to
or made up of local police, reportedly because of his
investigation of the police role in local robberies. In
March, Luis Tenderini, president of the Commission for Justice
and Peace of the Archdiocese of Olinda and Recife, was
kidnaped and tortured.
According to human rights groups, the police use scarce
resources for what they consider important cases, i.e., cases
involving middle or upper class victims. It is also widely
assumed by human rights groups in Brazil — given the slow
nature of Brazilian justice, the frequency of escape of
criminals from inadequate prisons, and the absence of a death
penalty in Brazil — that the police commonly take justice into
their own hands, including revenge for the killing of police.
In the first 9 months of 1989, 32 Rio de Janeiro state
uniformed policemen were killed in the line of duty. Police
in major cities are frequently accused of the deaths of
innocent persons in the course of conducting their operations,
especially when raiding the shantytowns in search of narcotics
traffickers or assailants.
In the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo there are
indications that the situation with regard to vigilante group
activities improved somewhat. Through October 1989 there were
63 investigations initiated by the Commission of Inquiry on
Death Squads in Rio de Janeiro. Of these, 18 were completed
and three resulted in guilty findings. In Sao Paulo, police
sources reported that 63 police and 450 civilians died
violently this year, a slight increase over the figure for
1988. These sources attributed the increase in deaths to the
addition of 12,000 police, which increased the possibility of
a confrontation between police and suspects. There were 208
police disciplined for corruption and unjustified violence,
including unjustified killings. Of the 208, 170 were expelled
from the force and some face prosecution. In Sao Paulo, some
human rights groups praised the current Sao Paulo
administration for vigorously investigating and pressing
charges against police and vigilante groups suspected of
killings. Human rights groups reported that government
reformers confront many obstacles in their efforts to contain
these killings, including lack of support by the general
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BRAZIL
public, which is more concerned with high crime rates, and
opposition among professional levels of the uniformed police.
(Because the uniformed state police investigate alleged abuses
by its own officers, many instances of unjustified use of
lethal force by police go unreported and unpunished, according
to human rights sources.)
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated abductions in
1989.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is prohibited by the Constitution, which strengthens
the legal penalties for torture and acquiescence in torture.
There continue to be many credible reports, however, that
police beatings and torture of poor prisoners and landless
peasants are widespread. These acts are intended to extract
information, confessions, or money from criminal suspects, and
sometimes to administer punishment. Human rights groups in
Rio de Janeiro and southern Brazil note a continued reduction
in reports of police brutality. They attribute the apparent
trend to the promulgation of the new Constitution.
In cases where police officers have been brought to trial for
abuse, there have been few convictions. Human rights
organizations find little public support for defending the
rights of alleged criminal offenders. Public criticism of the
police is directed not at the abuse of persons in detention
nor at the dismal prison conditions, but rather at the lack of
effective crime control.
Most prison facilities are poorly maintained. In April,
Americas Watch (AW) published a report entitled "Prison
Conditions in Brazil." The report cited severe overcrowding,
with only half the necessary prison spaces needed for Brazil's
inmate population, and noted that many prisoners were being
kept longer than their sentences due to poor record keeping.
AW found that many long-term prisoners were held in short-term
detention facilities because of lack of space. The report
cited testimony that the "parrot's perch" — a bar on which a
prisoner is suspended from the back of his knees, with his
hands tied in front of his legs — continues to exist, as does
beating of prisoners by guards. Poor prison conditions in
Brazil were given international publicity in February when 51
naked men were forced into a 5- by 10-foot room, causing 18 of
them to die of suffocation. The three police officials
believed responsible for the deaths were transferred to
administrative positions pending trial. The detention
facility where the incident occurred was closed and the
surviving prisoners were moved to other jails or prisons.
Partly as a result of poor security conditions and
overcrowding in Brazilian jails, there are periodic outbreaks
of violence and riots. In November 1989, in the Piraqura
state penitentiary in Parana, prisoners took 40 hostages.
This led to the killing of 10 prisoners and 1 hostage. A few
days later, five inmates died in Rio de Janeiro's Evaristodo
Morais prison uprising.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution limits arrests to those caught committing a
crime or those arrested by order of a judicial authority. In
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addition, soldiers charged with violating military rules and
regulations, or with military crimes as defined by law, may be
arrested. The constitutional provision for judicial
determination of the legality of detention is respected.
Legally, a person may not be arbitrarily detained, but the law
does permit provisional detention in exceptional circumstances
when ordered by a judge. Detention also may be ordered by a
court during a police investigation or the prosecution phase
and can be extended until the case comes to trial or until a
judge rules that reasons for the detention no longer exist.
Provisional detention in Brazil is used infrequently. In
1989, however, there were several cases of illegal and
incommunicado detention without a judicial order, as well as
allegations of arbitrary detention of squatters during
evictions. Human rights groups charge that police detain
people for questioning without probable cause, in some cases
based on race or other questionable motives.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is an independent branch of government. The
federal judicial system, with the Federal Supreme Court at its
apex, includes courts of first instance and appeals courts.
The states organize their own judicial systems, so long as
they do not violate basic principles in the federal
Constitution. Brazil also has a system of specialized courts
dealing with military, labor, electoral, and juvenile matters,
among others. A system of small claims courts has been
created by the new Constitution. Under the Constitution,
military courts no longer have jurisdiction to hear cases
against civilians.
The right to a fair public trial is provided for by law and is
generally respected in practice. Defendants are entitled to
counsel and must be made fully aware of the charges against
them. In cases where a defendant cannot afford an attorney,
one must be provided free of charge; private attorneys are
appointed by courts to represent poor defendants where public
defenders are unavailable. The state of Rio de Janeiro
recently established a special group of public defenders on
continuous duty to serve newly arrested defendants.
Defendants and their attorneys have the right to be informed
of the evidence on which charges are based. Only cases of
willful crimes against life are tried by jury; all others are
tried by a judge. The judicial system has a serious backlog,
and many cases may not be tried for months.
Lynchings of suspected criminals by irate citizens attracted
press coverage in 1989, and several human rights sources
believe the number of lynchings was higher this year than in
1988 — 14 occurred in a 2-month period in the spring.
Lynchings arise out of public rage against rising crime and a
feeling that the judicial system cannot be counted on to mete
out justice.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for freedom from arbitrary intrusion
into the home. There have been no reports of illegal entry
for political reasons. However, entry into homes without a
warrant occurs in searches for criminal suspects.
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The new Constitution provides the right for a person to file a
"habeas data" writ in court, at no financial cost, to obtain
information about himself in the possession of Brazilian
authorities. This writ may also be used to request the
correction of inaccurate data about the citizen which may be
in government files.
Wiretaps are unconstitutional except for purposes of criminal
investigation and prosecution when authorized by a judicial
authority in circumstances defined by law. The inviolability
of private correspondence is respected.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The right to free speech and to a free press is provided for
in the Constitution and is broadly exercised. The press and
broadcast media routinely discuss controversial social and
political issues. Opposition viewpoints are aired freely.
Most radio and television stations are privately owned, but
the Government controls licensing authority. Newspapers are
also privately owned and are vigorous in reporting and
commenting on government policies and performance. Some media
sources privately charge that self-censorship is widely
exercised by many media organizations to avoid offending major
governmental advertisers and creditors, including federal,
state, and local governments and government-influenced banks.
Foreign publications are widely distributed in Brazil. The
new Constitution abolished all forms of censorship. Prior
review of films, plays, and radio and television programming
is practiced only to determine the acceptable viewing age.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the right to assemble
peacefully. Permits are not required for outdoor political or
labor meetings, but such assemblies may not disturb another
meeting previously scheduled for the same place, and prior
written notification to government authorities is required.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no favored or state religion. Most Brazilians belong
to the Roman Catholic Church, which maintains an active social
and pastoral program. Spiritism has many adherents, and
Protestantism has been expanding in recent years. All faiths
are free to establish places of worship, train clergy, and
proselytize, although the Government reserves the right to
decide who may enter Indian lands. The National Council of
Brazilian Bishops and other missionary groups continue to
complain that visas for missionaries and other foreign
religious personnel are systematically delayed by immigration
authorities. In 1989 there were no expulsions of missionaries
or other religious denominations by the Federal Government
from the areas in or near Indian communities. In 1989
Catarimani, a Catholic missionary group, was allowed to return
to the Yanomami Reservation from which it was expelled in 1988.
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d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on movement within Brazil, nor are
there any restrictions on emigration or return. Brazil admits
few immigrants, does not formally accept refugees for
resettlement, and is selective in granting asylum.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change
their government through free elections; the November 15
election confirmed that this right exists in practice. On
that day, Brazil completed its democratic transition and held
its first direct presidential election since 1960. After a
runoff election on December 17, Fernando Collor de Mello was
declared the winner by the Supreme Election Tribunal in an
election that was singularly free and fair. Brazil had
returned to democratic rule in March 1985, with the
inauguration of a civilian president after 21 years of
military governments. During the last few years, executive
and legislative offices throughout the country at local,
state, and national levels have all been filled through fair
and democratic direct elections among candidates representing
as many as 38 separate political parties.
Voting is secret and mandatory for all literate Brazilian
citizens aged 18 to 70 except military conscripts who may not
vote. It is voluntary for minors aged 16 to 17, for the
illiterate, and for those over age 70. Women have full
political rights under the Constitution, and they are
increasingly active in politics and government. Indians were
also given the franchise under the 1988 Constitution.
When one of the political parties which was in opposition to
the military regime came to power in 1985 through a vote of
the electoral college, it was viewed as a major test of the
ability of the citizenry to change its government. Most
Brazilians believe that the true test of the transition to
full democracy were the free popular presidential elections
held in 1989. The armed forces retain significant influence
in the Government, but the military establishment is
respecting its limited role under the new Constitution.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Many local human rights groups cite the importance of the 1988
Constitution and the discussion preceding it in making
Brazilians more aware of their civic, political, and social
rights, and more sensitive to cases of human rights
violations. Brazil is a member of the United Nations Human
Rights Commission. A number of Brazilian nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) actively investigate allegations of
human rights violations and often initiate legal proceedings.
Several international NGO's either maintain offices in Brazil
or visit periodically. None of these organizations has
complained of government interference in its activities.
Brazilian human rights groups previously concerned with
political repression have turned their attention to problems
involving Indians, police mistreatment of suspected criminals,
poor prison conditions, urban vigilante groups, and rural
violence .
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Since 1985 a federal prosecutor in each state has been
designated to monitor and assist in identifying human rights
violations, and many states have established their own
Councils for the Defense of Human Rights.
Both Brazilian and foreign human rights organizations assert
that elements of the Federal Government have been fairly
responsive to human rights investigations, as have some state
governments. State and federal police officials have accused
the CPT of collaborating in illegal land invasions.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, and
nationality is unconstitutional, and racial discrimination
— illegal since 1951--is a crime excluded from bail. Brazil
is a multiracial society with a high degree of racial
tolerance. Public opinion polls, however, show most
Brazilians believe that poor and uneducated darker-skinned
Brazilians encounter substantial de facto discrimination. The
vast majority of the black population is disproportionately
concentrated in the lowest economic strata, a reflection of
history and cultural attitudes. For example, while 40 to 60
percent of Brazil's population is of African or other
non-European ancestry, few senior officials in the Government
or armed forces are black. In early 1988, the media reported
that the Foreign Ministry had hired its first black career
foreign service officer. Black consciousness organizations,
generally lacking in political influence, challenge the view
that Brazil is a "racial dem.ocracy" and denounce
discrimination in housing, education, the workplace, and
society at large. These organizations complain that blacks
are more inclined to be stopped by police and deprived of
their civil rights, and that they bear the brunt of police
brutality.
One year after the 1988 centennial of Brazil's abolition of
slavery, black consciousness organizations have not been able
to sustain broad public interest in discrimination. However,
black rights activists believe the attention given to racial
discrimination in the Constitution has served to improve the
awareness of blacks "civil and political rights. Recently,
there have been signs that the situation is improving. In
Porto Alegre, a large department store was closed temporarily
in November under a municipal anti-discrimination ordinance
when an elderly black man suspected of shoplifting was
detained and verbally abused. In the city of Sao Paulo, a man
was arrested and jailed for verbally harassing a young black
student and spraying her with a hose.
The 1988 Constitution specifically addresses the question of
women's rights, prohibiting discrimination in employment or
salaries as well as guaranteeing 120 days of paid maternity
leave. As a reaction against the new maternity leave law,
some employers reportedly seek sterilization certificates from
prospective employees or try to fire women in their
childbearing years.
There is a high incidence of physical abuse of women in
Brazil, principally but not exclusively among the lower
classes. Women are killed and assaulted with virtual impunity
in crimes of passion, where traditionally a man's "honor"
takes precedence. However, men who commit crimes against
women are beginning to be brought to trial, albeit in small
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numbers. In 1989 a man in Sao Paulo was convicted of sexual
harassment of a woman. Officials note that women are
increasingly sensitized to the problem and are more willing to
make official complaints. Concern over abuse of women led to
the opening of special women's police precincts in more than
12 major cities. These centers provide shelter, assist in
bringing actions against aggressors, and provide general
information on women's health. Women's organizations have
been active in promoting women's rights and lobbying the
Government. Women's groups have also been active in politics,
holding seminars and forums to inform women voters; one
nationally televised presidential candidates' debate dealt
exclusively with women's issues.
The country's estimated 220,000 Indians suffer from higher
levels of disease and infant mortality than other Brazilians
and from the impact of greater contact with non-Indians as
Brazil's internal frontier expands. Despite the Government's
responsibility under the Constitution and the 1973 Indian
Statute to protect the indigenous population, Indians continue
to receive inadequate assistance. According to a June 1989
report prepared by a citizens' action committee made up of
members of Congress, attorneys, and human rights activists,
several tribes lost half their population in the last decade
due to disease and other factors associated with the
colonization of nearby lands and the influx of miners and
lumber companies.
In 1989 the situation of some of Brazil's Indian tribes
deteriorated, partly as a result of the Federal Government's
decisions and actions. Following an August 1987 shooting
incident in which four Yanomami Indians were killed by
prospectors, the Federal Government declared that all
outsiders would be removed from the Yanomami area, which
contains 9,000 Indians. The outsiders who were forcibly
expelled included anthropologists, missionaries, doctors, and
nurses, while up to an estimated 50,000 prospectors remained
in the area throughout 1989. With one exception, the medical
teams have not been allowed to return. Indirect evidence
suggests that, as a direct consequence of the prospector
influx, the number of Yanomami who died from mercury poisoning
or in epidemics of infectious diseases increased in 1989.
According to the Committee for the Creation of Yanomami Park,
it is likely that several hundred Yanomami died in 1989 due to
these factors.
In 1989 violence associated with land disputes between
isolated tribes and non-Indian settlers increased. According
to the citizen's action committee's June 1989 report cited
above, three Yanomami were injured in January by miners who
invaded their lands; in February a policeman entered the
Maxcuxi area in the State of Roraima, burned down houses and
arrested five people illegally; and in April four Indians were
injured in a land dispute in the national Xingu Park. The
same report states that in May, police entered the same
Maxcuxi village in Roraima and burned down eight homes, the
church, and the school, and detained 25 men, women, and
children without charging them. According to the Indigenous
Missionary Council of the National Conference of Brazilian
Bishops (CIMI), more Indians have died as a result of attacks
or of disease in the past 2 years than in the previous decade.
Indian leaders complain that the Government has systematically
ignored their needs and promoted settlement or development
projects at their expense. They claim that many state and
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local governments, for example, have refused to pay the
salaries of Indian teachers in schools where grade school
instruction is in their native language. Indian leaders
charge that the Federal Government has used pressure and legal
subterfuges to avoid the demarcation of traditional Indian
lands required under the 1973 Indian Statute and the
Constitution. They criticize the Federal Government's
decision to establish national forests on the grounds that
they are open to colonization and economic exploitation by
prospectors and other non-Indians. Indian leaders claim that
the federal and state governments are more concerned about the
exploitation of mineral and other natural resources than
attending to the needs and rights of Indians.
The Constitution includes a chapter on the rights of Indians.
It guarantees them the exclusive use of the riches existing in
the soil, rivers, and lakes located on their lands, including
a share of the proceeds from any exploitation of water,
mineral, or energy resources found on these lands as
demarcated by law. Any act which permits the occupation or
possession of Indian lands by non-Indians, or which permits
exploration or exploitation of the natural resources existing
on them (except when there is relevant public interest, as
defined by law), will be considered null and void. The
Federal Government has the responsibility to demarcate and
protect Indian lands. Such lands cannot be sold, and Indian
rights over them will not expire under any statute of
limitations. Indian groups cannot be removed from their lands
except with Congressional approval, and in cases of force
majeure their immediate return is statutorily guaranteed as
soon as feasible. Brazilian Indians now have the authority to
bring suits in court to defend their rights and interests. In
all such suits they are to be assisted by a public
prosecutor. How effectively these provisions will be
implemented was unclear at year's end.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Brazil's labor code has long provided for union representation
of all Brazilian workers. The law imposed a hierarchical,
unitary system known as "Unicidade," which prohibited multiple
unions of the same professional category in a given geographic
area. It also stipulated that no union's geographic base
could be smaller than a "municipality." Workers in a union
whose numbers increased (as when an industry grew) could
petition the state to split a preexisting union into two or
more unions. Brazil's Constitution retains both "Unicidade"
and the requirement that no union's geographic base may be
smaller than a municipality, but it frees workers to organize
new unions out of old ones without prior authorization from
government authorities. The 1988 Constitution also eliminates
powers previously granted to the Minister of Labor to
"intervene" (i.e., depose) a union's independently elected
representatives and substitute others of the Minister's
choosing. The Government did not exercise this authority from
1985 to 1988.
At its June 1989 meeting, the International Labor
Organization's (ILO's) Committee on Freedom of Association
(CFA) , considering a complaint by the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), concluded that
provisions of Brazil's Constitution providing that no more
than one union can be formed in any occupational category in
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any one territory, as well as compulsory union contributions,
violated Convention 87 on Freedom of Association. The
Committee asked the Brazilian Government to bring its
legislation into conformity with the Convention.
Organized labor actively participated in the drafting and
approval of the Constitution in 1987-88. Reacting against
labor code provisions that made most work stoppages "illegal,"
the unions lobbied successfully for a constitutional guarantee
of the right to strike. The same meeting of the CFA cited
above considered two complaints filed by the ICFTU and other
labor entities alleging the discharge of strikers, and
government use of the military to suppress strikes resulting
in death and injury to the strikers. The Committee deplored
the violence and concluded that the Government's actions did
not conform with relevant ILO Conventions.
Complementary legislation passed in June 1989 stipulated that
essential services remain in operation during a strike, and
that workers notify employers at least 48 hours before
beginning a walkout. The Constitution prohibits interference
and intervention in labor unions by the Government, but
provides that abuse of the right to strike (such as not
maintaining essential services or giving advance notice,
denying workers not on strike access to their jobs, damaging
property, etc.) will be punished under the law. It also
incorporates a provision from the labor code which prohibits
the dismissal of employees who are candidates for union
leadership positions from the date of the registration of
candidacy until 1 year after the termination of their
mandates, if elected, except in the case of serious misdeeds,
as defined by law.
The two major labor centrals are the General Workers Central
(CGT) and the Sole Workers Central (CUT). Until mid-1989, the
two maintained similar positions regarding international
affiliation. Provisions in the CGT and CUT founding charters
mandated cooperation with all international labor
organizations and affiliation with none. Following an April
congress, however, new CGT leaders applied for affiliation
with the ICFTU. In May 1989, the Government designated labor
delegates to the ILO Conference from both the newly formed
centrals and the traditional confederations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize is guaranteed by the Constitution, and
trade unions are legally mandated to represent workers.
Although Brazilian laws do not make any provision for a
central labor organization, three such groups have
emerged--the CGT, CUT, and the Independent Workers Central
(USI). Communist Party of Brazil officials recently launched
a "fourth" central, the so called Classist Union Movement
(Corrente Sindical Classista) . To date this organization has
attracted no unions of significance. The Centrals do not have
legal standing to represent professional categories of workers
and have been created in Brazil as nonprofit civil
associations .
The Government has encouraged labor and management to resolve
differences through collective bargaining, which has become
commonplace. Nevertheless, a system of special labor courts
continues to exercise normative powers with regard to the
settlement of labor disputes, thereby discouraging direct
negotiation. Existing law charges these same courts (as well
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as personnel linked to the Federal Labor Ministry) with
mediation responsibility in preliminary stages of dispute
settlement. On the other hand, arbitration by neutral,
professional third parties is unknown.
Labor law applies uniformly throughout Brazil, including the
Free Trade Zones and Export Processing Zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
While the Constitution prohibits forced labor, there have been
repeated charges that it is utilized in Brazil, despite
federal government assertions that it is taking steps to halt
the practice and prosecute perpetrators. In 1989, the CPT
again denounced specific labor contractors in certain
northeastern and Amazon states for maintaining "slave" work
forces. The CPT charged that these contractors deducted
transportation and other inflated expenses from the workers'
meager salaries and employed armed guards to prevent the
"indebted" workers from leaving. According to press reports,
such cases of forced labor typically involve the exploitation
of vulnerable workers, especially minors or migrants. The CPT
charges that such work forces are most common deep in the
Amazon, where jungle areas are being cleared to prepare land
for agricultural use. The CPT has complained that state and
federal authorities have not promptly investigated reports of
the practice of compulsory l?>bor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum working age under the Constitution is 14, except
for apprentices, and legal restrictions have been approved to
protect working minors under age 18. By lav;, permission of
parents or guardians is required for minors to work, and
provision must be made for them to attend school through the
primary grades. All minors are barred from night work and
from work that constitutes a physical strain. Minors are also
prohibited from employment in unhealthy, dangerous, or morally
harmful conditions. However, it is estimated that 34 percent
of all children between the ages of 10 and 14 are economically
active. Many, perhaps most, of these working minors are
thought to be working in violation of the law, but accurate
statistics are not available. Enforcement of the law is
severely limited because of the lack of resources.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Organized labor demonstrated growing political strength by
lobbying for and achieving the adoption of significant
provisions in the Constitution. A workweek limit was set at
44 hours, pay benefits were expanded, and new protections were
established for agricultural and domestic workers. Several of
these advances were conditioned on the passage of
complementary enabling legislation that proved ,dif f icult to
enact. In June Congress overturned presidential vetoes of
minimum wage and cost of living adjustment measures. Real
worker income continued to lag in 1989. It is estimated that
some 40 percent of those economically active, including
minors, earned no more than the equivalent of one minimum
monthly salary of about $80, which is probably not adequate to
support a family with only one wage earner.
Brazilian workers also suffer because of the gap between the
legal assurance and reality of a safe work environment. Labor
Ministry figures indicate that Brazil ranks first worldwide in
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the number of workplace accidents. According to figures
gathered by the Government's Social Security system, 17
workplace-related fatalities occur daily across the country.
As these figures measure only those incidents involving
covered workers (some 23 million), they undoubtedly understate
the problem. (The total work force exceeds 50 million.)
There are no reliable statistics available covering the
incidence of job-related illness. Unofficial estimates,
however, link as much as 80 percent of Social Security system
payments to workplace factors.
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CHILE
The transition to democracy, begun with the October 5, 1988,
plebiscite which denied President Pinochet 8 more years in
office, continued with the December 14, 1989, election of a
civilian President and Congress. The elections were
characterized by international observers as free and fair.
The new President and Congress will assume office in March
1990; until then, General Pinochet will remain President, and
the military junta will continue to exercise the legislative
function. There is a separate judicial branch, but crimes
relating to state security continue to be heard in military
tribunals. In a plebiscite held July 30, amendments to the
1980 Constitution were approved by 85 percent of those voting.
The uniformed national police, the 28,000-man Carabineros, is
under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Defense and has
primary responsibility for public order and safety, crime
control, and border security. The 5,000-man Investigations
Police, also under the jurisdiction of the Minister of
Defense, is responsible for controlling and investigating
serious crime. The National Information Center (CNI),
responsible for internal and external intelligence-gathering,
is part of the Ministry of the Interior, but the President
exercises significant personal control. The majority of this
2,500-man force is composed of military personnel. The
85,000-man armed forces assert a role as the ultimate
guarantor of constitutional order and, in keeping with
longstanding tradition and under the terms of the current
election law, are responsible for ensuring the security of
voting places during elections.
Chile's economy is largely based on free market principles and
has a dynamic and growing export sector. Copper is Chile's
major source of foreign exchange, followed by fresh fruits and
fish meal. 1989 marked the sixth consecutive year of positive
real economic growth and the fourth consecutive year of annual
growth in excess of 5 percent. As a result, real wages have
increased and, while unemployment remains high in urban areas,
on the whole has decreased. Chile continues to make
substantial progress in overcoming its foreign debt problem.
The human rights environment in Chile improved dramatically
during 1989, although there were continuing instances of
abuses. Freedom from arbitrary arrest continued to be
undermined by vaguely defined and far-reaching state security
laws. Torture and kidnapings were considerably reduced in
comparison to previous years. Twenty-four persons, among them
9 Carabineros, a retired military officer, and a spokesman for
the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), were killed for
political reasons. The absence of any resolution to
longstanding cases of serious human rights abuses, among them
the 1976 murder in Washington, D.C., of exiled oppostion
leader Orlando Letelier and his American assistant Ronni
Moffitt, continued to concern both Chilean and international
human rights organizations.
Restrictions on freedom of speech and press have been greatly
reduced in law and have largely disappeared in practice. The
Government announced it would no longer accept a Special
Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Commission
(UNHRC) after the incumbent resigned in April. Delegations
from other human rights organizations, such as Amnesty
International (AI), Americas Watch, and the International
Human Rights Law Group, visited Chile during the year and in
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CHILE
some instances were given permission to visit prisons and
individual prisoners.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Deaths and injuries resulting from political violence
continued during 1989. According to the Vicariate of
Solidarity, the human rights organization of the Catholic
Church, 24 persons had died in acts of political violence as
of December 31. The independent Chilean Human Rights
Commission (CHRC) indicated that 30 deaths had occurred due to
political violence as of October 30. (For a discussion of the
bases of the statistics provided by these two groups, see
Section 4). Of the 24 deaths listed by the Vicariate as
politically motivated, 10 of the victims were members of the
military and security forces. The Lautaro Youth Movement
(MJL) took responsibility for ambushing and assassinating nine
Carabineros, and the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)
killed an army officer during an assault on an army air
station in August.
A member of the FPMR unit attacking the air station died in
the attempt. Another FPMR member died in September when,
officials claim, he activated a grenade following a shoot-out
with Carabineros; others claim he was shot. A member of the
MIR was killed in August in a failed assassination attempt
against a CNI official. A shopkeeper, who may have been
mistaken for his twin who worked for the CNI, was killed by
presumed members of the MIR in January. A young member of the
Communist Party was shot while being pursued by Carabineros
for painting slogans on a public wall early in 1989; the
police maintain he was killed, and a policeman wounded, by
gunshots from a passing car, but the victim's family claim the
Carabineros were responsible. In June a former air force
officer, who had been charged with human rights abuses but
whose case was dismissed because it was covered by the 1978
Amnesty Law, was assassinated by the FPMR.
Jecar Neghme, a spokesman for the political faction of the
MIR, was assassinated on September 4 as he walked from his
party's headquarters. Although the Minister of Government
cited (but did not divulge) evidence suggesting Neghme 's death
was prompted by differences between the political and armed
factions of MIR, most observers believe he was the victim of a
rightwing group with ties to the security forces, perhaps in
reprisal for the killing of security officials. There is,
however, no clear evidence implicating any individual or group.
In July a pregnant woman was shot and killed when Carabineros
attempted to disperse a group of demonstrators which had
symbolically seized public land. According to government
reports, Communist or other leftwing terrorist groups in 1989
caused 5 deaths and 69 personal injuries in attacks which
included 273 bombings, one of which occurred across the street
from the U.S. Embassy and 6 of which occurred at
American-Chilean binational centers. There were 12 attacks,
including bombings, of Mormon churches. Rightwing terrorist
groups continued to issue threats against journalists, human
rights activists, and political figures. In November the car
of journalist Monica Gonzalez was bombed and the home of the
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director of the magazine Analysis was set on fire. Also in
November, a cable television station and the offices of Radio
Mineria were bombed, allegedly by leftist terrorist groups. A
special investigator was appointed to investigate these
attacks on the media.
In January two Carabineros were charged with killing three
persons on June 30, 1986, and another was charged with
covering up the crime, known as the "Calle Mamina case."
Allegedly, the police had attempted to cast the deaths as
suicides during a confrontation. In March, a military
investigating judge recommended a finding of guilty against
two Carabinero officials in the torture-death of a young
student in 1985, and against another official for covering up
the crime, calling for a sentence of 6 years for the first
two, and 4 for the latter. However, as of December 31, the
military judge had not ruled on the matter. In August, the
Military Tribunal confirmed the December 1988 manslaughter
verdict against an army officer for the 1986 death by burning
of Rodrigo Rojas, a young Chilean who had lived in the United
States, and the near-fatal burning of his companion. Carmen
Gloria Quintana. A suspended sentence of 300 days in jail was
also confirmed. Human rights groups, including the Vicariate,
denounced the leniency of the sentence.
b. Disappearance
Human rights organizations report that politically motivated
kidnapings by private or paramilitary groups continued in
1989, but the number of incidents were lower and the duration
of the detentions shorter than in past years. The Vicariate
reported 7 kidnapings in Santiago as of December 31, and 4 in
other parts of the country as of August 31; the CHRC reported
18 through October 31. Because of the vehicles used and the
boldness of the operations, some official complicity is
suspected. There were no known arrests or prosecutions in any
of these kidnaping cases. Rightwing extremist groups may have
been involved in numerous kidnaping threats against persons
associated with political opposition organizations, including
journalists, judges, political leaders, and human rights
activists. Charges continued to surface that members of the
security and military forces, not always acting on orders,
were involved in some of these groups.
During 1989 there were no reports of persons disappearing
following detention by security forces or by persons suspected
of being official security agents. Investigations into the
last reported case of disappearance, that of five men in
September 1987, are inactive and appear to have been suspended.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There was a significant reduction in the use of torture in
1989. The Vicariate reported 24 instances as of December 31,
but the figure only covers cases in Santiago; the CHRC
reported 48 as of October 31. Agreements concluded in 1987 by
the Investigations Police, the CNI, and the Carabineros with
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), appear to
have reduced the incidence of torture and lesser forms of
police brutality. The agreements, which have generally been
honored, allow the ICRC to visit anyone detained by the
Carabineros and Investigations Police for violations of state
security laws. The ICRC is notified immediately when persons
are detained for politically motivated crimes and is allowed
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to visit the detainees after 24 hours of detention and before
the detainees are released or brought before the courts.
However, the ICRC is not allowed to visit detainees if the
prosecutor in the case orders them held for the 10-day periods
of isolation provided for under the Antiterrorist Law.
Although there were instances when periods of incommunication
were extended beyond 10 days, this practice was considerably
reduced in 1989. The CNI continued to abide by the 1987
agreement with the ICRC to turn over persons it arrested to
the Carabineros or the Investigations Police. One of the
constitutional amendments approved in the July 30 plebiscite
gave the status of constitutional law to international
agreements such as the U.N. and the O.A.S. Conventions on
Torture, signed by Chile in 1987 and ratified in September
1988. However, the Government attached reservations which
have the effect of denying any international efforts to ensure
compliance.
Government officials deny that torture is used or authorized
and assert that charges of alleged mistreatment by members of
the security forces are always investigated. In May, 10
members of the Investigations Police were indicted for
torturing 2 prisoners held for politically motivated crimes,
and in June 2 Carabineros were indicted for torturing a
suspect in April 1988.
Judicial investigations of torture are seldom concluded, due
in large part to the refusal of some state security
organizations to comply with court orders to make security
agents available to the courts for questioning. Last year's
Country Report on Human Rights Practices noted that Judge Rene
Garcia Villegas, who had publicly denounced the repeated
failure of CNI officials to cooperate with his investigations
into torture incidents and who had opined that torture cases
investigated by military judges implied impunity for those
charged, was suspended for 15 days with half pay. In October
1989, his offices were ransacked and the warning "Be Careful"
was scrawled on the window. He has received repeated threats
against his life. Early in January 1990, Judge Garcia was
rated "unqualified" by the Supreme Court for the second year
in a row, forcing his retirement, unless an appeal of the
decision is successful. The Supreme Court ruled that Garcia's
public statements criticizing the behavior of his judicial
colleagues for failing to pursue vigorously charges of torture
by security forces violated public norms.
Human rights leaders agree that Carabinero efforts to avoid
the use of unnecessary force continued in 1989. Opposition
political figures generally agree that Carabinero conduct
during legally held political demonstrations has been
generally evenhanded; detentions during rallies were
relatively few, given the large numbers of participants
involved in what was a very active political year, and most of
those held were released within 24 hours.
Activities of some Carabineros, however, detracted from that
organization's improved image. During a demonstration in
July, for example, Carabineros used excessive force in
evicting "squatters" in a poor Santiago neighborhood, and in
the confusion shot and killed a pregnant woman.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under Article 19 of the Constitution, civilian and military
courts may order detention for 5 days, and up to 10 days when
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terrorist acts are alleged to be involved. In some cases
involving special military prosecutors, detainees have had
their access to lawyers limited even after the prosecutor
formally charged them. The ad hoc military prosecutors
continued to order arrests of persons suspected of being
linked to four cases under their purview: the discovery of
arms caches in 1986, the attempted assassination of President
Pinochet in 1986, the kidnaping of an army colonel in 1987,
and the 1986 assault on a bakery in which a Carabinero
official was killed. None of those arrested in these cases
has been brought to trial. By January 1990 three of these
cases reached the summary stage; in each one the investigating
judge sought harsh sentences for those accused. These
findings and sentences are preliminary and remain to be
confirmed by a military tribunal.
The Vicariate reported 235 individual arrests and 450 group
arrests during demonstrations in Santiago through December 31;
there were 119 individual and 371 collective arrests in the
rest of the country through August 31. The Vicariate reported
833 individual and 2,983 collective arrests in 1988, and 699
individual and 2,596 collective arrests in 1987. The CHRC
reported 203 individual arrests and 1,241 collective arrests
as of June 30, 1989. Only a small number of those arrested
were arraigned before the courts; the vast majority were
released without charges, or charged with minor violations and
fined.
Many of those detained under Article 19 of the Constitution
are never charged and are released after several days. The
state security laws often appear to be used to harass
opponents of the Government but to a lesser degree than in
previous years. Persons are detained for prolonged periods of
time while their cases are investigated or released on bail
without any formal charge against which they can defend
themselves. Four persons associated with the Vicariate are in
this position. Moreover, charges are often levied well after
the event, heightening the impression of arbitrariness and
harassment. For example, five leftist political leaders were
charged in May for offenses against the armed forces because
of statements made in August 1986 in a private letter to the
then Vice Commander of the Army. Because of charges pending
against them, several political figures were denied the
opportunity to run for Congress.
Once formally charged with, or convicted of, violations of
state security laws, the accused are generally imprisoned
separately from common criminals and have rights of visitation
and communication with their families, friends, legal counsel,
and representatives of the ICRC. The ICRC has access to most
of those detained under the state security laws after a 5-day
period of incommunicado detention.
On August 17, 1988, the Supreme Court sentenced President
Manuel Bustos and Vice President Arturo Martinez of the
Unified Workers' Central (CUT) to 541 days' internal exile.
The action stemmed from a petition by the Ministry of the
Interior to overturn an appeals court verdict exonerating the
two from charges relating to the deaths of persons in the wake
of an October 1987 general strike. Despite pleas from Chilean
political leaders, international labor organizations, and
others, the Chilean Government held off on granting a pardon
until October 23, 1989, when one was issued apparently to
forestall an expected visit to Chile on their behalf by Polish
Solidarity leader Lech Walesa.
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With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
First instance jurisdiction for the prosecution of proscribed
political activities remains with the regular civilian courts,
but broad interpretation of state security laws has greatly
expanded military court jurisdiction. As in most civil law
systems, trial is not by jury, reliance is on the written
record rather than oral testimony, and the judge renders a
verdict after directing the investigation. The investigation
phase is considered secret, with limited access for the
accused or his attorney to evidence or testimony which has
been developed by the judge. Secrecy makes it extremely
difficult to ascertain if justice is being done. There is a
well-developed, multistage appeal process leading ultimately
to the Supreme Court. Weapons violations (often the basis of
charges against suspected terrorists) and charges of "Offenses
Against the Armed Forces," including slandering the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army (President Pinochet), are tried
before a military court. Appeals may be made to a military
court consisting of two civilian judges and three military
judges and, in the last resort, to the Supreme Court. In
March the President of the Supreme Court criticized the number
of cases handled in the military judicial system and
questioned the impartiality of decisions in a system
characterized by a military hierarchy.
Investigation by the courts of present and past human rights
violations made little progress during 1989. Human rights
organizations continued to charge that judges failed to
investigate vigorously charges of government abuses of human
rights .
The Social Aid Foundation of the Christian Churches (FASIC)
reported that, as of September 30, there were 439 persons in
prison facing 613 judicial proceedings related to state
security laws. Thirty-seven of these people have been in
prison since before 1983, but 138 were detained in 1986 and
1987. Sixty-three were detained in the first 9 months of
1989. Of the 613 judicial proceedings, 476 are before
military courts. Another 26 persons were released on bail
during 1989, 2 were released after completing their prison
terms, 1 was released unconditionally without a trial and 4
were pardoned. Of a total prison population of 439 involved
in violations of state security laws, 85 have been convicted
and are serving their sentences, while 354 remain in detention
with their cases still under investigation. In at least one
case, the investigation phase has lasted 8 years. Of four
persons charged in the 1984 murder of 2 Carabineros, one,
Dogoberto Lopez, was found innocent on February 8; the
investigating judge found the other 3 guilty. The sentences
still must be confirmed by a military tribunal.
International attention continued to focus during 1989 on nine
prisoners who face possible death sentences because of charges
of involvement in assassinations of senior military officers
and Carabineros and robberies in which people were killed.
Defense lawyers have charged that all were tortured and their
confessions obtained under physical and psychological duress.
Human rights organizations have assisted 111 prisoners,
including the 9 facing a possible death sentence, to obtain
visas to other countries. This was done in the belief that
possession of such visas might either allow these prisoners to
seek remission of their prison terms for exile or protect them
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from the death sentence. While the Government permitted many-
Chileans serving prison sentences related to politically
motivated acts to seek exile in the mid-1970's, this practice
has been severely restricted in recent years. One reason
given has been that some of those who sought exile later
returned to Chile illegally and became involved in terrorist
activities. The death penalty can only be imposed by-
unanimous decision of a military court. No one has been
executed by judicial order in Chile for a politically
motivated crime under the Pinochet Government.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Searches of the home and interception of private
communications are permitted by the Constitution, provided
search warrants are issued by either a civilian or military
court for specific locations. The 1984 Antiterrorist Law
provides for surveillance of those promoting political views
contrary to the Constitution or those suspected of terrorist
crimes, and for intercepting, opening, or recording private
communications and documents in these cases. The requirement
for proper court documents to authorize searches and
surveillance, however, was not always complied with during the
year. Searches were carried out by security forces or by
armed groups who failed or refused to show identification or
without the necessary court orders. However, the Vicariate
noted that during 1989, as in 1988, there were no reported
instances of security forces closing off entire neighborhoods
in order to conduct searches and that, in general, detentions
were more directly connected to specific cases and less
sweeping than in the past.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution recognizes freedom of speech and press.
Restrictions on those freedoms have been greatly reduced in
law and have largely disappeared in practice. Among the
constitutional amendments approved in the July 30 plebiscite
was the elimination of Article 8, which had provided for
sanctions against "persons or groups propagating doctrines
undermining the family, espousing violence or a concept of the
society, the state, or legal order .. .contrary to the
institutional order of the country." This Article had been
applied to media coverage, commentary, or publicity about such
groups or doctrines, and its elimination was welcomed as a
victory for freedom of speech and press. However, the
Military Code providing for sanctions against persons charged
with "Offenses Against the Armed Forces" remains in force. In
past years, critical editorials, satirical reports, and
articles on issues deemed sensitive by the Armed Forces have
been cited under this provision. According to the Chilean
National Association of Journalists, there were more than 30
charges pending in military courts against 19 of its members
in 1989. Most of these cases date from 1985 to 1988. In 1989
only two cases against journalists or media organizations were
initiated in the military courts. Additionally, the Interior
Ministry requested that a judge investigate possible charges
against the editor of a new leftwing magazine, Punto Final for
"Offenses Against the President." In another instance, a
judge declined to prosecute in a case brought before the civil
court by the Government. Military courts also are prosecuting
at least five nonjournalists for "Offenses Against the Armed
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Forces" made in interviews or because of their position as
director or owner of an offending medium. Most of these cases
were initiated 2 or 3 years ago. Several journalists have
received suspended sentences. A lawyer with the Vicariate,
indicted for an article he wrote for the Jesuit monthly
magazine Mensaje in 1987, was found not guilty in 1989 by a
military judge; however, there is a petition before the
Supreme Court to have the decision overturned.
Generally, however, informal censorship was no longer in
evidence, and self-censorship was no longer as pervasive as in
the past. Several books dealing with human rights abuses
under the Pinochet administration were published in 1989.
Media access for political and other leaders critical of the
Government was greatly expanded in 1989, and various opinions
on such formerly sensitive issues as human rights violations,
the civilian/military relationship, and controversial actions
of the Government were widely covered in both print and
electronic media. The media extensively covered and commented
on the political campaigns and the process of the return to
democracy. Candidates for the December 14 elections received
generally equitable television exposure, and political
personalities representing a wide spectrum were regularly seen
on weekly televised political forums. A debate between the
two leading presidential candidates, the first of its kind in
Chilean history, was aired on October 9. However, the press
chief of the government-owned national television was forced
to resign after the August 29 telecast of an interview,
notable for its objectivity and fair treatment, of the
candidate for the center-left coalition.
In October the Government promulgated a law to privatize
television channels. A seven-member National Television
Council (NTC) , appointed for a 6-year term, is authorized to
grant and take away licenses and sanction channels. Critics
of the measure cited it as an attempt by the Pinochet
Government to extend its control over television programming
through the 4-year presidential term which begins in March
1990 and to insure that only individuals or entities
sympathetic to the Pinochet Government receive licenses. An
army lieutenant colonel and a navy captain are among those
appointed to the NTC, and it includes no opposition
representative. The Television Law can be modified by an
absolute majority vote in the new Congress which takes office
in March 1990.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
There were few restrictions on peaceful demonstrations and
association in 1989. Although official permission to hold
rallies is no longer technically required, authorities must be
notified in writing of planned public events. Several large
demonstrations were held during 1989, including May Day labor
demonstrations and political rallies. Carabinero
crowd-control methods were generally nonconf rontational ,
although there were occasional clashes when tear gas and water
cannon were used, and which resulted in arrests.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion. Although
Chile is predominantly Roman Catholic, there are no
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restrictions on religious practices and no official
discrimination against any religious group. A number of
Protestant denominations and other groups are active and
report full freedom and tolerance, as does the local Jewish
community. Religious belief and adherence appear to have no
effect on acceptability for government positions. The Mormon
Church continued to be a target of leftwing terrorist groups,
primarily the MJL; Mormon churches were bombed, but there were
no reported injuries.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Chileans are promised full constitutional freedom to move
within and to enter and leave their country. However, as
noted in Section l.d., two Chilean labor leaders remained in
internal exile until they were pardoned in October. Many
exiles presumably choose to remain in their adopted countries
for economic and family reasons.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The transition from a military junta, which has held power for
16 years, to a democratically elected civilian Government is
proceeding in keeping with the terms of the 1980
Constitution. Presidential and congressional elections were
held December 14. Over 95 percent of registered voters cast
ballots in the fair and orderly elections. The new Government
will assume power on March 11, 1990. There is universal
suffrage for citizens 18 years of age or over, and over 95
percent of those eligible are registered to vote.
Discussions among government officials and political leaders
led to an agreement in April on changes to the 1980
Constitution, for purposes of "perfecting" it (in the view of
the officials) and to make it more democratic (in the view of
the political leaders) . The package of reforms was then
submitted to a plebiscite on July 30. Approximately 92
percent of registered voters participated in the peaceful
plebiscite, and 85 percent approved the package of reforms.
Although critics of the 1980 Constitution contend the reforms
were not sufficiently far-reaching, the reforms included
provisions to make amendment of the Constitution less
burdensome; increased the number of elected Senators, thus
diluting the power of appointed Senators; diminished the role
of the National Security Council and equalized the number of
civilians and military officers within it (it had previously
been weighted in favor of the military); and shortened the
next presidential term of office to 4 years.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In April the UNHRC Special Rapporteur resigned for health
reasons, and the Chilean Government announced it would not
accept a replacement. Subsequently, the Special Rapporteur
rescinded his resignation yet was refused entry by the Chilean
Government. Nonetheless, the Special Rapporteur plans to
submit a report.
The Government continued its cooperation with the ICRC, which
provided confidential reports to key government ministries on
the results of its visits to prisons, as provided for in the
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agreements signed late in 1986 and early in 1987 with the CNI,
the Investigations Police, and the Carabineros. The
Government permits visits and investigations by private
international human rights groups. The Government accorded
them no official status but made no effort to impede the
journalists and other international observers of the July
plebiscite and the December elections.
The Catholic Church continues to take the lead in defending
human rights. It supplies legal counsel to those accused of
politically related crimes and to victims of human rights
abuses. Its Vicariate of Solidarity monitors the human rights
situation throughout Chile, issues factual monthly reports,
and protects and defends significant numbers of people. The
statistics provided by the Vicariate generally cover cases
actually handled by it. An attempt by the Government to
secure certain files of the Vicariate was eventually suspended
when the Vicariate refused to surrender the documents. The
CHRC, a private organization, also continued to publicize
abuses. Statistics provided by the CHRC cover violations
brought to its attention throughout the country. Because some
persons involved in human rights violations may not go to the
Vicariate for assistance, the CHRC statistics provide a wider
but less first-hand picture of human rights violations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Minority groups do not suffer from any specific legal
discrimination. The only significant racial minority, the
Mapuche Indians in southern Chile, remains separated from the
rest of society because of historical, cultural, educational,
and geographical factors rather than official policy.
Legal distinctions between the sexes still exist, despite a
law passed in 1989 to reduce restrictions on women. For
example, wives can now retain control over income earned
independently from their spouses, although assets held at the
time of marriage become community property controlled by the
husband; decisions on where to live are to be jointly taken,
whereas before a woman was obliged to live where her husband
decided. The legal retirement age for women is 5 years lower
than that for men. Inheritance laws provide strong protection
for wives and favor female over male heirs.
There are no readily available figures on the magnitude of the
problem of violence against women, including domestic
violence, such as wife beating. Major media outlets rarely
cover the issue, and the most prominent human rights groups,
including women's organizations, concentrate their attention
and resources on other human rights issues. Under the changes
in the law which were enacted in 1989, a husband no longer has
legal control over a wife's person as well as her goods. This
change, at least in theory, should make it easier for women to
bring charges of physical abuse against their husbands.
The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination was signed by Chile in 1980 and ratified on
October 17, 1989. It entered into force on December 29 when
the text of the Convention was published in the official
gazette .
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Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers in Chile have the right to form and join unions.
Approximately 10 percent of the work force is organized. Most
aspects of labor rights are codified in 12 laws passed in
1987. The political parties law was amended to permit union
(and professional association) leaders to be political party
activists, but the prohibition against their simultaneously
holding both party and union or association office was
maintained.
Legally recognized unions do not need permission to hold union
meetings or conferences. Under the law, unions cannot elect
as an officer a person who is under indictment. The Labor
Code also discourages the development of national union
confederations, but labor unions can and do maintain relations
with international labor bodies in their fields. The
Government selects Chilean worker delegates to participate in
the conference of the International Labor Organization (ILO).
In 1989, as in prior years, the Government sought to avoid
challenges to the credentials of these delegates by consulting
with representative trade unions in Chile. However, in
selecting delegates to represent the Chilean workers in the
ILO, the Government ignored the major de facto umbrella labor
organizations, such as the Unified Workers Central (CUT),
which the Government does not recognize.
Under the Labor Code there are severe restrictions on the
right to strike. Strikes are prohibited in 25 designated
strategic enterprises, primarily public utilities, the largest
government copper mine, and the petroleum industry. There is
no indication that blacklisting of trade union leaders and
members who participated in illegal strike actions in past
years has ended; however, there was no instance of massive
dismissal of workers for striking during 1989. Legal strikes
which did take place tended to be brief; there were only three
strikes in 1989 which lasted 60 days or longer. After 60
days, striking workers are subject to loss of benefits and
jobs .
On January 26, 1988, President Manuel Bustos and Vice
President Arturo Martinez of the National Workers Command CNT
(which was subsequently subsumed into the CUT) were sentenced
to 541 days imprisonment for calling a general and illegal
strike on October 7, 1987, in the aftermath of which several
people died. An appeals court overturned the conviction.
Subsequently, the Minister of the Interior appealed to the
Supreme Court to restore the original sentence; on August 17,
1988, the high court imposed a sentence of 541 days of
internal exile, a sentence rarely handed down by Chilean
courts. Despite widespread national and international appeals
for a pardon, the Government had refused to grant one until
October 23, 1989, after the two had served 403 days of the
sentence. In April 1989, four other CUT officials were
charged with the same offense as Bustos and Martinez, calling
an illegal strike (to demand, among other things, the release
of Bustos and Martinez) which prompted some violence. They
had not yet been brought to trial at year's end.
In January the Ministry of Economy ordered the Association
of Teachers' President and Vice President to leave office
because they had failed to submit, as required by law, a
Carabinero certificate stating they had no charges pending
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against them; both have charges outstanding in connection with
their involvement in an allegedly illegal demonstration
several years ago. The Ministry of Economy rescinded the
order at the end of January, however, and fined them instead.
By year's end the Government had not yet responded to
petitions from two labor unionists for restoration of their
citizenship, which they lost when exiled; several exiled
political figures did have their citizenship restored.
Chile has not ratified ILO Conventions 87 on Freedom of
Association or 98 on Collective Bargaining.
The cases listed above are among numerous complaints filed
against Chile with the ILO by a number of national and
international trade union organizations over the past several
years. In its most recent interim report (June 1989) on the
status of these cases, the ILO Committee on Freedom of
Association (CFA) noted that the Government had provided
detailed information on most of the allegations, and made
recommendations for the resolution of outstanding charges.
In its review of the application of conventions in 1989, the
ILO Committee of Experts (COE) reiterated its call for Chile's
repeal of provisions of the Constitution and various laws
which bar individuals from holding public jobs or offices, or
positions in publishing or education by virtue of their
membership in or association with organizations which espouse
certain prohibited ideologies or political viewpoints. The
COE also cited laws which provide for discharge without
compensation for activities unrelated to the work place, as
incompatible with ILO standards. The Committee also called on
the Government to repeal laws which grant broad discretionary
power to executives of educational institutions and permit the
barring of students and teachers from such institutions for
the expressing of political opinions.
Organized labor continued to press during the year for a full
investigation of the 1982 murder of labor leader Tucapel
Jimenez. Efforts to pursue the investigation continue, but
the case remains officially closed. While the Supreme Court
dismissed indictments against a political leader and a trade
union officer for having slandered the Government in this
case, there remained high interest within Chilean and
international trade union circles in seeing this case reopened.
On December 24, 1987, after failing to make promised changes
in its Labor Code to enhance workers' rights, Chile was
formally suspended from the list of countries eligible to
participate in the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) Program, and it remained suspended throughout 1989.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
While the rules governing union organizing in firms employing
between 25 and 50 workers were eased in 1988, collective
bargaining is strictly regulated, and the entire collective
bargaining procedure can be nullified if any of a series of
legally imposed deadlines are missed by either the union or
management. Further, a union does not have the option of
delaying the bargaining process in anticipation of a more
propitious future bargaining atmosphere. A decision not to
negotiate a new contract upon expiration of the former one
results in automatically extending the expired contract for a
minimum 2-year period. Although Chilean law protects the
right for workers to form unions, in practice such laws are
not effective, especially in small workplaces.
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right for workers to form unions, in practice such laws are
not effective, especially in small workplaces.
Despite the restrictions in the Labor Code, there were 1,402
collective bargaining agreements signed in 1988, the latest
year for which data are available.
There are no export processing zones or other special
districts where different laws apply.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is implicitly prohibited in the
Constitution and Labor Code, and there have been no complaints
on this issue since the mid-1970's.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Child labor is regulated by law. Young persons aged 14 and 15
may be employed with the permission of their parents or
guardians, if they have completed their schooling and then
only in restricted types of labor. Those between the ages of
15 and 18 can be employed in a larger variety of labor, and at
expanded hours, but only with their parents' or guardians'
permission. Enforcement of these regulations in the formal
sector is good, but economic factors have forced many children
to seek part-time and full-time employment in the informal
economy which is generally difficult to regulate.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and
health standards are regulated by law. The normal workweek is
48 hours. The minimum wage is approximately $70 per month; it
is not considered sufficient for a decent standard of living,
but many households have two full-time wage earners.
The law permits the hiring of apprentices, but pay may not be
less than the minimum wage. Laws covering wages and hours of
work are difficult to enforce, and there are complaints that
occupational health and safety laws are not adequately
policed. Workers have the right to denounce employers who pay
less than the minimum wage, and employers can be forced to pay
back wages, but an employee who brings such a complaint risks
losing his job for having done so.
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COLOMBIA
Colombia is a constitutional, multiparty democracy. Two
parties, the Liberals and the Social Conservatives, have
dominated national politics since the mid-19th century, but
smaller parties are usually represented in Congress, state
assemblies, city councils, and among popularly elected
mayors. The Constitution provides for independent legislative
and judicial branches of government. In practice, the courts
and, to a lesser extent, the Congress provide significant
checks on presidential power.
Internal security is the primary responsibility of the
Ministry of Defense, which includes the National Police. The
Ministry is responsible directly to the President and operates
under civilian control. The Department of Administrative
Security (DAS), roughly equivalent to the U.S. Federal Bureau
of Investigation, reports directly to the President.
Colombia has a mixed economy in which private enterprise plays
the dominant role. The coffee industry, which accounts for
some 30 percent of the country's legal export earnings, is
essentially in the private sector, as are most entities
engaged in manufacturing, agriculture, and the service
sector. There is also a large informal economy. State
enterprises control domestic participation in the oil and coal
industries and play an important role in the electrical and
telecommunication utilities.
Despite Colombia's strong democratic traditions, it has
suffered from social unrest and an extraordinary level of
violence for most of the past 40 years. The main causes of
the violence and the concomitant human rights abuses are
political extremists of both the left and the right, and the
enormously wealthy narcotics traffickers, with the latter
being the single largest cause in 1989. There have also been
significant abuses by individual members of the army and
police in responding to violence from these other sources.
The extreme left includes several armed guerrilla groups which
use terrorism and narcotics trafficking to achieve their goal
of violently overthrowing the democratic Government. The
extreme right is composed of disparate elements, including a
number of "self-defense" groups which were originally formed
by rural landowners to defend against guerrilla attacks and
which have degenerated into vigilante squads that assassinate,
torture, and massacre people believed to have links with
leftist political figures or the guerrillas. In areas where
traffickers are powerful, these groups are often allied with
the traffickers. The traffickers control enormous illicit
enterprises which utilize extreme violence in attempts to bend
the Colombian political and judicial systems to their ovjn
purposes. The major traffickers have achieved virtual
immunity from prosecution by threatening, kidnaping, and
murdering judges, government officials, political leaders, and
their families. The relationships among the traffickers and
between traffickers and rightwing elements or guerrillas are
complex.
To cope with the persistently high level of violence and human
rights violations, the Government has resorted to
extraordinary measures. In August President Barco launched a
major offensive against the traffickers and issued
constitutionally authorized state of siege decrees providing
for confiscation of the property of persons involved in
narcotics trafficking and the reimplementation of extradition
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for fugitive traffickers. The President's September 1988
peace plan led to a reduction in guerrilla-related violence in
1989. Colombia's largest guerrilla group, the Revolutionary-
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), announced a unilateral
cease-fire in February, and the number of its attacks declined
although it has not abandoned violence. The M-19 guerrilla
group signed a peace accord with the Government in October,
and tentative talks were begun with the FARC and another
guerrilla organization.
Human rights abuses violate government policy, and there is no
evidence that the Government or senior military officers have
ordered such acts; many take place in remote regions without
the knowledge of central authorities. Although much more
needs to be done, the Government in 1989 continued its efforts
to improve the human rights record of its own security
forces. It provided training on human rights to about 300
military personnel and, with the assistance of Canada, it
trained all village ombudsmen in human rights. Nevertheless,
soldiers and policemen have also been involved in
assassinations and massacres of suspected leftists, and
rural-based local military commanders have sometimes assisted
rightwing groups, seeing them as allies against the
guerrillas. Some of these same groups have been linked to
narcotraf f ickers . In past years little was done to stop such
actions. Military officers have attempted repeatedly to
obstruct prosecution of military personnel who committed human
rights abuses. In early 1989, however, the armed forces' high
command and the police began to dismiss officers and enlisted
men believed to be involved in human rights violations, and
some of these cases were subsequently being prosecuted in the
civilian court system. None of these trials had been
concluded by year's end, and violations continued.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Colombia has one of the highest murder rates in the world, and
its police and judicial systems lack the resources to
investigate and prosecute most of these crimes, making it
difficult to separate political and nonpolitical murders.
Nevertheless, the figure of 324 confirmed political killings
in Colombia from January through August 1989 provided by the
Bogota-based group Centre de Investigaciones y Educacion
popular (CINEP) — a Jesuit-affiliated social research
institution which follows the human rights situation — seems
reasonably accurate. This is a significant drop from the 706
political killings recorded by CINEP during the same period in
1988. CINEP labeled an additional 1,069 murders as possible
political killings, compared to 1,145 during the same period
in 1988. These numbers exclude deaths in combat.
Narcotics-related killings increased some 140 percent during
this period for a total of 129.
A number of spectacular assassinations in 1989 highlighted the
vulnerability of even figures at the highest levels of
Colombian politics and government. In the 90-day period
beginning May 30, killers hired by the narcotics traffickers
murdered a governor, a state police chief, two judges, and, on
August 18, Senator Luis Carlos Galan, a leading presidential
candidate. The head of the DAS narrowly escaped death on May
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30 when a car bomb exploded in a crowded Bogota street as his
motorcade passed by during the morning rush hour. Seven
persons died in the explosion. On October 17, Hector Jimenez
Rodriguez, a judge of the Medellin Superior Court who, as a
member of the Court's penal chamber, heard narcotics cases,
was shot to death outside his home. On December 5, Criminal
Court Judge Bernardo Jaramillo Uribe was also assassinated in
Medellin. The self-described "Extraditables" (top
traffickers) publicly admitted many such killings.
Narcotics traffickers did not restrict their killings to
prominent public figures. They, and groups of bandits and
rightwing extremists backed by them, slaughtered hundreds of
peasants, minor politicians, and low-level government
officials, either because they were suspected of leftist or
proguerrilla sympathies or because they had attempted to
interfere with the criminal activities of the traffickers. On
January 18, near the town of La Rochela, gunmen massacred a
team of 12 judicial officials investigating a previous
massacre of townspeople which likely had been ordered by
traffickers. Narcotics interests are also believed to be
responsible for the many deaths resulting from the bombing of
an Avianca aircraft on November 27 and certainly were
responsible for an explosion at DAS headquarters in Bogota on
December 6, which killed 64 and injured over 700
Labor suffers a disproportionately high rate of violence.
Many affiliates of the largest workers' confederation, the
Unitary Workers Central (CUT), are Communist controlled, and
some, like the banana workers unions in Uraba, are controlled
by guerrilla groups. Many of their members have been killed
by presumed rightwing elements. Trade union leaders of the
Democratic Labor Confederation (CTDC) have been threatened and
assassinated by guerrillas trying to weaken and intimidate
moderate unions. Two gunmen on November 21 murdered Nel Dario
Gomez, the secretary of his CUT-af filiated union, who worked
in Monteria, Cordoba department, distributing land reform
parcels to rural members. Forty-seven union activists were
killed during the first 8 months of 1989, according to CINEP
figures; it is not clear that all these murders were
politically motivated, however.
At least 45 persons associated with the Union Patriotica (UP)
party, which was established as the political arm of the FARC,
were killed during the first 8 months of 1989, according to
CINEP statistics. Most of these murders were probably by
extreme rightists, although a few of the assassinated
politicians may have been the victims of common crime. Many
UP figures assert that the Government is either unwilling or
unable to afford them adequate protection. The most notable
UP casualty was senior party official Jose Antequera, who was
assassinated on March 3 in Bogota's airport. On November 21,
Gustova Castro, a UP activist, was assassinated by
unidentified gunmen near Ibaque, Tolima department.
Political killings also affected the ruling Liberal and the
opposition Social Conservative Parties. At least 14 elected
officials and a much larger number of party activists of these
two major groups had been assassinated as of mid-September.
Few of these killings have been solved, and the specific
motivations for many of these incidents of political violence
are often unknown.
Although the gunmen responsible for some of these crimes have
been apprehended, those who ordered them almost invariably
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escape prosecution. Even if a major figure were to be
captured, a conviction would be difficult; the judicial system
has been paralyzed by intimidation.
The leftist insurgent groups are responsible for a large
number of killings which occur outside the scope of armed
conflict. The guerrillas frequently kill those who refuse to
submit to guerrilla extortion, those who attempt to leave the
guerrilla organizations, and persons who are perceived to have
helped the Government. In several January incidents, the FARC
murdered three fishermen, four cement workers, and five
peasants, apparently because they did not support the
guerrillas or were suspected of being army informers. The
following month, another guerrilla group, the Popular
Liberation Army (EPL) , killed six peasants who had refused to
pay a guerrilla-imposed "tax."
The Government took action in 1989 against the military and
police officials who participated in the 1988 massacre of
residents of the village of Segovia, Antioquia. Two army
officers and one police official were dismissed from service
and along with three civilians were turned over to a civilian
court to be prosecuted for terrorism. In addition, three more
army officers and two police officials were under
investigation by the Attorney General's office for human
rights abuses.
In October Amnesty International (AI) issued a report on
Colombia in which it charged that government security forces
were directly responsible for thousands of extrajudicial
killings and also suggested that the traffickers and their
allies operate with government support. Clearly, Colombia,
whose democratic system is under assault by narcotics
traffickers and political extremists, has a serious human
rights problem. AI * s assertion that the high command of the
security forces has adopted a deliberate policy of gross human
rights violations was rejected as inaccurate and misleading by
Colombians with a wide variety of political views as well as
by local and international human rights groups. Two other
reports issued in late 1989, one by the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights and the other by the Washington Office on Latin
America (WOLA) , assert that persons connected to the
Government or security forces have links to violence. An
Americas Watch (AW) report of April 1989 was "certain" that
the Government was not behind any of the killings but was not
prepared to absolve the military or political leadership. In
any case, AW held the Government indirectly responsible for
the murders by failing to fully protect all its citizens.
In 1989 senior military and police officials initiated a
campaign to expel officers believed to be cooperating with
armed rightwing groups. While never condoning such
cooperation, in previous years the highest officials of the
Government had not taken effective steps to recognize and stop
it. In the first 8 months of 1989, however, 84 officers were
dismissed from the armed forces, according to Attorney General
Alfonso Gomez Mendez, most of them for association with
narcotics traffickers, cooperation with armed rightist groups,
and violations of human rights. In one of the most publicized
cases, the army high command removed and retired Lieutenant
Colonel Luis Bohorquez, the top military commander in the
Magdalena Medio region, who was accused of supporting the
armed rightwing groups which dominate the region. In April
the Government announced the formation of a 1,000-man special
police force devoted exclusively to combating rightist
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groups. Despite the Government's efforts, however, there
likely are members of the police and army who continue to
participate in extrajudicial killings. Punishment for human
rights abuses within the military judicial system seldom
extends beyond dismissal from the service. In 1989 the
Supreme Court upheld the right of civilian courts to try
military personnel in a wide variety of situations. In the
immediate future, however, there appears to be little prospect
of effective action by judges of the weak civilian judicial
system.
b. Disappearance
The number of disappearances in Colombia appears to have
declined in 1989. CINEP reported 101 disappearances in the
first 8 months of 1989 compared to 192 during the same period
in 1988. Most disappearances take place in areas of active
guerrilla insurgency as a result of forced recruitment by the
guerrillas, flight from such recruitment, executions by either
the guerrillas or rightist groups, or common kidnaping.
Despite efforts by the security forces to dismiss human rights
abusers over the past year, there continue to be reports that
individual military and police personnel are also involved in
specific disappearances.
Kidnapings by guerrillas and common criminals remained
prevalent in 1989. The kidnapings of wealthy persons for
ransom is an important source of revenue for the guerrillas,
but they also kidnap for political reasons, sometimes
executing their victims after mock trials. Reliable
statistics on kidnaping are unavailable because friends and
relatives often fear that the victim's life will be endangered
if his situation is publicized or reported to the authorities.
The Attorney General's Human Rights Office was created by
President Barco in 1986 specifically to investigate
allegations of disappearances in which government officials
are suspected to have been involved. The Human Rights Office
receives complaints from the public, and the Attorney General
has the power to impose administrative sanctions and recommend
dismissal of officials involved in violations of the law,
although he cannot bring criminal charges. This is the
responsibility of a judge acting on a complaint which may be
filed by the person against whom the crime was committed or
anyone else who has knowledge of the offense.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is prohibited by law. There are reliable reports,
however, that police frequently beat and torture
detainees — whether arrested as common criminals or as
suspected guerr i llas--especially during the first 24 hours of
detention. The rightwing groups which operate in the
countryside frequently torture their victims cruelly before
killing them, as evidenced by the condition in which their
bodies have been found. The guerrillas also mistreat their
captives. In one early May incident, a guerrilla group
tortured and subsequently executed two soldiers captured in
the department of Meta. In October the National Liberation
Army (ELN) kidnaped and tortured the Bishop of Arauca before
murdering him.
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d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The right to challenge the legality of detention is generally
respected. A person may be arrested if apprehended in the act
of committing a crime or if an appropriate order of capture
has been issued by a judge. The police must inform a judge of
a person's detention within 24 hours. Within a specified
time, depending on the circumstances of the case, the judge
must decide if there is enough evidence to pursue the case.
If there is, he issues an order of detention under which bail
is possible, or an order of preventive detention, under which
the person is incarcerated until trial. However, there are
occasional instances of arbitrary arrest or detention for
political purposes, and the police sometimes arrest persons of
modest economic means on charges of dubious validity in an
effort to extort money for their release.
In response to the wave of apparently narcotics-inspired
assassinations which culminated in the August murder of
presidential candidate Galan, President Barco issued a state
of siege decree which provides for 7 days of incommunicado
detention of those suspected of narcotics trafficking.
Detainees must then be turned over to the civilian judicial
system. In practice, those arrested under the decree are
often turned over to a civilian judge or released before the 7
days have expired.
There are no legal provisions for exile. With regard to
forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is independent of the executive and legislative
branches of government. The rights of public trial and due
process are provided for in the Constitution. Accused persons
have the right to representation by counsel; if they do not
have an attorney, the court will appoint one. However, due to
an overburdened judicial system and a traditional reluctance
to grant bail, most prisoners incarcerated for common crimes
never come to trial but are simply released after serving the
minimum sentence applicable to the crimes alleged. Only about
25 percent of prison inmates have been convicted of crimes.
Bail is prohibited during the first 210 days of detention for
suspected terrorists arrested under an antiterrorist decree of
1988.
When a narcotics-related case does come to trial, the judicial
system is usually so intimidated that it is unable to conduct
it impartially. Many magistrates, judges, jurors, and
attorneys have been threatened with death, killed, or had
family members killed because they were investigating or
prosecuting narcotics traffickers or their associates.
Following the Galan assassination, the President issued a
decree abolishing the easily intimidated three-person juries
which had been used in murder cases.
A system of specialized judges to investigate and prosecute
narcotics cases has existed since 1987. A system of public
order judges was created in August 1987 to investigate and
prosecute public order crimes (terrorism, torture, personal
injury, narcotics trafficker violence, etc.). In January 1988,
the Government established the Tribunal of Public Order as a
court of appeal for the above crimes. These officials
expedite legal proceedings because they both investigate and
prosecute. (Normal legal procedures in Colombia involve
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separate judges for the investigation and prosecution stages
of the judicial process.)
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
A judicial order is constitutionally required for authorities
to enter a private home, except in the case of hot pursuit.
While Colombian human rights organizations report widespread
violations of this requirement in the more remote regions of
the country, government forces in urban areas generally
respect the sanctity of the home and the right of privacy.
Persons from rural areas frequently claim that they have been
forced to leave their farms by military counterinsurgency
operations, guerrilla conscription and confiscation, and by
armed thugs hired by narcotics traffickers and local
landowners .
Telephone taps and mail intercepts are normally allowed only
under close judicial supervision. Nevertheless, a 1988 state
of siege decree allows police to use such measures without
judicial authorization if it is deemed necessary to facilitate
an investigation into terrorism or related activities.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These constitutionally assured rights are respected, and the
press often vigorously criticizes the Government and its
leaders. The privately owned print media are under no
governmental restraints and publish a wide variety of
political views, including public calls for the President's
resignation. Television frequencies and transmission
facilities are controlled by the State, which leases time to
private television production companies and imposes some
guidelines relating to the coverage of terrorism. Under a
1988 state of siege decree, television and radio programs are
prohibited from identifying witnesses to terrorist acts and
from broadcasting live transmissions of ongoing terrorist
incidents. During a crisis, the Government reserves the right
to prohibit the broadcast media from covering certain news
events. This right was not exercised in 1989. All
significant candidates for public office generally receive
unbiased coverage on television and radio newscasts.
The most serious threat to freedom of expression comes from
the narcotics traffickers, who both threaten and kill
journalists and others who publicly support extradition or
strong antinarcotics measures. In September a truck bomb
severely damaged the offices of the Bogota daily El
Espectador, which has long been a vigorous critic of the
traffickers. Later that month Guillermo Gomez Murillo, a
correspondent for the newspaper, was assassinated in his
home. Gomez was one of more than a dozen journalists who have
been assassinated in recent years, most of them by trafficker-
affiliated rightwing extremists. In mid-October a car bomb
almost completely destroyed the offices of La Vanguardia
Liberal, the principal newspaper of the eastern city of
Bucaramanga. Narcotics interests have threatened advertisers
in the press as another part of their effort to halt the press
campaign against them.
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b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of peaceful assembly is respected. Public meetings
and demonstrations are normally held without interference.
Under the state of siege, prior permission is required for
demonstrations and is usually granted, except when the
Government believes there is a clear and imminent danger to
public order. Following the August murder of Luis Carlos
Galan, which was followed by a wave of terrorist actions
directed by the narcotics traffickers, the mayor of Bogota
temporarily banned all demonstrations in the city.
Colombians have the constitutional right to form political
parties, trade associations, unions, clubs, or groups of any
type which do not advocate violence. Theoretically, the
Government can deny legal status to newly formed groups, but
this power is almost never used. Any organization is free to
associate with international bodies in its field.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion. According
to official statistics, 217 different religious sects are
registered in Colombia. Although the predominant position of
the Catholic Church is established by a treaty between the
Government and the Vatican, and the overwhelming majority of
Colombians are Catholic, no legal discrimination exists
against any religious group, and there is little or no
religious discrimination in practice.
The Government permits proselytizing among Indians as long as
the Indians welcome the missionaries and are not induced to
adapt changes that inhibit their survival on traditional
lands. The Government requires all missionary groups (both
Catholic and non-Catholic) to keep it informed of their
activities and expects them to respond to guidance.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens are free to travel domestically and to leave and
return to Colombia. In traveling through areas where
operations against rural guerrillas are under way, civilians
require safe conduct passes from the military; guerrillas
reportedly use a similar means to restrict travel in areas
under their control. There are no restrictions on
emigration. Colombians who have sought and been granted
diplomatic asylum in foreign embassies have always been
allowed to depart the country. Expatriates can, by law,
repatriate. Colombia uses accepted United Nations standards
to determine the status of refugee and asylum seekers and does
not turn away those who qualify.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Colombia has a democratic system of government, and elections
have been conducted fairly and openly for the past 30 years.
Persons are enfranchised by the Constitution at age 18.
Public employees are forbidden by law to participate in
political campaigns but, with the exception of military
personnel, may vote.
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Colombian politics are dominated by the Liberal and the Social
Conservative Parties. Both include elements with widely
divergent political views. All parties operate freely without
government interference. The UP, which participated in
national elections for the first time in 1986, is the third
strongest party. It received 3,1 percent of the total vote
cast in city council elections in 1986, and less than 1
percent of the vote in the 1988 mayoral elections. Elections
will be held in 1990 for the presidency, the Congress, and
local offices.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Colombia is sensitive to its human rights image abroad and
cooperates with investigations by international and
nongovernmental human rights groups based abroad. AW s
factfinding missions which visited Colombia in December 1988
and in February 1989 were able to interview a number of
government officials. WOLA also cited interviews with
government and party officials in its 1989 report on
Colombia.
The two most respected human rights organizations within
Colombia are CINEP and the Permanent Committee for the Defense
of Human Rights. Information compiled by these groups has
been used extensively by international organizations such as
AI, AW, and WOLA. CINEP, the Permanent Committee,
universities, and other groups regularly sponsor conferences
to analyze violence in Colombia. Colombia is an active
participant in international and regional human rights bodies.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The law provides women equal civil and property rights. Women
comprise just over 25 percent of the country's economically
active population. Women are legally entitled to remuneration
equal to that of their male counterparts, a law generally
respected more by the Government than private industry. Forty
percent of the university population is female.
violence directed against women appears to be disturbingly
common, especially in the countryside and in lower income
strata in the cities, but a lack of reliable statistical data
makes it impossible to gauge its true extent. Victims of
domestic violence such as wife beating often are reluctant to
file reports or to press charges, thus leading to the
liklihood that such abuse is significantly underreported.
There is a code of family law to protect the interests of
mothers and children, and women who are the victims of
domestic violence can bring charges brought against their
assailants. The Government does not condone such abuse.
Domestic violence, however, is not treated as a serious crime
in Colombia.
There are womens ' associations active in Colombia which work
for the rights of women in the workplace, in the home, and in
public life. Through the Colombian Institute of Family
Welfare, the Government provides education in domestic
relations and personal behavior, primarily to families in
lower income levels. Churches are also active in this
domestic education of their parishioners. Because the
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judicial system in Colombia is weak, the police and courts are
no more effective in enforcing laws relating to the treatment
of women than they are in enforcing other parts of the law.
Several million black Colombians comprise the country's
largest racial minority. They enjoy the full legal rights of
all other citizens.
Colombian Indians also legally enjoy all the rights and
privileges of full citizenship. Nevertheless, Indian rights
groups protest that they suffer a variety of abuses, and they
are seeking to promote improvements through community action,
public education, and legal aid. Their most common complaint
continues to be that Indians are forced off contested land by
armed thugs hired by landowners. When the Indians retaliate,
the landowners call on local police and military forces for
protection. There were no incidents of this nature reported
in 1989. In an effort to protect Indian culture, the
Government in 1989 designated certain land in southern
Colombia for the use of the Indians.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of workers to organize labor unions and to strike is
recognized specifically in the Constitution, although public
service unions may not strike. Law 26 of 1976 affirms the
autonomy of labor organizations to produce their own statutes
and rules, to elect trade union officials, and to administer
their own activities. Law 26 also prohibits the dissolution
or suppression of trade unions by administrative fiat and
allows the almost automatic granting of official status to
labor organizations which have the requisite number of members.
While the right to strike is guaranteed, the steps required
before a legal strike may be called include direct
negotiations, followed by conciliation, and only then may the
problem advance to the stage of either a strike or arbitration
by the Ministry of Labor. Arbitration is compulsory in the
public service sector and for official employees who legally
do not have the right to strike. In the private sector the
Minister of Labor may intervene in a dispute at the stage of
conciliation and when it affects the national economy.
Almost half of the country's 1.2 million unionized workers
belong to the CUT, formed in 1986. Although the CUT is not
officially a member of the Communist-controlled World
Federation of Trade Unions, it is heavily influenced by an
element that has retained strong links to the international
Communist labor movement. The rest of Colombia's organized
workers belong to three long established confederations, two
of which are affiliated with the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions and the third with the World
Confederation of Labor.
In its 1989 report, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Committee of Experts (COE) expressed deep concern at the
violent situation in Colombia which creates hardship for the
population and prevents the exercise of union activities. The
COE also cited a number of provisions in the labor law which
it said were incompatible with Convention 87 because they
allowed the Government to interfere with the internal
administration of unions and inhibit the right of unions to
further and defend the interests of their members. The COE
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asked the Government to make the necessary modifications in
the legislation.
At its May-June 1989 session, the ILO Committee on Freedom of
Association (CFA) expressed its deep concern over the large
number of trade union leaders and members who had been
murdered or had disappeared since 1986. The Committee recalled
that it had considered allegations concerning the murder or
disappearance of more than 200 trade unionists at its November
1988 meeting and that, since that time, complaints of an
additional 46 murders and one disappearance of trade unionists
had been received. The CFA noted important government
measures to fight the death squads and hired assassins but
regretted that there was no indication of steps taken to
strengthen the judiciary.
The CFA's May-June 1989 session also considered a complaint
filed by several Colombian and international trade union
organizations alleging that the Government violated Convention
87 on Freedom of Association by arresting four trade union
leaders and 80 workers, searching and closing the trade union
premises, and arbitrarily discharging 50 trade union officials
and 350 workers because they had engaged in a strike for wage
increases. The Government contended that its actions were
based on common crimes and sabotage committed by the workers
and their union, which resulted in the cutoff of electric
power throughout the country for a 24-hour period. The
Government alleged further that the actions of the union had a
political motivation relating to a coup attempt which occurred
at the same time. The CFA asked the Government to provide
information on the charges against the detained unionists and
workers, and to reply to the allegations of arbitrary
discharge .
The observations of the two committees were the subject of a
"special paragraph" in the 1989 report of the ILO Conference
Committee on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations (CACR), urging the Government to take the
necessary steps to bring its law and practice into line with
ILO Conventions and guarantee the safety of trade unionists.
(See Section, l.a. for a discussion of violence directed
against unions.)
b. The Right To Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right of workers to organize labor unions and to engage in
collective bargaining enjoys constitutional protection. At
the present time, unions have been successful in organizing
only the largest firms and the public services, which include
from 9 to 11 percent of Colombia's economically active
population.
In the private sector, workers have the right to bargain
collectively; however, because of high unemployment, they have
limited bargaining power. The use of strikebreakers is
prohibited by law, and generous severance benefits tend to
discourage management from firing union militants. However,
this provision, like other provisions of labor law, is
effectively ignored by small and medium-size enterprises.
Colombian labor law is applied uniformly throughout the
country, including the export processing zones.
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The COE report cited above also urged the Government to take
steps to provide public employees the right to bargain
collectively, and to protect them from antiunion
discrimination in accordance with Convention 98 on Organizing
and Collective Bargaining.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is legally prohibited, and the
prohibition is respected in practice. The COE report, cited
above, requested the Government to bring certain provisions of
law relating to prison labor into conformance with ILO
Convention 29 on Forced Labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The law prohibits the employment of children in most jobs
before the age of 14, particularly where such employment might
interfere with schooling. This provision is respected in
larger enterprises and major cities. However, the extensive
informal economy is effectively outside government control.
Approximately 2.5 million children under 15 years of age work
in the informal sector for low pay under poor conditions with
little protection from the labor code, according to a 1987
study.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Government annually sets a national minimum wage which
serves as an important benchmark for wage bargaining. The
minimum wage (about $100 per month as of December 1989) is
insufficient to maintain an acceptable standard of living.
One report noted that 60 percent of the work force is paid the
minimum wage or less.
The labor code regulates the hours of labor and other work
conditions. While the 8-hour day is standard in larger
companies, the workweek for most Colombians generally exceeds
40 hours. A standard week of five 8-hour days remains an
important long-term goal of Colombian trade unions.
Workers' occupational safety and health are extensively
regulated, including the use of protective clothing and
ventilation, first aid and fire fighting equipment at the job
site, sanitary facilities and potable water, and compensation
for injuries. These regulations apply to the larger
agricultural enterprises as well as industry and mining.
However, exemptions for small companies, the frequent use of
workers as subcontractors rather than employees, and general
enforcement difficulties leave large numbers of workers
outside the protection of the law. The Government is
endeavoring to improve regulatory enforcement, and improved
working conditions are a priority goal of trade unions.
Violations appear to be more frequent among the newer, smaller
industries. More than half of all the violators are
concentrated in the commercial sector and in the restaurant
and hotel industries, while almost one-fourth are in the
manufacturing sector. Labor regulations most frequently
violated by management are mandatory affiliation of workers to
the Social Security Institute, observance of minimum salary
levels, timely payment of salaries, and maintenance of
hygienic conditions and occupational safety standards.
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Costa Rica is a 100-year old democracy with separate
executive, legislative and judicial branches. Elections for
president, two vice presidents, and 57 deputies to a
unicameral legislative assembly are held every 4 years and
have been free and fair. Oscar Arias won the presidency in
February 1986 in an election in which approximately 80 percent
of all eligible voters participated. New elections will take
place in February 1990. The President is constitutionally
barred for life from reelection. Members of the Legislative
Assembly may be reelected but only after at least one term out
of office.
The 1949 Constitution abolished Costa Rica's standing army.
The country's small security forces consist of the Civil
Guard, the Crime Prevention Unit, the Directorate of
Intelligence and Security, the Narcotics Control Unit of the
Ministry of Public Security, and the Rural Guard of the
Ministry of Government. The Judicial Police, charged with
investigating crimes, report directly to the Supreme Court.
These public security organizations observe the procedural
safeguards established by the law and Constitution and are
subject to the strict control of the civilian Government.
Significant agricultural and light industrial sectors lead the
Costa Rican economy. The steady economic growth of recent
years continued during 1989 at a projected rate of 3.6
percent. Private enterprise accounts for 70 percent of the
gross national product. The right to hold private property is
protected by the Constitution, although delay in compensating
foreign and Costa Rican citizens for expropriated properties
has been a problem in recent years. Properties are
expropriated for incorporation into nature protection reserve
areas or are based on legal claims of Indians.
During 1989 the Arias administration continued to demonstrate
a strong commitment to the longstanding Costa Rican tradition
of respect for human rights. There were, however, some
problems of de facto, though not de jure, discrimination
against women, blacks, and Indians.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The Government does not practice, abet, or condone political
killing, and none was reported.
b. Disappearance
There were no known or reported incidents of politically
motivated abductions or secret arrests.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits cruel or degrading treatment and
holds invalid any statement obtained through violence. These
prohibitions are respected in practice. Prisoners generally
receive humane treatment in Costa Rica. The press, however,
occasionally reports incidents of alleged police mistreatment
of prisoners. In 1989, for example, the press reported
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allegations by two men that they had been imprisoned and
tortured in the basement of the Judicial Police (OIJ)
building. However, their accusations were dismissed after a
thorough investigation by the Judicial Inspections
Department. Charges of mistreatment of prisoners in 14 other
cases are still under investigation.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Warrants are required for arrests, and an arraignment must
take place within 24 hours of arrest. Article 48 of the
Constitution entitles detained persons to a judicial
determination of the legality of the detention. These rights
are generally respected, although there are frequent reports
of detainees remaining in custody long periods awaiting trial.
Costa Rica has separate pretrial detention for major offenses,
such as narcotics trafficking, and this detention can last for
months .
The right to bail is provided for in law and observed in
practice. Bail is sometimes denied to repeat offenders,
however, and is usually denied to foreigners on the assumption
that they would leave the country before coming to trial. A
1988 drug law, upheld by the Supreme Court, allows denial of
bail to accused drug offenders. Detainees may be routinely
held incommunicado for 48 hours after arrest and for up to 10
days with authorization of judicial authorities. The
judiciary is generally effective in ensuring that legal and
constitutional safeguards are observed.
The Constitution bars exile as punishment. With regard to
forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is widely recognized as independent and fair.
The Supreme Court, the final court of appeal, supervises the
work of the lower courts. Its 24 magistrates are elected for
8-year terms. Accused persons may select their own attorneys;
access to counsel is guaranteed and honored in practice. The
State provides legal counsel for those who cannot afford an
attorney.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There were no reported instances during 1989 of extralegal
invasions of privacy conducted by, or with the knowledge of,
the Government. Warrants are required to search private homes,
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution specifically provides for freedom of speech
and press. These freedoms are generally respected in
practice. Nine private newspapers (including two Communist
weeklies), six private television stations, and several radio
stations pursue independent editorial policies. The media
freely criticize the Government, and there is no evidence of
self-censorship or intimidation.
Foreign journalists challenged a law requiring the
accreditation of journalists by the government-sponsored Costa
Rican National Journalists Association; the Inter-American
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Court of Human Rights declared in 1985 in an advisory opinion
that the law is incompatible with the freedom of information
provisions of the Inter-American Human Rights Convention. The
Minister of Information in 1988 recommended formally that the
Government remedy this perceived restriction of freedom of the
press, but in October 1988 President Arias came out in favor
of the journalists' accreditation law in a speech to the Costa
Rican National Journalists Association. To date, the law
requiring the accreditation of Costa Rican and foreign
journalists has not been revised. A Costa Rican newsman was
convicted in 1989 by a criminal court for engaging in
journalism without a license.
In what some charged was a violation of the freedom of
expression, the censor's office banned the film "The Last
Temptation of Christ" early in 1989. In June the Law
Students' Association of the University Costa Rica denounced
the ban before the Attorney General for Human Rights. At
year's end, the Censorship Tribunal of the Ministry of Justice
was awaiting the Attorney General's decision before issuing
its own opinion.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Constitutional provisions of freedom of assembly and
association are fully respected. Permits are not required for
public meetings. Authorization is needed only for parades or
similar large-scale gatherings.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in the Constitution and
observed in practice. While Roman Catholicism is the official
state religion, Costa Ricans affiliated with a wide range of
religious groups participate without prejudice in social and
political life. The Constitution stipulates that the
President must be a layman. There are no restrictions on
religious activity, and foreign missionaries and clergy of all
denominations work and proselytize freely.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no unusual restrictions on travel within the country
or abroad, and both citizens and foreigners are free to live
anywhere within the national boundaries. Neither emigration
nor a citizen's right of return is restricted. Costa Rica
supports multinational refugee programs and has accepted many
refugees from Central and South America, although the
continuing influx of Nicaraguan refugees has provoked
government expressions of concern over strains on the economy
and social fabric. During 1989, there were two instances of
border officials forcing Nicaraguans entering Costa Rica to
return to Nicaragua without allowing them to be interviewed by
the proper authorities (immigration officials and office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) to
determine if they were in fact political refugees. In July
111 Nicaraguans and in August 10 Nicaraguans were turned away
at the border. The Constitution specifically prohibits the
Government from repatriating any foreigner who may be subject
to political persecution in his own country, and political
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asylum traditionally has been granted to exiled dissidents of
various political orientations.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Costa Rica is a democracy in which citizens choose their
government through free, open, and competitive elections. The
integrity of elections is ensured by the independent Supreme
Electoral Tribunal, and election results are respected. The
Legislative Assembly can and does reject executive branch
initiatives. Citizens can and do petition their elected
representatives for legislative redress and assistance with
government bureaucracies. The ruling National Liberation
Party and the opposition Social Christian Unity Party control
29 and 25 seats, respectively, in the 57-member Legislative
Assembly. Two rival Communist parties, which freely
participate in the political process, each hold one seat. An
independent provincial party holds the remaining seat.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
A 1984 Executive Order created the Ombudsman for Human Rights,
under the Attorney General's office. Called the Defensoria
Para Derechos Humanos, it hears complaints from individuals.
There is also a similar office for complaints concerning the
penitentiary system.
Costa Rica has traditionally been a strong supporter of
international and private human rights organizations. The
Inter-American Institute of Human Rights maintains its
headquarters in San Jose. The Government has invited the
Inter-American Human Rights Commission to visit the country
whenever it wishes. Three nongovernmental groups monitor and
report on human rights matters in Costa Rica: the Costa Rican
Commission for Human Rights, the Commission for the Defense of
Human Rights in Central America and the Family and Friends of
Political Prisoners of Costa Rica.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Costa Rica's population includes some 26,000 Indians, most of
whom live in traditional communities on 21 reserves which, in
part because of their remote location, often lack access to
schools, health care, electricity, and potable water. The
Government is attempting to improve the quality of basic
services in the Indian communities. Indians participate in
the management of their own affairs through the National
Indian Commission. Indian leaders continue to urge the
Government to devote more resources to improving the welfare
of the indigenous population.
The role of women, although still primarily domestic, is
legally unrestricted. Women and men generally are paid
equally for equal work. A law designed to supplement existing
legislation against sex discrimination was introduced in the
Legislative Assembly in August 1988, but it was not enacted.
Physical abuse of women is prohibited by law but does occur.
When reported, cases of physical abuse of women, including
domestic violence, such as wife beating, are prosecuted and
often result in stringent penalties, usually prison terms
determined by the gravity of the crime. Abuse of female
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minors is considered aggravated assault. Neither the
Government nor Costa Rican society tolerates violence against
women. The Costa Rican press has reported a recent increase
in the number of violent crimes against women and these
reports have increased the awareness of Costa Ricans to the
problem. There are a number of women advocacy groups in the
country with various degrees of effectiveness. These groups
monitor official and unofficial reports of abuse and provide
counseling .
Costa Rica's population of 30,000 blacks, who reside largely
on the Caribbean coast, enjoys full rights of citizenship as
well as other rights and protections, including laws against
all forms of racial discrimination. However, prejudice toward
blacks and Indians, generally covert, still exists in some
elements of the population. The Caribbean coast, with its
large black minority population, suffers from a lower level of
development than San Jose and the Central Valley. The
consequent high unemployment in the region has resulted in
labor and racial tensions.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Costa Rica has ratified International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention 87 on Freedom of Association. Approximately 15
percent of the work force is organized, and there are several
different trade union centrals in Costa Rica. Unions are
independent of government control and are free to maintain
relations with recognized international bodies such as the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) , the ICFTU, and other trade union
organizations contend that the Solidarismo movement in the
country, an alternative to traditional trade unionism, is an
employer inspired and dominated "company union", supported by
the Government as an alternative to independent trade unions.
Leaders of the Solidarismo movement claim that it is a
legitimate form of employee organization, and that Solidarismo
organizations and their officials are prohibited by law from
engaging in antitrade union activities.
At the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA)
Conference in Geneva in June 1989, the ICFTU filed a formal
complaint against the Government of Costa Rica, alleging that
it supports the Solidarismo movement in violation of
Convention 87. At its November 1989 meeting, the CFA noted
that the Government had not supplied information requested by
the Committee and adjourned consideration of the case until
its next meeting in February 1990.
When labor disputes arise within the San Jose metropolitan
area, the presiding judge of the Labor Tribunal attempts to
negotiate a settlement. Labor inspectors from the Ministry of
Labor handle disputes outside the capital. If conciliation
fails, the case is referred to a labor court, which decides
the legality of the strike. Unions have complained that this
process is complicated, time-consuming, and often fruitless.
Public sector strikes are illegal but occur with some
frequency.
Strikes and labor unrest were at higher levels in 1989 than in
the past year. Two of the most significant strikes were a
doctors' strike and a general strike in the port city of
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COSTA RICA
Limon. In the former, the strike was declared illegal, but
an agreement was reached under which no reprisals were to be
taken against strike participants. In the latter, the strike
was also declared illegal, but an agreement was reached with
the Government providing for the lifting of the strike and
subsequent negotiations, and for affected employers to decide
individually whether or not to withhold the salaries of
striking workers.
At its 1989 meeting, the ILO Committee of Experts (COE) ,
recalling its previous complaints about the broad strike
prohibitions in Costa Rican law, noted that provisions in the
pending revision of the law are still too broad. The COE
called on the Government to bring the latter provisions into
conformance and enact the new law.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Costa Rica has ratified ILO Convention 98 on the Right to
Organize and Collective Bargaining. The right to organize is
provided for in the Constitution. The commitments are
observed in practice. However, there have been some
allegations that the Government is unresponsive to charges of
antiunion discrimination in the private sector.
In spite of guarantees in the 1943 labor code, many labor
leaders claim that the statute is outdated and unjust. They
cite in particular a clause which permits employers to fire
workers for "any other grave fault" not specified elsewhere in
the code as a mechanism used by management to fire would-be
labor organizers. To date, this code has not been revised,
although the Government has attempted to negotiate a mutually
acceptable revision with representatives of both management
and labor. In the report of its 1989 meeting, the COE noted
that the pending revision of the labor code includes
provisions providing for nondiscrimination and nonintervention
vis-a-vis unions suggested by the ILO in 1981. The COE urged
early enactment of the new code.
Labor regulations in Costa Rica's nine export processing zones
do not differ from the rest of the economy, either in law or
in practice.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and
there are no known instances of either.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Constitution provides for special employment protection
for women and minors and establishes the minimum working age
at 12 years, with special regulations in force for workers
under 15. The government child welfare agency, in cooperation
with the Labor Ministry, is responsible for the enforcement of
these provisions. Regulations concerning the employment of
children are effectively enforced by the responsible
government agencies.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Constitution defines the normal hours of the workday,
remuneration of overtime, days of rest, and annual vacation
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COSTA RICA
rights. It specifies compensation for discharge without due
cause, and the right to a minimum wage.
A national wage board, composed of three members each from
government, management, and labor, sets minimum wages and
salaries for all sectors. While violations sometimes occur,
these wage and salary levels are generally respected. The
minimum wage ranges from $156 to $391 per month, depending on
occupational field. Workers at the low end of this wage scale
often find it difficult to maintain a minimally decent
standard of living. The minimum protection wage, which is set
as the bare minimum a worker may receive, is currently $5.20
per day.
Normal work hours are set at 8 hours for daytime and 6 hours
for nighttime work, with weekly totals of 48 and 36 hours
respectively. Ten-hour days are permitted for work not
considered unhealthful or dangerous, but weekly totals may not
exceed 48 hours. Nonagricultural workers receive an overtime
premium of 50 percent of regular wages for work performed in
excess of the daily work shift. Agricultural workers are not
paid overtime if they voluntarily work beyond their normal
hours .
A 1967 law governs health and safety at the workplace. This
law requires that industrial, agricultural, and commercial
firms with 10 or more workers must establish a management-
labor committee. The law allovjs the Government to inspect
workplaces and to fine employers for violations. However,
there are too few labor inspectors, especially outside of San
Jose, to ensure that minimum conditions of safety and
sanitation are maintained.
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CUBA
Cuba is a totalitarian state dominated by a single person,
Fidel Castro, who is Chief of State, head of Government,
leader of the Communist Party, and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. With support from a few long-time associates.
President Castro exercises control over nearly all aspects of
Cuban life through a network of directorates ultimately
responsible to him through the Communist Party. The party is
the only legal political entity and is headed by a
self-perpetuating elite. All government positions, including
judicial offices, are controlled by the party. Elections are
held only to endorse party-approved candidates; there was one
isolated exception in 1989 (see Section 3) . Though not a
formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite
for high-level official positions and professional advancement
in most areas.
The Ministry of Interior (MININT) is the principal organ of
repression and of totalitarian control. It operates border
and police forces, orchestrates public demonstrations,
determines the legality of associations, investigates evidence
of nonconformity, regulates migration, and maintains pervasive
vigilance through a series of mass organizations and
informers. The Ministry underwent structural reorganization
in 1989 and is now under de facto control of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces (FAR) . The mass organizations attempt to extend
government and Communist Party control over each citizen's
daily activities at home, work, and school. Citizens are
exhorted to ensure ideological conformity and to report
deviation.
The Cuban economy is highly centralized and managed by a group
of advisors close to President Castro. The Government
controls the means of production and is virtually the
country's sole employer. In the late 1970's, Cuba began to
use market mechanisms, but in 1986 the Government reversed
course and began the ongoing "rectification of errors"
campaign. It sought to stamp out an emerging informal private
sector while promoting antimaterialist "socialist morality."
The abandonment of the liberalization program in favor of more
orthodox Communist policies has played a major role in the
Cuban economy's recent stagnation. In 1989 this campaign of
Marxist economic orthodoxy caused sharp conflicts with Cuba's
reform-minded socialist trading partners.
Cubans do not possess equal protection under the law, the
right to freely choose government representatives, freedom of
expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and association, or
freedom to travel to and from Cuba without restriction. There
is no independent judiciary, due process safeguards can be and
are constitutionally circumvented, and defense attorneys face
severe disadvantages under the judicial system. Aside from
the churches, which themselves are monitored by the party,
there is virtually no institutional autonomy in Cuban
society. All media are Government-owned and remain under
tight control, and the practice of religion continues to be
discouraged. Government efforts to monopolize control over
many aspects of life remain very intrusive.
The human rights situation in 1989 worsened significantly from
the previous year. The Government stepped up repression in
marked contrast to the limited relaxation effected in 1988.
During the year the Government cracked down on human rights
groups, executed four uniformed officers without a fair trial,
and denied internationally recognized human rights monitors
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CUBA
permission to attend a trial of three human rights leaders.
Efforts by the United Nations Secretary General to implement a
U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) resolution to follow up
on reported abuses in Cuba had by year's end produced little
response from the Cuban Government. The only positive
carryovers from 1988 into 1989 included continued releases of
political prisoners, permission for the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to again interview political
prisoners, and the slight expansion of the 1988 exceptions
granted to the churches.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
FAR General Arnalio Ochoa, MININT Colonel Antonio De la
Guardia, MININT Major Amado Padron, and FAR Captain Jorge
Martinez were executed by firing squad on July 13 following a
show trial (see Section I.e.). Although the full story behind
the Ochoa/De la Guardia case is still unclear, there are
circumstantial indications that political motivation may have
played a part in making Ochoa the key figure in the case and
in sentencing him and three others to death.
Although not politically motivated, there have been some
reports of police officers engaging in unjustified use of
lethal force. In one such example, police investigating a
petty theft killed a Havana youth, Elisco Canada Coffiguez, in
June, and in another Julian Cela Cuellar was reportedly shot
to death in Havana on July 8, for allegedly verbally abusing
an arresting officer who was breaking up a street fight.
b. Disappearance
There were no credible reports of politically motivated
disappearances in 1989.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Reliable reports of prisoner abuse and beatings rose in 1989,
with a severity in some cases amounting to torture. There was
no indication that Cuban authorities undertook investigations
or disciplinary actions in response to charges of such abuse.
Punishment cells remain in regular use for disciplining
inmates, in violation of international norms. Rodolfo Frometa
and Angel Donato Martinez, two "nuevos plantados" (new
prisoners who refuse prison "reeducation"), reportedly were
held incommunicado in punishment cells in Combinado del Este
Penitentiary for more than 1 year from 1988 to 1989. In
January there were multiple allegations that guards had beaten
and placed in isolation cells several prisoners in Combinado
del Este during a protest by the so-called lancheros (persons
arrested for illegal attempts to leave the country).
Cuban Human Rights Party activist David Moya was severely
beaten in a Pinar del Rio prison for organizing protests
against prisoner mistreatment, according to the Cuban Human
Rights Party and his own reports smuggled out in August. The
beating and use of electric prods on 11 Combinado del Este
inmates in December 1988 reportedly resulted in two prisoners
being treated for cranial fractures. The prisoners were
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CUBA
protesting the removal of a political prisoner to a prison for
common criminals. In March and August, dozens of Combinado
del Este inmates engaged in hunger strikes and smuggled out
written denunciations of the conditions of their confinement;
these protests reportedly resulted in several severe beatings
and frequent confinement in punishment cells.
Several charges of confinement of political prisoners in
psychiatric hospitals were reported in 1989. Four dissidents
were confined in psychiatric hospitals, ostensibly for
evaluation, for periods ranging from a few days to several
weeks. None of the four reported mistreatment during their
hospital stays. One, Julio Soto Angurel, leader of the Jose
Marti Council of Independent Defenders of Human Rights and
National Reconciliation, remained at year's end in the Havana
Psychiatric Hospital, where he was confined after his arrest
on October 8.
Following his release in 1989, Cuban Human Rights Committee
member Jesus Leyva Guerra reported that security police
detained him in July 1988 and then transferred him to the
prison ward of the Gustavo Machin Psychiatric Hospital in
Santiago de Cuba. Leyva said he was forced to undergo
psychiatric "treatment" and, after he began a hunger strike,
was subjected to electroshock six times.
With a sharp drop-off in the number of outside groups
permitted to visit Cuban prisons in 1989, it was far more
difficult to appraise current conditions. Physical
improvements in prison conditions, such as in ventilation and
sanitation, that were made in 1988 before visits by
international human rights groups, apparently were largely
maintained but not expanded during 1989. Local human rights
monitors assert that punishment cells in provincial jails
featured harsher conditions of confinement.
Political prisoners released in 1989 claimed that, while
conditions remained the same for those incarcerated for
political offenses, mistreatment of common prisoners increased
during the year. There were reports of beatings of prisoners
incarcerated for attempting to leave Cuba without government
permission. These prisoners, who are treated as common
criminals, were protesting the Government's refusal to
recognize them as political prisoners. Reports smuggled out
of the prisons indicate, however, that political reeducation
of prisoners has become essentially voluntary since 1988;
therefore, prisoner protests have largely centered on general
prison conditions.
Local human rights monitors reported a notable rise in
incidents of alleged police brutality by arresting officers,
often in situations involving minor offenses. These included
the shooting of Edel Guerrero Licea and Hidelberto Figuerado
in Palma Soriano at a religious festival in December 1988, the
August 16 shooting of Iran Sanchez Hernandez (who was
attempting an illegal departure from the island), and the
shootings of a Havana youth for "resisting arrest," and a
16-year-old after a traffic infraction. In none of these
cases has there been any indication that any police official
was investigated or punished for such actions. Two other
incidents ended in death (see Section l.a.).
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CUBA
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Article 245 of the Cuban Law of Penal Procedure requires
police to file formal charges and either to release a detainee
or place him at the disposition of a prosecutor within 96
hours. Authorities are also required to provide suspects with
a defense attorney within 10 days of arrest. Despite some
signs that authorities were more concerned to follow legal
forms, Cuban procedural rights related to arrest continue to
be widely denied. Article 61 of the Constitution permits
denial of all recognized civil liberties in the case of anyone
actively opposing the "decision of the Cuban people to build
socialism." This article is implicitly invoked by Cuban
authorities who, in the past, justified lengthy detentions of
dissidents by characterizing them as "counterrevolutionary
elements . "
Arbitrary arrests and prolonged detentions without trial of
dissidents increased in late 1988 and continued through 1989.
At least 18 such arrests, followed by prolonged detentions, of
dissidents took place in the weeks following the September
1988 UNHRC visit. Since then, a total of approximately 50
dissidents have been subjected to punitive actions ranging
from threats, harassment, and beatings to detentions and
imprisonment. Cuban authorities used brief detentions ranging
from several hours to several days to intimidate dissidents
without formally charging them.
For example, seven members of the Free Art Association (APAL)
were detained for months before being charged and brought to
trial in September 1989. Lazaro Cabrera Puente, Pablo Pupo
Sanchez, Juan Garcia Cruz, Gilberto Plasencia, and Ramon
Obregon had been detained since October 1988. Carlos Novoa
and Jose Mari Becerra had been arrested in January. Amnesty
International (AT) reported that Novoa had gone on a 59-day
hunger strike beginning in May to demand that he be charged
and brought to trial.
Elizardo Sanchez (President of the Cuban Commission for Human
Rights and National Reconciliation), Hiram Abi Cobas (head of
the Cuban Human Rights Party), and Hubert Jerez (head of the
Marti Committee for Human Rights) were arrested on August 6
for "disseminating false information" concerning the trial of
General Ochoa (see Section I.e.). Following their arrests,
the human rights leaders were confined in the Villa Marista
detention center for about 6 weeks before being transferred to
Combinado del Este prison. According to Sanchez, while in
Villa Marista they were each held in solitary confinement
inside windowless 10 foot by 3 foot isolation cells that were
brightly illuminated 24 hours a day for 36 days prior to their
November 17 trial.
Orlando Polo, leader of the "Green Path" ecological-pacifist
group, was arrested three times in August and September and
held without being charged for 1 week in the Villa Marista
detention center and for 2 weeks in the Havana Psychiatric
Hospital. In Villa Marista, Polo was interrogated about
unspecified charges without the benefit of an attorney.
Several more activists continued to be held at year's end
without charges. Enrique Acosta Ruiz, Sergio De la Vega
Gomez, and Lazaro Rosa Arbolez were arrested in April.
Esteban Gonzalez, Manuel Pozo and two other members of the
Pro-Amnesty Committee, a group calling for the release of
political prisoners, were arrested in September. Cuban Human
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CUBA
Rights Party activist Edits Cruz was taken into custody in
November. Altogether, over 25 arrested or detained activists
were still imprisoned or held without being charged at year's
end.
Reliable reports indicated that some prisons were filling up
again in 1989 after the Government reportedly released over
8,000 criminal offenders in 1988 under the new penal code. In
1989 the authorities began a massive and sustained campaign to
prosecute economic offenders, and this may be adding to the
prison population. Reports from inside prisons indicate that
the number of offenders incarcerated for attempted illegal
departures increased in 1989 although prison sentences for the
offense remained moderate by Cuban standards. In 1988,
especially in the months leading up to the visit of the
UNHRC ' s Cuba Working Group, many persons arrested for illegal
departure attempts from the island were not jailed but were
fined and released with a severe warning.
Precise numbers of political prisoners in Cuban jails are
difficult to determine because of the release of hundreds of
prisoners over the last 2 years, differences in definitions of
political prisoners, and the Government's traditional secrecy
about the prison population. Current estimates of the number
of Cuban political prisoners range from Americas Watch's (AW)
January 1989 estimate of "several score additional Cubans to
possibly as many as a few hundred" to the Cuban human rights
activists's claims of many more. In March 1988, the
Government stated that there were 455 persons imprisoned for
crimes against state security, a category which now does not
include offenses such as illegal departure, contempt, and
offenses related to the practice of a religion, such as
conscientious objection. Another indication of the prisoner
population came from the ICRC, which reported that its
delegation in May visited 257 prisoners, including some
convicted of illegal departure, in 10 Cuban detention centers
including the Havana Psychiatric Hospital.
During the year Cuban authorities continued to release
selected political prisoners, including some on the condition
that they immediately emigrate to the United States.
According to U.S. press reports, the Government notified the
U.S. Catholic Conference in November 1988 that it would free
225 political prisoners, including 44 it had previously
labeled as too dangerous to release. Cuban authorities
subsequently did not release the entire group, although at
least 8 of the 44 "dangerous" prisoners, including "plantado
historico" Alberto Grau, were freed in 1989. There are three
remaining "plantados historicos" (long-term political
prisoners who have refused "reeducation") still in prison.
Alfredo Mustelier, one of these three who has served 20 years
of his 25-year sentence, claims that he should be released
under retroactive provisions of the 1988 Penal Code. He
undertook two lengthy hunger strikes in 1989 to protest his
continued incarceration and was gravely ill in December. The
U.N. Secretary General, members of the U.S. Congress, and many
nongovernmental organizations have asked President Castro to
review the cases of Mustelier and the other two "plantados
historicos . "
Many human rights activists were arrested on April 3 in order
to forestall their planned demonstration at the Soviet Embassy
during the visit of President Gorbachev. The demonstrators,
who wanted to call for support of "glasnost" within Cuba,
received sentences ranging from 3 to 9 months.
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The Cuban Penal Code retains internal exile as a sanction
against convicted offenders, but no instances of forced
removal or resettlement were reported in 1989.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Cuban law and trial practices do not meet international
standards for fair and impartial public trials. The
Constitution terms the courts independent, yet it explicitly
subordinates them to the National Assembly and the Council of
State (Article 122). Judges are elected by the rubberstamp
National Assembly and its lower level counterparts. The
independence of the judiciary is compromised by the de facto
subordination of the courts to the Communist Party: there is
no known case in which a Cuban court has successfully ruled
against the Government on any political or security matter.
Civil courts exist at three levels--municipal , provincial, and
the Supreme Court. All civil courts are presided over by
panels composed of a mixture of professionally prepared judges
and lay judges. There is also a system of military tribunals
which tries certain counterrevolutionary activity cases.
Defendants have a general right of appeal at the municipal
level and a conditional right at the provincial level. Cases
involving maximum prison terms or the death penalty are always
open to appeal. The Law of Penal Procedure provides that an
appeal must be presented within 5 days.
The revised Penal Code (Law No. 62) implemented in 1988
reduced the number of capital offenses and the length of
sentences in some cases. The new code did not, however,
significantly modify the previous definition of political
offenses, the punishment meted out for them, or due process
provisions for accused political offenders. Under provisions
of the revised code, defense lawyers may be excluded until an
investigation is completed, and attempted illegal departure
from Cuba remains punishable by up to 3 years' imprisonment or
a fine of up to approximately $1,000.
Political offenses, which prevent virtually any form of free
expression, remained unchanged in the revised penal code,
which retained the concept of "dangerousness" (Articles 72-89)
and vaguely defined it as "the special proclivity of a person
to commit crimes, demonstrated by his conduct in manifest
contradiction of Socialist norms." If the police determine a
person is exhibiting such behavior, the offender can be
brought before a court which may apply police surveillance,
reeducation, or therapy lasting for from 1 to 4 years. In
1989 as in 1988, the concept of "dangerousness" appears to
have been invoked rarely, if at all.
Cuban evidentiary practices do not meet generally recognized
international standards. A trial for political offenses
ordinarily consists of evidence given by the prosecution's
witnesses, who are generally employees of state security
organs. In some cases, the only evidence is the defendant's
confession, obtained without due process safeguards against
self-incrimination or coercion. There are usually no defense
witnesses, although testimony on behalf of the defendant from
a member of a Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (see
Section l.f.) may be introduced and may contribute to a
reduced sentence.
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Cuban law provides an accused the right to a defense attorney,
but the latter 's impartiality and independence are compromised
by the absence of a private bar association and by ideological
controls exerted over members of the state-controlled lawyers'
collectives, especially in defending persons accused of crimes
against state security. When the legal collectives were
reorganized in 1984, some 15 percent of then-active attorneys,
including many active in political cases, were denied
readmission and thus effectively disbarred.
Government-appointed defense attorneys generally are poorly
prepared and unsympathetic towards the defendant. In 1988 the
visiting New York City Bar Association delegation observed
Cuban trials for common crimes and found the counsel
ill-prepared and unaggressive. Typically, defendants and
lawyers are afforded little time together; in some cases,
former political prisoners have asserted, clients see their
counsel only one hour before trial. Others are unable to meet
at all with their attorneys.
Observers have noted a reluctance among attorneys to defend
persons charged with political offenses. Lawyers are
discouraged from taking political cases because of persecution
suffered by those who do. Domingo Jorge Delgado, for example,
was freed in 1988 and allowed to emigrate to the United States
in 1989, after serving 8 years in prison following his defense
of a group of persons who had attempted to seek political
asylum. Former political prisoners have alleged that state
security officials apply pressure on all persons involved in
the judicial process, and that those officials, not the
courts, really decide the fate of the detainee.
Several prominent cases of dissidents illustrate how the Cuban
judicial system works in practice:
Samuel Martinez Lara, Secretary General of the Cuban Human
Rights Party, was sentenced on April 7 to 9 months in prison.
Martinez, David Moya, Roberto Bahamonde, and two other members
of the Cuban Human Rights Party were arrested on April 3 for
announcing a demonstration, which was to call for "glasnost"
in Cuba, outside the Soviet Embassy during Soviet leader
Gorbachev's visit. All were held incommunicado until their
closed trial 3 days later where, without defense attorneys
present, they were convicted of "illegal association." Moya
received a sentence of 9 months and Bahamonde a sentence of 3
months in prison. In a June 1989 report, AI criticized the
trials of Bahamonde, Martinez, Moya, and six other imprisoned
members of the Cuban Human Rights Party, stating that they
were punished because of their peaceful political and human
rights activities and that procedures in their trials did not
conform to international standards for fair trial.
Bahamonde 's and Moya ' s sentences were subseguently extended
without any semblance of due process. Two months into his
prison sentence on June 9, Bahamonde was sentenced to an
additional year for "illegal economic activities." According
to a letter smuggled out of prison, Moya was found guilty of
"contempt" at a courtroom set up in a prison dining room in
September and sentenced to a further year in prison. Martinez
was not released upon completion of his sentence on January 4,
1990
General Ochoa and 14 other top military and security officials
received few due process safeguards at their highly publicized
trial in June and July. Drug trafficking and other serious
charges were leveled against them first in the official press
OA Qnn r\ an
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and then in 2 weeks of show trials. The proceedings were
influenced by the publicly stated views of President Castro
and the presentation before the military tribunal by Minister
of Defense Raul Castro, as well as official media comments
about the guilt of the accused. Defense lawyers for the
accused had little time to prepare an adequate defense,
received little court time compared to the prosecutor, and
apparently at no time did other than to ask for clemency. The
accused were sentenced on July 7, their appeal was quickly
rejected on July 9, and the Council of State confirmed the
death sentences of Ochoa and three other defendants, which
were carried out later the same day. AI , AW, and the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (lACHR) condemned
the trial's procedures and its swift aftermath.
In mid-1989, defense lawyers in two prominent cases involving
human rights activists described below were given greater
pretrial access to their clients than was available in
previous years. In neither instance, however, was the outcome
of the case notably altered in favor of the defendants as a
result of these opportunities for more extensive consultations.
Prior to the trial of seven APAL dissidents in September, some
defendants, including Carlos Novoa and Pablo Pupo Sanchez,
were released on bail and allowed regular consultations with
their attorneys. After a trial heavily laden with political
invective, according to eyewitnesses, the seven activists
received harsh prison sentences ranging from 9 to 21 months on
charges of "continued illegal association," "failure to report
a crime," and, in one case, "possession of a firearm." In the
case of defendant Juan Enrique Garcia, his attorney had
excused himself one day prior to the September trial because
the date allegedly conflicted with his vacation.
In November Elizardo Sanchez and two other human rights
leaders were tried publicly for "spreading false information"
on the Ochoa affair; representatives of AW and AI were not
permitted to enter Cuba to attend. Likewise, the Government
did not allow two U.S. journalists to appear as witnesses for
the defense. Two foreign diplomats were allowed to attend the
proceedings. All three defendants vjere granted the right to
defense attorneys, but pretrial consultations were limited.
At the trial, the accused were allowed to speak freely in
their own defense. Although the prosecutor requested the
maximum sentence (4 years) for Sanchez, he was sentenced to 2
years and the other 2 defendants were given 18 months each.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Official intrusion into private and family affairs remains one
of the most repressive and pervasive features of Cuban life.
Government or Communist Party-directed mass organizations
permeate Cuban society. The State has assumed a virtual right
of interference, even for those who do not actively oppose the
Government and its practices. Beyond promoting ideological
conformity, many of these intrusions are ostensibly aimed at
"improvement" of the citizenry.
The extensive apparatus of the MININT decides on the legality
of all private and public associations, and utilizes an
intricate system of informers, block wardens, and block
committees (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution -
CDR) to monitor and control public opinion. Police searches
are at times carried out without warrants, as occurred in the
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homes of several human rights activists in 1989. Authorities
were more careful than in the past to observe the appearance
of respect for the rights of those suspected of dissent, but
Cuban courts automatically issue warrants in security cases,
thus rendering this procedural safeguard meaningless.
The authorities possess a wide range of social controls. For
example, the educational system teaches that the State's
interests have precedence over all other ties and commitments.
Teachers, selected in part for their ideological commitment,
espouse Communist Party doctrine and can sanction students
whose families question orthodox opinion. Teachers also
evaluate the political and ideological character of their
students, which is noted in records carried with each student
throughout his or her education. Cubans are also pressured to
join a variety of mass organizations, including the Union of
Young Communists, despite the supposedly voluntary nature of
these groups. Outstanding students or workers, according to
reliable reports, often find themselves coerced into
membership in such mass organizations.
CDR ■ s are neighborhood surveillance/security committees tasked
with closely monitoring the daily lives of individual
residents. Participation in Cuba's 80,000 CDR's is in
practice involuntary in urban areas. The Government in 1988
announced the elimination of one CDR report on the beliefs of
citizens, but there is little evidence that this change
significantly altered the role of the CDR's as guardians of
social conformity. CDR's apparently continue to report
suspicious activities, such as contact with foreigners,
reception of foreign broadcasting in the home, conspicuous
consumption, unauthorized meetings, and criticism of the
Government. CDR activity, if anything, increased in 1989 as
the Government undertook a massive campaign aimed at
corruption and petty economic offenses.
Former political prisoners are often subjected to
discriminatory treatment and are relegated to menial,
intermittently available work, no matter what their education
or experience. Their children may be harassed in schools and
sometimes barred from higher or even technical education.
There was evidence that this discrimination abated in recent
years and that authorities were attempting to prevent the
grosser forms of discrimination from being exercised against
departing immigrants as well. Human rights activists report
frequent incidents of threats and harassment by government
officials. Cubans have no right to receive publications from
abroad and can expect all correspondence with foreign
countries to be carefully monitored.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Cuban authorities continue to place very extensive checks and
controls on freedom of expression. The Government does not
allow direct criticism of the "Revolution," e.g. the basic
policies and Marxist-Leninist orientation of the Government,
party or leadership. Laws are enforced against antigovernment
"propaganda," antigovernment grafitti, and slander or insults
against government officials. Local CDR's monitor and report
on expressions of dissent or criticism.
The electronic and print media are owned by the State or
party-controlled organizations and operate according to party
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CUBA
guidelines. No public forum exists for airing one's views
apart from the government-controlled media. In 1989 as in
previous years, the Government used the media as a vehicle to
indoctrinate the population. Cuban media content reflected
government views of events and stories tend to congratulate
the Government for internal successes, primarily economic
ones. By comparison, Cuban media coverage of Eastern European
developments was terse but straightforward.
In 1989, the Government moved to shut down new dissident
efforts to publish independent newsletters. Thirteen members
of the Cuban Human Rights Party were arrested for printing and
distributing several issues of its new bulletin Franqueza
(Openness). Manuel Gonzalez, Manuel Gonzalez, Sr., and Iris
Perez received prison sentences ranging from 6 months to 1
year for producing Franqueza. Copies of a second, unsigned
dissident newsletter. El Lente (The Lens), appeared
sporadically during the year.
Cuban censorship of foreign media in 1989 expanded to include
reform-minded Soviet publications. In August the Cuban party
leadership announced it was removing two Soviet journals.
Sputnik and Moscow News, from circulation. The Cuban
Communist Party newspaper Granma justified the journals' ban
from circulation by citing their "negative consequences" among
the Cuban populace. Periodicals from non-Communist countries
are not available to the general public, and foreign
broadcasts, apart from U.S. -based Radio Marti, are not heard
by significant numbers of people.
The Government extended its intimidation to the foreign press
on several occasions in 1989. A group of U.S. journalists
covering the July 26th celebrations reported being warned that
foreign journalists who visit Cuban dissidents or who report
about them could jeopardize their stay in Cuba and issuance of
future visas. The Reuters correspondent in Havana was
expelled from Cuba in July for publishing a report the
Government found unacceptable.
Artistic and literary freedom are circumscribed by government
control. Party and government officials carefully scrutinize
humor and irony in the arts. In 1989 one art exhibition
containing pictures which unf latteringly portrayed President
Castro was closed. A Vice Minister of Culture barred from
public display a painting which depicted Castro speaking to a
crowd whose faces were all identical to his.
Academic freedom is severely limited. Education is the
exclusive prerogative of the State, and the school system
follows Marxist-Leninist precepts as interpreted by government
guidelines. Academics can write freely so long as their work
does not conflict with any government or party policy.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution does not provide for freedom of assembly or
association. Any assembly of more than three persons even in
a private home is punishable by up to 3 months in prison and a
fine. Organizers of "illicit or unrecognized groups" can
receive a sentence of up to 9 months (Article 240 of the Penal
Code) .
There was no known instance in 1989 of authorities approving
any public meeting by a group not recognized by the Government,
On the contrary, the Government continued its crackdown
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begun in October 1988 on dissidents seeking to hold meetings
or to organize demonstrations. During Soviet leader
Gorbachev's visit to Havana in April, at least 21 activists
were arrested in connection with a planned demonstration.
Four Cuban Human Rights Party members received sentences of
from 3 to 9 months for "planning an illegal gathering" (see
Section I.e. ) .
Article 208 of the Penal Code prohibits "illegal or
unrecognized groups." The Ministry of Justice, in
consultation with the MININT, determines the legality of all
organizations. Apart from "recognized" churches and one or
two groups such as the Masonic Order which are carefully
monitored by authorities, the small, unrecognized, and thus
illegal human rights groups represent the only associations
independent of the State and the party. The authorities
continued to ignore the applications for legal recognition
made by the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National
Reconciliation and the Cuban Human Rights Committee over the
past 3 years.
Cuban citizens are expected to join party-controlled mass
organizations, such as the CDR's, the Confederation of Cuban
Workers, the Federation of Cuban Women, and the Union of
Communist Youth. Resisting membership makes persons subject
to a range of unofficial sanctions.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Government places restrictions on the practice of religion
and discriminates against believers, despite the
Constitution's recognition of the rights of citizens to
profess and practice any religious belief. Religious
believers are excluded from membership in the Communist Party
and thus from almost all executive and leadership positions,
including posts in the Government, the courts, and the
teaching profession. Persons who publicly profess their
religious beliefs may be subject to informal discrimination in
the workplace and through social pressures on their children
in school. Practicing Catholics, for instance, have a
difficult time getting more desirable jobs or being admitted
into certain fields of study.
Fidel Castro and other Cuban officials have publicly admitted
that religious discrimination exists, although they claimed it
was not authorized. Indeed, there has been a perceived slight
relaxation of official attitudes toward religion which
contributed to modest increases in both church attendance and
baptisms. Catholic Church officials noted in 1989 a growing
number of youths willing publicly to profess their faith.
The Government and Communist Party continued to maintain
restrictions and controls on the activities of organized
churches. Churches and other religious groups must register
with the Government and be "recognized." Recognized faiths
customarily are permitted to hold religious activities only
within specifically designated places of worship, but
permission was granted for services in prisons and some health
care institutions in 1989. Many Catholic and Protestant
churches have closed, and new construction has been restricted
since the Revolution. Four Protestant and two Catholic
seminaries are allowed to operate, but no other formal
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CUBA
religious training schools are permitted. Atheism is taught
by youth organizations. Churches have no access to official
mass media. The observance of religious holidays is
difficult, and most traditional processions are prohibited.
Christmas is a normal workday.
Despite these restrictions, relations between the Government
and recognized churches have improved since the mid-1980's.
In 1989 the Government demonstrated a greater willingness to
establish a dialogue with church leaders, and President Castro
welcomed the prospect of a future papal visit to Cuba. The
Government slightly expanded the ad hoc exceptions it granted
in 1988 to recognized churches: admission of foreign clergy
to work in Cuba, greater tolerance for religious instruction,
freedom for clergy to travel abroad, permission for the
importation of increased quantities of Bibles, and freedom to
hold conventions. While churches have been granted
exceptions, they have not been conceded "rights".
Since April, clergy have been allowed to visit prisoners who
have requested their services. The Catholic Church
established telex links among its diocesan offices and with
church officials overseas as authorized by the Government in
1988. The Seventh-Day Adventist church held a national
congress in Cuba, and foreign Adventist officials were
permitted to attend in their official capacity. The small
Jewish community was again allowed to import religious
materials, and kosher food and wine. Cuban authorities, while
clamping down on other unauthorized publications in 1989,
continued to permit limited circulation of an independent
newsletter published by a Catholic layman. The Government
allowed access to construction materials needed to rebuild
some existing churches, but provincial and local officials
have opposed certain restoration projects. In December 1988
in Palma Soriana, a parish priest, with the help of his
congregation, succeeded in restoring and reopening a small
chapel. Local party officials organized a mob to break up the
inaugural service. When the priest managed to defuse the
protest by leading the crowds outside the church in the
national anthem, he was detained by police for "proselytizing
and holding a service in public" and released hours later only
after vigorous public protest.
Members of certain faiths have suffered active persecution.
Human rights monitors reported several cases of Jehovah's
Witnesses arrested for illegal meetings and possession of
clandestine publications (i.e., Jehovah's Witnesses tracts) in
1989, including the cases of Ursulo Brito and Samuel Camacho
Hernandez (sentenced to 6 months in prison), and of Eloy Ramos
Gonzalez (sentenced to 1 year). In April police reportedly
infiltrated a Jehovah's Witnesses prayer meeting in Suri and
staged a raid on the home of Felipe Bofill where prayers where
being offered for Bofill's gravely ill son. Several persons
were arrested, tried, and convicted of charges of "illegal
meeting and possession of clandestine printing."
Other religious groups also suffer such repression; in a raid
in December 1988 reported by the Cuban Human Rights Committee,
the home of Baptist pastor Eliejar Samado Cazavus of Granma
was ransacked and religious literature confiscated. Samado
subsequently lost his job and was forced to rely on small
donations from his congregation to support his family.
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d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no legal restrictions on domestic travel, but Cuban
citizens require permission both to leave and to reenter Cuba.
Opportunities for nonofficial foreign travel are severely
restricted, limited generally to elderly pensioners, church
officials, and special humanitarian cases for serious family
illness or death.
Cuban authorities strictly control emigration but in 1989
again permitted several thousand persons, including hundreds
of former political prisoners, to leave the country
permanently with no right of return. Draft-age males were
generally not allowed to depart. During 1989 the Government
continued to deny, without any explanation, exit permission to
some persons and their immediate families who had already been
accepted into immigration and refugee admissions programs of
other countries. For example, the Government has repeatedly
refused exit permission to Sebastian Arcos Cazabon, the son of
human rights leader Sebastian Arcos Bergnes.-
It is a crime to leave the country without authorization.
Persons who attempt to flee on small boats or inner tubes face
sanctions ranging from fines to 3 years' imprisonment. The
number of persons convicted of "illegal" departure reportedly
rose sharply in 1989 (see Section I.e.). Discrimination
against intending legal emigrants lessened in 1989, although
extricating a family from the web of state employment,
housing, and education remains a complex and often frustrating
process. Once emigration formalities are completed, all
family possessions and property go to the State unless
immediate relatives are able to take possession.
Cubans traveling as emigrants or refugees to other countries
have no right to return for a visit or repatriation. The
Government continued to restrict the number of persons of
Cuban origin from the United States permitted to visit their
families in Cuba to 50 persons per week under a worldwide
quota of 5,000 per year. Persons who came to the United
States in the Mariel boatlift were routinely denied
repatriation and the Cuban Government allowed no more than 10
of them per week to visit Cuba. Entry into Cuba by Cuban
Americans was suspended entirely for the last quarter of
1989. The Government reduced to $250 per trip the amount of
currency visiting expatriates can bring to family members in
Cuba .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Cuban citizens have no legal right to seek to change their
government or even to advocate this right. The only political
organization allowed in Cuba is the Communist Party. The
overlapping party and state hierarchy has remained largely
unchanged for 30 years. Members of the highest governing
bodies, the Politburo and the Central Committee, are selected
by a small group of party leaders. Although direct elections
are held to fill municipal offices, the provincial assemblies
and the National Assembly are elected indirectly. Only the
party and its affiliated mass organizations have the right to
distribute political materials or to organize electoral
meetings. All candidates must, in effect, be approved by the
Communist Party. In March, dissident Roberto Bahamonde
challenged the system and ran against the Communist Party
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CUM
candidate for a municipal assembly seat in Havana. Bahamonde
lost and was imprisoned on other charges several weeks later
(see Sections l.d. and I.e.).
In December 1988, 163 European and American intellectuals
joined Cuban expatriates in signing an open letter calling for
a plebiscite on Fidel Castro's rule, following the October
1988 example of Chile. One month earlier, the Cuban Human
Rights Party had advocated a plebiscite on whether to repeal
the Constitution and convoke a constituent assembly.
Government officials rejected the call for a plebiscite and
called the comparison with Chile "absurd."
In 1989 Fidel Castro distanced Cuba from democratizing trends
sweeping through the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe,
rationalizing his continued unwillingness to allow greater
opportunities for Cuban citizens to participate freely in the
political system.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Domestic human rights monitors are legally unrecognized and
lead a precarious existence dependent upon the vagaries of
government policy. The Government continued, in violation of
its own statutes, to refuse to recognize the applications for
legalization submitted in 1988 and 1989 by several such groups
(see Section 2.b.). In its 1988/89 Annual Report, the lACHR
called on the Government to recognize human rights
associations and their right to engage in their activities
freely. The three principal domestic human rights monitoring
groups are the Cuban Human Rights Comjnittee (CCPDH) , the Cuban
Human Rights Party (PPDHC) and the Cuban Commission for Human
Rights and National Reconciliation (CCDHRN) . There is a host
of smaller human rights-related groups, most notably the Free
Art Association (APAL) and the Marti Committee for Human
Rights, which appeared in 1988. In February 1989, the PPDHC,
CCDHRN, and Marti Committee for Human Rights banded together
under an umbrella group, the Coordinator of Human Rights
Organizations.
The Government's stepped-up crackdown on Cuba's human rights
movement was the most significant development in the country's
human rights situation in 1989. Official policy changed from
increasing limited tolerance through mid-1988 to repression
after the September 1988 visit of the UNHRC Cuba Working
Group. Since then, the Government has taken or fabricated
opportunities to harass, detain, or imprison approximately 50
activists and has, in effect, silenced many of its leading
domestic critics. Some of the arrested activists had
presented testimony to the UNHRC Cuba Working Group, although
their arrests were officially for alleged actions unconnected
with their testimony. The UNHRC delegation was assured by
Cuban authorities that the witnesses would not suffer
reprisals for their testimony. About 25 of those activists
arrested or detained, including the leaders of four of the
five human rights groups named above, remained imprisoned or
held without charge at year's end (see Section l.d.).
The atmosphere of increased openness leading up to the UNHRC s
visit led some human rights activists to attempt to exercise
what they viewed as their rights to peaceful assembly and
speech. The Government responded with the pattern of arrests,
swiftly staged trials, and misdemeanor convictions which began
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CUBA
with the October 1988 arrest of six APAL activists and the
November 1988 arrest of PPDHC leader Tania Diaz Castro.
In 1989 the Government further clamped down as activists
continued to test the limits of its tolerance by circulating
petitions and underground publications and, in one case,
trying to organize a demonstration. Cuban authorities
appeared to follow legal procedures more scrupulously, but
imposed harsher punishments. Elizardo Sanchez's 2-year prison
term was the harshest sentence meted out to a human rights
activists in several years (see Section I.e. for details on
dissident trials). Extralegal harassment continued as well.
Several human rights activists were beaten by thugs and at
least eight others were arrested during a November 12 mass;
incorrect rumors had circulated that prayers would be said at
the mass to support hunger striking political prisoner Alfredo
Mustelier. By the close of 1989, members of the human rights
movement who were not in jail had reduced their public
activities because of government repression.
The ICRC was the only monitoring group which visited Cuba in
1989. Cuban authorities permitted the ICRC to make a second
annual visit to prisons and to monitor conditions of inmates.
The ICRC, whose findings are strictly confidential, did report
that its delegation interviewed 257 prisoners in 10 detention
centers, including the Havana Psychiatric Hospital. The
Government denied permission to representatives from AW and AI
to attend the trial of human rights leader Elizardo Sanchez.
Following its September 1988 visit, the UNHRC Cuba Working
Group submitted a 400-page report to its parent commission in
February 1989. The report detailed extensive human rights
abuses by Cuba and noted numerous outstanding questions posed
by the Working Group which Cuban authorities had failed to
answer. The UNHRC, at its 1989 session, passed a resolution
charging the U.N. Secretary General to maintain a dialogue
with the Cuban Government in order to follow up on outstanding
issues in the Working Group's report. Cuban authorities (who,
under international pressure in 1988, had invited the Working
Group to visit) made it clear in their 1989 public statements
that, notwithstanding the content of the report, they
considered international attention to Cuban human rights
practices to be a closed chapter.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Cuba is a multiracial society with a large population of
persons with mixed racial ancestry. The Constitution
expressly forbids discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or
national origin, and there were no known incidents of direct
racial or sexual discrimination in 1989. The Family Code of
1975 equalized pay scales, eliminated sexual discrimination in
promotions, provided generous maternity leave, and gave
employed women preferential access to goods and services.
Public or official expressions of racial discrimination or
prejudice are rare. The official women's organization, the
Federation of Cuban Women, is used to mobilize women
politically rather than to advocate women's rights exclusively.
There are no official data available on the incidence of
violence against women. Neither the Government nor society
condone such violence. Cuban law establishes strict penalties
for sexual abuse or rape of women, including the death penalty
for the rape of minors or serious injury to the victim. The
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CUBA
Penal Code also provides lesser sanctions for sexual coercion
of women by authorities or guardians. These statutes appear
to be enforced with typical severity by the authorities,
although sexual crimes are never reported in the press.
Anecdotal evidence from human rights groups and other sources
indicates that domestic violence such as wife beating is a
problem, but a lack of statistical data makes it impossible to
gauge its true extent. Due to societal traditions many
victims of abuse are reluctant to file a report or to press
charges, so it is likely that cases of violence are
significantly underreported . Women complain of verbal
harassment in public and expected subordination at home.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution gives priority to state or collective needs
over individual choices regarding free association or
provision of employment; the decision and choices of workers
are subordinate to the "demands of the economy and society"
(Article 44). Strikes are not permitted under the law.
Established Cuban labor organizations are not trade unions in
any real sense and do not act as a voice for workers' rights,
including the right to strike. Labor is organized under the
control of the State and party through one umbrella group, the
Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) . The CTC is affiliated
with the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions
and its regional organization, the Permanent Congress of Trade
Union Unity of Latin America (CPUSTAL) . The CTC serves
primarily as an instrument of the State to enforce political
and labor discipline, to encourage productivity, to hold down
labor costs, and to save raw materials. Some CTC member labor
organizations have served as debating forums for the
consideration of a limited range of labor issues such as
worker safety and local working conditions.
The right to form an independent union is prohibited and even
discussion of such a step has been subject to punishment.
Despite increased repression of many dissident groups in 1989,
however, several embryonic labor organizing groups appeared
and discussed the need for autonomous representation of
workers' interests along the lines of the Solidarity movement
in Poland. Two of these groups, the Independent Trade Union
Movement and the Free Trade Union, claimed to have gathered
membership in workplaces in the capital region. These tiny
groups remain very much on the margins, and even the
discussion of independent unions is a dangerous form of
dissent, often characterized by authorities as a form of
"industrial sabotage." In August Havana ironworker Ricardo
Figueira Castro, a member of the CCPDH, was arrested and
charged with enemy propaganda. Figueira had unsuccessfully
sought a position in his factory's official union with the
idea of making it more responsive to workers' needs.
Nevertheless, he began to represent workers' interests
informally with management and to speak out about the need for
more independent representation with coworkers. Figueira 's
arrest soon followed.
In its 1989 report, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Committee of Experts (COE) again challenged the trade union
monopoly granted to the CTC in violation of Convention 87 on
Freedom of Association. The Committee asked the Government to
report what steps it is taking to bring its legislation into
conformance .
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CUBA
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Effective collective bargaining does not exist. The State
Committee for Work and Social Security sets wages and salaries
for the state sector. There are no known export processing
zones in Cuba. Since the CTC is an instrument of the
government policy, antiunion discrimination is not a relevant
concept except as it applies to the Government's repression of
independent union groups like those mentioned above.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution and the Labor Code do not contain
prohibitions on forced labor. Workers do not have full
freedom to change jobs without official approval. Every
worker must present a work identification card in seeking a
new job. This card contains information on performance of
"voluntary" work, protection of socialist property, political
consciousness, failure to meet production goals, and
negligence. In practice, any job change remains under the
control of the authorities who grade and evaluate employee
records that form the basis of the work identity cards.
Special groups of workers on loan from other jobs known as
"microbrigades" are employed on special construction projects,
often working a 60- to 70-hour week of physical labor. Some
human rights monitors allege that workers refusing to
"volunteer" for such projects often find themselves victims of
discrimination or even risk losing their jobs. "Microbrigade"
workers, however, are reportedly rewarded with priority
listing for apartments, a very powerful incentive for
voluntary work.
Various ILO bodies have found that governmental restrictions
on the freedom to choose or change employment are incompatible
with ILO Conventions prohibiting forced labor. Most recently,
the 1989 report of the ILO Committee of Experts, cited above,
found provisions of the new labor code imposing "correctional
labor," and compulsory labor for damage due to negligence, to
be incompatible with Convention 105 on forced labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum working age is 17; however, the labor code
provides for exceptions for those aged 15 and 16 to obtain
training or to fill labor shortages. There is no evidence
that authorities deviated from these rules in 1989. However,
all students above the age of 11 are expected to devote 30 to
45 days of their summer vacations to agricultural work up to a
maximum of 8 hours per day.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
During 1989 Cuba's minimum wage remained at $140 per month at
the overvalued official exchange rate or about $20 in terms of
black-market buying power, plus a "social wage" consisting of
free medical care and education, along with subsidized housing
and rationed food. Even with the state subsidies, a worker
needs to earn substantially more than the minimum wage to
support a family. The value of the "social wage" in improving
living standards is diminished by the persistent shortages and
tight rationing that have become standard features of the
Cuban economy. For example, most newly married couples must
live with relatives for years before obtaining their own
housing and the supression of free farmers' markets in 1986
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CUBA
(following a brief experiment with market incentives)
exacerbated shortages of some foods, although caloric intake
remains high.
Maximum hours of work are 44 regular hours per week, with
shorter workdays for unusually demanding jobs such as
underground mining. Overtime is limited by law and practice,
although workers are pressured to engage in additional unpaid
"voluntary" labor. Workers receive 30 calendar days of
vacation regardless of seniority or age. Provisions for
worker safety and control of pollution generally appear
inadequate. There is a lack of effective control and
enforcement mechanisms to ensure worker safety, and industrial
accidents are apparently frequent.
547
DOMINICA
A parliamentary democracy and a member of the Commonwealth of
Nations, Dominica has been independent since 1978. Prime
Minister Eugenia Charles' Dominica Freedom Party, in office
since 1980, was reelected in 1985. The opposition Democratic
Labour Party won 43 percent of the popular vote in the 1985
elections. A third party, the Dominica United Workers Party,
was formed in 1988.
The police have been the only security force in Dominica since
1981. The Commissioner of Police supervises a small Special
Services Unit (SSU) , which has been incorporated into the
Regional Security System of the Eastern Caribbean States, and
oversees a marine unit which functions as a coast guard. The
police are controlled by and responsive to the democratically
elected Government.
Dominica's economy is based extensively on agriculture. Per
capita gross domestic product is $1,480. Although rugged
terrain and periodic devastation from hurricanes have tended
to hamper development, the economy grew at an impressive rate
for the previous 3 years before slowing down in early 1989.
Affected by a drop in prices, banana exports fell by
approximately 28 percent from the 1988 level. Meanwhile both
the construction and tourism sectors contracted significantly.
In September Hurricane Hugo struck parts of the island,
damaging the banana crop and sections of the country's
infrastructure. The Government's promotion of agricultural
diversification, and a number of new manufacturing and
agricultural ventures (e.g., aloe vera production and a
cardboard box factory) should help offset the adverse effects
of these developments.
The country's human rights record remained good during
1989.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of politically motivated or other
extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no reports of torture or other forms of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. These are
prohibited by the Constitution.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or
exile, and the Government respects these constitutional
provisions. According to Dominican law, persons arrested or
detained must be charged with a crime within 24 hours or be
released from custody. This requirement is honored in
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DOMIWICA
practice. There were no cases of arbitrary arrest or exile in
1989.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Dominican law provides for public trial before an independent,
impartial court. Criminal defendants are presumed innocent
until proven guilty, are allowed legal counsel, and have the
right of appeal. Indigents are provided free legal counsel
only in capital cases.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There were no reports in 1989 of arbitrary government
interference in the private lives of individuals. Arbitrary
entry, search, and seizure are prohibited by the Constitution;
search warrants are required by law.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The right of free expression is provided for by the
Constitution and adhered to in practice. The political
opposition openly criticizes the Government. Although the one
major weekly newspaper is church supported and generally pro-
Government, it does include opposition viewpoints. Similarly,
while the main radio station is state-owned, Dominicans enjoy
access to independent news sources via cable television and
radio reception from neighboring islands. Opposition groups
sporadically publish their own "journals."
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Government respects the constitutionally mandated freedoms
of association and assembly and does not hinder opposition
groups from holding political meetings or public
demonstrations. Such meetings and gatherings were held
periodically throughout the year.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Roman Catholicism is the predominant faith in Dominica, and
there are various Protestant denominations. There are also
small Muslim and Rastafarian communities. There is no
discrimination on the basis of religious faith or practice,
and outside religious groups are not restricted in their
activities .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
These rights are provided for by law and respected in
practice. The Government may revoke passports if subversion
is suspected, but has not done so in recent times.
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DOMINICA
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Although independent only since 1978, Dominica has a much
longer tradition of democracy and home rule. Power is
exercised by a Cabinet appointed by the Prime Minister.
Elections in 1980 and 1985 were free and fair, and were
contested by the incumbent Dominica Freedom Party and the
opposition Labour Party, which won four of 21 seats in the
latter contest. Elections to be held in 1990 will also be
contested by a third party, the United Workers Party.
Elections are by secret ballot and held every 5 years, or
earlier, at the discretion of the Prime Minister.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Dominica has not been accused of any human rights violations
by international groups. There are no government restrictions
on the formation of local human rights organizations, although
none exist at present.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There are constitutional provisions, respected in practice,
against racial or sexual discrimination in Dominica.
Religious practice is not restricted nor is it the basis for
discrimination. Labor laws specify egual pay for equal work.
Officials of the Government's Women's Desk and the Community
Welfare Desk state that violence against women, including
domestic violence such as wife beating, is not characteristic
of Dominican society. Nevertheless, the Government in 1989
concluded a research project on the subject of violence
against women. Interviews were conducted with government and
church officials, with the public, and with victims of abuse.
The survey touched on such issues as which acts are defined as
domestic violence, the number of instances of domestic
violence, and the laws protecting women against violence.
While there are no specific laws dealing with domestic
violence, the Government is aware of the problem and is
investigating its effect on society.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the legal right to organize, to choose their
representatives, and to strike. Approximately 20 percent of
the work force is organized. Unions are historically more
closely associated with the opposition than with the current
governing party. While there were no major strikes in 1989,
one union used secondary boycotts effectively against two
employers to force negotiation of pending demands. Unions can
and do associate with confederations and international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Antiunion discrimination by employers is prohibited by law,
and union rights are enforced by judicial and police
authority. Enforcement mechanisms are the responsibility of
the Department of Labor, whose inspectors carry out
investigations under the supervision of the Commissioner of
Labor. Unions have legally defined rights to organize workers
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DOMINICA
and to bargain with employers. Collective bargaining is
widespread in the nonagr icultural sectors of the economy,
including the government service, and there is also recourse
to mediation and arbitration by the Government. Labor
regulations and practice governing Dominica's three industrial
estates and its other export firms located outside the estates
do not differ markedly from that prevailing in the rest of the
economy. About half of the country's export firms have been
organized by trade unions. However, it is not legally
compulsory for employers to recognize legally constituted
unions as bargaining agents. Moreover, as most of the work
force is female and there is no minimum age for industry, wage
rates tend to be lower than in the economy generally. Also,
the small labor inspection office lacks qualified personnel to
carry out its duties under existing labor legislation.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited and does not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum working age is 14 years; this provision is
generally observed in practice.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The minimum wage for agricultural workers is $3.80 per day,
which is barely sufficient to provide them a minimally decent
standard of living. The minimum salary for civil service
workers is $337 per month. There is no minimum wage law for
industrial workers. The standard workweek is 40 hours m 5
days. The law provides for a minimum of 2 weeks' paid
vacation. The Employment Safety Act, an occupational health
and safety law, is considered to be consistent with
international standards. The enforcement mechanism consists
of inspections by the Department of Labor, which can and does
prescribe specific compliance measures, impose fines, and
prosecute offenders.
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The Dominican Republic is a constitutional democracy with a
popularly elected president and a bicameral congress. The
Supreme Court heads an independent judiciary whose members are
appointed by the Senate. Political parties representing the
ideological spectrum from left to right freely and actively
participated in the May 1986 national elections, the sixth to
be held since 1966. In the elections of 1978 and 1986, the
reins of government were peacefully transferred from one
ruling party to the opposition. The current President,
Joaquin Balaguer, was inaugurated in August 1986 and will
serve until August 1990.
The National Police (PN), the National Department of
Investigation (DNI), and the military serve as the security
services. The PN has general investigative and principal
arrest authority. The military has investigative and general
arrest authority for armed forces personnel and can arrest
suspects apprehended by military patrols. The DNI is the
principal national investigative body for national security
concerns and generally does not have arrest authority. In
1988 the Government created the National Executive Council for
the Control of Drugs to coordinate domestic and international
narcotics programs, bringing under a single authority elements
of the National Police, military, and DNI. All branches of
the security services are responsive to civilian authority.
The Dominican Republic has a mixed economy based primarily on
agriculture (approximately 15 percent of the gross domestic
product) and services. The Government accounts for nearly 25
percent of the gross domestic product and controls several
major industries (sugar, the national airline, electricity,
etc.). Historically, sugar has been the principal export,
although tourism, free trade zones, and remittances from
Dominicans living abroad now generate more foreign exchange.
The country continues to face the burdens of a $4-billion
external debt, a 45-percent inflation rate (estimate for
1989), a rapidly growing population (2.3 percent annually),
and concomitant high levels of unemployment (some 25 percent)
and underemployment (20-25 percent). During 1989, discontent
over the continued deterioration of basic public services,
inflation, and low wage levels generated a series of
demonstrations (some of which became violent), serious
sectoral strikes (including extended teachers' and public
doctors' strikes), and a national general strike in June.
Dominicans generally continued to exercise the broad range of
human rights provided by the Constitution. The political
environment remained unrestricted, and individuals and
political groups freely debated and criticized the
Government's policies and programs. The major human rights
problem which has continued to generate criticism within the
Dominican Republic and abroad was the abuse of human and
worker rights of Haitians residing in the Dominican Republic.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known cases of political killings in 1989.
Daniel Mirambeaux, an ex-member of an extremist, leftist party
who was accused of murdering a New York City policeman during
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
a drug-related crime in October 1988, died on June 30 as a
result of a fall from a third story landing in the national
police headquarters as he was on his way to be transported
back to the United States to stand trial. The official
autopsy stated that the death "was highly compatible with
homicide," fueling charges that the Dominican Government
engineered the death. The four Dominican police officers who
had custody of Mirambeaux at the time of his death all
testified that Mirambeaux jumped from the landing. The
official report and an independent investigation by the United
States Federal Bureau of Investigation, (done at the Dominican
Government's invitation), both determined the probable cause
of death as suicide. The four police officers involved were
suspended from active duty for "gross negligence" in allowing
Mirambeaux to escape physical custody. They were themselves
placed in custody, and a court-martial recommended that they
be separated from the police. On December 22, however.
President Balaguer announced that, as an act of Christmas
clemency, he was ordering their release and reinstatement,
explaining that they had already been punished enough for
their act of negligence.
In two additional cases, the police have been accused of abuse
of prisoners leading to death. In August, Montero Mondesi
died of blows allegedly received while in police custody at
the National Police Headquarters. The officials in charge
were arrested, and the police chief ordered an autopsy and
complete investigation. In September, relatives charged that
Armando Moya Salazar died in custody after being tortured by
the police.
Members of the military were implicated by relatives in the
alleged beating and death of Geovanny Cuello Sencion.
According to press accounts, Cuello and some friends were
picked up by a military patrol following a bar fight he had
with an off-duty soldier. The press reported that Cuello was
held at a military base and beaten for several days, and he
subsequently died on September 16. The military alleges that
Cuello and his friends were involved with illegal drugs. The
police chief led a high-level investigation into the
incident. The military court tried four enlisted men who made
up the patrol. In December their case was still under final
review. No officers have been brought to trial in the
incident .
b. Disappearance
There were no credible reports of politically motivated
disappearances in 1989.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture, but several cases of
mistreatment of prisoners or detainees by law enforcement
officials and military personnel were reported by the press.
In its 1989 report covering 1988, Amnesty International (AI)
expressed concern over the reported beating of several people
in detention following their arrest in mass demonstrations.
The Government states that it has investigated reports of
alleged police abuses, but any results of such investigations
have not been made public.
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There were no credible reports of arbitrary arrest or exile of
citizens for expressing views contrary to or critical of the
Government. However, in mid-December 1988, the Government
summarily deported Dr. Paul Etienne, a Haitian who worked for
a nongovernmental center providing health and social services
to Haitian sugar plantation workers. Human rights groups,
including AI, observed there was no apparent reason for the
expulsion other than his criticisms of the Government's
treatment of Haitians.
There have also been frequent assertions that security forces
forcibly detain Haitians and require them to cut sugar cane on
state-owned plantations (see Section 2.d.)
The Constitution stipulates that suspects may be detained for .
a maximum of 48 hours for investigation before arraignment,
after which they must be charged or released. In 1989 there
were procedural complaints that people were being held in
prison improperly. In response, the Attorney General began to
review prison records in June. She subsequently ordered the
release of 56 prisoners being held without timely trial or
without legal cause, faulting the District Attorney's office
for issuing "irregular" holding orders.
In the last half of 1989, the judiciary, some elements of the
executive branch, and various human rights groups complained
that prisoners were being improperly held, often after court
release orders had been issued in their behalf. Police and
prison officials, on their part, complained that courts were
releasing dangerous criminals or letting them off with light
sentences. After evaluations by the Attorney General and the
Santo Domingo District Attorney, over 50 prisoners were
subsequently released. In late November, President Balaguer
responded to the demands that the Government ensure that court-
ordered releases be obeyed by announcing that the executive
branch was preparing legislation to reform the habeas corpus
law.
Large numbers of people were detained during the year as a
result of protest activities. Many hundreds were reportedly
detained as a measure to prevent violence on the eve of the
June general strike; the strike was peaceful, and those
detained were released shortly thereafter. Also in late June,
a number of teachers were arrested during a confrontation
between striking Dominican teachers' association members and
police; the teachers were released within a few days.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
There are no known political prisoners. The Constitution
provides for a public trial. No special court for political
or national security cases exists, and civilians may not be
tried by a military court. Members of the armed forces are
tried by military courts, except under specific circumstances
and only after review by a military board. The appeals
procedure, which includes appellate courts and the Supreme
Court, is widely utilized. Court-appointed lawyers normally
are provided at public expense to indigents only in criminal
cases; they are seldom provided in criminal misdemeanor cases
in which their provision is at the court's discretion.
Prosecuting attorneys are appointed by the executive branch.
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Judges at all levels are appointed and approved by the
Senate. They are nominally independent of the executive
branch and are subject to removal or transfer by a majority
vote in the Senate. Their terms of office correspond roughly
to that of the President and other elected officials. The
newly elected Senate can either designate their replacements
or reconfirm them.
Judges earn a relatively low salary, and there have been
allegations that the fairness and timeliness of some trials
have been subject to influence and manipulation. There is
widespread public belief that a number of judges and
prosecutors accept bribes. To increase the professionalism of
the judiciary, the Government, in cooperation with the U.S.
Department of Justice, began in 1988 and continued in 1989 a
program which provides judges and court attorneys with
professional training in the legal aspects of criminal
investigation.
The slowness of the judicial system, a problem for many years,
continues to come under criticism. In an effort to attack the
backlog of cases in the courts, the Supreme Court, with
technical assistance from the U.S. Government, has
computerized the Dominican central files and court docket.
Although the right to judicial determination of the legality
of detention exists, preventive detention of those awaiting
trial is legal and commonly employed, and many of those
accused remain in prison for lengthy periods.
Ex-president Salvador Jorge Blanco (of the opposition
Dominican Revolutionary Party) returned to the Dominican
Republic after an absence of 18 months in November 1988 and
remains involved in a lengthy trial on charges of corruption
during his presidency (1982-86). He maintains that his
prosecution is politically motivated.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There were no credible reports of arbitrary governmental
interference with the private lives of persons or families.
Constitutional safeguards against invasion of the home are
generally observed. A residence may not be searched except in
the presence of a prosecutor or an assistant prosecutor,
excluding cases of "hot pursuit" or instances where there is
probable cause to believe that a crime is actually being
committed.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These liberties are provided for by law and are respected in
practice. Dominicans of all political persuasions enjoy
freedom of speech and regularly exercise it. The numerous
privately owned radio and television stations air all
political points of view. Dominican newspapers are privately
owned and freely reflect independent and opposition points of
view. There is no government censorship on political grounds.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are provided for by the Constitution and are
respected in practice. Outdoor public marches and meetings
require government permits, which are routinely granted.
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Indoor gatherings of political parties, labor unions, and
other associations are unrestricted.
Professional organizations of lawyers, doctors, and others
function freely and can maintain relations with counterpart
international bodies of diverse political philosophies.
Although formed as professional associations, many of these
organizations take on roles similar to those of labor unions,
including protest activities and strikes.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Discrimination on religious grounds is prohibited by the
Constitution. There are no religious requirements to hold
public office, no restrictions on the practice of religious
faiths, and no social discrimination based on religion.
Approximately 95 percent of the population is Roman Catholic,
and the Church's preeminent position is recognized in the
Concordat between the Dominican Republic and the Holy See.
There have been no credible reports of government interference
with the free practice of religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no unusual legal restrictions on travel within or
outside the country for citizens. However, the status and
treatment of Haitians living in the Dominican Republic and of
persons of Haitian descent have generated criticism by the
press and private groups, both in the Dominican Republic and
abroad. The Haitian community of perhaps 1,000,000 is
composed mainly of illegal immigrants seeking improved
economic conditions. Over the years, many have remained after
the end of seasonal agricultural contracts and others have
slipped over the border. In February 1989, Haiti created the
Commission for Haitians Overseas to try to induce these
Haitians to return.
In early January, a truck carrying some 73 Haitians overturned
killing 47 Haitians. Several survivors told the press that
they had been captured at the border, kept in military
barracks for several days, and then put on the truck guarded
by Dominican soldiers destined for a sugar plantation. This
incident focused national and international attention on the
situation of Haitians in the Dominican Republic. More
attention arose when the 1989 International Labor Organization
(ILO) Committee of Experts (COE) again faulted the Dominican
Government for its failure to address problems pointed out in
a 1983 ILO study of Haitians in the Dominican Republic. In
addition, the ILO General Assembly made specific criticisms of
the Government for failure to protect worker rights of
Haitians working in the Dominican Republic.
A May 1989 report issued by the private U.S. human rights
group, Americas Watch (AW), charged that the Government and
the state-owned sugar corporation (CEA) did not allow the free
travel of Haitian seasonal agricultural workers during the
sugar harvest, restricting them to the sugar plantations which
had their contract and not permitting them to return to
Haiti. It has also charged that security forces paid
recruiters to lure Haitians into the Dominican Republic who
were then forcibly taken to the state-owned sugar company
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
plantations. The Dominican Government denied these charges
(see Section 6 .c. ) •
For the most part, the Government does not deport illegal
Haitian immigrants, although it may do so under Dominican
immigration law. The Government claimed that this policy is
motivated by humanitarian considerations, noting the problems
the new Haitian Government would have in reassimi lating
hundreds of thousands of its poorer citizens. As a result of
ILO and other criticism of Dominican Government treatment of
Haitian residents, and calls for the Government to legalize
undocumented persons of Haitian descent born in and living in
the Dominican Republic, many economic and political leaders
are publicly calling for the enforcement of immigration laws
and the deportation of large numbers of Haitians.
Persons seeking political refuge (virtually all are Haitian)
are not repatriated if the Government determines that they
have a legitimate fear of persecution. Both Haitian
ex-President Henri Namphy and ex-Port-au-Prince Mayor Franck
Romain were among Haitians from fallen governments who fled to
the Dominican Republic and safety in 1988 and remained through
1989. A group of Haitian military officers who led an aborted
coup attempt in April were allowed into the Dominican Republic
in transit to the United States. Six members of the Basque
separatist organization "ETA" received political asylum in the
Dominican Republic in April. Despite subsequent requests from
Spain, the Dominican Government stated that it would not
extradite or return the six men.
The Constitution requires that all foreigners abstain from
political activities while in the Dominican Republic. During
1989, the Avril Government in Haiti repeatedly complained that
the Dominican Republic was being used by Haitian dissidents,
especially those from the Duvalier regime, as a safehaven for
antigovernment activity. However, the Dominican Government
has insisted that it will enforce its prohibition, especially
in asylum cases, of political activity by foreigners.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Dominican Republic is a functioning multiparty democracy
in which governments are freely elected by the citizenry every
4 years by secret ballot. Opposition groups of the left,
right, and center operate openly and participated in the 1986
elections in which nearly three-quarters of the registered
electorate voted, selecting national, provincial, and
municipal office holders. All major parties and a large
number of smaller parties are involved in open and free
campaigning for the next general election, scheduled for May
1990.
Although the bicameral Congress is similar in structure and
representation to that of the United States, it exerts limited
power in practice. The President uses the veto, broad
discretion to act by decree, and his influence as the head of
his party (which currently has an overwhelming majority in the
Senate and a near majority in the Chamber of Deputies) to
exercise principal influence in enacting laws and
regulations. However, in its enactment of bills, the Congress
does provide an open forum for the free exchange of views and
debate. On rare occasions, the Congress successfully
challenges the President.
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Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The access of international human rights organizations is
unrestricted. During 1989, AW visited the Dominican Republic
twice to study the issue of Haitian seasonal workers. AW
representatives freely met with a wide variety of people,
including a number of government officials, and traveled
throughout the country.
Private organizations which freely report and comment on human
rights include the Dominican Human Rights Committee, the
Dominican Union for the Defense of Human Rights, and the
National Committee of Human and Labor Rights. The major labor
confederations (which represent the principal regional and
international labor organizations) also have offices and
internal organizations which work with and for worker rights
and on the Haitian agricultural workers' issue. There have
been no credible reports that the Government has restricted
entry to, or activities within, the Dominican Republic of
these organizations.
The Dominican Republic participates actively in international
and regional human rights bodies and supports efforts to
promote human rights in international forums.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination based on sex and race is prohibited by law.
Divorce is easily obtainable by either spouse, and women can
hold property in their own names apart from their husbands.
Nonetheless, women traditionally have not shared equal social
and economic status or opportunity with men.
There is no officially sanctioned violence against women,
although such violence, including domestic violence such as
wife beating, does occur. However, a lack of statistical data
makes it difficult to determine its actual extent. Human
rights and women's rights groups do not consider violence
agsinst women to be one of their major concerns, and
government policy generally reflects this attitude. During
1989, the Government did take several positive steps to
protect women. For example, during the summer the police
mounted an effective campaign to combat kidnap-f or-rape crimes
in Santo Domingo.
The Dominican populace is predominantly nonwhite (73 percent
mixed and 11 percent black) . For historical reasons and
because of sharp cultural differences, there is a strain of
prejudice against Haitians in Dominican society. This often
translates into discrimination against those with darker skin
(i.e., Haitian appearing) (see Section 2.d.). Dark-skinned
Dominicans, including some of Haitian descent, have been
successful in a variety of fields, including elected political
office. Still, persons of Haitian descent
("Dominico-Haitianos") traditionally fill the lowest economic
and social niches, in part because of concern about possible
illegal status, a lack of skills, and problems with the
language and culture. AW has reported that due to prejudicial
attitudes, children of such persons often cannot obtain
documents to prove their citizenship and therefore are
unable to attend school. There is no evidence that children
of Dominican citizens of Haitian descent have been unable to
obtain such documentation or attend school.
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Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides for the freedom to organize labor
unions, and also for the rights of labor to strike and the
private sector to lock out. However, unions operate under the
handicap of a dated labor code (1951) that gives unions few
rights vis-a-vis management and gives no effective protection
for organizers or union officials. The labor code specifies
in detail the steps required to constitute a legal union,
federation, or confederation, and labor objects that the
Government can use the failure to comply with every minute
detail to withhold official recognition, as AW reports it has
done with the Union of Cane-Cutters of Barahona, which applied
in February 1988 to the Ministry of Labor and has not yet been
recognized.
The labor code defines the right to strike but also denies the
right to strike to workers in public services and prohibits
general strikes. Nevertheless, professional organizations
representing public service workers have not been deterred
from strikes — including major work stoppages in 1989 by
doctors, nurses, teachers, agronomists, and judges, as well as
participation by many public workers in the June 1989 general
strike. Although these strikes were illegal under the labor
code, the Government negotiated with the striking parties.
The ILO's COE in 1989 noted several deficiencies in the
Dominican labor code, including the prohibition of sympathy
strikes and political strikes.
Organized labor in the Dominican Republic represents about 12
percent of the work force and is divided among 8 competing and
highly politicized confederations and a small number of
independent unions. The confederations exercise only a
limited degree of control or coordination over their
affiliates and receive only minimal financial support from
their members. An umbrella group to coordinate organized
labor was formed in July 1989 as a result of the general
strike, to negotiate on a sector-wide basis with the private
sector on a variety of labor issues.
Labor groups represent the political/ideological spectrum, and
several are associated with regional and international labor
organizations. According to knowledgeable estimates based on
the membership of Dominican organized labor, 32 percent were
affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions, 16 percent with the World Confederation of Labor, and
25 percent with the Communist-controlled World Federation of
Trade Unions (WFTU) . An additional 22 percent were affiliated
with the Communist regional trade union organization
(CPUSTAL) , apart from the WFTU. There have been no credible
reports of the Government interfering in or
restricting association with international labor organizations
or activities.
Many of the labor groups are affiliated with political parties
and frequently pursue partisan political objectives as much as
workers' economic interests, but are independent of government
control. The ailing economy and high unemployment and
underemployment have hampered the growth of organized labor.
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The labor code clearly stipulates that workers cannot be
dismissed because of their trade union membership or
activities. Still, there are complaints that these
protections are ignored and that labor leaders are being
discriminated against. Criticism is often directed at Article
69 of the code which essentially permits an employer to
dismiss a worker without cause. The ILO's COE noted in 1989
that the Government still needed to strengthen measures
protecting workers against antiunion discrimination.
Although the labor movement is growing and collective
bargaining is increasing, both continue to be severely
limited by the competition and fragmentation of labor and
labor's scarce financial and manpower resources in difficult
economic times. One of the fastest growing economic sectors
is the industrial free trade zones which began in the late
1960's and now employ about 112,000 workers (5.5 percent of
available jobs), representing the third largest source of
employment after the Government and the sugar industry. The
free trade zone labor force, over 70 percent female, is
generally nonunionized. Although the labor code applies to
free trade zones, in both 1988 and 1989 there were allegations
that workers identified in applications for union recognition
were dismissed from free trade zone companies shortly after
the presentation of documents to the Secretariat of Labor.
Labor union officials also charged that the Secretariat of
Labor failed to act on formal applications for recognition of
unions in the free trade zones within the required 30-day
period.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law. There was no
contract between the Governments of Haiti and the Dominican
Republic to bring in Haitian cane cutters for the 1989
harvest. AW reported that in 1989, as in the past, Haitian
laborers in the sugar cane fields, especially those in the
country illegally, were subject to abusive living and working
conditions and in some cases were forced to work against their
will. AW charged that the Government (which controls a major
part of the sugar industry through the parastatal corporation
CEA) used military and police to round up Haitians and then
compelled them to sign a sugar cane cutter contract or be
deported. Some human rights groups report that they have
documented cases of Dominicans of Haitian descent and Haitians
residing legally in the country being subjected to this
treatment. The issue has been under review for a number of
years by ILO supervisory bodies. In the 1989 annual meeting,
the Committee on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations expressed detailed concern about the situation
of Haitians on the CEA plantations, and the ILO Conference
adopted a "special paragraph" in its annual report critical of
the Dominican Republic for violating ILO standards on forced
labor .
In response to the AW report alleging that persons of Haitian
origin were coerced to cut sugar cane against their will.
President Balaguer said that the charges were purely political
in nature. The Acting Foreign Secretary admitted that
individual abuses may occur, but he affirmed that this in no
way reflected Dominican Government policy. The CEA denied the
charges, and the CEA director said that CEA does not and will
not tolerate abuses towards Haitian workers.
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Dominican labor code prohibits employment of youths under
14 years of age, and restricts the nighttime employment of
youths aged 14 to 18. The labor code also provides that
employees under age 18 work no more than 8 hours a day, and
specifies that those 18 years and younger may not be employed
in dangerous or unhealthy jobs. In practice, many of the
restrictions in the labor code are ignored. Young people,
including minors younger than 14 years of age, engage in a
variety of work which technically violates the labor
regulations. There are many youths in the informal economy,
selling newspapers, washing car windows, shining shoes, or
begging in the streets. The Dominican Government denied that
it encouraged or deliberately permitted the illegal employment
of youths. During the year, the Secretariat of Labor
investigated the employment of youths in Santo Domingo and
Santiago areas and enforced the law in cases where companies
were found with underage workers or teens without proper
permission. Some young workers obtained work permits and
continued their employment. Those who were unable to obtain
permits were released. Some companies were subjected to small
fines for violating the law. The AW report charged that
Haitian youths were being recruited and used to harvest sugar
cane for CEA. The Episcopal Black Bishops' Conference, held
in Santo Domingo in April, made a similar charge (see Section
6.C.) .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The labor code establishes that all workers are entitled to 24
hours of rest after 6 days of work; in practice, a typical
workweek is Monday through Friday plus half a day on
Saturday. However, for manual and unskilled labor, longer
hours are not unusual. Safety and health conditions at places
of work do not always meet legal standards. The existing
social security system does not apply to all workers and is
underfunded; as a result benefits are low, payments often
delayed, and medical care is limited and available only in the
major cities.
Conditions among agricultural workers are in general much
worse, with little rest and long hours during harvest and
planting seasons. Some observers alleged that Haitian workers
on CEA plantations are not allowed to eat or rest during the
day at harvest time and are required to work significantly
longer than the legal 48-hour week. The Government has
responded that Haitians live under the same conditions as
Dominicans doing equivalent work and has denied that it
condones or permits mistreatment of workers. The CEA
management has affirmed that it would punish any manager found
mistreating workers.
In 1988 the Government, in response to terms worked out in
church-sponsored talks including the government, labor, and
business sectors to maintain real wages in the face of high
inflation, raised the basic minimum monthly wage from $55 to
$80. Some smaller businesses and agricultural workers were
exempt from the new pay scale. As a result of the June
general strike, the minimum wage for the public sector was
raised in August 1989 from $64 to $80 a month. The general
strike also led to negotiations between organized labor and
business leaders to raise the private sector minimum wage.
Business leaders unilaterally granted a raise from $80 to $104
a month in August, while negotiations continued. In October
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the Government's National Salary Committee officially raised
the national private sector minimum wage to $104, the
voluntary level offered by the private sector. However, after
a threat of a national labor strike by seven of the eight
national labor confederations, the Government and labor
negotiated an additional raise of $7 to $111.
According to labor leaders and many private sector
businessmen, the vast majority of workers receive only the
minimum wage. The current $111 a month is not sufficient,
even with high government subsidies on essential goods and
services, to maintain a small family at a minimally acceptable
standard of living. A report published in mid-1989 by a local
economic study center concluded that real salaries had
declined by 50 percent since 1970. A June 1989 study by a
local retail association found that feeding a family of five
at a subsistence level (assuming one meal a day, with
inexpensive canned tuna as the only animal protein) would cost
$137 a month.
ft
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ECUADOR
Ecuador is a constitutional republic with a president and
71-member unicameral Congress chosen in free elections.
Members of the Supreme Court, chosen by Congress, preside over
an independent judiciary. In 1989 Ecuador celebrated the 10th
anniversary of its return to democracy after 7 years of
military rule. Fourteen registered political parties, a free
press, and numerous and active labor unions characterize an
open and lively political system. President Rodrigo Borja of
the Democratic Left party completed the first year of his
4-year term in August. Although the Popular Democracy (a
Christian democratic party) withdrew its members from the
executive branch coalition in July, it continues to cooperate
with the President's party in the legislature, as does the
small Communist party, the Broad Front of the Left (FADI).
Congressional elections are currently scheduled for June 1990.
The President controls the police through the Ministry of
Government. In 1989 there were few charges of police abuse of
citizens for political reasons, although Ecuadorian human
rights activists charge that lower level police officials
sometimes resort to force during investigations of common
crime.
A small group of violent leftwing terrorists, Alfaro Vive
Carajo (AVC) , that maintains links with the Colombian M-19
group, continues to operate in Ecuador. A few AVC members are
in jail, having been sentenced for participation in violent
crimes. Other AVC members were released from prison after
completing their sentences. The Borja Administration and the
AVC signed an accord in March 1989 in which the AVC agreed to
integrate itself into legitimate political activity.
Ecuador has a basically free enterprise economic system
although the Government controls petroleum production and
export. Petroleum, agricultural products, and fish account
for the bulk of exports. High foreign debt, unfavorable terms
of trade for key export items, and extensive rural poverty,
especially among highblood Indians, burdened the economy in
1989.
Most human rights were well respected by the Government in
1989. Problem areas included police or military mistreatment
of suspects during criminal investigations, brutal prison
conditions, lengthy detentions without charge, and faulty
judicial procedures.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known political killings in Ecuador in 1989.
Some human rights observers believe the killing by unknown
assailants on September 6 of journalist Francisco "Pancho"
Jaime, who published a satiric magazine in Guayaquil
lampooning top politicians in Ecuador, was politically
motivated. Others discount this, believing it was likely a
personal matter. No arrests have been made in the case. One
person was shot and killed during a January 9 demonstration in
Quito, but it remains unclear who did the shooting. There
were no cases of excessive use of force by police resulting in
extrajudical killings in 1989 as there were in previous years.
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b. Disappearance
There were no known cases of disappearance attributable to
government forces in 1989. Four of the cases still unresolved
at the end of 1988 remain unresolved. The 1985 disappearance
of Consuelo Benavides Cevallos led to a multiparty
congressional investigation which concluded in 1989 that
Benavides was killed within a week of her disappearance, and
that the naval forces stationed in Esmeraldas Province
probably were responsible for the disappearance and killing.
The Supreme Court decided in 1989 not to hear the case brought
by the Benavides family and recommended that a lower court
hear the family's suit. That case was in progress in
Esmeraldas at year's end.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although torture and other such forms of intimidation or
punishment are prohibited by law, there are persistent
credible reports that excessive force is used by lower level
police officials, particularly against youthful suspects
during investigations of common crimes. There have been no
instances in recent years of police officials being tried and
punished for such conduct.
Prison conditions continue to be so brutal as themselves to
constitute cruel and inhuman treatment. Beatings for
disciplinary purposes are common. Use of solitary confinement
in an arbitrary manner as a disciplinary measure also
continues, although the Director of Prisons indicated to human
right activists his intention to end the practice.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and prolonged
detention without charge. The criminal code provides for a
judicial determination of the legality of detention and
reguires that arrested persons must be charged within 48 hours
of arrest. In practice, some suspects are held substantially
longer than 48 hours before being charged. Five members of
the AVC, who were being held without charge in connection with
a 1985 murder case, were released in October; they had been
imprisoned since 1985. Preventive detention is limited to 48
hours by law. In 1989 there were no cases of arrest for
crimes which could be construed as political. Forced exile is
not practiced.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Congress elects the Supreme Court and has the power to
impeach judges, to set the budget of the judicial branch, and
to ratify the Supreme Court's judicial review decisions. From
time to time, the Supreme Court investigates allegations of
judicial inefficiency or improprieties and may remove judges
of lower courts. In November the Congress enacted a law
granting authority to remove lower court judges to provincial
courts .
The autonomous Constitutional Guarantees Tribunal (TGC) is
composed of representatives named by the President, the
Congress, the judiciary, municipalities, business, and labor.
The TGC is empowered by the Constitution to investigate
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breaches of constitutional or human rights. The TGC submits
its findings to Congress but has no statutory power to enforce
sanctions. Military courts may try only those cases involving
infractions of military regulations or acts against military
installations .
As in most civil law systems there is no trial by jury;
judges play a central role in deciding guilt or innocence. In
theory, defendants have the right to counsel as soon as
arrested, although in practice this can take time and depends
on defendants' economic resources. They can call witnesses on
their own behalf, cross-examine all witnesses, refrain from
testifying against themselves, and appeal to higher courts.
Although a public defender system is mandated by the
Constitution, the quality, reliability, and availability of
the defenders are inconsistent.
Due to both inefficiency and corruption, detainees often face
extended periods of pretrial detention after being charged and
tried. Time spent awaiting trial and sentencing counts toward
completion of the final sentence, but some long-term detainees
have been found innocent, and, because of incompetent defense,
many prisoners never see their final sentences reduced
concomitantly. The poor and other disadvantaged groups who
cannot afford to hire private lawyers usually face the longest
periods of pretrial detention.
According to some human rights activists and political
figures, corruption charges against Abdala Bucaram (President
Rodrigo Borja's opponent in the 1988 presidential campaign and
mayor of Guayaquil in the mid-1980 's) as well as the ongoing
suit against the son-in-law of former President Febres-Cordero
are politically motivated, and demonstrate that the Ecuadorian
legal system is open to political manipulation.
There were no political prisoners in 1989.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Police are required to have a warrant to enter a private home
or business except in cases of hot pursuit. The police
generally respect the sanctity of private homes and
correspondence, although there have been cases of illegal
entry in past years. Police surveillance is permitted and
used in practice in criminal investigations. No specific
cases of illegal surveillance or entry were reported in 1989.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and
communication and this is respected in practice. Most of the
major media organs — television, print and radio — are in
private hands, although the Government owns one radio
network. The Government occasionally requires television and
radio to broadcast government programs featuring the President
and requires newspapers to carry a minimum amount of news
prepared by the National Secretariat of Social Communication.
The media are lively and open, and represent the spectrum of
political opinion from conservative to Communist. There are
two major dailies in the capital, three in the principal
commercial center, Guayaquil, and more than 20 additional
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papers published daily throughout the country. There are also
numerous newsmagazines published in Ecuador. There are four
national television networks and over 400 radio stations, as
well as programming from the United States available in
Ecuador by cable, all of which operate freely, without
censorship.
There is no evidence of government interference with academic
freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the rights of free assembly and
association for peaceful purposes, rights which are generally
respected in practice. Public rallies require prior approval
(which is generally granted unless public order or safety are
threatened) from local government agencies.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it relates to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Citizens are free to practice the religion of their choice.
There is no official state religion, although the population
is nominally over 90 percent Roman Catholic. There are active
Protestant and Jewish communities in the major cities. The
Constitution prohibits discrimination against persons for
religious reasons, although members of the clergy of any
religious faith are barred from election to the Congress, the
presidency, or vice presidency. Foreign-based religious
orders are active in Ecuador and generally have cooperative
relations with the Government.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution provides all citizens the right to travel
freely throughout the country, choose their place of
residence, and depart from and reenter Ecuador freely. These
rights are respected in practice. Persons from other
countries have readily found asylum in Ecuador. Some human
rights activists and lawyers report that Ecuadorian
immigration authorities have occasionally not respected the
right of foreigners in deportation proceedings. No cases of
forced resettlement were reported in 1989.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Following 7 years of military rule, free and open democratic
elections for president took place in 1979, 1984, and 1988.
Congressional elections take place every 2 years, with the
next scheduled for June 1990. There are currently 14
political parties legally registered in Ecuador, including 2
Communist parties — the Soviet-oriented FADI and the more
extreme Popular Democratic Movement (MPD) (more sympathetic to
the Chinese Communist Party), both of which are represented in
Congress. In total, 11 of the 14 registered parties are
currently represented in the legislature. Voting is mandatory
for literate citizens over 18 years of age, and voluntary for
the illiterate. Active duty members of the military service,
according to the Constitution, may not vote. All citizens,
regardless of sex, religion, socioeconomic status, or ethnic
origin, have the right to form and join political parties.
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Only legally registered political parties can present
candidates for election, and a candidate has to be a member of
a legally registered party to stand for election.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In 1989 there were no reports of lack of cooperation by the
administration of President Rodrigo Borja with either domestic
or international human rights groups. There were complaints
that lower level security officials occasionally did not
cooperate in reviews of specific human rights cases. However,
human rights observers agree that at the political level
government officials are normally cooperative and often try to
resolve problems which occur in the first instance at lower
levels .
The organizations most active in monitoring human rights in
Ecuador during 1989 were the Ecuadorian Ecumenical Commission
on Human Rights, the Latin American Human Rights Association
(ALDHU, headquartered in Quito), and the Ecuadorian
Congressional Commission on Human Rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Although the Constitution specifically outlaws discrimination
for racial, religious, linguistic, gender, political, or
social reasons, in practice such discrimination does occur.
There is no overt or legally sanctioned discrimination against
these groups, but historically the urban poor have been and
remain predominantly black, Indian, or of mixed ethnic
background. The vast majority of the Indian population is
rural and poor. Indigenous groups complained that government
programs encouraging economic development and migration to
sparsely populated areas traditionally inhabited by various
Indian tribes are destroying indigenous cultural and economic
life. The Government promotes colonization in the Oriente,
which has the effect of negating the land rights of the
indigenous people of the region. This colonization process
reflects a desire on the part of some in the Government to
fortify the frontier with Peru. Other government agencies are
attempting to establish mechanisms to ensure that the rights
of the Indian population are protected, but to date these
efforts have been only minimally successful, if at all.
Even though some changes in law in 1987 and 1989 granted
additional rights to women in the areas of property, divorce,
and inheritance, women still suffer discrimination under civil
law. No recent data on women in the Ecuadorian work force are
available but women's rights activists agree that women's wage
rates are lower than men's even in the same occupation.
Violence against women probably occurs with greater frequency
than is reported in the media or in official data. Wife
beating is believed to be common but is rarely reported. Wife
beating is not prohibited by law. Human rights groups believe
that in this male-dominated traditional society, women are
either afraid or ashamed to report rapes when they occur. In
addition, until recently, Ecuadorian men had the legal right
to beat a female relative caught in an "illicit" sexual act.
In 1989 there were no official government programs designed to
address the problem of violence against women.
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Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers by law enjoy the right of association in forming and
belonging to trade unions, as well as the right to strike.
The only limitation on these rights is the prohibition against
unionization for the military, police, and those government
employees (the vast majority) who are covered by the
Ecuadorian Administrative Code. (Public employees covered by
the Ecuadorian Work Code do have the right to form unions and
to strike) .
Approximately 12 to 15 percent of the labor force is
unionized. There are four large labor centrals or
confederations, and numerous unaffiliated unions, some of
which are quite effective, such as the National Drivers'
Federation. Unions are free of government control and are
free to join international labor organizations. The
Confederation of Free Trade Union Organizations is affiliated
to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU) .
In a rare instance, the Government took into custody the
president of the National Drivers Federation in an attempt to
break a June strike, but the union leader was only held for 48
hours and the strike took place anyway.
In its 1989 report, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Committee of Experts (COE) reiterated its observation that
several of the provisions of Ecuador's labor code are
incompatible with ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of
Association. Among them: prohibitions on public employees
forming trade unions; the requirement that members of works
councils' executive committees be Ecuadorian; dissolution of a
works council when union membership falls below 25%;
prohibition of unions participating in political or religious
activities; and the penalty of imprisonment for instigators of
collective work stoppages. The Government's failure to bring
its legislation into compliance with Convention 87 and
Convention 105 on forced labor (see below) was the subject of
a "special paragraph" in the report of the Committee on
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CACR) to the
1989 International Labor Conference.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
All private employers with more than 15 employees who belong
to a union or employees' association are obliged by the Labor
Code to negotiate collectively when the union so requests.
This broad right does not extend to most public sector
employees, nor to management in certain entities with social
or public objectives, "nor to employees of entities financed
by municipal or central government taxes, tariffs, or
subsidies." The Labor Code prohibits discrimination against
unions, and requires that employers provide space for union
activities if the union requests. However, the report of the
ILO's COE, cited above, noted Ecuadorian law does not provide
protection against antiunion activity at the time of
recruitment .
The Labor Code provides for resolution of labor conflicts
through an Arbitration and Conciliation Board which consists
of the labor inspector of the Ministry of Labor, two
representatives named by the workers, and two named by the
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employer. Participation in this arbitration process is
voluntary, and strikes and lockouts are permitted even while
arbitration is under way.
The ICFTU executive board in May 1989 resolved to ask the
ICFTU general secretary to lodge a complaint with the ILO
against the Government of Ecuador for its actions in
connection with a strike against the National Brewers Company
because these actions "contribute to flagrant disregard for
recognized international labor standards." Some observers
within Ecuador's labor movement, however, are not in agreement
that the employer is guilty of "flagrant disregard."
The labor law is enforced uniformly throughout the country;
there are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor is prohibited under the Constitution as well
as the Labor Code. In 1989 there were no reports of forced
labor. The ILO's COE called on the Government to repeal
Decree 105, which provides punishment, including compulsory
labor, for anyone who participates in a work stoppage.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Persons of less than 14 years of age are prohibited by law
from working, except in special circumstances such as
apprenticeships. Those between ages 14 and 18 are required to
have parental or guardian permission to work. In practice, in
rural areas and in the active informal economy which is
particularly evident in major cities, many children under the
age of 14 work in family-owned businesses, as shoeshiners,
street peddlers, or on family-owned farms. Rudimentary
enforcement mechanisms exist but are totally inadequate.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor Code provides for a 40-hour workweek, a 15-day
annual vacation, a minimum wage, and employer-provided
benefits. The minimum wage was recently raised to
approximately $47 per month. This minimum wage is not
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker
and his family. Many must supplement the minimum wage with
income from other sources. Employers are responsible for
maintaining safe and clean working conditions. The Social
Security Institute is responsible for enforcement, which is
generally adequate.
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El Salvador has a freely elected democratic government, with
an executive branch headed by a president, a unicameral
legislative assembly, and an independent, but politically
appointed, judiciary. On June 1, for the first time in
Salvadoran history, civilian control of the government passed
from one political party to another following free and fair
elections. Alfredo Cristiani of the Nationalist Republican
Alliance (ARENA) party assumed the Presidency from the
incumbent, Jose Napoleon Duarte of the Christian Democrats
(PDC) .
The Armed Forces of El Salvador (ESAF) total 56,000, including
some 11,500 members of the police forces. There are three
national police entities, usually referred to as the security
forces: the National Police, the National Guard, and the
Treasury Police. The security forces are considered part of
the armed forces. The National Police, National Guard, and
Treasury Police report to the Vice Minister of Defense for
Public Security.
El Salvador has a mixed economy, and private property is
generally respected. The country's economy is predominantly
agricultural. Coffee accounts for 65 percent of foreign
exchange earnings. The economy has experienced 6 years of
modest growth, despite losses of nearly $2 billion caused by
an armed insurgency. The Farabundo Marti Front for National
Liberation (FMLN) follows a strategy of seeking to disrupt the
operations of the economy: it holds traffic bans which
disrupt normal commercial activity; it extorts "war taxes" to
raise income; and it has increasingly resorted to sabotage of
economic targets. The group's stated goal is to worsen
economic conditions in order to turn the population against
the elected government. The FMLN's November 1989 offensive,
during which attacks were focused on San Salvador and other
urban areas, caused nearly $20 million worth of damage to
economic enterprises and infrastructure.
The FMLN has been engaged in an armed insurgency since 1980,
dedicated to the violent overthrow of governments now
regularly established through democratic processes. The FMLN
has an estimated 6,000 full-time combatants backed by a
network of front groups, part-time militia, and urban commando
cells. During much of 1989 the FMLN pursued a public policy
of attempting to make the country "ungovernable" through
increased urban bombings and assassinations of intellectuals,
newspaper columnists, civilian employees of the military,
former FMLN members, mayors, and government ministers and
their families. The FMLN sought to thwart the democratic
elections in March by threatening the lives of those who
administered the election process and those who transported
voters to the polling places, and rejected a government
cease-fire during the election period. On the political
front, the FMLN offered in January and in September two
proposals to negotiate an end to the conflict. For the first
time the FMLN dropped demands for power sharing and
acknowledged the validity of elections as a means to power; it
specifically called for postponement of the March elections.
FMLN insistence on an unconstitutional delay in the elections
and its refusal to accept the Government's cease-fire proposal
made agreement on a proposal impossible. In September the
FMLN made a new proposal; shortly thereafter the Government
and the FMLN agreed to permanent monthly meetings in an
attempt to reach an end to the conflict and the FMLN's
incorporation into political life. Meetings were held in
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September and in October. On November 11, the FMLN launched a
nationwide offensive which left over 3,000 guerrillas,
soldiers, and civilians dead and thousands more wounded.
Nevertheless, the government delegation went to Caracas for
the scheduled November 20 negotiating session, but the FMLN
did not show up.
As the insurgency gathered strength in the early 1980's,
members of the security forces repeatedly violated the human
rights of their fellow citizens and were unquestionably
involved in widespread death squad activities. Although
abuses continue, successful investigation and prosecution
efforts now mean that military personnel, including officers,
cannot count themselves immune to prosecution. In March
1989 the military turned over two officers, three
noncommissioned officers, and six soldiers to civilian
authorities for prosecution resulting from the September 1988
massacre of 10 civilians in San Sebastian. In May an active
duty officer in the armed forces was found guilty and
sentenced for the 1987 murder of three men. In January 1990,
Colonel Guillermo Alfredo Benavides Moreno, Commandant of the
Military Academy and Overall Commander of units providing
security to the Academy area, along with two lieutenants, a
sub-lieutenant, and five other soldiers, was held in custody
and charged with the slayings of six Jesuit priests, a
housekeeper, and her daughter on the campus of the University
of Central America on November 16.
Statistics kept by the American Embassy, aggregated for only
the first 8 months of the year, do not show an increase in
civilian political killings. Nevertheless, rightwing
vigilantism continued to be a serious human rights concern.
While intense investigation of some notable cases has produced
information useful to the prosecution, in many cases it was
unclear who the perpetrators were — rightwing vigilantes, the
security forces, the FMLN, or common criminals taking
advantage of the violent environment that has characterized
the country in recent years.
The judicial process continued to be hindered by archaic
procedures, inadequate facilities, intimidation of judges, and
corruption. The FMLN ' s assassination of the Attorney General
in April was an additional blow. Unfortunately, there was
little progress in the prosecution of some key human rights
cases during 1989. Although the military leadership showed
somewhat greater cooperation in investigations of reported
human rights abuses by members of the military, this attitude
was not reflected in the lower ranks of the ESAF, where
cooperation with civilian investigators is, at best, erratic
or problematic.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The assassinations of the Jesuits, the Attorney General, and
the Minister of the Presidency were among the numerous
political and extrajudicial killings occurring during the
year. Discerning a trend or pattern in the level of such
violence is always difficult, the more so in 1989 with a
guerrilla offensive beginning in November. The collection and
classification of information on politically motivated
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killings is inexact, and general numbers can only indicate
trends in violence over time in comparison with past reports
using a consistent methodology. Common criminal murders, for
example, can easily be disguised as political killings by
perpetrators wishing to confound investigators; at the same
time, a political motive in other murders may go undetected,
causing them to be classified as common crimes.
The November FMLN offensive precluded a satisfactory count of
political killings through the end of the year. Through
August, the number of deaths reported in the Salvadoran press
which may have been politically motivated averaged 17 per
month; this compares with a monthly average of 19 in 1988, 23
in 1987, 22 in 1986, 28 in 1985, 64 in 1984, 140 in 1983, 219
in 1982, 444 in 1981, and 750 in 1980. Given the isolation of
some rural areas, it is likely that the press does not report
the full number of civilian deaths.
Of the 138 apparently politically motivated killings of
noncombatants during the first 8 months of the year, 64 appear
clearly to have been perpetrated by the FMLN, with another 16
probably attributed to them; 14 killings were attributed to
military personnel; and in 2 cases there was insufficient
evidence to designate the likely assailants. Included among
the 138 victims were 42 civilians reportedly killed in combat
action between the FMLN and the El Salvador military.
In statistics maintained by the U.S. Embassy on unexplained
murders in which a political motive, though not apparent could
not be excluded, these deaths decreased from an average of 21
per month during 1988 to an average of 16 per month during the
first 8 months of 1989. A breakdown of these statistics
showed that in the period after the March election the monthly
average was 13, compared to 21 in January through March.
There continued to be reports of noncombat killings attributed
to the military and police. On July 24 the ESAF announced the
deaths of two young men. Hector Miranda Marroquin and Lucio
Parada, who were in the custody of the Atlacatl Battalion
beyond the legally allowed 72-hour detention period. The
military high command ordered an investigation into the deaths
and two soldiers were charged with the murders; the first is
in custody and the other fled to avoid arrest. The second
suspect charged, in a statement given when he was outside of
the country, that his actions were directed by a death squad
which operated out of the Armed Forces' First Brigade. The
First Brigade denied the charges, and the case remained under
investigation at year's end.
On August 22, a member of the Atlacatl Battalion killed a 17-
year-old high school student in an apparent accident. The
ESAF apologized to the family and charged the soldier
responsible. In another case in August, members of the
military detachment in Sonsonate killed one student and
wounded seven. The Chief of the Joint Staff apologized to the
parents and promised to bring the guilty soldiers (who claimed
to believe that the students were FMLN members setting up a
roadblock) to justice. Although an investigation was under
way, by year's end no soldiers had been detained.
On November 16, 1989, six Jesuits, their housekeeper, and her
daughter were murdered on the Central American University
campus (UCA) . The victims were Father Ignacio Ellacuria, the
UCA's Rector; Father Segundo Montes, Director of the UCA's
Human Rights Institute; Father Ignacio Martin Baro; Father
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EL SALVADOR
Amando Lopez; Father Joaquin Lopez y Lopez; Father Juan Ramon
Moreno Pardo; and Mrs. Elba Julia Ramos and her daughter,
Celine Ramos. The Government initiated a thoroughgoing
investigation employing the forensic expertise of the
U. S. -supported Special Investigative Unit. President
Cristiani offered a $250,000 reward for information leading to
the arrest of those involved and asked for assistance from the
United States, Great Britain, Spain, and Canada in the
investigation. Autopsies were conducted and a full range of
ballistics tests were run on the recovered bullets and
shells. Testimony was taken from military personnel and
civilians who were polygraphed to evaluate the veracity of
their information. At the beginning of 1990, nine soldiers of
the Atlacatl Battalion, including a colonel and two
lieutenants, were in legal custody for the killings.
President Cristiani expressed the determination of the
Government to take the case beyond investigation to
prosecution and conviction of the wrongdoers.
On election day, three journalists died in unrelated
incidents. Dutch cameraman Cornell Lagreuw died while filming
a firefight between the military and the guerrillas. He was
struck by stray bullets. Lagreuw' s film shows him to be
directly behind a guerrilla position. During the subsequent
attempt by fellow journalists to get him to emergency medical
care, a military helicopter repeatedly fired at the vehicle he
was being transported in, hitting no one but impeding the
vehicle's progress. The ESAF acknowledged its actions but
explained that the pilots thought the vehicle was transporting
fleeing combatants. Another journalist was killed by Air
Force soldiers manning a roadblock near the Ilopango air
base. The soldiers in this case have been charged with murder
and were awaiting trial at year's end. A third journalist
died in the eastern city of San Miguel; apparently his vehicle
ran a roadblock before dawn on election day. The Minister of
Defense and the Chief of the Joint Staff initiated a thorough
review of the military's procedures for dealing with the press
in the field and issued new guidance to the military on these
procedures .
A special military honor board headed by the Minister of
Defense in March found evidence that 11 ESAF members,
including two officers, were culpable in the September 1988
killings of 10 civilians at San Sebastian. The soldiers and
officers were turned over to civilian authorities for
prosecution. At year's end, the investigative phase of the
prosecution was nearly complete, and the ESAF members remained
in detention awaiting trial.
In 1989 various groups charged that formal paramilitary death
squads were operating again. Not since 1984, however, have
there been any publicly acknowledged death squad killings by
ultra-rightwing groups, as there were in earlier years. While
some human rights groups continue to attribute certain
political killings to "death squads," many of these deaths are
likely the result of individual acts of rightwing vigilantism
rather than of organized paramilitary death squads as existed
before 1984. One case drew special attention and grave
concern. On April 5 Maria Cristina Gomez, a school teacher
and member of the National Teacher's Union (ANDES), was
kidnaped by unidentified persons in a Jeep Cherokee wagon as
she was leaving her school in Ilopango. Later that day, her
body was discovered near a cemetery. An autopsy showed she
had been severely tortured and raped before being shot four
times. Her murder bore many of the characteristics of the
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death squad killings of the early 1980's. Members of her
union charged the Air Force (which had security
responsibilities in the area) with responsibility, which it
denied. By year's end there had been no progress in
identifying her assailants or the motive for her abduction and
death.
Ten persons were killed and 30 wounded in the October 31
bombing of the labor union FENASTRAS ' s headquarters. The
Secretary General of the union, Febe Elizabeth Velasquez, was
among the dead (see Section 2.b.).
Killings by the FMLN, especially of prominent figures,
escalated during the last 9 months of the year. The April 9
assassination of Attorney General Roberto Garcia Alvarao dealt
a severe blow to the legal system, as the Attorney General is
the chief prosecutor of human rights cases in the country. By
year's end, there had been no progress made in the
investigation of his murder. The June 9 assassination of the
Minister of the Presidency, Jose Antonio Rodriguez Forth,
raised additional concern in the Government and country. He
and his butler, both unarmed, were killed in the driveway of
his private residence. The home of then Vice President-elect
Francisco Merino was bombed on April 14. The FMLN took
responsibility for the April bombing and the killing of the
Attorney General, and is widely believed to be responsible for
the murder of Rodriguez Forth. The FMLN took credit for or is
believed to be responsible for the June 26 killing of National
Fire Chief Roberto Armando Rivera, the October 10 killings of
the wife and son of a conservative newspaper editor, the
October 17 murder of the 21-year-old daughter of an army
colonel, and the November 28 assassination of Francisco
"Chachi" Guerrero, the immediate past president of the Supreme
Court of Justice and a former foreign minister.
During the year, the FMLN threatened to kill 214 of the 262
mayors in El Salvador. As part of its preelection campaign of
intimidation, the FMLN killed 1 governor and 10 mayors, and
forced the resignation of more than 90 other mayors. On March
15 Francisco Peccorini, a 75-year-old American citizen and
former Jesuit priest, was murdered by the FMLN because of his
criticism of guerrilla infiltration of the National
University. Miguel Castellanos, a former guerrilla who
renounced violence in 1985, was assassinated by the FMLN in
February. Edgar Chacon, a conservative political columnist,
was killed on June 30. Guerillmo Payes, a member of Chacon's
conservative research institution, was also assassinated in
July. Carlos Ernesto Mendoza, the editor of a journal
critical of the FMLN, lost his arm but survived an April bomb
attack. The FMLN may also have assassinated the five
Salvadoran journalists who died at the National Information
Center during the November offensive.
In other killings attributed to the FMLN, many victims were
rural residents who refused to collaborate with the guerrillas
or were suspected of being government informers. On May 22,
the FMLN killed eight civilians by blowing up a van near
Tacachico. There are also credible reports of civilians being
taken from buses and killed by guerrillas. In addition the
FMLN's use of car-bombs and homemade mortars in urban areas
caused at least three civilian deaths.
b. Disappearance
The Constitution and government policy forbids unacknowledged
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detention by the security or military services. However,
there continue to be credible charges of persons who
disappeared after having been taken away by members of the
army or security forces. In relatively few cases are
"disappeared" persons never accounted for; most of the time
their detention is eventually acknowledged or family members
find them in some other way.
On August 19, Sara Cristina Chan Chan and Juan Francisco Massi
disappeared from in front of a factory near the Ilopango Air
Force base and have not been seen or heard from since. Family
members say that many witnesses identified members of the Air
Force as having abducted the two. The Air Force denies ever
having detained them.
On June 3, Marts Guzman disappeared after leaving the offices
of the National Union of Displaced Earthquake Victims. She
was a leader in the organization. There were no witnesses to
her disappearance. She has never reappeared, nor has her body
been discovered. Members of her organization believe that the
armed forces may have been involved.
A series of disappearances were reported in July and August in
the department of Santa Ana. Four persons connected with the
National University campus in Santa Ana disappeared in that
period. Cecilia del Carmen Rodriguez, a professor, was
abducted on July 11 by unknown armed individuals; she was
freed on August 29. David Antonio Guevara Toledo, a student,
was kidnaped on August 6 and reappeared on August 31. Jose
Adolfo Lima and Santiago Martinez Centeno, also students at
the University in Santa Ana, disappeared on August 11. They
reappeared on August 31. Lima and Martinez claimed they had
been tortured and threatened with death. All accused the
army's Second Brigade, based in Santa Ana, of kidnaping and
holding them against their will. The commanding officer
denied responsibility for their disappearances. Their
kidnapers have not been apprehended, nor was there any
evidence of an active investigation in the case as of the
year's end.
According to press reports, a total of 56 civilians
disappeared between January and August, but this figure
includes nonpolitical disappearances such as lost or runaway
children aged 10 or over. Persons who desert their families,
emigrate, or join guerrilla ranks may account for some of the
disappearances. In addition, many persons reported missing by
family members often were found later to have been legally
arrested and appropriately reported to human rights
organizations, particularly to the Government's Human Rights
Commission (CDH) . During the same period, the press reported
that 153 persons were abducted by the guerrillas, and 17
others by unknown assailants.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were many charges and reports of abuse by the security
services, with most asserting both physical and psychological
torture. Alleged abuses include deprivation of food and
sleep, threats against the detainee or his family, prolonged
interrogation while blindfolded, being forced to stand for
long periods of time, forced exercise, and blows to the ears.
Almost all prisoners arrested for membership in the FMLN claim
to have been forced to sign confessions without being
permitted to read them. Instances of severe beati.igs, rape.
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choking, use of a hood to asphyxiate, injection with
unidentified drugs, and electric shock were also reported.
While there are confirmed cases of torture and mistreatment of
prisoners by members of the security services, it is not
believed that there is a government policy that permits or
condones torture or mistreatment of prisoners. When a
complaint of mistreatment appears credible, the CDH reports
the incident to the commander of the unit responsible and to
the Ministry of Defense. The International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) also reports its findings, based on
interviews with prisoners and ex-prisoners or on information
from other confidential sources, to the President and Minister
of Defense. The absence of a military justice system means
that those offenders whom the military will not publicly
identify are seldom, if ever, subject to the civilian courts.
Notably, in March a lieutenant was convicted for the August
1987 killing of three men in Santa Ana, and in September he
was sentenced to 30 years in jail. Charges against two
enlisted men implicated in the case had been dismissed in 1988.
On June 12 the Treasury Police arrested Jose Tomas Mazariego,
a labor activist. He v^as released on June 15 before the legal
72-hour detention period expired. He immediately alleged that
he had been tortured by the police while in custody, claiming
that acid was poured on his knees and ankles. A CDH doctor
who examined him when he was released determined that he had
not been tortured with acid, though his knees did reveal
lacerations that may have been caused by repeated bruising or
scraping .
In recent years, there have been few allegations of
mistreatment of prisoners in El Salvador's prisons, which are
administered and staffed by Justice Ministry personnel. No
verifiable instances of torture occurred in the penitentiaries
in 1989. Guerrilla prisoners, a total of 89 at the end of
September, are distributed throughout the prison system and
are treated as common criminals.
Human rights instruction is a formal and regular part of
police recruit training and officers' classes. The CDH, the
ICRC, and Catholic clergy give regularly scheduled courses on
human rights for police, military, and civil defense personnel.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The criminal code prohibits terrorism, insurgency, and other
actions against the stability of the State, but persons
arrested for those offenses are afforded the same legal
protection as common criminals. Judges and nonjudicial
authorities, most often security force officers, are empowered
to issue arrest warrants, which must be in writing. The
Constitution requires that all persons detained by the police
be turned over to the courts within 72 hours or be freed.
This guarantee has been applicable since the state of
emergency was ended in 1987. Following the initiation of the
November FMLN offensive, however, the National Assembly
enacted a state of siege which authorizes the extension from
72 hours to 15 days the period of allowable detention before
an initial judicial determination is made. Arrests without
apparent sufficient cause do occur, but incommunicado
detention beyond the permitted period is not common and, when
it has occurred, it has usually been the result of a detention
in the field by an operating military unit.
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Holding political views opposed to those of the Government is
not justification for arrest unless the suspect advocates
violence. The courts have held that membership in a front
organization controlled by the guerrillas is not in itself
sufficient reason for holding an arrestee, although membership
in one of the guerrilla groups is.
The Salvadoran security and armed forces are required to
register detainees and have them examined by a doctor or nurse
upon entry into police facilities. In insurgency-related
arrests, they are required to notify promptly the family of
the detainee, Tutela Legal, CDH, and the ICRC. The
registration, notification, and arraignment procedures,
together with the official prohibition on mistreatment of
prisoners, continued to be generally enforced in an effort to
eliminate mistreatment by government authorities.
From January to August 1989, the security forces detained
3,113 persons, including 168 foreigners, on suspicion of
subversive offenses. Of that number, close to two-thirds were
subsequently released by the police and never formally
charged; 578 were consigned to the courts; and the remainder
were hospitalized, deported, sent to the juvenile facility, or
had their cases disposed of in another manner.
In the days following the start of the FMLN November
offensive, the ESAF searched the facilities of several
independent organizations, including churches and other
humanitarian organizations. Twenty-five incidents involving
the facilities of church groups occurred during the first 2
weeks of the offensive, when ESAF units were investigating
leads relating to arms caches or other indications of support
for the FMLN. Several dozen church workers, mostly Catholics,
Lutherans, and Episcopalians, were arrested during this
period. The overwhelming majority of religious institutions
and facilities were not affected. Responding to domestic and
international concerns that the searches and arrests were
being carried out in an arbitrary manner. President Cristiani
ordered the ESAF to prohibit field units from searching the
offices of any religious, political, labor, or other
humanitarian group without the specific authorization of the
military high command. After that order in late November, one
church facility was searched.
During the arraignment proceedings, the judge may order the
accused further detained for up to 72 hours (or 15 days under
the state of emergency) to determine if the evidence warrants
holding the accused for trial. This time limit is normally,
but not without exception, adhered to in practice. The judge
is then legally constrained to a time limit of 120 days for
investigating serious crimes, and 45 days for lesser offenses,
before bringing the accused to trial or dismissing the case.
In practice, however, these limitations are rarely followed,
primarily due to the backlog of cases. All persons held in
the prison system, however, are incarcerated by judicial
order, if not by sentence.
As a recourse against illegal detention, anyone can, from the
time it appears a court will issue an arrest warrant until the
trial is completed and a sentence is carried out, request that
an appeals court or the Supreme Court review the legal basis
for the detention. Such an appeal freezes action on the case
until the higher court has rendered its decision.
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The Government does not recognize the FMLN as a belligerent
power and so does not accord prisoner-of-war status to
captured guerrillas; captured guerrillas are turned over to
the civilian court system for criminal prosecution. In the
case of a group of war-wounded and handicapped FMLN
ex-combatants who occupied the National Cathedral and later
the Mexican Embassy, the Salvadoran Government allowed them to
leave the country to take advantage of offers of free medical
care by passing an amnesty in the National Assembly.
Forty-six of them departed for Cuba in October.
There are no provisions in the law for exile. Many leaders of
the FMLN claim to be in exile, but it is self-imposed. Some
of them could, however, be subject to arrest in El Salvador
for participation in guerrilla operations if they were to
return. Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR a formal
political ally of the FMLN) leader Reuben Zamora, who returned
in 1988 from such an exile, left again in late 1989, alleging
that the Government's vigorous counter-offensive against the
FMLN placed him in jeopardy. He had earlier in the year been
an active campaigner for his party in the March presidential
election. Mr. Zamora returned to El Salvador in early 1990.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution stipulates that the judiciary, the Attorney
General's office, and the Solicitor General's office (public
defenders) are independent of the rest of the Government and
each other. The Legislative Assembly chooses the Supreme
Court justices for 5-year terms, the Attorney General for a
3-year term, and the Solicitor General for a 3-year term. The
Constitution establishes the regular court system and provides
for a special system should the Legislative Assembly enact a
state of exception. The Assembly enacted legislation to
invoke an indefinite state of exception on November 13,
following the initiation of the FMLN offensive; under its
terms, security forces are allowed to detain FMLN suspects for
15 days for interrogation before consigning them to the
courts. The state of exception remained in effect as of
year's end.
The Constitution provides that a person accused of a crime may
have a lawyer present upon being arraigned, but the right is
seldom used, probably because few arrestees can afford to hire
a private attorney. Court-appointed attorneys are not
generally available to a defendant until the investigative
phase is over and the judge determines there is sufficient
evidence to enter the final, or plenary, stage of the trial.
The defendant has a right to be present in court and to
confront the witnesses that testify against him. All trial
records of adults are open to the public unless the judge
rules that the case be kept confidential. An appeal process
exists and is used regularly.
Most major crimes in El Salvador are tried publicly before a
five-person jury. Absences of attorneys, the destruction of
many court buildings in the October 1986 earthquake, and a
practically nonfunctioning jury identification and
notification system hinder the ability of the judicial system
to process cases expeditiously. Corruption and intimidation
by political extremists are also factors. As a result, only
10 percent of the 2,058 prison inmates in September were
serving sentences; the rest were awaiting adjudication of
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their cases. Bail is available for some minor offenses, but
is seldom used. Prisoners are usually incarcerated for 6 to
18 months from the time they are charged until they are
brought to trial, and even longer waits are common.
Historically, civilian judicial authority has not extended to
the military officer corps. Many low-ranking members of the
military and police have been discharged and turned over to
the civilian courts for trial on criminal charges, but,
traditionally, officers of the armed and security forces have
been treated differently from other citizens before the law.
Judges are frequently reluctant to bring charges against them,
and colleagues often fail to cooperate in the prosecution of
crimes imputed to a fellow officer. This pattern began to
change in 1989 with efforts to prosecute a major and a
lieutenant accused of the 1988 San Sebastian killings and the
conviction and sentencing of Lieutenant Rivas in the murders
in Santa Ana (Section l.a.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government generally does not interfere arbitrarily in the
personal lives of citizens, although the Constitution allows
it the right to intervene when it believes national security
is threatened. Both the Government and the guerrillas use
networks of informants. According to the Constitution, before
entering a private dwelling the security forces must have the
inhabitant's consent, a judicial warrant, or reasonable belief
that a crime is being or will be committed. In practice, the
security forces often use forced entry to carry out arrests
and investigations. Government forces often intercept mail
deliveries in the conflictive zones, wiretapping of telephone
communications by the Government, the FMLN, private
individuals, and political parties is widespread. The
Government was accused in late November of indiscriminately
entering the premises of religious and humanitarian
organizations, conducting mass arrests, and seizing property
found on the premises. Government officials asserted that
military forces were acting on intelligence reports,
indicating that either such premises or some of the
individuals therein were acting on behalf of the FMLN.
The guerrillas arbitrarily interfere with the lives of
inhabitants in the conflictive zones, expropriating food and
medical supplies, intercepting mail, and often forcing
villagers to attend indoctrination sessions. They engage in
forced recruitment either to fill their ranks or to obtain
laborers and porters. FMLN committees exercise a high degree
of control over the villages set up by refugees who return
from camps in Honduras, an extension of their control inside
those camps. The people usually comply with the FMLN demands,
because the guerrillas regularly back up their threats by
killing those who fail to cooperate.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
There were new claims in 1989 of improper Air Force bombings
near civilian populations that caused civilian deaths.
Following President Duarte's 1984 guidelines, the Air Force
claims to refrain from attacking guerrilla concentrations and
installations when civilians are nearby. However, there are
credible charges from people in the countryside which
contradict this claim, especially in Chalatenango, Cabanas,
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and Morazan departments, where there have been military ground
operations which received close air support from the Air
Force. There were no reported civilian casualties as a result
of this activity in rural areas during 1989.
During the November FMLN offensive, the guerrillas took
positions in the working class neighborhoods north and east of
San Salvador, using innocent civilians as shields against Army
and Air Force counterattacks. The FMLN set up fortified
positions in civilian housing complexes and used private homes
as command headquarters or sniper posts. In many instances,
confirmed by diplomatic officials and the international media,
the guerrillas did not allow the civilian residents to
evacuate these areas. This tactic was designed to provide a
shield and maximize the number of civilian casualties in order
to blame the ESAF for those casualties.
The Embassy estimates, based on death reports and visits to
hospital and emergency organizations, that there were between
200 and 400 civilian deaths in the capital during the fighting
and between 1,500 and 3,000 civilians wounded. Most of the
wounded received minor injuries and only 600 to 700 required
hospitalization. Most casualties were the result of heavy
street fighting and the use of infantry weapons such as small
arms, machine guns, grenades, and mortars; few casualties seem
to have been caused by aerial bombardment.
Charges of indiscriminate bombing by the Air Force during the
FMLN urban offensive were not borne out. An Americas Watch
(AW) report noted that in three San Salvador neighborhoods
visited "the civilians had the impression that helicopter
strafing and bombing were aimed principally at guerrilla
emplacements." The ESAF followed its existing Rules of
Engagement (ROE) regarding close air support during the
offensive. The ROE allows for air support in populated areas
only when the mission is to "retard or dissuade" terrorist
activities. According to Embassy reports and eyewitness
civilian accounts, the Air Force made efforts to target
helicopter strafing, rocketing, and bombings at guerrilla
emplacements, which resulted in few civilian casualties.
However, despite initial ESAF denials, the ESAF did drop
several bombs on guerrilla positions in San Salvador and San
Miguel. Both 500 and 250 pound bombs were employed. These
attacks caused some civilian casualties.
The guerrillas' use of unmarked, indiscriminately placed
landmines and booby traps is a major cause of death and
maiming among peasants. Planted along farm roads and paths,
around guerrilla-downed electric poles, under railroad tracks,
near water sources, in farmlands, and on coffee plantations,
these mines killed 52 civilians in 1988 and 36 in the first 8
months of 1989.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
There are no governmental restrictions on freedom of speech
and the press. El Salvador has a vigorous local press which
regularly prints strongly antigovernment commentary. In the
aftermath of the assassination of the Minister of the
Presidency, a series of strict antiterrorist law reforms were
proposed in the National Assembly, some of which might have
impinged on freedom of speech and the press. After reviewing
the proposed law. President Cristiani returned the bill to the
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National Assembly for redrafting and reaffirmed his
Government's commitment to freedom of expression and the
press. In November, following the initiation of the FMLN
offensive, the Assembly passed the bill. President Cristiani
again refused to sign the bill and returned it to the
Assembly, noting his concern about the constitutionality of
specific provisions of the legislation. He indicated to the
Assembly that it should draft a bill which could be accepted
by the broadest possible group in the Assembly and the nation.
San Salvador, a city of 1 million, has five daily papers, five
television stations, and numerous radio stations. There are
also two cable television systems that broadcast news programs
from overseas. Television journalism in El Salvador is
flourishing. Press agencies have reported that in El Salvador
a wider range of opinion is permitted and heard than in many
other Western democratic countries. Interviews feature a full
range of political figures representing all political
viewpoints, including politicians, labor leaders, human rights
activists, private sector representatives, and government
officials. Of the leading daily newspapers, three are
conservative and the other two are more centrist in their
views. One of the latter, while editorially conservative,
presents a full range of views from conservative to far left,
including unedited articles from the FMLN press agencies
SALPRESS and NOTISAL, press releases from both liberal and
pro-FMLN organizations, and a weekly supplement from the
Jesuit-operated University of Central America. Furthermore,
the views of the left are expressed in a variety of journals,
newsletters, periodicals, bulletins, and paid advertisements
in the daily press. A 1981 decree forbidding publication of
anonymous paid advertisements or communiques remains in
effect, but recent examples of such propaganda show this law
to be essentially unenforced.
Television stations sell broadcast time to political and labor
organizations of all political viewpoints. These are
uncensored and are often broadcast live. During the 1989
election campaign, the Government was targeted with bitter
media attacks by the opposition without interference.
Commercial radio stations use news and propaganda reports
recorded from the clandestine guerrilla radio stations or
supplied by the guerrillas on cassettes. The Government owns
two television channels with identical programming and one
radio station. The Armed Forces operate a radio station.
Academic freedom is protected by the Constitution and
respected by the Government.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Any association not formed for criminal purposes is legal and
permitted in El Salvador. Political, professional, religious,
labor, and social organizations operate without legal
restriction. The Interior Ministry questioned the legal basis
of a number of leftist groups in June, but did not pursue the
issue. Groups from the left and the right criticize the
Government and hold marches and demonstrations without
interference from the Government. Those labor, displaced
persons, and human rights organizations which have been
credibly identified as FMLN fronts frequently stage marches.
During the preelection period the Democratic Convergence (CD)
party (see Section 3) charged the military with intimidation
at its rallies. Some CD members were arrested in rural
departments but were subsequently released.
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In 1989 there were several large, violent demonstrations
during which protestors burned cars and buses and looted
stores. The response of the police was measured, and, though
many demonstrators were frequently detained following
confrontations with the authorities, no deaths connected with
security control of demonstrations were reported during this
year. The police did not interfere with nonviolent
demonstrations .
Following the killing of the wife and son of a conservative
newspaper editor on October 10, the killing of Colonel
Casanova's daughter October 17, and the October 30 mortar
attack on Army headquarters, the offices of the leftist
FENASTRAS union were bombed by unknown assailants on
October 31. Ten were killed in the blast, including FENASTRAS
secretary general Febe Elizabeth Velasquez, and 30 wounded.
FENASTRAS, UNTS , and the FMLN all blamed the Armed Forces and
the Government for the bombing. Some members of the military
and the ruling ARENA party accused the FMLN or FENASTRAS of
rigging the incident in order to promote antigovernment
agitation.
President Cristiani called for an investigatory commission to
look into the crime, but FENASTRAS initially refused to permit
the Special Investigative Unit (SIU) to conduct a physical
examination of the site or the bodies. An FBI explosives
incidents expert was made available and along with SIU
personnel visited the site on November 8 after it had been
cleaned up and much evidence destroyed.
The day of the FENASTRAS bombing, offices of the Committee of
Mothers of Political Prisoners, Disappeared and Assassinated
of El Salvador (CO-MADRES) in northern San Salvador were
bombed, resulting in injuries to three persons, including a
U.S. citizen. CO-MADRES blamed the military but there was no
evidence to establish culpability.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for by the Constitution and is
respected in practice. Although the country is predominantly
Roman Catholic, an estimated 20 percent of the population
subscribe to other faiths. Arrests of church members and
employees, both Catholic and Protestant, are unrelated to
religious beliefs. Such arrests usually were related to
essentially secular activities, involving humanitarian relief
work for the poor and others dispossessed by the war;
authorities have voiced suspicions that such work often
provides a cover for guerrilla recruitment or provision of
support for the insurgency.
During the first two weeks of the November FMLN offensive, the
ESAF searched the facilities of at least 25 church groups
which it had reason to believe were sympathizing with or
supporting the FMLN. (See Section l.d.)
The Catholic Church is one of the most influential
institutions in the country. The Archbishop's Sunday homily
is broadcast live from the Metropolitan Cathedral on one of
the Government's television stations and on radio. Catholic
Church publications disseminate the Church's position on human
rights and the war. Catholic Church statements have become
582
EI, SALVADOR
increasingly critical of the leftist insurgency, but the
Church does not hesitate to criticize the Government as well.
Some foreign missionaries and clerics encountered difficulty
in applying for residence status and/or extending their visas,
and concern was expressed that immigration officials were
discriminating against them by reviewing their immigration
status. It is believed that these incidents resulted from
politically motivated harassment by lower level officials, but
there was no evidence that any of the cases arose from
official objections to individual religious beliefs or
practices .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution establishes the right of free movement.
However, Article 97 specifically states that foreigners may
not inv^olve themselves in the internal political affairs of
the country, and this article is used by the Government to
deny entry to or deport foreigners who might violate that
section of the law. Local military commanders require that
foreigners receive permission before entering conflictive
zones; they often restrict entry when military operations are
under way in those areas. Some internal movements by
Salvadorans are similarly restricted. The country is mired in
a 10-year-old conflict with some well-defined geographic areas
of military operations in which travel is restricted during
periods of combat. The state of exception that was in effect
for most of the decade ended in 1987, although a state of
siege was enacted in November in response to the FMLN
offensive. However, other than the restrictions on travel
within conflictive zones noted above, there are no limits on
constitutional freedom of movement.
In 1985 there were an estimated 525,000 persons displaced
within El Salvador by the conflict. Today approximately
140,000 persons are still in need of Government resettlement
assistance. There may be another 7,000 who are not registered
with the Government and receive assistance from private relief
organizations. An additional 55,000 are refugees in other
Central American countries and in Mexico, and more than
550,000 are estimated to be illegal immigrants in the United
States.
An increasing number of refugees are returning from abroad.
The Government is actively involved in discussions with
members of refugee camps in Honduras to facilitate their
return to their homes in El Salvador. Through September 1989
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) repatriated
some 300 persons in 1989. Approximately 1,180 refugees from
the Mesa Grande camp in Honduras were repatriated to El
Salvador in October under the auspices of the Governments of
El Salvador and Honduras and the UNHCR. About 1,700 refugees
from the Colomoncagua camp in Honduras walked back to El
Salvador in two large groups during November and December
without authorization from the UNHCR or the concerned
Governments. None of these entities were prepared to assist
or receive the refugees, »*ho entered El Salvador without
protection, documentation, or guarantees of future help.
In some cases local military commanders have blocked the
shipment of food, medicines, and other materials to the
communities where the lefugees now reside, claiming that
supplies were being diverted to the guerrillas. For the most
583
EL SALVADOR
part, however, there is no government harassment of persons
returning to El Salvador from abroad. The Government imposes
no control on emigration and cooperates with international
organizations that arrange Salvadoran emigration to other
countries .
The Government, with assistance from the UNHCR and the ICRC,
has registered some 400 Nicaraguan refugees, although
officials estimate as many as 3,000 are residing in the far
southeastern part of the country. Registered refugees are
free to travel within El Salvador.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for rights and procedures by which
its citizens can change their government by peaceful means.
There have been six national elections since 1982. In the
most recent, on March 19, 1989, six political parties
participated in the presidential elections in which the
governing PDC lost the presidency to the ARENA, marking the
first democratic transfer of control of the Government from
the ruling party to the opposition. Although a leftist party
allied to the FMLN participated in the elections, receiving
less than 4 percent of the vote, the FMLN itself refused to
participate in the electoral process and through attacks and
threats sought to disrupt the elections. The elections were
contested by a wide range of parties that represented views
across the entire political spectrum, and marked the return to
the political arena of Guillermo Ungo as the presidential
candidate for the Democratic Convergence (CD), a coalition of
three leftist parties allied to the FMLN guerrillas. The CD
united Reuben Zamora's Social Christian Movement Party (MPSC) ,
Ungo • s National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) , and Reni
Roldan's Social Democratic Party (PSD). The CD's
participation was a milestone in recent Salvadoran history
because it demonstrated that political toleration in the
country existed to the point where the self-proclaimed allies
of the FMLN could freely compete in national elections.
Voting is by secret ballot. In preparation for the March
elections, the Central Elections Council (CCE) distributed
1,850,000 computerized voter identification cards (carnets) as
a safeguard against fraud; 55.6 percent of those with carnets
voted.
The Constitution allows all political parties that do not
advocate armed opposition to the democratic system to ,
participate in the electoral process. It establishes a
citizen's right to membership in any legally recognized
party. In practice, even parties still linked to the FMLN
were permitted to participate. The Nationalist Democratic
Union (UDN) — the political front for the Communist Party of El
Salvador (PCES) — did not participate despite its status as a
legal political party.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged violations
of Human Rights
The Government continued to be receptive to official groups
interested in human rights. High-ranking government officials
and military officers regularly meet with visiting legislators
from different countries, human rights organizations, church
and labor groups, and others. AW and the Lawyers Committee
584
EL SALVADOR
for Human Rights maintain a joint office in San Salvador. The
ICRC has an agreement with the Government that permits it to
work in the conflictive areas to assist noncombatants , to
visit prisoners and detainees accused of guerrilla activity,
and to make confidential reports to the Government on human
rights issues. Tutela Legal and the CDH also have access to
the prisons. The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in El
Salvador made his ninth annual visit to the country in October.
Domestic human rights organizations active in El Salvador
include the CDH and the Catholic Archbishopic ' s Human Rights
and Legal Aid Office, Tutela Legal. The CDH receives
testimony about human rights violations, conducts
investigations, visits arrested persons, and reports to the
local commanding officer and the Ministry of Defense when it
discovers a case of abuse. Its doctors examine detainees to
determine the validity of complaints of torture. The CDH
keeps a register of persons injured by landmines and is
working in conjunction with international assistance
organizations on a project to register civilian amputees and
provide them with prosthetic devices. The CDH also maintains
a roster showing the status of those detained by security
forces .
Tutela Legal's staff often conducts its own investigations,
visiting persons detained by the security forces, carrying out
some on-site investigations, and receiving testimony about
human rights violations. Tutela files its findings on human
rights cases with government authorities. Though its
marshaling of data is usually comprehensive, Tutela has on
occasion asserted that, based on circumstantial evidence only,
the perpetrators of certain killings are death squads linked
to the Government. Such assertions are typically made when
the body of a victim is found in an area or zone to which
access has been under the control of the security forces.
Tutela Legal, while not providing figures, expressed concern
about what it termed an increase in human rights abuses by the
military.
Guerrilla defectors and captured documents provide evidence to
show that the FMLN controls several groups that are ostensibly
independent human rights organizations. These include the
Human Rights Commission of El Salvador (nongovernmental)
(CDHES) , the Federation of Committees of Mothers and Families
(FECMAFAM), the Committee of Mothers of Political Prisoners,
Disappeared and Assassinated of El Salvador (CO-MADRES) , and
the Christian Committee for the Displaced (CRIPDES) .
Notwithstanding this link, they operate without government
interference and regularly publicize their views in the local
media. These groups consistently report only on alleged
abuses by government forces and do not investigate,
acknowledge, or even record human rights abuses committed by
the FMLN. Although some individual members of these groups
were arrested during 1989 and charged with guerrilla
membership or activities, all were subsequently released by
the security services or the courts. The Lutheran Church, the
National Association of Indigenous Persons (ANIS) , many labor
unions, universities, and other nongovernmental organizations
also have human rights and legal assistance offices.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
El Salvador is ethnically homogeneous, though a small segment
of the population claims to have descended solely from the
region's indigenous Indians. There is no official
585
EL SALVADOR
discrimination against these Indians. There does not appear
to be any discrimination in housing, jobs, and education. The
Government neither permits nor condones de jure or de facto
discrimination. Under the Constitution, women enjoy the same
legal rights as men, and are represented in all three branches
of government, in business, and in the professions.
Violence against women, including domestic violence such as
wife beating, is undoubtedly widespread, but the lack of
adequate reliable statistics makes it impossible to gauge its
true extent. Charges of rape are frequent and there is no
specific governmental policy to address the problem. In
September seven female labor activists alleged they were raped
while in the custody of the National Police. Only one of the
seven filed a formal complaint and submitted to a physical
examination; the examination substantiated the allegation.
Both the National Police and the Special Investigative Unit
were investigating the case in October.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Article 47 of the Constitution prohibits the Government from
using nationality, sex, race, creed, or political philosophy
tc prevent workers or employers from organizing themselves
into unions or associations. This provision was intended to
provide the legal framework for secondary legislation,
including a revised labor code. Legislative action on such a
code has been stymied, however, because of a lack of consensus
between the government, the private sector, and labor.
Several separate proposals for revising the code have been
drafted since 1985, but none of these have been formally
submitted to the Legislative Assembly. The Cristiani
Administration has indicated interest in reform of labor laws,
but has not yet developed any firm proposals nor taken a
position on any of the proposals previously prepared. A
confusing and sometimes conflicting set of laws dating from
1963 which govern labor relations remains in place. While
existing statutes provide protections which are enforceable
under the Constitution, their inconsistencies often result in
cumbersome procedures and significant delays.
Legally, only private sector workers have the right to form
unions and to strike. Employees of the nine autonomous public
institutions may form unions but are barred from striking.
Finally, existing law bars agricultural workers and employees
of government ministries and departments from forming unions
or striking (although in practice, public sector strikes do
occur) . These employees are instead represented by
associations whose function, in practice, is similar to that
of unions.
There are approximately 150 currently active trade unions,
employee associations, and peasant organizations, with a
combined membership of just over 400,000 — roughly 20 percent
of the work force. These organizations freely elect their
officers in accordance with their individual constitutions and
bylaws. Leaders of worker organizations appear regularly on
television, publicize their views in the country's major
newspapers, and conduct seminars on various issues without
government interference. Unions have also been able to
organize or participate in public demonstrations without
government interference as long as the demonstrations remained
peaceful. On several occasions during the year.
586
EL SALVADOR
demonstrations sponsored by pro-FMLN labor organizations
became violent, resulting in the intervention of security
forces to restore order, and occasionally resulting in several
demonstrators being detained.
While the law allows the recognition of a union to be
withdrawn "for cause," since 1980 this has occurred in only
one instance. The Government acted in the case of the union
of workers for the Rio Lempa Hydroelectric Project (STECEL)
after the union, working in concert with the FMLN, cut off
electricity to most parts of El Salvador, causing several
deaths and significant economic damage.
Twice since 1986 the Salvadoran Supreme Court has reaffirmed
constitutional safeguards protecting trade unions, worker
associations, peasant organizations and their leaders from
arbitrary and capricious behavior by management and/or the
Government. In March 1986, the Court ruled unconstitutional a
July 1985 decision by the Labor Ministry which had stripped 11
leaders of the Sewer and Waterworks Union (SETA) of their
positions because they had disobeyed a labor judge's order to
end a strike. The court held that union leaders cannot be
deprived of their leadership status because such status
derives from union elections. In August 1987, the Supreme
Court similarly overturned an order of the Ministry of
Interior which had divested leaders of the ANIS of their
positions. The Court voided the Ministry's order, reinstated
the leaders, and ruled that the Minister of Interior was
liable for civil damages for having exceeded his authority.
The right to strike for the private sector is provided for by
law and is freely exercised in practice, despite cumbersome,
time-consuming legal procedures. As unions routinely fail to
fulfill these requirements, almost all strikes are declared
illegal. In several instances workers have occupied factory
premises as part of a strike or work stoppage. In cases where
such activity is part of an illegal strike, security forces
have intervened to remove workers and protect factory premises,
There were 19 private-sector strikes during the period
January 1-September 30, 1989, affecting approximately 3,000
workers. The Ministry of Labor intervened as provided for by
law in an effort to resolve the disputes, even in cases
involving illegal strikes. The absence of specific laws
granting workers in autonomous government institutions or
public employees the right to strike has not deterred such
strike activity.
In 1989 the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) of the
International Labor Organization (ILO) considered four cases
based on complaints filed by several international and
Salvadoran labor organization alleging violations of ILO
Convention 87 on Freedom of Association by the Government.
The complaints, some of which date back to 1981, allege, inter
alia, that: the Government was implicated in the murder,
harassment, intimidation, and disappearance of trade
unionists, and the destruction of trade union property; and
that certain public employees were denied the right to
organize and bargain, and were not protected from antiunion
discrimination. The Government, in its various responses to
the complaints, has contended, among other things, that the
complaints were part of a pattern of propaganda and
provocation designed to discredit the Government and
frequently resulted from subversive acts perpetrated by the
guerrillas and unions allied with them. The CFA has
587
EL SALVADOR
repeatedly deplored the violence that has prevailed in the
country which, according to the Committee, has prevented the
full exercise of the rights guaranteed by the Convention. The
Committee considered it unacceptable that the Government had
not provided detailed and complete answers when the lives and
freedom of trade union leaders were at stake, and urged the
Government to bring detainees to trial without delay and to
initiate independent judicial inquiry into the murder and
disappearances of numerous trade unionists named in the
complaints. El Salvador has not ratified ILO Convention 87 or
Convention 98 on Collective Bargaining.
FMLN-linked labor organizations regularly use ostensibly
peaceful dissent to provoke government actions, then level
charges of worker rights violations when the Government
responds to street violence and occupations. For example, in
September the FMLN-linked FENASTRAS union demonstrated in San
Salvador, burning several buses and automobiles, and causing
thousands of dollars in damage to other private property. The
subsequent arrests of 60 demonstrators were characterized as a
violation of worker rights. The same tactic is applied when
members of these organizations are detained by government
authorities for suspected involvement in terrorist
activities. While security forces detained numerous union
members during 1989, these detentions seldom resulted from
legitimate union activities. The FMLN also seeks to disrupt
and subvert democratic labor groups that refuse to collaborate
with it.
Labor unions are not restricted from affiliation with
international organizations, and Salvadoran unions freely
affiliate with such groups, including the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the World Confederation of
Labor, and the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade
Unions .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right of collective bargaining is granted in Article 39 of
the Constitution, and Article 269 of the labor code. Under
the labor code, only private sector workers can exercise this
right, but the Constitution is interpreted broadly to provide
all workers the right to bargain collectively.
Private sector unions use the mechanism of collective
bargaining extensively. Approximately 28 collective
bargaining agreements covering private sector employees were
certified by the Ministry of Labor between January 1 and
September 30, 1989. According to Ministry statistics, these
contracts covered approximately 44,000 workers. Nearly 60
percent of the collective bargaining agreements certified
since June 1984 were contracts for unions affiliated to
antigovernment labor organizations. A similar collective
bargaining practice is also followed, albeit in a more
informal manner, between public employees and the Government.
The Director General's office (DGT) of the Ministry of Labor
is responsible for overseeing the implementation of collective
bargaining agreements and acting as conciliator in
labor-related disputes in the private sector and autonomous
government institutions. According to the Ministry, during
the period January 1 through September 30, 1989, the DGT
participated directly in 41 labor-management conflicts.
Approximately 35 were resolved through its participation.
588
EI. SALVADOR
Article 47 of the Constitution states that union officials at
the time of their election, throughout their term and for one
year following their term shall not be fired, suspended for
disciplinary reasons, removed or debased in their work
conditions except for legal cause. This provision is
generally observed in practice.
The relationship between the business community and the labor
movement improved somewhat during the last years of the Duarte
regime, but a large reservoir of distrust still remains.
Labor leaders perceive the Cristiani Government as being
antilabor, but in the first few months of the regime the labor
code continued to be enforced as in the past. As before,
however, businessmen frequently take measures to prevent
unions from being formed. Union leaders have also complained
about lengthy and complex procedures required to register new
unions .
El Salvador has one export processing zone. There are no
differences in labor regulations in this area and those which
prevail in general. However, there are no labor unions
represented in any of the firms in this zone, and the firms
discourage labor organizing by preventing organizers from
entering the zone and intimidating workers who attempt to
organize.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor except
in cases of public calamity and other instances specified by
law.
The ILO's Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions has for a number of years noted with concern the
provisions in the penal code that allow the imposition of
sentences involving compulsory labor and has made suggestions
on how to improve existing legislation and practice. Reform
of the penal code is being considered by the Legislative
Assembly. The FMLN continues to force civilians, including
minors, to serve as porters, spotters, and couriers for the
guerrilla army. Reports from family members of those
impressed indicate that the FMLN increased its use of this
practice before and during the November offensive.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Constitution prohibits the employment of children under
the age of 14. The labor code states that exceptions can be
made only in cases where it can be demonstrated that such
employment is absolutely indispensable to the sustenance of
the minor and his family. This is most often the case with
children of peasant families who traditionally work with their
families during planting and harvesting seasons.
The Constitution also prohibits the employment of persons
under 18 and all women in occupations considered hazardous.
The law is enforced through inspections undertaken by the
Ministry of Labor. There are credible reports that in at
least some cases these inspections have revealed violations
which have been corrected.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Government's National Minimum Wage Council recommends
increases in the minimum wages for commercial, industrial.
589
i EL SALVADOR
service, and agro-industrial employees. Over the past several
years, wages have not kept pace with inflation. From 1983 to
1988 real wages in the private sector have declined by an
estimated 40 percent. Commercial as well as industrial and
service workers in San Salvador were paid $2.80 daily, while
their counterparts in other areas of the country received
$2.65. Agro-industrial workers employed in the cotton and
sugar industries received $1.71 daily, while those employed in
the coffee industry earned $2.65. Wage rates for most
categories of workers are higher than the legal minimums,
especially in the private sector. For the most part, minimum
wages are inadequate to meet the Ministry of Economy's
standard of basic necessity.
The law limits the workday for minors between 14 and 18 years
of age to a maximum of 6 hours, while for adults it is 8
hours. Premium pay is mandated for longer hours.
The Constitution and the labor code spell out the rights of
workers to a healthy and safe working environment. These
statutes require employers, including the Government, to take
steps to ensure that employees are not placed at risk in their
workplaces. Despite extremely limited budgetary resources,
the Ministry of Labor attempts to enforce the applicable
regulations. According to Ministry figures, the Inspector
General's office conducted approximately 12,500 inspections
and reinspections between January 1 and September 30, 1989.
Most of these occurred in commercial, industrial and service
establishments. Nearly 183,000 employees were covered by
these inspections and reinspections. The Inspector General's
corps cited employers for almost 350 infractions and assessed
fines totalling $1,250. Employers were also ordered to pay
approximately $1,300 to employees as compensation for unjust
dismissal .
I
590
GRENADA
A member of the Commonwealth of Nations, Grenada's
parliamentary form of government, wi^h a Governor General as
titular Head of State, was suspended in 1979 by the Marxist
People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) and then restored in
October 1983. Free and fair elections in December 1984
brought the New National Party (NNP) into power with 14 seats
in the 15-member lower house of Parliament. Prime Minister
Herbert Blaize later broke with the NNP and formed The
National Party (TNP) with the support of six Members of
Parliament. With a majority of elected Members of Parliament
no longer supporting the Government, the Prime Minister
prorogued Parliament on August 23, rather than face a
potential vote of no confidence. Under the Constitution, the
Prime Minister has until March 27, 1990, to hold new elections.
Political and civil rights are provided for by the
Constitution and respected in practice, although the Emergency
Powers Act of 1987 gives the Government authority to suspend
most civil rights should the Governor General declare a state
of national emergency. Although provisions of the Act have
never been applied, opposition politicians objected
strenuously to it, citing existing government authority to
deal with national emergencies.
Security in Grenada is the responsibility of the 600-strong
Royal Grenada Police Force (RGPF) , which includes a 75-man
paramilitary Special Services Unit (SSU) and a 30-man coast
guard unit. It is controlled by and responsive to the
civilian government.
Grenadians enjoy substantial freedom to pursue economic goals
in a free market environment. Major improvements in
infrastructure have accompanied economic growth, which has
averaged 5 percent annually in real terms over the past
several years. Economic development in agriculture,
construction, tourism, transportation, and communications has
been aided by a return of Grenadian capital and substantial
economic assistance following restoration of democratic
government in 1983.
Grenada's overall human rights record remained good during
1989.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of politically motivated or other
extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances
or abductions.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution specifically prohibits torture, and there
were no reported incidents of torture in Grenada in 1989.
Some of the prisoners convicted of the 1983 murder of Prime
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Minister Maurice Bishop, whose cases are still under appeal,
made allegations of beatings by prison officials, but these
have not been substantiated. The Government authorized the
formation of a prison visitation committee in 1989 to visit
the prison periodically, but the program had not been
implemented by year's end.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
According to law, police have the right to detain persons on
suspicion without a warrant, but formal charges must be
brought within 48 hours. This time limit is adhered to in
practice. If the detainee is not charged within this time, he
must be released. In 1989 no one was detained for political
reasons .
The law provides for a judicial determination of the legality
of detention within 15 days after arrest on a criminal charge.
Formal arraignment or release of the arrestee must be
determined within 60 days. These procedures were generally
followed.
There is a functioning system of bail, although those charged
with capital offenses are not eligible. Persons charged with
treason can only be accorded bail upon recommendation of the
Governor General.
No Grenadian citizen was exiled in 1989. With regard to
forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to fair public trial is provided for by law and is
observed in practice. Those arrested and charged are brought
before an independent judiciary and are allowed access to a
lawyer of their choice. For capital crimes, the courts
appoint lawyers when the accused cannot pay for his defense.
In other cases, the defendant is assigned counsel if the case
reaches the appellate stage. Following a determination by a
judicial hearing that there is sufficient evidence to
substantiate a criminal charge, the defendant is remanded for
trial. Due to the backlog of cases caused by a lack of judges
and facilities, a significant amount of time can pass before
those charged are brought to trial.
The Government has taken particular care to afford a fair
public trial, including an appeal process which has been under
way for 2 years, in the cases of the 17 former PRG and army
officials convicted of the murders of Maurice Bishop and 10
others on October 19, 1983. Fourteen defendants have been
sentenced to death and three to long prison terms. This
appeals process continues before a panel of Caribbean jurists,
although it was temporarily delayed by the death of the
president of the court in December 1988. The Grenada
Government continues to bear the cost of both the prosecution
and the defense in the appeal.
There are no persons imprisoned without due process. There
are no political prisoners, the 17 PRG and revolutionary
army officials having been convicted of capital crimes.
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f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There is no arbitrary interference in private life. Warrants
for searching homes are normally required by law except in
cases of hot pursuit. In practice, warrants are obtained in
the majority of cases before a search is conducted. There
were no reports of arbitrary monitoring of telephones or
correspondence .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is provided for by the
Constitution and freely exercised. There are five weekly
newspapers and several papers which are published
irregularly. Most are affiliated with political parties, but
the two most widely circulated newspapers are independent.
Flyers are occasionally distributed by remnants of the PRG ' s
Revolutionary Military Council and the New Jewel Movement.
Newspapers are frequently critical of the Government.
Grenada has one government-operated radio station. There are
no regulations regarding equal access to radio broadcasts by
opposition political parties. In practice, the official
opposition party was given occasional air time, but made
sporadic, informal complaints that the time given was
inadequate. In 1988 a license granted to a private FM radio
station by the Government a few months earlier was revoked and
the station closed. After an inconclusive court case on
charges of operating without a license, the owners resumed
broadcasting, only to be closed down again. In October, the
Government announced that it had issued a license for a new
privately owned FM radio station, which was scheduled to begin
broadcasting by year's end. Its programming was not expected
to deal with political matters.
Grenada currently has a fledgling television broadcasting
system which was purchased from its American owners in
September 1989 by a public corporation controlled by the
Government. Under its previous owners, the programming
featured regular political interview/talk shows which were
open to all the political parties in Grenada, as well as to
public commentary. It was unclear at year's end if the policy
of free access by opposition political parties to television
will continue under the government-controlled public
corporation.
In 1989 the Government, as it did in 1988, banned the
importation of a number of Marxist-oriented publications
destined for the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (MBPM) , in
connection with the anniversary of the coup which overthrew
the elected government of Sir Eric Gairy in 1974. The
Government noted that the Constitution allows limitations on
freedom of speech and the press when deemed necessary to
protect the public interest. On April 11, the Government
issued a formal order prohibiting permanently the importation
of 86 specific publications into Grenada on the basis that
they were contrary to the public interest.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Grenadians enjoy the right to assemble for any peaceful
purpose, including the public protest of policies or actions
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GRENADA
of the Government. Supporters of political parties meet
frequently and hold public rallies. There are no controls on
private or public associations, and permits are not required
for public meetings.
Citing a refusal to endorse a celebration of the destruction
of democracy, the Government refused to permit foreign
visitors to remain in Grenada in March 1989 to attend events
planned by the MBPM.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
All groups enjoy freedom of religion. The Roman Catholic and
Anglican faiths predominate, but there are many Presbyterian
and Methodist as well as evangelical church members. In
addition, there is a small Baha ' i community and an Islamic
center which serves the Muslim community. Complete religious
freedom extends to the Rastaf arians , who were harassed under
the PRG regime. Clergy, including missionaries, travel and
prosyletize freely. No apparent advantages or disadvantages
are conferred by adherence to a particular faith, although
Christian prayers and hymns form part of many governmental and
political meetings. Representatives of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints travel and proselytize in Grenada.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There is freedom of movement within Grenada and, in principle,
the right to enter and leave is guaranteed to all Grenadian
citizens, except in special circumstances as outlined and
limited by the Act to Restrict the Freedom of Movement of
Certain Persons, passed in 1986. The law allows the minister
responsible for national security to restrict travel out of
Grenada of any person whose aims, tendencies, or objectives
include the overthrow of the democratic and parliamentary
system of government. Anyone so restricted may appeal after 3
months to an independent and impartial tribunal, presided over
by an accredited lawyer chosen by the Chief Justice. The law
was enacted after the Grenadian Appeals Court upheld a
government action withholding the passport of a former member
of the PRG who sought to leave the country in 1985. The
Government subsequently reversed its decision in this case
late in 1988; the individual's passport was returned, and he
has been permitted to travel abroad and return.
No one was forcibly repatriated to Grenada in 1989. There
were no official applications to Grenadian authorities for
refugee status, although the Baha'i community includes
Iranians who left their homeland to escape persecution. Work
permits are granted to them, and they are allowed to practice
their religion freely. The Government has allowed students
and others to return to Grenada from Cuba and other Communist
countries .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for this right through free and fair
elections to be held at least every 5 years. Formed by the
union of three parties to contest the December 1984 elections,
the ruling NNP won 14 of the 15 parliamentary seats in an
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election in which 85 percent of the voters participated. The
NNP's majority was reduced after the resignation of two
members in 1986, and further defections in 1987 left the NNP
with only a 9 to 6 majority. After being ousted as party
leader of the NNP in a January 1989 convention. Prime Minister
Blaize broke with the NNP in August and established a new
party. The National Party (TNP) . The dismissal and/or
resignations of remaining NNP members of the Cabinet then left
the Prime Minister's TNP with a 6 to 9 minority in
Parliament. Rather than face a potential vote of no
confidence, the Prime Minister, in accordance with
constitutional provisions, advised the acting Governor General
to prorogue Parliament indefinitely on August 23.
Constitutionally, the Parliament ended its maximum 5-year term
on December 27, 1989, and elections must be held no later than
March 27, 1990. It was not certain whether or not Parliament
would be reconvened in the interim.
Local government elections promised by the NNP in the 1984
campaign remain a topic of public debate but have yet to be
held. The political system is not dominated by any particular
ethnic group, nor are there any restrictions which limit
participation of any elements of the Grenadian population.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government has welcomed visits of several human rights
organizations in the past, including Amnesty International.
In September the Government hosted and participated in a
seminar on the Judiciary and Human Rights in the Commonwealth
Caribbean sponsored by the International Commission of Jurists
in association with the Caribbean Justice Improvement Project.
The Caribbean Institute for the Promotion of Human Rights
(CARICARE) is active in Grenada. It has called on the
Government to recognize and accept the jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Court of Justice, but there was no action on
this issue in 1989.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no evidence of official discrimination in health
care, employment, or education. There have been some reported
incidents of unofficial job discrimination against Guyanese
and other foreign-born residents. Women frequently earn less
than men performing the same work; wage differences are less
marked for more highly paid jobs.
Grenadian women's rights activists contend that violence
against women in Grenada is common, and that most cases of
spouse abuse go unreported to police authorities. To address
this problem, one women's group instituted in December 1989 a
telephone crisis hot-line so that victims of rape or spouse
abuse have a mechanism for requesting support and assistance.
The Grenadian police confirm that most cases of alleged abuse
are not reported and those that are are settled out of court.
Grenadian law stipulates a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment
for a conviction of rape. Sentences for assault against a
spouse vary according to the severity of the incident.
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Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers are free to organize independent labor unions. Local
Labor Ministry officials estimate that approximately 25
percent of the total work force is unionized, although this
figure may be low. Workers in the public and private sectors
can and do strike legally if they give advance notification.
The threat of strike action by three public sector unions in
September 1989 contributed to a wage settlement highly
favorable to the workers. Union leaders play a significant
role in the political process, and one labor leader serves in
the Grenada Senate at the nomination of the governing party.
In 1989 all unions were free of government control, and none
was given government support. Grenadian unions are affiliated
with the Caribbean Congress of Labor. The Grenada Trade Union
Council still maintains contacts with the Communist-controlled
World Federation of Trade Unions, although at a very low level
of activity.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers are free to participate in collective bargaining.
Legislation compels employers to recognize a union which
represents the majority of workers in a particular business.
Grenadian law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers
against union members and organizers. If a complaint of
discrimination arises, mechanisms exist for trying to resolve
it. After all avenues for resolving a complaint have been
exhausted between union representatives and employers, both
sides may agree to ask for the assistance of the Labor
Commissioner. If the Labor Commissioner is unable to find a
resolution to the impasse, the Minister of Labor can appoint
an arbitration tribunal if both parties agree to abide by its
ruling .
There are no areas in which union organization and collective
bargaining are discouraged or impeded by the Government,
including the export processing zone. In August workers at
Abbott Labs Grenada, located in the export processing zone,
voted not to form a union by a three to one margin in an
election considered to have been free and fair.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution specifically prohibits forced labor, and no
such incidents were reported in 1989.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The statutory minimum age for employment of children (16
years) is enforced in the formal sector by periodic checks
made by inspectors from the Ministry of Labor. Enforcement in
the informal sector (i.e., family farms and small family
businesses) is less effective.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no effective regulation of work hours or occupational
safety standards, although the normal workweek rarely exceeds
40 hours. A legal minimum wage has been fixed for the
agricultural sector only. However, it is very limited in its
scope, and for the majority of agricultural workers, as in
other sectors, the minimum wage is determined by union/employer
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negotiations. The Government's own wage rate and vacation
allowances are comparable to those in the rest of the Eastern
Caribbean. Wages from full-time jobs normally provide the
basis for at least a minimally decent living standard.
r
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GUATEMALA
The Constitution of Guatemala, which took effect in January
1986, provides for a president and a 100-member unicameral
congress, both elected by universal adult suffrage, as well as
an independent judiciary, and a Human Rights Ombudsman. The
Christian Democratic Party formed a civilian Government
following free and fair elections in 1985.
The military has the primary responsibility for national
security, and has been engaged in fighting against the nearly
30-year old guerrilla insurgency. In addition, the mobile
military police (PMA) , which number about 1,000 members, also
plays a role in protecting key installations. The military
continues to have a reputation for human rights violations,
though its record has improved over the past 5 years. The PMA
reports to the Minister of Defense, an active duty general.
The National Police (some 11,000 members) and the Treasury
Police (about 2,000) report to the Minister of Interior
(Gobernacion) . The two civilian forces are generally not well
regarded and historically have been weak and corrupt
organizations with poor human rights records.
Real economic growth continued in 1989, albeit at a slightly
slower rate than in 1988 due to a less than expected rate of
investment and a fall in the rate of growth of coffee export
earnings. Although the Government has been able to sustain
the economic recovery begun in 1987, the increased growth has
been insufficient to impact on the country's major problems of
poverty, poor health and social services, high rates of
illiteracy and infant mortality, and inadequate infrastructure.
Violence in Guatemala decreased in the first 2 years of the
new civilian Government's tenure in comparison with the levels
of the early 1980's. In 1989, however, the country saw a
resurgence of violence and terrorism, much of it politically
inspired. A coup attempt in May 1989 by disaffected military
and ex-military personnel sought, among other things, to oust
reformist Defense Minister General Gramajo. Departing from
past practice, the Government moved to prosecute the
plotters. In November, seven were found guilty. Five were
sentenced to 10 years, two to 2 years in prison. With foreign
aid, the Government made efforts to continue to
professionalize the police and the judiciary in order to
increase their ability to investigate and prosecute crimes.
However, the Government, hampered by a week criminal justice
system, was unable to check the determined efforts of
antidemocratic elements and criminals to create an environment
of chaos and a lack of effective government control. There
continued to be credible reports of security forces personnel
and political extremists engaging in extrajudicial killings,
disappearances, and other serious abuses. Few, if any, of the
perpetrators of such actions were apprehended, tried, and
convicted. Throughout the year, the Communist guerrillas
increased their campaign of violence, which included
destruction of public and private property, robbery, forced
recruitment and labor, murder, and indiscriminate use of land
mines. Drug-related crime and corruption also rose in 1989,
and evidence grew of guerrilla involvement in the cultivation
and trafficking of opium. Terrorists launched a series of
bombings in the latter half of the year directed at television
and electrical transmission towers, the telephone company,
retail stores, political party headquarters, and the offices
of two human rights groups. A series of kidnapings and brutal
murders took place in August and September, including those of
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a group of evening students at the University of San Carlos in
Guatemala City.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Police statistics showed about 2,000 murders countrywide,
nearly the same as in 1988. Critics charge that these figures
understate killings in those areas with minimal police
presence or where residents refused to report incidents.
While most killings appeared to result from personal vendettas
or other criminal activities, an unknown but probably
relatively small number were politically motivated. It is
impossible, however, to determine the exact number.
There is no evidence that extrajudicial killings were part of
the Government's counter insurgency or anticrime actions, or
that top government officials ordered or condoned them.
However, as stated publicly by the Defense and the Interior
Ministers at the height of the wave of violence which swept
the country over the summer, persons in the security forces as
well as extremist political groups engaged in extrajudicial
killings. Authorities failed to investigate effectively and
bring to trial the perpetrators of these crimes. Particularly
troubling was the failure, with few exceptions, to detain or
prosecute those perpetrators who were likely to have been
connected with the security forces. In this regard, the
V/ashington-based International Human Rights Law Group asserted
in a July report that the police were unwilling to investigate
a case aggressively when the military was thought to be
involved. There is reason to believe that some military
officials take steps to shield lower ranking personnel
involved in these killings. These serious abuses continued
despite efforts to improve those forces' overall human rights
performance, including strengthening the army's Office of
Inspector-General, providing human rights and other
professional training for army and police officers, and
creating a functioning Office of Professional Responsibility
in the police.
The media reported frequent discoveries of bodies, often with
signs of torture or post-mortem mutilation. While many were
not identified, a number were persons who had arrest and
conviction records, leading some to conclude that vigilante
groups were involved in some killings in which the
perpetrators likely had access to police, court, and prison
data. There were credible reports that, during the summer, an
average of four bodies of teenaged males were found daily in
Guatemala City, bound and shot once in the back of the head.
In late May and early June in Jocotillo, Villa Canales, armed
men killed six persons in two incidents; at least some of the
victims were said to have had criminal records and one
apparently had deserted the army. Though no arrests resulted,
vigilantes, including members of the security forces, were
generally thought to be responsible for many killings of this
nature.
In August gunmen killed prominent lef t-of-center Christian
Democrat leader and journalist Danilo Barillas. Although the
police investigation was unsuccessful in establishing a motive
or perpetrator, popular suspicions focused variously on
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GUATEMALA
enemies within his party, on leftwing extremists put to
disrupt the electoral process, and even on drug traffickers.
In September the bodies of five San Carlos University students
were found. They were some of the San Carlos students who had
disappeared earlier (see Section l.b.).
While conclusive evidence was lacking, political extremists
appeared to be responsible for the shooting in the capital on
September 28 of student activist Villeda Lara and his brother,
a labor leader. Both men survived the attempted assassination.
On July 2, Jose Rolando Pantaleion, a former member of the
Coca Cola union, was killed. The case remained open at year's
end. During the early 1980 "s a number of Coca Cola union
leaders were killed. Pantaleon was not a well-known figure
within the union, and it is not clear that his death was
labor-related or why he was singled out.
An INDE (electrical) union director, Jose Leon Segura, was
killed as he waited for a bus on September 27. The union was
in the midst of a campaign to obtain the ratification of a
collective bargaining agreement. Segura apparently believed
he was in danger and had tried to obtain documents to leave
the country. No leads had been developed in the case by
year's end.
Guerrillas were involved in extrajudicial killings in rural
areas. Reliable reports indicate uniformed guerrillas
murdered relatives of army personnel in the area between
Patulul, Suchitepequez, and Pochuta, Chimaltenango in April.
Guerrillas killed a deputy mayor in San Marcos department, the
Huehuetenango deputy military zone commander, and, in Quiche,
two repatriated refugees: Mateo Juan Baltazar, an alternate
delegate to the National Dialogue (set up under the National
Reconciliation Commission established under the Esquipulas II
accords), and his brother.
Uniformed, machinegun-bearing guerrillas of the Revolutionary
Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) temporarily seized
the town of Acatenango, Chimaltenango where, according to the
press and an eyewitness, they publicly murdered an already
disarmed policeman. Uniformed guerrillas also briefly took
San Miguel Duenas, near Antigua, held a forced meeting of the
inhabitants, and killed a small child when his parents tried
to run a roadblock in their vehicle.
Army personnel in rural areas were credibly reported to have
engaged in extrajudicial killings of persons suspected of
guerrilla sympathies or drug smuggling, particularly in San
Marcos and the marijuana-growing area of Peten.
While no killing as large as the unsolved 1988 El Aguacate
massacre occurred during the year, in May a group of armed men
killed five persons, including a military commissioner and his
son, in Sanquin, Chimaltenango, not far from El Aguacate. The
military commissioner is a local civilian employee of the army
who acts as a liaison with military units in the area.
Survivors said the killers had on previous occasions stolen
supplies from Sanquin. One foreign human rights group cited
witnesses who alleged the men had "uniforms typical" of the
treasury police, a characteristic not uncommon, however, of
insurgent groups in the area. Neither the arms, the area, nor
the method of operation are those used by the treasury
police. The case remained unsolved at year's end.
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Another multiple killing took place in September, which also
involved a military commissioner as a victim, and occurred
near Iztapa, Escuintla. Armed men attacked the commissioner's
home, killing six visitors. Initial suspicion fell on
guerrillas in the Escuintla area, but the case remained
unsolved .
Although several members of the security forces faced trial
for common crimes, including armed assault and murder, the
Government was either unable or unwilling to apprehend or
prosecute those involved in extrajudicial killings. One
exception was the resolution of the 1987 murders of two
university graduates in Quetzaltenango . Rejecting an appeal
of a 1988 conviction, in August 1989 a court reaffirmed
30-year sentences for the former Quetzaltenango police chief
and five of his men who were convicted of the crime.
b. Disappearance
Disappearances, many of which ended in death, proved to be the
most controversial human rights issue in Guatemala in 1989.
Despite promises of action by government officials, including
the President, authorities did not solve numerous apparently
politically motivated disappearances, fueling concerns about
the State's ability to maintain public safety. Human rights
groups charged there were hundreds of disappearances, either
occurring since the current Government took power or remaining
unsolved from previous years. Amnesty International (AI)
listed over 220 unresolved disappearances from January 1986 to
June 1989. The Government provided a report discussing 83 of
those cases, in which some were accounted for by initial
reports deemed false, others by emigration, and a few by
discovery of dead victims. In others, victims were released
by their captors, and some cases remained inconclusive. Some
local human rights observers characterized the report as
evincing a somewhat more positive official attitude towards
disappearances; they credited AI and the Guatemalan
Congressional Human Rights Commission for inducing the
Government to prepare a response, even if incomplete. The
Human Rights Ombudsman reported 203 disappearances in 1988, of
which 55 ended in death. The Ombudsman claimed that of the
cases listed by AI as disappeared, 114 were resolved, most by
the reappearance of the claimed victim alive and well. In
late September, the Supreme Court of Justice agreed to begin
passing daily lists of police arrests and writs of habeas
corpus to the Congressional Human Rights Commission, a
practice which could facilitate a search for missing persons.
On March 15 Lucia Guadalupe Avila De Estrada, a leader of a
group of workers who attempted to form a union at the Bonin
Laboratories, was briefly kidnaped but later released. Her
abductors told her that she and her family would be killed if
she remained active in the prounion group. She resigned from
her job. The Government attempted to obtain an arrest warrant
for security guards at the laboratory who were suspected of
being involved in her kidnaping, but the courts found that
they did not have sufficient evidence.
In April and May, six members of the Rurujel Junam Council of
Ethnic Communities (CERJ), a largely indigenous group opposed
to obligatory service in civil defense patrols, disappeared in
three incidents. Two were found to have been drafted into the
army. The four still missing reportedly were taken on two
different days in early April in a conflictive area of
Suchitepequez Department by armed men with blackened faces. A
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witness to one incident reported that the kidnapers wore olive
green uniforms; he assumed they were soldiers. The National
Police and the Human Rights Ombudsman looked into the events
but reached no conclusions. The President's Advisory-
Commission on Human Rights concluded that someone might have
thought the four were guerrillas and extrajudicially executed
them. The army denied responsibility.
The Department of San Marcos, a zone of considerable conflict
and opium cultivation, averaged about three disappearances a
month in 1989. Most of these occurred in ways and places
making it impossible for investigators to establish basic
facts. Some of those missing might have been killed in
combat, taken in drug-related incidents, kidnaped, or forcibly
recruited by guerrillas. Although the army denies
responsibility, involvement by military personnel in at least
some of these cases seems certain. One such case was the July
6 disappearance of Preciliano Rafael Velasquez in San Rafael
de la Cuesta. According to available information, armed men
in a truck with Salvadoran license plates apparently took
Valasquez to the San Marcos military zone command for
questioning about a guerrilla presence on the estate he
managed. Two earlier kidnapings similar to Velasquez's were
those of Eulalio Ambrosio (June 16) and Joaquin Lopez (June 5
or 6). In both of these, witnesses saw armed men seize the
victims. His son claimed to have seen Ambrosio, General
Secretary for San Marcos of the Social Democratic Party (PSD),
being taken to the military zone command. Velasquez and
Ambrosio remain missing; Lopez's body was found 2 weeks after
he disappeared. In another case, the military commissioner,
Aquilino Lopez Escobar, was reported taken from his home in El
Tumbador, San Marcos, September 19 by men in olive green
uniforms. Lopez's brother, who apparently witnessed the
event, in this case blamed the guerrillas.
Aurelio Lorenzo Xicay, a member of the Mutual Support Group
(GAM), was found dead on July 25, 2 days after his
disappearance in the capital. Human rights groups accused
security forces of involvement in this unsolved crime.
Another reported kidnaping of a GAM member was that of Maria
Rumualda Camey. Armed men took Rumualda from her Escuintla
home on August 14; her fate remains unknown. Human rights
groups charged security services with her kidnaping. In late
September, 10 of Rumualda 's relatives, including her husband
and children, left for Spain.
The disappearances of 10 San Carlos University evening
students between August 21 and September 10 drew much
attention. The reported victims were either currently or
previously active in the University Students' Association
(AEU) . Several of the victims apparently participated in
support of the massive teachers' strike which took place
earlier in the summer, following which a self-described
anti-Communist group began a campaign of terror and death
threats against university students and professors (see
Section 2. a.). On September 10, the bodies of four of the
students, bearing signs of torture, were found near the
University's Guatemala City campus. On September 19, the body
of a fifth, discovered 4 days earlier, was identified in a
town 40 miles outside the capital. The other five remained
missing. Popular suspicion fell primarily on rightwing
extremists and the security forces. Many local observers
concluded that the security forces, or persons within them,
conducted a "counterinsurgency" operation aimed at preventing
a rebirth of guerrilla movements at San Carlos. An October
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report by Americas Watch (AW) termed the government response
to the killings "inadequate," and declared that the manner and
pattern of the incidents "strongly suggest" either involvement
or acquiescence of the security forces. Official efforts to
solve the crimes yielded no results by year's end. Following
these events, several other students went abroad. In
December, another student, Marco Tulio Montenegro, was found
murdered 2 days after having been expelled from the University
Students' Association.
Some disappearances had less grim endings. One student, Lemus
Godoy,. listed initially by GAM and AEU as missing, personally
denied the reports. A GAM member, Miguel Morales, allegedly
kidnaped August 23, appeared unharmed 2 days later; his
captors reportedly apologized for "making a mistake." In
September two students reported that they had been kidnaped
and held briefly, during which time they received death
threats. The son-in-law of Christian Democrat presidential
hopeful Rene de Leon also was seized, beaten, and abandoned
hours later — bruised but alive.
While the Government claimed that it did not have the
resources or capability to investigate disappearances, it
quickly rescued a young upper-income student kidnaped in
October (in what was apparently a criminal incident for
ransom) and captured some of the alleged kidnapers,
demonstrating that it could, on occasion, mobilize itself to
effective action.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Credible, verifiable reports of inhuman or cruel treatment of
detainees in official custody remained rare. The police
leadership engaged in ongoing efforts to curtail such abuses,
apparently with some success. The Human Rights Ombudsman
charged, however, that prison conditions themselves
constituted cruel and inhuman treatment, and bore at least
partial responsibility for the March uprising at Pavon prison
near Guatemala city. The prison director, in a statement to
Congress, admitted conditions at Pavon were difficult, citing
severe overcrowding, lack of medical care, bad nutrition, and
unsanitary conditions.
Reports of brutality by the military were more frequent, but
generally unr:orroborated. Some alleged victims reported that
they had suffered degrading treatment by civil defense patrols
or military commissioners.
Another report of alleged torture under investigation is the
case of Sister Diana Ortiz, an American Ursuline Sister. She
disappeared on November 2 from the Posada Belem religious
retreat in Antigua, located about 40 kilometers outside
Guatemala City, and reappeared on the morning of November 3 in
the capital. She declined to discuss what had happened to
either Guatemalan or U.S. Embassy officials prior to her
departure from Guatemala for the U.S. on November 5. In a
statement later submitted by the Ursuline Order on behalf of
Sister Ortiz, she stated that she was kidnaped by several men,
taken to an undisclosed location, beaten, sexually abused and
burned with cigarettes. The Government of Guatemala opened an
investigation of the case and requested additional information
on the incident from Sister Ortiz. As of year's end. Sister
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Ortiz had not acceded to the request. The perpetrators have
not been identified.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Allegations of arbitrary arrest or detention by police (as
distinct from the security forces) are infrequent in
Guatemala. Under the Constitution, a person cannot be held
for more than 6 hours without being brought before a judge and
formally charged with a crime.
An arrest warrant is required from the criminal court when an
accused is not apprehended in the actual commission of a
crime. The law also limits to 20 days the time a person may
be held for investigation, after which he must be charged or
released. Additionally, the law incorporates a constitutional
protection against illegal detention and requires the personal
appearance of any person who is illegally detained or whose
freedom is threatened in any way. Other protections include a
system of bail and access to lawyers. Involuntary exile is
not used as a punishment.
There were no known instances during 1989 in which critics of
the Government were formally arrested for political reasons.
The Human Rights Ombudsman charged that there were "secret"
jails, off-limits to the Ombudsman and other investigators,
that did not respond to writs of habeas corpus. Military and
police officials denied this. There were credible reports,
however, that the security forces have "safehouses" where they
conduct illegal interrogations of persons not formally
arrested and where they sometimes torture and/or kill
detainees. Relatives of suspected rightist terrorist Mario
Roberto Martinez Pena charged that police arrested Martinez at
3 p.m. September 15 but did not bring him before a judge until
11:30 p.m. and that neither they nor his attorney knew
Martinez's whereabouts during that time. The police replied
that they obeyed all legal norms. The suspect and a colleague
were released in November when a judge found insufficient
evidence to bring them to trial.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for a court of constitutionality, a
supreme court, a court of appeals, and several other courts of
special jurisdiction. Military courts have jurisdiction only
over military personnel. Civilian trials are public;
defendants have the right to be present and represented by an
attorney. Law students often provide state-funded legal
services to indigent defendants. The Court of Appeals
automatically reviews convictions. The judiciary in 1989
continued to work to increase its capacity to deal with cases
of both ordinary and political violence. "Model" courts were
established in urban and rural areas as a pilot project. New
techniques and procedures, including prioritization of cases,
bilingual capacity in indigenous areas, and other innovations
are being developed to try to overcome the historic problems
of corruption, favoritism, understaf f ing and lack of training
that have hindered the effective administration of justice.
In June Eleodoro Sal Siquinajay admitted, in an army-sponsored
press conference, that he belonged to the ORPA unit
responsible for the 1988 El Aguacate massacre and to kidnaping
and killing a missing resident of El Aguacate. Persons who
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saw Sal after the press conference, however, reported that he
had recanted his statement and charged army pressure was
behind the confession. Some observers expressed concern that
the press conference violated Sal's rights: he had not come
before a judge within 6 hours and had been forced to
incriminate himself. On September 26, Sal was found not
guilty of kidnaping and murder; he received 2 years in prison
and a fine of $18 for theft and illegal possession of a
handgun.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of home,
correspondence, and private documents. This provision seemed
to be generally respected. Critics charged, however, that
Civil Defense Patrols were a form of forced membership in an
organization. The evidence on the patrols, however, was
mixed. In most areas that still had the patrols,
participation appeared to be voluntary; in the conflictive
areas of Quiche and Huehuetenango, however, the degree of
voluntarism was open to serious question. While the military
has denied allegations that it threatens or persecutes rural
villagers or groups that actively campaign against the
patrols, a number of such activists have disappeared or been
subject to other abuses.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
A nearly 30-year-old guerrilla conflict continued throughout
1989. Some human rights groups charged the Government with
indiscriminate use of aircraft and artillery by the military
against civilian populations; allegations of "carpet" bombing,
strafing, and heavy artillery barrages, however, were not
generally credible given Guatemala's small air force and
limited artillery resources. While little information exists
on treatment given captured guerrillas, there are unconfirmed
reports that they have suffered physical abuse and even death
at the hands of their military captors. Similar reports
indicate that guerrillas also engaged in such practices with
captured soldiers.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of expression, and there
were no government-sponsored efforts to restrict it. Vocal
critics of the Government received widespread media attention
throughout 1989. The three major newspapers maintained
strongly antigovernment editorial policies throughout the
year; one openly supported a rival party. Press releases and
advertisements by guerrilla groups and other opposition groups
were frequently run by the press with no government
retaliation. Foreign films, books, television programs (most
via cable), magazines, and newspapers were available. The
Government did not interfere either with foreign radio
broadcasts or the activity of foreign journalists, even those
critical of the Government and the military.
In August a customs official seized 12 books mailed to CERJ
leader Amilcar Mendez. Mendez petitioned the Human Rights
Ombudsman who ruled in his favor; the books were given to
Mendez with apologies from the customs service.
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In spite of official respect for freedom of expression and
press, reported threats and acts of violence against the media
increased significantly in 1989. The transmission tower of a
television station was bombed in July, killing a technician.
The explosion occurred the night the station was to broadcast
a widely publicized exclusive interview with Nicaraguan
President Ortega. The interview never aired. A car belonging
to the coowner of the largest radio network was bombed outside
his home, also in July. Elements of the security forces
acting on their own were widely believed responsible for both
actions, but the perpetrators have not been apprehended. The
magazine For Que ceased publication after the publisher and
other staff members were threatened; some left Guatemala. The
magazine had strong ties to Danilo Barillas, the Christian
Democrat politician who was murdered in August (see Section
l.a.). Other journalists also reported receiving death
threats and some reportedly left Guatemala. Despite the
closing of For Que, the number of publications and media
outlets grew in 1989, continuing a trend established with the
return of elected government.
While journalists continued to exercise self-censorship on
topics such as the insurgency and political violence, they
criticized the military more openly than ever in the past.
The navy's mishandling of a boat accident in January, in which
over 100 persons died, drew vigorous press scrutiny and
criticism. This attention — despite some apparent initial
efforts to cover up the incident — pushed the Government into
admitting official malfeasance. The media responded strongly
to public criticism leveled against them by the Minister of
Defense. The same reaction greeted President Cerezo's address
to the nation in which he sharply criticized specific media
organizations. The furor abated only when President Cerezo
visited those organizations and firmly restated his support
for a free and independent press.
Students and some faculty members of San Carlos University in
Guatemala City were subjected to threats, kidnapings, and
murder in a wave of violence in August and September (see
Section l.b.). The victims were accused by a group calling
itself the "Secret Anti-Communist Army of San Carlos
University" of having links to guerrilla organizations. The
intimidation temporarily shut down night classes on the campus
and effectively dissolved various student associations.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the rights of peaceful assembly
and political association. Parades, rallies, and
demonstrations were held frequently during 1989. By law,
organizations must obtain legal association status from the
Government, a cumbersome procedure. Labor, religious,
student, human rights, and charitable organizations operated
legally, including those with foreign ties. The lack of legal
association status did not prevent numerous other
organizations from operating openly.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion. Religious freedom is provided for
in law and realized in practice. While 70 percent of the
population is nominally Catholic, many Indians mix traditional
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and Catholic beliefs. A large number of other religious
denominations have an active presence; 25 percent of
Guatemalans adhered to Protestant denominations, many with
ties abroad. Generally, foreign priests and missionaries
worked without interference. Guatemala has small Mormon,
Jewish, Baha'i, Buddhist, and Islamic communities.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government does not restrict foreign travel; critics
traveled freely. The Government does not revoke citizenship
for political reasons. The return of one exile group, the
United Representatives of the Guatemalan Opposition, however,
amid considerable press and television attention, resulted in
their allegedly receiving death threats. The group went
abroad again after a car bomb was discovered and defused near
their residence.
Freedom of movement within Guatemala was generally unhindered
except in some conflictive areas. In guerrilla-controlled
villages of northern Quiche (known as Popular Communities in
Resistance, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) maintained
tight control over travel. Threats and violence, including
the use of land mines, severely restricted movement into or
out of these areas. The army also restricted movement in some
conflictive areas.
Guatemala remained a refuge for thousands of Central
Americans. Over 30,000 Nicaraguans and unknown numbers of
Salvadorans were reported to be in Guatemala. Guatemalan
refugees returning from Mexico numbered around 900 through
September, a rate half that of the previous year. Some
refugees returned once again to Mexico, primarily for economic
reasons. The Mexican Government, however, denied press
reports of a mass migration back to Mexico by Guatemalan
refugees .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Guatemalans have the right to change their government by
democratic means. There is universal suffrage. The voting
age is 18 and voting is by secret ballot. Vinicio Cerezc of
the Christian Democratic party (DCG) won free and fair
elections in November 1985 and became President in January
1986. While slightly more than half of the 100 congressional
deputies were DCG, 10 other parties, ranging from far right to
moderate left, also are represented in the legislature.
Congressional debates were lively and well-covered by the
media; on occasion the Congress asserted itself, most notably
by exercising its constitutional right to deny the President
authorization to travel abroad, holding "no confidence" votes
against government ministers, and rejecting the Government's
1990 budget. New national elections are due in 1990, and
political party activity was intense during 1989. Some 20
parties will seek to participate in the 1990 elections.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government did not hinder international human rights
organizations working in Guatemala. Senior officials met
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representatives of such groups, including AW and AI , to
discuss the human rights situation in Guatemala.
The constitutionally created office of the Human Rights
Ombudsman was active during 1989; pronouncements by that
office, including those highly critical of government
performance in handling the investigation of the November 1988
El Aguacate massacre and of authorities' efforts to solve
disappearances, were widely disseminated by the media.
The Congressional Comm.ission on Human Rights, also mandated by
the Constitution, increased its activity despite meager
resources. The Commission pressed for reappointment of a U.N.
Human Rights Rapporteur (Guatemala has been subject in the
past to UNHRC scrutiny) and was successful in obtaining from
the Government requested lists of arrested persons. The
President's Advisory Commission on Human Rights, apparently
concerned primarily with defending abroad the Government's
human rights record, achieved little during the year in
advancing the cause of human rights.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) opened an
office in Guatemala in January 1988, but by the end of 1989 it
had not yet reached agreement with the Government on carrying
out its full range of humanitarian activities. It did conduct
a limited program, incuding an educational program for the
Army.
Despite official tolerance, some foreign and local human
rights organizations and personnel suffered violent attacks
from assailants assumed to have links to the security forces
or rightwing groups. The office of one small local group, the
Commission for the Investigation, Study and Promotion of Human
Rights (CIEPRODH) , was shot at in January. Explosions damaged
the offices of the GAM and the Peace Brigades International in
August. In December three Peace Brigadists, including a
United States citizen, were stabbed by unknown assailants.
Throughout the year GAM members reported receiving threats and
were targets of violence, including kidnaping and murder. The
leader of CERJ alleged receiving numerous threats and charged
that unknown persons tried to run his car off the road. In
late December, the offices of the ICRC were damaged by a
grenade blast.
Several nongovernmental human rights groups published reports
in 1989 on conditions in Guatemala; the reports were based
primarily on field work and interviews conducted openly in the
country. One group, although highly critical, thanked the
Government for allowing its "observation of the National
Police in a manner and degree unknown under previous military
regimes . "
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
About half the population is culturally indigenous, the other
half ladino. While possessing equal legal rights, indigenous
people generally continued to be outside the national economy,
culture, and language. The brunt of the fighting in the
guerrilla conflict fell on indigenous people: young rural men
were much more likely to be drafted into the army or forcibly
recruited into guerrilla bands than their urban Westernized
counterparts. Both sides fielded largely Indian forces led
principally by ladino officers; most combat occurred in
indigenous areas. The majority of victims of disappearances
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and extrajudicial killings were indigenous persons. On the
positive side, some progress, particularly in nontraditional
agriculture and bilingual education, was made to provide
Indians a somewhat higher standard of living in the future. A
few Indians held public office, including as congressmen and
mayors; some are serving as Army officers.
Women are increasingly active in the country work force, but
discrimination on the basis of sex in the workplace
continued. Jobs were often advertised on the basis of sex,
and women typically received lower wages for the same or
similar job. There are no organizations devoted to women's
issues and, with the exception of Mrs. Cerezo, there are no
prominent persons involved with the issue.
Violence against women, including domestic violence such as
wife beating, is common but does not receive much attention
from the Government, public, or press. Such abuse, including
criminal sexual violence, often goes unreported by victims and
is not considered a high priority for law enforcement. Police
are reluctant to intervene in what is frequently considered a
domestic affair. Few cases of rape are brought before the
courts .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the legal right to join a union of their
choosing. Procedures for obtaining legal status for trade
unions are those adopted in the wake of the 1954 coup and are
cumbersome. In 1988, 66 unions obtained legal status and a
similar number will have done so in in 1989. The newly formed
unions were mostly in the public sector, which was guaranteed
the right to organize by the Constitution. Despite the
increase, only about 8 percent of the country's work force is
unionized.
The law allows several unions in the same company; some union
leaders complained that parallel unions undermined their
members' interests. There were allegations that the
Government favored unions with ties to the governing Christian
Democratic party (in the case of the port workers in Santo
Tomas de Castilla, there was evidence that this accusation was
accurate) .
There is an active Solidarismo movement in the country. While
leaders of the movement claim that it is a legitimate form of
worker organization, the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) , and the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and
other international trade union organizations contend that
Solidarismo is an employer-inspired alternative to independent
trade unions. The Ministry of Labor has thus far refused to
register Solidarismo organizations as unions.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, but
procedures for a legal strike remain cumbersome. Most strikes
simply occur without legal permission. In practice, the
Ministry of Labor makes no effort to obtain a judicial
determination of their legality. A notable exception was the
66-day teachers strike which was formally declared illegal.
In the end, teachers agreed to return to work but accepted a
settlement which cost them half a month's pay. They were the
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first public sector employees to lose money through an
unlawful strike.
Unions may form federations and confederations and join
international bodies. The Confederation of Labor Unity is
affiliated with the ICFTU and its Latin American Regional
Labor Organization. The Latin American Confederation of Labor
also had a local affiliate, the General Confederation of
Guatemalan Workers. While no labor unions openly acknowledge
ties with the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade
Unions (WFTU) , some in the Guatemalan Confederation for Labor
Unity receive aid from the WFTU, Cuba, or Nicaragua.
Labor leaders are often identified by human rights groups as
the victims of threats, disappearances, and murder (see
Sections l.a. and l.b.). Many were lower level labor
activists, and there is not a clear explanation why they have
suffered most of the violence. Local factors such as a plant
manager's antiunion sentiment were responsible for some of
these abuses. The kidnaping of Lucia Guadalupe Avila de
Estrada (Section l.b.) was linked to her union activities.
The Labor Ministry and the Labor Courts do not normally
involve themselves in cases of threats, disappearances or
murders .
In its 1989 report, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Committee of Experts (COE) recognized the establishment of a
tripartite commission to update the labor law and reiterated
its request that the Government bring provisions of its Labor
Code into conformity with Convention 87 on Freedom of
Association, in particular those provisions which currently
place unions under strict government supervision; impede
unions' participation in politics and sanction those that do
participate; and prohibit strikes by agricultural workers and
otherwise unduly restrict the right to strike. At its
November 1989 meeting, the ILO Committee on Freedom of
Association urgently appealed to the Government to submit
information regarding a new complaint against the Government
alleging violation of Convention 87.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
According to the Labor Ministry, there were 70 to 80
collective bargaining agreements in force in 1989, and they
covered only a fraction of the organized work force. Many
public sector unions were negotiating their first contract.
The greatest obstacle to organizing was discriminatory
antiunion actions by employers and others. Workers who sought
to form unions were sometimes fired; others quit and went
abroad as a result of threats. It was common for courts to
issue injunctions to force companies to obtain judicial
authorization before firing employees. Companies which
ignored the law faced only the token punishment of small fines.
The law allows workers to appeal discriminatory firings and
provides for separation pay for those who lose their jobs. In
practice, however, the labor courts remained overburdened and
legal remedies were slow. The courts have often not been able
to reinstate dismissed employees.
Guatemalan labor laws are based on constitutional provisions,
and there are no areas of the country that are outside their
jurisdiction. A new law authorizing the creation of export
processing zones specifies that all labor codes apply in them.
In its 1989 report, cited above, the COE noted that the
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Constitution grants freedom of association and collective
bargaining to all workers in the public and private sectors
and expressed its satisfaction with a decree setting forth
procedures for the exercise of the rights to organize, bargain
collectively, and strike in the public sector.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced labor and it does not
generally exist. Some local and foreign human rights groups
charged, however, that coercion was used in some areas to
ensure a suitable number of "volunteers" for the civil defense
patrols. There have also been isolated cases of alleged
compulsory labor outside of the routine activities of the
civil patrols but no pattern to these instances has been
established.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Constitution prohibits the employment of children under
the age of 14 years. In the industrial sector, where
government labor codes were enforced, child labor did not
appear to be common. In the informal sector, this regulation,
as well as others, was not effectively enforced. In 1989 it
was common to see children employed as street vendors, begging
for money, or watching and washing cars. In rural areas,
entire families worked. Migrant laborers, particularly those
from the indigenous highlands, often bring their families with
them and spend several months away from their homes,
interfering with the children's education.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Constitution provides for a 44-hour workweek. While
occupational safety and health regulations existed, they were
not always enforced effectively. The minimum wage for farm
labor was $2 per day, though there were a number of higher
minimum wages by employment sector in urban areas. Ministry
of Labor data show that 85 percent of Guatemalan families did
not have enough income to meet basic needs and that 72 percent
lived in extreme poverty. Minimum wages were raised in 1988
for the first time this decade; no raise took place in 1989.
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GUYANA
The Cooperative Republic of Guyana, a member of the
Commonwealth of Nations, is a small, multiracial developing
nation located on the South American continent; culturally and
politically it is considered a part of the Caribbean. A
unicameral Parliament is chosen by direct election in a
multiparty political system. The head of the majority party
in Parliament serves as Executive President. Under the 1980
Constitution, parliamentary, regional, and municipal elections
are held at least every 5 years. The People's National
Congress (PNC), currently led by President Hugh Desmond Hoyte,
has dominated political life since the 1964 elections. The
opposition parties boycotted the November 1989 municipal
elections, alleging that they would not be free and fair due
to ruling party control of the electoral machinery.
Guyanese society and political life are influenced by
differences between the ethnic Afro-Guyanese and
Indo-Guyanese. Urban Afro-Guyanese dominate the ruling PNC,
the Guyana Police Force (GPF) , the Guyana Defence Force (GDF) ,
and other security forces; Indo-Guyanese predominate in the
agricultural and business sectors.
The Guyana Police Force has primary responsibility for
maintaining law and order throughout Guyana. In addition, the
Customs and Excise Department, and various branches of the
Special Constabulary, have arrest authority within certain
well-defined limits. The Police and Constabulary, the GDF,
the Guyana National Service, the Guyana People's Militia,
Guyana Prisons Service, and the Customs and Excise Department,
are directly responsible to the civilian Government.
Public corporations control two of Guyana's major export
industries, sugar and bauxite, which employ about 17 percent
of the work force. The third principal export industry, rice,
is primarily in private hands. Despite the Government's
efforts to enhance the role of the private sector and
encourage private foreign and domestic investment, the economy
continued to be plagued by external debt, sluggish growth, and
a deteriorating infrastructure. On March 31 the Government
began an economic recovery program with the assistance of the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The program
included an immediate 70-percent devaluation of the Guyana
dollar, which drastically reduced real income and sparked
public protests.
Human rights concerns in Guyana continue to center on police
abuse of persons arrested, limitations on press freedom, and
questionable electoral practices. Although the improved
atmosphere noted since the 1985 change of PNC leadership
following the death of Linden Forbes Burnham has continued,
several unions which exercised the traditionally recognized
right to strike in 1989 suffered reprisal from public sector
employers, and the authorities showed little tolerance for a
new labor umbrella organization which challenged government
policies .
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GUYANA
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No politically motivated or governmentally instigated
extrajudicial killings are known to have occurred. Summary
executions do not take place.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances,
clandestine detentions, or abductions.
c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
While torture is prohibited by the Constitution, the Guyana
Human Rights Association (GHRA) has expressed its concern over
"the use of violence by the police and its apparent acceptance
by society at large.' It has also stated its belief that
"those responsible for excessive violence constitute a small
element within the force as a whole." Police regulations
require internal investigation of all charges of abuse, and in
the past some police officers have been disciplined or fined.
In 1989 no police officers were disciplined or fined as a
result of police investigations of brutality, although some
were reportedly punished for corruption. The Director of
Public Prosecutions did not prosecute any police on charges of
brutality during 1989. On June 9, the legislature passed the
Police Complaints Authority Bill which provides for the
establishment of an independent Police Complaints Authority
consisting of one person qualified to be a puisne (inferior)
judge of the high court and two assistants. Although the
Authority itself will have no investigative powers, it will
supervise police investigations of specified cases of
misconduct or serious crimes alleged to have been committed by
members of the police force, and will make annual reports to
the legislature.
Civil and criminal suits may be brought against police
officers by private citizens, but critics charge that police
discourage complainants from bringing suit. One case, in
which it is alleged that a prisoner died while in police
custody in 1986, was in court at year's end.
The GHRA noted in 1989 its concern with reports of inadequate
nutrition for prisoners in the nation's penal system.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution provides that no person may be deprived of
personal liberty except as authorized by law, and also calls
for judicial determination of the legality of detention. Some
opposition politicians allege that the arrests of party and
union activists during the May 1989 sugar strike was a
politically motivated act of intimidation. The Government
states that the arrests were part of an investigation into
cases of arson. Most arrestees were released without charge.
In an ongoing treason case, three People's Progressive Party
(PPP) activists state that they were held incommunicado from
their alleged arrest on April 28 until a writ of habeas corpus
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GUYANA
was filed on May 3. On August 14, however, the magistrate
presiding over the case accepted the statement of the police
that the three were not in fact arrested until May 3.
On December 6 the National Assembly voted to repeal the
National Security Act, which permits the detention without
charges for up to 3 months of persons who are deemed (by
officials at the ministerial level) likely to act "in any
manner prejudicial to public safety or public order or the
defense of Guyana. At year's end, actual repeal was in the
legislative process and the Act remained in force. No one has
ever been detained under these provisions of the Act.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Under Guyana's British common law system, the Constitution
provides that anyone charged with a criminal offense has the
right to a hearing by a court of law, and this right is
respected in practice. Guyana has a functioning bail system,
and defendants are granted fair public trials. Defendants are
represented by counsel appointed by the court when necessary.
Timely charges are presented, and appeal can be made to higher
courts. There are no political prisoners or special courts
for political security cases. A pending treason case against
three men is being heard in the regular court. Some
opposition figures have expressed concern over the courts'
rulings in certain cases involving government interests, such
as in libel suits brought by government officials. Opposition
lawyers complain that the judiciary is prone to grant lengthy
postponements in trials affecting the Government or law
enforcement officials; however, postponements are routinely
granted to both the defense and the prosecution. Delays in
judicial proceedings are most often caused by shortages of
trained court administrative personnel.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government generally respects the right to privacy. Some
opposition politicians have alleged incidents of government
surveillance, particularly at meetings and rallies. The
National Security Act, which the National Assembly voted to
repeal in December (Section l.d.), permits police of the rank
of inspector and above to conduct searches for narcotics and
arms without a search warrant but with probable cause.
Narcotics laws also permit searches for narcotics without
warrants but with probable cause. The laws requiring
judicially issued warrants for all other searches were
respected.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The constitutional provision for freedom of speech is
respected, and Guyanese can, and do, criticize their
Government and its policies.
Guyana's public television station, Guyana Television
(GTV-10) , broadcasts a 1-hour program on Sundays. It also
provides a nightly 15-minute news program, which generally
presents the Government's point of view but does include
coverage of opposition views and events, to the country's two
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SUXAMA
private television stations. The two private stations
normally broadcast satellite transmissions from the United
States, including uncensored network news, but do not produce
their own local news broadcasts. The country's only radio
station, the government-owned Guyana Broadcasting Corporation
(GBC) , is selective in reporting the views and activities of
opposition parties. Some of the GBC's radio interview and
commentary programs allow public criticism of the Government,
but, in general, they reflect government policies. The GBC
radio station refused, for example, to allow the Anglican
Bishop's "Charge to the Synod" to be broadcast on the April 9
"Church Calling" radio program on the grounds that it was not
devotional. The GBC similarily refused to broadcast a July 9
Catholic Church program concerning the 1979 murder of Father
Bernard Arke. Although there is interest in establishing
private radio stations, the Government has yet to implement a
licensing procedure allowing for their operation. Foreign and
regional radio stations can be heard on medium and shortwave
bands .
In the past the Government, through ownership of the country's
only daily newspaper and radio station, issuance of import
licenses for newsprint and printing presses, and control of
most hard currency, maintained varying degrees of control over
the media. This control, however, has been easing since
1987. The independent Stabroek News currently publishes twice
a week. Newsprint availability remained a problem, but the
shortage affected government as well as independent
publications. The Guyana Press Association, reactivated in
1988, continued to function in 1989.
Individual members of the Government have sometimes brought
libel suits against publishers, which critics claim is to
discourage press criticism of the Government. A lawsuit filed
in 1988 by individual police officers against the GHRA over
its "Brief on Police Violence" is still being heard in the
courts. No such libel suits were filed in 1989.
In 1989 the government-owned daily newspaper, the Guyana
Chronicle, reduced its previously expanded coverage of news
and commentaries that differ from government views, and became
more clearly reflective of government positions. Independent
periodicals remained free to criticize the Government and its
policies. Information on government activities is carefully
controlled, although in 1989 government officials were
increasingly available to the press through press
conferences. The April 1988 Public Corporations Act, which
provides for the fining and imprisonment of employees of
public corporations who disclose unauthorized information
about government activities and operations, continued to be
viewed by the media as a restraint. To date, no one has been
charged under the law. Guyanese can receive printed materials
from abroad without restrictions, but scarce foreign exchange
limits their availability. Certain regional newspapers and
international news magazines, which often contain criticism of
the Government, are, however, regularly available.
The Government's record on academic freedom continued to be
good. Several opposition activists in the GHRA and the
Marxist Working People's Alliance (WPA) teach at the public
University of Guyana, and opposition parties have also
organized groups there.
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GUYANA
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Public Order Act requires police permits for mass
political meetings but allows the police commissioner, at his
discretion and without explanation, to refuse permission for a
public meeting. In 1989 opposition parties organized numerous
rallies and marches, particularly in April, to protest the
establishment of the Government's economic reform program.
Opposition figures complained, however, that permission to
hold rallies and use amplified sound systems was at times
arbitrarily denied. Although all requests to hold marches in
April during the period of protests against the Government's
economic program were denied, several marches took place
without incident, while marchers in others were arrested for
taking part in illegal processions. Unruly protestors were
occasionally arrested but usually released within hours or the
next day. The Government imposes no restrictions on private
associations, which are not required to be registered and
which may maintain relations with international bodies as they
wish.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of thought and
religion. There is no favored or official state religion. All
religions in Guyana are allowed to select their places of
worship and are free to maintain links with coreligionists in
other countries. Christian, Hindu, Muslims, and Baha'i
communities in Guyana practice their religions without
restrictions. There are no restrictions on travel for
religious purposes, nor pn training of clergy, religious
publishing, conversion, religious education, or charitable
activities .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement within Guyana is provided for in the
Constitution. Travel to certain Amerindian areas requires
government permission, a regulation dating from colonial times
designed to protect the indigenous peoples from exploitation.
The GHRA, opposition politicians, and some clergy contend that
permits are sometimes denied to missionaries and non-PNC
politicians, and that the regulations are being used to
maintain PNC influence among the Amerindians. Guyanese are
free to travel abroad, emigrate, and to return. Guyana is
neither a refugee receiving nor generating country. There are
no forced resettlements or displaced persons, and citizenship
is not denied on political grounds.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Guyanese are free to express their political views and to join
or support a variety of political parties, but electoral
practices call into question whether citizens in practice have
the ability to change the Government. All citizens 18 years
of age or older are eligible to participate in the political
process and to vote. National and regional elections, by
secret ballot, are held at least every 5 years. The leader of
the winning party serves as President and forms a Cabinet.
Constitutionally, the next national elections must be held by
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GUYANA
early 1991.
Opposition parties vigorously criticize the Government and are
free to field candidates for election. Since 1964, however,
the People's National Congress (PNC), a predominantly
Afro-Guyanese party, has dominated political life through
questionable electoral practices. Opposition parties
regularly charge the ruling party with fraud. Following the
1985 elections, opposition parties, including the Communist
People's Progressive Party (PPP), joined in the Patriotic
Coalition for Democracy (PCD) . The PCD seeks such reforms in
Guyana's election laws as the counting of ballots at the
polling places rather than at central counting places.
President Hoyte stated in September that he opposed the
counting of ballots at polling places on grounds that voters
in "ethnic enclaves" could easily be subjected to
intimidation. The PCD boycotted the November 1989 municipal
elections, stating that current electoral laws were
insufficient to guarantee that they would be free and fair.
The unopposed PNC slates were declared elected. Thirty-six
prominent individuals from a broad cross-section of Guyanese
society signed an open letter on electoral reform in August,
calling for the creation of an acceptable elections commission
as well as election monitoring by local and international
observers .
The Integrity Commission, appointed by the Government in 1986
to investigate the need for a code of ethics for public
officials, also called for electoral reform, including greater
dialogue with opposition parties. In 1989 the PCD requested a
meeting with President Hoyte, who agreed to meet a single
spokesman to represent the six parties. By year's end the PCD
had not agreed on a spokesman. The President did meet during
the year with the leader of the recently formed United
Republican Party, which is not a member of the PCD.
Political parties are organized generally along ethnic lines,
a situation that predates independence. President Hoyte has
appointed a number of Indo-Guyanese to ministerial and other
government positions and attracted still others to the PNC.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government regards outside criticism of its human rights
practices as interference in its internal affairs. The GHRA,
the most active local human rights group, functions without
government interference. The GHRA is a nongovernmental
organization formed in 1979 with support from trade unions,
professional organizations, and churches, and it issues
periodic press releases and publishes an annual report on
human rights in Guyana. It also gathers information from
members, victims of abuse, trade unionists, clergy, other
interested parties, official documents, and newspapers. A
British prisons expert who visited Guyana in 1989 was received
by government officials, but was not permitted to examine
prisons. The Government contended that its refusal was due to
insufficient advance notice.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for fundamental rights to all
persons in Guyana. Guyanese society and political life
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GUYANA
continue to be influenced by ethnic differences between
Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese . Guyana has a small ethnic
Amerindian population, composed of nine tribal groups, living
in scattered reservations throughout the country. Relative to
most Guyanese, their standard of living is low. The GHRA has
alleged that Amerindians are subjected to government control
of their leaders and land titles, as well as limitations on
access to their reservations by clergy and other outsiders.
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex
and provides women the right to equal pay for equal work.
There are no discriminatory family laws or restrictions on
women's right to own property. There are no organizations
that focus primarily on women's rights. Violence against
women, including domestic violence such as wife beating, is
considered by many to be a significant problem. However,
victims of such abuse oftentimes are reluctant to report it to
the authorities or to press charges, and underreporting of
incidents of such violence makes it impossible to estimate its
true extent. The Government does not condone this practice,
but other than providing victims with access to the courts for
redress has not recommended additional legislation or other
remedial action.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of association is provided for in the Constitution,
which specifically enumerates a person's right "to form or
belong to trade unions." Approximately 88,000 of Guyana's
estimated 240,000 workers are organized. Unions are free to
choose their own officials. There have been allegations that
the Government has attempted to influence the outcome of some
union elections, but in general elections are vigorously
contested. The views of trade unions and trade unionists are
widely publicized in both the government-controlled and
independent media. Workers in Guyana have a generally
recognized right to strike, but this right is not codified.
The sugar and bauxite industries experienced highly disruptive
6-week strikes protesting the March 31 budget, which launched
the difficult IMF-monitored economic recovery program,
including a 70-percent currency devaluation. The strike ended
when workers in both industries returned to their jobs without
a formal wage settlement agreement after the Government
pledged to seek ways to ameliorate the situation. Public
employees providing essential services are forbidden to
strike, but a procedure exists for the review of grievances by
a tribunal appointed by the Minister of Labor.
Political parties, particularly the ruling PNC, wield
significant influence in a number of unions, and political
figures often have dual roles as trade union leaders. All 18
actively participating unions in the Trades Union Congress
(TUC) , the major umbrella labor organization, are either
strongly influenced by or affiliated with the PNC. Guyana's
largest union, the Guyana Agricultural and General Workers
Union (GAWU) , is affiliated with the opposition PPP.
Six unions belong to the dissident Federation of Independent
Trade Unions of Guyana (FITUG), which was originally formed
when these unions plus one other (which later returned to the
TUC) walked out of the September 1988 TUC conference in
protest against heavy-handed electioneering tactics by PNC
activist delegates. FITUG, whose members have not formally
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GUYANA
severed their ties with the TUC, has renewed a longstanding
call for reform of the TUC to redistribute internal power and
safeguard the independence of the organization from political
influence.
FITUG suffered some consequences because it played the major
role in protesting against the budget. The Government
continued its efforts begun in 1988 to bring the FITUG unions
back into the TUC, and several unions which struck during the
labor unrest in the first half of 1989 suffered reprisals from
public sector employers. In February, the leadership of
Guyana's two bauxite unions was temporarily "derecognized" and
collection of the union's checkoff dues (as required under the
unions' collective agreement) was discontinued by their public
sector employer following a FITUG-inspired 1-day protest
strike against government policies. A number of teachers who
participated in this protest strike were dismissed or
transferred to remote sections of the country, and in one
instance it was reported that picketing teachers and students
were attacked by PNC-connected thugs. In response to a 1-day
protest strike in April by a FITUG affiliate, four state
corporations dismissed nearly 300 workers and ceased deduction
of that union's checkoff dues. Collection of checkoff dues
was reinstituted by mid-year for all affected unions,
including one whose checkoff dues had been discontinued in
late 1988. All but a few of the terminated workers were
rehired in their previous positions, and some but not all of
the teachers had their dismissals or transfers rescinded.
The trade union movement has only limited influence beyond
issues directly related to industrial relations. Unionists
and their property are not specifically protected by law.
Under the Trades Union Act, property of trade unions is vested
in the unions' trustees for the use and benefit of the union
and its members ,
Unions freely maintain relations with recognized Caribbean and
international trade union and professional groups. All three
of the global trade union internationals have affiliates in
Guyana .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Public and private sector employees possess and utilize the
right to organize and to bargain collectively. In 1987, the
most recent year for which figures are available from the
Ministry of Labor, 18 collective bargaining agreements were
concluded. Although an amendment to the Labor Act gave
centralized bargaining power to the TUC in negotiations with
the public sector, this law was overturned on procedural
grounds in 1987, and the collective bargaining provisions have
not been resubmitted to Parliament.
The Chief Labor Officer and his staff at the Ministry of Labor
provide consulation services. Disputes are frequently settled
through consulation and dialogue without resorting to strikes
or other industrial action. During the sugar and bauxite
strikes, however, this process did little to help resolve the
dispute. There were no known cases of antiunion
discrimination. There are no special areas or industries
where collective bargaining is impeded or discouraged; labor
laws and regulations are applied uniformly throughout the
country.
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GUYANA
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it
does not exist in Guyana.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Minimum age laws are set out in the Factories Act and the
Employment of Women, Young Persons, and Children Act. Under
the law, no person under 14 years of age shall be employed in
any industrial undertaking, and no person under 16 shall be
employed at night, except under regulated circumstances.
Government policy, however, is stricter: no one under 18 can
be employed outside the family. In addition, the terms
"industry" and "factory" as used in the law have been
interpreted by the Ministry of Labor to encompass nearly all
workplaces except offices and retail shops. According to the
law, children under age 14 may be employed only in enterprises
in which members of the same family are employed. The
Ministry of Labor monitors compliance with minimum age laws.
There are significant numbers of children in Guyana under the
age of 14 who engage in street vending and there have been no
apparent efforts by the Government to limit this activity.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Hours of employment are set under the Factories Act and vary
by industry and sector. Most workers work an 8-hour day and a
40-hour week. The Ministry of Labor monitors compliance with
laws on maximum hours. Occupational health and safety
standards are also treated under the Factories Act. The
Occupational Health and Safety Division of the Ministry of
Labor conducts factory inspections and investigates charges of
substandard workplaces and conditions. The Ministry of Labor
report for 1987 states, however, that this division was
hampered by understaf f ing and inadequate funding.
Despite a 20-percent increase in the minimum wage for public
employees, the 70-percent devaluation of the Guyanese currency
on March 31, and the subsequent inflation, caused the public
sector minimum daily wage to decline from the equivalent of
$2.49 at the official exchange rate to $.90 per day. The
widely used black market rate for U.S. dollars is
approximately 40 percent more than the official rate. In
September the Government implemented a further 20-percent
increase, which brought the public sector minimum wage to the
equivalent of $1.09 per day. This figure is considered
inadequate to support workers and their families, primarily
because continuing inflation and the recent devaluation have
far outpaced wage increases. There is no legally established
private sector minimum wage, but private employees' salaries
are in almost all cases higher than those of public workers.
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HAITI
Haiti was ruled in 1989 by a military Government headed by Lt .
Gen. Prosper Avril. Noncommissioned officers and soldiers of
the Presidential Guard asked Avril to serve as transitional
Head of State in September 1988 after they deposed General
Henri Namphy, whose flagrant human rights violations had been
widely condemned. Although the Government has its power base
in the Army, all but one of the cabinet ministers appointed by
Avril are civilians. Haiti had no legislative body in 1989.
An independent electoral council began work in April to
prepare for local, parliamentary, and presidential elections.
Local elections were scheduled to begin in April 1990.
The Haitian Army constitutes the state security apparatus. In
urban areas, army units serve as police. In rural areas,
Section Chiefs, who are approved by the Army but are
responsible to the Ministry of Interior, serve as the rough
equivalent of local sheriffs. There were credible reports
that the army units serving as urban police were involved in a
number of human rights violations during 1989; even more
abuses took place in rural areas where Section Chiefs were
often held responsible. Armed bands, some possibly linked to
remnants of the Tonton Macoute militia (the security apparatus
of the former Duvalier dictatorship), committed a number of
murders .
Haiti is the poorest and most densely populated country in the
Western Hemisphere. Poverty, unemployment, and economic
inequalities continue to plague all aspects of life for most
Haitians. The embargo on most foreign government-to-
government aid throughout most of 1989, imposed after
disrupted elections in late 1987, further damaged the
economy. Economic opportunities remain very limited for most
Haitians .
Human rights abuses perpetrated or directed by government
leaders were the hallmark of previous Haitian regimes. The
Avril Government avoided the egregious violations--massacres
and politically motivated ki llings--characteristic of its
predecessors. Also, despite some exceptions, the Avril
Government in 1989 generally did not target political and
human rights activists nor repress basic civil liberties, such
as freedom of expression and freedom of the press. However,
in late January, 1990, the Avril Government imposed a state of
siege which suspended basic civil liberties, including freedom
of the press, and arrested, beat, and deported a number of
prominent opposition politicians. This action posed serious
questions about the intent of the Avril Government to stand by
its commitment to a transition to democracy. Avril continued
in 1989 an extensive housecleaning of the military and police,
retiring or otherwise removing over 100 officers and enlisted
men suspected of corruption or narcotics trafficking.
Following an attempted coup d'etat in April, Avril dissolved
the Dessalines Battalion, which was a source of numerous human
rights violations in the past.
Nonetheless, serious human rights violations persisted in
1989. There were numerous reports of brutality and arbitrary
arrest. In many cases, both in the capital and in the
provinces, the inefficient and often corrupt judicial system
failed to provide a speedy and fair trial to those accused of
crimes. With the notable exception of former Macoute Augustin
Majeure, who was sentenced in Gonaives in September to hard
labor for life, perpetrators of past heinous crimes have not
621
HAITI
been charged, arrested or tried. Few army personnel or
Section Chiefs were punished for abuses conunitted in 1989.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Political killings clearly sanctioned by high-ranking
government officials, such as the massacres and assassinations
of political activists that took place under the previous
post-Duvalier governments in 1987 and 1988, did not occur in
1989. In November unknown assailants murdered three political
activists who were writing graffiti advocating the return of
former President Manigat, but there was no substantiated
evidence linking these apparently politically motivated
killings to government forces. Nonetheless, as in previous
years, individual soldiers and rural Section Chiefs committed
a number of extrajudicial killings, either for personal
reasons, at the behest of private patrons, or in clear abuse
of their official powers. The Government announced
disciplinary actions against several dozen soldiers and
Section Chiefs charged with abuses; one, Lt . Antoine Metellus,
was court-martialed and sentenced to a prison term, while
others were transferred or relieved of their duties. However,
Haitian human rights organizations report that the individuals
implicated in the following incidents, chosen for their
illustrative and not inclusive nature, have not been arrested
or tried:
On May 15, a group of soldiers from the St. Marc barracks
accompanied a wealthy landowner, Chardieu Joseph, on a raid
against a group of peasants in Grand-Bois, killing one,
Registre Chariot. A group of peasants then took revenge by
murdering Joseph's mother. The soldiers and Joseph responded
with a further attack on the peasant village.
On June 4, the Section Chief of Grande Saline killed two
peasants and wounded five others who had been participants in
a longstanding land dispute.
On July 11, a group of soldiers from Petite-Riviere-
de-1'Artibonite illegally entered the home of a peasant,
Joannis Malvoisin, and killed him. Malvoisin had been
involved in a land dispute with a wealthy landowner.
On August 25, Port-au-Prince police officer Claudy Joachim
shot and killed a man who was leaving the civil courthouse
after responding to a lawsuit filed against him by a
creditor. Joachim's motive is unknown.
On November 17, three members of the party of former President
Leslie Manigat were murdered, allegedly as they were putting
up political posters. No perpetrators have been identified,
although the Government has opened an investigation.
The phenomenon of "popular justice" continued in 1989. Crowds
summarily killed a number of individuals suspected of being
criminals or former Macoutes.
Many Haitians criticized the Government for failing to control
a growing problem of common crime in Port-au-Prince, some of
which involved murders and robberies. There were charges that
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HAIXL
either military or rightwing elements were sponsoring criminal
gangs for the purpose of creating a climate of fear and
insecurity, thereby justifying continued military rule and
repression of civil liberties. Although soldiers were
suspected in some of these crimes, the perpetrators were
usually unidentified. In an attempt to collect illegally held
arms, the Government published lists of former civilian
"attaches" of the Dessalines Battalion, many of whom were
suspected of being henchmen of rightwing elements within the
Army, and summoned them to Army headquarters to turn over
their weapons. According to the Government, hundreds of
illegal weapons had been collected by the end of the year.
b. Disappearance
There were no credible reports of disappearances in Haiti in
1989.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution specifically prohibits physical brutality
during interrogation and provides for the right of the accused
to have a lawyer and witness present during questioning. In
practice, however, beatings and other physical abuse of
prisoners remain common in Haiti, despite official admonitions
to soldiers and Section Chiefs. The following illustrative
cases were well documented:
On January 9, soldiers in the Carrefour barracks beat Ernst
Louisdor, who had been accused by a sergeant of being a
thief. Louisdor was subsequently hospitalized for internal
bleeding.
On June 17, Army officers ordered the beating of four members
of the Popular Literacy Movement, fracturing the arm of one of
them and damaging another's eye.
On August 1, police in Cap Haitien tied up and beat National
Popular Assembly (APN) activists Patrick Casimir and
Jean-Robert Lalanne following a demonstration.
In late August, police in Port-au-Prince severely beat Jacquet
Douyon, a member of a church youth group.
On November 2, three political activists were arrested and
beaten. Jean-Auguste Mesyeux, Evans Paul, and Etienne
Marineau were battered in appearance when they were paraded on
a government broadcast. At year's end, the state prosecutor
was preparing to try the trio for attempting to assassinate
the President.
None of the perpetrators of the above abuses were disciplined
for these abuses, so far as is known.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under Haitian law, a person may be arrested or detained if
apprehended during the commission of a crime or pursuant to a
judicial warrant based on evidence justifying the arrest. All
detainees must be brought before a judge within 48 hours to
determine the legality of continued detention, according to
the law. If the judge determines that a legal basis for the
arrest exists, the person may be held for further legal
process; otherwise the detainee must be released.
623
HAITI
In practice, a poorly organized and sometimes corrupt legal
system more often than not fails to adhere to the law's
requirements. Arrests are frequently made without a judicial
warrant, and most detainees are held for periods in excess of
48 hours before being brought before a judge. Some detainees
are never given the opportunity to challenge the legality of
their imprisonment.
Haitian law requires that a suspect be formally charged at
least 2 weeks prior to trial, and that the accused be
permitted to meet with an attorney before trial. In fact, the
absence of a public defender often deprives suspects of this
right. There is no legal procedure for posting bail in
Haiti. Judges, however, can and sometimes do grant
provisional liberty to a prisoner.
Numerous arbitrary arrests, i.e., illegal arrests without
judicial warrant, were ordered by Section Chiefs or carried
out by rural soldiers who became involved in personal quarrels
or land disputes. In a few cases, illegal arrests appeared to
be directed against individuals for political reasons, usually
after being accused by local authorities of having
participated in "Communist" or "disruptive" activities. In
each of these cases, the detainees were released after periods
ranging from 1 day to 3 weeks. The following cases were among
the arbitrary arrests reported by human rights groups during
1989:
On February 6-7, Port-au-Prince police arrested, without
judicial warrant. Rockefeller Guerre and Sylvan Jolibois, two
opposition figures accused by the Government of participating
in a bombing on February 5 during carnival.
On August 14, the Section Chief of Jean-P.abel, Anovil St. Vil,
arrested four members of the "Tet Kole" peasant group and
incarcerated them in the prison at Port-de-Paix, allegedly for
planning violence aimed at avenging the victims of a massacre
at Jean-Rabel in 1987.
On August 16-17, soldiers in Champagne arrested 23 members of
a militant opposition group, the National Popular Assembly
(APN) , allegedly for "Communist activities."
On August 20, soldiers in Labaret arrested three members of
the Labadie Youth Movement (MJL) during a concert. On July
10, the police had arrested four persons accused of being
members of that organization.
On November 22, the Army arrested 13 members of the League of
Former Haitian Political Prisoners (LAPPH) in Anse-A-Pitres,
allegedly for "disruptive activities" such as inciting the
population to join a hunger strike in support of three
imprisoned activists. Eleven were released about a week
later; one was still held by the Army, and one was in the
hospital due to injuries inflicted by army interrogators.
Three other LAPPH members, including its Secretary-General,
Gaston Jean-Baptiste, were also detained for several days in
November .
The Constitution prohibits deportation or forced exile of
Haitian citizens. With regard to forced or compulsory labor,
see Section 6.c.
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HAITI
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution establishes an independent judicial branch of
government and provides for the right to a fair public trial,
but chronic weaknesses in the judicial system, and sometimes
interference by elements of the executive branch, can deny
this right in practice. Many cases never reach the trial
stage, and cases that do go to trial are often unfair because
of corrupt or incompetent judges and the absence of defense
attorneys. The Minister of Justice has been instructed to
prepare an in-depth reform of the judicial system. In
September he signed a contract with a private organization to
provide education for the public and local judicial officials
on their legal rights and responsibilities. The Government
acknowledges that Haitian prisons have long held and continue
to hold numerous detainees who were never publicly tried or
convicted of any crime. The Minister of Justice ordered the
release of 82 such prisoners from the National Penitentiary in
May.
Arraignments and trials are held in public and sometimes
receive extensive media coverage. By law, defendants have the
right to be represented by a lawyer. Lengthy delays and
outside influence on judges and other judicial officials,
however, often effectively limit the accused person's exercise
of the right to a fair trial.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
During 1989 there continued to be incidents in which police or
Section Chiefs entered private homes without the required
judicial warrant in search of suspects or illegal arms.
Soldiers or members of the Presidential Guard searched homes
without warrants looking for an ex-Sergeant allegedly involved
in coup plotting. The home of Human Rights League president
Joseph Maxi was searched on November 1 and 3 (Maxi himself
went underground on the second occasion) , and the home and
offices of a peasant leader were searched on November 9.
Although such searches continued despite legal sanction,
systematic invasions of privacy, family, or correspondence did
not occur in Haiti in 1989.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of expression for all citizens is provided for by the
Constitution. There are several privately owned newspapers
and radio stations, including influential stations owned and
operated by the Protestant and Catholic Churches. A privately
owned cable television system also operates independently.
The Government operates a newspaper and a national radio and
television station.
Privately owned print and broadcast media in 1989 often
expressed editorial views critical of the Government and
freely reported the activities and declarations of government
opponents. The Government imposed no censorship of the
media. Several incidents of harassment of journalists by
soldiers took place. There was no evidence that these
incidents were part of any systematic effort to intimidate the
free press; on the other hand, there was no known instance of
soldiers being punished for such abuses.
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During the attempted coup d'etat in April, soldiers of the
Presidential Guard were reported to have severely damaged four
radio station transmitter facilities in Port-au-Prince.
President Avril subsequently apologized to the owners of these
radio stations but denied that the incident occurred under
official orders.
On February 15, soldiers from the Dessalines Battalion,
apparently out of the control of their officers, struck
several journalists who were covering a youth group
demonstration in Port-au-Prince and confiscated some of their
cameras and tape recorders.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly and
association. Numerous political, human rights, and
socioprofessional organizations were active in Haiti in 1989,
and most operated without interference from the Government.
Some rural military officials and Section Chiefs attempted to
prevent peasant groups from holding meetings without obtaining
advance permission from local authorities. In the village of
Labadie, for example, local military officials insisted on
being present at MJL meetings, citing security concerns as the
justification for this policy. Human rights organizations
contend that this practice represented an attempt by the local
authorities to monitor and intimidate the group. Various
human rights groups claim that the military or Section Chiefs
continue to deter citizens from speaking out against the
Government .
Mass demonstrations were few in 1989. Several proposed
demonstrations, such as an anti-imperialist march called by
the APN in Port-au-Prince on July 28, failed to materialize
due to poor attendance. Police dispersed some demonstrations,
including those protesting anticontraband measures in January,
but other rallies and meetings took place unhindered, such as
an antigovernment rally of human rights and political groups
in the National Theater on April 26.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Religion is an integral part of Haitian life and culture and
is practiced widely without interference from the Government.
Roman Catholicism is embraced in varying degrees by about 75
percent of the population. Voodoo, a mixture of African
animism and Christianity, is also practiced by a majority of
Haitians. Various Protestant denominations and foreign
missionary groups openly proselytize in Haiti. There are no
government restrictions on missionary activities, affiliations
with overseas coreligionists, or religious instruction and
publishing .
Attacks on churches, a series of which took place under the
Namphy Government in 1988, did not recur in 1989.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Although the Government does not normally restrict domestic
travel of citizens or foreigners, an irregular network of
military checkpoints operates across Haiti. On occasion.
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additional vehicle checkpoints are established, generally to
check for possession of weapons or for vehicle and driver
documentation. There are no restrictions on persons changing
their residences or places of employment. Every Haitian
citizen is eligible for a passport, and travel documents are
neither issued nor denied on the basis of political
considerations.
Migrants continue to leave Haiti bound for destinations in
more prosperous areas of the Caribbean or North America.
Pursuant to a 1981 agreement with the Government of Haiti on
the interdiction of undocumented migrants, approximately 4,300
would-be illegal migrants to the United States were
repatriated to Haiti from international waters by the U.S.
Coast Guard in 1989. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service officers on board the Coast Guard vessels interviewed
those interdicted to determine if any were potential
applicants for political asylum. The overwhelming majority
expressed only economic reasons for seeking to leave Haiti.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change
their government through elections, but, in practice, Haitians
did not, in 1989, enjoy this right. Following the 1986
overthrow of the Duvalier dictatorship, violence and coups
d'etat disrupted the electoral process in 1987 and 1988.
President Avril has promised to restore elections and, as a
first step, in February convened a forum, in which
representatives of 28 political and labor groups participated,
to determine the composition of an independent electoral
council. The Council was subsequently created in accordance
with the forum's recommendations. In September the
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), after consulting with
groups and individuals across Haiti, announced an electoral
calendar for local, legislative, and presidential elections
during the period from April through November 1990. The Avril
Government endorsed the schedule and has promised to abide by
it.
According to the 1987 Constitution, all male and female
citizens 18 years of age or older have the right to vote.
Voting is not mandatory but is noted in the Constitution as a
citizen's duty. A secret ballot is not explicitly required.
The Constitution provides for a 5-year presidential term as
well as checks and balances between the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government.
In March President Avril restored 262 of the 298 articles of
the Constitution. The entire Constitution had been
effectively set aside by the previous military government.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Several local human rights groups operated in Haiti in 1989.
The Government does not generally restrict their activities,
which include monitoring of violations, providing legal
assistance to victims, and holding seminars to educate the
population on human rights. Two of these groups published and
distributed monthly newsletters detailing human rights
violations. However, the Army detained some 16 members of the
LAPPH . One of them was hospitalized after being beaten during
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HAITI
an interrogation. The Army's action reportedly was to prevent
the human rights group from opening an office in southeastern
Haiti .
During 1989 Haiti received visits from a U.N. Special
Rapporteur on human rights, a representative of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, and a delegation
from Americas Watch and the National Coalition for Haitian
Refugees. They met with government officials and numerous
private sources.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Ninety-five percent of Haitians are descendants of African
slaves who gained their independence from France through a
revolution ending in 1804. Most of the rest are mulatto or of
European or Middle Eastern descent. Under Haitian law, no
distinctions are made with regard to race. Nonetheless, there
are longstanding social, economic, and political tensions
between blacks and mulattos which date back to Haiti's
revolutionary period.
Haiti has two official languages, French and Creole.
Virtually all Haitians speak Creole. Approximately 20 percent
of the population, mostly members of the educated class, speak
French. There is no official discrimination on the basis of
language, but some social class divisions are drawn along
linguistic lines. Although most printed matter is in French,
written media increasingly carry articles in Creole. Creole
is the dominant language in radio and television broadcasts.
The Haitian Constitution makes no distinction between civil
and political rights of men and women. The role of women in
Haiti is limited by tradition, but there is no official
discrimination between the sexes. Women enjoy legal rights in
education, property, and voting.
Violence against women occurs with some frequency although a
lack of statistical data makes it impossible to determine its
true extent. Such abuse is not sanctioned by the Government.
Haitian law does not differentiate between domestic violence
and general assault. Due to societal traditions, victims of
such domestic violence as wife beating often are unwilling to
press charges, thus leading to the likelihood that this abuse
is significantly underreported. Human rights groups do not
consider violence against women to be one of their primary
concerns .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides workers, including civil servants
and public sector employees, the right to form unions.
Workers do not need government authorization to establish and
join trade unions. A union, which must have a minimum of 10
members, is required to register with the Ministry of Social
Affairs within 60 days of its establishment. Unions are
relatively free to organize but, according to Article 242 of
the labor code, they may not engage in commercial activities
or concern themselves with matters unconnected with the
defense of worker rights. The Government would ultimately
decide what constitutes worker rights. As far as is known, it
has not challenged any unions or would-be unions on these
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HAITI
grounds. If it were to deny recognition to a union, the union
would be denied access to labor courts.
It is estimated that there are fewer than 10,000 full-time
employed members who belong to local unions. In practice,
attempts to form trade unions are generally frustrated by
employers who prefer the status quo.
There are four major labor federations in Haiti: the
Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers (CATH) , the Federation
of Unionized Workers, the Confederation of Haitian Workers
(CTH) (formerly CATH/CLAT) , and the Independent General
Organization of Haitian Workers. All have contact with
international labor organizations. For example, FOS is
affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions and its Latin American group, the Inter-American
Regional Organization of Workers; and CTH with the World
Confederation of Labor.
Shortly after taking office. President Avril met with the
leaders of three of the major labor federations to revive the
tripartite (labor, management, and government) negotiations on
an amended labor code. In mid-1989 provisional agreement was
reached on the various issues which divided labor and
management. Labor representatives have since proposed
additional changes, however, and then boycotted subsequent
commission meetings pending resolution of another issue not
directly connected to the revised code negotiations. At
year's end the new code had not been issued.
Chapter VI of the existing labor code recognizes the right to
strike, although it restricts the duration of certain types of
strikes. Strikes are not uncommon, but their legality is
usually contested by the employer. Government employees in
several cities staged protests, walkouts, and strikes,
generally over arrears in pay. In almost all cases the
workers eventually received their back pay, although some were
subsequently dismissed because agencies' funds were not
sufficient for their continued employment. The American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
has alleged that workers fired in past years by their public
and private sector employers for engaging in legitimate union
activities still have not been accorded justice in the
courts .
Haiti's compliance with International Labor Organization (ILO)
standards has been reviewed by a number of ILO supervisory
bodies in recent years. In February 1989 the Committee on
Freedom of Association (CFA) , reviewing allegations of
government and employer reprisals against the CATH after a
2-day strike in 1987, noted that despite revoking the
dissolution of the CATH and releasing detained trade unionists
the Namphy Government did not compensate mistreated workers
for their medical expenses or make full restitution of assets
seized. The CFA also called on the Government to be more
vigorous in seeking reinstatement of dismissed workers for
their involvement in legitimate trade union activities. In
1989 the ILO's Committee of Experts (COE) expressed hope that
Haiti's new draft labor code would correct discrepancies
between the present code and ILO Convention 87, which Haiti
has ratified, regarding freedom of association.
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HAITI
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Haitian labor unions remain weak; forbidden under the
Duvaliers until 1981, they were then allowed to operate only
within strictly circumscribed limits. It was not until after
Jean-Claude Duvalier's departure in February 1986 that unions
were allowed to organize freely.
Formal union contracts do not yet exist; rather, informal,
unofficial, mostly unwritten agreements, and in some cases,
tacit acceptance, allow the presence of unions in plants.
Although unions have become relatively more active in
grievance negotiations, formal management recognition of
unions as bargaining agents is not yet the norm. Even with no
government interference, the relatively new phenomenon of
trade unionism has developed erratically in Haiti, where
unemployment is estimated to affect 50 percent or more of the
available work force, and where many employers still question
the legitimacy of unions.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The labor code prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there
were no charges of such practices in 1989.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for factory employment is 12 years. Fierce
adult competition for jobs ensures that child labor is not a
factor in the industrial sector. In both rural and urban
areas, children often work at odd jobs to help supplement the
family income.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The labor code (last revised in 1984 and now in the process of
being liberalized) governs individual employment contracts,
protects apprentices and women, and establishes minimum health
and safety standards, particularly for hazardous occupations.
The code sets the normal workday at 8 hours, and the workweek
at 48 hours, with 24 hours' rest on Sunday. The code provides
for paid annual leave of at least 15 consecutive working
days. Workers may take up to 15 days' annual sick leave. The
current daily minimum wage prescribed by law is $3.00 in
Port-au-Prince and $2.64 in the rest of the country. The
majority of the Haitian population subsists on much less than
the minimum wage. According to a number of labor
representatives from Haiti as well as from the United States,
the Government has not systematically enforced labor laws
regarding wages and minimum safety regulations, but the
industrial sector generally adheres to at least minimum
standards. The latter sector tends to be concentrated more
heavily in the Port-au-Prince area and is more accessible to
outside scrutiny. Economic factors in this sector render
adherence to minimum standards relatively affordable as well.
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HONDURAS
Honduras is a constitutional democracy with a President and
bicameral Congress elected every 4 years. Free and fair
elections held on November 26 resulted in the election of
National Party candidate Rafael Leonardo Callejas as
President. His party won 71 seats in the 128-member
legislature. The institutionalization of democratic reforms
is still incomplete; in particular, the civilian government
has yet to demonstrate that it can ensure the disciplining of
those members of the military who commit human rights abuses.
Domestic security is the responsibility of the armed forces,
including its police branch, the Public Security Force
(FUSEP) . The Armed Forces are constitutionally responsible to
the President of the Republic but in practice operate with a
great deal of institutional autonomy. In previous years both
the police and members of the armed forces were involved in
human rights abuses; there are allegations that this behavior
continued to some extent in 1989. However, in 1989 FUSEP
began to demonstrate a willingness to punish some abusers.
Other branches of the armed forces appear to have tightened
Internal controls to reduce the possibility of abuse, although
the military's resistance to making public what punitive
actions, if any, are taken against human rights offenders
makes it difficult to evaluate their efforts.
Honduras is one of the poorest countries in the Western
Hemisphere. Per capita income was officially estimated at
$917 in 1988, but a realistic valuation of the lempira would
yield a per capita income of about $600. While its
agricultural-based economy has registered modest increases
during the last several years, the rapidly growing Honduran
population has resulted in persistently high levels of
unemployment and underemployment. The current high fiscal
deficit, combined with an overvalued exchange rate, has
inhibited private sector expansion, and the large trade
deficit has frustrated attempts to service the rapidly growing
external debt arrears and to attract net inflows of capital.
The high rates of criminal violence recorded over the past
several years continued in 1989, due in part to the economic
problems noted above. As in past years, there are credible
reports of extrajudicial killings of suspected criminals by
security forces. Leftwing violence included the probable
assassinations of four persons, bank robberies, and several
violent attacks on U.S. military personnel which injured
several persons. The Anti-Communist Action Alliance (AAA)
continued a sporadic graffiti campaign and telephone death
threats directed against leftist leaders, but by year's end
its activities had all but ceased.
Principal human rights concerns in 1989 included political and
other extrajudicial killings by political extremists and
members of the security forces. The most common human rights
violations committed by FUSEP continued to be physical abuse
of detainees and prisoners, and incommunicado detention.
Individual members of the security forces also were involved
in killings arising from use of excessive force, sometimes for
personal motives. However, FUSEP in 1989 demonstrated a new
sensitivity to public concerns, announcing a number of
punitive actions taken against agents guilty of human rights
abuses. Most of those involved in abuses were turned over for
hearings before a military tribunal, while others were
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HONDURAS
dishonorably discharged and sent for trial in nonmilitary
courts .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were seven assassinations in 1989 that apparently had
political motives. Four were likely committed by the armed
left (three were publicly claimed by leftwing groups).
Although there was some immediate public speculation that the
military may have been involved in the remaining three cases,
these remain unsolved. Conclusive evidence was lacking in all
three cases.
On January 7, several unidentified assailants ambushed Adan
Rugama, a military commander of the Nicaraguan Resistance Army
(ERN) and aide-de-camp to Enrique Bermudez, ERN
Commander-in-Chief. Speculation that the highly professional
assassination was carried out by members of the Cinchonero
guerrilla organization, in collaboration with the Nicaraguan
Embassy, has never been confirmed.
The leftwing Popular Liberation Movement-Cinchoneros claimed
responsibility for the ambush on January 25 in a residential
neighborhood of Tegucigalpa in which former Commander-in-Chief
of the Honduran Armed Forces General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez
and his chauffeur were killed. Although it is assumed that
the Cinchonero claim of responsibility is genuine, the
identities of the individual assailants have never been
established.
The fourth victim of an attack presumed to have been committed
by leftists was Pablo Flores Garcia, a former member of the
Cinchoneros. Flores Garcia deserted the guerrilla group in
1986 and provided information to the Armed Forces which
reportedly led to the deaths of several high-ranking guerrilla
commanders. Unknown assailants shot and killed Flores Garcia
on July 22 near his home outside of La Lima, Cortes
Department, and draped his body with the Cinchonero flag.
The fifth victim in 1989 of possible politically-motivated
violence was Edgardo Herrera, an activist in the leftist
Student Union University Revolutionary Front (FRU) 'and head of
his San Pedro Sula Residential Community Organization, who was
shot to death on July 4 by three unidentified men. There was
an immediate public suspicion that he had been killed by the
military in retaliation for his activities in the FRU, but
there was no evidence to support this contention by year's end.
On July 6, Salomon Vallecillo, President of the Honduran
Tobacco Workers Union, while waiting at a bus stop in San
Pedro Sula was gunned down by two men dressed as private
security guards. Again, some public speculation centered on
the military as possibly involved in this assassination, but
the identity of the assassins and the motive for the murder
remained unknown at year's end.
Also on July 6, Jose Danilo Martinez, a union member, was shot
and killed by a drunken police agent. The agent was given a
dishonorable discharge and imprisoned pending trial in a
nonmilitary court.
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HONDURAS
With the left organizing demonstrations against the
assassinations and the Armed Forces denying involvement, a
third killing occurred on July 11. Roberto Ramon Garay, a
conservative political activist, an attorney, and the head of
the Northern Regional University's Extension Program, was shot
to death by two men as he and his family arrived at their home
in a San Pedro Sula neighborhood. With the exception of the
case of Danilo Martinez, no identification was made by year's
end of any of the people involved in the killings.
There was also no progress in identifying the perpetrators of
the double assassination in January 1988 of Miguel Angel Pavon
and Moises Landaverde. In late 1988 and again in early 1989,
Fausto Reyes Caballero gave press interviews in the United
States in which he claimed to have been a collaborator with
Battalion 3-16 of the Armed Forces and stated that Battalion
members carried out the killings. Reyes Caballero said his
information on the Pavon-Landaverde and other unsolved human
rights cases was obtained through his own alleged ties to
Battalion 3-16 and his work as a Honduran transit policeman in
San Pedro Sula until August 10, 1989. On that day, according
to Reyes Caballero, he was forced suddenly to flee Honduras
because of an assassination attempt against him by several of
his Battalion 3-16 "colleagues."
An investigation by Honduran and U.S. authorities showed Reyes
Caballero 's testimony was fabricated. Documents indicate that
he was dishonorably discharged from the Honduran police in
March 1984 on charges of theft and corruption, that he had
departed Honduras for the United States in June 1984, and that
he had lived and worked illegally in Miami since that time,
returning to Honduras only for two brief visits.
There was a definite increase in 1989 in the number of violent
and unsolved deaths. As of December 17, 263 such cases had
been reported in the press, compared to 185 for all of 1988.
Of those cases reported through that date, the vast majority
appear to have been cases of common crime. Fourteen deaths,
however, were possible or probable cases of extrajudicial
killings of criminals by the police. Three victims of almost
certain extrajudicial killings were Pompilio Cruz Cuevas,
Gloria Espinal Godoy, and Olga Marina Ventura Salgado. Cruz
Cuevas was an oft-convicted criminal and the latter two were
convicted prostitutes. All were reportedly detained by agents
of the National Department of Investigation (DNI) on the night
of June 20. The following day, their bodies were found on the
outskirts of Tegucigalpa, each having been shot. In the
remaining cases, the possibility of police involvement is far
less substantial, most often resting only on the fact that the
victim had or was believed to have had a criminal record.
The police publicly accepted responsibility for another five
killings — one a case of mistaken identity. In four cases, the
police attempted to justify the killings by asserting that the
victims had attempted to escape from custody. The lack of
credibility of those claims was best illustrated in the case
of Luis Norberto Flores, accused of heading a gang of
thieves. Flores was arrested by the DNI on March 31. For
several days, his wife brought him food, although she
apparently did not see him personally. On April 3, she was
told that Flores was not and never had been held at the jail.
Earlier that day, Flores had been taken from his cell and into
the city, shot four times, and left for dead. Flores managed
to get to a hospital, but the following day two DNI
lieutenants arrived and removed him by force. Flores' body
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HONDURAS
was later found, now with twelve bullet wounds, on a city
street. In response to public pressure, the police finally
admitted having killed Flores, but offered the improbable
story that on both occasions he was leading police to his
colleagues in crime when he tried to escape. In this, as in
other cases involving the killings of criminals, no known
action was taken against the police agents involved. In a
case in which the police accepted responsibility for the
killing of the "wrong" suspected subversive, the five agents
involved were imprisoned pending trial before a military
tribunal. At year's end they were still awaiting trial.
In contrast to the apparently tacit official approval of the
killing of repeat offenders, other agents involved in wrongful
deaths or deaths under questionable circumstances were dealt
with more severely. The majority of such cases related to
deliberate and unjustified use of lethal force, negligent
homicide, or killing for personal motives by individual
members of the police. In many instances of such killings,
perpetrators could not be identified by witnesses or the
suspected assailants had fled to avoid arrest. Police agents
identified as having been involved in 15 of approximately 22
cases in which killings were personally motivated,
unjustified, or due to negligence were either arrested and
bound over for trials or hearings, or were the subjects of
arrest warrants. In one case a FUSEP soldier was
surreptitiously photographed when he shot and killed an
unarmed suspect. He was dishonorably discharged and was
awaiting trial at year's end. In the remaining seven cases,
it is unknown what, if any, action was taken against those
responsible.
The willingness of FUSEP to punish abusers and to publicize
such punishment first became apparent in April, after which
the agents involved in controversial cases were almost without
exception bound over for trial or hearings. While the
majority of such officials continue to be held under military
jurisdiction, those responsible in a number of the more
egregious cases were dishonorably discharged and imprisoned
pending trials in ordinary criminal courts.
In July FUSEP announced that 16 agents, 3 sergeants, and a
corporal had been turned over to the courts charged with
abuses, and that 43 soldiers and 3 officers had been dealt
with similarly. Unlike FUSEP, the other military branches
continue to resist making public what punitive actions, if
any, are taken against human rights offenders. One of the few
exceptions during the year was a highly controversial case in
which two youths were shot and killed near a military base.
Following a public outcry against the killings, the Armed
Forces announced the names of the three soldiers involved and
said that all had been charged with murder and were being held
for trial before a military tribunal. Altogether, proceedings
were begun between January 1 and October 11 against 28 members
of the military charged with murder, with another 9 members
awaiting trial for other abuses leading to injury.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances
in 1989. The disappearance of Jose Leonel Suazo Castillo,
while not politically motivated, appears to have been a
deliberate criminal act of vengeance by a member of the
military with the concurrence of his superiors. Suazo was a
member of the Conservative National Party, although not
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HONDURAS
politically active. According to his mother, Suazo had gotten
into a fistfight with a police official at a bar in the early
morning hours of January 29 and the official had threatened
him. Men identifying themselves as agents of "military
intelligence" began an active search for Suazo. On the night
of February 2, Suazo told a friend that a car appeared to be
following them. Initial press reports were that Suazo
"disappeared" after leaving his companion. However, the
victim's mother subsequently received information that her son
was actually detained and handcuffed in view of eyewitnesses
and taken away in the car that had been following him. On May
2, during her second visit to query authorities at the seventh
region FUSEP headquarters, Suazo's mother claims to have
glimpsed her son in the courtyard of what she later learned
was a FUSEP intelligence detention facility. It appeared he
was being taken under escort from the building housing the
cells to a vehicle. Since that time, Mrs. Suazo alleges, she
has received detailed information from highly credible sources
confirming her son's detention. Nevertheless, police
authorities continue to deny any knowledge of Suazo's
whereabouts .
The Honduran commission responsible for oversight of the
demarcation of the Honduran-Salvadoran border reported in 1989
that three Honduran farmers were kidnaped by Salvadoran
guerrillas and never seen again.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The use of torture is prohibited under the Constitution, and
FUSEP has officially adopted a United Nations-approved code of
conduct for law enforcement agencies which reiterates that
prohibition and commits the police force actively to oppose
violations. Nonetheless, the physical abuse of detainees and
prisoners continues to be common. The most routine form of
abuse is beating, sometimes severe, although accusations of
more sophisticated forms of torture occasionally arise.
Several persons in prison for arms trafficking to the
Salvadoran guerrillas, for example, claim to have been
subjected to electric shocks and to have been beaten on the
soles of the feet during incommunicado detention, prior to
being turned over to the courts.
Abuse of prisoners appears to be fairly routine, but it is
difficult to assess the extent to which torture occurs. Under
the law, a confession obtained under torture is null and void;
as a result, most prisoners brought before the courts
automatically claim such torture and their own innocence.
However, the Supreme Court's Department of Forensic Medicine
is required to provide physical examinations of persons
claiming to have been tortured in order to determine the
validity of the charge. The Department's detailed
documentation indicates that, of the 142 persons examined
between January and mid-September, 39 showed evidence of abuse
other than bruising from handcuffs or that sustained on the
arms at the time of arrest. The most common abuse claimed by
the prisoners was kicking and blows from various blunt
instruments such as billy clubs, rifle butts, and sticks.
There were three claims (one confirmed) of electric shock and
one unconfirmed claim of burning by cigarettes. Six confirmed
cases involved gunshot wounds and one involved sodomy. The
Department's statistics hold DNI agents responsible in 30 of
the 39 confirmed cases of abuse. FUSEP agents, other members
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of the military, penitentiary guards, and private security
guards were involved in the remaining confirmed cases. It is
not known what, if any, punishment was given to those
responsible.
Beatings of detainees or prisoners resulted in two deaths in
1989. Jose Martinez Nendez, a prisoner at the La Ceiba Penal
Farm, died August 31 of injuries sustained in a beating
administered after a failed escape attempt several days
earlier. There has been no information released concerning
action taken against the responsible prison guards. Melvin
Efren Mata Garcia died the day after DNI agents, on September
29, detained him on suspicion of selling fraudulent passports
and beat him severely. On October 4, FUSE? announced that the
two responsible agents had been dishonorably discharged and
were being held in the Central Penitentiary pending trial in a
nonmilitary court.
The total number of security agents held for trial on charges
of physical abuse of detainees or prisoners is unavailable.
Press reports, however, reveal that at least some offenders
are being held. Two FUSEP sergeants accused of torture of
civilian detainees in Olancho Department were both turned over
for hearings before the Military Tribunal, and the superior
officer of one of the offenders was also disciplined for
failure to supervise the actions of his subordinates. In
another case, a special forces officer, who shot and injured a
civilian for refusing to take off military trousers he was
wearing, was given a dishonorable discharge and turned over
for trial in a nonmilitary court. There were other similar
cases reported throughout the year. Approximately 20 police
agents are currently serving sentences in the Central
Penitentiary for human rights abuses.
After the military took over administration of the Central
Penitentiary in February, a move prompted by charges of
massive corruption and organized criminal activity involving
both prison officials and inmates, there were many charges of
torture. Many believe that the complaints of torture came
essentially from those whose interests were compromised by the
change in the prison's management. In May, in response to
continuing controversy, the Government turned the penitentiary
back to civilian control, leading to an immediate cessation in
accusations of torture.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under the law, a person may be arrested only with specific
court authorization in the form of an Order of Arrest and must
be informed clearly of the grounds of arrest. The suspect may
be held no longer than 24 hours by security forces before
being turned over to the court, where evidence supporting
legal processing is reviewed. Within 6 days, the court is
obligated to order either the release of the detainee or his
remission to a penal center pending trial. Bail is both
available and widely used.
Despite these legal provisions, the police and other elements
of the security forces carried out an undetermined number of
detentions without judicial order in 1989. In addition, the
police appear frequently to violate the 24-hour rule, often
holding detainees for questioning well beyond the legal
period. Other than cases involving terrorism and/or
subversion, generally handled by the military, most of the
violations of the laws and regulations governing arrest and
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HONDURAS
detention are committed by agents of FUSEP and, most
particularly, of the DNI. The length of incommunicado
detention varied from several hours to several weeks.
Detainees, in many instances, are simply released at the end
of their illegal detention, rather than turned over to the
courts.
Continuing violations of the laws of detention and arrest have
raised understandable concerns about other related abuses,
including possible extrajudicial killing of suspected
criminals. According to press reports, the DNI arrested
Miguel Antonio Ramos on May 25 and his two colleagues, Felipe
Amador and Juan Ramon Avila, on June 5, on suspicion of
murder. The families have reportedly been unable to determine
their whereabouts.
Although incommunicado detention and failure to comply with
writs of habeas corpus do not seem to be widespread, there
continue to be credible reports of such violations.
Compliance with writs of habeas corpus is occasionally evaded
by the transfer of detainees from one detention facility to
another .
There have been no cases of forced exile. With regard to
forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
All nonmilitary trials in Honduras are public; there are
neither secret tribunals nor political prisoners. The law
provides for a fair trial of accused persons. Persons accused
of a crime have the right to an initial hearing by a judge to
assess the merits of the charges, to bail, and to an attorney,
provided by the State if necessary. The defendant also has
the right to an appeal and is considered innocent until proven
guilty. The Armed Forces maintains a separate judicial system
of military tribunals for cases involving military personnel.
Proceedings in these forums are not open to the public.
Despite legal guarantees of fair trial, in practice this right
is often abridged. Acute shortages of both human and material
resources has impeded improvements, and the judiciary remains
the least effective branch of government in Honduras.
The most serious inequity of the judiciary has been the
absence of a public defender system to handle cases of
indigent persons, most of whom consequently have failed to
receive a timely adjudication of their cases. A 1987
government order for the courts to provide state-hired
attorneys for the poor was not implemented in 1988 for lack of
funding, although private organizations volunteered some legal
services for the indigent. In May, with assistance from the
U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), the
Government established a Public Defendants Office (PDO) . As
of September 30, the PDO had 240 cases in its dockets, in
which 58 defendants were at the plenary stage and 30 had been
sentenced or set free.
In January 1989, the Government announced that 84 percent of
the country's prisoners had not been sentenced. That figure
represented only a slight improvement over the 85 percent
figure given in mid-1988 and the 88 percent cited in
mid-1987. Records indicated that, regardless of the court, a
prison stay of 2 or 3 years pending sentencing is by no means
uncommon. Much of the delay in sentencing was attributable to
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HONDURAS
backlogs in judicial processing, understa££ing in the courts,
or the poor quality of judges in the lower courts. For
example, a judge in El Progreso, Yoro, issued only two
decisions in the 126 cases pending at the start of the year.
Another factor that has contributed to the backlog, according
to many judges, is the lack of a judicial investigative system
that would assist in and expedite decisions. The judicial
branch has yet to receive resources equal to the
constitutionally mandated 3 percent of the total annual budget
of the Honduran Government. Under an A. I .D. -funded program,
justices of the peace are gradually being replaced with
legally qualified personnel chosen on the basis of merit.
Twenty-seven law school graduates were chosen in 1988 and 27
more in 1989 through a competitive examination to fill
vacancies in the same number of courts. This merit system
will continue until all justices of the peace are both
educationally qualified and proven competent in practice. In
addition to upgrading the quality of judicial services, the
new system offers the nominees unlimited tenure, with removal
permitted only for due cause, a major step toward curtailing
political influence in judicial decisions.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government respects the constitutionally protected rights
to personal and family privacy and the inviolability of the
home and private communications. Telephonic and written
correspondence is generally free from monitoring, although, as
provided by law, official review of such communications may be
authorized by judicial order for specific purposes, such as
criminal investigations or national security. Similarly,
private homes may be searched only on the basis of a judicial
order, with the exception of "urgent cases'* in order to
"impede the commission of crimes or avoid grave harm to
persons or property." There were no known violations of these
rights during 1989.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, and
those rights are normally respected in practice. A wide range
of political opinions are carried in the print media as well
as in television and radio broadcasting. With the exception
of one government-owned radio station, all of the
communications media — newspapers, over 100 radio, and 4
television stations — are privately owned. Criticism of the
Government and the Armed Forces is routine. Despite
occasional sharp exchanges between the media and government
authorities, there are normally no efforts by the authorities
to suppress expression of opinion. However, the Armed Forces
did begin legal proceedings in January against the editor of a
major daily newspaper for two editorials considered defamatory
to the military. The suit was subsequently allowed to lapse
in the courts.
Academic freedom is respected in Honduras. Academic and
political organizations abound in the university and secondary
schools, and many are well to the lef t-of-center or affiliated
with radical left groups. On-campus discipline of these
sometimes violent groups was left to academic administrators
in 1989.
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HONDURAS
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right to peaceful assembly for political, religious, or
other purposes is clearly provided for by the Constitution.
No prior authorization or permit is necessary, although
open-air assemblies may require a permit for "the sole purpose
of guaranteeing public order." Antigovernment and other
demonstrations were carried out on a routine basis without
impediment throughout the year.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Although predominantly Roman Catholic, Honduras has no state
religion. All forms of religious expression are
constitutionally protected, and foreign missionaries operate
in many parts of the country. The Constitution contains an
express provision that no clergyman of any religion may hold
public office or engage in political propaganda based on
religious motives or beliefs. There is no attempt to control
or impede the free expression of religious beliefs or
proselytization in Honduras.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens are normally unimpeded in entry into or exit from
Honduras, and travel freely within the country's national
borders. In locations near the border with El Salvador,
security concerns related to the movement of Salvadoran
guerrillas have led to the imposition of a 9:00 p.m. curfew.
There are also limited security-related travel restrictions
along the Nicaraguan border. There are no permanent travel
restrictions for Hondurans or resident foreigners, although
national security concerns have led to increased police checks
for personal identification. Exit visas are required to leave
Honduras but are not denied on political grounds.
Hondurans returning from Communist or Arab nations have been
questioned at length about their travels, and citizens of all
Communist and most Arab nations need special permission to
enter Honduras.
Although not a party to the U.N. Convention on Refugees,
Honduras has maintained a generous policy with regard to
refugees from neighboring countries. Despite increased
popular resentment of the refugees and the perceived costs for
Honduran citizens, the policy has remained unchanged to date.
There were few new additions to the officially documented
refugee population during 1989, with the exception of the
Nicaraguan camps, which added between 100 and 150 new entries
per month. Most of the new entrants arrived directly from
Nicaragua, a change from 1988 when the new arrivals came
largely from unofficial refugee settlements within the
country. At the end of October, the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) was caring for 12,137 Salvadorans, 23,636
Nicaraguans (9,000 of those Miskito and Sumo Indians), and 441
Guatemalans .
Refugee repatriations began in earnest in 1988 and continued
in 1989. Through the end of October 1,441 Salvadorans, 5
Guatemalans, 480 Nicaraguan Ladinos, and 1,479 Nicaraguan
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HONDURAS
Indians had taken advantage of voluntary repatriation.
Repatriations from the Salvadoran camps were suspended by the
Government of El Salvador for a short time in September to
allow the newly installed Government to review repatriation
procedures. By the end of the year, however, several
large-scale repatriations had taken place, including the
orderly departure of 1,180 refugees from the Mesa Grande
camp. Scheduled repatriations from Colomonagua and San
Antonio camps in November and December, however, were called
off when approximately 1,200 refugees from Coloraoncagua staged
an unauthorized walkout of the camp on November 18. The
"spontaneous" repatriation (apparently pre-arranged to
coincide with the FMLN offensive in El Salvador) violated an
agreement between the refugees and the Government of El
Salvador that all those returning would cooperate with
documentation prior to departure from the camps. The
returnees entered El Salvador at the Las Flores border post,
in territory that is under control of the Salvadoran
guerrillas. On December 9, the Colomoncagua refugees staged a
second, similar repatriation in which approximately 500
persons participated. Those repatriations brought the
officially documented Salvadoran refugee population in
Honduras down to 10,437 by mid-December. However, the refusal
to cooperate with the Salvadoran authorities in documentation
prevented the expected and much larger repatriation of some
10,000 Salvadoran refugees by early 1990. The UNHCR provided
no assistance in these unilateral repatriations undertaken
without the consent of the country-of -origin Government.
Fewer problems of refugee abuse were reported than in 1988.
The repressive control exercised by guerrilla-affiliated camp
coordinators in the Salvadoran settlements was responsible for
much of the outflow of refugees from Colomoncagua and Mesa
Grande camps in the first half of 1989. Refugees took
advantage of UNHCR offers of third-country resettlement to
leave the camps, despite the objections of coordinating
committees. Once outside of the camps, these refugees offered
first-hand details of serious abuses committed against
"dissidents" by the coordinating committees. In addition, the
female official of an international organization was forcibly
stripped at the orders of camp coordinators at San Antonio in
retaliation for having delivered mail to refugees against the
wishes of the coordinators.
Honduran handling of Nicaraguan refugees was less positive
than in the past. There were credible reports of cases of
forced repatriation as well as incidents of arbitrary
detention of officially documented refugees, who were removed
from the camps and held for sometimes lengthy periods.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Hondurans have and exercise the right to change their
government through democratic means. National and municipal
governments are chosen by free, secret, direct, and obligatory
balloting every 4 years. A president may serve only one term;
any vice president (there are three) who serves, even on an
interim basis, as acting president is prohibited from running
for the office of president. All Honduran-born citizens have
the right to hold office, except for members of the clergy and
the Armed Forces.
All four legal political parties participated in the third
consecutive national election that took place on November 26,
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HONDURAS
1989 in which the President, all members of the National
Congress, and all elected officials at the municipal level
were selected. The two major parties, the National and the
Liberal, received 94 percent of the votes cast. Rafael
Leonardo Callejas of the opposition National Party won the
presidential election with 51 percent of the vote to 43
percent for Carlos Flores Facusse of the ruling Liberal
Party. The National Party also won a majority of the seats in
the unicameral legislature (71 seats to 55 seats for the
Liberals and 2 seats for the PINU-Social Democrats) .
Complaints from the then-ruling party that the National
Elections Tribunal and the National Registry of Persons were
manipulated to its detriment led to calls for major reforms of
both those bodies.
Organizers of a new party must present a petition of 10,000
signatures of members to obtain legal status. If a party
fails to gain that same minimum number of votes in any
election in which it participates, it loses legal status.
Given the deep historical affiliations with the two major
parties, it has proven very difficult for new parties to gain
sufficient popular support to qualify for legal status.
There were complaints during the pre-election period that the
major parties had manipulated electoral laws and mechanics to
block the inscription of an independent candidate. The
leaders of the two smaller parties complained that such action
has denied them equal advantage under the electoral system.
Each of the small parties received less than 2 percent of the
total national vote in the elction.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government cooperates with local and international human
rights organizations, and the President frequently met with
visiting delegations of human rights monitors and activists
from abroad. The governmental Inter-Institutional Commission
on Human Rights handles both domestic and international
inquiries concerning human rights and has been responsive to
inquiries •
Honduras was condemned in 1988 in the first two cases of
disappearance ever tried in the Inter-American Human Rights
Court (lAHRC) in San Jose, Costa Rica. The Court ordered
Honduras to pay an undetermined indemnity to the families
involved, the sums of which were to be negotiated between the
relatives of the victims and the Government. When the
negotiations reached an impasse in 1989 the Court itself
established a sum per family equivalent to approximately
$200,000 at the actual, as opposed to the official, rate of
exchange. The Government of Honduras took strong exception to
the court ruling, arguing that it violated an agreement
reached previously with court representatives concerning the
factors to be used in arriving at a fair settlement. In late
1989 the President sent to the Congress draft legislation
authorizing payment, but the Congress failed to approve the
legislation before recessing in December.
In the final case before the lAHRC, the Court found
insufficient evidence to find Honduras responsible for the
disappearances of two Costa Ricans in 1981.
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HONDURAS
In September 1989, a representative of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights visited Honduras at the invitation of the
Government. The main purpose of the visit was to investigate
the use of torture. To that end, the U.N. representative was
given full liberty to inspect courts and prisons, speak with
inmates, and meet with any groups and persons of interest. He
issued no findings prior to his departure, but indicated a
full report would be issued following his return to Geneva.
The best-known of the nongovernmental human rights
organizations is the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights
in Honduras (CODEH) and its Central American-wide affiliate,
CODEHUCA. Despite a number of genuine efforts on behalf of
human rights, CODEH' s charges frequently have been exaggerated
and ill-documented, and in some cases false. Many observers
in Honduras consider the group to be highly politicized and
partisan. Although CODEH in the past routinely published its
findings in the Honduran press, allowing a detailed study of
its claims, no CODEH reports were so issued in 1989.
Nevertheless, CODEH presented various statistics during the
year, and a comparison of those documents revealed serious
discrepancies.
A new human rights organization, the Authentic Committee for
the Defense of Human Rights in Honduras (CODEH-A) , was
established in 1989. The group was founded by Hector Orlando
Vasquez, whose public dispute with CODEH President Ramon
Custodio allegedly led to threats against Vasquez' life.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution expressly prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sex, race, class, or any other basis. Education is
equally available to both males and females, but in practice
women are limited in some careers because of strongly held
cultural values and attitudes, despite the absence of any
overt impediment. Ethnic minorities, while enjoying full
equality under the law, continue to be the object of some
social discrimination.
Physical abuse of women, particularly in the home, is a common
feature of life in Honduras, and reflects the country's
male-dominant culture. Although Honduran law offers remedy to
the victims, few women avail themselves of the legal process.
There are credible reports that women held in the country's
jails are sometimes raped or pressured into providing sexual
favors in return for their release, but charges of such abuse
have been brought to court in only a few instances.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers are free to organize themselves into labor unions.
Labor unions have been active in Honduras over the past 36
years and continue to exert considerable influence, both
economically and politically.
The right to strike, along with a wide range of other basic
labor rights, is provided for by the Constitution and honored
in practice. Even though the civil service code stipulates
that public workers do not have the right to strike, neither
public nor privte sector strikes were not declared illegal in
1989. There were several major strikes, including a 9-day
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HONDURAS
walkout by health workers. The longest strike in Honduran
history, the 81-day walkout of the Teachers' Pension Fund,
ended when the President agreed that workers' wages lost
during the strike would be paid.
Honduras' trade union movement maintains close ties with
international trade union organizations. The largest union
group, the Confederation of Honduran Workers, is an affiliate
of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU). The second largest, the General Workers Central, is
affiliated with the World Confederation of Labor. The third
major organization, the Unitary Federation of Honduran
Workers, is affiliated with the Communist-controlled World
Federation of Trade Unions. The three labor organizations
claim to represent about 20 percent of all Honduran workers,
including a substantial number of peasants and rural laborers.
A number of private firms have instituted labor/management
"solidarity" associations. Organized labor, including the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) and the ICFTU, expressed strong
opposition to these associations on the grounds that they do
not permit strikes and have inadequate grievance procedures.
Nevertheless, the membership of such associations has
increased in the last few years from 2,000 to approximately
10,000. Solidarity organizations are not formally recognized
by the Ministry of Labor.
In its 1989 report, the ILO Committee of Experts (COE) renewed
its request to the Government to bring certain provisions of
its legislation into conformance with Convention 87 on Freedom
of Association, including provisions which: place a numerical
restriction on the right to organize; limit to one the number
of unions per enterprise; require that union officers must be
engaged in the work of the workers they represent; require
that two-thirds of the membership present must approve a
strike action; grant the Government broad powers to prohibit,
or require lengthy procedures for, strikes in certain
industries. Also in 1989, the ILO Committee on Freedom of
Association (CFA) expressed satisfaction with the Government's
action granting legal recognition to union federation.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and to bargain collectively are
protected by law and observed in practice. Retribution by
employers for trade union activity is not uncommon, in spite
of a specific provision in the labor code against such
activity. There were two killings of trade unionists, one of
which may have been politically motivated (see Section l.a.).
On November 15 unidentified persons exploded a bomb at a
residence occupied by the leader of the electrical workers'
union. There were no personal injuries and no group has
claimed responsibility for the incident. However, these
rights and guarantees are jealously guarded by the powerful
union movement which does not hesitate to make use of the
legal system to enforce their observance. The prevalence of
unionized labor in the workplace and its political influence
act as a further defense against antiunion discrimination or
pressures. The free trade zones are governed by the same
labor regulations as the rest of private industry, and
conditions in these export processing plants is generally
considered to be superior to the national average.
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HONDURAS
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced or compulsory labor in Honduras; such
practices are prohibited by law and by the Constitution,
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Constitution and the Labor Code prohibit the employment of
children under the age of 16 years. Violations of the labor
code frequently occur in rural areas or in small companies.
High unemployment and underemployment have resulted in many
children supplementing the family income by working in small
family farms or as street vendors. The Government does not
have the capability to enforce child labor laws in these
situations.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Constitution and the labor code require that all labor be
fairly paid; minimum wages, working hours, vacations, and
occupational safety are all regulated by law. The minimum
wage, revised as of January 1, 1990, varies by occupation and
ranges from $3 to $5 dollars per day. It is doubtful that the
new minimum wage is sufficient to provide a decent standard of
living. Many households will need to pool family members'
salaries to survive. The minimum wage is expected to be
raised again in the near future.
The standard workday is 8 hours; a standard workweek is 44
hours. The Labor Code provides for a paid vacation of 10
workdays after 1 year, and 20 workdays after 4 years. The
regulations are frequently ignored in practice as a result of
the high level of unemployment and underemployment.
An ILO technical expert investigated allegations by labor of
improper use of pesticides in the banana industry. A
U.S. -owned company agreed to make the recommended changes in
production, but small independent banana producers reportedly
disregard safety in the use of pesticide. There have also
been verified instances where Miskito scuba divers have died
or suffered injuries by improper diving procedures in the
unregulated lobster fishing industry. In December the
Government prohibited the use of scuba divers in the
lobster-fishing industry. Boat owners and Miskito Indians
protested the prohibition because of lost income to the large
number of divers and the lobster fishing industry. A motion
to cancel the prohibition was pending before the courts at
year's end.
644
JAMAICA
Jamaica, a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, is a
constitutional parliamentary democracy. A Governor General,
appointed by the Crown on the advice of the Prime Minister,
represents the Queen as Head of State, while the elected Prime
Minister, the leader of the majority party in Parliament, is
the country's chief executive. The Parliament is comprised of
an elected House of Representatives and a Senate appointed by
the Governor General.
Two major political parties have alternated in power since the
first elections under universal suffrage in 1944. The maximum
length of a parliament is 5 years, and the Constitution
requires that a general election be held no more than 3 months
after the dissolution of Parliament. The last election, held
in February 1989, resulted in Michael Manley's People's
National Party (PNP) winning 45 of the 60 seats in the House
of Representatives. The opposition Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) ,
which formed the government from 1980 to 1989, holds the
remaining 15 seats.
The security forces are directed by the Ministry of National
Security and consist of the Jamaica Constabulary Force
(JCF-police) , the Jamaica Special Constabulary Force (JSCF-an
auxiliary police force), and the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) .
Since 1974 the JDF has been authorized to conduct joint
operations with the JCF to maintain peace and order under the
Suppression of Crime Act.
Jamaica has a mixed economy emphasizing the private sector and
based on tourism, bauxite and alumina production, light
manufacturing, and agriculture. The Manley Government is
pursuing policies which promote private investment, both
domestic and foreign, in order to stimulate economic growth
and modernization.
In 1989 human rights were generally respected in Jamaica, but
there continued to be credible reports that the police rely
excessively on the use of lethal force, particularly in
dealing with criminal suspects. This continues to be the
country's most persistent human rights problem.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Officially sanctioned murder of political opponents does not
occur in Jamaica. However, some violent crime has political
overtones. Both major parties, as well as the Communist
Workers Party of Jamaica, have some supporters who
occasionally resort to violence to prevent supporters of rival
parties from engaging in legitimate political activities, such
as holding rallies or voting, and to punish those believed to
have harmed their party's interests. The legal system has
often been ineffective in dealing with cases of presumed
politically motivated killing because of a code of silence
adhered to by suspects, victims, and witnesses alike.
Intimidation of witnesses and jurors also complicates efforts
to prosecute offenders.
Violence aimed at disrupting the political process is
heightened during elections. As a step toward reducing
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JAMAICA
election-related violence, the two major political parties in
1988 engaged in talks aimed at defusing tensions between the
parties and between JLP and PNP partisans. On August 26,
1988, the two party leaders signed a "political code of
conduct" intended to reduce election-related violence. An
Ombudsman was appointed to monitor compliance with the
agreement and to report violations. As a result of these
efforts, the electoral campaign of 1988-89 was relatively
peaceful, and the number of persons killed decreased from
several hundred in the previous contested national election to
12 in the most recent one.
The incidence of violent crime remains high in Jamaica. There
continue to be credible reports of excessive use of lethal
force by the police in dealing with suspected criminals.
According to police statistics, officers killed 91 persons and
wounded 63 in shooting incidents through the end of August
1989. Eight police officers were killed and 22 wounded in the
line of duty during the same period. The disparity between
the ratio of persons killed by police to those wounded has led
several human rights groups to charge that some officers are
engaging in summary executions of suspects.
Both local and international human rights groups have
criticized the fact that the JCF itself is responsible for
investigating police abuses. In July, National Security
Minister K.D. Knight announced plans to establish an
independent body to review complaints against members of the
force, but as of the end of the year no action had yet been
taken.
b. Disappearance
There is no evidence of abduction, hostage-taking, or
disappearances perpetrated by the security forces. Using the
power granted under the Suppression of Crime Act to take
persons into custody without an arrest warrant, however, the
JCF has on occasion held incommunicado for varying periods
persons suspected of criminal activities. In nearly all these
cases, the detainee was released once relatives or associates
protested.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and other abuse of prisoners and detainees is
prohibited by law. Nonetheless, suspected criminals are often
beaten or mistreated by police while being held in local
stations. In 1989 there were numerous complaints of police
brutality, including reports of beatings by guards and
security personnel of inmates held in prisons. Figures on
human rights abuses by police are unavailable. As of October,
92 police officers had been placed on adminstrative leave
pending resolution of criminal conduct cases, many of which
involved minor offenses. A number of policemen were convicted
and punished. To address identified shortcomings in police
performance, the JCF is receiving training in police
investigative techniques from the U.S. Justice Department's
International Criminal Investigative Training Program, and is
engaged in a law enforcement accreditation program.
In past years, some persons have brought suit successfully
against the police for unlawful actions, and the Government
has been required to pay damages. According to police
statistics, 200 complaints were filed against police between
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JAMAICA
January and August of 1989, of which more than half alleged
assault by JCF officers. Almost $200,000 was paid out in
damages following successful lawsuits against police during
that period.
Violence in the prisons is commonplace, with both prisoners
and guards subject to assault. Prison guards allegedly beat
to death two inmates during disturbances following a July
hunger strike at the Kingston General Penitentiary.
Government investigations into the incident had not been
completed by year's end. At the St. Catherine District
Prison, where 200 death row inmates are housed in cells built
for 60, guards temporarily stopped feeding inmates in August,
following a series of attacks by heavily armed prisoners.
Commercial guard forces, which have proliferated in recent
years due to the high crime rate, continue to be the subject
of complaints, especially concerning the use of excessive
force. According to the Jamaica Council for Human Rights
(JCHR), private security guards killed 40 persons in 1988;
figures were not available for 1989 at year's end. There are
currently more than 200 private security firms in Jamaica, and
many often hire less qualified applicants than the police and
provide less training. Some guard company recruits have been
found to have criminal records. Licensing for commercial
guard forces is the subject of draft legislation being
considered by the Government.
Lynching of individuals accused of theft of goods, livestock
or crops, housebreaking, or rape occurs with some frequency in
Jamaica. Such incidents are reported in the media, but
prosecutions of vigilantes remains rare.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under the Suppression of Crime Act, which has been regularly
extended at 6-month intervals since its adoption in 1974,
security forces do not need a warrant to detain persons
"reasonably" suspected of having committed a crime. Although
the Act was conceived as an extraordinary measure, security
forces have come to rely on it extensively. Detention of
suspects without a warrant occurs regularly, particularly in
poor neighborhoods.
In July the Government lifted the Act in 7 of Jamaica's 14
parishes. However, government officials warned that it could
be reintroduced in those areas if there is a significant
increase in crime. In areas where the Act has been lifted,
reports indicate that police are relying on blank, presigned
warrants to meet the new legal requirements.
Police must record detentions and are responsible for ensuring
that detainees appear before a member of the judiciary within
24 hours of detention. Most detainees are held for 3 to 5
days. However, there have been instances of detainees being
held for several weeks without being brought before a judicial
officer. Many detainees are unaware of their right to timely
judicial review of the grounds for their detention. The JCHR
indicates that 90 percent of its caseload involves assisting
people attempting to locate and gain the release of detained
family members. The JCHR reports that supervisory police
officers have been more cooperative in recent years in
providing information about detained persons.
For suspects charged with a crime, there is a functioning bail
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system. Bail is set by the local police supervisor in minor
cases. A judicial officer sets bail for those charged'with
more serious crimes. Persons unable to make bail while
waiting for a judicial hearing are often detained for long
periods. Outsiders are permitted access to the accused.
There are no political prisoners.
with regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Persons who have been charged with criminal offenses have
access to legal representation, and legal counsel is provided
to indigents in criminal cases. The Court of Appeal and the
Parliament may refer cases to the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in the United Kingdom. The judicial system,
though independent, is overburdened and operates with
inadequate resources. Budgetary shortfalls have resulted in a
steady attrition of trained personnel, causing further
delays. Some cases take years to come to trial, and others
have had to be dismissed because case files could not be
located. In August 120 prisoners at the Kingston General
Penitentiary went on a short hunger strike to protest long
delays in processing their cases. Some of these prisoners had
been held for more than 4 years awaiting trial or decisions on
their appeals. The Chief Justice in an October speech called
attention to the shortage of court reporters, clerks of the
court, and lawyers prepared to work for the Government. A
labor action by court employees in late 1989 further
exacerbated difficulties in processing cases rapidly.
A special Gun Court, established in 1974, considers all cases
involving the illegal use or possession of firearms and
ammunition. Public attendance is restricted, and less
stringent rules of evidence are used. In capital cases,
hearings before the Gun Court serve as preliminaries to jury
trials under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
According to the JCHR, one of the weakest areas of Jamaican
justice is the inability of the police to provide witnesses
with proper protection. Intimidation, even murder, of
witnesses is a chronic problem hampering criminal
prosecutions, and jurors are sometimes threatened by
associates of criminal defendants. The parliamentary
Ombudsman has reported instances in which similar threats and
intimidation are directed against witnesses and jurors in
criminal cases where the accused is a policeman. Some
convictions have been obtained for such attempts to subvert
the judicial system. In August the Government announced plans
to implement a protective custody program for threatened
witnesses. By year's end the program had not yet been
implemented.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary intrusion by the State
into the private life of the individual. Under the
Suppression of Crime Act, however, search warrants are not
required to enter homes or businesses believed to be occupied
by persons "reasonably" suspected of having committed a crime,
and this authority is sometimes abused by the police. In July
the Act was declared no longer applicable in 7 of Jamaica's 14
parishes (see Section l.d.). Regulations approved by
Parliament in 1980 require that every effort be made by
I
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security forces to have the owner or occupant of the premises
present during any search.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press are provided for in the
Constitution and are observed in practice within the broad
limits of libel laws and the State Secrets Act. Jamaica's
largest privately owned newspaper. The Daily Gleaner, has been
critical of Jamaican governments through the years. A new
national daily. The Record, appeared in 1988 and has followed
this tradition. Several smaller newspapers and magazines are
also published, and foreign publications are widely
available. The government-owned Jamaica Broadcasting Company
(JBC) operates two radio stations and the island's only
television channel. JBC typically has been accused of bias in
favor of the Government, by whichever party is in opposition.
Radio Jamaica (RJR) is a privately owned broadcasting
company. Although the Government has a 25-percent equity
holding in RJR, the company is independent, and its broadcasts
are often critical of government policies. A new privately
owned FM radio station began broadcasting in 1989.
The previous JLP Government granted three licenses to new
regional radio stations in 1988, as part of a long-planned
divestiture program. Two of the three regional stations were
on the air at year's end; the third was expected to begin
broadcasting in early 1990. The Government's Broadcast
Commission retains the right to regulate programming during
emergencies. In July Prime Minister Manley announced that the
Government would retain JBC, while allowing private concerns
to operate a new television channel and an island-wide radio
station, but these plans have not yet been implemented. There
are now more than 13,000 satellite antennas on the island, and
many Jamaicans watch foreign television broadcasts without any
government restriction.
There is no censorship or interference in academic
institutions .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
association. Large numbers and varieties of professional,
business, service, social, and cultural associations function
freely. Public rallies are staged by all political parties.
Such events require a police permit, which is normally
granted. The PNP and JLP held rallies and meetings throughout
the island during the last election campaign.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for by the Constitution and is
well established in Jamaica. More than 80 percent of the
population belongs to various Christian denominations, and
religious groups of all kinds operate freely. Evangelical
Christian movements have gained a significant following, and
foreign evangelists regularly visit.
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d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution provides Jamaican citizens freedom of
movement and immunity from expulsion from the country. There
are no restrictions on foreign travel or emigration.
Citizenship is not revoked for political reasons.
Those who apply for refugee status are handled on a
case-by-case basis. The country does not often accept asylum
seekers, primarily for domestic economic reasons. Jamaica is
a party to the 1951 U.N. Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have, and freely exercise, the right to change their
government. The Constitution requires that, except under
defined emergency circumstances, an election be held not later
than 5 years after the first sitting of the preceding
Parliament, but the Prime Minister may call national elections
any time within that period.
The 1989 general election, in which the FN? replaced the JLP,
was relatively peaceful by the standard of previous Jamaican
elections. Twelve persons were killed in election-related
violence. Both parties worked during the electoral campaign
to keep violence under control.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no restrictions on human rights organizations in
Jamaica. The Jamaica Council for Human Rights, the country's
only human rights organization, has vigorously protested
abuses by the police and has called for corrective reforms.
The Council's work continues to be hampered by a lack of
adequate resources. An Americas Watch representative visited
Jamaica in 1989 and met with government officials and human
rights activists.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Jamaican women are accorded full equality under the
Constitution, and the 1975 Employment Act requires equal pay
for equal work. In practice, because of cultural and social
traditions, women often still suffer economic discrimination,
which is frequently evidenced in hiring practices.
Violence against women occurs with some frequency in Jamaica.
The new Government has established a Bureau of Women's Affairs
within the Ministry of Labor, Welfare and Sports. Several
nongovernmental organizations exist to help victims cope with
the effects of domestic violence, such as wife beating.
According to officials at a crisis center, police are
frequently unwilling to assist battered women in taking legal
steps against their assailants. Furthermore, Jamaican law
does not differentiate between domestic violence and general
assault cases. Women are, therefore, often reluctant to bring
charges under the General Offenses Against the Person Act,
under which the only sanction available is the incarceration
of the offender.
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Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Article 23 of the Constitution specifically provides for the
right to form or join a trade union, and other, more general
articles obligate the Government to protect the person and
property of trade unionists. In Jamaica, labor unions, like
professional groups and private associations, function
freely. The Labor Relations and Industrial Disputes Act
(LRIDA) codifies regulations of workers' rights.
Unions draft their own constitutions and rules, elect
officers, determine objectives, affiliate with national or
international groups, and select delegates to conferences.
Some Jamaican unions have joined democratic international
trade secretariats, such as the Caribbean Congress of Labor
and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The
third largest labor union is affiliated with the
Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions, and the
World Confederation of Labor has attracted one Jamaican
adherent .
Jamaican law neither prohibits strikes nor provides a right to
strike, but in practice unions and workers use the strike as a
tool. Striking workers can interrupt work without criminal
liability but cannot be assured of keeping their jobs. In
1989 there were several work slowdowns as well as an 11-day
strike involving 500 workers at an alumina plant brought about
by a breakdown in contract negotiations. The LRIDA and other
laws provide that certain categories of essential service
workers (usually government-employed) do not have the right to
strike. In its 1989 report, the Committee of Experts (COE) of
the International Labor Organization (ILO) cited the laws'
broad definition of essential services in which strikes are
prohibited as restricting the right to strike provided by the
ILO's Convention 87 (Freedom of Association).
About 25 percent of the work force belongs to unions, and
union influence is felt in all important economic sectors.
The two largest unions, the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union
and the National Workers Union, have organizational and
leadership ties to the two major political parties, the JLP
and the PNP, respectively. Both unions maintain their
independence and sometimes take positions different from those
of their respective parties. The third largest Jamaican
union, the University and Allied Workers Union, is linked with
the (Communist) Workers Party of Jamaica, whose leadership
maintains direct control over the union.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Constitution provides for the right to organize and belong
to labor unions, and LRIDA provisions include guidelines for
labor, management, and government on issues such as organizing
work sites, negotiating agreements, and conflict resolution.
However, in 1989, the COE cited the labor law's requirement of
40-percent membership in order to negotiate an agreement as
inconsistent with the ILO's Convention 98 (the Right to
Organize and Collective Bargaining). Employees may not be
fired solely because they are union officers. On the other
hand, union affiliation may not be a prerequisite for
employment. The Government rarely interferes with union
organization efforts, and judicial and police authorities
effectively enforce the LRIDA and other labor regulations.
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JAMAICA
Labor, management, and the Government remain firmly committed
by law and in practice to collective bargaining in contract
negotiations and conflict resolution. Collective bargaining
is widely used, even in some nonunionized firms. When labor
and management fail to reach an agreement, cases may be
referred to the Ministry of Labor for arbitration or
mediation. An Independent Industrial Disputes Tribunal (IDT)
forms the first appeal level above the Ministry. Any cases
not resolved by the IDT pass to the civil courts. This system
has proved effective. However, unions and some employers
continue to believe that the collective bargaining process is
undermined by a 1986 LRIDA amendment which permits the
Minister of Labor unilaterally to refer cases involving the
national interest to the IDT.
Domestic labor laws apply to Jamaican export free trade
zones. Ministry of Labor officers cite a need for more .
compliance verification, especially in the free zones, but
believe that most employers obey legal requirements. While
domestic manufacturing companies are predominantly unionized,
only 2 of the 18 factories in the Kingston Free Zone have
union representation. The two unionized firms were unionized
before they began operations in the Free Zone. Resistance by
employers (all foreign), difficulty in unionizing female
employees (who represent a majority of the work force in the
free zones), and inconsistent organizing efforts are the
reasons generally cited for the lack of additional
unionization in the free zones. The Government is aware of
the strong employer opposition to unions in the free zones; it
neither discourages nor encourages unionization. Jamaica's
second largest union has indicated its intention to organize
workers in zone factories. During 1989 nonunionized workers
in some free zone plants conducted short work stoppages to
protest working conditions.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution does not specifically address the matter of
forced or compulsory labor. However, Jamaica is a party to
the ILO Convention which prohibits compulsory labor, and there
have been no allegations that this practice exists in Jamaica.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Juvenile Act provides that children under the age of 12
years shall not be employed except by parents or guardians,
and that such employment may be only in domestic,
agricultural, or horticultural work. Children under 12 years
of age may not be employed at night or at industrial sites.
The Educational Act stipulates that all children aged 6 to 11
must attend elementary school. Industrial safety, police, and
truant officers are charged with enforcing the law.
Enforcement is erratic, however, and children under 12 are
sometimes seen peddling goods or services on city streets.
There is no evidence of widespread illegal employment of
children in other sectors of the economy.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The LRIDA establishes some basic conditions of work. The
Factory Act stipulates that all factories be registered and
approved by the Labor Ministry before they can begin
operating. The Ministry's Industrial Safety Division is
required to make annual inspections of all factories, but
budget constraints reduce the number of inspections actually
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JAMAICA
made. The Ministry maintains records on industrial accident
victims. If a private-sector work site does not meet the
definition of a "factory," the Ministry does not have the
authority to inspect it.
In accordance with International Monetary Fund guidelines,
government wage policy aims to keep maximum annual wage and
fringe benefit increases to 10 percent or less to help contain
inflation. Most wage settlements have followed this
guideline, but exceptions have been made for workers with a
history of inadequate pay. In a two-step process that began
in June 1988, the Government increased minimum wage levels to
approximately $75 per month, effective January 1, 1989.
Higher minimum wages apply to skilled workers, depending on
their specialty. Most salaried workers are paid more than the
legal minimum wage. For a worker with a family of five or
less, the minimum wage represents a bare subsistence level.
This level is more supportable in rural areas than in urban
locations. The minimum wage law also provides for a 42-hour
standard workweek and overtime pay. The Ministries of Labor,
Finance, the Public Service, and National Security enforce
labor laws and regulations.
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MEXICO
Mexico is a Federal Republic which has been dominated by the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) since its founding in
1929. Periodic political reforms have expanded the
opposition's role and stake in the political system; never
more so than in the 1988 presidential election year.
Nevertheless, the PRI has maintained its preponderant
political control throughout the Republic by a combination of
voting strength, organizational power, and, the principal
opposition parties and other observers charge, electoral
fraud. The 1917 Constitution stipulates that power be divided
among a bicameral legislature, a judiciary, and an executive.
The President's powers, however, far outweigh those of the
other branches in Mexico's highly centralized system.
The principal law enforcement organization in Mexico is the
Federal Judicial Police, which is controlled by the Attorney
General. The General Directorate of Investigations and
National Security under the control of the Secretariat of
Government is responsible for investigations involving
national security. Despite the tendency toward centralization
of authority, municipal, state, and Federal police exercise
authority in their respective areas of jurisdiction. Local
police forces, often controlled by political bosses and
landowners, have been involved in human rights abuses, and the
Federal police have been responsible for deaths of detainees
in their custody. There is no evidence, however, that these
abuses are the result of policies favored or directed by the
Mexican Government.
Mexico has a mixed economy, which combines elements of
domestic market capitalism with state ownership of major
industries. Through a program of divestiture of some
state-owned firms, principally those operating in
"nonstrategic" sectors, the Government is increasing the role
of the private sector in the economy. Notable examples of the
privatization policy which were announced or implemented in
1989 include the major airlines and the public telephone
company.
A wide range of individual freedoms is provided for by the
1917 Constitution and honored in practice. Some important
exceptions, however, continue to be noted. The exceptions
include abuse by police and judicial authorities of detainees
and prisoners; political and extrajudicial killings, mostly
the result of confrontations between peasants and landowners,
their agents, and local police over disputed land; and
recurring credible charges by opposition parties, civic
groups, and outside observers of election fraud. While these
and other human rights abuses persist, the Government has
taken several steps to improve the situation, notable among
them a large-scale amnesty program for persons accused of
crimes of a "political or social nature," various attempts at
a national debate on electoral reform, and the establishment
of a Director General for Human Rights under the Secretary of
Government .
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MEXICO
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
In Mexico's rural states disputes over land are often violent
and sometimes result in extrajudicial killings. While the
Federal Government continues its efforts to curb such
violence, violations continue nonetheless.
Paramilitary bands and local police controlled by political
bosses and landowners are often accused of oppressing and even
murdering peasant activists. Such charges have been made not
only by independent peasant organizations, but also by the
PRI-af filiated National Confederation of Peasants (CNC) . The
independent groups attribute the killings to persons employed
by local strongmen (caciques), as well as to members of the
CNC and to the local police. As an example, 11 persons died
in mid-February in Pijijiapan, Chiapas State, in an apparent
dispute between the Independent Central of Agricultural
Workers and Campesinos (CIOAC) and CNC-af filiated claimants to
the same parcel of land; the CIOAC had been a Mexican
Socialist Party affiliate, while the CNC represents the PRI ' s
peasant arm. Press reports cite police involvement in the
incident, though no police have been charged with any crime.
State governor Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido, as well as CNC
officials in Mexico City, decried the Pijijiapan violence.
A CIOAC activist, Sebastian Perez Nunez, was shot to death,
apparently by a local Chiapas rancher, on December 29, 1988,
in apparent retaliation for a CIOAC-led takeover of land. Two
Mexican Socialist Party (PMS) activists, Santos Cabrera Rosas
and Elpidio Dominguez Castro, were also murdered early in
1989, and four peasant sympathizers of presidential candidate
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas were killed in a confrontation on January
22 with state rural police in Xoxocotla, Morelos State,
following municipal elections. The Federal Government
continued its ongoing efforts to control this violence, and
attorneys general from various states met frequently during
the year with national law enforcement and Secretariat of
Government officials to pursue this goal.
A number of apparent assassinations of political activists and
militants also occurred within the last year. Political
motives cannot, as yet, be ascribed with certainty to any of
the killings, though opposition groups assert such was the
case. In each instance, state judicial officials have
promised thoroughgoing investigations.
In otherwise peaceful elections on July 12 for mayors and
local legislators in the northern state of Durango, the
candidate of the local Committee for Popular Defense (CDP) for
mayor of the small town of Simon Bolivar was shot in a
purported robbery and left clinically dead in what may
actually have been a politically motivated crime. PRI special
delegate Cesar Martinez Bonilla was killed September 21 in
Nochixtlan, Oaxaca, reportedly by an Authentic Party of the
Mexican Revolution (PARM) militant.
Meanwhile, several of 1988 's most prominent cases of alleged
political killings have no apparent solution in sight,
including those of Cardenas' personal aides Francisco Ovando
Gil and Roman Gil Heraldez. A suspect has been formally
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MEXICO
accused in the August 1988 murders of four young Revolutionary-
Workers Party (PRT) activists, but the party itself believes
that the crime was politically motivated, and that the actual
murderer is still at large.
On February 17, a Mexican Federal judge found four defendants
guilty of abuse of authority and injuries in connection with
the August 1986 detention and torture of U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agent Victor Cortez in Guadalajara.
Subsequently, the four defendants, all Jalisco state judicial
police officers, were sentenced to 5 years in prison and fined
the equivalent of $140. Two additional suspects remain at
large. In related developments, Rafael Caro Quintero, Ernesto
Fonseca Carrillo, and others accused of involvement in the
kidnaping and murder of U.S. drug enforcement administration
(DEA) agent Enrique Camarena were convicted and sentenced in
Mexico City on drug trafficking charges, with Caro receiving a
sentence of 116 years and Fonseca 140 years. Though lengthy,
the trial has followed normal Mexican judicial procedures.
On December 23, 1988, prisoners at the Venustiano Carranza
Center for Social Readaptation in Tepic, Nayarit, rioted.
Special tactical police taams flown in from Mexico City to
quell the rebellion responded with excessive force, killing
21. Among those left dead in the melee were the prison warden
and the police team commander. Of the 21 fatalities, 13 had
been filmed by an NBC television camera crew surrendering to
prison authorities; each of the 13 was later found dead with a
bullet wound in the head. The press in Guadalajara reported
extensively on the deaths of two Mexican citizens while in
detention.
On December 21, 1988, Antonio Gomez Reyes died as an apparent
consequence of beatings received after his arrest. He was
never charged and the circumstances surrounding his arrest
remained unclear. Jorge Perez Gonzalez died in detention on
February 8, after allegedly being forced to sign a confession
of growing marijuana. The Mexican press reported that a
prisoner drowned in July at the hands of the Nuevo Leon State
Police. In December the press reported the death of
19-year-old Fernando Jordan de la Torba in La Paz, Baja
California Sur. The victim, son of a prominent family, died
of peritonitis, allegedly after being severely tortured and
beaten while under detention by the Federal Judicial Police.
By year's end there was no official investigation in progress,
and a Federal Deputy for the state charged that high
government officials were inhibiting legitimate investigations
into this and other cases.
b. Disappearance
According to the Committee in Defense of Prisoners, the
Persecuted, Disappeared Persons, and Political Exiles of
Mexico, a prominent human rights organization, there are 552
disappeared persons in Mexico, an increase of 5 over the
previous year. The majority of disappearances are cases which
occurred during the earlier presidential administrations of
Luis Echeverria Alvarez and Jose Lopez Portillo. The
Committee believes that a total of 26 persons disappeared
during the Miguel de la Madrid administration, which ended on
December 1, 1988.
One of the five recent disappearances included PRT militant
Jose Ramon Garcia Gomez, who was purportedly removed from his
home in Cuautla, Morelos State, on December 16, 1988, by state
656
judicial police agents. There were no traces, at year's end,
of his whereabouts, and both federal and state investigators
have been unsuccessful in their respective searches. The
Conunittee has also classified Francisco Sahagun Baca as
disappeared. Sahagun was formerly head of the Federal
Government's Division of Investigations for the Prevention of
Delinquency (DIPD) and a purported member of the "White
Brigades," a group charged with acts of torture,
disappearance, and assassination during the Government's
campaign in the 1970's against insurgent guerrillas.
Reportedly arrested on July 10, 1989, on drug-related charges,
he has not been heard from since.
Many human rights activists and opposition politicians were
very concerned when Miguel Nazar Haro was appointed head of
the Intelligence Directorate of the Federal District's
Secretariat of Public Security. In the 1970's, Nazar had been
head of the Federal Directorate of Security and another
purported member of the "White Brigades." Like Sahagun, he
has been charged with direct participation in acts of illegal
detention, torture, and disappearance. Nazar Haro
subsequently resigned his DDF position, apparently under
public pressure.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.
Although torture is prohibited by the Constitution, human
rights organizations continue to charge that law enforcement
officials employ psychological and physical abuse, most often
in the period immediately following arrest and especially
during interrogation. The Government has stated that the use
of torture to extract confessions is an illegal and
unacceptable substitute for investigative work. Accordingly,
the Administration continued its efforts to recruit new
personnel into the various police forces and emphasizes
education and training in legitimate investigative skills.
The Attorney General's Office has contracted with human rights
organizations to provide courses designed to sensitize law
enforcement personnel to the need to respect human rights.
United States consulates continued to report problems
concerning the arrest of U.S. citizens. In many instances,
those detained alleged they were abused and tortured by
military and law enforcement authorities, most often for
purposes of obtaining admissions of guilt. They claimed to
have been subjected to beatings, electric shocks applied with
cattle prods and stun guns, sexual assaults, attempts at
suffocation, and death threats. Some declined to discuss
their cases with consular officials for fear of reprisal.
As an example, six U.S. citizens were arrested in Baja
California Sur in May 1989 by elements of the Federal Judicial
Police for alleged possession of cocaine. All six, including
one woman, were strip-searched. One was blindfolded and had a
plastic bag tied around his head to the point of suffocation;
a gun was later discharged at his head and a knife held to his
throat. Overall, there have been 74 complaints by U.S.
citizens throughout Mexico (through the month of September
1989), an increase of 6 over the previous year.
Unfortunately, formal diplomatic protests sent to the
Secretariat of Foreign Relations have not always produced
satisfactory responses.
In late October, the Bar Association of the state of Sonora
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MEXICO
issued an open letter to protest the "constant violation" of
fundamental constitutional rights and abuse of prisoners,
including torture and murder, by the police authorities at all
levels in the state. Some members of the church and the media
supported the Association's allegations.
There were some signs of improvement, however. The U.S.
consulate in Nuevo Laredo noted a marked drop in abuse cases
after the transfer of Federal police commander Hugo Tinoco
Causor and his subsequent indictment on charges of torture and
illegal deprivation of liberty. The consulate general in
Guadalajara reported an end to complaints of mistreatment by
military authorities in the Puerto Vallarta area. It also
noted that Jalisco's relatively new governor, Guillermo Cosio
Vidaurri, has made a significant effort to improve police
recruitment, training, and compensation. About 150 corrupt
state police and judicial officials were dismissed, and more
were expected to follow.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under provisions of the Constitution, an arrested suspect can
be held in police custody for up to 48 hours before he must be
brought before a judge to make a preliminary statement of
guilt or innocence. The judge has an additional 24 hours to
determine whether detention should continue or not. Both
standards, however, have frequently been violated, with
charges of abuse, torture, and the extortion of forced
confessions from accused persons during this initial period.
Mexican citizens are guaranteed the right to seek restraining
orders and to make appeals ("amparo"), a constitutional
protection provided against "coercive and abusive acts of
authority." In a recent reform of the restraining
order/appeal system, certain categories of persons are
automatically granted such petitions. Incidents of arbitrary
arrest and imprisonment occur most frequently in criminal
cases and, notably, in land tenure disputes.
Exile and extradition of Mexican citizens are not normally
practiced in Mexico.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system is divided into Federal and state court
systems, with the Federal courts having jurisdiction over most
civil cases and those involving major felonies. Under the
Constitution, trial and sentencing must be completed within 12
months of arrest for crimes that would carry at least a 2-year
sentence. Despite efforts at reform, this standard is often
not met because of delays caused by cumbersome court
procedures, case backlogs, and defense motions. Trial is by
judge, not jury, in nearly all criminal cases. Defendants
have a right to counsel, and public defenders are available.
Other rights include defense against self-incrimination, the
right to confront one's accusers, and the right to a public
trial.
"The political opposition alleges that the judiciary, with
judges placed in office by renewable appointments, is
dependent on the executive branch. The Government denies that
political beliefs have any bearing on the impartial
administration of justice. Factors such as low pay for judges
658
ti£Zl£Q.
and law enforcement officials and high caseloads contribute to
corruption in the judicial system
The National Front against Repression (FNCR) states there are
currently 33 political prisoners in the country. It
acknowledges the release by the Government during the past
year of four political prisoners, including PRT activist and
23rd of September League militant Heladio Torres Flores, and
Manuel Alba Vera, also imprisoned for crimes committed during
the "armed struggle" of the 1970's. The majority of political
prisoners, as defined by the FCNR, are peasants and peasant
activists arrested in disputes over land. The Government has
disputed the appellation "political prisoner" in these cases,
charging that most of those listed by the FNCR are actually
guilty of common crimes such as terrorism, criminal
association, and damage to property. The Government has
consistently denied that it holds political prisoners.
President Salinas de Gortari initiated a sweeping amnesty
program in February in which a total of 1,176 prisoners
accused of committing crimes of a "political or social nature"
were released from jail. Human rights activists, including
the prestigious Mexican Academy of Human Rights, allege that
the amnesty program distracts public attention from the
problems of political prisoners and the disappeared and is
really aimed at alleviating problems of overcrowding in
Mexican prisons, particularly as the Government activates its
new campaign against drug trafficking.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home,
or Correspondence
Article 16 of the Constitution provides for the privacy of
individuals. Although the Government generally does not
intrude on this right, and search warrants are required by
law, peasants and urban squatters involved in conflicts over
land titles have charged that local landowners, accompanied by
police, have entered their homes without appropriate judicial
orders and sometimes have resorted to violence.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and of the press are provided for by the
Constitution. The current administration has tolerated much
direct public criticism, particularly in the print media.
Mexico's press is also a primary source for reporting
allegations of human rights violations. However, the State's
role as sole supplier of newsprint in Mexico has long given
rise to charges that the Government uses this control to
pressure editors into quashing unfavorable reports, with some
journalists avoiding confrontation by self-censorship.
President Salinas acknowledged the problem and, on October 9,
announced his intention to privatize the supply of newsprint.
Opposition political parties have often charged that Mexico's
two principal television networks, one government owned and
the other privately owned but allegedly partial to the
Government, accord PRI candidates unfair advantage in coverage
of their campaigns. Article 52 of the revised Federal
Electoral Code does provide opposition parties with 15 minutes
per month of television time and additional time during an
electoral campaign. However, the opposition asserts that
PRI's advantage derives from its status as Mexico's "official"
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party, with party activities (including campaign events)
covered as if they constituted national news.
In sharp contrast with 1988, no Mexican journalists are known
to have died violently or under suspicious circumstances in
1989. However, press reports indicate that a reporter for El
Sol Veracruzano was abducted in Mexico City in early January,
and as many as nine press photographers were assaulted over
the course of the year.
In a major development, the murder of Excelsior journalist
Manuel Buendia Tellezgiron was purportedly solved after a
5-year investigation, with sometime police agent Juan Rafael
Moro Avila accused of the crime. Moro, in turn, blamed former
policeman Jose Luis Ochoa Alonso for the murder, averring that
he only arrived at the scene after Buendia was hit; Ochoa
himself was later murdered. Moro further alleged that Jose
Antonio Zorilla Perez, a former chief of the now defunct
Federal Security Directorate (Secretariat of Government), was
the "intellectual author" of the crime. In addition, several
cases pending from 1988 have apparently been solved, including
the murders of Tijuana investigative reporter Felix Miranda
and Mazatlan journalist Manuel Burgueno. No suspects have as
yet been identified in the shooting of Ciudad Juarez
television personality Linda Bejarano.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution grants the right of peaceful assembly for any
lawful purpose. A government permit is generally required for
major demonstrations, and the Government, with few exceptions,
permits demonstrations by a broad range of political groups.
Within the Federal District, opposition political groups as
well as peasant and indigenous organizations are allowed
frequent access to both main boulevards and the city's large
central square for demonstrations. In rare instances,
unauthorized marches, sit-ins, and other forms of protest are
broken up forcibly by police and security forces, especially
outside the capital.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution permits individuals to practice the religion
of their choice. However, no religious body is granted legal
standing, and the clergy is barred from participating in
politics, voting, owning real estate, or wearing religious
garb in public. Some of these prohibitions are not strictly
enforced, nor is a constitutional restriction against
preuniversity religious schools, many of which exist.
Mexico is predominantly Roman Catholic, though Protestant,
Mormon, Jewish, and other religious communities also exist and
enjoy freedom of worship. Protestant Evangelists and Mormons,
principally foreign-supported groups, are active and
especially successful in certain rural, largely indigenous
communities. Some critics have stated that the Government
finds these foreign groups threatening and, therefore,
selectively enforces anticlerical laws in favor of the
predominant Roman Catholic Church. Other critics assert the
opposite; that the laws are not enforced against the
Evangelists in order to reduce the influence of the Catholic
Church.
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A rapprochement of sorts between church and state began under
the previous presidential administration of Miguel de la
Madrid. Incoming President Salinas de Gortari has taken the
rapprochement several steps further, inviting leading clerics
(including the Apostolic Delegate) to his December 1, 1988,
inauguration and holding public meetings with them (including
briefings by Cabinet members on the status of foreign debt
negotiations) .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement within and outside the country is
unrestricted. Mexico has traditionally followed a liberal
asylum policy concerning Central American refugees and asylum
seekers from other countries--even though the Constitution
does not provide for their recognition, nor do laws exist
which govern their entry into and residence in Mexico. The
Government has usually admitted persons whom the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recognizes as
refugees. Over 41,000 Guatemalan refugees reside in camps and
resettlement centers in southern Mexico. According to the
UNHCR, an additional 150,000 Guatemalans reside illegally in
Mexico, mostly in the state of Chiapas, though large numbers
also reside in Mexico City and other urban areas.
Undocumented Guatemalans lead a precarious existence because
they are subject to deportation if caught, and they also can
be subjected to exploitation by private Mexicans as a source
of cheap labor.
Until quite recently, Guatemalan refugees in the southern
border states have been restricted in their movements and in
opportunities for legal work in order to avoid friction with
local residents and to discourage permanent resettlement in
the area. Under this same policy, refugee children born in
Mexico were not recorded or issued birth certificates, and
could not claim Mexican citizenship. These restrictions have
since been relaxed, according to UNHCR and government
officials, with refugees now able to seek some work outside of
the camps and children now being registered. Government
policy has been to encourage the voluntary repatriation of
individuals and groups of refugees, with assurances that their
personal safety and security would be respected.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change their Government
Since 1929, Mexico's Government has been controlled by the
PRI , which has won every presidential race since then and
every gubernatorial race, save for the 1989 Baja California
Norte contest. To secure its continuance in power, the PRI
has over the years relied on extensive public patronage,
massive government and party organizational resources and,
according to opposition parties as well as independent outside
observers, extensive electoral fraud.
Following Federal elections in 1988, a total of six parties
gained representation in the Chamber of Deputies and two in
the Senate--the latter a first in Mexican political history.
The President and senators are elected for 6-year terms;
deputies for 3-year terms. The combined opposition won an
unprecedented 237 seats out of total of 500 in the lower house
of Congress and 4 of 64 in the upper. Though in a minority,
the opposition made its weight felt on at least one occasion
during the year, compelling the Government to revise its
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foreign investment law by regulation instead of by legislation.
Charges of electoral fraud were heard frequently and
vociferously throughout the last presidential contest and in
several follow-on state elections, notably elections in July
1989 for the state legislature of Michoacan. Most observers
acknowledge that fraud occurs in Mexican elections,
particularly in outlying, rural areas, and less so in urban
areas, where a more politically active and perceptive
electorate exists; they also recognize, however, that most
recent elections have been somewhat more honest those of the
past. The Government has consistently defended the ruling
party's victories and has specifically denied allegations of
fraud, while admitting that the electoral system is an
imperfect one which could and should be improved.
The PRI has, during 1989, pursued efforts to improve its
method of choosing candidates for public office. A number of
PRI state committees have experimented with limited nominating
primaries or conventions.
In municipal elections held through December 1989, the
Government recognized several opposition victories by both
leftist and conservative parties. In the state of Michoacan,
for example, the center-left Party of Democratic Revolution
won almost half of the state's municipalities, including the
state's capital and most populous city, Morelia. In other
regions, the Federal Government also recognized many
opposition victories, but, in at least one case in the state
of Sinaloa, only after occasionally violent protest activity
by political activists from both sides. On the whole, the
Government's ability to insure fair electoral practices at the
local level remained flawed but improving.
The Government has sponsored, largely at opposition behest, a
series of debates in the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal
Electoral Commission on reform of the Constitution and the
Federal Electoral Code. During the week of October 16, the
Chamber of Deputies approved amendments providing for newly
initiated electoral bodies to review election results, the
opening of all sessions of electoral bodies to the public, and
the establishment of a minimum 35 percent of the vote for any
one party to claim a majority of seats in the Chamber of
Deputies. Although the leftist opposition criticized the
changes as "cosmetic," the conservative opposition viewed the
amendments as steps, albeit small ones, toward a more
evenhanded political system.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government permits both domestic and international human
rights groups to operate in Mexico without restrictions or
harassment, and has pledged its full cooperation with efforts
by Amnesty International (AI) to monitor human rights
violations in Mexico. Various ranking Mexican officials
(including the Secretariat of Government's new Director
General for Human Rights and Refugee Affairs, appointed in
December 1988) met with AI representatives, domestic human
rights activists, and UNHRC officials to discuss human rights
problems. The Director General serves as an ombudsman to both
domestic and foreign human rights and refugee groups, as well
as to Mexico's state governors and judicial system officials.
He has no independent authority, save for that which derives
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from the political power of the Secretary of Government.
There are three well-known human rights organizations in
Mexico. The first of these, the Mexican Academy of Human
Rights, is composed of leading political and academic figures;
it serves primarily as an information clearinghouse on human
rights abuses in Mexico, although some limited guidance is, on
occasion, provided to individuals. The National Front Against
Repression (FNCR) and the Committee in Defense of Prisoners,
the Persecuted, Disappeared, and Political Exiles of Mexico
both take highly public stances on individual human rights
cases, as well as the larger issues of political prisoners and
the disappeared.
In its report covering events in 1988, AI again expressed
concern about reports of political killings, arbitrary arrest
of political opponents, the use in evidence of confessions
obtained under duress, continuing rural violence, and
torture. AI also voiced concern about disappearances in
previous years which have never been satisfactorily clarified
by the Government; 52 disappearances occurring between 1972
and 1983 are reportedly being investigated by AI .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status.
Mexico takes pride in its Spanish and Indian origins and in
the success the country has achieved in fostering a climate of
racial harmony. Indigenous groups, many of which do not speak
Spanish, are encouraged to participate in political life and
the Government is respectful of the desire of these groups to
retain elements of their traditional lifestyle. These groups,
however, remain largely outside the country's political and
economic mainstream, a result not of restrictive governmental
policy but rather of longstanding patterns of economic and
social development.
Religious discrimination is generally nonexistent except for
sanctions contained in the constitution denying any religious
institution legal standing, and barring clergy of any
denomination from participating in politics, voting, owning
real estate, or wearing religious garb in public.
Historically, women in Mexico have played a subordinate role,
economically, politically, and socially. However, women are
becoming increasingly active both in the economy and
politically. Legally, women are equal to men. They have the
right to file for separation and divorce and to own property
in their own name. The Constitution provides for equal pay
for equal work and for maternity leave, violence against
women, including wife beating, is not infrequent, but there
are no reliable statistics on the extent to which it occurs.
Domestic assault is a crime, but in practice, due to social
tradition, women are often reluctant to file reports of abuse
or to press charges, and police are reluctant to intervene in
what is often considered a domestic affair. Violence against
women was not widely discussed as an issue of public policy
during 1989 though the number of women's action groups is
increasing, and they have begun to offer expanded counseling
and legal services for victims of sexual crimes.
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Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Article 123 of the Constitution provides workers and employers
the right to form unions and professional associations of
their own choosing. Registration requirements are not
onerous, and unions must register with the Labor Secretariat.
These rights are widely exercised in Mexico where a fairly
diverse trade union movement exists. Close to 35 percent of
the Mexican work force--now estimated at 26 million--is
organized into trade union confederations and independent
unions. There are no limitations on union organizing among
civil servants, a sector that is highly unionized in Mexico.
The Government does not formally control Mexican trade unions,
but the vast majority, some 85 to 90 percent, are affiliated
with the PRI. The remainder are independent or support
opposition parties, including those of a leftist or Marxist
orientation. In 1989 the Government went outside of the
judicial process on at least two occasions to take action that
affected the integrity of union structures. In May, after an
illegal strike by bus drivers in Mexico City, the Government
withdrew recognition of the union, fired the workers, and
announced plans to restructure the bus company. The
Government subsequently reinstated the workers and imposed
terms for their continued employment. In August the
Government declared the state-owned copper mine, CANANEA,
bankrupt, effectively breaking the union at that plant.
Mexican law grants workers the right to strike. Strikes are
relatively infrequent, however, usually occurring when
collective bargaining impasses arise or when plant closures or
layoffs are threatened. Wildcat strikes also occur. The
Federal Labor Law of 1931, as amended in 1971, sets forth
lengthy and somewhat cumbersome procedures for calling a legal
strike. Notice of intent to strike must be filed 6 to 10 days
in advance, and efforts at conciliation, mediation, and
arbitration between the parties in dispute are required.
Local, state, and Federal tripartite conciliation and
arbitration boards — composed of labor, employer, and
government representatives — conduct these negotiations. The
labor law also stipulates that strikes are a measure of "last
resort." Article 123 grants public sector workers the right
to strike under specific conditions set by the labor law.
Several highly publicized illegal strikes occurred in 1989.
As noted above, Mexico city bus workers walked out briefly in
May. Earlier, dissident members of the 1.2 million member
teachers union SNTE went on strike from April 17 to May 12,
effectively shutting elementary and secondary schools in the
Federal District and several states, especially in the south.
The teachers' principal demands included the ouster of
longtime union chieftain (and "moral guide for life") Carlos
Jongitud Barrios, a 100-percent wage increase, and internal
union democratization. The strike ended after Jongitud
resigned (on orders from President Salinas) and the Government
conceded a 25-percent wage increase. Additional work
stoppages have followed, mostly over democratization issues.
In August dissident workers at the parastatal SICARTSA steel
mill in Lazaro Cardenas, Michoacan initiated a wildcat strike
in demand of a 60-percent wage increase; the strike remained
in effect at year's end.
Only one legal strike of any significance took place in 1989.
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A strike in August closed 15 export processing zone factories
in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state. Local rivalries between the
dominant labor confederation and an independent union prompted
the walkout, which lasted 3 weeks. Following state government
intervention, the rivals reached an agreement permitting
independent unions to continue to operate if they paid dues to
the confederation.
Mexican unions may freely form federations or associations and
belong to international organizations. The largest of these
federations, the 5-million strong Confederation of Mexican
Workers (CTM) , is also the most powerful. The second largest
is the Federation of Government Employees (FSTSE) , with
slightly less than 2 million members. There are also other,
smaller PRI-af filiated confederations. Nearly 8 out of 9
million organized workers are affiliated with PRI-af filiated
labor organizations. All PRI-af filiated trade union
confederations, and a number of independent unions (totaling
33 in all) are members of the Congress of Labor (CT), which
provides overall coordination to the movement. Occasionally,
both the CTM and CT take issue with the Government over
official wage and economic policies, but open dissent is
rare. Though diminished somewhat of late (with several
notable union leaders failing at the polls), the practice of
placing a significant contingent of union officers in
high-ranking government positions, such as that of Federal
senator or deputy for the PRI, continues. This symbiotic
relationship tends to limit their freedom of action.
The CTM is affiliated with the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions and the latter "s Inter-American Regional
Organization. One of the smaller independent unions belongs
to the Latin American Confederation of Workers. The
Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions has one
minor Mexican affiliate.
In its 1989 report, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Committee of Experts repeated its observation that several
provisions of the 1963 Federal Act on State Employees do not
conform with Convention 87 on Freedom of Association,
including the prohibition of two or more unions in the same
state body, the prohibition against employees in the service
of the State from leaving the union, the prohibition of public
sector unions joining union organizations of workers or
peasants, and the extension of restrictions applicable to
trade unions to public sector unions. The Committee asked
that the Government make appropriate changes in the
legislation .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Both the right to organize and to bargain collectively are
provided for by labor law, and are generally respected in
practice. There appear to be few, if any, restraints on union
organizing. Collective bargaining is widespread, particularly
in industry and commerce. The aforementioned tripartite
boards of conciliation and arbitration promote voluntary
worker-employer negotiations. The boards have additional,
statutory responsibilities, such as registering collective
bargaining agreements reached between labor and management.
Workers are protected against antiunion discrimination. Labor
laws encourage unionization though there are no legal
requirements for unionization in any industry or branch of
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commerce. Although government workers are almost fully
unionized, collective bargaining in the government sector is
much less common since bargaining does not cover wages, but is
limited to certain working conditions. The right to organize
and bargain collectively is respected in the in-bond or
maquila zones, although workers in some 80 to 90 percent of
the firms do not belong to unions. One reason, perhaps, is
that in general the nonunion maquila firms provide benefits
and working conditions that match or exceed those covered by
union contracts.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Mexico is a signatory to ILO conventions regarding the
prohibition of forced labor. Such practices are also
prohibited by Mexican law. There have been no reports for
many years of forced labor in Mexico.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The law sets the minimum age for employment at 14 years.
Children over 14 years but under 16 years may work a maximum
of 6 hours per day and are provided additional legal
protection. They cannot be employed in certain hazardous
jobs. Child labor laws are observed fairly strictly in large
and medium-sized manufacturing and commercial establishments.
This is less true in small shops and factories, and many
street vendors are children. Enforcement of child labor laws
is the responsibility of the Labor Secretariat and local,
state, and Federal boards of conciliation and arbitration.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Constitution provides for a minimum wage for for workers,
with variations for geographic zones and professional
specializations. The National Minimum Wage Commission
--another tripartite body--sets the minimum rate of pay,
approving periodic increases. Since late 1987, successive
tripartite economic pacts have restricted the frequency of
wage increases. In June 1989, the Government announced a
6-percent increase, bringing the minimum daily wage in Mexico
City (the highest of the three geographic zones) to
approximately $3.50. The next adjustment is expected in
January 1990.
Inflation and frequent devaluations have significantly eroded
the peso's purchasing power, with the average worker suffering
a 50-percent decline in real wages since 1982. Although
inflation in 1989 appeared to be under control, the current
minimum wage provides for a barely acceptable standard of
living for the substantial number of workers who receive it.
With additional contract benefits, organized workers enjoy a
somewhat better standard of living than the unorganized.
The maximum legal workweek is 48 hours. In recent years, the
average workweek has declined considerably, to a level of 42
to 43 hours. The CTM and other Mexican unions are currently
campaigning for legislation to reduce the legal maximum from
48 to 40 hours. Current tripartite negotiations have featured
this issue. In practice, however, many Mexicans work at more
than one job and easily exceed the average 42 to 43 hours per
week. The Constitution provides for required rest periods,
stipulating that no worker may work more than 3 hours of
overtime per day nor work overtime more than 3 consecutive
days, with overtime pay calculated accordingly. Anecdotal
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evidence suggests that workers frequently exceed these norms.
With respect to occupational health and safety, legislation is
relatively advanced and provides substantial protection.
Health and safety standards are better observed in large
firms. There appears to be a higher incidence of industrial
accidents in smaller firms and on construction sites. This
does not reflect inadequate legislation, but rather a lack of
sufficient inspection personnel to adequately monitor health
and safety regulations. Mexican labor law requires the
formation of mixed commissions of government, labor, and
workers to oversee security and hygiene; it also sets
conditions for compensation due to work related illness or
injury.
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The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) , a one-party
Communist dictatorship, has ruled Nicaragua since a broad
opposition coalition toppled the Somoza dictatorship in 1979.
The FSLN has ignored its 1979 commitment to the Organization
of American States (OAS) to install and foster a genuinely
democratic system of government. In 1987 a new Constitution
institutionalized Sandinista control over the country's
national security apparatus (army and state security) and over
the national economy. Both an internal civic opposition and
an armed resistance movement (RN) have long challenged the
legitimacy of FSLN rule in Nicaragua.
The Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) and the Ministry of Interior
(MINT), in addition to their normal military and police
structures, maintain an extensive and repressive internal
security apparatus. Using Warsaw Pact and Cuban instructors,
they have developed a tight internal control system which
engages in surveillance and infiltration of the legal
political opposition, and which includes the "Committees for
the Defense of the Revolution," a system of neighborhood
informers based on the Cuban model to monitor and control the
population. The EPS and the MINT are under the direct control
of the Sandinista party.
Although the economy is technically "mixed", the Sandinista
leadership has made it clear that the State and the economy
are unalterably Socialist. The Government exercises
regulatory authority over much of the economy, is openly
hostile to private initiative, and has expropriated private
property for political as well as economic reasons. Dissident
political expression is often punished by the withholding of
food ration cards and other economic punishments.
Under pressure, at a series of Central American summits and in
meetings with the internal opposition, the FSLN in 1989
committed itself to take actions which could have an important
impact on the human rights situation: to move up national
elections from February 1991 to February 1990; to allow
political parties and the media to operate with greater
freedom; to grant amnesty to political prisoners; to suspend
the military draft during the electoral period; to repeal or
amend certain draconian laws of public order; and to refrain
from confiscation of private property for political purposes.
However, there is serious doubt about Sandinista intentions to
conduct a free and fair election and to relinquish power if
they lose. The political opposition and independent media
operated somewhat more freely than in 1988.
Because of serious continuing abuses, the general human rights
situation in Nicaragua remained poor in 1989. Political and
extrajudicial killings are still being reported, the political
opposition still suffers considerable harassment and
intimidation, the Government continues to hold political
prisoners, and the writ of the security forces still runs deep
and wide. While the Sandinistas have allowed the political
opposition and independent media to operate with more formal
freedoms as elections approach, Nicaragua remains a one-party
State. Whether this new "political space" was simply a
tactical move by the Sandinistas and will not last beyond the
internationally monitored February 1990 election was a major
human rights concern at year's end.
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RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were reliable reports of political and extrajudicial
killings throughout 1989. The human rights organization
Americas Watch (AW) reported a "pattern of summary executions
by government forces." Amnesty International (AI), in an
October 6, 1989, update on the human rights situation in
Nicaragua, reported that it "has continued to receive reports
of cases of apparent summary execution of noncombatants in war
zones during 1989 from both domestic and international human
rights organizations." AI stated that, while it had not yet
had the opportunity to verify such cases independently or
interview surviving family members, it nevertheless "noted
that several cases have been documented independently by more,
than one source." The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (lAHCR), in a 1989 report, also reported "complaints"
of extrajudicial killings "chargeable" to government forces.
Precise numbers of those summarily killed by government forces
remain elusive. AW reported 51 killings attributable to the
Sandinistas between March 1988 and June 1989. AI reported 56
killings in its October 1989 update, but some of these predate
1988 and 1989. Another reliable human rights organization
reported government forces summarily executed 9 RN members and
13 peasants in 1989. On December 10 in the rural town of
Masatepe a United Opposition Union (UNO) political rally was
attacked by Sandinista thugs. The ensuing melee resulted in
one person being stabbed to death with a machete, while
numerous other persons were injured.
It is clear that government security forces continued to carry
out extrajudicial killings of Nicaraguan citizens. While
specific cases are more readily available for 1988 and
earlier, reliable observers reported the continuation of this
pattern of abuse in 1989. For example, AI reported that
Sandinista soldiers from the Los Millones army base killed
five children and one adult who were celebrating a birthday
party in Comarca los Pases, Chontales, on January 28, 1989.
In another case, the EPS killed a Roman Catholic lay preacher
from Matiguas, Matagalpa, on January 27, 1989. Carmelo
Mairena Rosales, a farmer from the area of Rio Blanco,
Matagalpa, was taken from his home on December 24, 1988, and
removed to a state security facility in nearby Matiguas. His
dismembered body was found on December 27. No one has been
charged with this murder. RN members reported that the EPS
captured an RN commander, "Toro," and seven of his men on
October 3, 1989, and executed them the next day. The bodies
were not recovered.
Most extrajudicial killings attributable to the Government
take place in the isolated and rugged areas of central
Nicaragua, long areas of sympathy and support for the armed
resistance. The killings seem designed to cow the local
population; residents in these areas have long reported a
climate of fear and intimidation, based on the apparent
willingness of local Army and MINT forces to kill suspected
resistance sympathizers.
In response to charges of such abuse, the Government took
action against 13 EPS soldiers for the murders of 7
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civilians. Nine of these soldiers were convicted, and
reportedly are serving prison terms of from 6 to 30 years.
Two soldiers were in the trial process, and two others were
being sought by authorities at year's end. Both AI and AW
claim that the Government has not been consistent in
investigating cases and prosecuting suspects.
The RN has also been accused of engaging in summary
executions, usually of suspected informers or Sandinista
spies. Between March 1988 and April 1989 the organization
Witness for Peace charged that the RN carried out 20 killings
of noncombatants in Nicaragua. Although RN leaders denied
most of these allegations, they accepted some as valid and
prosecuted many of those involved. RN commander Isaac Blacker
Hurtado, alias "Israelita," was found guilty of the
premeditated murder of an alleged Sandinista agent in August
1989. Blacker was tried by an RN tribunal created to judge
cases involving RN members in serious crimes. Five other RN
members were given lengthy sentences for carrying out a
torture-murder .
b. Disappearance
Reports of disappearances generally involve persons initially
detained by the EPS or state security forces on charges of
draft evasion or collaborating with the RN. EPS military
recruitment practices include late evening roundups of young
males at schools, movie theaters and other public sites, and
at military check points where "recruiters" halt vehicles and
remove draft-age men. Those so detained are usually not given
an opportunity to notify their families, and relatives must
search in military installations throughout the country to
determine if the missing person has been conscripted or has in
fact disappeared. Some who resist conscription have
disappeared permanently.
The Government and private human rights monitoring
organizations have charged the RN with kidnaping peasants for
conscription and taking them into Honduras. An independent
human rights organization reported 18 cases of kidnapings by
the RN from January to August 1989. The RN says that many of
these persons claimed as missing have in fact volunteered for
service with the Resistance. The RN released 104 Sandinista
military and Nicaraguan civilians from its holding areas in
Honduras on December 29, 1988. Forty-four of the released
prisoners returned to Nicaragua, while 60 decided to remain in
Honduras as refugees.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Nicaragua's three types of prisons include State Security
(DGSE) facilities, national penitentiary prisons, and open
farms. The majority of Nicaragua's prisoners are held in the
first two systems, and most human rights abuses occur there.
Interrogation of detainees is usually conducted in DGSE
detention facilities. During interrogation detainees have
been subjected to various forms of physical and psychological
torture, including food and water deprivation, mock
executions, and beatings. The nongovernmental Permanent Human
Rights Commission (CPDH) reports that physical torture is more
commonly used against peasants, while psychological methods
are utilized against members of civic, political, and labor
organisations. Death threats against prisoners and their
families are also common. The systematic use of these
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interrogation techniques by the DGSE reflects a deliberate
policy which targets political prisoners in DGSE prisons or
its secret jails.
AI representatives visited the Las Tejas DGSE detention center
in Matagalpa in March 1989. The center was temporarily empty,
but the visitors noticed several closet-like cells, which the
MINT claimed were no longer in use. Subsequent interviews
with prisoners in the national penitentiary system prison in
Juigalpa, however, revealed that such cells were still being
used to force prisoners to cooperate with their captors. The
cells are less than a square meter in size; the prisoner
cannot move his arms and legs. AI added that "the cells have
no openings for light or air and are pitch-dark." Bringing
the use of these cells to the attention of the MINT, AI
reminded the MINT that it had previously claimed it no longer
used such cells or such interrogation methods. In June 1989
AI reported that it had received a communication from the MINT
claiming that the MINT had converted the cells into closet
spaces .
AI further reported that prisoners who participated in a
hunger strike in February 1989 at the Modelo jail in Tipitapa
were taken to the El Chipote interrogation center and were
systematically physically abused — held handcuffed and naked,
deprived of water, and several were beaten. This treatment
went on for a number of days. AI stated that 13 of the hunger
strikers were reported to have been severely beaten, and that
one of them, Rosenda Rugama Guadamuz, was beaten into
unconsciousness and removed to the prison infirmary.
Three prisoners, former National Guardsmen Silvio Mayorga,
Miguel Cordero, and Guadalupe Pineda, have allegedly been so
severely mistreated during their 10 years of imprisonment that
a judge in Managua's Fourth Criminal Court ordered them
released. The release order was ignored by the director of
the national penitentiary system, and the same judge who
ordered the release subsequently annulled it. Silvio
Mayorga 's condition worsened to the point where he was finally
placed in a civilian hospital in September 1989.
Several of the almost 1,900 former National Guardsmen who were
freed after a 10-year imprisonment on March 17 reported brutal
treatment during their incarceration, including sexual
torture, beatings, poor sanitary conditions, denial of niedical
care, and rations of spoiled food. Other former National
Guardsmen still in prison (39 remain jailed) also report
systematic mistreatment which they claim has continued through
1989.
As reported in the Sandinista media, some of the 44 former
prisoners of the RN who returned to Nicaragua in early 1989
alleged they were tortured and generally abused while in
resistance prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution provides that a detainee must be brought
before a competent legal authority within 72 hours of arrest;
this provision is often ignored, and suspects have been held
for m.onths without charges or access to counsel. Short-term
arrest and interrogation appear to be an integral part of the
Government's counterinsurgency tactic of harassing and
intimidating suspected RN supporters, especially in isolated
areas of the countryside. Such suspects are generally picked '
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up at night by the DGSE and normally held until they agree to
confess or implicate others in counterrevolutionary
activities. Persons suspected of views critical of the
Government are often detained and charged with common crimes.
The CPDH has reported that in some areas peasants have been
charged with "counterrevolutionary activities" if they refuse
to join Sandinista mass organizations.
The Government arbitrarily detained hundreds of peasants in
1989 during large-scale roundups of suspected RN supporters in
the departments of Chontales, Matagalpa, and Jinotega. Entire
families were detained for days in primitive jail facilities
for allegedly giving food and assistance to RN forces. Former
National Guardsmen residing in Nicaragua have reported
widespread abuse and arbitrary arrest. The leaders of this
group have been picked up by DGSE agents and threatened with
rearrest or even death if they did not cease their organizing
work in the ex-prisoners association or if they did not become
DGSE informers. Members of the private sector Cattleman's
Association, most of whom are reportedly in favor of the
political opposition, claim they were arrested on fabricated
charges of aiding the RN.
The Government in past years used the Law for Maintenance of
Order and Public Security, a vague instrument which
criminalized a wide range of antigovernment activities, to
charge and sentence many Nicaraguans for political and
"counterrevolutionary" activities. As part of an agreement
reached with the political opposition on August 4, 1989,
concerning electoral conditions, the Government repealed this
law in October.
Also as part of the August 4 agreement, the Sandinista
Government reformed certain aspects of the Law of Juridical
Functions of the Sandinista Police on October 10, 1989. The
reform of this law technically eliminates the authority of the
Sandinista Police to imprison persons, restoring this
authority to the judicial branch of government. The reformed
law also requires that a written warrant be used for arrest,
except in cases of flagrant crimes. The reformed law
nevertheless continues to allow police detention for up to 9
days (essentially the same as the previous law), but the
police must now take into account any evidence provided by a
defense attorney. The new version, however, apparently
eliminates the previous broad discretionary right of the
police to imprison persons, on their own authority, for up to
2 years. The reformed law still contains articles that could
permit abuses. For example, it authorizes police arrests
based on "written orders from other organisms", probably a
reference to the MINT'S State Security branch (DGSE) and, in
some cases, military authorities. By year's end, it was not
yet clear if the reformed law will, in practice, substantially
reduce arbitrary detentions.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Anti-Somocista Popular Tribunals, basically nonprofessional
political courts, were abolished in January 1988.
Nevertheless, many of the untrained judges of these Tribunals
have been moved into the regular court system. The influx of
these often poorly-prepared jurists has politicized the
regular court system to a greater extent than previously was
the case. Three Supreme Court Justices resigned in December
1987, charging that the Executive Branch showed no respect for
the court and its decisions.
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The majority of Nicaragua's political prisoners were tried and
convicted by the Anti-Somocista Popular Tribunals. Despite
the abolition of these Tribunals, their cases have not been
reviewed. Nevertheless, the Government pardoned 1,783 former
National Guardsmen and 72 other prisoners in March 1989.
Thirty-nine Guardsmen were not pardoned because the Government
claimed they were too dangerous to release and were guilty of
especially vicious crimes; the 39 responded that they were
still being held because of their refusal to submit to
"reeducation." A number of human rights organizations charged
that the decision not to release the 39 was politically
motivated. In addition, there was criticism that, in choosing
which of the Guardsmen it would release, the Government had
not followed the criteria for release set forth in an lACHR
report on the prisoners. This report resulted from the 1988
Sapoa negotiations between the Nicaraguan Government and the
RN, in which it was agreed that there would be a release of
former National Guardsmen on the basis of an lACHR
investigation and recommendation. The lACHR report, however,
has never been made public, reportedly at the insistence of
the Sandinista Government. In its annual report, the lACHR
said, "by denying a pardon to the 39 persons, the Government
of Nicaragua continues to be in violation of the provisions of
the American Convention on Human Rights."
In a few instances, the judicial system or National Assembly
has released or pardoned criminals apart from a more general
amnesty. In April an appellate court freed three Nicaraguans
who were convicted in June 1988 for passing "secret" economic
data to the U.S. Embassy; the court ruled that the government
documents were not secret and that there was no law against
the distribution of government economic information. In a
separate case, the National Assembly pardoned three prisoners
who had been serving long-term sentences for espionage,
treason, or other activities against the State.
The August 1989 International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) semiannual census of political prisoners showed 1,268
"counterrevolutionaries" and the 39 former Guardsmen. The
ICRC count did not include, however, persons held in state
security interrogation and detention facilities. Since August
1988, the Sandinistas have released, according to their
statistics, some 1,358 peasants accused of counter
revolutionary activities. However, the charges against these
persons have not been dropped, nor their sentences pardoned;
they could be returned to custody at any time. Under
Nicaraguan law, the only institution that can grant
provisional liberty is the judicial branch, while the National
Assembly is the only institution that can legally pardon
prisoners. The Government in any case did not publish a list
of the peasants given provisional freedom nor make available
information on where they had previously been detained.
Consequently, it was extremely difficult for human rights
monitors to determine whether the prisoners released were
convicted "counterrevolutionaries" or detainees who had been
held without charge or trial.
The question of how many political prisoners the Government is
holding is a contentious one. The Government admits to
holding some 1,300 political prisoners. Some local human
rights organizations, such as the CPDH or the U.S. -funded
Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights (ANPDH) , believe the
number may be three or four times greater. AI and AW accept
as more likely a total figure closer to that provided by the
Government. The Government has stated that it would publish a
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master list of all prisoners it is holding for all crimes.
This would allow the Government's list to be crosschecked with
those of various human rights groups. The Government has yet
to publish its list, however, and until it does the total
number of prisoners held, political and common, will remain
unknown. The Government at year's end stated that it would
not release the remaining political prisoners until "concrete"
steps are taken to begin the process of demobilizing the RN.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
According to Article 26 of the Constitution, the Government
cannot violate the home, correspondence, or communication of
Nicaragua's citizens. By law, a private home may only be
searched with a warrant from a competent judge or another
expressly authorized official to prevent a crime from being
committed or to avoid injury to persons or goods. Despite
these restrictions, homes of civic opposition leaders have
been searched without a warrant. Unauthorized searches of
homes to locate -draft-age men have been common. In rural
areas, military and DGSE troops routinely search homes without
a warrant.
The Government also routinely monitors the telephones of
political, business, and labor leaders; it intercepts and
examines correspondence mailed both within the country and
from abroad. A wide network of DGSE informants monitors the
activities of persons suspected of anti-Sandinista attitudes
or behavior. In sum, putative national security needs have
largely overridden the Constitution on the inviolability of
the home and private communications.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Prior to the formal suspension of offensive operations in
March 1988, civilian casualties due to indiscriminate
artillery fire were common. As noted in the case of RN
commander "Toro" (see Section l.a.), the rights of prisoners
were not always respected. Both sides in the armed conflict
have been accused of killing prisoners. The Government
suspended its declared cease-fire on November 1, 1989. By
year's end, it was not yet clear if this action would
seriously impede the activities of humanitarian organizations
in conflictive areas. The RN, in several cases, suspended
officers who were tried and convicted of human rights
violations in the conduct of their field operations.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
While the state of emergency — which permitted broad
restrictions on freedom of speech and press — was lifted in
January 1988, the Provisional Law on Communications Media
remained in effect. This law grants the Media Directorate of
the MINT significant power over the press, including the power
to order suspensions. In May 1989, the Independent
Journalists Association filed a lawsuit against the Government
for its continued use of the Provisional Law on Communications
Media. The Sandinista-dominated Supreme Court decided in
favor of the Government, and the Independent Journalists
Association denounced the action before the lACHR.
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During the August 4 meeting with the internal opposition, the
Government agreed to reform the more onerous aspects of the
media law, especially those parts dealing with MINT control
over the media. The law was reformed in September 1989, but
the changes appeared to be minimal. The Supreme Electoral
Council (SEC), during the electoral period, will be "charged
with applying the media law and appropriate regulations in all
areas pertaining to the electoral law." This leaves the vast
majority of media affairs under the control of the MINT.
Regarding the new media law, the lACHR said in its annual
report that the law, "grants excessive and counterproductive
powers to the Ministry of the Interior," which it
characterized as a "political agency." The lACHR also
criticized the new law for maintaining a "government monopoly
on television."
Nicaragua's only daily opposition newspaper. La Prensa, and
independent radio stations have been outspoken throughout the
year in their criticism of the Government. Nevertheless, they
operate under continuing government pressure designed to
intimidate and restrict their freedom of expression. For
example, the Government continued its prohibition against any
government entity placing notices or advertisements in La
Prensa, which the Government accuses of being a spokesman for
the RN and the United States Government. In November 1989,
the independent Radio Catolica was the subject of a complaint
filed by a Sandinista radio station, charging Radio Catolica
with violating the electoral law by broadcasting partisan
political ads. The SEC warned the radio station not to do so
again; Radio Catolica rejoined by noting it is forced to carry
Sandinista propaganda and electoral activities whenever the
Government deems them "news" and forces all the media to carry
the items on nationwide networks.
While the situation of the media improved, compared to 1988,
the Government continued to engage in a pattern of censorship
and harassment. The MINT warned the director of the
independent radio station Radio Corporacion to modify the tone
of his commentaries. Three employees of Radio Corporacion
were threatened by State Security agents because of their
employment at a station opposed to the Government. The
Government also warned La Prensa in writing that its
editorials should show more respect for the leaders of the
revolution. Officials of Radio Catolica's news program were
also warned by the Government to be more cautious in
presenting information and to "project less violence" in the
station's news broadcasts. Other sources of intimidation of
the media include government control of supplies of newsprint,
a particular problem for La Prensa, and the arbitrary delay in
releasing equipment and spare parts for opposition media from
customs control, a problem encountered by Radio Corporacion.
Radio Catolica's news broadcasts resumed on March 20 after
being curtailed on July 11, 1988, following its coverage of
the Sandinista breakup of an opposition rally in Nandaime, but
the independent radio news broadcast "Cinco en Punto" (Five
O'clock Sharp) was suspended in January following its
transmittal of news on cuts in the Nicaraguan defense budget.
A foreign journalist from Freedom House was expelled in July
after being accused of spying. Sandinista authorities seized
500 copies of an exile newspaper, Nicaragua Hoy, at the
Managua airport in November, refusing to allow them into the
country.
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b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the rights of association,
assembly, and peaceful demonstrations. However, opposition
political rallies during the year often continued to be marred
by the presence of Sandinista-controlled mobs — the so-called
turbas. The turbas generally attempt to provoke violence, and
they often succeed. Opposition rallies throughout the country
in October and November 1989 witnessed rock-throwing incidents
and beatings. The Sandinista toughs usually attacked
stragglers arriving late to the rally or stoned those on the
fringes of it. The opposition has begun to register
complaints about these activities with the SEC and with
international observers, but the Sandinistas generally deflect
criticism of the actions of the turbas by claiming that they
are simply a spontaneous manifestation of the people's
enthusiasm. In two instances, turba attacks against
opposition rallies resulted in large-scale violence and
death. The press and observer organizations wrote extensively
about these incidents in Cofradia on December 3 and Masatepe
on December 10 . -
Citizens in the more isolated parts of the country have
reported being directly threatened with physical harm if they
attend opposition rallies. Workers have been threatened with
losing their jobs if they attend opposition events. Such an
incident happened in the town of Nandaime prior to a rally on
November 19. Several U.S. Congressmen were shown threatening
letters left at the doorsteps of the citizens of Muelle de los
Bueyes, Chontales, the night before a November 12 opposition
rally. The departments of Matagalpa, Jinotega, and Chontales
have witnessed significant Sandinista harassment of those
wishing to attend opposition events. In general, the more
isolated the area, the more direct have been the threats. A
UNO rally in Masatepe on December 10 was disrupted by
Sandinista thugs; one UNO supporter was mortally wounded in an
assault attributed to the thugs by electoral observers of the
bipartisan, U.S. -based Center for Democracy.
For much of 1989 legal assembly was impeded by the
Government's requirement that all outdoor demonstrations
receive prior approval from police authorities. Many rallies
were effectively crippled by the withholding of government
permission until the last moment. Publicity for the rallies
was prohibited until such permission was obtained. Commencing
in September 1989, however, prior permission was no longer
needed for political rallies that form part of the electoral
campaign. The opposition was able to plan and carry out
outdoor rallies without such prior permission.
The Government sent a circular note to all diplomatic missions
in Managua in June stating, in part, that foreign diplomats
were not permitted to observe political rallies or meetings.
Members of Managua's diplomatic community were privately
informed by the Government that the ban applied only to U.S.
diplomats. On July 31, four U.S. Congressmen were ordered by
MINT officials to leave the city of Diriamba, where they had
been invited by an opposition party to attend an outdoor
rally. The Congressional delegation was escorted out of town
by MINT officials, who told the Congressmen that their safety
could not be guaranteed.
A number of private and professional organizations exist in
Nicaragua. Their members are able to meet and to maintain
contact with their foreign counterparts. Several of these
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private organizations, however, have been the focus of verbal
attacks by FSLN officials and by the Sandinista press. The
Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP) , for example,
has been described by the Government as an agent acting
against Nicaragua. The private civic organization, Via
Civica, which has been active in encouraging voter
registration and education in connection with the February
elections and which receives funding from the U.S. National
Endowment for Democracy, was the subject of harsh attacks in
the pro-Sandinista daily El Nuevo Diario.
The Government continued its policy of confiscating the
property of its private sector critics. In June 1989, the
farms of three leading coffee growers, who were also COSEP or
coffee growers' association leaders, were confiscated
following their criticism given during a meeting of the coffee
association in the town of Matagalpa of Government economic
policies. The three were charged with "discouraging
production" and fomenting anarchy and social chaos during a
period of economic crisis.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
organized labor, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for the free exercise of religion.
Nicaragua is 85 percent Roman Catholic; the rest of the
population belongs to a variety of Protestant denominations or
professes no faith. There are no direct restrictions on
religious activity or association, but the regime has a
generally hostile attitude toward the Catholic Church, which
it views as a rival to its control over Nicaraguan society.
The Government's relations with the leader of the Catholic
Church in Nicaragua, Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, continued
to be hostile during 1989. Sandinista-controlled women's
groups conducted weekly protests for much of the year
demanding that the Cardinal intercede on behalf of relatives
allegedly held prisoner by the RN, and the Sandanista-
controlled press printed occasional articles clearly designed
to undermine the position of the Church and its leaders. On
the other hand, the Government permitted the former leader of
the Church's social action program, COPROSA, to return to
Nicaragua in order to resurrect the program, and President
Ortega announced in March that 10 foreign priests expelled in
1984 could return to Nicaragua. The Government did not return
to the Church COPROSA 's vehicles and equipment, which it
confiscated when it shut the program down in 1985.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government imposes restrictions on foreign travel through
the use of exit visa requirements. The Government limits some
opposition figures to single-exit visas; it also often denies
exit visas to young men of draft age or to professionals with
skills needed by the State. Exiles returning to Nicaragua are
required to sign a document upon arrival declaring that they
renounce any ties with the RN. There were no reports of
refugees being forcibly expelled from Nicaragua in 1989.
Several prominent figures who have in the past been associated
with the RN voluntarily returned from self-proclaimed exile;
they reportedly encountered no special harassment.
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Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Constitution states that "political pluralism assures the
existence of participation of all political organizations in
the economic, political, and social affairs of the country,
without ideological restrictions except for those which seek a
return to the past or advocate the establishment of a similar
political system." While a wide variety of political parties,
ranging from Communist to conservative, have legal status, the
right of citizens to peacefully change their government has
not yet been tested in Nicaragua.
The Marxist-Leninist Sandinista Party, more than the formal
institutions of government, is the de facto ruler of
Nicaragua. Its nine-man Directorate makes all the essential
decisions of state, which are subsequently endorsed by the
various ministries and the 103-member National Assembly. The
powerful EPS and MINT are for all practical purposes
instruments of the Sandinista Party and are used to ensure its
monopoly of power. This symbiotic relationship between the
party and the State throws into serious question the right of
citizens to change their Government. "Bourgeois" formalisms,
such as free elections, are not central to the Sandinista
political philosophy. Thus, while recognizing that the
Sandinista Government has in fact taken many steps to
establish the formal mechanisms for free elections, their
commitment to holding free and fair elections in 1990, with
the possibility of a real turnover of power to an elected
opposition, continued to be viewed with skepticism by many
observers.
The October voter registration process for the elections was,
for the most part, orderly, but opposition figures complained
that registration was somtimes obstructed by the Government in
rural areas, where the opposition anticipate support, and said
their observers did not always receive their credentials
promptly.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government states that it welcomes international scrutiny
of its human rights record, but has shown itself to be
sensitive to attempts to probe too deeply into its human
rights practices. It continued during 1989 to attack
independent Nicaraguan human rights groups. The
Government-sanctioned human rights group focused virtually all
of its attention during the year on alleged human rights
abuses by the RN.
International human rights groups made visits during 1989. AI
and AW both conducted prison inspections, but AI ' s visits were
to State Security detention centers that had been emptied of
prisoners. The ICRC visited political prisoners held in the
regular national penitentiary system, and was continuing
negotiations with the Government over visits to detention
centers. The lACHR also visited Nicaragua, but its full
report on political prisoners was not published, reportedly at
the insistence of the Government. The lACHR 1989 annual
general report did include sections on Nicaragua, which
concluded that the trials of ex-National Guardsmen lacked
validity under international human rights law.
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The CPDH was founded to document abuses during the rule of the
deposed dictator Anastasio Sotnoza, and its work has continued
during the Sandinista regime. The CPDH has been the target of
many Sandinista attempts to discredit it, the latest occurring
in September 1989 when the Government attempted to malign the
organization's reporting on political prisoners. CPDH members
report frequent harassment and threats. The CPDH is routinely
denied access to government prisons and is not allowed to seek
information from MINT personnel. In July 1989 CPDH
investigators were denied entry to the town of La Libertad in
Chontales, where they wished to investigate numerous charges
of human rights abuses. CPDH Executive Secretary Lino
Hernandez was told by MINT officials that the MINT had issued
orders to keep him out of town. Prisoners and their families
are warned by Government officials not to report abuses to the
CPDH.
Other Nicaraguan organizations that investigate and record
allegations of human rights violations include the Office of
Legal Assistance for Ethnic Minorities of the Atlantic Coast,
the Office of Legal Assistance of the Evangelical Committee
for Development Aid, and the Legal Aid Office of the Central
American University. The ANPDH, based in San Jose, Costa
Rica, is a U.S. Government-funded group independent of the RN
but clearly opposed strongly to the Sandinista regime. It
trains RN combatants in respect for human rights, and
investigates reports of RN abuses. The ANPDH opened an office
in Managua in 1989.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Nicaragua's minorities, numbering some 80,000 Indians and
26,000 English-speaking blacks, live primarily on the Atlantic
coast. Sandinista efforts after 1979 to integrate the
Atlantic coast more closely with the rest of Nicaragua
alienated much of the coast population and generated many
human rights abuses, including forced relocation, destruction
of villages, mass imprisonments, killings, and
disappearances. These conditions led to mass flights of
Indians to Honduras. An autonomy statute was promulgated in
September 1987 which purports to establish a democratic and
responsive program for meeting the special needs of the
Atlantic coast minorities. However, it fails to address major
issues of fundamental concern to the area's indigenous groups,
such as allocation of income from regional resources. In June
1989 Indian leaders Brooklyn Rivera and Steadinan Fagoth
announced they would return to Nicaragua to reintegrate into
their communities and to participate in Atlantic coast
political life. They and other Indian leaders returned in
August and September.
The Government also continued to facilitate the return of
Miskito refugees from Honduras. The U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) office in Managua reported that 2,557
Nicaraguans had returned through UNHCR programs through the
end of September, including 884 Miskito Indians who returned
from Honduras, and four who returned from Costa Rica.
Violence against women, including domestic violence such as
wife beating, exists in Nicaragua. However, a lack of
reliable statistical data makes it very difficult to determine
the true extent of this problem. Victims of such abuse
frequently are reluctant to report it or to press charges,
leading to the likelihood that it is significantly
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under reported.
The Government does not tolerate such violence. In
particular, the Sandinista mass organization, the Luisa Amanda
Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan Women (AMNLAE) , assists in
protecting the rights of women and bringing cases of violence
against individual women to the Government's attention.
AMNLAE also urges government sanctions against publications
that may contribute to violence against women by publishing
articles that feature women as sex objects. Women are not
subject to any special restrictive measures by the Government,
and they participate in most levels of the economy and society.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Article 87 of the Constitution provides workers the right to
associate in organizations of their own choosing and to elect
their own representatives. In practice, however, the
Government often uses coercion, economic pressure, or force to
impede workers' rights to organize and elect their
representatives. For example, in October 1989 the leadership
of the government-controlled Sandinista Workers' Central (CST)
used economic coercion to expel the leadership of an
independent construction union, SCAAS. The CST was able to
capitalize on government control of the country's battered
construction industry to coerce workers to renounce the
leadership of the SCAAS, an affiliate of the anti-Sandinista
Independent Confederation of Labor (CGT-I). With unemployment
at about 60 percent in the construction sector, the CST was
able to use the threat of job loss to lure workers from the
CGT-I and to establish a rump Sandinista-controlled SCAAS,
which then was given legal status by the Government.
The right to strike is recognized in Article 83 of the
Constitution. However, a decree law in 1981 stipulated that
any worker who incited a strike could be jailed for up to 3
years. In May 1989, a series of wildcat strikes by teachers
broke out throughout the country. The teachers complained
about the dramatic drop in their purchasing power due to
hyperinflation and currency devaluations. In response, the
Government and the Sandinista-controlled mass organizations
launched a propaganda campaign to discredit the teachers,
accusing them of being "unpatriotic" and "agents of the U.S.
Embassy." In fact, the majority of the disaffected teachers
were members of the Sandinista-controlled National
Association of Nicaraguan Educators. The strikes were
eventually quelled through economic coercion and Sandinista-
sponsored intimidation.
The CST is affiliated with the Communist-controlled World
Federation of Trade Unions. The other major Sandinista labor
body, the Rural Workers Association, is not affiliated with
any international body. Anti-Sandinista trade unions are
allowed a measure of freedom to maintain international
contacts, although subject to Government surveillance and
harassment. For example, the Confederation of Labor
Unification is affiliated with the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and the Confederation of
Nicaraguan Workers is affiliated with the World Confederation
of Labor (WCL) .
ICFTU, WCL, the Latin American Workers' Central, and the
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International Organization of Employers (lOE) have filed a
number of complaints against the Government of Nicaragua.
These complaints allege that the Government violated
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 87 on
Freedom of Association by, among other things, the murder,
assault, intimidation, and imprisonment of trade union
leaders, the destruction of their property, and denial of
their right to express their views. These complaints have
alleged the harassment, intimidation, and imprisonment of
employer representatives and the confiscation of their
property. In September 1988, an ILO study mission was
dispatched to Nicaragua to investigate these allegations.
Based on the mission's report and conclusions, the ILO
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) , at its November
1988 meeting, urged the Government to take concrete measures
in the shortest period of time to apply fully the Conventions
on Freedom of Association, including changes in legislation
and the release of worker and employer representatives from
prison. The CFA recommended the establishment of a Commission
of Inquiry unless the Government provided information
demonstrating a- change of attitude and a clear desire to make
progress before the Committee's next meeting.
At its November 1989 meeting the CFA summarized the various
Freedom of Association complaints brought against the
Government of Nicaragua by the ICFTU, the WCL, and the lOE.
Acknowledging some cooperation from the Government, the
Committee noted its failures to respond to requests and
recommendations and continuing contradictions between
statements of the complainants and the Government, and
recommended that the matter be referred to a Commission of
Inquiry (COI) .
During 1989 the ILO Committee of Experts (COE) and Committee
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CACR)
also considered complaints against Nicaragua. The COE noted
the lifting of the state of emergency, but cited reports of
ILO representatives and committees indicating that a number of
excessively severe regulations remained in effect, including
the General Provisional Act which forbids the publication,
distribution, circulation, exhibition, dissemination, showing,
transmission, or selling of writings which compromise or
endanger internal security, national defense, or national
economic stability. Noting that elements of the media ha^l
been suspended under this Act, the Committee called on the
Government to give full guarantees of expression to worker and
employer representatives so they could defend the interests of
their members.
The COE noted that 60 strike actions had been recorded in 1988
but that trade union organizations had reported pressure and
repressive measures against strikers. The COE noted other
provisions or omissions in Nicaraguan legislation which do not
accord with Convention 87, including: failure to guarantee
the right of association to public servants and other groups
of workers; requirement of approval of an absolute majority of
workers in a work place in order to form a union; and
excessive limitations on the right to strike, including the
Government's authority to refer strikes to compulsory
arbitration. The COE expressed the hope that new legislation
correcting these and other deficiencies would be promptly
enacted.
The CACR also observed the persistence of divergencies between
law and practice and the full application of ILO Conventions
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87 and 98 (collective bargaining), and requested the
Government to take promptly all measures necessary to
eliminate restrictions concerning the right of employer and
worker representatives to freely exercise the rights
guaranteed by these two conventions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Articles 82 through 88 of the Constitution contain a number of
labor rights, including the right to negotiate individual or
collective bargaining agreements. Nicaraguan workers,
however, do not enjoy these rights in practice. The
Government does not prohibit, but state-owned companies also
do not engage in, collective bargaining with independent labor
unions. Moreover, the Government directs its own
Sandinista-controlled union, the CST, to accept what the
Government proposes. With respect to working conditions, the
Government simply does not negotiate with unions on this issue.
Restrictions on independent union organizing activity are
mostly extraof facial and indirect. Union activists are
subject to state-sponsored intimidation by Sandinista
militants. There are no economic processing zones where
additional restrictions or regulations on labor apply.
In its 1989 report, the COE repeated its longstanding request
to the Government to repeal Decree 530, which requires that a
collective bargaining agreement must be approved by the
Government before it can become effective, in violation of
Convention 98 on collective bargaining.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Although there is no official policy of using forced labor,
the Government uses its Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS) to
mobilize local communities to perform specific economic
development projects, ostensibly on a voluntary basis. The
CDS chiefs in various neighborhoods are responsible for
organizing these labor crews for weekend work projects. Those
who do not participate in these projects are reportedly
subject to a range of sanctions that could affect their
working conditions, housing situation, or children's schooling,
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children under the age of 14 legally are not permitted to
work. Article 84 of the Constitution states "child labor that
can affect normal childhood development or interfere with the
obligatory school year is prohibited." This law is generally
enforced in the small modern sector of the economy, but
children frequently work on family farms at an earlier age.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Government has not strictly enforced employer compliance
with occupational health and safety requirements. In June
1988, the Government suspended the National System for
Ordering Work and Salaries, although it continues to serve as
a "reference point" for employers in determining wages and
salaries. The minimum wage for workers varies from sector to
sector. For example, the average wage for agricultural
workers is about $32 per month. The average minimum wage for
industrial workers is $58 per month, and in the service sector
about $19 per month.
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For state workers, these salaries are augmented by food
allocations and other incentives. With hyperinflation having
reached five-digit figures for 1988, and likely to reach
four-digit figures in 1989, the real purchasing power of
workers has plummeted dramatically over the past year and the
living standard for the working class has declined sharply.
The Government periodically adjusts state workers' salaries;
however, Government officials have acknowledged that these
salaries are not adequate to provide the basic needs oi.
workers. The legal workweek in Nicaragua is 48 hours for most
workers. The legal workday for agricultural workers is 6
hours, and the workday in the mining sector is 7 hours.
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The Constitution provides for a representative democracy, with
direct popular election of the president and legislature, an
independent judiciary, and a broad range of civil and
individual rights, but in practice Panama was ruled during
most of 1989 by a military dictatorship under General Manuel
Antonio Noriega, the Commander of the Panama Defense Forces
(PDF). On December 19, Guillermo Endara, who was widely
credited with having won elections in May that were
subsequently annulled at Noriega's behest, was sworn in as
President. The Noriega regime was ousted by U.S. forces that
entered Panama on December 20 to protect U.S. lives, ensure
U.S. ability to meet its obligations under the Panama Canal
Treaties, help restore democracy to Panama, and bring Noriega
to justice on narcotics-related charges in the United States.
Under the Noriega dictatorship, Panama's security and police
institutions both fell under the PDF, which was composed of
Army, Navy, Air Force, and police components consisting of
approximately 15,000 members, all responsible to the PDF
Commander. One of the Endara Government's first acts was to
disband the PDF and replace it with a new organization, the
Panamanian Public Force (FPP) , under direct civilian
authority. Although the precise structure and
responsibilities of the FPP were still being worked out in
early 1990, the Panamanian Government indicated that the FPP
would be a national police organization, with a national air
service and a national maritime service established as
separate entities.
The continuing political crisis throughout 1989 had a deep
impact on Panama's service-oriented economy, which is
sensitive to public and international confidence. Panama's
gross domestic product dropped by 20 percent in 1988 and an
additional drop was projected for 1989.
Human rights under the military dictatorship steadily
deteriorated throughout 1989. Elections were annulled,
protest brutally repressed, and an unconstitutional regime
that ruled by decree was installed. A rebellion led by PDF
officers failed and many participants were tortured, killed,
or imprisoned. The Noriega dictatorship closed all the
country's opposition media, took over two television stations,
and intimidated a third. The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (lACHR) concluded in its 1989 report that
Noriega's de facto regime violated the rights to humane
treatment, personal liberty, movement and residence, and
thought and expression. On the most basic level, the report
stated that the Noriega provisional government was "devoid of
constitutional legitimacy." Upon taking office. President
Endara made the observance of human rights, the correction of
prior human rights abuses, and the prosecution of human rights
violators matters of the highest priority for his
administration.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The Panamanian Human Rights Committee (CPDH) confirmed a
number of killings in connection with the May 1989 elections,
including Nicolas Van Kleef , a Dutch priest killed on election
day and Alexis Guerra, an opposition vice presidential
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PANAMA
candidate's bodyguard, killed during a political rally on
May 10. According to CPDH lawyers, the regime made no effort
to investigate these deaths. Relatives or organizations
representing the victims tried to pursue their rights through
the Noriega-controlled courts, but without success. The new
Attorney General named by President Endara immediately began
investigating human rights abuses, with over 50 cases being
handled as of early January 1990.
On August 3, eyewitnesses reported, that in reaction to a
large demonstration the PDF illegally entered the University
of Panama campus and deliberately shot to death a student,
Luis Antonio Gonzalez Santamaria, with birdshot at point-blank
range. Gonzalez apparently was picked at random for execution
to deter protests on the campus. Two other students were
reported wounded in the attack.
After the October 3 military uprising, there were reports that
rebel soldiers who led the effort to oust General Noriega were
alive when they laid down their arms. The Noriega regime
later announced that 10 of them had been killed in the
fighting. The new Attorney General announced that his
office's investigation had found evidence that Major Giroldi
Vera, who led the coup attempt, had been shot to death in jail
the day after he was placed in detention.
Officials of human rights groups and the Catholic Church
indicated that from 90 to as many as 233 military personnel
may have been summarily executed after the military rebellion
on October 3. Many are believed to have been tortured before
death. Bodies returned to families reportedly had multiple
fractures, cuts, evidence of severe beatings, and bullet
wounds inflicted at point-blank range.
b. Disappearance
People in Panama seldom disappeared permanently under the
Noriega regime, although there were a few cases in past
years. CPDH lists only two persons who are believed to have
disappeared, of whom only one is thought to have political
implications. By the end of 1989, a University of Panama
student rights group began circulating names and pictures of
several persons thought to have disappeared.
Throughout the year, the Noriega regime arrested and held
incommunicado a number of political opponents. Information on
the whereabouts of many of these detainees was kept from
family members and lawyers, and habeas corpus applications and
appeals for the protection of constitutional rights were
ignored.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
General mistreatment, physical and mental abuse, and outright
torture at the hands of the PDF was comjnon in 1989. After
both the May 7 elections and the October 3 rebellion, many
Panamanians reported waves of deaths, arrests, detentions, and
torture by members of the PDF or paramilitary groups under
their control. Victims commonly reported that they were
robbed, held in extended solitary confinement, often in cells
too small to permit standing up or lying down and filthy with
human excrement, and denied the opportunity to bathe. They
were frequently stripped naked and exposed alternately to cold
and heat, or deprived of food, sleep, and medical treatment.
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Other forms of severe abuse reportedly included using electric
shocks to various parts of the body; handcuffing arms into
extremely painful postures; burning the feet or buttocks with
heaters, cigarettes, or branding irons; threatening homosexual
rape; threatening death by holding a gun to the head; and
employing vicious beatings.
Less commonly, victims charged that they were forced to listen
to or witness the torture of others, including relatives, to
be tortured in front of relatives, to sit naked on blocks of
ice, to have fingernails or toenails extracted, and to suffer
male and female rape, victims also had fingers or other
appendages amputated, or were cut with razor blades (in one
case the word "yanqui" was carved on a victim). There was a
report that four rebel military personnel were stuffed alive
into body bags and placed in freezing morgue lockers until
they died of suffocation or cold. During public
demonstrations, common PDF tactics included the use of
birdshot, rubber truncheons, water cannons using water laced
with acid, and tear gas. Many of these charges were covered
in the lACHR report.
After the May elections, opposition legislative candidate
Olimpo Saenz was arrested and taken to Carcel Modelo prison in
Panama City, where for 8 hours he was suspended by his
handcuffed wrists from the rim of a basketball hoop, with his
toes barely touching the ground and his neck wrapped tightly
in an American flag. He was beaten repeatedly with rubber
hoses, and his screams were reported from nearby apartment
buildings. He suffered a similar, second round of beatings
the following day, in which he was forced to remain standing
during the duration of the torture which lasted 14 hours.
This treatment resulted in internal injuries and his
subsequent hospitalization.
On October 3 Christian Democrat Raul Ossa, a former
legislator, was incarcerated and physically and
psychologically tortured for 6 days. He was denied food and
sleep, punched, beaten, and continuously interrogated.
Another Christian Democratic activist, Gustavo Cedeno, was
abducted, interrogated, and beaten on December 5 and 6 before
he was released.
Prison conditions under the Noriega regime were generally
inadequate and in some cases constituted cruel or inhuman
treatment. Most prisoners in Panama City's Cercel Modelo
prison had no beds, only blankets, and one U.S. citizen
imprisoned there contracted tuberculosis from poor nutrition,
unsanitary conditions, and the lack of beds. Prisoners at
Carcel Modelo reported that they could hear the screams of
persons who were being tortured or beaten. Conditions at the
prison on the Island of Coiba were believed to be so bad that
threats of being sent there were often used to subdue
prisoners in other facilities. The Endara Government has
publicly declared its intention to reform Panama's prison
system.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution establishes the right of a detainee to a
judicial determination of the legality of the detention and
requires a warrant for arrest, except in cases of persons
arrested during the commission of a crime. A suspect may not
legally be detained for more than 24 hours without being
charged and brought before a magistrate. Police are required
to inform accused persons immediately of the reason for their
686
detention. After being charged with a criminal offense, an
accused person may be held until authorities conduct an
investigation and bring the case to trial.
In practice, the Noriega regime routinely disregarded
constitutional requirements and due process for persons
incarcerated for political offenses. Frequently, prisoners
were moved from one place of detention to another while
authorities were denying to attorneys and family members that
the detainees were in custody. A favorite tactic was to have
night courts impose lengthy, "noncommutable" sentences
(criminal sentences are otherwise routinely commuted for good
behavior). For example, in several cases a year-long,
noncommutable sentence was imposed for the distribution of
opposition newsletters. In many cases, prisoners were never
charged and had to file a writ of habeas corpus, which can
take as long as 6 weeks to process and was regularly ignored
by PDF authorities.
The judicial system suffered from a chronic backlog under the
Noriega regime, resulting in as many as 3 years' incarceration
of prisoners awaiting trial. Such prisoners constitute a
large portion of the prison population. Time spent in jail
awaiting trial counts toward completion of the final sentence
for those convicted.
In 1989, by conservative estimates, 300 Panamanians went into
exile and three times as many were incarcerated (military
prisoners are included in the estimate) . Approximately 300
persons were jailed during the elections in May, and another
100 civilians were incarcerated thereafter. In the wake of
the October 3 military insurrection, reported estimates of PDF
personnel arrested and incarcerated varied from 200 to 600.
The persons who went into exile in 1989 included three key
opposition figures: Aristides de Icaza, owner and director of
Radio Exitosa radio network; Jose del Carmen Serracin, of the
opposition Authentic Panamenista Party (PPA); and newspaper
publisher Jaime Padilla Beliz. (All three returned to Panama
after December 20.) The Noriega regime attempted to deport
two members of the Catholic clergy: Spanish priest Jose
Majadas and Peruvian nun Elsa Maria Schaus, the principal of a
Catholic school (who was actually forced to leave Panama for a
few days). In both cases, public pressure resulted in the
return of the clergy to their communities.
During 1989 the PDF was involved in hundreds of incidents of
harassment of U.S. military personnel and dependents in
Panama, often culminating in illegal detentions and denial of
due process under the Panamanian Constitution and the Panama
Canal Treaty. A U.S. citizen and military dependent, Kurt
Muse, was arrested in April, subjected to sleep deprivation,
intimidation, and interrogation, and held without charge in
solitary confinement until December 20, when he was freed by
U.S. forces. Another American citizen, Leonard Accles, was
also held without charge in similar "preventive detention" for
over a year, with lengthy periods of solitary confinement,
until after the U.S. intervention when he was released. He
was physically and psychologically abused when arrested, and
consular access was denied for long periods.
with regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
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PANAMA
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides that persons charged with crimes are
presumed innocent until proven guilty and have the right to
counsel. The local bar association and National University-
law school offer legal counsel at nominal fees. The
Government provides public defenders for indigent defendants,
but only after the pretrial phase. A new judicial code, which
became effective April 1, 1987, provides for public trials
based on oral testimony and argument. However, most trial
procedures are still conducted with written presentations by
the prosecution and defense without the presence of the
accused. The documents produced are available for examination
by both sides. In general, the burden of proof rests on the
prosecution. The right to appeal a verdict is available to
the prosecution and the defense.
The Constitution provides a number of safeguards designed to
maintain the independence of the judiciary: the Supreme Court
is chartered to uphold the Constitution and laws; magistrates
are barred from simultaneously holding other public office or
otherwise participating in politics; Supreme Court
magistrates, who are nominated by the President and ratified
by the Legislative Assembly, nominate all lower court judges.
The Attorney General, appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Legislative Assembly, appoints Superior Court District
Attorneys, who in turn nominate Circuit District Attorneys. A
system of magistrates, named by mayors, deals with a high
volume of minor civil and criminal cases. Magistrates are
empowered to impose fines of less than $600 and to order
detentions of up to 1 year, and their decisions can be
appealed only to the mayor and not to any judicial official.
However, the Constitution's provisions for an independent
judicial system were largely ignored by the Noriega regime.
The most serious obstacle to obtaining a free and fair trial
lay in the interference of the PDF. The military not only
meddled with the outcome of specific trials, but in practice
appointed judges and transferred or dismissed those who did
not respond to PDF directives. This influence extended to all
levels of the court system.
In June the CPDH asserted that the Noriega regime had violated
many provisions of the country's legal code by its practices
of holding mass trials without due process, refusal to
recognize habeas corpus writs, detention and sentencing of
persons without charges, sentencing of minors as adults, and
rejecting or ignoring evidence offered in defense of accused
persons .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There were credible charges that the Noriega regime routinely
tampered with mail and that telephone calls were extensively
monitored. The CPDH reported that one regime official
publicly admitted this in a radio interview. Under the
Constitution, judicial warrants must be issued before
officials may enter homes. However, warrants to search homes
of regime opponents were freely granted to the PDF by the
PDF-controlled courts. The military and paramilitary forces
also frequently searched homes, destroyed or removed private
property, and detained persons found on the premises without
appropriate warrants or court orders.
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Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, and
in the past Panama traditionally enjoyed free media which
engaged in spirited and open criticism of the Government. The
Noriega regime responded to the ongoing political crisis by
subjugating the media, both electronic and print, either to
complete regime control or severe self-censorship. All
opposition media were closed in February 1988. At that time,
the regime also eliminated local distribution of foreign news
publications .
In 1989 the Noriega regime further tightened control of the
media by prohibiting opposition newsletters, closing a
semi-independent radio network, and attempting to curb the
international press. By December 19, there remained only one
nonregime radio program of news commentary, and it stayed on
the air by never criticizing the military. In November an
earlier prohibition against live call-ins for radio news
commentary programs was extended to sports and general
entertainment programs as well. Many Panamanians listened to
frequently jammed Radio Impacto, which broadcast news and
anti-Noriega information from Costa Rica, and to the Voice of
America. Any Panamanian caught with a copy of the Tropic
Times, the English-language newspaper of the U.S. Southern
Command, was subject to a $300 fine. Regime commentators
launched a campaign of personal attacks against some
Panamanian journalists who worked for international wire
services or otherwise tried to maintain some objectivity in
reporting .
Before and during the May elections, foreign journalists were
allowed to come to Panama, but 10 of them were expelled
immediately afterward. Also during the elections, Panamanian
cameraman Fernando Arauz was severely wounded when he was
reportedly shot in the chest by armed government supporters.
French journalist Bertrand de la Grange, a Le Monde reporter,
was hit in the waist by birdshot fired by a soldier.
The Endara Government has declared its full commitment to
freedom of the press. Since it assumed power on December 20,
three newspapers, (La Prensa, El Siglo, and El Panama America)
which had been banned by the Noriega regime, have reappeared
and are being operated by their rightful owners. A fourth
paper, Critica Libre, has been returned to its rightful
owner. Soon after the December 20 U.S. military intervention,
the owner of television channel 4 took possession of that
station's facilities and began broadcasting freely. The
Endara Government has taken possession of a number of radio
stations that had been confiscated by the Noriega regime for
distribution to Noriega's followers, pending investigations to
determine the rightful owners. Former Noriega supporter Tomas
Altamirano "Fito" Duque continues freely to publish his
newspaper. La Estrella de Panama.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the right of peaceful assembly,
but the Noriega regime continued to interfere with this right
on a systematic basis. Harassment--including attacks on
demonstrators by brutal paramilitary squads and random
detentions--was used to disrupt protests or even peaceful
assemblies. In 1988 the PDF formed "dignity
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battalions" — paramilitary groups of civilians, PDF members,
unemployed persons, released criminals, and government
employees charged with political or publicity functions. The
dignity battalions received small arms and other military
training from the PDF. In 1989 the PDF increasingly used
these groups to harass political opponents and public
demonstrators and to commit other human rights abuses. For
example, dignity battalions participated in the attack against
opposition political candidates at the Santa Ana Plaza on May
10, where at least one opposition supporter died and many
people — including an opposition candidate for vice
president — were bloodied and injured in events covered by the
world media. The PDF also responded to peaceful protests with
the use of tear gas, baton charges, birdshot, and water
cannons using water mixed with acid.
Meetings of professional, social, and civic groups were
severely restricted by the Noriega dictatorship in 1989. A
1988 decree prohibited nonprofit groups (which range from
charities and church organizations to civic clubs such as the
Lions) from supporting or engaging in any activity the regime
considered threatening to the security of the State. On
October 5, 1989, Noriega announced so-called war laws, which
forbade political gatherings by any civic organization and
eliminated all government employee associations that
functioned like unions. (Unions legally registered with the
Government were exempted from this law. An exception was also
made for the public employee umbrella group FENASEP, which has
a history of government control.) With an elaborate system of
informants in the student and teacher ranks, frequent school
closings, and repeated arrests, antiregime student leaders
were effectively intimidated.
The Endara Government, in response to the breakdown in public
order immediately following the December 20 U.S. intervention,
declared a temporary curfew from 11:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. The
new Government stressed that the curfew was temporary and was
designed to protect lives and property in an uncertain
security situation.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for religious freedom, and there is
no state religion. Although Roman Catholicism is predominant,
there are no restrictions on the free exercise of religious
beliefs, including proselytizing. The Catholic Church took a
strong anti-Noriega moral position, and its leadership was
attacked sharply by the Noriega-regime press. Priests (many
of whom are foreigners) were threatened with expulsion to
deter them from speaking out against the Noriega regime.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution permits Panamanians to move freely within the
country and to emigrate. However, freedom of movement was
curtailed severely in the days before and after the May
elections. PDF members manning checkpoints searched vehicles
and asked for passenger identification. Election observers
were frequently escorted away from the interior of the
country. In one case, their airplane was confiscated, and the
observers had to return to the capital by road. The
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PANAMA
authorities interfered with and detained opposition leaders
attempting to visit constituencies in the interior.
Following the December 20 military action, U.S. forces
temporarily blocked certain roads and established a number of
vehicular and pedestrian checkpoints. The Endara Government
worked with U.S. military authorities to remove obstacles when
no longer needed and to replace U.S. troops with FPP personnel
at the few checkpoints that remained as of January 15, 1990.
Panama has accepted refugees of widely differing ideological
persuasions, and hundreds of displaced persons and exiles from
other countries reside in the country.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
In early 1989, faced with approaching elections, the Noriega
regime launched a wave of repression, closed most opposition
media, limited the opposition's access to the media, and
attempted to keep the foreign press out of Panama. Although
some opposition rallies were permitted, free campaigning was
clearly restricted. Despite massive regime fraud, the Civic
Democratic Opposition Alliance (ADOC) won the election by a
three-to-one margin, according to independent observers,
including the Catholic Church. The Catholic hierarchy, an
international observer delegation led by former President
Jimmy Carter, and the official U.S. delegation headed by
Congressman John Murtha (D-PA) denounced the electoral fraud.
After the elections, in which vote counters were attacked and
four people were murdered, many opposition candidates and
participants were forced into hiding and exile or were
arrested and tortured. On May 10, the winning opposition
slate leaders were publicly beaten, and one was hospitalized.
One of their bodyguards was killed and another wounded. The
CPDH reported that by June 1 over 140 persons had been
detained in postelection roundups of political opponents.
The May 1989 elections removed any remaining pretense of
quasi-legal civilian government. Provisional President
Francisco Rodriguez was installed by General Noriega on
September 1 as the regime's chief executive. New elections,
although alluded to by the regime, were not scheduled. On the
civilian side, the PDF wielded its control in part through the
governing Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). Although the
legislature was disbanded in September, the PRD continued to
play an important role because its members filled most key
positions in the Government.
On October 3, a group of PDF officers led an unsuccessful
attempt to overthrow the Noriega regime. Thereafter, Noriega
and his loyalists reportedly killed as many as 90 PDF
personnel and arrested or dismissed several hundred others for
their alleged involvement in the rebellion.
On December 20, the ADOC candidates for President (Guillermo
Endara), First Vice President (Ricardo Arias Calderon), and
Second Vice President (Guillermo "Billy" Ford) took their
oaths of office. The Electoral Tribunal announced that its
annulment of the May 7 election had been coerced by General
Noriega and the PDF, and issued a new decision recognizing the
victory of the ADOC candidates. As of January 15, 1990, the
Electoral Tribunal was engaged in issuing the official
election results of the May 7 legislative elections. Most
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legislative races were expected to have clear winners. In
cases where doubt existed, new elections were to be held.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The lACHR in November issued a severely critical report on
human rights violations in Panama, calling on the Noriega
regime to restore political rights, return to constitutional
order, stop all violence against the civilian population,
release political prisoners, authorize the return of exiles,
and open the media.
Other international human rights groups were critical of
Panama, but during the past year, only the lACHR visited the
country and carried out an investigation. The lACHR
delegation visited prisons and spoke with political opponents
but was prevented by the regime from visiting the opposition
newspaper La Prensa. The International Committee of the Red
Cross requested but was denied access to political prisoners
in 1989.
Several private human rights groups operate in Panama,
including one organized by students at the University of
Panama. Since the political crisis began in June 1987, these
groups have collected data about individual cases of abuse,
acted as advocates for detainees, observed opposition
demonstrations, and voiced concern about human rights
violations. Toward the end of 1989, many of these human
rights activists were harassed and arrested by the Noriega
regime. Two private groups that are generally respected both
within and outside Panama are the CPDH and the Center for
Investigation of Human Rights and Juridical Assistance of
Panama .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, birth out of wedlock, social class, sex, religion, or
political views. Owing to traditional bias and general
economic conditions, Panamanian women generally do not enjoy
the same economic opportunities as men. Panamanian law does
not recognize community property, and divorced or deserted
women are often left destitute. Although the Constitution
mandates equal pay for equal work, wages paid to women are
lower than those for equivalent work performed by men and
increase at a slower rate.
According to local officials of the Catholic Church, violence
against women and children in the family is a serious problem;
however, there are few published statistics. A 1985-86 study
funded jointly by the Government and the University of Panama
entitled "Exploratory Study on the Physical Mistreatment of
the Panamanian Woman," by Dr. Carmen Anthony and Gladys
Miller, used data gathered from hospitals. The study
concluded that the problem was serious and needed to be
addressed by the Government and social agencies. Both the
Catholic Church and the Ministry of Social Welfare have
programs directed at the problem. Church officials state that
their program mainly serves poorer women because upper-class
women tend to seek private medical assistance.
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Panama is a racially mixed country. The traditional monopoly
of power by persons of European descent effectively ended with
the ouster of the civilian government by the military in
1968. People of mixed race are active politically and are
represented in senior civilian positions in the executive
branch and in the PDF.
The law does not discriminate against any social, religious,
or cultural group. However, naturalized citizens may not hold
certain categories of elected office, and the Constitution
reserves retail trade to native Panamanians.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Historically, Panamanian workers enjoyed a wide range of
benefits under the law. The rights to organize labor unions
and to strike were generally unrestricted in the private
sector as well as in certain public sector agencies specified
by law. Elections within Panamanian labor organizations, as
well as employer and professional associations, were generally
democratic and free from government interference. These
organizations were unrestricted in their right to affiliate
with international bodies, and their members freely
participated in political parties and other aspects of
Panamanian political life. However, the political crisis has
had a severe negative impact on workers' rights in Panama.
Workers have been fired, arrested, and jailed for exercising
their labor rights. The Noriega regime effectively controlled
almost all labor organizations and leaders. Within this
constraint, workers remained generally free to join the union
of their choice.
Four decree laws handed down in October gave the Noriega
regime added power to dismiss public employees, suspend the
award of legally mandated bonuses, hire and fire free of
traditional restraints, and regulate employee meetings. The
regime subsequently used all of this authority.
Most public-sector employees are forbidden to form unions or
to strike. The "war laws" enacted by the Noriega regime in
1989 abolished public employee representative associations,
which functioned like unions. Only the regime-controlled
public employee umbrella association, the Federation of Public
Sector Employees (FENASEP) , was granted an exemption. Legally
registered unions also were exempted from these laws.
In an October speech to labor leaders, Noriega told them that
they no longer had the right to strike. This was echoed by
then Government and Justice Minister Renato Pereira in an
October 1989 television address, when he said that "it is no
longer legally possible to declare a strike." No major strikes
occurred in 1989.
The Endara Government has indicated its receptivity to labor
concerns, including revising labor decrees and laws. Exiled
labor leader Isaac Rodriguez returned to Panama soon after
December 20 and has led labor efforts to persuade the new
administration to rescind the Noriega regime's antilabor
provisions .
In its 1989 report, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Committee of Experts (COE) reiterated its observation that
certain provisions of the law do not conform with Convention
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87 on Freedom of Association, including: a requirement of 50
workers (or 10 employers) in order to form a union (or
employer organization) ; prohibition of more than one union in
an enterprise; a requirement that 75 percent of the members of
a union be Panamanian; automatic removal from office of union
officials dismissed from their employment; extensive powers of
the authorities over records and accounts of unions; and the
exclusion of public employees from the labor code and,
consequently, from the right to organize and bargain. The
committee urged the Noriega regime to bring its legislation
into compliance.
A complaint filed by the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions, and the World Confederation of Labor and its
regional organization for Latin America, the Confederation of
Latin American Workers, allege that the Noriega regime
arrested 4 trade union officials and 50 members of the Water
and Electrical Workers Union, searched and closed the union's
offices and confiscated its funds, and arbitrarily discharged
50 trade union officials and 350 workers. At its May-June
1989 session, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association
asked the Noriega regime to supply details of the judgments
and the status of the cases against the union officials and
v7orkers and urged the regime to reply to the other allegations
in the immediate future.
In June 1989, the ILO Conference Committee on the Application
of Conventions and Recommendations considered the same issues
regarding Panamanian labor law that were addressed by the COE
and repeated its request that Panamanian law and practice be
brought into conformance with the Convention.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Denial of the right to organize in two important private
sector areas, the Colon Free Zone and offshore banking, has
long prompted concern among labor leaders. In other areas,
the Noriega regime selectively denied, or interfered with,
this right. During 1988 and 1989, the Noriega regime
succeeded in illegally gaining control of the elections and
the leadership of the largest private sector labor central,
the Confederation of Republic of Panama Workers (CTRP) . The
right to bargain was in jeopardy in those cases in which the
Noriega regime perceived that its economic or national
interests were at stake. Labor leaders charge that the regime
used the Ministry of Labor to protect extensive economic
interests of regime members in violation of the labor code.
c. Prohibition Against Forced or Compulsory Labor
Panama has an extensive labor code, which prohibits forced or
compulsory labor. There was no forced labor in Panama in 1989,
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The law prohibits work by children under 14 years of age or
under the age of 15 if the child has not completed primary
school. Both hazardous and night work are prohibited for
persons under age 18. Children between ages 12 and 14 may
perform farm or domestic labor as long as the work is light
and does not interfere with schooling. However, in the
deteriorating economic climate, some children worked in
violation of the existing law.
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e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Panama has a comprehensive labor code, which in theory gives
extensive rights and benefits to workers. The maximum legal
workweek is 48 hours. The law has established a minimum wage
for most work categories and requires that substantial bonuses
be paid for overtime. According to Panamanian labor leaders,
the minimum wage is sufficient to provide at least a minimally
decent standard of living for a worker and his family.
Although changes in the labor code in 1986 released employers
from the obligation to pay certain bonuses and overtime
premiums, employers still are required by law to provide
workers with compensation adequate for a decent standard of
living. The economic downturn resulting from the political
turmoil since mid-1987 has caused many employers to reduce
work hours or employee pay in order to stay in business, and
many workers accepted the nonenf orcement of certain labor code
provisions to prevent a permanent loss of their jobs.
The labor code details numerous health and safety standards
for all places of employment. Female employees are entitled
to receive 12 weeks' mandatory maternity leave and the right
to return to their jobs. The Ministry of Labor and Social
Welfare is responsible for ensuring compliance with these
regulations, but too few inspectors and widespread corrupt
practices have hampered strict enforcement of the labor code.
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PARAGUAY
Paraguay, independent since 1811, has been ruled almost
continuously by authoritarian regimes. In early 1989,
however, a new Government committed itself to a transition to
democracy and respect for human rights and subsequently took
important steps toward that goal. On February 2, 1989,
General Andres Rodriguez overthrew the 34-year-old
dictatorship of General Alfredo Stroessner. On May 1, in what
were judged by observers to have been relatively free and fair
elections. President Rodriguez received a mandate to guide the
country's transition to democracy. Nonetheless, at year's
end, the military and the ruling Colorado Party remained the
principal sources of power.
The police forces, under the overall authority of the Ministry
of Interior, hold primary responsibility for internal security
and maintaining public order. However, after the February
coup, the military, which in the last years of the Stroessner
regime seldom was called upon to control the civilian
population, was used several times to end illegal land
occupations by campesinos.
The political opening initiated by President Rodriguez was
complemented by economic reform. The new Government pursued
market-oriented econom.ic policies, including the elimination
of a multiple exchange rate system that contributed to
corruption and contraband. Corruption, however, remains a
serious problem. The Government also is considering the
privatization of some unprofitable state enterprises.
Paraguay is a predominantly agricultural, private
enterprise-oriented country. Business associations,
influential during the Stroessner years, continue to be
significant, both politically and economically, but they now
are confronted by the growing strength of organized labor.
The new Government took significant steps to reverse the
repression of human rights prevalent during the Stoessner
years. Political exiles were allowed to return, and
opposition political parties, previously banned, were legally
recognized and allowed to operate freely. Press restrictions
were largely lifted, but a cautious press continued to
exercise a measure of self-censorship. Newspapers and radio
stations closed by Stroessner were allowed to reopen.
Movement was made toward an independent judiciary by including
one member of the opposition on the Supreme Court and several
others on lower benches. There was a much greater, although
not complete, respect for freedom of assembly. Short-term
political detentions were fewer (though problems remained),
and the country's last two political prisoners were freed.
Meanwhile, recognition of and respect for labor rights
improved substantially, with workers free to organize, meet,
and march. Two of the country's leading human rights
activists were elected to Parliament. Two laws used by the
Stroessner regime to prosecute opponents for political
activity were repealed, and the Government ratified the
American Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American and
U.N. Conventions against torture. Several police officials
accused of torturing political detainees under the Stroessner
regime were removed from their jobs, and criminal proceedings
were initiated against some.
Human rights concerns shifted from basic to more complicated
issues. A very significant impediment to full transition to
democracy lay in the flawed voting procedures and electoral
laws that make it very difficult for any opposition party to
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win an election against the President and his party. The
freer political climate gave birth to rising expectations
among previously repressed groups, particularly landless
campesinos and independent labor unions. The new Government
at times reacted by violently breaking up demonstrations and
detaining leaders; the investigation and prosecution of former
police torturers moved slowly; respect for habeas corpus
remained questionable; the press was circumspect in
criticizing the President; and the Government often failed to
protect worker rights to collective bargaining.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Two unsubstantiated cases of politically motivated deaths were
reported by the press in 1989. Neither case appeared to
involve government culpability. On March 25, opposition
Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA) leaders reported that a
party committee member in the interior town of Acahay was
slain. According to the local press, the man was killed by
another member of the PLRA. In another case, a Colorado youth
was killed on October 1, reportedly as a result of internal
party bickering in the town of Borja.
b. Disappearance
There were no reported cases of politically motivated
disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Paraguay ratified the Inter-American Convention Against
Torture in October. The Inter-American Human Rights
Commission reported in September, however, that it still was
receiving reports of sporadic cases of torture and abuse by
security personnel. Nevertheless, these appeared to be
isolated cases mostly in areas outside the capital city and
neither systematic nor reflective of government policy. The
Government dismantled torture centers used by the Stroessner
regime and initiated prosecution of former officials accused
of torture. Additional investigations were under way, but by
the end of the year no cases had been concluded, and it
remained to be seen to what extent those responsible for human
rights abuses under the previous regime would be held
accountable (see Section I.e.). While abuse of prisoners
occurs relatively less frequently than during the Stroessner
years, rough treatment of prisoners is still common.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution provides for a judicial determination of the
legality of detention and stipulates that any person arrested
without a warrant must be presented formally before a judge
within 24 hours of his detention and have charges filed
against him within 48 hours. Authorities continued frequently
to ignore these provisions in both political and criminal
cases during 1989 although not as routinely as in the past.
Some political detainees continued to be held incommunicado.
For example, Efigenio Lisboa, a prominent trade unionist in
Ciudad del Este, was arrested in June by military authorities
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PARAGUAY
and held incommunicado in military detention for 27 days for a
speech the military found offensive. No charges were filed,
and Lisboa was released.
Exile no longer was used as a means of political control in
1989, with one exception. Although the exact number is
unknown, beginning immediately after the February coup,
political exiles — political and trade union activists as well
as writers and members of the performing arts — began returning
to Paraguay. The only exiles not permitted to return were
members of the still illegal Paraguayan Communist Party
(PCP) . Many PCP members returned clandestinely and were not
arrested or otherwise harassed by the Government. However,
Ananias Maidana, the Secretary General of the PCP who had been
living in exile for more than a decade, was refused permission
to enter Paraguay when he attempted to return to the country
on December 12.
Mario Mancuello, whose son disappeared in police custody in
1976, was freed from the arbitrary punishment of having to
sign in before 7 a.m. every day at his local police station,
as he had been required to do for the previous 12 years.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
In general accordance with the civil law tradition, trials are
conducted almost exclusively by presentation of written
documents to a judge, who then renders a decision. The
accused often appears before the court only twice — to plead
and to hear sentencing. All judgments are automatically
reviewed by an appellate judge, and the law provides for
appeals to the Supreme Court. Court proceeding are not open
to the public. Court proceedings in cases of a sensitive
political nature are held in secrecy, and any subsequent press
reports are based only on the attorneys' or judges' comments.
The Constitution and the Penal Code provide numerous
safeguards to protect the rights of individuals. While
nominally independent, the judiciary has been, in effect,
subordinate to the executive branch, which exercised its
influence through the presidential appointment of judges,
control over the judiciary's budget, and through the
discipline of the ruling Colorado Party. Supreme Court
Justices are appointed to serve for the same 5-year term as
the President of the Republic. Executive interference,
administrative shortcomings, and the lack of adequate
financial support for the judicial system limit the right of
an accused to a fair and speedy trial. More than 70 percent
of accused persons, after serving in detention the normal time
prescribed as a penalty for the crime of which they are
accused, are then released without ever having their trial
proceedings completed. To protest the long delays in the
judicial processing of their cases, 166 detainees in the men's
National Penitentiary of Tacumbu went on a hunger strike in
May. The hunger strike produced no major results. While no
prisoners were released, public attention was drawn to the
plight of detainees being held for prolonged periods without
having been tried or sentenced. Judges, including the Supreme
Court Justices, continued periodically to visit the country's
prisons to interview inmates to determine the status of their
cases.
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PARAGUAY
The popular perception that the police and judicial
institutions of the State still serve those with political,
military, or economic power discourages some citizens from
reporting police abuse. Public confidence in the equal
application of the law was not enhanced in 1989 when
high-level Stroessner-era public officials accused of theft of
public funds were allowed to take advantage of a technicality
in the law to evade prosecution by donating to the State large
sums of money or land. By contrast, in September, an attorney
who had filed several such criminal complaints was detained
without bail on charges of extortion and blackmail, which,
according to the press, were based on accusations from an
official of a government ministry.
President Rodriguez assumed office promising an independent
judiciary. A move toward that goal was the unprecedented
appointment in June of a non-Colorado Party member. Christian
Democratic jurist Jeronimo Irala Burgos, to the Supreme
Court. Another sign of change came in early August when the
executive branch acceded to a decision of a lower court judge
and allowed two-Europeans married to Paraguayans to return to
Paraguay. The two had been expelled by the Stroessner
Government on charges of carrying out subversive activities
and were turned back by the police when they tried to return
in July. As a sign that much remained to be done, however,
judges alleged that they had been pressured to slow down the
processing of cases against ex-Stroessner officials accused of
human rights abuses and theft of public funds. Later, the
Government threatened but stopped short of transferring four
judges presiding over such cases.
The new Government abolished the infamous security laws 209
("Defense of Public Order") and 294 ("Defense of Democracy")
used by the Stroessner regime to jail political opponents
arbitrarily.
Paraguay's last two remaining political prisoners were freed
during 1989. Alejandro Mella Latorre, a Chilean journalist
imprisoned for 8 years as a coconspirator in the Asuncion
assassination of ex-Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, was
released February 16. Mella Latorre had remained imprisoned
after completing his original sentence, awaiting the outcome
of his trial for alleged involvement in a prison riot. The
Stroessner regime had refused to release him even though he
already had served more time in jail for the alleged second
offense than the penalty for that crime. Remigio Gimenez, who
was serving a 30-year sentence, was freed August 29, after 11
years in prison, after the Supreme Court overthrew his 1978
conviction, ruling that the statute of limitations had run out
before he had been found guilty of the crimes police alleged
he had committed in the 1950's.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
While government and security forces generally do not
interfere in the private lives of citizens, there have been
notable exceptions. Although private homes are protected
constitutionally from police entry except under the terms of a
judicial warrant or to prevent a crime, this protection often
has been ignored in practice.
With the exception of some isolated cases, after the coup the
Government stopped interfering with the Paraguayan Human
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PARAGUAY
Rights Commission's (PHRC) mail. The organization reported no
knowledge of further problems mailing its newsletter overseas.
The Interior Ministry in February voided the use of Special
Agent police identity cards. Known as "stool pigeons," these
police informants were a notorious tool used by the Stroessner
regime to maintain surveillance over the populace.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Despite broad constitutional assurances of freedom of speech
and press, Stroessner tolerated little of either. After
February 2, however, an unprecedented degree of freedom of
expression emerged in Paraguay. Both the print and broadcast
media, as well as political activists and individual citizens,
were able to speak out without government interference on
subjects they never dared broach during the Stroessner years.
The day after the coup. General Rodriguez publicly pledged his
Government would respect freedom of expression; he has kept
that promise. The Catholic station. Radio Caritas, forced by
the Stroessner regime to reduce its broadcasting power weeks
before the coup, returned to full strength the day after
Stroessner's fall. Radio Nanduti, jammed and then forced off
the air by the Stroessner Government in 1987, resumed
broadcasting within days after the coup. The newspaper ABC
Color resumed publication in March, 5 years after being closed
by Stroessner. The opposition Febrerista Party's weekly
newspaper El Pueblo, shut down in 1987, also returned to the
streets. The Inter-American Press Association (lAPA), which
met in Paraguay for the first time in April, praised the new
journalistic freedom in Paraguay.
Only 2 weeks after the coup, Paraguayan television viewers
were treated to a televised debate among opposition and
Colorado Party spokesmen. Opposition party presidents Domingo
Laino (Authentic Radical Liberal), Euclides Acevedo
(Febrerista) and Jorge Dario Cristaldo (Christian Democratic)
exchanged views with Colorado Party Vice President Edgar
Ynsfran on a range of issues. Radio Nanduti owner Humbert©
Rubin was the guest journalist. Under Stroessner, the
opposition effectively was barred from all appearances on the
two national television stations, even during news
broadcasts. During the campaign for the May elections the
government-owned radio station granted free broadcasting time
to the competing opposition parties. Two weeks after the
coup, Asuncion's Channel 13 televised live a discussion on
torture in which the panelists, victims of torture during the
Stroessner regime, told their stories and answered call-in
questions from viewers.
Despite its newfound freedom, the press demonstrated a certain
discretion, even caution, in 1989. Paraguayan editors
exercised a considerable degee of self-restraint in what they
did and did not publish. While radio and television were more
aggressive and provocative, one glaring taboo remained: no
one publicly said anything derogatory about President
Rodriguez. In one example, the Central Unitaria de
Trabaj adores (CUT) labor federation waged a vociferous
campaign against Colorado Senator Bias N. Riquelme in support
of striking workers at his brewery. Although it was widely
known that President Rodriguez was a part-owner of the
brewery, CUT never publicly attacked the President.
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PARAGUAY
In a specific instance of limitation of freedom of expression
in 1989, the Government prohibited the performance of the play
"San Fernando," written by Paraguayan playwright Alcibiades
Gonzalez Delvalle, which portrays national hero Francisco
Solano Lopez in an unfavorable light.
Although legally the public National University (UNA) is
autonomous, under Stroessner faculty positions were reserved
for Colorado Party members, and students complained about the
lack of differing perspectives taught in the classroom. In
1989 change in academia was slower than elsewhere in the
society. After the coup, students clamored for a voice in
administrative and faculty appointments and repeatedly
demonstrated to protest alleged abuses. A major objective of
the students was to bring about the ouster of Stroessner-era
deans who, according to the students, had repressed student
activism, were guilty of financial irregularities, or were
incompetent. Students won a number of those battles. In one
example, the dean of UNA'S School of Philosophy resigned in
August after students campaigned for months for her removal,
accusing her of - administrative irregularities. In 1989
student groups favoring opposition political parties and
dissident Colorado Party factions continued to participate
openly in free student government elections, often winning.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The rights of peaceful assembly and association provided for
by the Constitution were violated regularly by the Stroessner
Government. In 1989 one of the clearest and most immediate
changes after the coup was the removal of many former
restrictions. Before the coup, police insisted on prior
authorization for opposition gatherings and routinely denied
such authorization. The new Government required no such
authorization. Just 3 days after the coup, the Government
announced that it would not interfere with a march planned by
the opposition National Accord that Stroessner 's Government
had vowed to prevent. The march of thousands took place
February 11, without police interference. Radio Nanduti,
which frequently was prevented from holding public forums in
its auditorium in 1988, was the site of numerous opposition
political gatherings after the coup, especially during the
election campaign. Opposition political, labor, and student
groups held many rallies and marches during the year.
There were limits, however, to the new respect for freedom of
assembly. In February the Interior Ministry imposed a ban on
demonstrations in the heart of downtown Asuncion, citing the
need to maintain public order in the congested commercial
district. In July the youth arm of the PLRA canceled a march
after the police vowed to use all necessary measures to
enforce the ban. In one case, the Government unleashed attack
dogs on procampesino demonstrators in the restricted area on
June 23; several persons were bitten. On October 11, police
detained for 20 hours three prominent trade unionists
belonging to the CUT after they led a march on the
presidential palace. That night, police used water-hoses to
break up a demonstration by workers protesting the arrests.
The next day, police used force against landless campesino and
urban homeless marchers. No one was injured seriously, but
the incidents showed that government tolerance for
demonstrators had its limits.
The Government also showed greater respect for freedom of
association. Under Stroessner two of the country's five
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Opposition political parties — including the largest, the
PLRA — were illegal. Before the May 1 election, the Government
granted legal recognition to all parties that applied. These
recognized parties included the existing PLRA and Christian
Democratic Parties, as well as six new parties formed during
the campaign. In another move, teachers were no longer
required to belong and contribute financially to the Colorado
Party.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Roman Catholicism is the predominant and official religion in
Paraguay, but the Constitution provides for freedom of
conscience for all persons. The new Government continued to
respect that freedom in 1989, with all religious denominations
free to worship as they chose. Adherence to a particular
creed confers no advantage or disadvantage, and conversion
from one faith to another is not interfered with. Foreign and
local missionaries proselytize freely.
The Rodriguez Government has attempted to mend the rupture
that occurred in church-state relations during the Stroessner
years. In his first public statement after taking power.
General Rodriguez listed respect for the Catholic Church as
one of the reasons for the coup. A Spanish priest expelled in
1988 was allowed to return to Paraguay.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
In general, Paraguayan citizens travel freely within the
country with virtually no restrictions, but there continued to
be periodic and random roadblocks in rural areas to verify
possession of national and voter registration cards and the
current payment of registration fees, as well as to intercept
stolen cars and contraband. In 1989 the Government
discontinued the practice of denying passports to opposition
leaders. Paraguayan passports still are not valid for travel
to Communist countries, and the Government does not allow
citizens of Communist countries to enter Paraguay. There
were, however, some exceptions to these rules in 1989. The
Government chose not to interfere in the travel of a
Paraguayan delegation to the Communist-sponsored World Youth
Festival in North Korea in July. Earlier, the Government
first denied and then agreed to grant a visa to a Hungarian
youth leader to allow him to visit Paraguay to assist the
organizing efforts of the Paraguayan delegation to the
Festival.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
In 1989 Paraguay was in the process of a transition to
democracy, scheduled to culminate in 1993 with the election of
a new President, but significant problems remained. Although
the May 1 general elections, following a free and open
campaign, were the most honest in recent Paraguayan history,
Paraguay still was in the process of building effective
democratic institutions. While there was more tolerance of
opposition in 1989, President Rodriguez dominated the
political scene, as did Stroessner before him. The ruling
Colorado Party's two-thirds majority in the Senate and Chamber
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of Deputies gave it complete control of the legislature, which
did not reject any significant presidential proposal during
the year.
Although President Rodriguez and the Colorado Party received
approximately 70 percent of the votes, certain factors
diminished the citizenry's ability peacefully to change their
government. Paraguay's antiquated polling system allowed for
fraud. Among the widespread voting irregularities were the
consistent lack of secret balloting, registration of voters on
election day, inaccurate voter lists, and distribution of
ballots outside polling booths. Another shortcoming was the
law that gives the party that wins a plurality of the
parliamentary vote two-thirds of the seats in both chambers.
Nevertheless, eight parties, including two formed during the
campaign, competed in the multiple-party, multiple-candidate
election that was witnessed by over 100 international
observers. These observers were allowed to travel and visit
polling places freely.
General elections, held every 5 years, next will take place in
1993 (the 1989 election was to select a government to complete
Stroessner's term). Municipal elections, also held nationwide
every 5 years, will be held in October 1990, when for the
first time local governments will be directly elected. The
law requires that all Paraguayans between 18 and 60 years of
age vote; sanctions for not voting rarely were applied.
Although the Constitution provides for equality of political
rights for women, in practice women continued to play only a
minor role in Paraguay's political life.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
During 1989 the Government welcomed discussion of human rights
in Paraguay with a variety of outside governmental and
nongovernmental organizations. In August Paraguay ratified
the Inter-American Human Rights Convention, and agreed to a
visit in 1990 of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission
(lAHRC) of the Organization of American States, which had been
barred by the Stroessner regime. The lAHRC's 1989 Annual
Report on Human Rights in Paraguay noted the Government's
pledge to correct the pervasive abuses of the former regime.
Local organizations remained active in the investigation and
defense of human rights. Four major human rights groups
operate in Paraguay: the Committee of Churches (supported by
foreign churches), the Paraguayan Human Rights Commission
(which publishes a periodic newsletter), PRODEMOS (a group
that includes Roman Catholic Bishop Mario Melanio Medina among
its leaders), and the local chapter of the Association of
Latin American Lawyers for the Defense of Human Rights. The
Catholic Church also is an active advocate of human rights.
The Church's weekly newspaper Sendero includes reports on
alleged human rights violations as a major part of its
editorial format. Two of Paraguay's leading human rights
advocates. Carmen Casco de Lara Castro of the Paraguay Human
Rights Commission, and Francisco Jose de Vargas of the
Committee of Churches, were elected opposition members of
Parliament in the May election. As a result of the country's
improved human rights situation, the Committee of Churches in
1989 underwent a reorganization, shifting some of its
attention away from prisoner assistance toward civic education.
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Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Ethnically, socially, and culturally, Paraguay has one of the
most homogeneous populations in South America. More than 90
percent of the people are of mixed Guarani Indian and Spanish
descent. An even larger percentage of the population is Roman
Catholic. The large majority of Paraguayans speak both
Guarani and Spanish. Partially because of these common
unifying elements, there is no clear evidence of
discrimination based on race, religion, or language in
Paraguay. In fact, in political and military circles, fluency
in Guarani and ties to peasant or rural origins are considered
advantageous.
The participation of women in the social and political system
of Paraguay is limited through informal means in this still
predominantly male-dominated society. There are, however, no
laws limiting participation of women. There are several
nongovernmental women's organizations which focus primarily on
encouraging civic education and greater participation in the
democratic transition process. While the traditional social
system limits the participation of women, they long have been
active in the economy, particularly those women from lower
income groups, and they increasingly participate in business,
the professions, and the artistic world. In 1989 the Congress
studied a proposal formulated by womens' groups to reform
discriminatory provisions of the Civil Code pertaining to
marriage and property rights of women. President Rodriguez
broke a longstanding informal barrier when he appointed a
woman. Dr. Cynthia Prieto, as Minister of Health — the first
woman minister in the history of Paraguay.
Violence against women, such as wife beating, is fairly common
in Paraguay. Such abuse is against the law, but the law is
not generally well enforced. Legislation pending in the
Chamber of Deputies would establish a subsecretary ministerial
position (probably within the Ministry of Health) with
responsibility for women's issues.
Paraguay has an unassimilated Indian population estimated at
75,000-100,000 which is generally ignored and neglected. The
Government's National Indigenous Institute has the authority
to purchase land on behalf of Indian communities and
expropriate private property under certain conditions to
establish tribal homelands. The Government actively
encourages church groups to work with indigenous populations
in health and welfare, as well as in religious matters. The
problems of the indigenous population, particularly those
involving land claims, continued to receive frequent media
attention. Although there is a government agency responsible
for Indian affairs, the social services (schools, health
posts, etc.) in Indian areas are generally of relatively poor
quality compared with those in other areas of the country.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Paraguay has been without beneficiary status in the U.S.
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program since 1987,
when it was found not to be in compliance with the GSP
statutory requirements regarding internationally recognized
worker rights. Paraguay was removed from the program after a
review of charges that Paraguayan workers were being denied
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PARAGUAY
freedom of association and that their leaders were being
harassed.
After the February coup, private sector workers became free
from government interference to form and join unions of their
choosing without previous authorization. Public sector
workers, however, continued to be prohibited by law from
unionizing. After the extralegal restraints of the Stroessner
regime were removed, Paraguayan workers organized scores of
new unions. Only a small proportion of Paraguay's workers
were organized, however.
Numerous International Labor Organization (ILO) experts came
to Paraguay in 1989 for meetings with the Ministry of Labor to
explore ways of improving labor rights in Paraguay. In August
international trade unionists from Latin America, Western
Europe, and North America attended meetings in Asuncion of the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU),
including a session of the ICFTU' s Human Rights Committee. In
October the Ministry of Labor hosted an international,
tripartite conference on "Labor Relations in a Democratic
Society" in cooperation with the Government of Spain.
Government, business, and labor leaders from Argentina, Spain,
Uruguay, and Paraguay shared their recent experience of the
transition from authoritarianism to democracy. However, the
lack of participation by the principal leaders of Paraguay's
major business associations drew criticism from their foreign
counterparts and from the Minister of Labor.
In a significant change from the Stroessner era when the
government-controlled Confederation of Paraguayan Workers
(CPT) dominated organized labor, by the end of 1989 it
appeared that most Paraguayan trade unions were independent of
the Government and the ruling Colorado Party. A second labor
central, the National Workers Central (CNT) , was legally
recognized in July 1989. It is affiliated with the World
Confederation of Labor and its regional organization, the
Latin American Confederation of Labor (CLAT) . In August a
third labor central, the Unified Workers Central (CUT), was
formed by approximately 80 independent labor unions and
campesino organizations. The CUT was legally recognized in
October. The new CUT maintains contacts with the ICFTU and
its regional body, the InterAmerican Regional Workers
Organization (ORIT) , the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) , and the
Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) ,
as well as with Brazil's CUT.
During the year, CUT increasingly came to dominate the labor
scene while the CPT, which maintained its ties to the Colorado
Party after the coup, suffered from internal divisions. The
Stroessner Government, for political reasons, often
arbitrarily denied legal recognition to independent trade
unions. After the coup, the Ministry of Labor recognized all
unions that met the legal requirements. By the end of the
year, over 200 unions had been recognized. Among the newly
recognized unions that previously had been denied legal status
was the first union at a savings and loan bank. The
Inter-union Workers' Movement (MIT), grew from eight member
unions to approximately 30 in the first 6 months after the
coup. MIT is not formally a labor central.
The right to strike, while recognized under Paraguayan law,
remained difficult to exercise due to the complex legal
process of factfinding, arbitration, and adjudication — which
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can involve delays of several years — required before a strike
can be considered legal. There were no major strikes declared
legal in 1989. In late August, a wave of worker walkouts hit
the country, of which the four major strikes all were declared
illegal by the Ministry of Labor's Conciliation and
Arbitration Board. The law prohibits public sector workers
from striking.
Meanwhile, in response to growing labor unrest, the Government
in September formed a new nonofficial government-worker-
employer Labor Mediation Commission made up of representatives
of the Ministries of Labor and Commerce, the country's three
labor centrals, and the two leading business associations. In
its first case, the new tripartite panel resolved a dispute at
a lumber mill, ending both a strike by the workers and the
temporary closing of the plant by the company.
The general respect for human rights that began with the
overthrow of Stroessner directly affected the labor movement.
Workers were free to hold meetings and stage protests, and the
Government generally did not harass their leaders. There were
some exceptions, however. Efigenio Lisboa, a prominent trade
unionist in Ciudad del Este, was arrested twice in 1989, and
spent much of the year in detention (see Section l.d.). In
October police detained overnight three CUT leaders for
leading a march on the Presidential Palace. Meanwhile, police
used water-hoses to break up a demonstration by workers
protesting the arrests. (See Section 2.b.)
Two striking workers were killed by the Armed Forces at Itaipu
Dam on December 12. The two were members of a splinter
faction of the union representing workers employed by Itaipu
contractors, a faction which had been on strike for the past 2
weeks. The two workers were taking part in an illegal effort
by the striking faction to block the main access road to
Itaipu and keep nonstriking members from entering. Under
circumstances which still are not entirely clear, a military
detachment assigned to guard the dam opened fire on the
strikers while attempting to clear the road, killing the two
and wounding several others. The unit claimed that strikers
fired first, while the union claimed that none of the strikers
were armed. The Paraguayan Government has launched an
investigation. The confrontation and violence shocked labor,
management, and Paraguayan society as a whole. Government
mediators got the parties to sit down and negotiate a
solution, putting an end to the strike.
The Government permits labor unions to maintain contact with
regional and international labor organizations. The American
Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) reopened its
office in Asuncion 3 months after the coup. AIFLD had closed
its office in 1981, severing its relationship with the
government-controlled CPT. In 1989 AIFLD continued working
with MIT, while extending assistance to the new CUT.
At its November 1989 session, the ILO Committee on Freedom of
Association (CFA) considered four cases concerning Paraguay.
These cases, involving complaints filed before 1989, allege
antiunion discrimination, including dismissal, transfer, and
detention, without charges, of workers; employer interference
in the legitimate activities of the union; interference with
the right to strike; and failure of the Government to
recognize a union. Three of the cases arose in the private
sector and one in the public sector. Noting that the union
which had been denied recognition had subsequently been
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recognized, the Committee requested the Government to improve
its machinery for enabling employees dismissed for union
activities to seek reinstatement; recalled the need for
legislation specifying remedies and penalties for employer
interference; expressed deep regret for the detention and
subsequent dismissal of a teacher, allegedly for union
activities; and requested the Government to provide detailed
information regarding the actions taken with regard to all the
individuals involved in the cases.
Several of these cases were also addressed by the ILO's
Committee of Experts (COE) . Among its recommendations, the
COE urged that measures be adopted to protect those categories
of workers — in particular public employees — not covered by the
Labor Code from antiunion discrimination; reiterated the need
for the Government to grant, unequivocally, the right to
organize and bargain collectively to public employees.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
A favorite antiunion tactic of Paraguayan employers after the
coup was to fire the leaders of nascent unions. The Labor
Code, dating from the Stroessner period, provided little
protection. Several labor leaders have challenged their
dismissals through the courts, a lengthy process that can take
years. At year's end, the Congress still was studying a
proposal presented by the MIT in July to strengthen those
provisions of the Labor Code that protect the job stability of
union leaders. According to a study done by CUT, 629 workers
were fired for union activity between February 4 and September
20, although not all of those workers were union leaders.
Subsequently, 101 of those workers were rehired by one firm
ordered to do so by a labor court.
The right to bargain collectively is recognized in the Labor
Code, but the Government did little to enforce the provision,
and it was not practiced generally. Some employers agreed to
collective bargaining, but there are no legal sanctions or
government pressures forcing them to do so. The labor laws
permit a union to represent all of the employees of a company
in collective bargaining even if less than half of the
employees are members of the union. The law also allows
multiple unions to represent the same employees at a work
place.
Under the law, there exist no areas, such as special economic
zones, exempt from the provisions of the Labor Code. Paraguay
has no export processing zone. In practice, the rights of
labor are more strongly exercised in the capital city,
Asuncion, than in other cities or the rural areas because the
vast majority of the country's unionized jobs are located in
the capital.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by law and was not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Minors between 15 and 18 years of age can be employed legally
only with parental authorization and cannot be employed in
dangerous or unhealthy conditions. Children between 12 and 15
years of age may only be employed legally in a family
enterprise, an apprenticeship, or in agriculture. The Labor
Code prohibits work by children under 12. These age
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PARAGUAY
restrictions are generally enforced, except in the informal
economy. It has been estimated, for example, that there are
about 15,000 children, many younger than 12, working in the
streets of Asuncion (500,000 population) selling newspapers,
shining shoes, cleaning car windows, and so forth.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Government establishes a private sector minimum wage,
which depends on the type of work and the region, based on
studies of the cost of living prepared by the National
Economic Coordinating Committee. The minimum monthly wage in
Asuncion was approximately $125. The minimum wage is barely
sufficient for a worker and his family to maintain a minimally
decent standard of living. Furthermore, it has been estimated
that 72 percent of Paraguayan workers earn less than the
decreed minimum, which the Government does little if anything
to enforce.
The Labor Code provides minimum guarantees of worker rights
and benefits. The law does not cover public sector,
temporary, or domestic workers. According to the Code,
maximum weekly hours are 48 for day work and 42 for night
work, with 1 day of rest. The law provides for a 1 month
annual bonus. Married women need their husbands' consent to
enter a labor contract, although labor contracts cannot be
denied to women who worked prior to marriage. Paid maternity
leave of 6 weeks prior to and after birth is required. Day
care centers for children under 2 years of age are mandatory
for enterprises employing more than 50 women. Severance pay
is specified and compensation provided in cases of unjustified
dismissal .
The Labor Code also governs conditions of safety, hygiene, and
comfort. The nascent independent trade union movement has yet
to focus on occupational safety and health. That, coupled
with the slowness and relative expense of the labor law
system, resulted in the frequent failure to provide the
protections established by the Labor Code. In general, the
Government did not effectively enforce the safety and hygiene
provisions of the Labor Code, partially for lack of inspectors,
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Peru has a freely elected democratic government, with an
executive branch headed by a president, a bicameral
legislature, a separate and independent judiciary, and an
attorney general's office (the Public Ministry). Peru's
history has been punctuated by periods of military rule, most
recently from 1968 to 1980. President Alan Garcia and his
center-left American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) won
the last general elections in 1985 by a large margin. The
next elections are scheduled for April 8, 1990.
Public security responsibilities are shared by the police and
the military. The Interior Ministry and its police services
have the primary counterterrorist role in the city of Lima and
in the 114 provinces which are not under a state of
emergency. The military leads the effort to combat subversion
in the 69 provinces which are currently under a state of
emergency. The states of emergency place all executive branch
authority in the local military command, suspend restrictions
on arbitrary detention and the requirement for search
warrants, and restrict rights of movement and assembly. More
than 50 percent of Peru's population of 22 million lived under
a state of emergency in 1989. Peru's history of military
coups has weakened civilian control over the military. There
is little oversight of military activities in the emergency
zones by civilian judges or prosecutors, and the
constitutional rights of persons detained by the military are
routinely ignored.
In Peru's mixed economy, private property is generally
respected. Unfavorable terms of international trade, lack of
foreign investment, capital flight, and internal structural
problems led in 1989 to stagnant exports, rising unemployment,
fiscal disaster, and one of the world's highest inflation
rates. Austerity measures produced a deep recession and a
50-percent cut in per capita annual income to an estimated
$800, without curbing inflation.
The chief factors driving human rights violations in Peru
remain the terrorist activities of the Sendero Luminoso
(Shining Path) Maoist guerrillas. The Sendero regularly
assassinates anyone perceived to be an opponent, or merely
uncooperative, including ordinary citizens, typically Indian
residents of the Andean highlands. As measured by the number
of reported deaths of government workers (144 civilian, 243
police, and 105 military), 1989 was the most violent year
since Sendero announced its "popular war" in 1980. Sendero
also increased its control over Peru's major coca-growing
region, the Upper Huallaga Valley, where it both represented
peasant coca growers in their dealings with narcotics
traffickers and cooperated with traffickers to thwart law
enforcement efforts. The Senate Commission on Violence
estimated that Sendero was responsible for a total 1,526
deaths in 1989. Several other smaller terrorist groups were
also active. Independent human rights groups charge that the
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) committed 161
political murders in 1989 and that the Rodrigo Franco Command
(CRF) murdered eleven.
Human rights abuses by government security forces also
increased in 1989, although independent investigations were
increasingly difficult to carry out because military
commanders restrict access to emergency zones. The Public
Ministry reports a backlog of over 3,000 pending cases of
disappearances, over 500 of them filed in 1989. There were
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credible reports of summary executions, arbitrary detentions,
and frequent use of torture by police and the military. The
Senate Commission on Violence estimated that government
security forces were responsible for a total of 1,228 deaths
in 1989. Trials of military personnel accused of human rights
violations move slowly, if at all. In December two police
officers were sentenced to prison terms for their roles in the
1986 massacre of 124 prisoners at Lurigancho prison. The 6
army officers and 69 other police personnel on trial were all
acquitted.
A special congressional commission on paramilitary activities
was established after the April and May assassinations of two
members of the Chamber of Deputies. Commission members
concluded that extremist members of the ruling APRA party,
working with elements of the Ministry of Interior, are using
the Rodrigo Franco Command (CRF) vigilante terrorist group to
conduct operations against suspected antigovernment terrorists
and sympathizers.
It is estimated that at least 3,198 persons (civilian and
military) were killed in terrorist-related violence in 1989,
an increase of over 50-percent from the previous year.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Political and other extrajudicial killings rose again in
1989. Sendero Luminoso continued to assassinate teachers,
engineers, development and human rights workers, Indian
peasants, and political candidates, as well as government,
police and ruling party officials. Official government
sources reported more than 1,450 civilian deaths from
terrorist violence. The independent National Coordinator for
Human Rights calculated a total of 823 civilian political
assassinations, 720 of them by Sendero, through the first 10
months of 1989. The Senate Select Committee on Violence and
Pacification calculates that Sendero's forces committed 1,526
killings in 1989. Sendero's killings thus remained primarily
aimed at the general public; by comparison, government
security forces suffered 157 deaths at Sendero's hands. Due
to the isolation of many rural areas where Sendero is most
active, the number of victims almost surely is underreported.
Sendero continued to use violence in the countryside,
particularly assassinations, to impose its control over
certain areas, punish peasants who withhold their support, and
eliminate opposition. In one such incident, Sendero killed at
least 45 peasants in three settlements in Huancavelica
department on June 9. The townspeople were rounded up,
community leaders and those who had refused Sendero's earlier
call for a work stoppage were selected for "trial," and then
shot, stabbed, or had their skulls smashed as family and
neighbors looked on. Another massacre, also probably by
Sendero, took place in the village of Canaire in Ayacucho
department, in which 35 were killed on February 27.
In the cities, Sendero used attacks more for propaganda and
intimidation purposes. In a major effort to disrupt the
nation's November 1989 municipal and April 1990 presidential
elections, it expanded its attacks on government and APRA
party officials to include opposition officeholders and
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candidates for public office, regardless of party affiliation.
Sendero attacked and killed several foreigners in 1989,
including tourists, development workers, and journalists.
A second terrorist group, the MRTA, has expanded beyond its
original base of operations in Lima and environs to field its
own paramilitary cadres in some rural zones, most notably in
northern San Martin department. Though the MRTA chiefly seeks
the destruction of property through the selective bombing of
banks, factories, foreign businesses, and diplomatic
installations, these attacks killed at least 161 people in
1989. Among those killed was a police sergeant during a
September attack on the Lima residence of Economy and Finance
Minister Cesar Vasquez Bazan.
A third terrorist group, the CRF, also increased its
activities in 1989. Suspected of being controlled by elements
of the APRA party and the Ministry of Interior, the CRF
carried out a campaign of intimidation, bombings, and
assassinations. Among those targeted by CRF in 1989 were
journalists, human rights workers, labor union memDers,
lawyers, leftist politicians, and others the CRF accused of
working to advance the cause of Sendero or MRTA. According to
the Senate Committee on Violence, CRF was responsible for 11
murders in 1989, a figure which closely tracks with that of
independent human rights organizations.
There are no official statistics on the number of summary
executions in 1989. Because the number of confirmed
disappearances sharply rose for the second consecutive year,
it appears probable that the number of summary executions also
increased in 1989. In an August 1989 report. Amnesty
International (AI) charged that not only did the number of
extrajudicial killings and disappearances in emergency zones
grow "in a spectacular manner" during 1988 and the first half
of 1989, but that for the first time these practices were no
longer confined to the emergency zones, nor were the victims
only from indigenous peasant communities in the Andean
highlands .
Several notable cases of probable military killings occurred
in 1989. On May 17, some 100 troops of the Third
Ollantaytambo Infantry Battalion entered the town of Calabaza,
Satipo, Junin department. According to survivors' accounts
filed with the Attorney General's office, the townspeople were
assembled, and two hooded individuals (said to be former
Sendero members cooperating with the army) selected
approximately 20 persons. The prisoners were taken to a
ravine, tortured, and killed, although several escaped. The
next day the bodies of 11 townspeople, including those of 3
students aged 14, 16, and 17 years, were found on the shores
of the Calabaza river.
The last surviving witness of the May 14, 1988, army massacre
of at least 28 villagers in Cayara, Ayacucho department, was
killed in circumstances suggesting army invo vement. Martha
Crisostomo Garcia was shot to death after eight hooded
individuals in military dress burst into her house in Huamanga
at 3 a.m. on September 8, 1989. The ninth witness to
disappear or to be killed since the Cayara massacre,
Crisostomo had identified the body of one of those killed,
thus implicating General Jose Valdivia, then political-military
chief of the Ayacucho emergency zone. A Public Ministry
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investigator concluded that there was clear military
responsibility for the Cayara massacre. The ruling party
member leading the congressional investigation into the
killings, however, concluded there had been "no excesses
committed on the part of the military," even though the
commission has yet to produce its official report. At year's
end, the investigation remained stalled.
Also in May, Delfin Ortiz Serna, a witness to the November
1988 killing of a journalist, who had filed a deposition
implicating the military, was shot to death. In neither the
Calabaza massacre nor the murder of Crisostomo, nor in any
other 1989 incident of alleged military or police violations
of a civilian's human rights, were the results of official
executive branch investigations ever made public, nor were
charges brought against security officials.
The public military trial of 77 army and police officials
accused of the June 1986 killing of 124 inmates at the
Lurigancho prison in the aftermath of a failed Sendero
uprising concluded in December with two convictions — and 75
acquittals due to "lack of evidence." Although police Colonel
Rolando Cabezas Alarcon and a police lieutenant were sentenced
to prison terms of 15 and 7 years respectively, none of the
military officers implicated were convicted. The military
justice code contains no specific language for dealing with
cases of killing, kidnaping, or torture — only "negligence" and
"abuse of authority."
The assassinations of Chamber of Deputies members Eriberto
Arroyo Mio (April 27) and Pablo Li Ormeno (May 6) prompted the
Chamber to establish a commission to investigate paramilitary
activities. The commission's preliminary report was submitted
in mid-August, "hypothesizing" that APRA party youths are the
actual perpetrators of the bombings, murders, and threats
being committed in the name of the CRF, with Minister of
Interior Agustin Mantilla as the driving force behind the
CRF. Commission members received a num.ber of death threats;
the daughter of commission member Manuel Piqueras was briefly
detained by armed men who threatened her father. After the
APRA congressional leadership declared the commission
dissolved, the non-APRA commission members issued a final
report in October, again implicating APRA and Minister
Mantilla. The APRA members had not issued any separate report
by year's end. Interior Minister Mantilla has resolutely
denied any involvement in the CRF or similar groups. Although
several suspects were detained and later released, by year's
end no criminal charges were pending in connection with any
actions undertaken by the CRF.
The CRF is also suspected in the January murder of Ayacucho
journalist Juvenal Arroyo, along with his wife and two
children. In April Tingo Maria radio personality Guillermo
Lopez Salazar was shot to death in his home by suspected CRF
terrorists. Sendero killed Peru's most prominent
environmental reporter Barbara D'Achille in May. American
journalist Todd C. Smith was kidnaped, tortured, and killed by
unknown assailants in Uchiza, San Martin Department in
November .
Miners Federation Secretary General Saul Cantoral was kidnaped
and murdered by unknown assailants on February 13. Also in
February, a demonstration of striking farmers in Pucallpa,
Ucayali department (not then an emergency zone) was broken up
by police who may not have known that last-minute approval had
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been given for the demonstration. Eight died and dozens were
wounded after the police fired first tear gas and then bullets
into the crowd. Some 300 persons were arrested; most were
quickly released. Campesino organizers claim 28 remain
unaccounted for and are presumed dead.
In late August and early September, several dozen bodies were
found floating down the Huallaga river near Santa Lucia in the
north central department of San Martin. Many of the bodies
had been decapitated and were also missing hands and feet.
Although no organization claimed responsibility for the
deaths, public speculation centered on the possibility that
the military had killed drug traffickers, Sendero members, or
other civilians. Others pointed to the possibility of a war
between rival drug gangs or to Sendero having killed
traffickers or civilians. The inability of police or private
human rights groups to ascertain responsibility for these
deaths, much less arrest those responsible, is indicative of
the level and variety of major violence prevalent in Peru
today.
b. Disappearance
Since 1983 there have been an estimated 2,800 to 3,500 cases
of disappearances involving the security forces, the majority
of which occurred prior to 1985. Local human rights groups
report having received formal complaints of 297 new cases of
disappearances in the first 10 months of 1989, compared to the
170 cases reported by the United Nations Working Group on
Disappearances in 1988. Most cases involved Army detention of
persons suspected of terrorist links in the emergency zones,
but there have been notable cases in Lima as well. Though a
large percentage of those detained by security forces within
the security zones have reappeared, human rights groups
believe that most of the remainder were or will be summarily
executed. The bodies of disappearance victims are rarely
found. Based on the testimony of survivors, it appears that
most victims are taken to military bases for interrogation.
Some are turned over to the police after lengthy detentions
and are later freed for lack of incriminating evidence. Human
rights groups argue persuasively that the rest are summarily
executed by the armed forces. An unknown number of
"disappeared" persons are unaccounted for because they joined
the ranks of MRTA or Sendero, either voluntarily or
involuntar i ly .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although the Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman or
humiliating treatment, charges of brutality toward detainees
are common. Huir.an rights groups state that suspected
subversives held by the Government are routinely tortured at
military detention centers; lawyers and others familiar with
the police and judicial system concur. In 1987 the Public
Ministry noted that the majority of detainees held by military
authorities showed signs of mistreatment or torture. In 1989
there were reliable accounts from released detainees of
torture or mistreatment both by police and the military.
The 1987 terrorism law requires that persons detained for
terrorism be interrogated only in the presence of a defense
attorney and a Public Ministry prosecutor. In these cases, a
court indictment must be sought within 15 days of arrest or
the prisoner must be released. Reliable reports of violations
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of these standards occur frequently in areas governed by the
military under a state of exception. There is some dispute as
to whether under Peruvian law the military is required to
adhere to these terrorism law requirements under a state of
exception, but Peru is obliged to meet such standards under
its international treaty obligations. In any event, the
military frequently ignore these standards. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1989 regained some access
to detainees in the military-controlled emergency zones and to
police detention centers where interrogations occur prior to
indictment .
Many victims of Sendero terrorism also show signs of having
been tortured before death. Torture of those victims often
follows a brief "popular trial," normally held in the presence
of rural villagers as a method of intimidation. Sendero uses
particularly brutal methods of execution, including slitting
throats, strangulation, stoning, and burning.
Prison conditions are extremely poor, and prisoners are likely
to experience unsanitary facilities, poor nutrition and health
care, and ill-treatment by prison staff. Many prison
cellblocks have reportedly fallen under Sendero or MRTA
control, with guards refusing to venture into them.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution, the penal code, and antiterrorist
legislation clearly delineate the arrest and detention
process. However, most if not all of these protections are
suspended in those areas under a state of emergency. In areas
not subject to a state of emergency, a warrant approved by a
Public Ministry prosecutor is required for arrest. Persons
arrested must be arraigned within 24 hours, except in cases of
drug trafficking, terrorism, or espionage, for which the limit
is 15 days. Detainees have the right to choose their own
attorney, or the Government must provide counsel at no
charge. Arrested persons are entitled to have an attorney
present when they make statements to the police. Under the
1987 terrorism law, police must also notify the detainees'
family and human rights groups of an arrest, although in
practice this is not consistently done. There is no bail or
provisional liberty for persons accused of terrorism.
Arrest procedures are different in the rural emergency zones.
The armed forces do not need an arrest warrant, and detainees
are often denied access to an attorney during interrogation
and to family members during their imprisonment. All
detainees, including those in the emergency zones, have the
right to seek judicial determination of the legality of their
detention, but this right is routinely disregarded by military
commanders in the emergency zones. Of the several thousand
prisoners held by the military inside the emergency zones,
human rights groups know of few who were turned over to
civilian authorities for prosecution. Arbitrary arrests and
detentions in the emergency zones in 1989 are estimated to be
in the hundreds.
In 1989 the military continued the practice of detaining
persons who enter the emergency zones to investigate human
rights cases or to instruct citizens on their constitutional
rights. Labor union organizers also often found themselves
detained under the broad terms of the terrorism law. In the 3
days before the mid-August start of a miners' strike, at least
34 organizers were detained and charged with terrorism.
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Another 10 were arrested the following week. By September 2,
all had been released and charges had been dropped against all
44.
The Constitution prohibits, and there have been no known cases
of, involuntary exile in the past 9 years. With regard to
forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is one of three separate branches of
government. Supreme Court judges, 23 in all, are nominated by
the President from slates supplied by an advisory committee,
and must be approved by the Senate. In the Peruvian legal
system, which is based on the Napoleonic Code, once criminal
charges are filed, a judge determines whether probable cause
exists. The judicial process prior to trial may last several
months, followed by a public trial. Defendants have the right
to be present at the trial, at which verdicts are rendered by
a judge or a panel of judges. Sentences may be appealed, and
judges may send cases back to lower courts for additional
investigation. Many judges on the Superior and Supreme Courts
are active in political parties, and there are occasional
claims that decisions have been politically motivated.
Courts face severe backlogs, a product of inefficiency,
influence peddling, and the sharp increase in terrorism
cases. There are too few public defenders for the large
caseloads. The Ministry of Justice reported in July 1988 that
there was a backlog of nearly 45,000 criminal cases. Human
rights groups have documented numerous cases of persons who
have been detained without bail, while awaiting trial, for
periods of up to 4 years. There are also widespread charges
of corruption and the suborning of judges, police, and
witnesses at all stages of the judicial process. Narcotics
traffickers reportedly have been able to buy their release
from jails. Outgoing Minister of Justice Cesar Delgado
Barreto acknowledged in September that fully two-thirds of all
prison inmates are awaiting trial for crimes of which they
have been accused, with only one-third having been judged,
found guilty, and sentenced.
Threats and intimidation of judges handling terrorism cases
represent a serious problem, accounting in part for the low
conviction rate of accused terrorists. Barely 5 percent of
those arrested for such actions are convicted, a notoriously
low rate that leads to police frustration with the judicial
process and to public tolerance of police abuses (this figure
does not include those held in military facilities inside the
emergency zones) . In 1987 Congress created special tribunals
to hear terrorism cases, and promised greater security
measures to protect judges and witnesses. There were
immediate problems with finding judges who were willing to
serve on these courts, with providing the guarantees of safety
required in the enabling legislation, and with the large
backlog of cases. Overwhelmed by these problems, the special
tribunals were abolished in April 1988. There continues to be
criticism of the lack of cooperation between the Interior
Ministry's technical police, who investigate and arrest, and
the Public Ministry prosecutors, who conduct their own
investigations as a part of the trial process.
Although the Constitution mandates that civilians be tried in
civilian courts. President Garcia proposed in July 1989 that
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civilian terrorists be tried by military tribunals throughout
the country, both in and outside the emergency zones.
Although this proposal was not adopted, special civilian
courts were established late in the year to try terrorism
cases in Lima and the rural emergency zones. The Supreme
Court decides whether military or police offenders are tried
in civilian courts or in a separate military court system.
The military generally asserts its jurisdiction in these
cases, and the Court typically rules in its favor. In the
first attempt to have a civilian court try a military officer
since 1986 (that case was thwarted when the officer fled the
country), nine army personnel, including at least one officer,
are to be tried in Sullana, Piura department, for the April
1989 murder of Army Sgt. Jorge Yanez Ceci after a round of
drugs and drinking. The civilian courts are making slow
progress on several cases involving alleged police violations
of human rights. Ongoing cases include those against police
charged in the 1981 killing in detention of Cusco University
student Marco Antonio Ayerbe, the 1982 killing of prisoners in
an Ayacucho hospital, the 1982 death of Francisco Nufflo, and
the 1986 torture of detainees in a Cusco police station. Two
police officers (of 71 police on trial) were sentenced to
prison in December 1989 for their roles in the June 1986
Lurigancho prison massacre (Section l.a.).
Military trials may be closed to the public at the discretion
of the ruling magistrate, and little is known about specific
cases. Although the military claims that human rights
offenders are severely disciplined, no member of the armed
forces has ever been convicted in either military or civilian
courts for human rights violations. Cases reportedly still
pending in military courts include charges against: a
lieutenant for the 1985 murder of 69 persons in Accomarca; an
officer for 3 1985 Huanuco deaths; and officers accused of
summary executions in 1986 in Parco and Pomatambo. The
military prosecutor asked for sentences ranging between 6 and
25 years against the 77 accused security force members (6 army
officers, 20 police officers, and 51 police) accused of
involvement in the June 1986 massacre of prisoners at
Lurigancho prison. The prosecutor requested a 25-year
sentence for police Colonel Roland Cabezas and 6 years for
army General Jorge Rabanal. Cabezas received a 15-year prison
sentence. Police lieutenant Jaime Oswaldo Marquina was
sentenced to 6 years. All other defendants, including army
General Rabanal, were found not guilty due to "lack of
evidence. "
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution stipulates that the police need a judicial
warrant to enter a private dwelling, and this requirement is
generally respected in practice. The requirement is suspended
in the emergency zones, however, and security forces in those
areas routinely conduct searches of private homes without
warrants .
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Approximately 1,748 combatants, including some 1,400 presumed
terrorists, died in armed clashes in 1989. Previously the
Government claimed to have killed 4,500 terrorists from
1980-1988, including 630 in 1988. Though the military may
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inflate these counts, confirmed killings of terrorists may
also be underreported because Sendero attempts to retrieve all
its casualties, including fatalities, after clashes with the
military. Local human rights groups charge that a significant
but unknown number of captured terrorists and innocent
civilians were executed by the military. Sendero' s disregard
for the rules of war and humanitarian law are infamous. As AI
reported in August, "the violent adversaries of the Government
routinely torture, mutilate and assassinate their captives."
Both Sendero and the military are known to have blocked
passage of relief supplies and humanitarian assistance. The
international relief organization Medicins Sans Frontieres
suspended its efforts in the emergency zones.
Abuse of the rights of prisoners (able-bodied, wounded, and
sick alike) was widespread by both security and terrorist
forces. The military's violations of international norms
ranged from the routine blindfolding of prisoners, to the
frequent refusal to admit to holding certain persons in
detention, to the less frequent summary execution of unarmed
prisoners. Responding to a Sendero ambush of a military
patrol, army helicopters on June 19 strafed a village near
Aguaytia in the Upper Huallaga valley, killing or injuring an
unknown number of civilians.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the
press. With 8 television stations, dozens of radio stations,
and 15 daily newspapers in Lima alone, Peruvians have access
to a very broad range of opinion and information. The media
are highly partisan. The Government owns one of the two
national television networks, a radio network, and three
newspapers; APRA operates two newspapers, and close advisors
of the President control a third. The independent media are
quick to criticize any branch of the Government. Most major
opposition parties boast their own newspapers, and opposition
figures also have frequent access to the government media.
There were occasional and credible complaints of government
pressure on the media and restrictions on journalists.
However, there was no discernible trend in these incidents,
nor did they constitute government policy.
Journalists were often barred from traveling in the rural
areas of the emergency zones, and those who attempted to do so
were occasionally detained by the military, although they were
generally released within hours. There were also frequent
complaints of police confiscation of video and photographic
material of events the Government did not want publicized.
Police arrested Janet Talavera, the interim director of the
pro-Sendero newspaper El Diario, in June. She was detained
under the provisions of the legislation prohibiting "apologies
for and encouragement of terrorism." Additional charges of
committing terrorist acts were later filed; she was awaiting
trial at year's end. Police raided the offices of El Diario
on November 2, arresting a dozen workers and closing the
paper. Nonetheless, it appeared irregularly for the remainder
of the year, edited and printed clandestinely. Luis Arce
Borja, the paper's permanent director, is also under
indictment for "apologies for and encouragement of terrorism"
and spent most of the year living in Europe. A local lawyer
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attempted to invoke the same statute against Cesar
Hildebrandt , one of the country's most prominent journalists,
who was at the time the editor of the influential magazine Si.
Hildebrandt alleged that the move was orchestrated from the
Presidential Palace. Whatever the truth, the move ultimately
came to naught. The antiterrorism statute has been applauded
by some journalists as necessary; others fear that it can be
used to stifle press freedom.
Journalists were sometimes the victims of violence and
threats. Four noted journalists were killed in 1989 (see
Section 1 . a . ) ; the College of Peruvian Journalists reported
that as many as 22 persons involved in the news media were
killed. The owner of the Panamericana Radio and Television
network. Hector Delgado Parker, was kidnaped by MRTA on
October 4, and his bodyguards killed. MRTA announced Delgado
Parker would be "tried" for unspecified "crimes against the
people." There were also death threats against other
journalists. The local ANSA correspondent temporarily fled-
the country in May after a reported threat.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These rights are expressly provided for in the Constitution
and are normally respected in practice except in areas under a
state of emergency (where the right of assembly is
suspended) . Public meetings in plazas or streets require
advance permission, which can only be denied for reasons of
security or public health. Municipal authorities usually
approved permits for demonstrations in nonemergency zones.
Many unauthorized demonstrations also occurred, and, for the
most part, the Government dealt with them in a
nonconf rontational manner. However, as opposition groups
adopted more provocative and violent tactics, the Government
often denied permits or broke up marches. Police resorted
more often to clubs, tear gas, buckshot, and f iretruck-mounted
water cannons to disperse unruly or threatening crowds. At
least eight (and possibly many more) were killed in February
when police opened fire on a demonstration of striking farmers
in Pucallpa (see Section l.a.).
There are no particular restrictions placed on political
activity by trade associations or professional bodies. Such
organizations are permitted to, and routinely do, maintain
relations or affiliate with recognized international bodies in
their respective fields.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Roman Catholicism predominates in Peru, and the Constitution
formally recognizes the Church. The Constitution also
establishes the separation of church and state and ensures
freedom of religion and conscience. These rights are
respected in practice. Members of minority religions
encounter no government interference in practicing their faith
or in exempting their children from religious instruction in
public schools. Organized religions are free to establish
places of worship, train clergy, engage in religious
publishing, and proselytize. Foreign-born clergy are not
barred from entry; rather, they constitute a significant
presence, even within the dominant Catholic Church.
Missionary organizations operate freely in the country.
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Nonetheless, particular members of various religious
organizations report having received death threats from
Sendero, MRTA, or the CRF during 1989. Several religious
workers were killed. These incidents appear prompted by the
terrorist group's perception that a given individual's
activities "strayed" from pastoral to political. Some
religious officials fear, however, that Sendero is
increasingly antagonistic to organized religion in general.
They cite the December bombing of a Catholic church, increased
amounts of Sendero vitriol directed against the church, a
spate of killings of religious workers, and reports of death
threats in some areas of the country against those who
celebrate Christmas. MRTA bombed three Mormon churches, which
it publicly accuses of having links to U.S. corporate
interests .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution provides for the right of free movement, and
there are no political or legal constraints on foreign travel
or emigration. Approximately 150,000 Peruvians emigrated to
other nations in 1988, and similar numbers are believed to
have emigrated in 1989. Departure taxes and passport costs,
although substantially reduced at year's end, nonetheless
constitute a prohibitive expense for millions of Peruvians.
Freedom of movement is legally suspended within the emergency
zones and travelers may be detained by authorities at any
time. Other domestic and international travel is not known to
be restricted for political reasons. There have been no major
resettlement efforts by the security forces in several years.
Persons fleeing turmoil in other countries traditionally have
been encouraged to return eventually to their country of
origin or to emigrate to third countries, but have not been
forced to do so. Involuntary repatriation occurs only in
cases of persons accused of nonpolitical crimes.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Peru is a democracy governed by a freely elected president and
congress. The political process is open, subject to
monitoring by an autonomous National Elections Board, and
elections are vigorously contested by parties ranging from
conservative to Marxist. In the November 1989 municipal
elections, for example, 10 political movements fielded
candidates for mayor of Lima. Sendero Luminoso persistently
sought to deny citizens their political rights--particularly
in the more remote areas--by killing candidates and elected
officials and threatening voters. Sendero leaders have
repeatedly and publicly stated their intention to disrupt the
1990 presidential elections, just as they tried to disrupt the
November 1989 municipal elections. By September 30, over 590
mayors and city aldermen elected in the general municipal
elections of 1986 had been forced from their posts by
terrorist threats or violence. Over 75 mayors and other
municipal, district, and provincial officials were killed by
Sendero during 1989. After Sendero assassinated Fermin
Azparrent, the Mayor of Ayacucho City, on September 19,
Sendero warned that any mayoral or city alderman candidate in
Ayacucho who did not withdraw his candidacy within 24 hours
would also be killed. All but one candidate withdrew (and he
moved to Lima) . A second candidate reentered the race the
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week of the election. Nationwide, 252 districts (12.5 percent
of the total) fielded no candidates for municipal office.
Suffrage is both universal and mandatory for persons 18 to 70
years of age, except for active duty police or military, who
are barred from voting or holding public office. Balloting is
direct and secret. Although the fine for failing to vote was
raised from $4 to approximately $50 (roughly equal to a
month's minimum wage) on the eve of the November elections,
the National Elections Board announced afterwards that the
fine would not be enforced. Elections are held every 5 years
for president and the two vice presidents, as well as for the
Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The president is barred from
running for consecutive terms of office. Elections for the
nation's newly established regional parliaments are to be held
every 3 years, at the time of the nation's municipal
elections. Under the Constitution the Government is headed by
a powerful executive. More than 95 percent of all new laws
are enacted through unilateral presidential decrees.
Nonetheless the legislature (currently also dominated by the
APRA party) freely and openly debates government policies and
does on occasion vote against government positions.
The political system, although legally open to all, is
dominated by Peruvian males of European or mixed European and
indigenous background.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Access by the ICRC to the emergency zones and to detainees
which had been denied in mid-1988 was restored in early 1989
and ICRC personnel visited over 100 security detainees in
September. AI last sent =i formal delegation to Peru in
November 1988 and was received by various members of the
Cabinet. Outside of the emergency zones, the Government did
not impede or restrict their access. In May 1989 AI forwarded
a draft report to the Government for comment but did not
receive a reply. AI published the report, "Peru: Human
Rights and State of Emergency," in late August, noting that
"grave violations of human rights" had increased throughout
the previous 18 months. In November AI released a second
report, "Caught Between Two Fires," charging that "torture,
mutilation, 'disappearance,' murder, and rape have become a
hallmark of the armed forces' 'campaign against terrorism.'"
The Ministry of Defense issued an immediate, heated denial but
did not further address the charges.
Local human rights organizations complain that they are
limited by the military in their efforts to investigate human
rights abuses in the emergency zones and that their requests
to the Government for information are usually ignored.
Although most groups state that they are usually not harassed
or threatened by the Government, incidents continued to
occur. In September three visiting human rights lawyers and
five local residents preparing a seminar on constitutional
rights were arrested on terrorism charges in San Marcos
province of Cajamarca department. They were held for 2 1/2
days before all charges were dropped and the eight were
released. Human rights groups also received threats from
terrorist groups, mostly from Sendero, but also from the CRF.
Due to violence and the specific threat of continued violence,
a num.ber of human rights and humanitarian assistance
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organizations were forced to close their offices in certain
emergency zones during 1989.
A number of local private human rights organizations
constitute the independent National Coordinator for Human
Rights. These include the National Human Rights Commission,
the Institute for Legal Defense, the Association for Human
Rights, and the Catholic Church's Commission for Social
Action. Other smaller groups work in the departmental
capitals and other cities. These groups are generally
credible observers, investigating and reporting on human
rights abuses to the extent possible, regardless of the
perpetrator .
In 1989 the Government repeatedly complained that both local
and international human rights groups distort or exaggerate
Peru's human rights problems. The Government's general
unresponsiveness to specific inquiries, however, has done
little to improve its credibility. Peru is a member of the
United Nations Human Rights Commission.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution grants women equality with men, and laws on
marriage, divorce, and property rights do not discriminate
against women. Nevertheless, tradition impedes the access of
women to leadership roles in major social and political
institutions .
Spouse abuse is a chronic problem. Anecdotal police reports
indicate that such abuse is increasing in frequency as the
nation's political and economic frustrations grow. In late
1988 a special police center, staffed by policewomen, was
established in Lima to provide legal, medical, and psychiatric
assistance to abused spouses and children. A number of
women's organizations and feminist groups are active in Peru.
Peru's large indigenous population and its small black
population were also subject to pervasive social
discrimination, although far less so than before the Velasco
resolution of 1968. The former group, mostly speakers of
Quechua, Aymara, and other native languages, traditionally has
lacked access to public services. Peru is a classic case of
differential development, with public investment traditionally
focused on the coast, drawing migrants to the cities,
especially Lima. Recognizing this fact, the Government has
increased the flow of resources and services to poor, largely
Indian, rural areas. Development efforts, however, have been
impeded by the difficulty and cost of providing services to
remote areas which are out of the mainstream of Hispanic
culture, and by the continued disruption of these efforts by
Sendero. As a result of current problems, as well as historic
and continued prejudice, the economic and social needs of
Peruvians of European ancestry continued to be met to a far
greater extent than those of Peruvians of black, mixed, or
pure Indian heritage.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides for the right of workers freely to
associate and form labor unions without previous
authorization. In practice, however, there are legal
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restrictions on the right to organize (see below), and a
requirement to register with the Ministry of Labor in order
for the union to become legal and capable of performing its
functions. Suspension or dissolution of labor unions is
forbidden by the Constitution, but it can be done legally
through the civil court system at the request of the union
itself, or by cancellation of the union's registration by the
Ministry. Unions may form industrywide federations which can,
in turn, form confederations, all of which can be affiliated
with international labor organizations. Private and public
sector unions of workers performing the same type of work
cannot join together as a confederation at any level. Police
and military are proscribed from forming unions.
About 18 percent of the labor force is organized. Organized
labor, however, is found in industries responsible for about
70 percent of Peru's gross national product. The majority of
unorganized Peruvian workers are those in the countryside and
those involved in the vast underground "informal" sector that
work outside government regulations.
Although a significant percentage of Peruvian organized labor
belongs to independent unions and federations, those unions
with a political party affiliation are routinely manipulated
to serve political interests.
The Confederation of Peruvian Workers is a member of the
Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers and is
affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions. The Communist party-controlled General Confederation
of Peruvian workers is affiliated with the Communist-controlled
World Federation of Trade Unions and its Latin American
organization, the Permanent Congress for Trade Union Unity of
Latin America.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike "according
to law." There is no strike law, however, even though
Congress has considered various implementing bills since the
Constitution was promulgated in 1979. By Supreme Executive
Decree (which defines some strike behavior in the absence of a
formal law), workers in the private sector must give 72-hour
notice to the employer and the Ministry of Labor before going
on strike. When direct negotiations between workers and
employers break down, the Government intervenes and
constitutes a tripartite (government, management, labor) board
to review the situation. If no agreement is reached, the
Government then weighs the overall economic implications of
the employer's and the workers' positions and makes a decision
(which can be appealed in the civil court system) . The
Government may then make a final offer which, if rejected,
will open the way for declaring the strike illegal. A
government determination that the strike is illegal can lead
to the dismissal of workers or union leaders and permits
employers to hire strikebreakers legally. Despite these
restrictions, innumerable strikes, often wildcat in nature,
did take place in 1989. There are no norms regulating strikes
in the public sector and all such strikes were therefore open
to legal challenge. In spite of the constitutional right to
strike, nearly all strikes in Peru are declared illegal.
However, the penalties on the workers who strike illegally are
seldom implemented.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee on
Freedom of Association, at its meetings in June and November
1989, considered at length several pending complaints against
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the Government of Peru. Among these complaints were
allegations from several trade union organizations that the
Government has used force to repress trade union demonstrations
and strikes resulting in the injury and death of strikers and
demonstrators, including the alleged murder of 88 peasants who
were participating in a meeting; and, that it has violated
trade union autonomy by searching union offices, detaining
their leaders, and interfering in their organizations. The
complaints also alleged that the Industrial Relations Bill and
administrative actions of the Government violate the right to
strike. The Committee deplored the violence, requested the
Government to submit further information, and agreed with the
union allegations regarding the Industrial Relations Bill.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
By law, employers cannot discriminate against union members or
organizers. In practice, however, union activists are
sometimes harassed by employers who threaten to fire them, or
who pay off the workers to leave the enterprise. (There were
reported incidents during the year of more serious harassment
of labor union activists, including arbitrary detention (see
Section l.d.), kidnaping, and killing (see Section l.a.). The
workers can appeal their case through the Ministry of Labor
or, in case a decision is not acceptable to both parties,
through the civil courts. Throughout this process, which can
be lengthy, the worker is kept on the company's payroll until
a final legal ruling is obtained.
The right to bargain collectively is provided for by the
Constitution, but there are restrictions on what can be
negotiated. In the public sector, for example, only working
conditions can be negotiated, and then only if the changes do
not involve expenses greater than the funds already budgeted.
In the private sector, collective bargaining can cover both
working conditions and pay. Labor laws and regulations are
applied uniformly throughout the country, including in an area
of the Amazon Basin, granted in a Peru/Colombia border
agreement, which is analogous to a free trade zone .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits compulsory labor, and this is
usually respected in practice. There have been reports of
compulsory labor on plantations in remote areas of the country
where law enforcement is all but nonexistent. Sendero has
also been accused of forcibly recruiting peasants to either
join its ranks or render support services.
In its 1989 report, the ILO Committee of Experts urged the
Government to adopt pending legislation prohibiting practices
which violate ILO Convention 105 on forced labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The law prohibits the employment of children under 14 years of
age. In the formal sector of the economy, the law allows for
the employment of older children in some jobs, for a limited
period of time, and for a curtailed workweek at full pay.
According to a 1987 Senate report, however, 1.1 million
children 6 to 14 years of age work. Unofficial sources
estimate that about half a million children work in the Lima
area alone. A June 1989 survey of 133 working children by the
Agrarian University in Lima showed that 78 percent of them
were between 10 and 12 years old. Some 40 percent sold
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assorted merchandise as street vendors, and 53 percent went to
school only occasionally or not at all. One-third worked 7
days a week, and 57 percent of the total worked between 2 and
5 days a week.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Labor code provisions concerning conditions of work are
routinely ignored for the majority of the working population.
The code provides for an 8-hour day and an official 48-hour
week for men, and 45 for women. There are government
standards for health and safety by industry, but these are
rarely enforced, either by the employer or the Government
(which has no inspectors). Accidents are common, and there is
usually no emphasis on prevention; once accidents occur,
employers normally make compensation.
All workers are entitled to 30 days' paid vacation. Those in
the private sector have to work a minimum of 260 days
(excluding 30 days' sick leave) or forfeit their vacation.
The minimum wage is increased regularly by the Government, but
it continues to lag inflation. Equal to about $40 per month
on the parallel market, the minimum wage is not sufficient to
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
However, many Peruvians are paid more than the minimum wage
and many others supplement their income through multiple jobs
and/or subsistence farming.
724
ST. KITTS & NEVIS
St. Kitts and Nevis is a small two-island state with a
parliamentary democracy modeled after that of the United
Kingdom. The Constitution provides the smaller island of
Nevis considerable self-government, as well as the right to
secede from the federation if certain enumerated procedures
are followed. The country is governed by a prime minister, a
cabinet, and a legislative assembly. The Governor General,
with largely ceremonial duties, is the titular Head of State.
The Constitution requires general elections at least every 5
years. Prime Minister Kennedy Simmonds and his People's
Action Movement came to power in a coalition Government in
1980 and were returned to power after general elections in
1984 and 1989.
Security forces consist of a small police force, which
includes a Special Service Unit that receives some light
infantry training, and a small coast guard.
St. Kitts and Nevis has a mixed economy based on sugar cane
and tourism. Most commercial enterprises are privately owned,
but the sugar industry (the country's largest) and 85 percent
of all arable land are owned by a state corporation. The
approximate 1988 per capita gross domestic product was
$2,534. Steady economic growth continued in 1989.
St. Kitts and Nevis maintained its good human rights record
during 1989.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Law enforcement authorities abide by the constitutional
prohibitions against the use of torture or other forms of
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Family members,
attorneys, and clergy are permitted to visit detainees
regularly.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and
this provision is respected in practice. The law requires
that persons detained be brought before a court within 48
hours. There were no reported cases of exile.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides that every person accused of a crime
receive a fair, speedy, and public trial, and these
requirements are generally adhered to. The judiciary, a part
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ST. KITTS & NEVIS
of the Eastern Caribbean legal System, is highly regarded and
independent. Final appeal may be made to the Queen's Privy
Council in the United Kingdom. There are no military or
political courts. Legal assistance is available to indigent
defendants .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Neither the Government nor the police interfere arbitrarily in
the private lives of individuals. Warrants are required to
search private homes.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the
press. The Government owns the only radio and television
station on St. Kitts. There is a religious television station
and a privately owned radio station on Nevis. The
government-owned radio and television generally do not
adequately publicize rallies and conventions held by the
opposition political party.
St. Kitts and Nevis does not have a daily newspaper, although
each of the major political parties publishes a weekly or
biweekly newspaper. The papers are free to criticize the
Government and do so regularly and vigorously. International
news publications are readily available.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the right of peaceful assembly.
Organized demonstrations, rallies, and public meetings
sponsored by political parties occur regularly. Usually these
take place without government interference.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for the free exercise of religion,
and religious practices are not restricted. Most church
members belong to Protestant denominations. All groups are
free to maintain links with coreligionists in other countries.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Travel inside and outside of the country is unrestricted.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens are able to change their government by peaceful
means. A vigorous multiparty political system exists in which
political parties are free to conduct their activities.
Periodic elections are held in which all citizens 18 years of
age and older may register and vote by secret ballot.
The People's Action Movement (PAM) of Prime Minister Kennedy
Simmonds holds a majority of seats in the Parliament. PAM has
worked closely with the Nevis Reformation Party of Nevis
726
ST. KITTS & NEVIS
Premier Simeon Daniel. In the March 1989 national election,
the two parties won 8 of 11 elected seats in Parliament. The
former head of the main opposition St. Kitts Labour Party, Lee
Moore, charged before the elections that PAM had used
fraudulent ballots to help insure its 1934 victory and was
prepared to employ fraud to maintain its majority in the 1989
elections, but he presented no credible evidence to indicate
that the elections were not conducted in any other than a free
and fair manner.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
No international human rights organization maintains an office
in St. Kitts and Nevis. The Government is firm in its respect
for human rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There were no reports of systematic discrimination based on
race, sex, creed, language, or social status. The role of
women in society is not restricted by law. However, the role
of most women in the country is still circumscribed by culture
and tradition. The Government created the Ministry of Women's
Affairs to help redefine the role of women in society and to
ensure that women's rights are promoted. According to a
Ministry official, violence against women is a problem in St.
Kitts-Nevis, but gauging the extent of the problem is
difficult because many women are reluctant to file a complaint
or pursue thier complaints in the courts. Despite this
reluctance, there were publicly reported cases of both
domestic violence and rape in 1989, and a number of
convictions. According to the Women's Affairs Ministry, the
police stand ready to investigate allegations of violence
(both domestic violence and rape) but may be cautious about
going to court, because many women eventually withdraw their
complaints. If the woman pursues the complaint, enforcement
by police and courts is effective. Penalties range from fines
to long-term imprisonment, depending on the gravity of the
offense.
The Women's Affairs Ministry sent a ministry official to the
United States in 1989 for training in counseling abused
women. A policewoman was also sent to the United States for
the same training, and now heads a special unit dedicated to
abused women. The Ministry also sponsored a workshop on child
abuse with an expert on domestic violence, which was attended
by police, clergy, teachers, community workers, and guidance
counselors. Ministry officals met regularly with police to
increase awareness of the problem of violence against women,
and also ran a 3-day radio program on the problem of domestic
violence.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides for the right to form and belong to
trade unions. The major labor union, the St. Kitts Trades and
Labour Union, is affiliated with the opposition St. Kitts
Labour Party and is organized in all sectors of the economy.
Membership appears to be declining, as the Government assumes
some of the social welfare roles formerly played by unions.
727
ST. KITTS & NEVIS
There is also an independent teachers' union and a union
representing dockworkers in the capital city.
The right to strike, while not specified by law, is well
established and respected in practice. There were no major
strikes in 1989, although workers on a public highway project
held a brief work stoppage to obtain a holiday pay concession,
which was granted. Unions are free to affiliate with
federations, confederations, and international bodies,
although St. Kitts is not a member of the International Labor
Organization.
b. The Right To Organize and Bargain Collectively
Labor unions are free to organize and to negotiate for better
wages and benefits for union members. There are no areas
where union organization or collective bargaining are
discouraged or impeded. There is no legislation governing
organization and representation of workers, and employers are
not legally bound to recognize a union, but past practice has
been for employers to do so if a majority of workers polled
wish to organize. The Labor Commission attempts to mediate in
disputes between labor and management on an ad hoc basis.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution forbids slavery and forced labor, which do
not exist in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum legal working age is 14. The Labor Ministry
relies heavily on school truant officers and the Community
Affairs Division to monitor compliance, which they do
effectively.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The workweek is 40 hours in 5 days. Workers are guaranteed a
minimum vacation of 2 weeks. Minimum wages for domestic
servants and retail store employees were established by law in
1984 and updated in 1989. These range from about $24 per week
for a shop clerk to $36 per week for a maid and $60 for a shop
supervisor. The minimum wage would provide an adequate,
though Spartan, living for the wage earner and family. Wages
may be supplemented by the widespread practice of keeping
small animals (goats, chickens). Most people live in extended
families where there may be more than one wage earner. The
Labor Commission undertakes regular wage inspections and
special investigations when complaints are received; employers
found in violation are required to pay back wages. While
there are no specific health and safety regulations, the
factories law provides general health and safety guidance to
labor ministry inspectors.
728
ST. LUCIA
A member of the Commonwealth of Nations, St. Lucia is a
multiparty, parliamentary democracy. For much of its 10 years
of independence, St. Lucia has been led by incumbent Prime
Minister John Compton. Compton's United Workers Party
defeated the St. Lucia Labor Party in the 1982 elections;
Compton was reelected in 1987, and the United Workers Party
currently holds a small majority of seats in Parliament. The
opposition Labor Party actively seeks to expand its bases of
support; elections are next due in 1992 but can be called
earlier by the Prime Minister.
The Royal St. Lucia Police is the only security force in the
country. Within the police force is a small Special Service
Unit (SSU) with some paramilitary training. A coast guard
unit has also been established under police auspices. A
police inquiry in 1988 dealing with allegations of corruption
resulted in the ouster of the Police Commissioner and several
high-ranking officers. Trinidadian Clive Sealy, the new
Acting Commissioner, has worked diligently to improve
operations and restore corps morale. The police have
traditionally demonstrated a high degree of integrity,
professionalism, and respect for human rights.
St. Lucia has experienced several years of sustained economic
growth, particularly in agriculture, tourism, and, more
recently, in manufacturing and construction. Economic
performance in all four sectors was strong during 1989.
Although an unemployment rate of around 15 percent remains a
source of potential instability, the situation has improved in
the last year.
St. Lucia continued to have a good human rights record in 1989.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or other extrajudicial
killings .
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearances or politically
motivated abductions.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution specifically prohibits torture, and no such
incidents were reported.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Government adheres to the constitutional provision
prohibiting arbitrary arrest or imprisonment and requiring a
court hearing within 72 hours after detention. There were no
reports of arbitrary arrest or other forms of extralegal
detention, or of forced exile in 1989.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
729
ST. LUCIA
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution requires public trials before an independent
and impartial court, and the provision of legal counsel for
indigents. Criminal defendants are entitled to select their
own legal counsel, are presumed innocent until proven guilty,
and have the right of appeal. Both constitutional and
statutory requirements for fair public trials are followed.
The regional West Indies Court of Appeal, a circuit court long
noted for its impartiality, serves as St. Lucia's appeals
court .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There were no reports of arbitrary intrusion by the State into
the private lives of individual citizens. Authorities
consistently observe constitutional prohibitions against
arbitrary search, seizure, and entry.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Constitutional provisions for free speech and press are
respected in practice. The Government neither interferes with
the operations of the press nor censors the content of the
three privately owned major newspapers, which cover the
spectrum of political opinion and are often highly critical of
the Government. The one local television station is also
privately owned. While Radio St. Lucia is government owned
and operated, the programming staff is allowed a large measure
of autonomy following a 1988 incident in which the Government
suspended a controversial radio call-in program. This
provoked a public outcry. Although the program in question
was never reinstated, the programming staff was subsequently
permitted a greater degree of programming autonomy.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of association and of assembly are provided for by
the Constitution. Permits for public meetings and
demonstrations are necessary if meetings are to be held in
public places such as streets, sidewalks, or parks. Permits
are routinely granted and are not denied for political
reasons. Refusal to issue a permit is rare and generally
stems from the failure of the organizers to request a permit
in a timely manner, normally defined as a 48-hour notice. In
one instance in 1989, police peacefully disbanded a group of
demonstrators in front of the House of Assembly for failing to
obtain a proper demonstration permit. This was the only
incident of this type in several years.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The majority of the population is Roman Catholic, but other
denominations are free to maintain places of worship, train
clergy, establish religious schools, and engage in the full
range of activities normally associated with religious
organizations. St. Lucia's small Protestant community
functions without impediment.
730
ST. LUCIA
d . Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
These rights are provided for in the Constitution and
generally honored in practice.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
St. Lucia's parliamentary system provides for genuine choices
among parties, policies, and officials. Although currently
there are two main parties, several other political
organizations also participate in free elections, which are
held at least every 5 years by secret ballot. The opposition
St. Lucia Labor Party plays a significant role in the
country's political life, and presently holds 7 of 17 seats in
the House of Assembly.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no local human rights groups in St. Lucia.
International human rights organizations filed no reports or
requests for investigations in 1989.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Government policy is basically nondiscriminatory in the areas
of housing, jobs, education, and advancement opportunities.
There are no legal restrictions on the role of women or
minorities .
Although violence directed specifically against women,
including domestic violence such as wife beating, is not
considered to be a major problem in St. Lucia, lack of
statistical data makes it difficult to guage its true extent.
An additional factor may be a reluctance on the part of some
victims to report cases or to press charges. In 1989 a
women's rights organization was established to monitor
existing abuses. The group has held a number of public
meetings to publicize the plight of battered women, and staged
a large demonstration to protest the killing of a woman who
was beaten to death. Because cases of this sort are rare, the
Government does not consider additional legislation or other
specific remedial action to be necessary but does support the
efforts of the monitoring group.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution, under the broader rubric of the right of
association, specifies the right of workers to form or belong
to trade unions. Unions are independent of the Government and
are free to choose their own representatives. Union elections
are sometimes vigorously contested. All unions are free to
publicize their views and determine policies aimed at
representing members' interests.
One recently formed union, the Technical and Allied Workers
Union (TAWU) , led by St. Lucia Labor Party Deputy Peter Josie,
has experienced difficulties with the Registrar of Trade
Unions and may be deregistered for failure to comply with
731
ST. LUCIA
government regulations (the Trade Union Act). There have been
no suggestions that the difficulties are a result of
discrimination or political considerations. To the extent the
Government plays a role in trade union activities, it has been
in the direction of supporting initiatives promoting national
trade union unity. During 1989 the Government succeeded in
negotiating a 6-year wage agreement with five unions
representing public servants, resulting in an unprecedented
period of harmonious government-labor relations.
Strikes in the private sector are legal if efforts sponsored
by the Government to resolve disputes fail. Strikes do occur
in practice. A strike by nurses was resolved in late 1988;
there were no strikes in 1989.
Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations,
and some have done so. St. Lucia has ratified International
Labor Organization Conventions 87 and 98 pertaining to freedom
of association and collective bargaining.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions are legally free to engage in collective bargaining and
they do so. Unions represent the majority of wage and salary
earners. Antiunion discrimination by employers against union
members is prohibited by law, and there are effective
mechanisms for resolving complaints. Union organizing and
collective bargaining are neither legally nor administratively
discouraged in the industrial free zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is illegal in St. Lucia and does
not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum legal working age in St. Lucia is 14, as
stipulated by the Women and Young Persons Act. The law is
enforced effectively by Labor Ministry officials.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Although no minimum wage is established by law, a
government-sponsored Wage Council reviews wage rates in
different sectors and offers wage recommendations which
generally are accepted as having the force of law. The
workweek is 40 hours in a 5-day period, and workers are
guaranteed a minimum annual vacation of 2 weeks. Occupational
health and safety regulations are relatively well developed.
The Labor Ministry periodically inspects health and safety
conditions at places of employment under the Employees
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1985. The act is
enforced through threat of closure of business if violations
are discovered and not corrected.
732
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
Since independence in October 1979, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines has retained the parliamentary system of government
it inherited from the United Kingdom. Democratic institutions
and respect for the rights of the individual are well
established. After defeating the incumbent St. Vincent Labor
Party in 1984 elections, James F. Mitchell and his New
Democratic Party won all 15 seats in the Parliament in general
elections held in May 1989. Although some concern was voiced
about the absence of any parliamentary opposition, the
elections were judged to be free and fair.
The Royal St. Vincent Police is the only security force in the
country. The Coast Guard serves under Police command, and a
small Special Service Unit (SSU) with some paijamilitary
training has been established within the police force. The
force, which is controlled by and responsive to the civilian
government, maintains traditions of professionalism which
place a high value on respect for human rights.
One of the poorer countries in the region, St. Vincent has a
very young population, a relatively high rate of illiteracy,
and serious unemployment problems. After several major
setbacks in recent years (primarily due to poor weather), the
nation's economy, centered on the vital banana industry, has
largely recovered. Banana exports boomed during 1988 and the
first half of 1989, but diversification to other export crops
had only limited progress.
The country's human rights record remained good in 1989.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or other extrajudicial
killings .
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment are prohibited by the Constitution,
and there were no reports of such practices.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
According to the Constitution, persons detained for criminal
offenses must be provided legal representation and have their
cases reviewed periodically. The Government strictly adheres
to these provisions.
With regard to forced or complusory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for public trials before an
independent and impartial court. Criminal defendants are
733
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
entitled to select their own legal counsel; alternately,
counsel may be provided by the court. Defendants are presumed
innocent until proven guilty and can appeal cases to a
regional high court system and ultimately to the Privy Council
in London.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There were no reports of arbitrary search and seizure or other
government intrusions into the private life of individual
citizens in 1989. The Constitution prohibits such actions.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the
press. The Government does not censor or otherwise interfere
with the operation of the press. There are two major
newspapers and numerous smaller, partisan publications; all
are privately owned, and most are openly critical of the
Government's policies. In 1988 the government-owned radio
station canceled a program which the Government considered
provocative; however, the station, with the Government's
approval, agreed to reinstate the program late in 1989.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are provided for in the Constitution and
respected in practice.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
All religions are free to practice and proselytize.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
These rights are provided for by law and honored in practice.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Notwithstanding the New Democratic Party's clean sweep of all
15 parliamentary seats in the May 1989 elections, St. Vincent
still has a genuine multiparty political system, with at least
four active parties. Although the "first past the post"
system tends to mask the degree of support for various
contenders, in the last election the opposition garnered over
30 per cent of the vote. Constitutionally, elections must be
held at least every 5 years, by secret ballot, with universal
suffrage.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Opposition political groups and the Vincentian press
occasionally comment on human rights matters of local
concern. The Government is responsive to public and private
inquiries on its human rights practices. Until late 1989, the
734
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
small Caribbean-wide human rights monitoring group CARICARE
was based in St. Vincent. However, the organization moved to
Trinidad for better access to transportation and communication
facilities .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal treatment under law
regardless of race, sex, or religion, and the Government
adheres to this provision. This year the Government took a
significant step forward in terms of wage scales for women,
adopting for the first time in a new minimum wage law the
concept of equal pay for equal work.
Violence against women occurs in St. Vincent but does not
appear to be characteristic of Vincentian society, according
to such sources as the director of St. Vincent's National
Council of Women, several government officials, and local
lawyers who handle such cases. The Vincentian newspaper also
reports all court cases and known incidents of violence.
Penalties for violent crimes against women are identical to
acts of assault perpetrated against men. For rape, depending
on the magnitude of the offence and the age of the victim, the
penalty is generally 10 or more years in prison. However, the
House of Assembly in 1989 was considering legislation
specifically addressing penalties for violent acts against
women. During the year, there were two convictions for rape,
as well as several others for assault against women. Although
some victims of such violence, especially domestic violence
such as wife beating, are reluctant to report it or to press
charges, in the past few years women have been increasingly
willing to report such incidents to the police and the
National Council of Women. The Governrtient ' s Ministry of
Education, Youth, and Women has a Women's Desk which assists
the National Council of Women with seminars, training
programs, and public relations. The Government provides some
funding for the National Council of Women and has been
supportive of radio call-in programs dealing with women's
issues .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
By law, Vincentians have the right to form unions, organize
employees and strike; laws of association are generally
respected in practice. Unions are independent and personal
and property rights of trade unionists are given full
protection under the law. With the partial recognition of the
St. Vincent union of teachers this year, the overall
proportion of the unionized labor force has increased slightly
from the approximately 15 percent level in 1988. Unions may
form or join federations or confederations. Unions are free
to affiliate and do affiliate with international labor bodies,
and both the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade
Unions and the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions have affiliates in St. Vincent.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There are no legal obstacles to organizing unions; however,
employers are not legally bound to recognize a particular
union as an exclusive bargaining agent. The law prohibits
antiunion discrimination by employers against union members
735
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
and organizers. Fairly effective mechanisms exist for
resolving complaints. In 1989 the National Workers Movement
achieved a recognition agreement with one foreign-owned firm
after a brief strike and the personal intervention of the
Prime Minister. At the same time the Public Service Union has
not yet attained recognition because it still has not reached
the necessary 50-percent membership of civil service
employees. There are no sectors or areas, including export
processing zones, where union organization and collective
bargaining are legally or administratively discouraged or
impeded.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is illegal in St. Vincent and does
not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
By law 15 years is the minimum working age; this provision,
which is monitored and enforced by the Ministry of Labor's
Labor Inspection Office, is generally respected in practice.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The workweek is 40 hours in 5 days. Workers are guaranteed a
minimum annual vacation of 2 weeks. Minimum wages, which are
set by law for economic sectors, were raised substantially in
1989. The main impact has been in the small manufacturing
sector, where daily rates almost doubled from $3.85 to $7.40.
This was the first increase in the minimum wage since 1982.
To date the impact on employment has been slight; several
firms have reduced their work force, but only one company has
closed due to the higher wage bill. Many minimum wages are
not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for
workers and their families, but most workers earn more than
the minimum. Informal arrangements covering occupational
safety and health do exist, but the Government has made little
progress in converting these into law.
736
SURINAME
Suriname returned to constitutional democracy in 1988
following 8 years of military rule. The governing three-party
coalition, the National Front for Democracy and Development,
has a large majority in the popularly elected National
Assembly. The Government's composition reflects Suriname's
ethnic divisions by including political parties representing
each of the country's three largest racial groups, the
Hindustanis (Asian Indians), the Creoles (generally the
descendants of emancipated slaves), and the Javanese. The
Presidency is held by a member of the Hindustani party, while
the Vice Presidency is filled by a leader of the principal
Creole party. Both officers are chosen by the elected
National Assembly.
The Surinamese military, whose influence had diminished
following the return to elected government, has reestablished
itself as the dominant political force in the country. In
contrast to the first year of Front Government, no military
men hold civilian government positions, but reports of
apparent harassment by members of the security services
continue. The military remains the most important threat to
the future health of Suriname's democracy. Throughout the
year, Surinamese military leaders acted to forestall
government actions with which they disagreed on issues
affecting their perceived interests. For example, they
c^arried out a well-publicized campaign against a peace
agreement reached in July at Kourou, French Guiana, designed
to end 3 years of debilitating maroon insurgency in the
interior. (Maroons are the descendants of escaped slaves who
fled to the interior several centuries ago.) Despite a
government announcement of the end of a state of emergency in
the interior, travel and the shipment of food and medicine
outside the capital remain restricted by the military, and
maroon refugees in French Guiana and displaced persons in the
capital are still afraid to return to their traditional
territories because of possible military retaliation. In June
the Government passed an amnesty law which provides a general
pardon for military and rebel actions taken since January 1,
1985.
The Surinamese economy enjoyed a limited resurgence in the
first half of 1989, even though the civilian Government had
made few significant economic policy changes. Real gross
domestic product rose strongly, due primarily to a significant
recovery in the key bauxite sector which traditionally
accounts for 70 to 80 percent of foreign exchange earnings.
In the aftermath of the military era, Suriname's human rights
situation continued its spotty improvement. The press offered
a forum for the robust expression of all shades of opinion
and, to an increasing extent, journalists were more willing to
criticize the military. The state-owned news agency became
somewhat less blatant in propagating the military's
viewpoint. While competing for political influence with the
military, the Government was slow in implementing the
Constitution which was overwhelmingly approved by the
population on September 30, 1987. Not until mid-1989 were
representative assemblies formed at the province and
subprovince level, and by year's end they had not yet become
active. Only a few of the 120 new laws required to implement
the Constitution had been passed by the Assembly, and the
constitutional court which will interpret the Constitution and
rule on human rights issues was not yet established. Although
the "state of emergency" was abolished by National Assembly
737
SURINAME
action in September 1989, the Government had taken no steps to
deprive the military of such "emergency" powers as
investigation and detention of civilians, issuance of visas,
and supervision of customs and immigration at airports and
harbors .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There was one credible report of a politically motivated
killing in 1989. A man filmed by a television crew carrying
an antimilitary placard in a demonstration in the town of
Moengo was forcibly removed from his home on October 30,
several weeks after the demonstration, and shot dead by masked
men. The incident occurred during a raid by Amerindian
insurgents on the town, which had been occupied by maroon
insurgents. Independent observers believe the killers were
Amerindian insurgents.
In December unknown assailants made an attempt on the life of
Suriname's most prominent human rights activist, Stanley
Rensch, at his home. Rensch subsequently left the country.
An amnesty law covering acts committed by the military and
rebels during the period January 1, 1985, to a date to be
fixed by the president (as yet undetermined), was passed by
the National Assembly in June. There is an exemption for
crimes against humanity, which are to be determined by the
Attorney General in accordance with relevant international
conventions. At year's end, the law still awaits steps by the
executive branch for its implementation.
Two suspects accused of murdering supposed regime opponents
during the years of military rule won acquittal on narrow
technical grounds. Both suspects are closely connected to the
Army. Government prosecutors indicated an interest in
bringing charges in one of the cases again, but by year's end
no date had been announced.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (lACHR) is
conducting investigations into the December 1987 killings of 7
maroons at the village of Pokigron and the November 1988 death
while in military police custody of a Surinamese citizen who
had just returned from the Netherlands. Government
representatives announced their willingness to cooperate with
the investigations. In September the lACHR held a hearing on
the Pokigron case; further consideration by the lACHR was
deferred until the next session of the commission in 1990.
b. Disappearance
Credible indications of disappearances were few in 1989.
Human rights activists and the press noted that in several
instances, maroons in outlying areas were detained by the
military authorities under state of emergency regulations.
One such incident reportedly took place in February and a
second in June. In both cases, the detainee was eventually
released.
738
SURINAME
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no indications of a systematic pattern of
mistreatment, but there was a sharp rise in the number of
reported instances of police brutality. Several police
officers were punished administratively in May for beating a
suspect arrested earlier in the year. The press reported also
that police officers severely beat a suspect detained in
connection with a drug investigation in July. Another press
report noted that a man detained in September after a traffic
mishap was beaten. A human rights organization claimed that a
police officer publicly pistol-whipped a man during a late
July soccer match and that a maroon arrested in mid-August
received harsh treatment before being released.
Credible sources charged that in May and September persons
entering and leaving the international airport were subjected
to humiliating strip searches by military police, who still
control that facility. The May incident involved a family
returning from Holland in which several female members were
detained several hours for reasons which were never
explained. A human rights activist leaving the country in
August was also strip searched by military police before being
permitted to depart. The activist's organization had
considered legal action against the Government but had not
taken any steps by year's end.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
According to law, a person suspected of committing a crime for
which the sentence is longer than 4 years may be detained for
investigation for up to 10 days before being brought before a
judge to be charged. The detention may be longer only if the
judge decides there is sufficient evidence to support the
charge. There is no provision for bail during this period.
There were four apparent instances of arbitrary arrest in
1989. In late April and early to mid-May, military police
detained several persons for suspected involvement with the
Jungle Commando, an insurgent group in the interior. Two of
the detainees are recognized leaders of the human rights
community, the third is a medical doctor involved with the
provision of care in the interior, and the fourth is a civil
servant. The detainees underwent 4 to 6 hours of rigorous
questioning before gaining their release after expressions of
concern by the public and diplomats. The authorities did not
bring charges against any of those detained.
Exile is not used as a method of political control. With
regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary and the
right to fair public trial in which the defendants have the
right to counsel. Indigents generally have access to free or
low-cost legal representatives. Civilian defendants before
the military court do not receive public trials, but news of
military court proceedings regularly appear in the press.
In late April, the military forcefully interfered with
judicial procedure. A paramilitary soldier accused of
involvement in a brutal 1986 massacre was removed from a
civilian jail by an armed platoon on the grounds that the
739
SURINAME
civil authorities had no power to arrest and try military
personnel. A government commission set up after the incident
to determine whether military or civilian authorities should
prosecute the case had not reported its findings by year's end.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Although the Constitution protects the right to privacy, there
were frequent allegations concerning the monitoring of
overseas telephone calls by security service personnel. The
charges persisted despite the reported withdrawal in March of
security service personnel from an office in the facilities of
the state-owned telephone system. Airport military security
personnel confiscated papers belonging to a departing Dutch
human rights activist in August after he was strip searched
(see Section I.e.). Throughout the year, several labor and
political officials reported harassment by anonymous figures.
The officials believed the harassment to have been due to
their peaceful opposition to the previous military regime.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
There were numerous reports of violations of humanitarian law
in 1989, and many appeared to be credible. Following a lull
of many months, conflict in the interior flared in April and
continued through the summer until the signing of the Kourou
peace agreement. One of the more serious violations of
humanitarian law was discovered in April when residents of the
maroon village of Pokigron fled to the capital bearing reports
of the village's destruction. According to still confused
accounts of what happened in Pokigron, it appears that
elements of the maroon Jungle Commando insurgency torched the
dwellings of villagers believed to be allied with the military
and that in response other promilitary elements took similar
action against Jungle Commando supporters. The persons
displaced from Pokigron now live under difficult conditions in
the capital.
Following the June start of an Army offensive in the area
around Suriname's central reservoir, there were frequent
reports of firing on unarmed civilians by military personnel.
A human rights group charged that a helicopter fired on
civilians on June 3 and on unarmed boats during the first week
of June. Beginning in July, there were many credible reports
of arbitrary restrictions on the amount and type of material
which residents of the interior could bring in to the region.
Foodstuffs and medicine were restricted most severely. These
restrictions reportedly contributed to or directly caused the
closure of medical posts in the interior and the death of
several patients, including women, children, and infants.
In late August and September, armed Amerindians hijacked a
small aircraft and held the pilot hostage for 1 month.
Another group of Amerindians hijacked a ferry boat, killing a
passenger in the process. Credible observers believe
Amerindian actions are connected to or have been ordered by
the military, and stem from military dissatisfaction with the
Kourou peace process. The Army took no actions against the
Amerindian insurgents, and military spokesmen publicly
sympathized with their objectives and praised their tactics.
The uprising of Amerindians contributed to a drastic
deterioration in already inadequate medical care arrangements
for the interior. One source noted publicly that the
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SURINAME
Amerindians had taken custody of the only ambulance available
in the Western Suriname settlement of Apoera and that the
transport of patients from the interior to the capital for
acute care had declined from around 95 per month to 6.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and of the press is protected by the
Constitution. As during the first year of civilian rule, the
Surinamese robustly exercised their right to criticize
government policies. Opposing political views faced little or
no restriction in gaining a forum, particularly in the print
media. In contrast to the first year of democratic
government, critics of the military were less reluctant to
speak out.
The Surinamese print media are privately owned and include
several church-owned newspapers. Most radio stations are also
owned privately, but the State operates both a television and
a radio station. The state-owned telephone company also
operates a television station. Government restrictions
generally prevent this station from broadcasting news and
public affairs programming. Academic freedom is legally
protected and appears to be protected in practice.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right to assemble peaceably and to form associations for
nonviolent purposes is protected constitutionally. These
rights are respected in practice. Official registration is
required in many instances and is generally granted. Most
large public meetings require a permit, and these are granted
routinely. Trade associations and professional bodies face no
restriction on engaging in political activity or affiliating
with international organizations.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of worship is respected in Suriname, a multicultural
and multireligious society. Foreign clergy are allowed to
administer to the needs of both local and expatriate
congregations, and missionaries enter the country freely to
proselytize. Organized religions are free to establish
training facilities for their clergy. Religious groups
maintained international contacts, freely organized trips
abroad, and published periodicals.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Surinamese may change their residence and workplace freely,
and may travel abroad as they wish. Although the authorities
lifted the state of emergency which limited travel to certain
interior districts on September 1, travel to the interior
remains limited in practice, largely as a result of the
precarious security situation. Troops at military checkpoints
have repeatedly denied permission to travel into the interior,
often on what appear to be arbitrary grounds.
741
SURINAME
Surinamese may emigrate without interference and may return to
take up residence at any time. Citizenship is not revoked for
political reasons. There were no known instances in which
refugees were forced to return to countries in which they fear
persecution.
Some 6,500 to 7,500 Surinamese refugees remain in camps in
French Guiana along the Surinamese border. Following the July
signing of the Kourou accord, representatives of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees began preparations for their orderly
return and opened an office in Paramaribo toward that end.
Although many refugees have expressed an interest in returning
to their traditional homes in Eastern and Central Suriname,
few if any have done so. The refugees cite fear of the
unstable security situation in their home region or
retaliation by the military for suspected connections with the
insurgency. During 1989 hundreds of maroons moved from the
interior to Paramaribo and its southern outskirts, mostly
because of Amerindian actions in their home areas.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Power and authority rests with the Surinamese people under the
Constitution approved by popular vote in 1987. Among other
rights, the Constitution provides for the right to change
government peacefully through the direct election by secret
ballot of a National Assembly of 50 members every 5 years. It
also protects the existence of political parties. Opposition
parties regularly present opposing views in the National
Assembly, the mass media, and in public gatherings.
Dissenting votes were cast in the National Assembly on a
number of bills and on procedural questions.
There are no special conditions or restrictions on nationality
or citizenship which limit participation in the political
system. In practice, however, the less educated maroons and
Amerindians from the interior are largely outside the
political process.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Although the authorities have repeatedly expressed a
willingness to cooperate with international and private human
rights groups, there has been little progress in the
implementation of these groups' recommendations concerning the
investigation of past atrocities and disappearances. During
1989, representatives of the International Committee of the
Red Cross visited Suriname regularly and conducted a course
for military personnel on the Geneva Convention and the laws
of war.
In addition to the official National Institute for Human
Rights (NIM) , there are several other local human rights
groups. The NIM was not particularly active during the year
and appeared unable to secure much official cooperation for
inquiries into such atrocities committed during the years of
military rule as the late 1987 massacre at the village of
Pokigron (see Section l.a.). Private human rights groups were
largely responsible for the collection of evidence on this and
other incidents for use before the lAHRC, which began an
inquiry into the tragedy in September. Private groups in
general are able to interview victims and report their
742
SURINAME
findings, generally through self-produced publications but
also to international and nongovernmental human rights
groups. Moiwana '86, Suriname's best known human rights
group, has faced repeated harassment. Following a December
attempt by unknown assailants on the life of the group's
founder, Stanley Rensch, and Rensch's subsequent departure
from the country, the future of Moiwana '86 was uncertain.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Legally sanctioned discrimination is prohibited and is rare in
Suriname's multiracial society. Ethnic consciousness remains
strong among all groups, however. Maroons and Amerindians
report the existence of unofficial discrimination. Such
ethnic differentiation is in many cases the result of limited
access to technical and higher education.
Women have a legal right to equal access to education,
employment, and property. However, social pressures and
customs inhibit the full exercise of these rights. In certain
spheres, notably marriage and inheritance, civil law holds
only limited sway. Thus Hindustani women (and men) must be
over age 30 to marry without the permission of the family
head. Maroon women cannot keep the estates of their dead
spouses; all property and money pass to the tribe. There is
no officially sanctioned violence against women. Surinamese
law does not differentiate between domestic violence and
general assault cases. Women's rights advocates do not
consider violence to be one of the major problems they must
address, but acknowledge that, due to the traditional practice
among various ethnic groups of resolving instances of domestic
violence within the community, violence against women could be
underreported.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Suriname's Constitution protects the right of workers to
associate and to choose their representatives democratically.
This right is exercised energetically--about one-half of the
total work force is organized. Unions are independent of the
Government and play an active role in local politics. The
right to strike is also protected by the Constitution.
Although there were no major industrial strikes during 1989,
labor officials have reported no instances of interference
with the exercise of this right. A nationwide general strike
on May 5, called to protest inaction by the Government
concerning the economy and the maroon insurgency, provided a
strong impetus to addressing these problems. The strike
demonstrated the power of the labor movement, which has fully
recovered from the havoc wreaked by the murder while in
military custody of several prominent labor leaders in 1982.
Though not legally protected, strikes and other labor actions
by civil servants are permitted in practice. There is an
active process of consultation between civil servants and
their employer. A 2-day strike by police personnel in April
was resolved after the installation of a government commission
to investigate police claims that the army had overstepped its
bounds in forcibly removing a soldier from civilian custody
(see Section I.e.).
743
SURINAME
Surinamese trade unions are permitted to maintain contacts
with regional and international labor associations. By 1989
the principal labor unions were represented in the democratic
international trade union movement. The Moederbond, following
a hiatus in affiliation that resulted from the events of 1982,
was fully reinstated to membership in the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Two other
Surinamese unions, C-47 and the Public Service Unions (CLO),
affiliated with the ICFTU at the same time. Another union,
the OASF, was affiliated to the World Confederation of Labor.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is explicitly
recognized by the Constitution and was respected in practice
in 1989. Collective bargaining agreements cover approximately
50 percent of the labor force. There are no special economic
zones in Suriname, and labor laws are applied uniformly
throughout the country. Surinamese law prohibits antiunion
discrimination by employers, and there are effective
mechanisms for resolving complaints of such discrimination.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by the Constitution,
and there were no known incidents of this practice in 1989.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum age for employment of children is 15 years.
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing this law.
There were few complaints of violations in 1989, especially in
the principal cities and towns. Persons under age 15
occasionally are employed as newspaper sellers and street
venders. Most such employment generally occurs after school
hours .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no legal m.inimum wage in Suriname, but wages remain
high by regional standards and provide workers with a decent
standard of living. Work in excess of 8 1/2 hours per day or
48 hours per week on a regular basis requires special
government permission, which is routinely granted. Overtime
work is payable at a premium. Occupational safety and health
regulations were fully in effect, and a number of workplaces
wt.re closed down during the year for noncompliance.
744
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Trinidad and Tobago is a republic with a parliamentary form of
government. Free and fair elections have been held at regular
intervals since independence from Great Britain in 1962.
Prior to December 1986, each election had been won by the
People's National Movement (PNM) . The election of the
National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) Government on
December 15, 1986 marked the first change of political power
in 24 years of independence.
The Trinidad and Tobago police force is, generally, a capable
and professional force. However, reports of abuse of
authority and corruption and the filing of court cases against
individual police officers continued during 1989. The legal
system provides measures for redress for the complainant in
such cases. Both the police and the Trinidad and Tobago
Defence Force are under the control of and responsive to
civilian authorities.
The country's mixed economy is based primarily on petroleum
production and refining, but efforts continue to diversify the
economy into agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism. Many
major industries are either wholly or partially owned by the
Government. There is a strong tradition of private enterprise
and ownership of property, however, and the Government is
endeavoring to sell several state enterprises, in whole or in
part. The economy has suffered with the worldwide fall in oil
prices, but Trinidad and Tobago continues to have a high
standard of living.
Political and civil rights are provided for by the
Constitution and are generally respected in practice. In the
event of a presidentially declared public emergency,
legislation may be enacted for limited periods that derogates
from constitutional rights and protections unless determined
by the Court "not to be reasonably justifiable" for the
purpose of dealing with the emergency. There were no
significant changes in Trinidad and Tobago's good human rights
record in 1989.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of politically motivated or other
extrajudicial killings. In September 1989, several shots from
a passing car were fired at a vehicle carrying the wife of
President Noor Hassanali. The motivation behind the attack
has not been determined.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution forbids such treatment, and any evidence
obtained by such means is inadmissible in court. Torture is
not practiced. During 1989 there continued to be credible
allegations in the press and charges in the courts that
individual police officers have mistreated persons under
745
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
arrest. The law permits victims of such treatment to sue for
civil damages and to file criminal charges against the
individual police officer involved, and such suits are
occasionally initiated. The courts often find in favor of the
complainant, and police officers found guilty of misconduct
are subject to disciplinary action. There is no evidence that
police brutality or other misconduct is systematic or condoned
by the Government .
The law requires a public coroner's inquest in any case of
death by unnatural causes in which a coroner finds the
circumstances warrant it. In 1989 there were 11 instances of
persons being shot by police officers who allegedly were
acting in the line of duty. In one instance a 14-year-old
girl was shot, which raised questions as to whether the use of
lethal force by the police was justified. Inquests were
initiated, with heavy media and public scrutiny at the time.
Some of the inquests in these cases have been completed while
some have been delayed by court backlogs. One inquest in
progress at year's end involved the death of a convicted
prisoner, who was allegedly beaten to death in 1988 by prison
guards after killing a guard. Police officers rarely are
indicted following an inquest. The verdict is generally that
the officer acted in self-defense.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution specifies that a suspect has the right to be
"informed promptly" of the reason for arrest or detention. In
practice, police usually charge a suspect within 48 hours, but
there have been cases in which charges have not been brought
for 4 or 5 days. Court orders may be obtained by the police
to hold an individual longer than normal to gather more
evidence. Arrests without warrant are permitted when a person
is apprehended committing an offense or when reasonable
suspicion exists that an offense has been or is about to be
committed.
The law does not allow preventive or incommunicado detention.
Persons arrested have the right to a judicial determination of
the legality of their detention. Detainees generally are
allowed access to a lawyer if one is requested, and to family
members, but police sometimes deny access if they believe it
would impede an investigation. There continue to be recurring
charges in the courts and press that the police have violated
one or more of these procedures in several cases. The courts,
which monitor police practices in these matters, have found
for the complainant in some but not all of the cases.
The Government introduced antidrug trafficking legislation in
1989 that included provisions for forfeiture of assets.
Several of the bill's search and seizure provisions prompted
concerns among lawyers, the media, and legislators that civil
liberties would be infringed. The Government has sought to
allay these concerns by amending the bill, which has not yet
been adopted by Parliament.
The practice of exile is illegal and does not exist.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution specifies that accused persons receive a fair
and public trial by an independent, judiciary; appeals may be
746
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
made to the Court of Appeals and eventually to the Privy
Council in London. Under common law practice, defendants
enjoy a presumption of innocence and the right to confront
witnesses and present evidence. These rights are respected in
practice.
All accused persons have the right to an attorney. Legal
assistance is available from the Legal Advisory Board of the
Ministry of Social Development and Family Services for persons
who demonstrate that they cannot afford an attorney. An
accused may be freed on bail pending trial unless charged with
murder; the Presiding Magistrate may suspend bail after
consultation with the prosecution and defense. Judicial
officials have noted, however, that bail jumping is a common
practice. Draft legislation proposed in 1988 by the
Government to restrict or deny bail for certain serious
criminal offenses was withdrawn by the Government for further
study after much criticism from the media and the legal
profession. The bill has not been reintroduced. Despite
continuing attention by government officials and the Bar
Association to the large backlog of cases awaiting trial or
appeal, there remain significant delays in bringing cases to
trial and in processing appeals.
There are no political prisoners in Trinidad and Tobago.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution prohibits such interference, a prohibition
generally respected in practice. Warrants are required for
searches .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of expression, and this
right is protected in practice by the country's independent
judiciary, a democratic and pluralistic political system, and
independent and privately owned print media. Academic freedom
is respected and is protected by law.
The import or circulation of publications may be prohibited
under the Sedition Act if they are deemed to have a seditious
intention. The law has been rarely invoked in recent years.
A Board of Film Censors is authorized to ban films it
considers to be against public order and decency or
undesirable in the public interest. Within the past year, the
Board's action came to public attention on one occasion when
it banned "The Accused." The Prime Minister, acting under
the Cinematograph Act, banned the showing in Trinidad and
Tobago of "The Last Temptation of Christ."
Foreign exchange scarcities have reduced allocations to
newspapers for the import of newsprint. One newspaper which
is generally critical of the Government won a court case
against the Government in 1989 after charging that the
Government had unconstitutionally reduced the newspaper's
foreign exchange allocation for the purchase of newsprint.
The newspaper continues to claim that it is receiving
discriminatory treatment with respect to foreign exchange
allocations .
Trinidad and Tobago Television (TTT) , the sole television
747
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Station in the country, is government owned. Its coverage is
generally unbiased, although the opposition has claimed that
informational programming on government-sponsored activities,
identified as NAR (the ruling National Alliance for
Reconstruction) initiatives, gives the NAR an unfair political
advantage. In recent years, the Government has received a few
applications for the licensing of one or more privately owned
television stations. No action has been taken on these
applications to date.
One of Trinidad and Tobago's two radio stations is government
owned, and the other is privately owned. Both are currently
operating without licenses while the Government develops a
telecommunications policy which will cover all broadcast media.
A government draft telecommunications white paper circulated
for public comment was criticized by media officials because
of certain sections which pertained to government regulation.
Those sections were thereafter deleted by the Government.
Political opponents of the Government have argued that the
presence of ruling party supporters on the executive boards of
the government-owned radio station leads to the same political
bias in broadcasting policy as they claim exists in TTT.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are protected by law and respected in
practice. Registration of private organizations is not
required. Permits are required in advance for street marches,
demonstrations, or other public meetings, and these are
normally granted, both to critics and supporters of the
Government.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The right to practice one's religion is provided for by the
Constitution and is respected in practice. There is no state
religion and no religious test for public office. There are
large groups of Christians, Hindus, and Muslim.s in the
population, and these and other religious groups are allowed
to maintain association with organizations and persons in
other countries and to perform religious travel. Religious
groups are free to establish places of worship and to engage
in religious training, education, and publishing.
Missionaries are permitted to enter the country and
proselytize. Conversion from one religion to another is not
hindered. Licensing of religious organizations is not
required. (N.B. Parliamentary approval is not a requirement
for incorporation of religious organizations as previously
reported. )
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no arbitrary restrictions on emigration or travel
either within or outside the country, nor on the changing of
residence or workplace.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The citizens of Trinidad and Tobago choose their government by
secret ballot in free and fair multiparty, multicandidate
748
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
elections held, as required by the Constitution, at intervals
not to exceed 5 years. Elections for municipal and county
officials are held every 3 years and elections for the
12-member Tobago House of Assembly every 4 years. The
Constitution allows citizens, as well as legal residents with
citizenship in other Commonwealth countries, who are at least
18 years of age, to vote, and there are no restrictions on the
participation of women in political activities.
The country is governed by a bicameral Parliament: an elected
36-member House of Representatives whose members represent
single-member voting constituencies and a 31-member Senate
whose members are appointed by the President, 16 on the advice
of the governing party, 6 on the advice of the opposition, and
9 at the President's discretion. The Prime Minister, who is
the Head of Government, is the member of the House of
Representatives who commands the support of the majority of
the House. The President, elected by Parliament, is the Head
of State.
Opposition parties have contested every general election since
party elections were begun in 1956, except in 1971 when the
opposition chose not to participate. Several opposition
parties combined in 1985 to form the NAR which, in the
December 15, 1986, elections, won 33 of 36 elected
Parliamentary seats. The PNM, which now forms part of the
opposition, had until then governed since 1956. During 1988
the NAR expelled some of its prominent leaders, who in 1989
formed a third major party, the United National Congress
(UNC) .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
An Amnesty International representative familiar with the area
regularly visits the country on routine business, and the
Government cooperates with these visits. Besides the
judiciary, which acts on legal cases involving alleged human
rights violations, there is an Ombudsman, an officer of the
Parliament, who is empowered to investigate complaints of
violations of law or policy and to report the findings to
Parliament. There is also a nongovernmental Bureau of Human
Rights, which was established by a local attorney and focuses
on areas of interest and concern to him. Trinidad and Tobago
is a party to the United Nations' international covenants on
human rights.
In 1989, the Caribbean Institute for the Promotion of Human
Rights relocated its headquarters to Port of Spain from St.
Vincent. This regional organization is composed of respected
Caribbean human rights activists who seek to collect
information and report on Caribbean human rights matters.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no evidence of systematic official discrimination
based on race, sex, religion, language, or social status in
Trinidad and Tobago. All persons are fully protected under
provisions of the Constitution. Trinidad and Tobago includes
various ethnic and religious groups that live together
peacefully, generally respecting each other's beliefs and
practices. Nevertheless, relations between Af ro-Trinidadians
and Indo-Trinidadians , who each comprise approximately 40
749
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
percent of the population, are complex and at times tense.
The private sector, which has long been dominated by
Caucasians and Indo-Trinidadians, continues to be the bulwark
of employment for these ethnic groups; at the same time,
Af ro-Trinidadians are employed in disproportionate numbers in
some segments of government services, particularly in the
police and military. Government cabinets have been
predominantly composed of Af ro-Trinidadians .
Women enjoy equality under the law. Many hold positions in
the Government, civil service, political party leadership,
business, and the professions. Women's groups speak out
publicly and are heard on all aspects of public life. Women
make up approximately 34 percent of the paid labor force, and
collective bargaining agreements cannot be registered with the
Industrial Court if they exhibit wage disparities between men
and women.
Although there has been no definitive collection of data, it
is generally speculated that as many as one in three women
have suffered physical abuse from their spouse or other family
member. The Government is concerned about this problem, as
well as child abuse. Since 1987, a cabinet-appointed
committee has been studying abuse patterns in Trinidad and
Tobago, and its recommendations for governmental and private
action are now before the Cabinet. There are several
privately operated shelters for battered women in the country.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of association is respected in law and practice. An
estimated 22 percent of the work force is organized into 45
labor unions. The unions are independent of government or
political party control, and they freely represent their
members' interests. Union members are free to choose their
own representatives, and unions are free to publicize their
views and determine their own programs and policies. The
majority of the unions are grouped into two labor
confederations, the larger of which is associated with the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, while the
other is associated with the Communist-controlled World
Federation of Trade Unions.
Workers are permitted, upon expiration of a conciliation
period, to strike, and employers are permitted to lock workers
out. After a strike or lockout has gone on for 3 months,
either of the parties involved can request the Minister of
Labor to refer the question to the Industrial Court, which is
part of the independent judiciary, for a binding decision.
Workers in two state-owned oil companies went on strike in
1989. Strikes and lockouts are not permitted in essential
public services, and the Minister of Labor may apply for an
injunction to halt any labor action he finds contrary to the
national interest. This power has not been invoked since
independence.
Workers in essential services with labor grievances may call
on the conciliation services of the Ministry of Labor or may
take their cases directly to the Industrial Court. They may
also file civil suits against the Government.
The Committee of Experts of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) has for several years concluded that
750
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
various aspects of the country's labor legislation, including
those related to strike and binding arbitration procedures,
are inconsistent with ILO Conventions 87 and 98.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The constitutional right of workers to organize and bargain
collectively is well exercised. Antiunion discrimination is
prohibited by law, and trade union property, as other private
property, is protected under law. The Ministry of Labor acts
as an impartial conciliator in collective bargaining
impasses. There are a few complaints each year to the
Ministry of Labor about private antiunion activities, usually
involving a suspension or dismissal of an employee who alleges
the action was taken in part because of union activity. The
Ministry of Labor is generally able to resolve the cases
brought to it.
During 1989, the Trinidad and Tobago Unified Teachers
Association filed a complaint with the ILO against the
Government for its 10 percent reduction of the salaries of
public servants, calling it a violation of collective
bargaining rights. The Government intends to respond to the
complaint in accordance with ILO procedures.
The Parliament in 1988 enacted legislation to regulate the
establishment of free trade zones. It is anticipated that
wages and terms of employment in the free trade zones may be
less favorable than the prevailing minimum standard, but the
legislation provides for internationally accepted worker
rights, including the right to organize and bargain
collectively.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced labor in Trinidad and Tobago. Although
there is no domestic legislation on this matter, Trinidad and
Tobago is a party to the relevant ILO conventions. The ILO's
Committee of Experts criticized provisions in Trinidad and
Tobago's law which permits penalties of imprisonment involving
compulsory labor for breaches of discipline by seamen and
other persons employed in certain public services.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Legislation prohibits the employment of children under the age
of 12 years, and children aged 12 to 14 years are permitted to
work only in family businesses. These restrictions are
generally respected in practice. Education is compulsory
until the age of 12 years.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no nationwide minimum wage rate. Most wages are
covered under collective bargaining agreements and provide a
decent living for workers and their families. The Ministry of
Labor is studying recommendations regarding the institution of
a nationwide minimum wage. Minimum wages and working
conditions were, in the past, set by the Minister of Labor for
three occupations considered difficult to organize into
unions: gas station attendants, shop clerks, and domestic
servants. That of shop clerks, for example, was $20 per
week. This government wage order expired in 1984, however,
and some employers now pay lower than the previous minimum
wage. Because this minimum wage level is not considered
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TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
enough to live on, minimum wage workers usually have secondary
sources of support, generally from their families. Working
hours are determined through collective bargaining agreements
or other employment agreements. The standard workweek is 40
hours. Additional hours are considered overtime at a
negotiated rate. Daily rest periods and paid annual leave
form part of most employment agreements. There are no legal
restrictions on overtime work.
Occupational health and safety is governed by the 1948
Factories Ordinance Bill, which sets requirements for health
and safety standards in certain industries and provides for
inspections to monitor and enforce compliance. The Government
enforces compliance with health and safety regulations,
although such enforcement is sporadic due to a shortage of
inspectors. Trade union representatives also monitor
compliance. A new occupational safety bill was prepared and
sent to the Legislative Review Committee of Parliament, but
there has been no action on the bill since 1986. Workers who
file complaints with the Ministry of Labor regarding
illegal or hazardous working conditions are protected under
the Industrial Relations Act. Government inspectors
investigate such complaints.
A severance and retrenchment law enacted in 1985 aims at
providing improved severance benefits for laid-off workers.
Controversial draft legislation to establish a severance
benefit fund remained under Cabinet consideration at year's
end.
752
URUGUAY
Uruguay is a constitutional republic governed by an elected
president and a bicameral legislature. On November 26, 1989,
a free and fair presidential election took place for the first
time since Uruguay returned to constitutional government in
1985 after 12 years of military rule. (The 1984 election was
not completely free since the armed forces prohibited some
politicians from campaigning.) Luis Alberto Lacalle of the
National (Blanco) Party was elected President and will begin
his 5-year term on March 1, 1990, succeeding Julio Maria
Sanguinetti of the Colorado Party. Uruguay's judicial branch
is independent, as is its legislature. Political parties, the
press, labor unions, private interest groups, and other
nongovernmental groups function freely, and political debate
is vigorous and unrestricted.
Uruguay's small military establishment, consisting of an army,
air force, and navy, is under the supervision of the Ministry
of Defense. The military does not participate in domestic
security matters unless ordered to do so by the civilian
authorities. Domestic security and public safety matters are
under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry, which
administers all of the country's police departments.
Uruguay is a middle income country (with a per capita gross
domestic product of $2,596 in 1988) whose economy is still
heavily dependent on agricultural exports and agro-industry.
After significant growth in 1986 and 1987, the economy slowed
dramatically in 1988 and was not expected to rebound
significantly in 1989. The slowdown is due to a reversal of
the same trends which fueled growth in 1986-1987, such as
increases in oil prices and higher international interest
rates; declining domestic demand and investment; and a severe
drought which seriously affected the agricultural sector.
During 1989 there were no credible reports of significant
human rights violations. After the return to democracy in
1985, all political prisoners and even some nonpolitical ones
received amnesty. The most important human rights event in
1989 was the referendum on the 1986 Law of Expiration, put
forth by the Government under heavy pressure from the
military, which effectively exempted military and police
personnel from prosecution for human rights abuses committed
during the military regime. Opponents of the law were able to
have the issue submitted to a referendum, and on April 16 the
law was upheld by a margin of 1,082,454 to 799,109 (57.5 to
42.5 percent of the valid votes cast) in a national
plebiscite. In 1989 the Supreme Court, by a 3 to 2 vote,
again upheld the Law of Expiration in cases challenging its
constitutionality, but only after classifying it as an
amnesty. The Government, to avoid offending the military, had
avoided calling the law an amnesty.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No cases of politically motivated or other extrajudicial
killings were reported.
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URUGUAY
b. Disappearance
No cases of disappearance were reported during 1989.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits brutal treatment of prisoners. In
July 1989, the death of a laborer while in police custody led
to charges of police mistreatment. The police maintained that
the prisoner hanged himself in his cell. The resulting
controversy led to the resignation of the Minister of the
Interior, and a Deputy Police Chief was convicted of
misconduct in connection with the death. There were no other
reports of possible mistreatment of prisoners in 1989.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution requires a written warrant for an arrest
except in cases where the accused is apprehended during the
commission of a crime. It also provides for the right to a
judicial determination of the legality of detention and
requires that the detaining authority in an arrest explain and
justify to the judiciary the legal grounds for the detention.
A prisoner has the right to counsel and the right to give a
statement and appear before a judge within 24 hours of
detention. The judge must begin the judicial process within
48 hours of arrest. Failure to com.ply with this 48-hour rule
has led to the release of detainees. Bond is allowed in those
criminal trials which could lead to a penitentiary sentence.
Military justice is applicable to civilians only during a
state of war or insurrection. These constitutional provisions
are generally respected in practice.
The victim mentioned in Section I.e. had been detained during
a "razzia," a random police sweep of bars and nightclubs in
which young adults are arbitrarily detained and held for short
periods without charge. Following the conviction of the
deputy police chief for deprivation of liberty in this case,
the police have ended their practice of "razzias." Young
adults involved in the "razzias" are the only persons known to
have been subjected to arbitrary detention. Since the end of
the military dictatorship, no Uruguayans have been forced into
exile for any reason.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary regained its autonomy in 1985, and military
officers appointed by the military regime to the Supreme Court
or the Higher Appeals Court retired from those positions at
that time. The law provides for two military justices on the
Supreme Court, who participate only in cases involving the
military. The Constitution requires that all trials must open
with a public statement of the charge by the prosecutor or the
complainant. However, Uruguayan court procedures require the
lawyers' arguments to be submitted to the judges in writing,
and these written statements are normally not made public.
There is a parallel military court system under the Military
Justice Code. Uruguay has no political prisoners.
Uruguay has a judicial system based on the Napoleonic Code.
Under the provisions of the Uruguayan Penal Code, an arrested
person may be held incommunicado by the police for a period of
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URUGUAY
24 hours. After 24 hours, the prisoner must be presented to a
judge who, in turn, has an additional 24 hours to release the
prisoner or issue a processing order which is based on
evidence that the accused person could be responsible for a
crime. When a processing order is issued, the prisoner then
is given access to legal counsel, and if he cannot afford a
lawyer, a public defender is appointed. If the crime carries
a penalty of at least 2 years in prison, the prisoner is
confined during the judge's investigation until the
authorities agree to release him on bail, or until the case is
closed. Trial proceedings are based on written arguments, and
the defense attorney has access to all documents which form
part of the written record. Under Uruguayan law, there is no
provision against self-incrimination, and the defendant may be
compelled to answer any questions to the judge.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for the right to privacy. The home,
absolutely inviolable at night, can be entered and searched
only with a legal warrant during the day. Protection for
private papers and correspondence is equally strong, and a
warrant is required for confiscation. These rights and
protections are well respected. Investigations of wiretapping
during the military regime continue, but there has been no
evidence of any such activity after March 1985.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press.
All elements of the political spectrum express their
viewpoints in both the print and broadcast media. Formerly
proscribed organizations such as the Tupamaro Movement, which
conducted terrorist campaigns in the late 1960's and early
1970 's, and the Communist Party freely publish newspapers and
operate radio stations. There are three nonaffiliated
independent television stations and one public service
government station. Montevideo has eight daily newspapers,
and there are approximately 65 to 70 newspapers in the
interior of the country (primarily weeklies). Uruguay has 23
FM and 87 AM radio stations, and 20 television stations. The
only government-owned media outlets are one television station
and one AM radio station.
In 1988 a conservative journalist was convicted for a second
time under the 1984 criminal libel law. He remained free
during 1989 pending appeal of the 6-month jail sentence which
he received. Each of this journalist's convictions resulted
from complaints brought by private citizens.
The National University is autonomous, and academic freedom is
respected. University elections have been held three times
since 1985, and student groups have resumed campus political
activities. Most professors dismissed for political or
ideological reasons by the military regime have returned to
their positions, although a few cases continue under study.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly and association are protected by law.
Formerly banned groups, such as the Tupamaros, are free to
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URUGUAY
organize and express their opinions. Public marches and
demonstrations are allowed with permits from the Ministry of
the Interior and occur without official harassment or
intimidation. Persons denied citizenship rights by the
military regime because of political affiliation or activity
have had their rights fully restored.
There were numerous attacks, generally late-night vandalism
but some cases of arson, against the offices of political and
labor groups, primarily but not exclusively leftist. These
incidents resulted in little damage and few injuries. No
arrests were made beyond that of one ex-policeman, dismissed
in 1983, who was identified by a witness to one of the attacks.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion, provided for by the Constitution, is
respected in practice. Most Uruguayans who practice a
religion are Roman Catholic. Members of other religions
exercise their faiths unhindered, and missionaries are free to
proselytize.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Internal and foreign travel and emigration are unrestricted.
An estimated 300,000 Uruguayans left the country during the
military regime, some for political and many for economic
reasons. Programs exist for their repatriation, and
Uruguayans who wish to return are encouraged to do so. All of
the prominent political figures exiled by the military regime
have returned.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The citizens of Uruguay have the right and ability peacefully
to change the government. Uruguay is a multiparty democracy,
with mandatory universal suffrage for those 18 years of age or
older. Voting is not restricted by race, sex, religion, or
economic status. The Colorado Party, the National (or Blanco)
Party, a coalition named the Broad Front, and a coalition
named the New Space are the four major political entities.
Each allows ideological divisions within the party, and each
such division may field its own slate of candidates for
general elections. The Uruguayan electoral system combines a
primary and general election in a double simultaneous vote.
Each party fields different lists of candidates; in essence,
voters express a preference for a list rather than an
individual candidate, as well as vote for a party. The
winning list of the party which gets the most votes wins the
Presidency and a percentage of seats in the Senate and Chamber
of Deputies corresponding to the percentage of votes that the
party as a whole received. A party therefore may run multiple
presidential candidates, each with his or her own slate of
legislative candidates. National and provincial elections are
held simultaneously every 5 years.
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URUGUAY
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The human rights performance of the Government since its
return to democratic rule in 1985 has not been the subject of
attention by international and local human rights
organizations, with the major exception of their serious
concern about, and opposition to, the Law of Expiration. The
Government is open to inquiries from such organizations and
does not restrict the activities of human rights
investigators .
Local human rights groups, some of which could not operate
openly under military rule, now function freely and without
restriction. A prominent local human rights group. Peace and
Justice Service (SERPAJ), was legalized in early 1985 after
operating underground for 2 years during the military regime.
SERPAJ investigates human rights issues, such as prison
conditions and cases involving killing, torture, and
disappearances which occurred during the military regime. An
effort by SERPAJ to have the Senate deny promotions to 11
military officers it claimed took part in past human rights
violations failed, and all 11 were promoted.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Uruguay has long been one of the most egalitarian countries in
Latin America. There are few racial or linguistic minorities
in the country. Nonwhites are disproportionately represented
at the lower end of the economic scale, but this is not the
result of legislation or official policy.
Uruguayan women enjoy equality under the law, but they face a
number of forms of discrimination owing to traditional
attitudes and practices. Pay is not always equal for men and
women, especially in less skilled jobs.
Violence against women, including wife beating, exists, but
until recently this problem received little publicity. It is
believed, however, that wife beating is common and widespread.
According to women's rights activists, abuse against women,
especially domestic violence, has apparently always been
common in Uruguay. Since the return to democracy in 1985,
this problem has been receiving increased public and
governmental attention. A government body called the
Commission of Women receives complaints of abused women, and
the penal code mandates a sentence of 3 months in jail to 3
years in prison for the crime of "private violence." However,
in practice the legal system is not effective in dealing with
what is essentially a cultural and educational problem. The
main legal recourse for abused women lies in making a legal
complaint against a spouse or boyfriend. However, many women
find it very difficult to make and sustain such a complaint,
especially those who continue to reside with their partners.
Several women's rights groups provide assistance to abused
women and also have programs to publicize the problem and
educate the population. One of these groups led a
demonstration in front of the Women's Commission offices on
November 14, 1989, to protest the Commission's failure to
assist a woman who was murdered by her husband on November 12,
1989, after 17 years of abuse.
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URUGUAY
The President signed into law an antidiscrimination bill which
calls for prison sentences, ranging from 3 months to 2 years,
for defamation as well as incitement to, or perpetration of,
acts of violence motivated by racial, religious, or ethnic
reasons. The law. Equality of Opportunities and Treatment For
Both Sexes in the Labor Field, was approved by Parliament on
May 17, 1989.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides for the right of workers to organize
freely, and the formation of unions is encouraged. Civil
servants may join unions, as may employees of state-run
enterprises. There are no legal restrictions on union
membership for workers in special economic zones.
All labor unions are independent of government or governing
party control. There are no restrictions on union political
activities. While some union members and leaders are
politically active, unions themselves have traditionally
refrained from participating in partisan politics. Workers
have the right to choose their own representatives, publicize
their views, and determine their own programs and policies.
Union officials have the right to represent the members'
interests. The member unions of the central labor
organization, the Interunion Workers Assembly-National Workers
Association (PIT-CNT), have about 250,000 members representing
over 80 percent of organized workers. The PIT-CNT is a
voluntary confederation of independent unions, and there are a
number of strong autonomous unions as well.
Uruguayan workers, including some civil servants, have the
right to strike, and many unions did so during 1989. Sympathy
strikes are not prohibited. Most of the contracts for the
industrial sectors negotiated in 1988 included "no strike"
clauses which restrict the workers' right to strike over pay
disputes during the term of the contract (18 to 24 months).
Of the strikes which took place during 1989, most were
resolved when the two parties involved reached a mutually
acceptable settlement. In the case of a job action in August
involving port workers, the Ministry of Labor and Social
Security (MTSS) stepped in, with the permission of both sides,
in a mediating capacity. There are no institutionalized
mechanisms for arbitration or mediation; the MTSS performs the
role of mediator on an ad hoc basis.
Workers can be legally compelled to work during a strike if
their work is considered to be an essential service, the
definition of which is relatively limited although it may in
some cases exceed International Labor Organization (ILO)
definitions. In the 1-day general strike on June 27,
municipal public transportation was declared essential and
minimal levels of bus service were maintained. During the
August strike by municipal workers, garbage pickup was
declared an essential service by the municipal government.
Workers were ordered to return to their jobs; few responded,
but there were no cases of workers being penalized for their
refusal .
There are no restrictions on unions' right to affiliate with
international trade union bodies. By choice, the PIT-CNT is
not officially affiliated with any of the three world
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URUGUAY
federations. Many individual unions are affiliated with
international trade secretariates.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Discrimination by employers, including arbitrary dismissal,
for union activity is prohibited. There is no
institutionalized mechanism for resolving such complaints
against employers, however, and no formal complaints are known
to have been filed with the Government.
Industrial contracts are generally negotiated on a
sector-wide, rather than plant-by-plant, basis. These
negotiations take place under the auspices of a tripartite
(government, workers, management) organization known as a
Salary Council. Each industrial sector has its own council.
The role played by the government representative can vary from
council to council. In some, the government representatives
see themselves as primarily arbitrators or mediators and only
participate in the negotiations when there is an impasse. In
others, the government representative is an active, equal
participant in all phases of the negotiations. Individual
firms and unions are not prohibited from bargaining outside
the council framework. The Government must approve contracts
before they become legally binding on the parties involved;
during the last round of wage negotiations (1988) the
Government approved only those contracts negotiated under the
council system. Most employers like the security gained from
the council system; most unions like the equity of wages that
results from the sector-wide negotiations.
In November 1989, the ILO's Committee on Freedom of
Association (CFA) reached interim conclusions regarding a
complaint presented by the PIT-CNT alleging, among other
things, that the Government exercises a veto power over salary
council collective bargaining agreements that exceed
anti-inflationary wage guidelines imposed by the International
Monetary Fund and in some cases has directly fixed wage
guidelines without convening the salary councils. The CFA
concluded that these allegations were largely unfounded,
noting that there has been a positive evolution as regards
collective bargaining in Uruguay to the extent that 83 percent
of the wage earners in the private sector are now covered by
agreements negotiated essentially bilaterally. The Committee,
however, urged the Government to legalize the right of
employees of autonomous and decentralized state enterprises to
conclude collective agreements.
Workers employed in the two special export zones are fully
covered by all labor legislation.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law, and there is
no evidence that would indicate its existence in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children are protected by a child labor code, violations of
which are punishable by fines of up to $500. Children under
the age of 15 generally are not employed, but children as
young as 12 may be legally employed if they have a special
government work permit. Children under the age of 18 may not
perform dangerous, fatiguing, or night work, apart from
domestic employment. Salaries and hours for children are
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controlled more strictly than for adults. Children over the
age of 16 may sue in court for payment of wages, and children
have the legal right to dispose of their own income. Children
working in the expanding informal sector, such as street
vendors or others with no fixed place of work or in the
agrarian sector, are generally less strictly regulated and
receive lower pay.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The legislated minimum wage is approximately $72.37 per month
for industrial workers. The minimum wage appears to be
effectively enforced and adhered to by the sectors to which it
is applicable. The minimum wage is adjusted every 4 months;
raises in the minimum wage are indexed to 90 percent of the
rate of inflation for the previous 4-month period. The
minimum wage was raised in November to approximately $79.59
per month. A family dependent on one minimum-wage income
would be living below the poverty line and would be in the
poorest 20 percent of the population. The median family
income for Uruguayans during the April-June 1988 period,
however, was close to double the minimum wage.
The standard workweek is 48 hours in 6 days. Industrial
workers receive overtime in compensation for work in excess of
48 hours. Workers are entitled to 10 days' paid vacation
after a year of employment; this vacation period increases
with each year of employment. Workers are protected by
legislation regulating the health and safety of working
conditions, and these existing laws and regulations appear to
be effectively enforced or adhered to in practice. However,
concern has risen in the last year over inadequacies in the
current legislation which governs health and safety in the
workplace, and the Parliament was studying more stringent
measures prior to year's end. Some labor regulations cover
urban and industrial workers more thoroughly than rural and
agricultural workers.
24-900 O—
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VENEZUELA
Venezuela is a republic with an active multiparty democratic
system, a free press, strong unions, and a longstanding
commitment to democracy. For more than 30 years, power has
passed peacefully between the two major political parties
through open elections. In 1988 a third Venezuelan party
emerged as a significant factor.
The Venezuelan security apparatus has civilian and military
elements, both of which are held accountable to popularly
elected authorities. The military services still focus on
conventional war, but are occasionally called upon to maintain
domestic order, for example, during the urban rioting which
erupted early in 1989.
Venezuela's mixed economy is dominated by the public sector.
The state-owned petroleum industry currently accounts for some
20 percent of the gross domestic product, more than any other
industry. The Venezuelan Government is in the process of a
major economic restructuring to reduce its dependence on oil
exports and to enable domestic business to compete more
effectively in the international market. To reduce the scope
of public sector intervention in the economy, authorities have
rationalized the exchange rate, reduced interest rate and
price controls, as well as the level of subsidies for consumer
goods. In the short term the adjustment program is likely to
be painful.
The principal human rights concerns in Venezuela result from
weaknesses, including alleged corruption, in the country's
judicial system, which often result in prolonged pretrial
imprisonment, and in the law enforcement system, which
continues to be charged with numerous instances of arbitrary
detention, of abuse of detainees, and of extrajudicial
killings. The 1989 human rights record was marred by
widespread riots and the reactions of security forces. On
February 27-28, crowds, reacting to a sharp increase in bus
fares, began burning buses. The violence grew when mobs,
frustrated by reduced food supplies, began widespread looting
of groceries and other businesses. With police unable to
restore order or to safeguard property, the Government
temporarily suspended some constitutional rights and used
military force to restore order and to feed the population.
While most Venezuelans were relieved at the army's success in
restoring order, many persons were killed, and critics
characterized some of the army's tactics as heavy-handed and
unjustified.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Authorities do not engage in or condone unlawful or arbitrary
killing for political motives, and there were no reports of
such killings. There have, however, been instances of
extrajudicial killings, including police shooting and killing
of criminal suspects, of security forces killing civilians,
and of arrested persons dying while in police custody.
In the only incident of its kind to occur under democratic
rule in Venezuela, a large number of extrajudicial killings
took place in February, when the Government, in response to
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VENEZUELA
widespread rioting and looting, declared a curfew and
instructed regular military forces to restore order in
numerous neighborhoods in Caracas and other cities. Critics
of the Government charged that security forces shot at random
into houses and businesses, killing people both in their homes
and on the street who were breaking no laws and represented no
threat. The Minister of Defense denied that an order to
"shoot on sight" was issued and said that his forces only
responded to attacks against them. Critics acknowledge that
snipers challenged the military in some areas (although the
prevalence of such activity is in dispute) , and the Government
admits that in some instances excess force might have been
used. The Government called on the army when the efforts of
police to control mob violence broke down. (In a few
instances, police officers actually joined the looting during
the first 2 days, before the armed forces intervened.) The
rioting spread not only through most of the capital but also
to smaller towns and cities throughout the country. It was
primarily in Caracas, however, that casualties occurred.
Violence subsided in most other urban areas before deadly
force was employed.
The Government estimated that there were from 275 to 300
deaths resulting from the riots. Other estimates were much
higher, and some government officials agreed that the official
figures were too low. A few sources, citing reports from
family members and personal contacts in hospitals and morgues,
contended that the death toll exceeded 1,000. The exact
number of deaths could not be established, nor could the
proportion of deaths caused by security forces versus those
caused, accidentally or deliberately, by mob actions.
President Carlos Andres Perez appointed a special committee to
investigate military actions during the riots, which found
that some abuses had occurred. An arrest warrant was issued
for two municipal police officers accused of abuse of
authority for entering a private residence and removing,
beating, and shooting at two persons with whom they had
personal differences. Some critics complained that the
Government's attempts to redress grievances arising from these
incidents were inadequate. The Government maintained that,
while unfortunate abuses did occur during February, many were
unavoidable given the extent of the disturbances.
In another case of extrajudicial killing, the shooting to
death of 14 civilians by Venezuelan security forces in the
town of El Amparo, near the Colombian border, during October
1988, was considered by both military courts and the Supreme
Court during 1989. Arrest warrants issued against some of the
officers involved in the shootings, based on the testimony of
two survivors, were revoked by the military court of appeals
on the grounds that the issuing court did not have
jurisdiction. Fearing for their safety, the two survivors
were given temporary refuge by the Catholic Church. The court
decision was sharply criticized as obstructing a full inquiry
into what generally is regarded as having been a massacre. In
a further appeal, the Supreme Court refused jurisdiction. On
December 5, however, a separate section of the Supreme Court
reviewed and annulled the earlier decision by the military
court. This second decision declared that the military court
does, in fact, have jurisdiction and should issue a new
decision based on "accurate" legal interpretations. At year's
end, it remained unclear what effect this ruling will have on
the El Amparo case.
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b. Disappearance
In the February-March violence, when civil liberties were
temporarily suspended by the Government using martial law
authority, numerous persons disappeared for varying lengths of
time. Some of these persons were later found dead, reportedly
having been shot in the head or back. Persons claiming to
have been eyewitnesses told of individuals taken from their
homes by security officials; some were later found in prisons
or other detention centers, and others were reportedly later
found dead. The Committee for the Disappeared, a group
composed of family members of the missing people, lists 16
persons as still being untraceable. Other human rights
groups, not necessarily made up of missing persons' families,
offer figures in this same range. Human rights groups
reported that the Public Prosecutor's office has increased
efforts to assist the families of the missing.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is prohibited by law. Constitutional provisions for
the integrity of the individual are generally enforced, but
allegations of physical abuse of detainees are prevalent.
There are claims that electric shocks and beatings are not
uncommon during ordinary times — some detainees have publicly
told of such experiences — and that more extreme abuses
occurred during the February riots.
In an August conference on Venezuelan prison conditions.
Justice Minister Guerra, who has been a strong proponent of
judicial and penal reform, noted that the prison system was in
need of "urgent" and "total reform." The nation's prisoners
live in "subhuman conditions," according to the Minister. He
was joined by Chief Public Prosecutor Escovar Salom in
recognizing that prison conditions are exacerbated by serious
overcrowding — 28,643 prisoners are kept in institutions
designed to hold 9,000. Sanitation and health care in prisons
are inadequate, as is the diet unless supplemented by
donations from friends and family. Discipline within prisons
is widely considered to be inadequate, and violence by guards
against the prisoners, and among the prisoners themselves, is
said to be common. Official personnel involved in such
violence are not known to be punished. Some sources argue
that conditions in preliminary detention centers, not set up
for extended incarcerations, are even worse, as they are often
pressed into service as de facto prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The right to judicial determination of the legality of
detention is provided for by law. Arrested persons or persons
under preventive detention legally can be held for up to 8
days without a formal detention order, during which time they
may be held incommunicado. Arbitrary arrests and arrests with
improper warrants are common, and the time limits for holding
persons are frequently exceeded, usually because of
inefficiencies in the legal system. A law increasing the
power of judges to redress abuses by ordering the release of
someone unjustly imprisoned aids in enforcing the 8-day limit
within which an arrestee must be formally charged or set
free. Even if a person is detained under a proper order, the
time of detention pending trial often exceeds the amount of
time the person would have been required to serve had he been
found guilty. For several days following the start of the
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VENEZUELA
February riots, the Government used martial law authority to
suspend the constitutional right which protects citizens from
detention without charge.
Bail is permitted only for relatively minor crimes.
Venezuela's bail laws have been under review by the Congress,
and the Government hopes to increase the applicability of bail
provisions, a step which would contribute to relieving
overcrowded prisons. Bail is not available in cases involving
allegations of government malfeaseance.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to a fair trial is provided by law, and there exist
a number of procedural safeguards. However, once formally
charged, the burden of proof is on the accused to prove his or
her innocence, and lengthy pretrial detention is the norm.
The law provides public defenders for those unable to afford
competent defense; however, the number of public defenders in
the country (350) is insufficient to meet this obligation. In
some cases, defendants who remain outside the country pending
assignment of a court date (to avoid extended pretrial
detention without bail) may not select their own attorneys;
the court appoints an attorney in these cases.
According to the Ministry of Justice, fewer than 25 percent of
all prisoners have been convicted. Judicial authorities
attribute the backlog to an insufficient number of qualified
judges, automatic review of all lower court decisions by
higher courts unable to limit their dockets, and failure to
enforce procedural deadlines at each stage of the legal
process. Delays of 2 or 3 years in a normal case are not
infrequent. The judicial process is almost exclusively a
written one, requiring costly and time-consuming production of
voluminous reports by judges, attorneys, and witnesses at
every stage.
Some Venezuelan leaders and legal experts also attribute
delays and other irregularities to corruption and the use of
personal influence. The civilian judiciary is legally
independent, but connections to the two major political
parties are important in the judicial selection process. In
September, the Public Prosecutor charged political parties
with "interfering abusively in (public) institutions, even
impeding the autonomy of the judiciary." To help prevent such
political meddling, there is a five-member Judicial Council
which is responsible for the nomination, training, and
discipline of judges. One member is selected by Congress, one
by the President, and three by the Supreme Court. A law
passed in October 1988 reduced the membership of the Judicial
Council to five from nine in an attempt to reduce political
party influence on the selection process.
Civilians charged with armed subversion are tried by military
courts as insurgents. There is no statutory time limit on the
adjudication of cases in military courts, although persons
convicted under the military justice system have the same
right to appeal to the Supreme Court as those prosecuted under
the civilian system. Military judges are appointed by the
Supreme Court. There has been criticism of the preponderant
referral to military courts (230 to 240 out of approximately
280 cases) of the legal cases brought against security agents
for alleged abuses during the February riots. Besides the
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VENEZUELA
lack of deadlines in the military system, critics contend that
the system's secrecy and tendency to close ranks make it
unlikely that the defendants would undergo an impartial,
complete prosecution.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence
The Constitution and law provide safeguards against arbitrary
interference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence.
These safeguards are largely honored in practice, although
there is evidence that some wiretapping takes place. Most of
the charges of invasion of privacy connected with a 1989
wiretap scandal came from politicians accusing opposing
parties of spying and eavesdropping. A Supreme Court Justice
was quoted by the press in June as saying the "violation of
privacy has created a syndrome of national anxiety." He
stated that he would undertake a study of Venezuelan law to
ensure it incorporated sufficient safeguards against
wiretapping. The proscription against government agents
entering houses without a warrant was briefly suspended in the
wake of the February riots.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of the press and free
speech. These liberties, along with academic freedom, are
almost universally honored, although the previous Government
on one occasion restricted newsprint to a journal deemed to be
"too free" in its investigations.
Venezuela has a free and lively press, which frequently
criticizes the Government and denounces instances of
government interference in the media. From February 28
through March 22, the Government rescinded a number of
constitutional guarantees, including freedom of speech and of
the press, because the media were allegedly reporting the
disturbances in an inflammatory manner. While human rights
sources report their press contacts exercised greater
self-censorship after the guarantees were restored,
journalists themselves say press freedom has generally
increased under the new presidential administration. The
media followed vigorously and with no apparent restraint the
development of various government corruption cases, including
the deliberations of the ruling party ethics tribunal which
expelled and disciplined some leading party members during the
latter part of the year.
Venezuela has 4 nationwide television networks, 2 of which are
government owned, 3 regional television stations, 168 radio
stations, and numerous newspapers and magazines, with 9
dailies in Caracas alone. The Government is a significant
source of advertising revenue for the media, but there appear
to be no recent instances where government advertising was
channeled for political ends.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of peaceful assembly and association is normally
respected in Venezuela, although it, along with several other
constitutional guarantees, was suspended from February 28
through March 22, when a nighttime curfew was also enforced.
Public meetings, including those of all political parties, are
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VENEZUELA
held without interference. Permits are required for public
marches but are not denied for political reasons.
Professional and academic associations operate without
interference. Most have ties to political parties.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The population is predominantly Roman Catholic, although other
religious groups enjoy freedom of worship and proselytize
actively. Foreign missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant,
are active throughout the country.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens and legal residents generally have freedom to travel
within the country and to go abroad and return. Travel in the
Amazon military zone is an exception and requires a special
permit for security reasons. Venezuelans may emigrate if
their tax obligations have been met. Citizenship can be
renounced. Recovery of nationality requires a residence
period of 2 years for Venezuelan-born repatriates. The
Constitution provides for revocation of citizenship for
naturalized citizens on specific, limited legal grounds.
Venezuela traditionally has been a haven for refugees, exiles,
and displaced persons from many European, Caribbean, and Latin
American countries. Refugees are given normal residence
status and may be expelled only for criminal activities.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Government is freely elected by secret ballot. Venezuela
is a multiparty democracy, with mandatory suffrage for all
those 18 years of age or older, and the political process is
open to all. Elections for the President, Congress, and state
legislative assemblies are held every 5 years. Over two dozen
parties participated in the 1988 national presidential
elections. Eleven parties are represented in the House of
Deputies and 4 parties are represented in the Senate.
In December governors in 20 states and mayors in 269
municipalities were elected for the first time in Venezuelan
history. This election was also the first to use a system
allowing the voter to choose individual candidates by name,
rather than selecting only among party slates. Critics
contend that the method developed for counting the votes,
which guarantees minority party participation, is unfair and
denies citizens truly direct representation.
Political views are freely expressed, and persons from the
entire political spectrum contend for positions ranging from
municipal council seats to the presidency. Minor parties won
18 percent of the seats in the national legislature in 1988;
some of these parties are outgrowths of former guerrilla
organizations. The two largest parties are the centrist
social democratic and social Christian parties. The Movement
Towards Socialism party, founded by disenchanted members of
the Venezuelan Communist Party, increased its share of the
total vote to 10 percent in the congressional elections of
1988. Even some of the smaller parties provide mechanisms by
766
VENEZUELA
which minority elements within their membership are guaranteed
a voice in administrative and policymaking decisions to
preclude their disenf ranchisement .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Latin American Foundation for Human Rights and Social
Development and the Federation of Families of Disappeared
Persons have offices in Caracas, and human rights
organizations are able to operate free of government
restriction. Both Amnesty International and Americas Watch
delegations visited in 1989 to investigate the February riots
and the 1988 massacre at El Amparo.
The number of local human rights groups proliferated
noticeably after February. Human rights groups do not suffer
from government persecution and vigorously criticize perceived
government inadequacies in redressing grievances.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no evidence that economic and social needs and
cultural aspirations are denied on a discriminatory basis to
any portion of the population. The Constitution prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex and accords women and
children "special protection" in the workplace. Women workers
receive extensive maternity leave benefits, and laws limit
their involuntary overtime.
The Venezuelan Government recognizes that violence against
women, including domestic violence such as wife beating, is a
problem. Due to inadequate statistical data, the true extent
of such abuse is impossible to gauge. Victims frequently are
reluctant to report cases or to press charges. The Ministry
of the Family operates shelters for beaten women. In an
effort to educate women about their rights, the Government
distributes pamphlets, especially in poor neighborhoods, to
alert residents to the illegal nature of domestic violence and
their legal remedies. While Venezuelan authorities are
sensitive to the problem, the ineffectiveness of Venezuelan
justice offers little prospect of quick relief.
Restrictions on property rights based on sex, religion, or
social status do not exist, but there are some restrictions on
ownership of business property and employment based on
nationality. For example, there is a wage/salary and
headcount rule in the labor law which requires that 75 percent
of all wages and salaries and 75 percent of the payroll
employees be Venezuelan nationals. The Superintendency cf
Foreign Investment has interpreted foreign investment
legislation to mean that "mixed" and "national" Venezuelan
companies should have Venezuelan nationals as president.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Both constitutional and labor law recognize and encourage
unions' right to exist. There are no restrictions on this
right in practice in either the public or private sectors
(except for the armed forces). The Government's positive
attitude toward unions reflects the prevailing political
767
VENEZUELA
climate. Unions play a major role in the Venezuelan economy.
One major union confederation (the Venezuelan Confederation of
Workers — CTV) and three small ones, as well as a number of
independent unions, operate freely in Venezuela. About 25
percent of the national labor force is unionized, and the
figure is about 44 percent in the urban formal sector. There
are no restrictions on affiliation with international labor
organizations; the CTV is an active participant in the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). In
1989 it hosted a congress of the ICFTU' s regional organization
for Latin America.
The CTVs top leadership includes members of several political
parties. The majority are affiliated with the country's
largest party, Accion Democratica (AD) (the social democratic
party), and AD and the CTV reciprocally influence each other.
The CTV, however, has repeatedly demonstrated its independence
from both the Government (in which AD holds the presidency and
a plurality of the seats in Congress) and the parties. The
clearest example of this independence is the CTVs frequent
criticism of the Government's economic policies, culminating
in the general strike of May 18.
The right of public and private sector employees to strike is
recognized legally and upheld in practice. In recent years
Venezuelan workers seldom resorted to use of the strike, but
the decline in living standards during the year, as the
Government introduced austerity measures, increased the
popularity of this tactic. In 1989 the Government resorted to
mandatory arbitration in the case of a strike by doctors
against the Social Security Administration. The arbitration
board awarded doctors a considerable increase over the
previous contract, but less than they believed they had been
promised. The award provoked considerable controversy among
doctors, but most returned to work.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The labor law specifically states that workers will be free
from all "interferences, prohibitions, subordinations, and
coercions" in the exercise of their rights to organize unions
and elect officials. The same legislation states that it is
the duty of unions to represent their members in negotiations
for a collective contract, and it also protects employees who
engage in union activities from reprisals by employers.
Venezuelan law encourages collective bargaining, which is
widely practiced. At the end of 1988, 39 percent of public
and private sector employees were covered by collective
contracts, including 36 percent in manufacturing, 61 percent
in construction, 18 percent in commerce, and 42 percent in
transportation.
Workers' legal rights are not restricted in free trade zones.
Labor law is enforced by Ministry of Labor inspectors,
tripartite (labor-management-government) commissions (which
hear complaints regarding firings), and labor courts.
Although parts of this system are overburdened and slow,
overall it is regarded as effective in protecting workers'
rights. In its 1989 report, the International Labor
Organization's Committee of Experts repeated its earlier
request to the Government to increase the severity of
sanctions under the law for antiunion discrimination.
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VENEZUELA
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced or compulsory labor in Venezuela;
unremunerated labor is prohibited by law.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Venezuelan law prohibits the following: the employment of
children under age 14; a workday of more than 6 hours for 14-
and 15-year olds; and night work or employment at hazardous
tasks for those under age 18. This legislation is enforced in
the formal sector of the economy but much less so in the
informal sector. Worsening economic conditions are probably
pushing more workers into the informal sector, including
children.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The minimum wage for new hires in the urban sector in
September 1989 was about $105 monthly, plus mandatory fringe
benefits that vary with the workers' individual circumstances,
but in general would increase wages by about one-third.
Because of an across-the-board wage increase given to the
urban private sector in March, the effective minimum wage for
anyone hired before that time is about $121 monthly plus
benefits. The agricultural minimum wage is lower,
approximately $68 monthly. While wages increased
significantly in 1989, a high rate of inflation, especially in
basic items such as food and transportation, offset these
gains. There is a consensus that workers" standards of living
dropped faster in 1989 because subsidies were reduced as the
Government's oil revenues fell.
By law, the workweek for blue-collar workers may not exceed 48
hours plus 2 hours' daily overtime or a maximum of 200 hours
overtime per year. The maximum legal workweek for
white-collar workers is 44 hours. Some unions, such as the
petroleum workers, have negotiated a 40-hour week. Employees
must be given a rest period of at least a half-hour after 5
hours of work. The law is generally observed with the
exception of restrictions on overtime. Paid holidays and
weekly rest days are also provided by law.
A health and safety law was passed in 1986, but its
enforcement awaits the development of standards and issuance
of implementing regulations. Opinions regarding the potential
effectiveness of this law vary. Some businessmen regard the
penal sanctions of this law for cases of negligence resulting
in injury as too harsh, and some labor leaders believe that
efforts to improve working conditions are proceeding too
slowly. The Ministry of Labor prepared for the establishment
of an Office of Occupational Health and Safety which is
scheduled to open in 1990.
769
EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
AUSTRALIA
Australia has a long history as a multiparty, parliamentary
democracy operating within a federal system of government.
Federal elections, last held in July 1987, must be held again
no later than November 21, 1990.
Federal, state, and local police in Australia carry out their
functions in accordance with civil law, which respects and
safeguards individual human rights. The law is observed in
practice .
Australia's developed economy, with important mining and
agricultural sectors and growing manufacturing and service
sectors, provides most Australians with a high per capita
income. Furthermore, the Government provides assistance for
the minority of relatively disadvantaged citizens.
Individuals are free to hold private property, pursue their
economic and personal interests, associate with others, and
organize trade unions.
Fundamental human rights are assured by law and respected in
practice in Australia. The Government's commitment to the
promotion of, and respect for, human rights is firm,
domestically and internationally. During 1989 protection of
the rights of Australia's 200,000 Aboriginals, the most
economically and socially disadvantaged minority in the
country, continued to receive significant government and
public attention. Also in 1989, a Royal Commission continued
investigation of deaths of Aboriginals in police custody, a
precedent-setting federal-state agreement resolved a
long-running land rights dispute, and a national council
system to give Aboriginal communities a more direct voice in
federal government neared enactment. Women's rights continued
to receive attention under the Federal Government's national
agenda for women, which includes a nationwide campaign to
reduce domestic violence.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Killing for political motives by the Government or by
political organizations does not occur.
b. Disappearance
There have been no instances of political disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Australian law prohibits all these practices, and this
prohibition is generally respected. However, concerns over
deaths in custody of Aboriginals continue to be addressed by
the Government.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Australian law prohibits arbitrary arrest and imprisonment.
This prohibition is respected in practice.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
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AUSTRALIA
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Australian law provides for the right to a fair public trial
before an independent judiciary. Defendants have full due
process rights including a presumption of innocence, an
unimpeded right of counsel (at public expense for indigents),
a right to confront witnesses, and a right to appeal. These
rights are respected in practice.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Under Australian law and in practice, no search may be
conducted without a judicial warrant. The Government does not
interfere with the privacy of family, home, or correspondence.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The democratic political system, an effective judiciary, and
diverse and independent news media combine to ensure freedom
of speech and press and full academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Although Australia does not have a bill of rights, it is a
party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which provides for freedom of assembly and
expression. These freedoms are respected in practice.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Australians have complete freedom of religion. A provision in
the Constitution precludes the adoption of an official state
religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Australia imposes no restrictions on movement within or
outside of the country. The rights of emigration and
repatriation are also protected.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Australians elect representatives to a two-chamber Federal
Parliament as well as to numerous state and local bodies
through free and open elections. Candidates are drawn from
three major parties and a number of minor parties. Voting, by
secret ballot, is compulsory in general elections for
Australians 18 years of age and older; eligible voters who do
not vote may be fined. Elections are held at varying
intervals as prescribed by federal, state, and local laws.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
As a matter of policy, the Government responds to any
communication from the United Nations alleging violations of
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AUSTRALIA
human rights in Australia. The Government also permits
unimpeded access to all international and nongovernmental
groups investigating alleged human rights violations.
On the international level, Australia actively promotes human
rights as a member of the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous
Populations and in other forums.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
By law, Australians have equal access to government services
without reference to race, sex, religion, language, or social
status. Basic food, shelter, health care, education, and
social security benefits are guaranteed for all. The Racial
Discrimination Act of 1975 prohibits discrimination on grounds
of race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin.
A national multicultural agenda, announced by the Federal
Government in July 1989, launched a 3-year education campaign
to improve intercultural understanding and committed the
Government to additional federal legislation if existing state
laws were found to address inadequately the concerns of ethnic
and racial groups. The following month, the Federal Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission began a special review
of the causes of racial unrest and incidents of alleged
"racist violence". However, Aboriginal groups and others
claim that Aboriginals, who comprise about 1.25 percent of the
nation's population, suffer widespread discrimination. The
Government acknowledges that the Aboriginal population is the
most disadvantaged group in terms of education, housing,
health, and employment. In addition to the broad range of
programs available to all Australians, the Government provides
services specifically aimed at improving Aboriginal
socioeconomic conditions.
A Royal Commission created in 1987 to investigate Aboriginal
deaths in police custody continued to review cases and take
testimony in 1989. The Commission's mandate was extended
until December 1990, but its findings will be based primarily
on an examination of the over 100 deaths in custody which
occurred between January 1, 1980 and May 31, 1989. Interim
social, legal, and law enforcement reforms recommended by the
Commission were endorsed by national police officials and
Aboriginal leaders in February 1989. Although many of these
reforms were implemented by state and local governments,
deaths in custody continued.
An agreement reached by the Federal and the Northern Territory
Governments in September 1989 recognized a limited number of
Aboriginal groups' land claims in exchange for their
acceptance of a land rights appeals process through the
Northern Territory court system. The agreement gave the 3,000
to 5,000 Aboriginal squatters in the disputed areas legal
status and allowed them to qualify for federally funded
community services.
The Federal Senate took up consideration of a controversial
plan to replace the Federal Department of Aboriginal Affairs
with the Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islander Commission
(ATSIC) , comprised of commissioners elected from the
Aboriginal councils around the country. Supporters of the
ATSIC maintain that it would give Aboriginals a greater voice
in issues affecting them. The Federal Government is publicly
772
AUSTRALIA
committed to a more formal delineation of Aboriginal rights
than currently exists.
Government at all levels and the Australian public place
considerable emphasis on women's issues, including violence
against women. There is growing concern about domestic
violence, the victims of which are mostly female. It is
difficult to measure the extent of domestic violence due to
the lack of reliable statistics and the reluctance of victims
to report incidents. However, a widely quoted April 1989
study by the Australian Institute of Criminology estimated
that between 1 in 3 and 1 in 10 families, from all
socioeconomic backgrounds, may be affected.
In response to public concerns, the Government began a 3-year
national domestic violence education campaign in 1987 which
included a nationwide awareness month in 1989. In
coordination with women's rights groups, law enforcement
authorities, and state and local governments, the campaign has
led to victim protection legislation, improved police training
and tactics, and increased sensitivity to domestic violence on
the part of community service agencies. Women's and legal
rights groups generally agree that these efforts have raised
community awareness, but that additional governmental
resources are needed to reduce the incidence of domestic
violence .
The Sex Discrimination Act of 1984 prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sex, marital status, or pregnancy. In 1986 the
Government passed affirmative action legislation obliging
employers to provide equal employment and promotion
opportunities for women employees. Women's rights and welfare
are promoted by a number of women's rights groups and the
Federal Government's Office of the Status of Women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Australian law and practice provide workers with full freedom
to establish and join trade unions, choose their union
representatives, and formulate union programs. These rights
of association include the right of Australian unions to
associate directly with their counterparts in other nations
and to participate in international labor organizations.
Unions represent about 40 percent of the work force and are
extremely active and influential. Australian workers enjoy
the right to strike, which is well established in practice.
However, a 1989 ruling of the Victoria Supreme Court declaring
the airline pilots union liable for damages arising from the
pilots' dispute with the airlines underscored that the right
to strike is not protected under domestic law.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Australian workers are granted the right, by law and in
practice, to organize and bargain collectively and to be
represented in negotiating the prevention and settlement of
disputes with employers. A pattern of centralized wage
negotiations with quasi- judicial arbitration and settlement,
as oposed to company-by-company collective bargaining, has
generally prevailed since the establishment of the
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission in 1904.
The Industrial Relations Act of 1988 made important technical
changes in the basic system, creating a new Industrial
773
AUSTRALIA
Relations Commission with expanded scope for performing
essentially the same tasks as its predecessor.
Industrial disputes are arbitrated by a system of federal and
state industrial courts in which trade unions receive a full
and fair hearing. The, rights of trade union officials are
fully protected in both law and practice.
Federal labor law and practice are uniform throughout the
country. There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Australia has ratified and fully respects International Labor
Organization (ILO) Convention 105 concerning forced labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Australia has ratified and fully respects the following ILO
conventions concerning minimum age for employment: Convention
7 (minimum age); Convention 10 (minimum age for agricultural
workers); Convention 15 (minimum age for trimmers and
stokers); Convention 112 (minimum age for fishermen); and
Convention 123 (minimum age for underground workers) . In
addition, federal and state ministries of labor monitor and
enforce a network of legislation (which often varies from
state to state) governing such interactive factors as minimum
school-leaving age, minimum age to claim unemployment
benefits, and minimum age to engage in specified occupations.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Australia has long had a tradition that workers should be
guaranteed a decent standard of living. Although Australia
has a formal federal minimum wage of $156 per week, the
federal minimum wage is rarely, if ever, used. Instead,
different minimum wage rates for individual trades and
professions are embodied in a comprehensive system of "awards"
sanctioned by various state and federal commissions. The
lowest current award of $217 per week is for clothing
workers. Combined with other regularly provided benefits and
government entitlements for low-income families, this wage
provides a decent standard of living.
In addition, a body of regulations and commission decisions
prescribes the 40-hour (often 38-hour) week, paid vacations
and sick leave, and health and safety standards in the
workplace, as well as other benefits for the overwhelming
majority of Australian workers. Compliance with these and
other regulations, such as minimum age of employment, is
actively monitored and enforced by federal and state
ministries of labor.
774
Mumii
Brunei is a small, wealthy. Islamic monarchy located on the
north coast of Borneo. It is predominantly Malay in
population, although there are substantial Chinese and other
minorities. Brunei is a hereditary and traditional Sultanate
that has been ruled by the same family for over 500 years. A
British protectorate until January 1, 1984, it has been
internally self-governing since 1959.
The Constitution promulgated in 1959 provided for the first
sharing of political power by the Sultan with an advisory
Council of Ministers. The Constitution, however, permits the
Sultan to override the decisions of legislative and executive
bodies in most instances. In elections for a legislative
council in 1962, a party opposed to policies of the Sultan won
a large majority; tensions over policy differences led to an
armed uprising in December 1962 that was put down by British
troops. The Sultan then invoked an article in the
Constitution that allowed him to assume emergency powers for 2
years. This state of emergency has been renewed every 2 years
and is still in force. Several persons detained under
emergency powers following the 1962 uprising remain in custody
without trial. Although the Constitution is not suspended,
the state of emergency allows the Sultan great latitude in
ruling by orders. These orders have in effect suspended
certain articles of the Constitution.
The activities of the Royal Armed Forces are devoted to
protecting the country against external threat and they are
not involved in maintaining internal security. The police
force is firmly under the control of the civil authorities,
and there is no evidence that it resorts to extralegal
measures in the discharge of its duties.
Since 1962 there have been no disturbances or agitation in
Brunei. Economic factors have much to do with the general
sense of well-being. Brunei has only about 240,000 people,
but produces about 150,000 barrels of oil per day and slightly
over 5 million tons of liquefied natural gas per year. It has
one of the highest per capita gross national products in the
world. Brunei has no debts, and the nation's financial
reserves are commonly estimated at between $20 and $30
billion. Petroleum revenues and interest on invested reserves
allow the Government to provide free medical care, schools,
and university training to its citizens. A large proportion
of the Malay population is employed by the Government at
generous salaries which permit a higher standard of living
than in surrounding countries. Government employees are
eligible for low-interest or no-interest loans to purchase
homes, automobiles, and appliances. The nation's second
largest employer, Brunei Shell, provides similar benefits to
its employees. Brunei has no income tax. There are several
substantial, low-cost housing plans designed to provide homes
for the landless. There is a chronic shortage of labor
throughout the economy, which helps to keep employee wage and
benefit packages high and makes it relatively easy for women
to find work in traditionally male occupations.
There were no major human rights developments during the year;
human rights remain restricted with regard to arbitrary
detention, freedoms of speech, press, and association, and the
right of citizens to change the government.
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RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of politically motivated killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no known disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
In late 1988 whipping became mandatory as punishment for
certain offenses, including rape, assault, extortion, robbery,
theft, vandalism, and drug-related crimes. Since then,
occasional sentences of whipping have in fact been handed down
and carried out. Previously, the penal code allowed for
whipping, but in practice this punishment was rarely
administered. There was no other evidence of torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution has no provision for habeas corpus. The
right exists, however, as the Application of Laws Act states
that the Law of England (1951) applies except where Brunei has
passed its own law. Under normal circumstances, a magistrate
must "endorse" a warrant for arrest. On rare occasions,
warrants are issued without this endorsement.
The Internal Security Act (ISA) permits the Government to
detain suspects without trial for renewable 2-year periods.
Since the abortive rebellion in 1962, the Government has
occasionally used the ISA to detain persons suspected of
antigovernment activity.
The Government acknowledges that five former members of the
Brunei People's Party (BPP) have been in detention under the
ISA since 1962 when that party was banned for its role in the
abortive uprising. Amnesty International (AI) has said it
believes the five BPP members are being held not for any role
in the 1962 rebellion, but as a general deterrent to political
activity. Two former leaders of the Brunei National
Democratic Party (BNDP) have also been in detention under the
ISA since February 1988, when that party was dissolved by the
Government. None of these detainees have been tried or
convicted of any crime.
In previous years the Government had announced the release of
some ISA detainees around the time of the Sultan's birthday on
July 15. None were announced in 1989.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The legal system in Brunei is derived from the British
system. Those suspected of common crimes are detained, tried,
and punished according to the law. Lacking a senior judiciary
of its own, the Brunei High Court has for its Chief Justice a
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BRUNEI
judge seconded from Hong Kong. There were no known instances
of interference with the judiciary by the Government in 1989.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Although the Government is empowered by law to intrude into
the privacy of individual persons, families, or homes, in
practice it has not been known to do so.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedoms of speech and press, though not restricted by law,
are not generally exercised. There is no political
opposition, and hence there have been no challenges which
might have tested the degree of government tolerance of
political criticism.
Brunei's only television station is government owned (two
Malaysian stations can also be received). It usually avoids
controversial issues, as do newscasts on the radio stations.
The single independent weekly newspaper generally avoids
controversial issues. A second weekly newspaper is published
by the Government.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom to assemble for political purposes has not been
seriously tested in recent years. In 1985 the Government
allowed establishment of the Brunei National Democratic Party
(BNDP), the first political party since party activity was
prohibited in 1967. Just before its first public meeting, the
Government announced that government employees could not
attend party meetings, become members of political parties, or
otherwise engage in organized political debate. In February
1988, the Government dissolved the BNDP and detained two of
its leaders, charging that the party's contacts with the
International Democratic Union were in violation of the
Societies Act.
In 1986 the Government approved the establishment of a second
political party, the Brunei National United Party (BNUP);
however, the organizers never announced its formation, and
nothing further has been heard of it. The Government requires
the registration of private economic, recreational, or other
organizations.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Islam is the official state religion, but the Constitution
provides for freedom of worship for other religions. There
are several Christian churches in the country. There are also
missionary schools in Brunei.
777
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on freedom of movement in the
country for citizens, permanent residents, and expatriates.
Some restrictions on travel abroad are placed on certain
expatriates as part of contract obligations to the
Government. Travel to Communist nations is restricted, and
travel to China by Brunei's ethnic Chinese citizens and ethnic
Chinese residents is tightly controlled. Brunei has not been
willing to accept refugees. In September 1989, a boat with
approximately 40 refugees from Vietnam was found in Brunei
waters. The refugees were given food, water, and medical
attention for about a week while their boat was being
repaired, at which time they were given provisions and
required to depart.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
There is no way in which citizens can change their government
through established democratic processes. Under the
continuing state of emergency, there are no representative
bodies at the national or local level and, since the
dissolution of the BNDP in 1988, no known functioning
political parties. However, citizens may seek to influence
government by working through appointed village headmen and
district officers, who meet regularly with their
constituents. They may also attempt to effect change by
petitioning the Sultan directly.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no government or private organizations in Brunei
which deal specifically with the protection of human rights.
AI reports it has on several occasions appealed to the Sultan
for the release of a number of political prisoners, some held
for many years without trial, but has received no reply. In
1988 the Government appeared before the United Nations Human
Rights Commission to answer AI allegations of human rights
violations relating to ISA detentions. The Government
acknowledged the detentions, but maintained that they are
justified in the interest of national security.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Women are denied equal status with men in a number of
important areas such as divorce, inheritance, and custody of
children. While there are no separate pay scales for women
and men, women in the work force traditionally have been
concentrated in lower paying clerical and secretarial jobs,
and have been less likely to find positions offering rapid
advancement. In recent years, however, employment
opportunities for women have greatly improved throughout the
economy, largely because of a chronic labor shortage. A
growing number of women hold senior level professional
positions, and the number of female university graduates is
also increasing. Religious authorities strongly encourage
Brunei Muslim women to wear the tudong, a traditional head
covering, and a growing number do so. There is no pressure on
non-Muslim women to wear the tudong, and few, if any, choose
to wear it.
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PRUNE!
The incidence of domestic violence against women is extremely
low. Because of the close-knit nature of Bruneian society,
this kind of behavior would be difficult if not impossible to
conceal, and would not be tolerated. The criminal penalty for
a minor domestic assault would be 1 to 2 weeks in jail and a
fine. An assault resulting in serious injury, such as broken
bones, would be punished by whipping and a longer jail
sentence. Rape cases are similarly rare.
The majority of the substantial Chinese minority in Brunei are
not citizens (those having no claims to other nationalities
were "British-protected persons" prior to independence and are
now either stateless permanent or temporary residents).
Permanent residents cannot own land but usually resolve this
problem through 7-year leases, the maximum amount of time for
lease agreements in Brunei. The process of obtaining
citizenship in Brunei is long and difficult. In general, the
Chinese community has prospered in Brunei, and much of the
country's commercial activity is in Chinese hands. While the
Chinese have done well economically, many are now reevaluating
their position in Brunei, especially the prospects of their
children in a society in which Malay citizens are favored in
such areas as government employment. Some are emigrating to
other nations, especially Australia and Canada.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Trade unions are legal in Brunei but must be registered with
the Government. Signatures of seven members are required for
registration. There are four registered trade unions, with a
total membership amounting to less than 5 percent of the work
force. The Trade Unions Act of 1962 permits the formation of
trade union federations in Brunei, but forbids affiliation of
Brunei trade unions with labor organizations outside Brunei.
Brunei is not a member of the International Labor
Organization. An individual contract is required between an
employer and each employee, but trade union activities are not
illegal and cannot be deemed to violate employee contracts.
Local legal experts interpret this provision as conferring the
right to strike. However, there have been no strikes in
recent memory.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There is no government interference with lawful union
activity. It is illegal to refuse employment or discriminate
against an employee for being or not being a member of a trade
union. While unions are legal and easy to register,
conditions in Brunei are not conducive to the development of
trade unions. Wage and benefit packages far exceed those of
neighboring nations; there is a lack of those kinds of
industries in which unions have traditionally developed; and
there is a long cultural tradition of trying to achieve
consensus rather than cause confrontation. As a result,
collective bargaining is limited to only a few industries.
There are no export-processing zones in Brunei.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited and it is not practiced.
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fifimiJELL
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Employment of children below the age of 16 is prohibited, and
below the age of 18 requires parental consent and approval by
the Labor Commission. Women under 18 may not work at night or
on offshore oil platforms. Laws on employment of children are
effectively enforced.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Labor is in short supply, and market forces allow most
citizens of Brunei to command high wages. The minimum wage in
Brunei is approximately $11.35 per day for citizens and
permanent residents, and approximately $9.80 per day for
foreigners. There is no special minimum wage for any
particular industry. Overtime must be paid for work in excess
of 48 hours, and double time must be paid for work performed
on legal holidays. Working conditions are subject to
inspection by the Labor Commission on a routine basis and in
response to complaints. Brunei's labor regulations are
effectively enforced by the Labor Department, which is
empowered to close any place of employment in which health,
safety, or working conditions are unsatisfactory.
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BURMA
Burma's military leaders seized power in September 1988 and
lethally suppressed sustained, countrywide, prodemocracy
demonstrations. The 1988 popular uprising, unprecedented in
Burma's history, had ended the long rule of the Burma
Socialist Program Party (BSPP), under now-retired chairman Ne
Win who had drawn the nation into isolation and allowed it to
decline economically. The September 1988 military takeover
restored Ne Win's 26-year dictatorship by placing in power a
group of senior military officers subservient to Ne Win and
other top officials of the previous government. These men
form the current ruling body--the 19-member State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC).
The SLORC has repeatedly assured the populace and the
international community that its stay in power is temporary
and that it will hold multiparty elections in May 1990. It
established an election commission and provided for the
registration of political parties, which reached as many as
233 during 1989. In practice, the military leadership has
maintained absolute control, keeping a heavy military presence
in Rangoon and other urban areas, enforcing martial law,
including a 10 p.m. to 4 a.m. curfew, imposing extensive
surveillance on government employees and private citizens, and
launching an aggressive propaganda campaign in the
government-controlled media which inaccurately portrayed the
events of 1988. It also attempted to blame Burma's political
and economic instability on elements of the right and left, as
well as foreign governments and news organizations. Early in
the year, it tried to hinder opposition campaign efforts
through intimidation, and eliminated much of the opposition
through wide-scale arrests of the most popular party leaders
and other political activists.
Burma has fought various insurgencies since 1948. Some of the
ethnically based insurgents have fought for a measure of
autonomy, if no longer for outright independence, against
perceived domination by the Burmans, the majority ethnic
group. In recent years most insurgent groups, financed
primarily through narcotics production and trafficking, have
engaged only in small-scale fighting in areas on Burma's
borders. The Government has used their continued existence to
justify in part continued authoritarian rule, including the
operation of an extensive security apparatus. During 1989,
the Government sought accommodation with several
insurgent/narcotic trafficking groups, to gain short-term
advantages vis-a-vis other dissident groups, to reinforce a
split in the Burma Communist Party, and to secure areas for
teak and logging concessions.
Over the last 27 years, Ne Win's "Road to Socialism" reduced
what was once the richest country in Southeast Asia to one
designated by the United Nations as a "least developed"
country. The military leaders promised a new open-door
economic policy and passed a law to permit foreign investment
but did not develop an economic strategy. The leadership,
which lacked economic training or expertise, failed to address
past mistakes--highly centralized decisionmaking, a vastly
overvalued currency, uncontrolled monetary expansion, and an
ineffective banking system — and made a bad economy worse.
Burma's dismal human rights situation deteriorated even
further in 1989. Government control over the population and
interference in individual lives significantly increased, as
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BURMA
did credible reports of torture, wide-scale arbitrary arrests,
disappearances, and compulsory labor.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Although instances of government-instigated political killings
were fewer in 1989 than 1988 (after the widespread shootings
of demonstrators in 1988), there is substantial credible
evidence of an undetermined number of civilian deaths at the
hands of military government officials or individual soldiers
throughout the year. The Government repeatedly denied these
charges and, despite international criticism, made no apparent
effort to investigate or to bring perpetrators to justice.
In January numerous reports surfaced that some students who
fled after the September takeover were killed after returning
to their homes. These reports strongly indicated that a
number of returned students died after having been mistreated
while in government custody, and that the authorities
routinely informed the dead students' parents that their
children had died of disease. There were also credible
reports that throughout the year some political prisoners died
in jail as a result of torture or other mistreatment at the
hands of the authorities.
Eyewitnesses reported seeing deaths of men impressed as
Burmese army porters after they were forced to walk ahead of
troops through mine-infested terrain; deaths from gangrene
after troops abandoned injured porters; overladen porters
falling to their deaths from mountain paths; and ill-fed,
inadequately clothed porters dying of disease. Amnesty
International (AI) reported in August an eyewitness account of
a soldier shooting a porter who could no longer walk. In that
same report, AI also cited allegations of the killings of
other porters, including members of ethnic minorities, and
stated that their sources repeatedly accused the Burma Army
33rd Light Infantry Division of unlawful killings.
In some instances, soldiers reportedly committed murder and
the crimes were then officially covered up. While it was not
possible to confirm these reports, they are plausible and
highly detailed, containing names of victims and perpetrators,
addresses, military ranks, and sometimes regiment or division
and military identification numbers, as well as date, time,
and place of killing. Methods of killing reported included
stabbing, bayoneting, and shooting. The victims' ages ranged
from 13 to young adult.
There were unconfirmed reports of summary executions by
soldiers in the field. In one case, opposition leader Aung
San Suu Kyi charged during a June press conference that eight
students had been shot near a jade mine in Mohnyin township,
Kachin State, by soldiers who reportedly made an effort to
separate and kill students from among nonstudent youths
present. AI also expressed concern about several reports of
executions of students by soldiers in remote areas near the
Thai/Burma border.
As in past years, for security reasons, Burmese authorities
did not allow diplomatic observers to travel to areas of heavy
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BURMA
insurgent activity. Therefore, it was not possible for them
to gather directly information about alleged human rights
practices by the Government or by the insurgents in these
areas. Government-controlled media continued to cite numerous
examples of insurgent-generated violence that resulted in
civilian deaths, and AI cited reports that insurgent forces
had fired on civilian areas.
b. Disappearance
It is impossible to estimate with any accuracy the number of
persons who disappeared and remained unaccounted for during
the year. Families and friends of many who disappeared
assumed the persons were under detention or died in jail,
whether this was the case or not (see Section l.d.). Others
may have been impressed to serve as army porters. Some
persons who disappeared may in fact be among the estimated
2,000 to 3,000 students hiding in the Thai/Burma border areas
and the 200 to 300 who have crossed into Thailand. During .
periods of mass arrests--March-April , July-September--some
persons disappeared but were later found to have been
detained. Some of these were subseguently released.
Burmese authorities are reluctant to respond to diplomatic
inquiries as to the whereabouts of Burmese and resident
foreigners, mostly South Asians, who have been jailed or
disappeared, and, if they reply, limit comments to general
statements that individuals were arrested for violations of
existing laws.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Diplomatic observers in Rangoon had a considerable body of
credible evidence--including eyewitness accounts--that
torture, beatings, and mistreatment of political detainees
were commonplace.
Instances of torture and mistreatment appeared more numerous
in 1989 than previously, but this may have been due to
increased reporting; most of the victims and their families
and friends were educated and had greater access to
foreigners. Physical and mental torture included beatings
that caused permanent damage; sleep and food deprivation;
cigarette burns; electrical shocks to the genitals and
elsewhere; and interrogations while the detainee was forced to
stand in water or to assume painful, unnatural positions for
long periods of time, (e.g., the "airplane" or "motorcycle"
postures which forced victims into a half-sitting stance with
arms outstretched; they were beaten if they collapsed) .
Sometimes detainees were falsely told that family members had
died or were in trouble.
Despite public and private expressions of concern by foreign
governments and international human rights organizations over
charges of torture, the Government repeatedly denied that it
practiced or condoned torture and made no apparent efforts to
investigate the charges. In at least some cases, victims were
forced to sign a document stating that they had not been
tortured.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Government arbitrarily arrested or detained several
thousand persons during 1989. A government spokesman stated
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BURMA
on September 8 that "only" 811 persons, including 170
students, had been detained since the military takeover and
denied that it had arrested anyone for political beliefs.
However, the Government has asserted that it is a crime to
criticize the Government and its leaders; many have been
detained for this reason.
While exact numbers are unknown, a conservative estimate of
politically motivated arrests during 1989 would be at least
4,000. Many persons were arrested on ostensibly criminal
charges. For example, a prominent political figure and a
student leader, both members of the leading opposition party,
were arrested and sentenced to 3 and 10 years respectively for
alleged involvement in an abortion case, even though Burma's
abortion law is rarely enforced. Many others were accused of
"violating law and order." Regardless of the charges, most of
the estimated 4,000 persons arrested were either active
members of opposition political parties, persons involved in
peaceful antigovernment demonstrations or pamphleteering, or
students who returned home after having fled to Thailand or
the border area after the military repression in September
1988. In a September 1989 report, AI expressed continuing
concern about 3 students said to have been forcibly
repatriated from Thailand and arrested January 7 by Burmese
authorities, and about 22 returned students reportedly
detained January 10 and held incommunicado since then.
In the period from July 23 to August 12, the Government
released 18,752 prisoners from jails and prisons throughout
the country. All of these prisoners had been arrested prior
to the September 1988 takeover and most had been charged with
nonpolitical crimes. It was widely believed but unconfirmed
that the Government released them to make room for the large
numbers of persons arrested for political reasons from July to
September.
Although arrests continued throughout 1989, there were several
distinct periods during which larger numbers than usual were
detained. Of the estimated 4,000 to 6,000 students who fled
to Thailand and the border following the military takeover, an
unknown number returned or tried to return to their homes;
many of these were taken into custody despite government
guarantees of their safety.
In March and April, authorities detained at least several
hundred political activists in Rangoon and Mandalay; by the
first of May, many of the best known leaders in Burma's
student opposition were in jail.
On July 20 the Government placed Burma's most popular
opposition figure, Aung San Suu Kyi, and her colleague. Tin
Oo, under house arrest where they have been held
incommunicado. Their detentions were followed by the largest
wave of arrests to date as authorities rounded up most of the
leadership of many of the country's major opposition groups.
Even before the establishment of military tribunals on July 18
(see Section I.e.), there was no provision in Burmese law for
a person in detention to seek a judicial determination of the
legality of his detention. Previously, in serious cases
involving national security, some persons were not formally
charged but instead were held under an antisubversion act in
indefinite detention without trial. In less serious political
and security cases, detention under the act was nominally
limited to 180 days. According to Burmese law, those
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BUBMA
designated "dangerous and destructive elements" can be placed
under house arrest without formal charges for up to 1 year, as
was the case with opposition leaders Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin
Oo . However, under martial law and the military tribunals,
anyone violating martial law orders is subject to summary
justice. Individuals have no pretrial rights under martial
law, particularly since the establishment of the military
tribunals. The accused has no right to a defense lawyer,
although in at least some cases military authorities allowed
the presence of defense attorneys. There is no bail, although
some defendants gain release by bribing officials.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Burma was under martial law throughout 1989. On July 18, the
Government invested regional military commanders with summary
judicial powers and gave them discretion to try offenders
either by courts formed under existing law or by military
tribunals. However, military tribunals have exclusive
jurisdiction over cases concerning defiance of orders issued
by the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)
or regional military commanders, and can mete out the death
sentence, life imprisonment, or at least 3 years' imprisonment
with labor regardless of existing law. The tribunals also can
reject or summon witnesses. Trials are public only at the
township level, and never under the military tribunals. Under
Burmese law, attorneys are not provided at public expense, and
the accused is not presumed to be innocent.
In practice, military tribunals tried virtually all offenses
— criminal or political — committed after the tribunals were
established, although civilian judges continued to hear some
earlier cases. On October 19, a military tribunal sentenced
to death an interpreter for a French journalist who allegedly
had helped the journalist film a beheading in 1988. During
trials, court officials must submit daily reports for military
review. Although reports were also given to the attorney
general, military authorities had the final say. The accused
were not guaranteed the right to a defense attorney. When
allowed to participate in a trial, a defense attorney's role
was severely limited. Lawyers were warned that an overly
aggressive defense jeopardized both client and lawyer. In
numerous cases, the tribunal refused to admit witnesses or
evidence central to the defense. Military tribunals imposed
heavy sentences on political prisoners. For example, a writer
was sentenced to 20 years with labor for allegedly exhorting
navy personnel to join in the 1988 prodemocracy
demonstrations, and a lawyer was given 14 years' labor for
providing "false" news to the British Broadcasting
Corporation. Appeal is theoretically possible, subject to
certain conditions: appeal of a sentence to 3 years'
imprisonment must be submitted to the regional commander
within 30 days; in cases involving the death sentence, life
imprisonment, or sentences over 3 years, appeals must be made
to the army commander-in-chief within 30 days. The army
commander-in-chief was designated final arbiter on all
tribunal decisions and sentences. In practice, military
authorities have been known to hamper the appeal process by
refusing to cooperate with and attempting to intimidate
attorneys .
It is impossible accurately to estimate the number of
political prisoners held at any one time. However, separate
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BURMA
reliable sources reported about 6,000 prisoners, including
2,000 students in Insein jail in April and about 2,000
political prisoners in Insein in September. It appears there
were at least 4,000 politically motivated arrests during the
year, many of which involved ostensibly criminal charges. The
Government denies holding any political prisoners (see Section
l.d.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence
In 1989 the State intruded extensively into the lives of
private citizens. Under martial law, forced entry and
warrantless searches of private homes and other premises were
commonplace and were often conducted without warning. The
Government strictly monitored the travel and whereabouts of
many individuals. A well-developed system of neighborhood
informers reported on dissidents and criticism of the
Government. Most people believed that security personnel
monitored private correspondence and telephone calls.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The Burmese army has fought various insurgencies for the past
four decades. These conflicts apparently have resulted in
numerous transgressions on all sides, such as the mistreatment
or killing of prisoners, neglect of the sick and wounded,
impressment of civilians for porter duty, and indiscriminate
attacks on civilian areas. Insurgents and the Government have
repeatedly accused each other of human rights violations. In
August, AI expressed concern over allegations of ill-treatment
and unlawful killing by the Burma army in insurgent areas. AI
also stated that several insurgent groups continued to attack
civilian targets.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Already severely restricted, freedom of speech and press in
Burma became virtually nonexistent in 1989. Imposition of
martial law overrode even nominal constitutional provisions
for freedom of expression. Although the Government permitted
the registration of politial parties, in practice opposing
views and criticism of the Government were not tolerated.
After popular opposition figure Aung San Suu Kyi publicly
criticized the current leadership as well as former leader Ne
Win, she was placed under house arrest, as was the chairman of
her party, the National League for Democracy. Thousands of
other political activists were also detained after peaceably
expressing antigovernment views (see Section l.d).
Government workers were instructed not to discuss politics in
their offices at the risk of losing their jobs. They were not
allowed to join or support political parties and had to sign
statements promising they would not participate in political
activities. Even private citizens became reluctant to express
opinions out of fear of government-paid informers.
As government employees, teachers and college professors are
subject to the same restrictions on freedom of speech,
political activities, and publications, and fear of reprisal
as other civil servants. Content of lessons and lectures is
severely circumscribed.
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As in the past, the Government runs and operates the mass
media, including television, radio, and the sole national
newspaper. The Working People's Daily. Newspaper editors are
appointed by the Government and editorials must be approved in
advance. Journalists are subject to strict publishing and
broadcast guidelines, especially on domestic matters. Even
international news is subject to prior review and selection.
All forms of communication — domestic and imported books and
periodicals, stage plays, motion pictures, and musical
recordings — are subject to government control and censorship.
Criticism of the Government, government officials, or sectors
of the economy controlled or partially controlled by the
Government is not permitted in the press. On May 26 the
Government announced a stricter enforcement of the 1962
Printers and Publishers Registration Law expressly to prohibit
political parties from releasing documents not previously
cleared by the Government. Also in 1989, the Government
imposed stricter regulations over video and audio cassette
rentals and for a period of time closed down all video and
cassette rental shops.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right of assembly exists only for those organizations
permitted by law and duly registered with the Government. In
practice, however, even the activities of these organizations
are severely restricted. The martial law edict decreeing that
people are not allowed to gather in groups of more than five
was unevenly enforced. Assembly within the premises of
political parties has been limited to 50 persons. In fact,
however, some party members in groups of less than 50 have
been arrested on their premises for "violating law and
order." For a time, people were allowed to congregate at
government-sanctioned rock concerts, and in June and early
July authorities did not interfere with increasingly large
crowds that gathered to hear opposition leader Aung San Suu
Kyi. In mid-July troops beat with bamboo sticks or arrested
peaceful demonstrators for violating martial law regulations.
Trade associations and professional bodies, like other
organizations in Burma, are permitted only if sanctioned by
the Government. Their activities are strictly monitored and
their members are not free to discuss politics or express
criticism of the Government.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Burma is a secular state dominated by the Burman ethnic
group. Freedom of religion is provided for in the
Constitution and, even under martial law, is widely observed
in practice. The great majority of Burmese are Buddhist,
although there are sizable Christian, Muslim, and animist
minorities based principally in various minority ethnic groups,
While minority religious groups are allowed to practice
freely, security services monitor the activities of some
religious communities closely. Some persons of mixed Burman
and ethnic minority ancestry have been known to convert to
Buddhism as a way of strengthening their claim to be
considered ethnic Burmans.
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There is considerable social prejudice against Muslims in
Burma. Occasionally this erupts in violence and has led to
government action infringing on the practice of Islam.
Religious groups can and do maintain links with coreligionists
in other countries, including the Catholic Church, which
maintains ties to the Vatican. Foreign religious
representatives are usually allowed only tourist visas and are
not permitted to preach, proselytize, or remain to carry out
missionary work. There is at least one long-time resident
foreign Catholic priest (Italian) in Burma.
All religious organizations are required to register with the
Government. Religious publications are subject to the same
governmental control and censorship as other publications. On
occasion, the Government has used a nationalization law to
take control of the property of religious organizations.
The Government in recent years promulgated two directives that
limit the right of assembly and association of Buddhist monks.
Acting through the government-controlled hierarchy of the
monkhood (Sangha), the State has prohibited monks from
attending various forms of public entertainment. While this
ostensibly has been done, in part, to maintain the moral
purity of the Sangha, it is also aimed at curbing the
political activities of monks, one of the most influential
groups in Burmese society and one which has been heavily
involved in the 1988 antigovernment protests.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Burmese citizens have the right to live anywhere in the
country. Except for limitations in areas of insurgent
activity, Burmese citizens can travel freely within the
country but must inform local authorities of their temporary
place of residence, a restriction greatly tightened under
martial law. In 1989 people who failed to report either
guests or intentions to stay overnight to the authorities were
subject to a jail term and arrests sometimes were made.
Noncitizen residents, including persons born in Burma who hold
foreigners' registration cards, must obtain prior permission
to travel. Legal requirements, bureaucratic procedures, and
corruption cause long delays in obtaining passports. Severe
limits are placed on what emigrants are allowed to take with
them.
Burmese citizens who left the country legally are generally
allowed to return to visit relatives. However, Burma does not
recognize dual citizenship; acquiring citizenship in another
country results in the loss of Burmese citizenship. With few
exceptions, those who take citizenship in another country are
banned from returning to Burma. Emigrants wishing to return
permanently are required to reapply for Burmese citizenship.
Burmese who leave the country illegally cannot legally
return. There were reported instances of Burmese wishing to
return to visit ill or dying parents being denied permission
to enter Burma.
Burma does not permit foreign refugees or displaced persons to
resettle or seek safe haven within Burma. The Government
treats persons claiming to be refugees as illegal immigrants
and imprisons them, although it freed and deported a number of
imprisoned Vietnamese refugees in 1988.
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Throughout the year, the Government imposed a 10 p.m. to 4
a.m. curfew on the entire country. In most cases, the curfew
was strictly enforced and violators were often punished. On
at least several occasions, riverboat passengers, stranded at
the jetty in Rangoon after curfew, were sent before a military
tribunal and sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment.
During 1989, and particularly in November and December, the
Government carried out a forced relocation of urban poor
countrywide, most often to inadequately prepared sites far
from jobs, schools, and extended families. In the great
majority of cases, there was no compensation. Those forced to
move were compelled to dismantle their old homes at their own
expense and also to bear the costs of purchasing a new site,
construction materials, and labor for building a new house, as
well as transportation expenses. There were many unconfirmed
reports that those without funds or assets to sell were moved
to reclaimed jungle sites miles from urban areas to cultivate
agricultural products to sell to nearby government factories
at controlled prices. The Goverment described all those
forced to move as "squatters," but in at least some instances
people had purchased their property and held deeds to it.
Some reportedly lived in apartments or houses coveted by the
military or were told they lived too near military
installations or government offices. At the same time, the
Government offered attractively priced, relatively luxurious
housing in areas of rapid real estate appreciation to
high-ranking military officers, and also provided houses and
land free of charge to former members of the now defunct Burma
Socialist Program Party which ruled Burma for 26 years.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Burmese people do not have the right or the ability
peacefully to change their government. In 1988 the military
seized power and suppressed a massive prodemocracy movement by
killing at least 1,000 peaceful demonstrators and injuring
many more countrywide. Throughout 1989 the SLORC tolerated no
dissent or criticism and controlled the population by
imposition of martial law, wide-scale arrests of political
activists, and intimidation. Although the SLORC allowed the
formation and registration of political parties and promised
elections scheduled for May 1990, its subsequent barring of
the major opposition figures from the elections virtually
eliminated hopes that this process would be free or fair.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government does not permit investigation of its human
rights practices, nor is it willing to discuss human rights
problems with outside government or nongovernmental
organizations. Requests for meetings specifically to discuss
broad human rights issues or individual cases are usually
deflected. The Government consistently denied charges of
human rights violations and publicly and repeatedly criticized
the U.S. Government and AI for what it called "fabricated"
reports of torture and other abuses and blamed both for
"interfering in Burma's internal affairs."
No internal human rights organizations exist. A group calling
itself Amnesty International of Burma, established during the
1988 prodemocracy demonstrations, was subsequently denied
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registration as a legal organization by the Government and
apparently has been disbanded.
The Government is conscious of and resents the outside
scrutiny to which Burma's human rights record has been
subjected since its lethal suppression of prodemocracy
demonstrations in 1988. Burma was the subject of a U.N. Human
Rights Commission (UNHRC) decision in February 1989 and also
is scheduled to be discussed at the 1990 UNHRC meeting. AI
expressed concern about actions of the Burmese Government
several times during 1989. The Governments of the European
Community and of Australia on several occasions publicly
expressed concern over human rights abuses in Burma.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Burma's numerous ethnic minorities have their own distinct
cultures and languages. Economic development among minorities
has lagged, and many still live at the subsistence level.
This is due in part to geographic factors which impede
economic development in the rugged, isolated, border areas
populated by minorities. Minorities have been
underrepresented in the Government and are largely excluded
from the military leadership.
Persons of nonethnic Burmese ancestry, primarily Indians and
Chinese, while denied full citizenship and excluded from party
or government positions, continue to play an important role in
the economy, a factor resented by many majority Burmans.
The government press has repeatedly denigrated Westerners or
those with mixed blood in pejorative terms, such as
"long-noses" or "green eyes."
Women in Burma have historically played an active role in
society, but this varies with cultural traditions and ethnic
backgrounds. In general, Burmese women enjoy most of the same
legal rights as men. They keep their own names after
marriage, are active in trade, and often control family
finances .
There is no violence directed specifically against women in
Burma. Although women as well as men died or were injured at
the hands of the Government, and in some cases reportedly were
raped, indications are that authorities generally treated
women better than men in detention. While in 1988 there were
unconfirmed but persistent reports of rape of several women in
detention by soldiers or police, rape is viewed with great
abhorrence by Burmese society.
Burma is governed solely by the military. Members of the
armed forces and their families enjoy privileges not available
to others. For example, during the enforced closure of all
schools and universities, which lasted over a year, military
children were allowed to attend special schools often taught
by military spouses. At the same time, the military
leadership closed down private schools set up by political
parties for teaching poor children whose parents could not
afford privately funded tutors and threatened legal action
against those who taught children privately.
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Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
There are no trade unions and no independent labor movement in
Burma. Workers do not have the right to organize
independently, to bargain collectively, or to strike. After
the Government violently suppressed prodemocracy
demonstrations in 1988, and imposed martial law, even
government-controlled workers' and peasants' mass
organizations were disbanded. There were no strikes in 1989.
In April the United States suspended Burma's eligibility for
trade concessions under the Generalized System of Preferences
program until the Government takes steps to afford its labor
force internationally recognized workers' rights. Again in
1989, as in previous years, committees of the International
Labor Organization (ILO) criticized Burma's legislation
imposing a single trade union structure which contravenes the
principles of ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association,
which Burma has ratified. The ILO committees, however,
expressed the hope that prospective political changes which
auger an end to the single party system would also lead to the
repeal of the single trade union law.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
As noted, workers have no right to bargain collectively.
Labor arbitration boards which, while government controlled,
at least theoretically provided an opportunity for the airing
of labor disputes, have been disbanded. The military
authorities are the sole authority over workers' issues. No
special economic zones exist in Burma.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Burma's legal code does not contain any statutory prohibition
of forced labor. For years the Burma army frequently
conscripted civilian males in the vicinity of military
operations (primarily in areas populated by ethnic minorities)
to serve as porters. On September 22, a government spokesman
acknowledged that the Burma army has traditionally used local
residents in insurgent areas as porters, but denied reports
that the military authorities had used students or other
detained youths. According to eyewitness and firsthand
reports during 1989, the Government conducted periodic
roundups on the streets of Rangoon and other major cities of
unemployed or those who could not prove employment. An
unknown number of these persons were impressed for duty as
Burma army porters in insurgent areas, while others were able
to bribe their way out of custody. Some reliable reports
strongly indicate that students and other political activists
also were taken from Rangoon to serve as porters or as
laborers in government mines or other installations.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children between 13 and 15 may work for 4 hours a day. The
penalty for employers who disregard this regulation is 2 years
in prison. However, the regulation is not strictly enforced.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is a 5-day, 35-hour workweek for employees in the public
sector and a 6-day, 44-hour workweek for private and
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parastatal sector employees, with overtime paid for additional
work. However, public sector employees seldom actually work
more than 6 1/2 hours a day. Workers have 21 paid holidays a
year, and there are numerous legal provisions to protect
workers' health and safety, but these are not strictly
enforced even for government workers. The legal minimum
government wage was raised in March from about $1.00 per day
to approximately $2.25 at current official exchange rates,
although at the more realistic free-market rate this works out
to about 21 cents a day. Wages commonly have lagged far
behind inflation and are not nearly enough for subsistence,
particularly in the case of large or extended families. In
the private sector, the minimum wage law applies only to
cheroot-rolling plants and rice mills. There are rules
governing health and safety conditions at workplaces,
pertaining to room size, ventilation, fire hazards, and the
availability of latrines and drinking water. In practice,
these are seldom enforced, particularly in the private sector.
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The regime in place in Cambodia's capital is widely known as
the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) although it now calls
itself the State of Cambodia. The PRK regime is headed by
Council of State Chairman Heng Samrin and Prime Minister Hun
Sen. The regime was installed by the Vietnamese army after it
drove the Khmer Rouge Communists from Phnom Penh in 1979. The
PRK is not recognized by the majority of the international
community. In September Vietnam apparently withdrew virtually
all of its main force units. However, Vietnam continues to
exert considerable influence over the PRK regime's policies.
Recently, the PRK regime has begun to pursue a set of
increasingly liberal economic policies.
PRK political institutions tend to follow the Vietnamese
model. Power is wielded by the Communist Kampuchean People's
Revolutionary Party (KPRP) , but the KPRP's control over
Cambodia has been challenged by the Coalition Government of
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) , composed of two non-Communist
resistance groups, and the Khmer Rouge. As in previous years,
resistance forces continue to wage a guerrilla war against the
PRK, operating primarily from areas along the Thai-Cambodian
border and in small enclaves in western Cambodia. Occupying
Cambodia's seat at the United Nations, the CGDK was formed in
1982, when the non-Communist resistance groups joined with the
Khmer Rouge in a loose political alliance.
In August 1989, all four Cambodian factions, along with
Vietnam, the ASEAN countries, the permanent members of the
U.N. Security Council, and several other nations, met in Paris
in an attempt to work out a negotiated settlement to the
conflict. After a month of discussions, the conference
recessed without an agreement, but efforts to reach a
diplomatic settlement continue.
The Khmer Rouge, with between 30,000 and 40,000 men under
arms, is considered the most effective fighting force in the
resistance coalition. While in power from 1975-1979, the
Khmer Rouge compiled one of the worst records of human rights
violations in history as a result of a thorough and brutal
attempt at restructuring Cambodian society. More than
1 million people, out of a total population of approximately
7 million, were killed or died under the Khmer Rouge's
genocidal reign.
Although the Khmer Rouge has intensified a major public
relations effort aimed at convincing the world that it has
abandoned its past genocidal policies, its authoritarian and
brutal treatment of Cambodians under its control continues in
camps along the Thai-Cambodian border not accessible to
international agencies and in parts of Cambodia under direct
Khmer Rouge control. Conditions are better at Site 8--the
first Khmer Rouge camp accessible to international
agencies--and two other open camps, but Khmer Rouge
administrators of all camps go to great lengths to prevent the
departure of people from their control. (See Section 2.6. for
an explanation of the various types of Khmer Rouge camps.)
The Khmer Rouge top leadership from the 1975-79 period remains
in power and is reliably reported to retain its ultimate goal
of regaining control over Cambodia.
The non-Communist resistance (NCR) is made up of two groups.
The first is the National United Front for an Independent,
Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) whose
de facto leader is Prince Sihanouk, Cambodia's former
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hereditary king and head of state. FUNCINPEC's military force
is the Sihanoukist National Army (known as the ANS, an
abbreviation of its name in French) .
The Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) is the
older of the two NCR groups. Its political leader is former
Prime Minister Son Sann who espouses a parliamentary form of
government for Cambodia. It was formed in 1979 with the
merger of several existing NCR groups, many led by former
soldiers from the pre-1975 period of the Khmer Republic.
While these two groups have been comparatively free of human
rights violations, there have been some credible reports of
violations committed by their respective armed forces.
The PRK's economic system began to change significantly in
1989 when the regime began to permit citizens to own land and
operate private businesses. There have been reports that the
official exchange rate was abolished in 1989, permitting the
market to determine the value of the riel against hard
currency. Hundreds of privately owned businesses are now
flourishing in Phnom Penh and, on a smaller scale, in
provincial towns. Lured by the prospect of commercial
opportunities, many foreign investors, particularly from
nearby Southeast Asian countries, are already doing business
in Cambodia or making plans to do so. Many visitors also
report growing corruption among PRK officials.
Reliable reports from travelers to Cambodia and Cambodians who
have left the country indicate that widespread and serious
human rights violations by the PRK regime continued in 1989,
despite evidence of improvement in some areas. The PRK
continues to discourage efforts to monitor its human rights
record.
During 1989 the human rights situation began to improve in
many of the displaced persons camps located along the
Thai-Cambodian border, in part because the United Nations
began a program of assigning security liaison officers to each
camp to train camp police and to institute a code of justice
and a court system.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The few Cambodians who departed the country in 1989 did not
report political killing by the PRK or Vietnamese in
regime-controlled areas of Cambodia.
Political killings by the Khmer Rouge appear to have been
reduced, but information on what happens in Khmer Rouge camps,
especially in those of its camps not open to international and
humanitarian organizations (where at least 50,000 people
reside), is sparse. One defector from a closed Khmer Rouge
camp reported that the Khmer Rouge, in an effort to regain
popular support, now imprison or attempt to "reeducate"
violators of their policies rather than kill them. He said,
however, that serious offenders are sometimes placed in jails
where they are starved to death.
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Khmer Rouge defectors report that civilians from the border
camps and prisoners from Khmer Rouge jails have been killed by
mines while performing forced labor, such as transporting
supplies for guerrilla forces in Cambodia. They also report
that those who attempt to flee Khmer Rouge closed camps run
the risk of being shot. One 1989 defector from a closed Khmer
Rouge camp reported that those accused of selling weapons or
associating with the NCR sometimes receive the death penalty.
Civilians continue to be killed during attacks by the Khmer
Rouge on towns, lines of communication, and economic targets
within Cambodia. Often the Khmer Rouge, before attacking a
town, have threatened all residents with death if they
resist. The Khmer Rouge policy of killing captured Vietnamese
troops and some PRK officials does not appear to have changed.
KPNLF and ANS units were not generally accused of political
killings during 1989. Murders by NCR troops did occur in
camps run by both factions, but these appear to have been the
result of domestic conflicts. In September, however, a
section leader in the major FUNCINPEC camp of Site B was
assassinated in what was believed to be retaliation for
alleged spying activities.
NCR forces attempt to avoid civilian casualties as much as
possible during their military operations. This was
especially evident during its major offensive launched
September 30 when the safety of civilians who occupied the
area attacked was a high NCR priority.
b. Disappearance
Reports of disappearances in Cambodia increased during 1989,
but it appears that most of these cases involved the PRK's
forced induction into the armed forces of young men between
the ages of 18 and 30. There were also sporadic reports of
residents from the displaced persons camps along the
Thai-Cambodian border being impressed for the resistance armed
forces. Disappearances from closed Khmer Rouge camps were
also reported.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Prisoners who were released or escaped from PRK prisons during
late 1988 or 1989 reported that the use of torture by PRK
authorities, who took over administration of the prisons from
their Vietnam advisers, has been reduced. Some prisoners
report that, in lieu of being tortured, prisoners are
sometimes just shown the tools of torture which could be used
against them unless they confess their alleged crimes.
Article 35 of the new PRK Constitution, promulgated in April,
specifically prohibits the use of coercion or physical abuse
against prisoners.
According to reports gathered by Amnesty International (AI),
in the past, persons suspected of being involved with the
resistance ran the highest risk of torture. Recent reports
indicate this continues to be true. This category has been
defined by the PRK authorities to include persons alleged to
have expressed opinions critical of regime policies or the
role of the Vietnamese, as well as those thought to be trying
to leave or return from areas under the control of the
resistance.
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According to AI and prisoners recently released from PRK
jails, beatings have been inflicted on political suspects
detained for interrogation. PRK authorities have been known
to use various forms of torture, but recent information on
such practices is unavailable. The PRK refuses to permit
outside inspection of its prison facilities.
As in previous years, some detainees undergoing interrogation
continue to be held incommunicado in small and completely dark
solitary confinement cells that are poorly ventilated and
unsanitary. They are constantly immobilized by shackles on
both legs; sometimes they also are handcuffed. They are
allowed no bedding or mosquito netting. To intensify
ill-treatment during interrogation, some detainees are also
deprived of food and water to progressively undermine their
physical strength and resistance to illness. They may not
bathe or go outside their cells to relieve themselves and are
permitted neither medication nor medical attention.
Although it is rarely reported that a suspect has been killed
during the actual interrogation, the indefinite period of
detention without charge or trial that usually follows
interrogation exposes detainees to the risk of death from a
combination of injuries sustained during interrogation,
unattended diseases, and inadequate diet.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
As a rule, PRK authorities often detain, interrogate, and jail
resistance sympathizers for extended periods without formal
charges. Estimates of the number of political prisoners held
by the PRK, including the estimates of AI, range up to several
thousand, but reliable figures are not available.
In April an AI current report noted that an additional 430
people had been detained by PRK authorities for political
reasons in 1988. Much of this information has come from
official PRK broadcasts reporting the arrests of people
accused of being "agents" of the CGDK or merely "political
enemies." AI has repeatedly urged the PRK "to provide details
about the fate of people reportedly arrested on political
grounds," but has received no response.
Separate sections within the police are responsible for the
investigation of activities by the non-Communist (KPNLF and
ANS) and Communist Khmer Rouge resistance groups. The
Ministry of Interior maintains at least three prisons in which
suspected supporters of the resistance are held without formal
charges. Provincial police and military internal security
units maintain additional detention and interrogation
centers. Regime regulations call for the arrest and
"reeducation" of "any person carrying out propaganda campaigns
to sabotage internal unity and Kampuchea-Laos-Vietnam
solidarity." Such "reeducation" means indefinite detention to
force a change in political thought.
In general there has been a virtual absence of legal process
for those detained. Detainees have seldom been informed of
the charges against them, or given access to lawyers, or
informed of any rights or legal protections. There has been
no requirement that officials notify anyone of a person's
arrest. The same PRK authorities have been responsible for
arrests, interrogation, decisions on a subject's guilt or
innocence, and prison administration.
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Since 1981 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
has unsuccessfully sought permission to visit prisoners
captured in combat. It has also not yet been able to gain
access to Thai prisoners reportedly held in PRK prisons.
During the October offensive against the PRK in northwestern
Cambodia, NCR troops captured 600 prisoners of war (POW's).
These prisoners are being detained for interrogation and
political orientation and, if they do not wish to join the
resistance forces, the NCR says it will release them. In
addition to these 600 POW's, the NCR forces also detained and
later released additional PRK soldiers, providing them with
money so they could return home. The Khmer Rouge also
captured POW's during 1989. The Khmer Rouge presented some
POW's they claimed to be Vietnamese to the press in October as
"evidence" that Vietnam still had troops in Cambodia. No
information is available as to what has since happened to
these prisoners.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Article 85 of the 1989 PRK Constitution guarantees defendants
the right to lawyers at all trials. In addition, this
Constitution states that "all stages of court proceedings
shall be held in public. Nevertheless, cases may be held in
secret if provided for by law." In past years, political
prisoners were regularly denied fair trials. There are no
indications that this situation has changed since the new
Constitution was adopted.
The PRK has used trials primarily for propaganda or public
intimidation, with verdicts decided in advance. There are few
procedural safeguards for defendants. Defendants have been
required to memorize carefully and rehearse in advance all the
questions and answers to be presented in court, even in cases
where the interrogators had already decided to release them;
if these defendants satisfactorily recited their testimonies
as rehearsed, they were released. Other reports indicated
that prisoners who had been arrested by PRK authorities for
alleged cooperation with the resistance were incarcerated, not
as a result of judicial proceedings, but rather because they
confessed to their crimes under interrogation. There are no
indications that these practices changed in 1989.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
PRK authorities search whenever and wherever they wish.
Networks of informers report to the secret police. Almost all
villages in Cambodia close to the Thai-Cambodian border in the
northwest provinces have been relocated inside a border
security zone, especially those near known infiltration
points. There are also numerous reports, confirmed by former
PRK district officials, that the regime confiscates rice and
other foodstuffs from villagers in some parts of the country
in an effort to prevent cooperation with the resistance.
In most of their camps along the Thai-Cambodian border,
especially in the south, the Khmer Rouge maintain strict
control on the social activities of those under their
control. The rules appear to differ little from those imposed
by the Pol Pot regime of 1975-78. For instance, the Khmer
Rouge punishes persons who marry without permission or forbids
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marriages altogether. If a marriage is permitted, the bride
and groom are often not allowed to live together. Contacts
with foreigners are restricted, and listening to unauthorized
radio broadcasts can result in punishment. Relief workers who
visit those Khmer Rouge camps open to outsiders report that
residents require permission to visit the health clinics run
by voluntary agencies or the ICRC's surgical facility at
Khao-I-Dang. One Khmer Rouge defector during 1989 reported
that in his camp, which was closed to international access,
between 5 and 10 children and adults died each month because
of the absence of medical care and the refusal of the Khmer
Rouge leaders to allow camp residents to leave to seek help
from international relief organizations.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The press and radio within Cambodia are wholly controlled by
the PRK regime. Criticism of the regime is not generally
tolerated. Possession of foreign books and periodicals can
result in arrest, but it is doubtful that such regulations are
strictly enforced. Some limited criticism of the regime was
tolerated in 1989 in publications such as the newspaper
Kampuchea. On one occasion, this criticism took the form of a
comparison implying that the PF.K regime's armed forces
sometimes engaged in undisciplined behavior similar to that of
Pol Pot's soldiers.
In some areas of the country, people can listen to foreign
radio broadcasts relatively freely, while in other areas,
people are discouraged from listening to these broadcasts and
threatened with arrest if they persist. The PRK makes a
nominal attempt to control what types of movies the population
sees, but widespread smuggling of video tapes has made movie
censorship virtually impossible.
The PRK has, in the past, controlled individual contacts with
foreigners. Rcently, however, visitors to Cambodia have noted
that Cambodians appear to be free to talk with anyone they
wish, including foreigners.
In Site 8, a Khmer Rouge camp open to international
assistance, residents have access to a relatively wide range
of foreign publications and can listen to the radio with
relative freedom. However, this was not the case during 1989
in the closed Khmer Rouge camps where, defectors report, those
who listen to foreign broadcasts, or even those of the
non-Communist resistance groups, are imprisoned. Residents of
closed camps also lack access to foreign publications. In
areas of Cambodia seized by the Khmer Rouge, the schools are
closed. The non-Communist groups do not have similar
restrictions .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The only associations permitted by the PRK are those created
to support the regime, such as those for farmers, women, and
youth. These are usually headed by ranking party or regime
officials .
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
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c. Freedom of Religion
Article 6 of the PRK's 1989 Constitution made Buddhism the
state religion of Cambodia. The regime also announced in May
that all men were free to enter the monkhood, provided the
ordination was approved by the regime and carried out by
designated senior monks.
Interviews with Cambodians who left the country in 1989
indicate that in many parts of the country there is now
considerable freedom to practice Buddhism and enter the
monkhood. There are reports, however, that in some areas, men
are still discouraged from entering the monkhood. Sometimes
this involves a requirement to pay a bribe to obtain the
necessary permission.
Generally, PRK authorities attempt to use Buddhism as one of a
number of organizations for "mass mobilization" to implement
party policies. Religious affairs are overseen by the
National United Front for Construction and Defense, the same
government agency that seeks to organize women, youth,
workers, and religious groups to support the State.
Communities that wish to construct Buddhist temples must apply
to the local front committees for permission. The most senior
monk is a Vice Chairman of the National Assembly, indicating
the subordination of the Order of Buddhist Monks to political
ends .
When in power in Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge disestablished
Buddhism as the state religion and systematically murdered
much of the Buddhist monkhood. Since being driven from power,
the Khmer Rouge has tried to give the impression of reform.
This is most noticeable in the large Khmer Rouge camp at Site
8, which has been accessible to international organizations
and relief workers since it was established as an evacuation
site in 1985 for people fleeing a Vietnamese offensive. This
camp has a temple with monks in residence. However, defectors
from other Khmer Rouge camps, and those relief workers
occasionally allowed into those camps, reported in 1989 that
Buddhism is still repressed by the Khmer Rouge outside of Site
8. Christianity and Islam were even more ruthlessly
suppressed by the Khmer Rouge when it controlled the country
and are not known to have been revived in Khmer
Rouge-controlled areas.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The PRK has attempted to control tightly all travel within
areas under its authority through systems of neighborhood
surveillance, family registration, and identification
documents. Despite formal regulations governing movements of
families and individuals, there is a growing ability to travel
within Cambodia as evidenced by the expanding domestic trade.
However, checkpoints are still ubiquitous, and bribes as well
as passes are required to pass through them.
Permission is required to travel abroad, and it is rarely
granted except for official business. Cambodians seeking to
leave the country to escape the conflict flee to the Thai
border or to U.N. -supported refugee or displaced persons camps
in Thailand. The regime routinely imprisons those caught
attempting to flee as well as those believed to be returning
from border camps affiliated with the CGDK.
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Most of the several hundred thousand Cambodian refugees who
fled to Thailand before 1980 have been approved for
resettlement and have departed for Western countries.
However, over 11,000 Cambodians approved for refugee status
but deemed "non-resettleable" — generally because of close
contacts with the Khmer Rouge regime before 1978 — remain at
the Khao-I-Dang holding center in Thailand. Another 291,000
Cambodians — generally those who have fled since 1980 — are
considered "displaced persons" and remain in other camps on
the Thai-Cambodian border. The PRK regime has agreed in
principle to accept returning displaced persons from camps in
Thailand. During 1989, 20 displaced persons were repatriated
from Thailand to Cambodia.
The Khmer Rouge tightly controls movement within areas under
its control. During 1989 some Khmer Rouge nonassisted camps
were relocated, in some cases to "hidden" locations closer to
the border. There are indications that these moves may be
only interim steps to the Khmer Rouge objective of
transferring some of its population back into Cambodia.
Defectors reported in 1989 that the civilian populations in
some closed Khmer Rouge border camps, especially in the south,
are not allowed to leave the camps. Those attempting to
escape run the risk of being shot by Khmer Rouge guards.
Along the northern border, however, many Khmer Rouge were seen
walking freely along roads on their way to new camps,
including the U.N. -assisted camp of Au Trao. Also, residents
of the Khmer Rouge camp at Site 8 are often allowed to leave
the camp each day to work for Thai farmers.
The Khmer Rouge limits access by international organizations
and voluntary agency personnel to camps under its control in
Thailand. International organizations continued their appeals
to the Thai Government in 1989 for greater access to
Cambodians in closed camps. In January the Thai Government
agreed to create U.N. -assisted camps for civilians under Khmer
Rouge control in the northern and southern sectors of the
border — at Au Trao and Site K respectively, similar to Site 8
in the central area. This decision resulted in the number of
Khmer Rouge civilians in U.U. -assisted camps rising to around
73,000 in October, up from 51,500 at the end of 1988.
Freedom of movement is also restricted i-n the non-Communist
camps. Residents wishing to move to a camp controlled by a
different faction must obtain permission from the camp
leadership or leave surreptitiously. International
organizations and voluntary agencies have good access to
NCR-af f ilrated camps in Thailand.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Cambodians do not have the right to change their government.
The Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party controls political
life in the majority of the country. Elections have been
staged by the PRK regime to attempt to demonstrate legitimacy
as well as the relative status of leaders by varying reported
percentages of the "vote." Although National Assembly members
are supposed to serve terms of 4 years (the second round of
elections should have been held in 1986), no elections have
been held since 1982. There were various announcements by the
regime during 1989 that elections would take place before the
end of the year. At year's end, no date for elections had
been set. The PRK regime has asserted that the scheduling of
elections is pending external diplomatic developments.
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Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Human rights violations in Cambodia have been the subject of
intense international attention since 1978, when the United
Nations Human Rights Commission and its Subcomraission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
began investigating the Khmer Rouge record of atrocities. In
February 1988, the Commission adopted the latest in a series
of resolutions on Cambodia, reiterating its condemnation of
persistent violations of human rights and reaffirming that
Cambodia's occupation by foreign forces deprives the people of
Cambodia of their right to self-determination.
With the exception of a brief visit in August 1989 by the
Cambodia Documentation Commission to investigate past Khmer
Rouge atrocities, the PRK authorities have not permitted
investigations of alleged human rights violations. The regime
has not responded to requests by the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights and by AI to visit regime-controlled areas.
Repeated requests by the ICRC to visit detainees under PRK
control have never been granted. Local Red Cross
organizations exist, but neither they nor any other groups
have a role in the protection of human rights. The Khmer
Rouge also does not permit investigations of the human rights
situation in areas under its control, except in U.N . -assisted
camps .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Directives issued by the PRK regime in 1982 seemed to accord a
privileged status to Vietnamese immigrants; there have been
reports of Vietnamese taking advantage of this privileged
status to force Cambodians out of desirable occupations or off
of property. Cambodians arriving on the border in 1988
frequently reported that Vietnamese in the cities continued to
supplant Cambodian merchants, and this privileged status
appeared to continue to be backed by the Phnom Penh
authorities. Many Vietnamese moved into Cambodia to join
other returning residents who had been expelled during the
Khmer Republic or Khmer Rouge periods. Most are traders or
fishermen, but a large group of Vietnamese farmers have
settled on rich marshland in Takeo Province.
In 1989, however, with the announced departure of Vietnamese
troops, many Vietnamese merchants and settlers began to leave
for Vietnam, apparently believing that the regime would not or
could not protect them. The CGDK has repeatedly claimed there
are up to 1.2 million Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia and
demands that they must all depart the country before a peace
settlement can be reached. There is no independent, verified
data on the number of Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia.
There is no specific information available on discrimination
of other types, including violence against women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers in Cambodia do not enjoy the right of association and
have no right to establish and join organizations of their own
choosing. Organized labor is totally under the PRK's control,
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and industries have organized branches of the official "Trade
Union for National Salvation." The "Kampuchean Federation of
Trade Unions" is an official mass organization headed by
Communist Party politburo member Mat Ly. As far as can be
determined, there is no right to strike.
Cambodia became a member of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) in 1969 but has ratified neither ILO
Convention 87 on Freedom of Association nor Convention 98 on
Collective Bargaining. The PRK regime has not supplied any
information on unratified Conventions to the ILO in 5 years.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There is no right to collective bargaining in Cambodia. The
PRK has not established any economic incentive zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is commonly used by the PRK, although not
primarily as a sanction or means of racial, social, or other
discrimination. Although the use of forced labor appeared to
decrease in 1989, the regime still conscripted thousands of
laborers to clear brush, cut timber, and build roads.
The decrease in the number of forced laborers during 1989
appeared to result from the institution of a nationwide
military draft. There were many reports of young men being
taken forcibly and sent directly to the front, with minimal or
no training. One student who fled to Thailand to escape the
draft reported that the authorities deliberately failed
students in his school to force them into the military. This
mass conscription policy has resulted in many of those subject
to the draft fleeing to Thailand. On one day in 1989, 119 PRK
defectors crossed into Thailand.
The Khmer Rouge also requires labor from all persons under its
control, including women, children, and the handicapped.
Khmer Rouge civilian defectors continued to report in 1989
that they were forced to carry supplies and ammunition into
the interior of Cambodia in support of military operations,
saying they were punished if they failed to comply.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
There is no known minimum age for the employment of children.
Children are regularly employed as soon as they are physically
able to perform the tasks required.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
No attention appears to have been given by PRK authorities to
ensure acceptable conditions of work, and there is little
information on this subject. Wage scales for the few
industrial and government workers are set by the regime and
are universally regarded as insufficient, forcing employees to
supplement their wages in other manners.
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CHINA
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian
one-party state ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) .
Following the Beijing massacre in early June, the Government
reinforced totalitarian measures to control political views.
A closed inner circle of a few senior leaders exercises
ultimate power over the nation, with Deng Xiaoping the first
among equals. Some of these party elders hold positions
within the Politburo, the Central Military Commission, or
other organs. Others hold no formal positions of authority
but still wield considerable influence.
The Government maintains control through a nationwide security
network which includes the Ministry of State Security; the
Ministry of Public Security; the Ministry of National Defense;
state judicial, procuratorial , and penal systems; and through
traditional societal pressure. In 1989 the security network
was responsible for widespread human rights abuses, especially
in Beijing and Xizang (Tibet).
Despite 10 years of economic reforms intended to expand the
role of market forces, China's centrally planned economy still
retains price controls and allocation of some key goods by
administrative directive. The Government has decentralized
some economic decisionmaking authority and endorsed the
development of a small private sector, particularly in retail
sales and services. As part of a comprehensive economic
austerity and restructuring program initiated in late 1988,
the Government took a more aggressive approach in scrutinizing
private firms, punishing tax evaders, and attempting to limit
the incomes of private entrepreneurs. The central authorities
also withdrew some of the economic decisionmaking power
delegated to lower levels.
The human rights climate in China deteriorated dramatically in
1989. On March 5-7, People's Armed Police (PAP) used
indiscriminate and excessive force in suppressing
demonstrations in Lhasa, Tibet, killing scores of persons.
These killings and other serious human rights abuses, however,
were dwarfed when the leadership ordered the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) and other security forces to suppress
forcefully a peaceful, student-led movement seeking greater
freedom for China's people. At least several hundred, and
possibly thousands, of people were killed in Beijing on June
3-4. The Beijing massacre was followed by a drastic,
country-wide crackdown on participants, supporters, and
sympathizers. Thousands were arrested and about a score are
known to have been executed, following trials which fell far
short of international standards, for alleged crimes committed
during the unrest. There have also been persistent but
unconfirmed reports of numerous unannounced executions. At
year's end the crackdown was still continuing. The Government
attempted to defend its actions by a massive disinformation
campaign, expulsion and harassment of foreign journalists, a
ban on the sale of books by dissidents, and the jamming of the
Voice of America and some other foreign radio stations.
Virtually all internationally recognized human rights
discussed in this report are restricted, many of them severely.
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RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
By far the most serious instance of extrajudicial killing in
China in 1989 was the June 3-4 massacre in Beijing. Credible
evidence indicates that the leadership deliberately ordered
the use of lethal force to suppress peaceful demonstrations.
The excessive force employed resulted in the deaths of many
unarmed civilians. As noted above, estimates of the number
killed vary widely, and an exact accounting may never be
possible.
In early March, the PAP shot and killed scores of Tibetan
monks and their supporters during demonstrations in Lhasa.
Hundreds more were injured as police used indiscriminate and
excessive force to quell protests in support of Tibetan
independence.
Many independent observers believe that the number of persons
actually executed in connection with the 1989 demonstrations
throughout the country is far higher than those officially
announced to date. Confirmation of such executions is not
available, and Chinese officials have refused to respond to
diplomatic requests for information.
According to reliable sources, 2 persons were killed and 150
injured, 10 seriously, during an April police raid on an
underground Catholic church service in Shi j iazhuang, Hebei
Province.
b. Disappearance
The Government, as a matter of course, does not publicly
announce the names of those detained or arrested. In view of
the large number detained after the Beijing massacre, concerns
have arisen over the fate of those detainees whose status has
not been clarified.
There were credible reports of numerous raids on university
campuses, private residences, workers' dormitories, think
tanks, and hotels in the weeks following the June 3-4 massacre
by both the PLA and various security bureaus. Large numbers
of persons who participated in or supported the spring
demonstrations were detained. While most of these detentions
occurred soon after the June massacre, the crackdown continued
months later. When universities reopened, returning students
were investigated, and some students were detained by security
forces. The Government acknowledges that some students, such
as Liu Gang, Zhou Fengsuo, Ma Shaofang, and others on the list
of 21 most wanted, have been arrested; however, it has not
publicly charged, or acknowledged holding, the majority of
students reportedly detained whose whereabouts are unknown.
Some workers at a computer firm that supported deposed CCP
General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, journalists from Beijing-based
newspapers, and intellectuals also remain unaccounted for.
Since announcing a total of about 2,500 detentions by the end
of June, the Government has refused to comment on the number
of additional detentions since that time or to provide any
information on those detained.
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Detention of leaders of unofficial religious groups continued
in 1989, often with no notification to followers or family
members. At least two dozen bishops, priests, and laymen of
the underground Catholic church were detained during the year,
and the status of several of them remained unknown at year's
end .
The whereabouts and status of many Tibetans detained during
demonstrations in Lhasa are also unknown. A security official
told a Western journalist in October that 400 had been
arrested after the March demonstrations and that 323 were
subsequently released. Other reports from Tibet cite
significantly higher figures.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Reports of torture and degrading treatment of persons detained
for committing so-called counterrevolutionary crimes have been
persistent and consistent. Many Chinese citizens who
participated in the demonstrations suffered beatings and other
forms of ill-treatment in police efforts to extract
information about others who may have been involved in the
demonstrations. A person involved in erecting the Goddess of
Democracy statue in Tiananmen Square was reportedly detained,
beaten, and forced to implicate others. He remains under
detention, and it is not known if he has been officially
charged. As of year's end, there were continuing reliable
reports of beatings of political detainees in the Beijing area
by security forces.
In Tibet officials have rebuffed diplomatic requests to visit
prisons and to discuss individual human rights cases. Since
the suppression of the March 5-7 demonstrations in Lhasa,
there have been persistent and convincing reports of torture
of those detained or arrested. A March 1989 report by U.S.
Congressional staff related accounts, based on interviews with
refugees from Tibet, of cruel and unusual punishment of
Tibetans .
Conditions in Chinese prisons are invariably harsh and
frequently degrading. According to press reports, more than
200 students and intellectuals are being held in the Qincheng
maximum-security prison north of Beijing. Prisoners are
reportedly packed eight to a cell. A person imprisoned prior
to the June massacre reported beatings in prisons in western
China. Prisoners, both criminal and political, are subjected
to severe psychological pressure to confess their "errors."
Those who resist are sometimes beaten and denied family
contact. According to an official of the Supreme People's
Procuratorate, cases under investigation concerning illegal
arrests and the extraction of confessions by torture rose 57.7
percent during the first 6 months of 1989 as compared with the
same period in 1988. The People's Procuratorates agreed to
hear 21,838 cases involving charges of torture. Of these, 838
were major criminal cases.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
China's Criminal Procedure Law proscribes arbitrary arrest or
detention. According to the law, interrogation should take
place within 24 hours of detention, and the detainee's family
or work unit should be informed of the reasons for it and the
place of detention. Articles 43-52 of the Criminal Procedure
Law, however, permit the police to delay notifying the family
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CHINA
and work unit "in circumstances where notification would
hinder the investigation." Frequently family members are not
informed when individuals are detained for political reasons.
A detainee may be held legally for up to 10 days prior to
formal arrest. In some cases, however, detainees have been
held for months without charge.
Under Article 19 of "The Regulations of the PRC on
Administrative Penalties for Public Security," police have the
authority to assign persons accused of disturbing the peace,
fabricating rumors, hindering government officials from
performing their official duties, and other minor public order
offenses to "labor education" camps for up to 3 years.
According to an article in the official press in October, some
2 million Chinese citizens have been sent to these camps in
the past 10 years.
Sentences imposed by criminal courts may be served in prisons
or in "reform through labor" camps, whose function is not
fully explained in the legal code. Many of these are in
remote areas such as Xinjiang or Qinghai. Upon release from
these camps, many prisoners reportedly have been denied
permission to return to their homes and forced to remain in
these underpopulated regions. This amounts to a form of
internal exile.
Some of those detained since the June massacre may be charged
with "crimes of counterrevolution," under Articles 90-104 of
the Criminal Law. These articles are cast in such broad terms
that they empower the State to detain people for a wide range
of activities considered in violation of the law. Those
detained for committing "crimes of counterrevolution" are
treated in theory the same as those detained for other crimes,
and their cases are supposed to be handled in accordance with
the Criminal Procedure Law. The imposition of martial law in
parts of Beijing in late May permitted martial law authorities
to issue orders and detain people independent of the authority
of the local Beijing government. Large numbers of people may
be detained for long periods of time without any public
notification while the PLA and police conduct their
investigations .
In 1989 the number of persons accused of political offenses
rose dramatically as a result of the spring demonstrations.
The number of people initially detained and the number who
remain under detention has not been released. Estimates of
the number of detainees after June 4 vary from the 2,500
officially announced in late June to over 100,000 according to
some journalists and human rights groups. Western press
reports in December quoted "well-informed" government sources
as putting the figure at 10,000.
Most of those detained appear to be manual workers. A number
of prominent intellectuals were also detained, including
journalist Dai Qing, former Democracy Wall prisoner Ren
Wanding, reformist Party official Bao Tong, and several
student leaders.
Some applicants for foreign visas have reportedly been
detained and interrogated for at least several days.
Several hundred people connected with the March 5-7
proindependence demonstrations in Lhasa were subsequently
detained. The Tibet Daily published on September 14 and 25
the names of 14 Tibetan Buddhist nuns who were detained and
806
sentenced to 2 to 3 years of "labor education" for
demonstrating in Lhasa on September 2 and 22. The nuns were
detained for shouting in a public area slogans demanding
independence for Tibet and were accused by the police of
engaging in "separatist activity." The police detained the
nuns and immediately adjudicated their cases under their own
authority. Because of the secrecy surrounding these matters
and the Government's refusal to discuss them, reliable
estimates of the total number of political prisoners in Tibet,
as in the rest of China, are not obtainable.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
China's judiciary is not independent but is controlled by the
CCP. The highest court is the Supreme People's Court. The
next level is the High Provincial People's Court, followed by
the Intermediate Local People's Court, and then the Basic
Local County People's Court. Separate and special military,
maritime, and railway courts function directly under the
Supreme People's Court.
In recent years the CCP and the Government have moved toward
establishment of a more independent legal system. There have
been efforts to define broadly stated laws more narrowly,
including the provisions of the law on "crimes of
counterrevolution," to make clear what are criminally
indictable offenses. Programs have been set up to provide
professional training for judges through overseas training
courses to acquaint them with legal procedures in the West.
Since June, however, the impetus for legal reform has waned.
Due process rights are stipulated under the Constitution but
are often ignored in practice. The law requires that all
trials be held in public, except those involving state
secrets, juveniles, and "personal secrets." It also states
that a defendant may be held in custody during investigation
prior to the trial for a maximum of 2 months, although a
1-month extension may be requested from the next highest
procuratorate . The procuratorate then has 1 1/2 months to
decide whether or not to prosecute the case. An additional
month is permitted if "supplementary investigation" is
needed. Any further delay requires approval of the Standing
Committee of the NPC. In practice, the period of pretrial
detention can be much longer. Two American citizens arrested
for alleged fraud and forgery were held for 7 months before a
decision was made not to prosecute.
The procuratorate sends to trial only those persons it
determines are guilty. Persons appearing before the court are
presumed guilty, and trials are thus, in effect, sentencing
hearings. Defense lawyers almost never contest their client's
guilt; their function is generally confined to requesting
clemency. There is an appeal process, but initial decisions
are rarely overturned, and sentences can actually be
increased. Defendants are expected to "show the right
attitude" by confessing their crime, and, because they are
presumed guilty, those who fail to confess are treated more
harshly.
The Government has publicly announced the executions of a
score of persons who were tried and found guilty of crimes
directly linked to the spring demonstrations. For example,
three were executed in Shanghai on June 22 allegedly for
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burning a train, seven in Beijing on June 22 allegedly for
"setting fire to military trucks, stealing military goods, and
assaulting soldiers," and two in Chengdu in July allegedly for
arson. A factory worker in Jinan was sentenced to death in
late October for allegedly setting fire to a car, three in
Chengdu in November for burning a cinema, and two in Beijing
in December for beating a policeman to death.
The Government has repeatedly argued that those executed were
"legally" found guilty of destroying government property or
other internationally recognized crimes, and not of political
offenses. The executions in Shanghai at least tend to belie
the Government's assertion. On June 6, during demonstrations
protesting the massacre of civilians in Beijing, a train ran
over a group of demonstrators in the Shanghai suburbs, killing
six. Angered by this, hundreds of people reportedly stormed
that train or the next train nearing the station and burned
it. A railway court convicted and sentenced to death three
people for burning the train. No one was detained in
connection with the death of the six demonstrators. The
Government contended that the defendants were accorded their
full rights. Serious doubts about the fairness of the trial
remain, however, including the excessive sentences, the
selection of these three persons for prosecution from among
the hundreds involved, the hurried nature of the trial, and
the mental competence of at least one of the defendants.
Given the near total lack of procedural safeguards in these
trials, government claims that the accused received "due
process" are not credible.
Those arrested for crimes of counterrevolution frequently are
tried in secret and family members are not informed of the
charges or details of the case. Credible reports suggest that
even years after the conviction and imprisonment of a person
considered a dissident, family members still do not know the
details of the alleged crime.
A number of political prisoners jailed in previous cycles of
repression, notably "Democracy Wall" dissident Wei Jingsheng,
remain in prison. Yang Wei, a former student in the United
States who was jailed for 2 years for activities during the
1986 demonstrations, was released in January but detained
again in July for involvement in the spring protests. Among
those who have been tried and convicted for clearly political
offenses during 1989 are Xiao Bin, who received a 10-year
sentence for "spreading rumors" about the demonstrations to
the American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) television; Zhang
Weiping, sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment for telephoning
information on Hangzhou protests to the Voice of America
(VOA) ; and Chen Zhixiang, a teacher in Guangzhou who was given
10 years for painting a "counterrevolutionary" slogan.
Persistent reports claim that many others, perhaps several
hundred, have been secretly convicted of similar political
offenses .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The law requires that search warrants be issued before
authorities may search premises, but it is often ignored. It
is unlikely the army and the security forces obtained warrants
prior to their raids on homes and businesses to arrest
"counterrevolutionaries" for their role in the democracy
demonstrations .
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CHINA
Personal and family life are extensively monitored and
regulated by authorities. Most persons depend on their work
unit for employment, housing, ration coupons, permission to
marry or have a child, and other aspects of ordinary life.
The work unit, along with the neighborhood watch committee,
monitors activities and attitudes. In the wake of the
demonstrations, authorities have redefined the function of the
neighborhood watch committees, requiring them to work more
closely with the Public Security Bureau. Mail is often opened
and read, telephones monitored, and television cameras located
at some key intersections, in luxury hotels, and in some
buildings. After the post-Tiananmen crackdown began, the
authorities produced television footage from clandestine
cameras showing alleged Taiwan spies observing the Tiananmen
Square demonstrations, and student leader Wuer Kaixi and other
demonstrators eating at the Beijing Hotel.
The Government strictly regulates dealings between Chinese
citizens and foreigners. Virtually all foreigners are forced
to live separately in designated residential compounds, and
all Chinese entering the foreign areas are closely monitored
by guards and video cameras on roofs and in elevators.
Residences of foreign diplomats, journalists, and businessmen
are assum.ed to be electronically and physically monitored.
The Chinese Government maintains a comprehensive and highly
intrusive family planning program. Individual and family
decisions about bearing children are controlled by the State,
with severe sanctions against those who deviate from official
guidelines. The Central Government sets an annual nationwide
goal for the number of births to be authorized. This is then
apportioned among provinces, and further down through
prefecture, county, town, and district levels. Ultimately,
each work unit (village, factory, or government office)
receives a target figure for births over the next few years.
As the allotments are quite small, couples wishing to have a
second child often must wait many years before receiving
permission. In some areas, newly married couples have also
been required to wait years before having their first child.
While strongly encouraging all couples to have only one child,
Chinese policy allows two or more children for many rural
families. Members of ethnic minorities, particularly in
remote areas, are also generally not subject to the same
strict limitations imposed on the Han majority.
Implementation of the policy varies widely from place to place
and from year to year. In many areas, couples apparently are
able to have several children without incurring any penalty,
while in other areas enforcement has been excessively harsh.
Periodic campaigns exhort all Chinese to have fewer children,
to have them later in life, and to space them more widely.
When national targets are not met, officials call for stricter
implementation, and some have advocated more coercive methods
than central government policy currently authorizes. Local
officials have great discretion in how, and how severely, the
policy is implemented.
Under China's national Marriage Law, women may not legally
marry before age 20; men before age 22. In practice, early
marriages are discouraged, and the press frequently extols the
virtues of later marriage. Lack of available housing and
other social concerns are often cited as additional reasons to
delay marriage.
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Couples are not allowed free choice about whether to practice
family planning, how many children they may have, or when they
may have them. In practice, most couples have little choice
concerning the form of birth control to use.
The population control policy relies primarily on heavy doses
of education and propaganda, augmented by severe psychological
pressure on those who resist. Disciplinary measures against
couples who violate the policy include stiff fines (often as
high as a year's salary), withholding of social services,
demotion, and other administrative punishments. If a unit
exceeds its allocation, punishment may be meted out to the
offending couples, to unit officials, and to the unit as a
whole. Some local officials have reportedly destroyed or
confiscated the private property of families with unauthorized
children if fines are not paid. In 1988 a Chinese couple
studying in the United States, Dr. Li Quanbang and Ms. Ping
Hong, were threatened with severe punishment if Ms. Ping
refused to abort her second child before returning to China.
Ms. Ping's employer warned her that, if she returned, she
would have to have an abortion even in the third trimester of
pregnancy. If she insisted on having the child, she would be
placed on probation and the entire factory would be punished.
Eventually the authorities relented, but the U.S. Government
determined that the Li family and a few other Chinese couples
who faced similar situations had demonstrated a well-founded
fear of persecution and granted them asylum in the United
States .
Physical compulsion to submit to abortion or sterilization is
not authorized, but continues to occur as officials strive to
meet population targets. Reports of forced abortions and
sterilizations continue, though well below the levels of the
early 1980's. In early 1989, a U.S. Congressional staff
delegation interviewed Tibetan refugees in Nepal. They, and
some previous news stories, reported harrowing accounts of
abuses in Tibet.
Chinese officials have consistently maintained that China does
not condone forced abortion and sterilization and that
officials who commit such abuses are punished. They admit,
however, that such punishment is rare and have refused to
provide documentation of any punishments.
Female infanticide also persists in some rural areas.
Insistence that local officials meet population goals has
contributed to the reemergence of this traditional practice,
generally by parents who hope to have more sons without
incurring official punishment. There are allegations that
some Chinese officials and doctors have participated in
infanticide or in abortions so late in pregnancy as to be
tantamount to infanticide. The Chinese Government strongly
opposes infanticide, to the point of prosecuting offenders,
but has been unable to eradicate it.
One recent development in China's population control policy
was the passage in November 1988 of a set of eugenic
regulations in Gansu province prohibiting people with severe
mental handicaps from having children. Provincial officials
estimate the rules will affect some 26,000 persons whose
intelligence quotient is judged to be 49 or lower. Should any
of these persons decide to marry, one spouse must undergo
sterilization. For those already married, one partner must be
sterilized and any pregnancies compulsorily aborted.
Officials claim that permission for any operation requires the
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consent of a mentally competent relative but acknowledge that
heavy psychological pressure may be employed to obtain
consent. As of December 1989, provincial officials said that
1,714 persons had been identified as requiring sterilization,
and 731 operations had been performed. According to a Health
Ministry official, the Government is drafting a new law to
extend the ban nationwide.
Despite a decade of efforts, officials acknowledge that
population growth has significantly exceeded the national
targets and that the goal of holding China's population to 1.2
billion by the end of the century will not be met. This
realization, together with a recent escalation of official
rhetoric, have led some observers to suggest that China may be
entering a new cycle of strict enforcement of family planning
policies, after a period of relative relaxation.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
On June 3-4, in order to clear peaceful demonstrators who had
occupied Tiananmen Square for several weeks, PLA troops fired
heavily and indiscriminately at crowds in the approaches to
and around Tiananmen Square, resulting in at least hundreds of
deaths and thousands of injuries. Some were crushed by
military vehicles driven into the crowd. The PLA also
suffered scores of casualties as enraged citizens fought
back. According to Western diplomats, some PLA casualties
also resulted from soldiers accidentally shooting or injuring
other soldiers. While it is difficult to know precisely how
many civilians died or were injured, the numbers are certainly
far greater than those cited by authorities. Mayor Chen
Xitong, in a speech before the National People's Congress
Standing Committee on June 30, said over 200 civilians were
killed, including 36 students, and 3,000 injured, with "dozens
of soldiers and police killed and 6,000 injured." Hospitals
and human rights groups, however, provided much higher
estimates. Visiting several hospitals in Beijing after the
June 3-4 massacre, diplomats and other observers viewed scores
of dead civilians, including women and children, with bullet
wounds and other injuries, and heard from medical personnel
the hardships the hospitals faced in treating the dead and
injured. At one hospital, doctors said that on June 3, 50
civilians had died from bullet wounds in their hospital alone.
The authorities clearly used excessive deadly force against
the demonstrators. While they used tear gas and rubber
bullets briefly in some areas of Beijing, the PLA and security
forces relied primarily on lethal force rather than
traditional riot control techniques to clear demonstrators
from the roads leading to Tiananmen Square. Foreign diplomats
and their families did not escape the heavy-handed actions of
the PLA. On June 7, PLA soldiers, allegedly returning fire
from a sniper, shot at a diplomatic housing complex, spraying
scores of apartments with gunfire but causing no casualties.
Chinese authorities have produced no evidence that a sniper
was actually present in the compound and firing at the PLA.
Security forces used excessive force in breaking up a
religious ceremony and demonstration by members of the
underground Catholic Church near Shi j iazhuang, Hebei Province
in April, leaving 2 civilians dead and at least 150 injured.
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In another major incident involving the use of excessive force
during demonstrations in Lhasa on March 5-7, police shot and
killed scores of Tibetan monks and their supporters.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Rights, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and self-expression are severely
restricted. Limited criticism of government policies and
officials is tolerated and had increased in recent years.
However, the limits were tightened again after June 4.
Citizens are not permitted to criticize senior leaders or to
express opinions contrary to the "Four Cardinal Principles":
Marxism/Leninism/Mao Zedong Thought as the theoretical
foundation of the State, socialism as its goal. Communist
Party leadership, and the "people's democratic dictatorship"
(which includes the right to use force against "counter-
revolutionaries") .
Those who violate these guidelines frequently are severely
punished. Xiao Bin, a worker in Dalian, was sentenced to 10
years' imprisonment for expressing personal views on the
Beijing massacre to an ABC news crew, and Zhang Weiping, a
student, was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment for informing
VOA about antigovernment demonstrations.
Renowned scientist and dissident Fang Lizhi sent senior leader
Deng Xiaoping an open letter on January 6 appealing for
amnesty for political prisoners. On February 16, 33 prominent
intellectuals signed an open letter to the national leadership
supporting Fang's call for amnesty. The Government attacked
the letter in the official press on February 23 and later
characterized it as an act of "counterrevolution." Some
signatories have since fled China while others have been
detained. Security forces stepped up surveillance of Fang and
restricted his movements. He and his wife Li Shuxian were
physically prevented from attending a banquet in Beijing
hosted by President and Mrs. Bush. In June Fang and Li took
refuge in the U.S. Embassy, after which the Government charged
them with criminal "counterrevolutionary" activity and named
them as key "conspirators" in the student demonstrations.
Television and radio are strictly controlled by the Government
and used to propagate the party's version of events. In the
wake of the June 3-4 events, the authorities began a massive
disinformation campaign, asserting that* the spring
demonstrations had evolved into a counterrevolutionary
rebellion led by a few conspirators. State Council spokesman
Yuan Mu claimed on June 16 that only 300 had died on June 3-4,
half of them PLA soldiers. Regular programming was replaced
by special programs giving the CCP ' s version of events. These
programs were broadcast several times a day for weeks. In
July China Central Television (CCTV) broadcast a four-part
program conveying the official version of the massacre.
Events were altered to suggest that the troops had been called
in to "quell a riot" rather than that troops fired on peaceful
demonstrators who then reacted in a rage. Again on September
23, CCTV televised a special program countering charges by
activists in the United States and featuring comments by Liu
Xiaobo, detained since June, denying that anyone had died in
Tiananmen Square. In the wake of the massacre, television
news constantly replayed assertions of government officials
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such as Yuan Mu and selected remarks by the handful of foreign
observers supportive of the Government position.
Following the imposition of martial law in Beijing, the
Chinese cut off the satellite feed for U.S. network news
services. Security authorities and PLA soldiers on the night
of June 3-4 detained two U.S. reporters along with a number of
other foreign journalists. In the aftermath, authorities
severely restricted the movements of foreign journalists,
harassing and expelling several of them.
After an 11-year moratorium, the Government resumed jamming
VOA Chinese-language broadcasts on May 21. The official press
has harshly attacked VOA reports, claiming that they were part
of a Western conspiracy to subvert China. Chinese authorities
confiscated film from foreigners leaving the country and
insisted on developing it for review and censorship.
Restrictions on the publication of books and other printed
material, which had generally eased during the 1980's, have
become much more stringent since June. Print media, like the
broadcast media, have been used to disseminate disinformation
about the spring demonstrations and the Government's crackdown.
A number of journalists were detained or otherwise officially
harassed in 1989. During the demonstrations, then Shanghai
Party Secretary Jiang Zemin sacked the editor of the World
Economic Herald, Qin Benli, and closed the newspaper,
silencing one of the country's few independent journalistic
voices. Since June, Qin has been under investigation. His
Beijing bureau chief was arrested and several staff writers
are still detained. Other journalists apparently still under
detention include personnel from the government mouthpiece
People's Daily, the official English-language China Daily,
Guangming Daily, and Radio Beijing. Others have been
dismissed from their jobs for printing material at variance
with the party line, including editor Tan Wenrui and director
Qian Liren of People's Daily, publisher Zhang Li and editor Li
Jiawei of the Sichuan Provincial Social Science Academy
Publishing House, Editor-in-chief Yao Xihua of the Guangming
Daily, Editor-in-Chief Li Xiaoshi and Deputy Editor-in-Chief
Sun Chang jiang of the Science and Technology Daily.
On July 17 the Government temporarily removed from the
newsstands foreign language newspapers, magazines, and
publications in order to limit access by Chinese citizens to
foreign news and to consolidate government control over the
importation and distribution of foreign printed material.
While the ban was lifted at the end of August, tighter control
on distribution has enabled authorities to censor foreign
language material more effectively. For example, several
issues of the Far Eastern Economic Review were withheld from
newsstands or had offending articles removed. More recently,
foreign media reports on the overthrow of Romanian dictator
Ceaucescu have been barred from distribution.
The Government reportedly has also banned publications by
activists and other authors considered unacceptable. Writings
by astrophysicist Fang Lizhi and his wife Li Shuxian,
investigative journalist Liu Binyan, playwright Su Xiaokang,
intellectuals such as Su Shaozhi, Bao Tong, Jin Guantao, Ge
Yang, Cao Siyuan, Li Honglin, Zhang Xianyang, Dai Qing, Liu
Xiaobo, Yan Jiaqi, and dozens of others have reportedly been
banned. Li Ruihuan, member of the Standing Committee of the
Politburo, on August 24 announced a campaign to "clean up and
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rectify" the publishing and audiovisual industries. Li said
the campaign was aimed at curbing publications advocating
"bourgeois liberalization" (Western social, political, and
cultural ideas) and pornography.
In the wake of the student demonstrations, the Government has
worked to reimpose more rigid ideological control over the
school system. The State Education Commission ordered that
30,000 fewer first-year students be admitted to universities
for the fall 1989 semester. The cuts were primarily among
those seeking to study the social sciences. The number of
students studying Western philosophy, political science, and
management were reduced. The entire first-year class at
Beijing University, a main center for the demonstrations, was
sent to an isolated camp for a year of military training and
ideological indoctrination. (The Government said this program
might be expanded to include additional universities in the
future.) Some recent college graduates are being sent from
Beijing to the countryside or to factories for ideological
training. On July 1, a State Education Corainission official
told the Chinese press that "students' level of patriotism and
willingness to serve their country should be major criteria"
in decisions on who should be permitted to study overseas.
Required study of the writings of Communist theoreticians has
been sharply increased.
Investigations into press activities have led to intimidation
of journalists and broadcasters, stronger press control, and a
complete halt, for now, of press reform. The Government has
made it clear that the press must support the party line and
cannot question the "Four Cardinal Principles." The detention
of journalists and broadcasters described in earlier sections
reinforced the Government's message.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Article 35 of the Constitution guarantees the right "of
assembly, of association, of procession, and of
demonstration," but such activities may not infringe "upon the
interests of the State" (Article 51) . In an effort to prevent
students from again demonstrating or occupying Tiananmen
Square, the National People's Congress Standing Committee on
October 31 adopted a law governing assemblies, parades, and
demonstrations that significantly limits the right of
individuals or groups to organize mass political activities.
The law, in theory, guarantees the right to assemble and
demonstrate but stipulates that parades and demonstrations
must abide by the Constitution and laws and may not "infringe
on the interests of the State, society, and collectives or the
legitimate freedoms and rights of other citizens." In
practice, this proscribes any protests against socialism or
the leadership. Moreover, this stipulation could be used to
ban protests that disrupt traffic, interfere with business, or
occupy public places, and all acts that could be interpreted
as "infringing" on the freedoms of other citizens. Also
banned are demonstrations that advocate national separatism or
jeopardize national unity.
The law does not apply to "traditional cultural, recreational,
or sports activities; normal religious activities; nor
traditional, nongovernmental activities among the people."
Also exempt are celebrations held by the State and assemblies
held by "state organs, political parties, social groups,
enterprises, or institutions in accordance with the law or
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their organic charters." Presumably, local authorities retain
the power to determine what are "normal" religious activities;
unapproved gatherings, such as evangelical revivals, religious
retreats, and outdoor masses could be restricted or banned.
Similarly, local officials would decide when "traditional"
cultural activities carry unacceptable political overtones
related to such sensitive issues as national separatism.
Procedures for obtaining a permit are extremely restrictive
and constructed in such a way as to discourage exercise of the
right of assembly. Demonstration organizers must apply for a
permit at least 5 days before the event, specifying the
purpose, type of demonstration, slogans to be used, the number
of participants and vehicles, the routes and times of the
march, the number and type of audio equipment, and the names,
addresses, and occupations of sponsors. Marches are generally
to be confined to the hours of 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. except with
special permission. The law reserves to local officials the
right to change the time, location, and route of a
demonstration, even after giving approval, requiring only that
they "promptly notify" the sponsors. Citizens cannot organize
or participate in demonstrations outside their own locality,
nor can government employees organize or participate in
protests that "go against their responsibilities and
obligations prescribed in relevant laws and regulations."
Professional and other mass associations are for the most part
organized and controlled by the Communist Party. Other new
regulations require all organizations to be officially
registered and approved, including societies, research units,
foundations, and chambers of commerce. Ostensibly aimed at
secret societies and criminal gangs, the regulations are also
used to prevent the formation of unauthorized political or
labor organizations, such as the student and worker groups
that emerged before and during the spring prodemocracy
protests. The regulations can also be used to close down
unregistered house churches or discussion groups that local
leaders deem potentially subversive.
In parts of Beijing, martial law was imposed on May 20 and
remained in effect until lifted in January 1990. Under
martial law, groups of people were not permitted to gather and
demonstrations were strictly forbidden. Martial law has also
been in effect in Lhasa since demonstrations broke out there
in early March. In areas where martial law is not in effect,
authorities also have adopted a stricter policy toward
allowing groups of people to assemble. Informants and
security forces maintain a close watch on groups formed
outside the Party establishment, particularly unauthorized
religious groups and other associations. Associations
recognized by the State are permitted to maintain relations
with recognized international bodies, but these contacts are
monitored and limited by the Government.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Religious freedom is subject to tight constraints. While the
Constitution affirms toleration of religious beliefs, the
Government severely restricts religious practice outside the
officially recognized and government-controlled religious
institutions. Religious proselytizing is restricted to
officially sanctioned places of worship or to the homes of
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persons properly registered with an officially recognized
religious institution. Religious conversion is tolerated
(though generally not for Communist Party members) .
By far the largest group of religious believers in China are
Buddhists who belong to the dominant Han ethnic group. Han
Buddhist leaders generally cooperate with the Government and
have experienced few reported difficulties. Daoism, widely
practiced in southern coastal provinces, is officially
respected as an important part of traditional Chinese culture,
but many of its practices conflict with government strictures
against superstition and waste of arable land and have been
heavily criticized. China permits Muslim citizens to make the
hajj to Mecca, and over 2,000 Chinese, most subsidized by the
Chinese Government or by overseas Muslims, make the journey
annually.
The Government insists that no religious institution may be
subject to foreign domination or influence. In order to
eliminate perceived foreign domination of Christian groups in
the past, the Government in the 1950 's established the
Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) and the Protestant Three
Self Movement (TSM) . The CPA ordains its own bishops and
priests, generally follows pre-Vatican II practices, and
rejects papal authority. Proselytizing by foreign groups is
forbidden. Americans and other foreigners have been expelled
for distributing Bibles or proselytizing. Twelve Americans
were detained in Kunming on June 23 and were later expelled
for having imported religious materials. Officially
sanctioned religious organizations are permitted to maintain
international contacts as long as these do not entail foreign
control. The TSM and its Buddhist and Muslim counterparts
have established extensive networks of international support.
The CPA has no official ties to Catholic churches outside
China, but its leaders frequently visit Catholic and other
religious leaders abroad.
Tibetan Buddhism is also tightly controlled. Religious
activity is thriving with some government support, though the
number of monasteries and monks remains far below the pre-1949
level. The Government does not tolerate religious
manifestations that advocate Tibetan independence. The
Government recognizes the Dalai Lama as a major religious
figure, but condemns his political activities and his
leadership of a "government in exile." As with other
religions, Tibetan Buddhist activities are subject to
government monitoring and control. The Government exercised a
considerable degree of control over the late Tibetan Buddhist
Panchen Lama, the second most revered religious figure in
Tibetan Buddhism. Following his death early in 1989, the
State Council approved procedures for selecting the
"reincarnated" Panchen Lama which will give the Government a
prominent role.
After forcefully suppressing all religious observance during
the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, the Government began in the
late 1970's to restore or replace confiscated churches,
temples, mosques, and monasteries. The official religious
organizations administer more than a dozen Catholic and
Protestant seminaries, nine institutes to train imams and
Islamic scholars, and institutes to train Buddhist monks. The
Government supervises the publication of religious material
for distribution, to ensure that it conforms to religious
beliefs and philosophical positions sanctioned by the
Government .
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There are active underground religious movements which pose an
alternative to the state-regulated churches and temples. The
Catholic underground church claims a membership far larger
than the 3.5 million officially registered with the CPA,
though actual figures are unknown. It has its own bishops and
priests and conducts its own services. Protestants also
conduct private services independent of government control;
some of these groups are apparently quite dynamic. The
Christian underground movement imports religious materials,
including Bibles, from abroad. Underground church officials
reject legally published material because it does not conform
to their beliefs. The Government generally tolerates but
sometimes actively suppresses nonsanctioned religious groups.
Security forces have raided illegal underground services,
resulting in arrests, injuries, and even deaths, as in the
raid on an underground Catholic service in Hebei in April in
which 2 persons were reportedly killed and 150 were injured.
A large number of Catholic leaders and somewhat fewer
Protestants have spent long periods in prison. Most long-term
Catholic prisoners had been released by late 1987, but
detentions continue. Bishops Julius Jia Guozhi , Joseph Fan
Xueyan, Pietro Liu Guandong, Giuseppe Li Side, Jiang Liren,
Mattia Lu Zhensheng, Filippo Yang Lipo, Paolo Li Zhenrong,
Bartolomeo Yu Chengdi , and other priests in the underground
Catholic Church as well as underground Protestant leaders were
reportedly detained during 1989 for varying periods of time.
Underground Catholic Bishop Casimir Wang Milu has not been
seen since his arrest in 1986 and is presumed to be in
prison. As of year's end, no information was available on at
least 20 Catholic priests detained by security forces in
Hebei, Gansu, Sichuan, and Fujian provinces. International
human rights groups report that at least 30 underground
Protestant leaders may also be in detention.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government uses an identification (ID) card system to
restrict the movement of Chinese citizens within the country.
Citizens are registered as residents of a particular
jurisdiction and assigned to a specific work unit. Movement
within the country or change of workplace can, in most cases,
be done only with government permission and agreement by the
work unit. Those workers on short-term work contracts with a
work unit have more leeway in movement. On expiration of a
contract, the worker may be able to negotiate a position in
another area or continue his contract. Significant numbers of
farmers have moved from the countryside to cities in search of
employment. Authorities are trying to limit the migration,
but they estimate there are at least a million unregistered
persons in Shanghai and Guangzhou and 700,000 in Beijing.
Measures undertaken in connection with the Government's
current austerity program will result in large-scale
unemployment and authorities reportedly intend to enforce
their return to the countryside.
After the June disorders, the Ministry of Public Security
ordered full national implementation of regulations on
carrying and checking residents' identification cards as of
September 15. The cards have been under partial and
experimental use for several years.
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Under the new procedures, citizens are required to carry their
ID cards at all times when out of doors and must present them
on demand of authorities. They must also present ID cards
when registering for voting, residence, military service,
marriage, or school entrance; applying for employment,
licenses, loans, notarization of documents, social insurance
or relief, travel to restricted areas or to leave the country;
participating in lawsuits; picking up mail or claiming
remittances; boarding an .airplane; or registering in a hotel.
More stringent scrutiny of ID cards will close loopholes
through which many Chinese have slipped in recent years. Some
have used the relative freedom of travel to act as business
middlemen and fixers, often involved in quasi-legal or illegal
cash-and-carry deals, money changing, and black market
activity. Also likely to be caught in the tighter net are
itinerant preachers and evangelists, many of whom lack a
permanent residence. Recent Chinese press reports decry
incidents in which people caught without their ID card were
subjected to extortion by police or shaken down by criminals
posing as police.
Existing restrictions on foreign travel were tightened in
1989. In the wake of the Beijing massacre, the Government has
implemented more restrictive criteria for passport issuance.
Procedures reportedly include obtaining a political "bill of
good health" from the work unit and its party committee and
submitting to background checks by the Public Security Bureau
(and, in Beijing, the martial law command). Passport
applicants are screened to determine the applicant's political
loyalty and his role in the spring demonstrations. The double
exit permit system implemented on June 20 was designed to
support this objective. In Shanghai, dissident Zhang Cai was
detained at the airport when trying to board a flight out of
China. There are also reports that some Chinese who marry
foreigners and wish to emigrate have had to repay the cost of
their education in order to obtain a passport.
The Government has imposed restrictions on overseas studies.
New regulations reportedly require tighter ideological
screening, and perhaps several years' work experience, as
prerequisites for permission to study overseas. Furthermore,
lower limits will be set on the number of publicly funded
students sent abroad to study humanities, with the emphasis
instead going to more practical studies such as the sciences
and specialized training.
China has continued to relax restrictions on internal travel
by foreigners. Since last year it has increased the number of
cities open to foreign visitors from 504 to 626. Tibet, the
capital of which remains under martial law, has begun again to
allow tourism. Tourists, however, must travel in groups of at
least three, obtain prior permission, and travel with
officially designated travel agencies. Most requests by
foreign diplomats for travel to Tibet since March have been
denied.
China encourages its citizens who are legally overseas
studying or doing research to return to assist in China's
development. Some 35,000 Chinese citizens are currently
studying or conducting research in the United States. The
State Education Commission declared on December 8 that
scholars returning from overseas would not be held accountable
for participation in prodemocracy activities while abroad.
However, many of these scholars claim that they or their
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families have been subject to threats of reprisals by Chinese
officials .
The Chinese Government accepts repatriation of PRC citizens
who have entered other countries or territories illegally.
The Hong Kong Government says it returned to the PRC 11,392
illegal immigrants in the first 9 months of 1989, compared to
21,001 in 1988. None of those returned were believed to be
considered by the PRC Government to have been participants in
or supporters of the spring demonstrations. To retaliate
against the Hong Kong Government for having allowed dissident
swimmer Yang Yang to depart for the United States, the PRC
temporarily suspended repatriation for 2 weeks in October.
Japanese authorities have decided to proceed with repatriation
of illegal immigrants from China who entered Japan by sea
during the summer of 1989. It remains unclear what
punishment, if any, these PRC citizens will face once they
have been repatriated.
China accepted more than 280,000 refugees and displaced
persons from Vietnam and Laos between 1978 and 1982. These
refugees were predominantly ethnic Han Chinese or married to
ethnic Chinese. In recent years, the Government has adopted a
stricter policy of "no new admissions." Thus, Chinese
authorities currently discourage Vietnamese refugees from
settling in China. There have been persistent reports that
local authorities along China's southern coast help to provide
food, water, and fuel to Vietnamese migrants so they may
proceed to Hong Kong, and in some cases, to Japan and Korea.
There also have been credible reports that Vietnamese refugees
reaching China's interior provinces have been forcibly
repatriated. Other credible reports suggest that the PRC has
also repatriated persons of other nationalities seeking
refugee status. Although China signed the Comprehensive Plan
of Action (CPA) negotiated at the International Conference on
Indochinese Refugees in Geneva in June 1989, it is unclear
whether China considers itself a CPA "participating state."
China has yet to create formal mechanisms to enforce CPA
provisions, and its policy on the principle of first asylum
remains ambiguous.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change their Government
The people of China do not have the right or the ability
peacefully and legally to change their government. Chinese
citizens can neither freely choose nor change the laws and
officials which govern them. China is ruled by the CCP, the
paramount source of political authority. Within the party, a
closed inner circle of a few senior leaders exercise ultimate
power over the nation. Most hold key positions within the
six-member Standing Committee of the Politburo, the Central
Military Commission, or other organs. Former senior leaders
continue to influence government policy. Deng Xiaoping
remains first among equals in this group despite his formal
retirement in October. The senior party leadership determines
policy, which is then implemented by the Government.
According to the 1982 Constitution, the National People's
Congress (NPC) is the highest organ of state power. It
nominally selects the President and Vice President, decides on
the choice of the Premier, and elects the Chairman of the
Central Military Commission. It had been granted, and had
begun to exercise, increasing independence and influence
during the late 1980' s. Debates had become much more open,
and several important government proposals were sent back for
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further study. During the May-June crisis, some NPC members
attempted to convene an extraordinary meeting of the body to
revoke the Government's declaration of martial law in Beijing,
but were unable to do so. Since that time, the NPC has
generally resumed its previous role of ratifying decisions
already made by the senior leadership.
The Government neither tolerates dissent nor accepts
challenges to its authority. The authorities denounce as
"counterrevolutionary" proposals to limit the power of the
Party or to alter the nation's ideology. The Government's
handling of the spring demonstrations, the killing of its
citizens, its subsequent crackdown on dissent, and its massive
disinformation campaign aimed at rewriting history demonstrate
the senior leadership's determination to retain power.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
China rejects the concept of universal human rights despite
its adherence to the United Nations Charter, which mandates
respect for and promotion of human rights. Chinese official
commentators in recent months have increasingly argued that
each nation has the right to define human rights as it
pertains to the human conditions existing within that
country. No nation or international organization, they say,
has the "legal right" to apply its definition of human rights
to conditions in other countries. Officials strongly reject
any criticism of China's human rights situation by
international human rights organizations and other nations,
and they assert that international groups and foreign nations
use human rights as a means to interfere in China's internal
affairs .
A resolution passed by the U. N. Human Rights Commission's
(UNHRC) Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities in August, calling on the Secretary
General to collect information on the human rights situation
in China, was denounced by the Chinese Government as brazen
interference in its internal affairs. China defended its use
of force in suppressing the demonstrations in June
legalistically, citing the legitimate right of the Chinese
authorities "to maintain law and order." It has also rejected
Amnesty International's August 1989 report condemning the June
massacre, and it has harshly and aggressively attacked the VOA
for its coverage of and commentary on the June events.
In October the Government denounced the awarding of the Nobel
Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama, who has been an outspoken
critic of human rights violations in Tibet, as "gross
interference in China's internal affairs" and as "hurting the
feelings of the Chinese people." A Ministry of Foreign
Affairs spokesman on October 7 said that awarding the Nobel
Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama "constitutes open support to the
Dalai Lama and the Tibetan separatists in their activities to
undermine and split China."
There are no organizations within China which specifically
monitor or comment on human rights conditions. The Government
crushed an incipient human rights monitoring group--Amnesty
89--f ollowing the June crackdown and has made it clear that it
will not tolerate the existence of such a group. It has
reacted with equal defensiveness to international accusations
of human rights violations in Tibet. Authorities have refused
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to respond to charges of human rights violations in connection
with the killing of demonstrators in Lhasa on March 5-7. They
have generally not permitted reporters or human rights workers
to visit Tibet, have refused diplomatic requests to discuss
human rights issues, and have generally denied diplomats
access to Tibet.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
While laws designed to protect women and minorities exist, in
practice discrimination persists in housing, jobs, education,
and other aspects of life based on sex, religion, race, and
class. The 1982 Constitution states that "women in the
People's Republic of China enjoy equal rights with men in all
spheres of life," and it promises, among other things, equal
pay for equal work. In fact, however, the general status of
women is not equal to that of men, and there was no
significant improvement in upholding women's rights or in the
working conditions of women in 1989. By many standards, the
status of women has regressed in recent years. Within the
work force, 83 percent of the 220 million women employed
perform physical labor. Seventy-seven percent of employed
women work in agriculture, 13 percent in industry, and 4
percent in the service trade. In industry, most women are
employed in lower skilled and lower paid occupations. The
number of professional women is low. Women who graduate from
college are less likely than men to be placed in prestigious
positions. There is a significant wage gap between men and
women performing the same tasks.
China's recent enterprise and labor reforms have sought to
streamline enterprises and give workers greater job mobility.
Women apparently bear the brunt of these reforms in terms of
job insecurity and cutbacks in welfare programs. Many
employers have admitted they prefer to hire men, citing the
avoidance of maternity leave and child care provisions as
their chief reason. Complaints from women of discrimination,
unfair dismissal, demotion, or wage cuts when they needed
maternity leave have risen significantly. There has been an
increasing number of reports of young women in the special
economic zones being fired when they become pregnant or reach
child-bearing age. The New China News Agency reported that
during factory efficiency drives in the second half of 1987,
over 60 percent of "redundancies" were women. To combat the
problem, on July 25, 1988, the State Council issued a
regulation on female employees' legal rights, stating that
work units will not be allowed to discriminate against women
or reduce their maternity benefits, but there is no evidence
that the regulation has been implemented effectively.
While the gap in the education levels of men and women is
narrowing, the majority of the educated, particularly the
highly educated, are men. Women now make up 37.4 percent of
high school students and 25.7 percent of university students.
Similarly, a disproportionate number of government-funded
scholarships for overseas study go to men. Women also
reportedly need higher scores than men to gain admission to
select universities.
There are reports of violence against women, particularly wife
beating, selling of women for wives, abuse of female children,
and female infanticide in some rural areas--practices the
Government condemns and attempts to curb. The Chinese have
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admitted that there is very little legal recourse to curb what
is a traditional tolerance for abuse of women. Selling women
for wives is a growing problem; in December the Government
began a campaign against the practice, labeling it one of "six
evils" to be eradicated. Official statistics are lacking but
unofficial estimates are in the tens of thousands. A New York
Times article quoted a confidential government document in
September that cited the rising cost of traditional rural
weddings (more than $2,500) versus the cost of buying a wife
($500 to $800) as one reason for the practice. Female
children are seen, particularly in the countryside, as
unproductive. They will leave the family and not provide
assistance for the parents' retirement (as sons are expected
to do) . Some provincial and local authorities have attempted
to ease this traditional bias by facilitating establishment of
retirement homes. Many female children are forced to work
long hours at an early age and are sometimes beaten if chores
are not completed. Numerous reports tell of young girls being
removed from school at the age of 8 or 9 to work in rural
enterprises or the fields so that their families can "make
some money from them before they leave home."
Chinese authorities have not succeeded in stopping abductions
and the trading of women and children. People's Daily
reported on November 15 that between 1981 and 1988 some 16,000
women and 900 children who were abducted in Shandong Province
were saved by authorities. Of the more than 14,000 arrested
for abducting women and children, 22 percent or 3,100 were
sentenced to prison. The number of abductions nationwide is
not known, but the statistics from Shandong would indicate
that the number is high.
The economic progress of minorities is viewed by the
Government as one of its significant achievements. Ethnic
minorities benefit from special treatment in marriage and
family planning, employment, and university admission.
Nevertheless, discrimination based on ethnic origin persists.
The concept of a largely homogeneous ethnic race of the Han
people pervades the general thinking of the majority Han
Chinese. Less than 7 percent of the population belong to one
of the 55 designated ethnic minorities. Most reside in areas
they have traditionally inhabited. Their standards of living
remain far below the national average. Despite the CCP's
avowed policy of increasing minority representation in the
Government and in the CCP, ethnic minorities are effectively
shut out of all but a few leadership positions and play a
minor role in decisionmaking. Some minorities resent Han
officials holding key positions in minority areas. Tibetans
in Tibet and Uighurs in Xinjiang have demonstrated against Han
Chinese authority. PLA troops are stationed in these areas,
and martial law remains in place in Lhasa. During an
inspection tour of Xinjiang August 26, Minister for Public
Security Wang Fang accused Uighur separatists of fomenting
local instability.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The PRC ' s 1982 Constitution guarantees "freedom of
association," but the guarantee is heavily qualified by
references to the interest of the State and the leadership of
the CCP, and, in fact, workers do not have the right to form
or join independent unions of their own choosing. Union
membership is theoretically voluntary for individual
822
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employees, but each enterprise must have a union and each
union must join the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU) , nominally an independent organization, but in fact
closely controlled by the CCP and the only legal national
federation. Virtually all state-sector workers and nearly 90
percent of all urban sector workers belong to ACFTU chapters.
The right to strike, which had been included in China's 1975
and 1978 Constitutions, was removed from the 1982 Constitution
on the grounds that the political system had eradicated class
contradictions between the proletariat and capitalists.
However, in 1983 the ACFTU Chairman stated that if a trade
union and its labor protection safety officers found that a
workplace was too dangerous, the union should organize the
workers to leave the hazardous areas. Thus, authorities
usually view strikes as justified only when they respond to
problems such as a sudden deterioration in safety conditions.
Nevertheless, strikes and, more commonly, work slowdowns do
occur. In the first half of 1988, 49 strikes were reported
officially. The number for 1989 is unknown, but reports of
job actions in support of prodemocracy demonstrations in the
spring of 1989 were widespread. Strikes and slowdowns
generally occur over distribution of benefits or safety
concerns at individual enterprises. They are usually resolved
without the need for intervention from outside the
enterprise. The usual role of the trade union in such strikes
is to persuade the workers to return to their jobs.
During the countrywide political demonstrations in the spring
of 1989, "Workers' Autonomous Federations" (WAF) were formed
in major cities. The Beijing WAF claimed to represent over
100,000 workers from 40 industries in the capital. WAF
leaders insisted they wanted to organize legally and did not
oppose the rule of the CCP. The concerns of the WAF included
bureaucratic corruption, wage disparities between workers and
plant managers, the absence of workplace democracy, the lack
of genuine workers' representation in the policymaking
process, and poor safety and working conditions. Established
primarily to mobilize and express workers' sympathy for the
demands of student demonstrators, the WAF did not have time to
build organizations at the enterprise level. Thus, although
there are workers who purport to carry on the work of the WAF,
the June crackdown apparently destroyed the federations. Many
observers believe concern over growing worker support for
students' demands prompted the Government to order troops into
Tiananmen Square on June 3-4. According to international
eyewitnesses, most of the Beijing WAF leaders were killed
during the massacre.
After June 4, workers became a primary target of government
reprisals. The Hong Kong Trade Union Education Center
(HKTUEC) compiled a list of 211 workers arrested in connection
with the demonstrations. According to the HKTUEC, 89 were
held on charges related only to their participation in the
autonomous federations. All of those known to have been
executed for offenses linked to the demonstrations were manual
workers .
At the ACFTU annual conference in December, its appointed
president declared that "trade unions must implement
resolutely the party's line and general and specific
policies." A senior party official, addressing the
conference, demanded that party committees at all levels
"exercise centralized leadership" over the union movement. He
explicitly ruled out the formation of independent unions:
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organizations that contravene the "Four Cardinal Principles,"
put forward proposals contrary to party policy, or threaten
state stability, would be "dealt with according to the law
immediately. "
The ACFTU claims to have contacts with trade unions in over
120 countries or regions and has stated that it will establish
links with foreign unions regardless of whether they are
affiliated with Western, Communist, or other federations.
However, its relations with the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU) have been strained. China has ratified
neither ILO Convention 87 regarding Freedom of Association nor
Convention 98 on Collective Bargaining. The ICFTU vigorously
protested Chinese violation of worker rights at the ILO
Conference in Geneva shortly after the Beijing massacre. In
November, the ILO's Governing Body approved stiff detailed
questions on the death of workers during the massacre,
arrests, death sentences, and executions, and government
allegations against the WAF.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Government does not permit collective bargaining. The
terms and conditions of employment, including wages, are
unilaterally determined through administrative regulations
which are treated as confidential material and are not
publicly available. Without legal status as a collective
bargaining body, the ACFTU' s role has been restricted to
consultation in decisionmaking on wages and wage reforms.
Trade unions have limited themselves to channeling workers'
complaints to the management of individual enterprises or
municipal labor bureaus.
Clause 33 of the "Provisional Directive on Private Enterprises
in the PRC" issued on June 3, 1988 states that trade unions in
private enterprises have the right to represent employees and
to sign collective agreements with the enterprise. Depending
on how it is implemented, this could form a basis for
important new trade union rights in China.
Under the labor contract system, which now covers
approximately 10 percent of the work force, individual workers
may negotiate with management over contract terms. In
practice, however, very few are able to negotiate effectively
on salary and fringe benefits. At its October 1988 National
Congress, the ACFTU leadership recognized that it would need
to be more responsive to worker demands for benefits and
improved safety conditions or face worker demands for a more
independent union. In reaction to the creation of the WAF,
the party began efforts to reassert control at every level of
the union structure. Thus, unions enjoy less freedom of
action than they have had for the last several years.
Labor practices in the Special Economic Zones do not vary
substantially from national practice. Although there are
reports of child laborers working in the Special Economic
Zones, the practice appears more prevalent in small
enterprises in the rural areas. Wages in the Special Economic
Zones, like those in other Chinese enterprises, are set by the
factory management in consultation with the factory Worker
Congress. In general, wages in foreign-invested joint
ventures tend to be higher than in Chinese enterprises.
824
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Although Chinese workers still do not have complete mobility,
foreign-invested joint ventures are given greater freedom to
recruit workers than their Chinese counterparts are allowed.
Like Chinese state-run and collective enterprises, joint
ventures are required to have unions and to provide office
space and facilities for union activities.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
China is still considering ratification of ILO Convention 105
on Forced Labor. Assignment of minor offenders to punitive
"education through labor" camps without benefit of trial would
appear to violate the Convention. Prisons and labor reform
camps are expected to be partially self-supporting and thus
require productive and profitable labor, with little
compensation, from their inmates. Some observers consider the
recent directives requiring students to perform manual labor
during the school year and university graduates to work for a
year or more in "grassroots units" before pursuing careers or
graduate study as another form of compulsory labor. More
broadly, the longstanding practice of unilaterally assigning
school graduates at all levels to specific jobs and
effectively trapping them in those jobs through the worker's
dependence on the work unit deprives workers of any
significant degree of choice in employment.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Regulations promulgated in 1987 prohibit the employment of
school-age minors who have not completed the compulsory 9
years of education. The employment of child labor is
pervasive, however, particularly in the rural areas and
reportedly in the special economic zones. In addition, many
private enterprises regularly employ children, often falsely
representing them as the children of the enterprise owner.
The problem is most serious in Guangdong Province, where a
recent State Statistical Bureau survey found that only 71
percent of the province's school-age children were attending
school. As noted (Section 5), there have also been increasing
reports of children, particularly girls, being removed from
school at the age of 8 or 9 to work in the fields. In
September 1988, the Ministry of Labor issued a circular
designed to curb pervasive child labor problems. It imposes
severe fines, withdrawal of business licenses, or jail for
employers who hire child laborers under 16 years of age.
According to Ministry of Labor officials, however, the
circular cannot be fully implemented until a national
conference is convened sometime in 1990 to discuss the problem
of child labor. Guangdong has not yet promulgated any
regulations to enforce the 1987 directive.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
China has not yet adopted a labor code, and deliberations on a
draft labor law appear to have been derailed by the post-June
crackdown. There is no minimum wage in China, although
administrative regulations apparently fix the minimum at
between $9 and $13 per month. A large proportion of a
worker's income comes in the form of bonuses or subsidies
added to a basic wage rate. For example, many foreign
investors have found that basic salary costs may make up as
little as 20 to 30 percent of overall costs per employee. As
part of a comprehensive economic austerity program initiated
in late 1988, the Government is attempting to reduce the
amount of bonuses paid to workers.
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The maximum and normal workweek is 48 hours, of which 3 to 12
hours are generally spent in political study or "education" on
current social issues. The time spent in political study
increased sharply in the second half of 1989, particularly in
work units whose members had been active in the spring
demonstrations .
At factories and construction sites, occupational health and
safety are constant themes of posters and campaigns. Every
work unit of any size must designate a health and safety
officer; the ILO has established a training program for these
officials. Even so, general health and safety conditions in
the workplace are extremely poor. The safety consciousness of
both workers and managers is generally very low. State
procurators deal annually with thousands of negligence and
accident cases involving criminal or civil liability. The
absence of a national labor code, however, makes enforcement
of safety regulations extremely difficult.
826
TAIWAN
Taiwan in 1989 continued its transition from an authoritarian
political system dominated by the Nationalist Party (KMT) to a
more open and pluralistic system. In January the authorities
legalized the establishment of opposition political parties.
The largest opposition group, the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP), registered as a legal party in April and vigorously
contested the island-wide elections in December. The
elections were the most free and fair in Taiwan's history.
The Legislative Yuan (LY), Taiwan's lawmaking body, continued
to expand as a forum for policy debate. DPP and younger
generation KMT legislators representing Taiwan constituencies
influenced the policymaking process through interpellations
and criticism of the Executive Yuan (the Cabinet) . The LY is
gradually becoming a more representative body as elderly
members representing Chinese mainland constituencies die or
retire. However, Taiwan's central parliamentary bodies,
including the National Assembly (the Electoral College) as
well as the LY, remained constituted under a representational
formula that maintains the predominant role of the KMT. The
authorities have initiated reforms to enhance the
representative nature of these bodies, but changes remain
controversial, both within the KMT and between the KMT and the
opposition.
Native Taiwanese comprise an estimated 85 percent of the
island's population, with Chinese mainlanders and their
offspring comprising the remainder. As increasing numbers of
Taiwanese and younger generation "mainlanders" ascend to
leading administrative and political positions, including
within the KMT, the dominant position of old guard KMT
mainlanders continues to erode. However, leadership of the
military and security agencies has remained predominantly
mainlander .
The military's role in politics has been reduced considerably
since the lifting of martial law in 1987. However, several
cases in 1939 raised questions about the military's level of
tolerance for opposition criticism.
Taiwan's economy continued to grow at a rapid pace, with per
capita income reaching a level of approximately $7,000. The
unemployment rate was under 2 percent, with a resulting demand
for immigrant labor. While basically a freemarket economy,
major sectors--including finance, steel, shipbuilding,
utilities, transportation, and petrochemicals--continued to be
dominated by state-run enterprises. The trend, however, is
towards greater economic liberalization. Privatization of
state-run enterprises remained on the political agenda.
Human rights, already improved in comparison with the pre-1987
martial law period, continued to expand in 1989. While the
trend towards a more open and pluralistic system continued in
1989 with the legalization of opposition political parties,
important restrictions still remain. Principal areas of
concern included restrictions on freedom of speech, press,
movement, association, the right of citizens to change their
government, and worker and women's rights. There were also
concerns about politically motivated prosecutions, selective
enforcement of the laws, and unfair campaign practices,
including restrictions on access to the mass media.
827
TAIWAN
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of persons being abducted or secretly
arrested by the authorities.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although Taiwan law expressly prohibits the use of torture,
there continued to be credible reports of persons subjected to
torture while in police custody. In some instances the
authorities paid compensation to victims. There were two
reported cases in 1989 of seven policemen given suspended
sentences for such abuses. Ministry of Justice officials
claim that all interrogations conducted by the Ministry's
Investigation Bureau are tape-recorded and that all
allegations of mistreatment are investigated. They also say
that the right of persons to have an attorney present during
interrogation is another check on torture. However, criminal
lawyers and legal scholars note that abuses most often occur
in local police stations where interrogations are not recorded
and that most persons do not have attorneys present at the
interrogation stage.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Police may legally arrest without a warrant anyone they
suspect of committing a crime for which the punishment would
be 5 years or more in prison and may call in persons for
questioning without a formal summons. Critics in the legal
establishment, the press, and the legislature point out that
these procedures sometimes lead to abuses. Persons called in
for questioning by the police are sometimes arrested without a
warrant after questioning.
Taiwan law requires that, within 24 hours after an arrest, the
arresting authorities must give notice in writing to the
arrested person and his designated relative or friend, stating
the reason for the arrest or detention. The code of criminal
procedure specifies that the authorities may detain an accused
person for up to 2 months during the investigation phase prior
to filing a formal indictment, and for up to 3 months during
the trial. Furthermore, during the investigative phase, the
prosecuting officer may apply to the court for one extension
of 2 months. The period of detention during trial may be
extended twice. The authorities generally have followed these
procedures and extended the periods of detention, although
trial usually takes place within 3 months of indictment.
Persons indicted for relatively minor criminal offenses can be
releaoed on bail at the judge's discretion.
The right to have a lawyer present during the investigation
phase is generally respected, but defense lawyers complain
that persons often are not advised of their right to have
legal representation during police interrogation, and there is
828
TAIWAN
no legal requirement that indigent persons be provided with
counsel .
In July 1985, the Legislative Yuan passed the "antihoodlum"
law, which accords police authorities broad powers, including
the power to determine whether a person should be designated
as a "hoodlum." The civil courts confirm or deny police
requests to remand alleged hoodlums for reformatory
education. Human rights organizations and defense attorneys
criticize the law as an extreme departure from appropriate
standards of due process. Alleged hoodlums can be held
incommunicado without legal representation, and their families
need not be notified of their arrests. Attorneys for persons
charged under the law have no right to examine documents or to
cross-examine witnesses. There is no appeal from the decision
to commit someone for reformatory education. Critics say that
courts simply put a rubber stamp on police decisions.
Prior to the lifting of martial law, reformatory education for
"hoodlums" was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
military. The process of transferring all nonmilitary
prisoners to civilian control has been completed. The law
does not authorize the courts to determine the length of
reformatory education; police and prison authorities decide.
The usual term is 3 to 6 months for a first offense. Repeat
offenders are detained for longer periods and detention may be
extended up to 3 years, depending on behavior in custody.
The antihoodlum law replaced a 1984 executive decree that did
not set a time limit on incarceration. As of the end of 1988,
authorities acknowledged holding 1,297 persons incarcerated
under the decree and the succeeding law. This comprised about
10 percent of the prisoner population at the time.
Authorities insist that they do not know how many of those now
in custody are being held under the antihoodlum law.
Many minor crimes on Taiwan are handled under the police
offenses law which authorizes police to punish an offender
with incarceration of up to 14 days, a fine of no more than
approximately $11.50, or forced labor of no more than 16
hours. Despite the 1980 opinion of the Council of Grand
Justices (theoretically empowered to decide constitutional
issues) that the statute is unconstitutional, it continues to
be used, pending the enactment of a law for the maintenance of
social order now before the legislature.
Under the executive decree and the police offenses law, the
authorities reportedly imprisoned some 4,000 people in an
anticrime sweep in 1984. The authorities say that all these
have now been released but the laws which fail to provide
basic due process protection remain on the books. There were
complaints that police in certain localities threatened
workers for opposition party candidates in the December 2
general elections with prosecution under the antihoodlum law
or similar laws if they did not refrain from campaigning.
with regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Taiwan's legal system is based on European and Japanese models
and does not provide for trial by jury. All judges are
appointed by, and responsible to, the Judicial Yuan. Informed
observers characterize the judiciary as not fully independent
and as susceptible to political and personal pressure.
829
TAIWAN
Since the lifting of martial law on July 15, 1987, civilians
may no longer be tried in military courts. Trials are public,
but attendance at trials involving juveniles or politically
sensitive issues may require permission from the court.
Defendants have a right to an attorney, but an attorney will
be assigned by the court only in serious cases. In all other
cases, responsibility for obtaining counsel rests with the
defendant .
In a typical court case, parties and witnesses are
interrogated by a single judge but not by a defense attorney
or prosecutor. The judge may decline to hear witnesses or to
consider evidence a party wishes to submit. Civil and
criminal law specifically provide the defendant with
protection from self-incrimination.
Court cases generally are heard in several brief court
sessions, often separated by weeks or months. Persons
convicted in cases where the sentence exceeds 3 years have a
right to review. The Supreme Court limits its review to the
legal aspects of the case and to specific procedural aspects.
The National Security Law stipulates, contrary to provisions
in the original martial law decrees, that convictions under
martial law cannot be appealed in the postmartial law period.
In most cases, judicial decisions must be approved by higher
court authorities before pronouncement. Although this power
is supposed to be restricted to correcting errors of law and
usage of legal terms, observers say this dilutes the authority
of judges and tempts outside interference with the judicial
process. In 1987 a review of judicial procedures initiated by
the authorities proposed abolishing this practice. Changes
have been made in the review procedure, but the practice
continues .
The authorities continued to try political opponents on
charges ranging from "sedition" (defined to include expressing
sympathy with Communism, espousing views contrary to the
authorities* claim to represent all of China, and supporting
an independent legal status for Taiwan) to "harming public
order" (arising from demonstrations led by the opposition) .
Two prosecutions for sedition were initiated in 1989, and
three others were appealed or had final appeal denied. In one
case, a new trial was ordered. In all cases but one,
defendants were members or supporters of the opposition DPP.
The authorities deny holding political prisoners. However,
international human rights organizations and pro-opposition
Taiwan human rights groups have estimated that there are
between 12 and 25 political prisoners in Taiwan. This figure
is down from some 90 to 100 political prisoners held in 1986.
In 1987 and 1988, the authorities granted early releases to
most political prisoners. Of the eight persons convicted by
military courts of sedition in 1980 for their role in the 1979
Kaohsiung Incident, all but one have been released.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Warrantless searches, common before the lifting of martial
law, are unusual now. A warrant must be obtained before a
search, except when the search is incident to arrest. The
exception is car searches which are routinely conducted at
roadblocks .
830
TAIWAN
Although the right to privacy is generally respected, members
of opposition political parties and other political dissidents
do experience invasion of privacy. Oppositionists allege that
authorities routinely intercept correspondence and telephone
calls and subject them and their associates to surveillance by
agents of the security forces. The authorities deny that
telephone conversations are monitored, or that oppositionists
are routinely subjected to surveillance.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
While the Constitution provides for freedom of speech and
press, these rights continue to be restricted in practice.
Nevertheless, the authorities have demonstrated increasing
tolerance for open debat.e, even on sensitive issues.
Security forces continue to monitor political expression, both
in Taiwan and overseas. Under Taiwan law, people may not
oppose the regime's basic policy of anticommunism or its claim
to sovereignty over all of China. Prosecutions for allegedly
promoting communism are unusual but do occur. In October
1988, a Hong Kong merchant was convicted of sedition for
having been a member of the Communist Youth League as a
student in the early 1970*s. He was acquitted by a higher
court, but the prosecution appealed and a new trial was
ordered. He was retried in late 1989 and acquitted. In June
1989, a videocassette seller was sentenced to 7 years in
prison for showing and selling a tape of a Pooples Republic of
China (PRC) National Day parade at an opposition party rally,
even though a local television station, which is partially
controlled by the armed forces, played the same tape on an
evening broadcast.
Those who question the legitimacy of Taiwan authorities by
supporting independence for Taiwan risk being charged with
sedition. While many public speeches and articles favoring
independence go unpunished, the threat of punishment remains
real. The editor of an antigovernment , proindependence
magazine, Cheng Nan-jung, was charged with sedition for
printing the text of a proposed constitution for an
independent Taiwan. He committed suicide rather than allow
himself to be arrested. In December Huang Hua, a veteran
oppositionist, was ordered to appear at a hearing on possible
sedition charges in connection with his call for an
independent Taiwan. He failed to appear at the hearing. At
year's end a formal indictment was expected. In an
extraterritorial extension of domestic law, Taiwan convicted
dissident Hsu Hsin-liang in December of "preparing to use
illegal methods to overthrow the government" and sentenced him
to 6 years and 4 months in prison. Evidence for the alleged
conspiracy included Hsu's published articles and statements
attributed to him while in the United States.
Charges of sedition are brought even in cases other than
alleged promotion of communism or c>dvocacy of independence.
An opposition editor was convicted of sedition for printing an
article accusing a senior military figure of plotting a
military coup. However, the military tried unsuccessfully to
persuade the courts to prosecute an opposition-oriented
newspaper, its publisher and director with sedition for
publishing an article criticizing alleged waste of public
money and abuse of power by senior officers.
831
TAIWAN
The authorities censor publications through provisions of the
Publications Law which empower the police to seize or ban
printed material that commits or instigates others to commit
sedition, treason, sacrilege, offenses of interference with
the lawful exercise of public functions, or offenses against
public order or morals. Since the lifting of martial law,
publication bans and confiscations declined significantly.
Although direct censorship of newspapers and magazines has
virtually ended, the KMT and the Government Information Office
(GIO) continue to exert some influence over the major daily
newspapers through guidance, political connections, and
threats of legal action and revocation or suspension of
licenses. A number of libel suits were brought by military
officers alleging defamation by opposition journalists who
criticized them.
The authorities have loosened restrictions on publications
from the Chinese mainland, and the works of many mainland
authors have been reprinted. However, even nonpolitical works
by persons in the PRC Government may be deemed unsuitable for
publication. Before the lifting of martial law, officials
routinely censored other foreign publications. They continue,
sporadically to restrict articles or periodicals they deem
offensive, but, overall, there is less official interference
with the free flow of international news than in the past.
In contrast with the relatively unrestrained and highly
competitive environment in which the print media now operate,
television and radio remain tightly controlled. The
authorities partially or wholly own all three television
stations. Television coverage of sensitive political subjects
is restricted and slanted. Oppositionists charge that the
military and the authorities control or own 82 percent of the
radio stations. Requests by opposition politicians to open
their own radio station have been turned down. The
authorities' continuing efforts to jam PRC radio broadcasts
have been ineffectual.
Restrictions on academic freedom remain. Campus publications
can be and are censored by school administrators; the severity
of censorship varies widely from campus to campus. Student
demonstrations occur and are tolerated, at least within
university campuses, but dissident students risk being
disciplined if they express their opinions too vigorously.
Male students risk being harassed after graduation when they
report for military service if their records show dissident
activity in college. Colleges and universities have
"education officers," who are military officers seconded to
the Ministry of Education for the purpose of teaching the
thought of Sun Yat-sen but who also monitor student attitudes
and behavior. Teachers are pressured to discourage students
from taking part in demonstrations. Teachers themselves risk
being disciplined and harming their careers if they hold
unorthodox views. Changes, however, are taking place on
campus, and the trend is to separate professional from
political activity. In early 1989, the faculty of National
Taiwan University (NTU) , the most prestigious university in
Taiwan, voted to prohibit faculty members from holding
concurrent party and university positions. Since the vast
majority of .such cases involve concurrent KMT party positions,
the effect is to enhance the independence of the faculty from
political control. NTU also in 1989 recognized an
independently elected leader of the student union.
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TAIWAN
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly is provided for in the Constitution but
was restricted under martial law. In 1987 the Legislative
Yuan passed the Assembly and March Law which allows peaceful
demonstrations. They must be approved by the authorities and
must not violate the Constitution or advocate communism or
Taiwan's separation from China. The DPP and other opposition
groups have organized and carried out numerous demonstrations
under the new law.
The new law provides, however, that demonstration organizers
may be held responsible for the behavior of participants.
Oppositionists have been prosecuted for alleged harm to public
order and interference with public functions resulting from
demonstrations they organized. In April 1989, DPP legislator
Chu Kao-cheng was convicted of disturbing public order at a
demonstration in the previous month and given an 18-month
suspended sentence. In June DPP Taipei City Council member
Hsieh Chang-ting was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment in
connection with a demonstration outside the LY on June 12,
1987. DPP National Assembly member Hong Chi-chang was
sentenced in October to 15 months in the same case and to 18
months in connection with another demonstration on May 20,
1988. Prosecutors deny that politics plays a part in
decisions to lay charges, but most observers believe that
prosecutions of oppositionists are often politically motivated.
The Election and Recall Law was amended in January 1989. It
supports and strengthens the right of assembly by permitting
political parties to organize, advertise, campaign, raise
funds, and financially support candidates. The new law
relaxes restrictions on the types of rallies, the time
candidates may speak, and the use of loudspeakers. Although
the new law retains the restriction on campaigning to the
2-week period before the election, in practice this was not
observed and no prosecutions were undertaken.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The constitutional provision for freedom to practice religion
is generally observed in practice. Most Taiwan inhabitants
adhere to Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, animism, or a
combination of these beliefs. Other religions include
Christianity and Islam. There is no established or favored
religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution provides for the freedom to change residence,
but registration of one's residence is required. Except for
military and other restricted areas, there is general freedom
of internal travel. An exit permit is required for travel
abroad. Emigration and private travel abroad have become
freer since 1987 when the authorities began to allow travel to
mainland China to visit relatives. There are now no countries
to which civilian residents of Taiwan may not travel.
Exit permits may be refused for a number of reasons, including
failure to complete compulsory military service. Under the
implementing regulations of the 1987 National Security Law,
833
TAIWAN
however, reasons for refusal must be given, and appeals may be
made to a special board. Although in the past outspoken
critics have been denied exit permits, no one was denied in
1989.
The authorities claim to recognize the right of Chinese who
hold Taiwan passports, and who normally reside in Taiwan, to
return from abroad. Nonresident citizens are usually issued
"overseas Chinese" passports and require visas to travel to
Taiwan. The authorities will not authorize the entry of
Chinese between the ages of 16 and 70, even those who have
long held Taiwan passports, if they have lived in Communist-
controlled areas within the preceding 5 years. Exceptions
include persons of outstanding merit and mainland residents
coming because of the serious illnes or death of close
relatives .
The authorities continue to deny visas to a number of overseas
critics for political reasons. These included individuals who
wanted to observe the December elections. A number of
dissidents who entered without visas were subsequently either
deported or prosecuted for illegal entry, including Columbus
Leo, a Canadian citizen who received a 10-month sentence for
violating Taiwan's National Security Law.
A 1984 law authorizes the authorities to detain persons or
revoke their passports for behavior which harms the interests
of Taiwan, or endangers security, public order, tradition, or
Taiwan's economic interests. Critics of the law state that it
gives the authorities the power to revoke the passport of any
Taiwan citizen who makes remarks overseas that are deemed
inimical to the interests of the Taiwan authorities. They
argue that this violates the right of all citizens to return
to their homeland. This law is not used frequently.
Increasing numbers of Taiwanese dissidents previously denied
reentry are now being permitted to return; however, a number
of overseas Taiwanese dissidents still considered
"undesirable" by the authorities have been denied entry into
Taiwan under this legal provision.
Under Taiwan's "Orderly Departure Family Reunification
Program," since 1977 more than 5,850 ethnic Chinese from
Indochina have been resettled on Taiwan, and more than 3,000
persons who arrived from Indochina by small boats have been
granted "temporary" refuge. Fifty-nine of the boat-people
found sponsors and resettled on Taiwan. The others have been
resettled in third countries. Although 168 rem.ain officially
classified as refugees, they have been practically resettled
in Taiwan, and the refugee camp has been officially closed
since late 1988. There have been no reports of refugees from
non-Communist areas; authorities advise that such instances
would be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Indochinese
refugees are not forced to return to their country of origin.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Taiwan has taken some significant steps away from its
authoritarian political system to a more pluralistic one, but
the people do not yet have the ability to change their
government through democratic means. Political power still
resides with the KMT, which established itself in Taiwan after
the defeat of the Japanese in 1945. Reflecting their
constitutional claim to be the government of all of China, the
authorities maintain not only a provincial and local
834
TAIWAN
government system but also an array of central-level political
bodies identical to those found on the mainland prior to
1949. In the past, centers of power on Taiwan have been the
Presidency, the Executive Yuan, the military and security
apparatus, and the KMT Central Standing Committee. Today,
power is increasingly being shared with the Legislative Yuan
which, in turn, is increasingly representative.
Mainlander control of political power, however, has been
gradually diminishing as more Taiwanese have taken over
important leadership jobs. Taiwanese Lee Teng-hui's accession
to the Presidency and the KMT chairmanship, after President
Chiang Ching-kuo's death in January 1988, was a particularly
visible indicator of this trend. Native Taiwanese now
comprise a majority in the Cabinet and the Central Standing
Committee. As a result of these changes, Taiwan's top
decisionmakers are gradually becoming more representative of,
and more responsive to, their constituents. This trend also
reflects the impact of political reforms in fostering
accountability as well as generational changes in which
younger and more highly educated leaders of both Taiwan and
mainland origin have been appointed to positions of authority.
The most important elective bodies at the central level are
the Legislative Yuan (the highest lawmaking body) and the
National Assembly, which convenes every 6 years to elect the
President and Vice President. There have been no general
elections to these two bodies since 1948. Surviving mainland
representatives elected in 1948 continue in office and form
the majority of these bodies. Additional representatives from
Taiwan province and the offshore islands have been chosen
since 1969 in periodic "supplementary elections."
Nevertheless, of the 768 National Assembly seats filled as of
the end of 1989, only 84 are supplemental members. Of the 250
Legislative Yuan seats filled as of the end of 1989, 67 were
supplemental legislators elected in Taiwan. These 67 were the
most active members in the legislature, due largely to the
advanced age and incapacity of those elected four decades ago.
In the face of persistent and growing calls for more
representative institutions, the KMT has committed itself to
rejuvenating the central parliamentary bodies. Elections on
December 2, 1989, increased elected legislative seats to 101.
Plans have been announced to triple the number of elected
National Assembly delegates by 1992. There is also a draft
retirement plan for aging mainlander representatives to
encourage them to step down voluntarily. The authorities,
however, have refused to adopt any comprehensive measures to
end the mandates of those parliamentarians, believing that it
would call into question their claim that these bodies
represent all of China. Suspicious that the KMT is seeking
unfairly to prolong its majority, the DPP is calling for the
complete reelection of all central parliamentarians by the
people of Taiwan. Even some supplemental KMT legislators call
for the retirement of members serving indefinite terms.
The KMT continues to be the dominant political party in
Taiwan, as has been the case since 1945. Originally composed
overwhelmingly of mainlanders, its membership of over 2
million is now more than 70 percent Taiwanese. There are also
two miniscule, nominally independent, parties which came from
the mainland. The KMT's structure and control mechanisms are
based on Leninist models; however, the party's operations are
considerably more flexible. In 1988 the KMT began to remove
835
TAIWAN
formal party organs from the military and the school systems
and to democratize its party structure.
The passage of the Civic Organizations Law in January 1989
legalized the organization of political parties. The major
opposition party, the DPP, was formed in 1986 in defiance of
martial law; it registered as a political party in April
1989. The Labor Party was formed in 1987 and the Workers
Party, an offshoot of the Labor Party, in March 1989. At
present there are 38 registered parties.
The DPP claims a membership of 25,000. The other opposition
parties are much smaller. The role of the opposition is
greater than its small numbers might indicate. Opposition
members are very vocal in elective bodies and frequently use
interpellation sessions to raise controversial or sensitive
issues. Their activities have spurred some KMT legislators to
criticize regime policies openly.
Opposition candidates still face several disadvantages in the
election process, principally the authorities' virtual
monopoly of television and radio. The Central Election
Commission remains under the control of the Executive Yuan.
Half its membership of 14 is KMT, one is DPP, and the
remainder are independent. The Control Yuan (the highest
supervisory organ) continues to be indirectly elected under a
voting system that guarantees KMT domination. Persons
convicted of sedition under martial law, including some of the
best known figures of the opposition, continue to be barred
from voting, holding public office, and practicing certain
professions. The benefits the KMT enjoys in terms of access
to public and private funds and assistance from administrative
and security agencies give it an unfair advantage according to
opposition politicians. Finally, although the law prohibits
vote-buying and bribery, critics of the electoral system say
that the law is ineffective in preventing such practices.
Nevertheless, the December elections were an important
milestone in Taiwan's evolution to a more democratic system.
The KMT won about 58 percent of the overall popular vote, down
from 70 percent in 1986, and the DPP increased its popular
vote from about 23 to 30 percent.
Universal suffrage exists for citizens 20 years of age and
over. Voting is voluntary and by secret ballot; voter turnout
in the December elections reached about 75 percent.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Taiwan authorities permit representatives of international
human rights organizations, including Amnesty International
and Asia Watch, to visit and meet Taiwan citizens freely.
Taiwan has two principal human rights organizations: the
Chinese Association of Human Rights (CAHR) and the Taiwan
Association for Human Rights (TAHR) . The CAHR, staffed mostly
by retired officials, is regarded as the establishment-
oriented human rights organ. The TAHR is aligned with the
DPP. The effectiveness of the two associations is limited,
however, by the fact that they do not coordinate activities
and, in fact, have contact only when representatives of
international human rights organizations visit Taiwan.
836
TAIWAN
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Taiwan's only non-Chinese minority group consists of
aboriginal descendants of Malayo-Polynesians , slightly more
than 1 percent of Taiwan's population, who were already
established in Taiwan when the first Chinese settlers
arrived. They face no official discrimination but significant
cultural and economic barriers. Specially designated seats in
both central and provincial legislatures are reserved for
representatives of these aboriginal people, and the
authorities have instituted a number of social programs to
ease their transition into the dominant Chinese society. The
aboriginal people complain that they are prevented from owning
ancestral lands in mountain areas under the control of the
authorities. Furthermore, they are not allowed to use
non-Chinese personal names on legal documents. Some complain
of economic exploitation by commercial or tourist concerns.
The sale of aboriginal children into prostitution is a serious
social problem.
The law prohibits sex discrimination, but it exists both de
facto and de jure. There are still some laws that
discriminate against women, relating mostly to divorce issues
and inheritance, but a revised Civil Code passed by the
Legislative Yuan in March 1985 provides for more equal
treatment of women in the areas of marriage and divorce.
Women have complained of being forced to quit jobs because of
age or childbearing restrictions, and restrictive quotas exist
within certain ministries to control the number of women who
may be hired even after passing the rigorous civil service
examination. A women's rights movement is active and growing.
Although data on violence against women are not available,
women active in politics, human rights, and women's
organizations single out intrafamily violence as a serious
problem, especially wife beating. There is a tradition of
tolerance for wife beating and strong social pressure for
abused wives to conceal their treatment to avoid "disgracing"
their families. The critics of this violence believe that
greater mobility, education, and job opportunities are making
women less inclined to tolerate such abuse and more willing to
complain of mistreatment, but it is not known if the number of
actual complaints filed increased in 1989. A somewhat similar
situation exists with regard to rape, since the victims are
still socially stigmatized. Under Taiwan law, the authorities
may not undertake a prosecution for rape; only the victim may
make a complaint. Because rape trials are public, women are
reluctant to prosecute their attackers. Rape counseling
services are not yet available, but feminist and human rights
organizations have assisted rape victims, and victims are now
more willing to come forward and press charges.
In 1989 the problem of child prostitutes received considerable
public attention. Women's rights activists criticized police
for not closing down brothels and judicial authorities for
allowing parents to sell their daughters, sometimes
repeatedly, into prostitution. According to some reports,
violence and coercion are used by brothel owners to prevent
girls from escaping.
Although the Taiwanese dialect is the mother tongue of most
inhabitants of Taiwan, the authorities forbid its use in the
educational system and impose limits on its use in broadcast
837
TAIWAN
media--Mandarin Chinese broadcasting must not be less than 55
percent on AM radio and 70 percent on FM radio and television.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Labor's right of association is seriously limited by a number
of laws and regulations. One of these requires organizers to
seek the approval of the authorities to establish unions.
Labor unions may draw up their own rules and constitutions,
but these must be submitted to the authorities for review.
Unions may be dissolved by the authorities if they do not meet
legal requirements for certification or if their activities
disturb public order. According to official sources, no
unions have been dissolved, although certification has been
denied where there were competing unions. In the latter
cases, the unions were asked to reconcile their differences
and file as a single union. Civil servants, teachers, defense
industry workers, and administrators acting on behalf of
employers are prohibited from organizing unions. Public
employees particularly guard their political views for fear of
jeopardizing job benefits or opportunities for promotions.
Most of Taiwan's 3,300 unions are controlled by the KMT, but
the DPP and Labor Party organizers have made inroads as
workers have grown increasingly restive over salary issues and
working conditions. In the last 3 years, workers have
sometimes rejected KMT or management-endorsed union slates.
The authorities in 1988 moved to strengthen laws regarding
workers' right to strike. Revisions of the labor disputes
law, which became effective in June 1988, recognize labor's
right to strike but place serious restrictions on it. Both
labor and management are forbidden from disrupting the
"working order" when either mediation or arbitration is in
progress. Before a strike can be called, it must be approved
by a vote of the full membership of the union. The
authorities have required official approval before such a
meeting can be called. Applications for arbitration may be
made to the local government. The authorities have, in at
least one case, not waited for such an application but deemed
the dispute to be in arbitration in order to avoid a strike.
Stiff penalties may be levied should no-strike/no-retaliation
clauses be violated, but critics say that employers have
ignored the law and dismissed or locked out workers without
any legal action being taken against them. Regardless of
legal limitations on the right to strike, however, workers
have struck or staged slowdowns with increasing frequency.
Unions may form confederations but no administrative district,
including cities, counties, and provinces, can have more than
one labor confederation. The Chinese Federation of Labor, the
only legal union federation on Taiwan, is closely associated
with the KMT and is affiliated with the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Taiwan is not a member of
the International Labor Organization.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
As of September 1989, 2.488 million workers, or approximately
30.13 percent of Taiwan's paid employees, belonged to 3,336
unions. Under the Labor Union Law, employers may not refuse
employment to, dismiss, or otherwise unfairly treat workers
because they are union members. There have been occasional
838
TAIWAN
reports, however, of antiunion discrimination in labor
disputes. The Chairman of the Workers Party was fired in May
for union activity, and a foreign priest was abruptly expelled
in March because of his involvement in the independent labor
movement. Laws governing union activities apply equally
within export processing zones.
Collective bargaining is provided for under the collective
agreements law but is not mandatory. Only about 341
collective agreements were in force as of March 1989. Since
such agreements are made only in large-scale enterprises and
less than 5 percent of Taiwan's enterprises fall into this
category, the proportion of workers covered by them is small.
Legal restrictions on the right to strike and provisions for
involuntary mediation or arbitration seriously weaken
collective bargaining.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Taiwan law does not allow forced or compulsory labor, except
as punishment for crime. However, the police o,ffenses law
permits compulsory labor up to a total of 16 hours as
punishment for minor crimes without recourse to judicial due
process. There have been reports of women and girls being
forced into prostitution or prevented from leaving brothels.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 15, and interaction between
the law stipulating this and a compulsory education law
effectively keeps child labor to a very low level.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Taiwan Labor Standards Law, promulgated in 1984, was
enacted to provide minimum labor standards. It covers some
3.5 million of Taiwan's 5.6 million paid workers. The law has
enjoyed only limited success in several areas, and there is a
growing sentiment that it a.. J other labor laws should be
strengthened and extended to cover additional workers.
By law, the workweek is limited to 48 hours (8 hours per day,
6 days per week) with certain provisions for overtime. Taiwan
in 1988 increased the basic wage, which functions essentially
as a minimum wage, to approximately $342 per month. There is
general agreement that the basic wage is less than that needed
to assure a decent standard of living; however, the average
manufacturing wage is over $633 per month. Most large firms
provide their employees with allowances for transportation,
meals, housing, and other benefits which can amount to another
60 to 80 percent of base salary. There are minimum standards
for working conditions and health and safety precautions.
Unemployment insurance is being studied and may be offered to
a small segment of workers in a pilot program.
The authorities' efforts to increase workers' awareness of
their rights through union education programs and the
establishment of complaint channels appear to be bearing some
fruit. In 1988 there were 67 lawsuits filed involving
management and labor.
Despite the establishment of the Council on Labor Affairs,
many provisions of labor legislation have not been enforced
because the number of inspectors is far too small. There are
272 inspectors for approximately 123,000 enterprises covered
839
TAIWAN
by the Labor Standards Law. In 1988, 13,655 enterprises, 10.6
percent of the total, were inspected. Since most enterprises
are small, family-owned operations employing relatives who
will not report violations, actual adherence to the hours,
wage, and safety sections of various labor laws is hard to
document but is thought to be minimal.
840
ELU
Fiji's multiracial society is about evenly divided between
indigenous Fijians and ethnic Indians, with each community
constituting approximately 47 percent of the total population.
Indians dominate the economy and professions and are prominent
in the public service.
Fiji was a parliamentary democracy until May 1987, when the
army deposed a newly elected government in a bloodless coup.
Coup leader Lt . Col. (now Major General) Sitiveni Rabuka cited
Indian predominance in that government as a primary reason for
the coup. An interim civilian government, formed in December
1987 when Rabuka" s military regime voluntarily stepped down,
is headed by Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, who held
that office for 17 years prior to the April 1987 elections.
At year's end, the Cabinet consisted primarily of civilians
but included Military Forces (FMF) Commander Rabuka and four
other military officers. The military remained very
influential, especially in security matters.
Sugar is the mainstay of Fiji's economy, with tourism the
second largest foreign exchange earner. The economy suffered
a severe decline in the wake of the first coup in May 1987,
but has made significant progress toward recovery. The
Government is promoting light manufacturing for export as a
long-term means of reducing dependence on sugar and tourism.
Human rights were less constrained in 1989 than in the
previous year, but freedom of the press and assembly remained
restricted, and the right of citizens peacefully to change the
government remains unclear. Discrimination against Indians
and women also remained a problem.
The major human rights issue in 1989 involved efforts to draft
a new constitution. The interim Government and the Fijian
community made it clear that the constitution, when adopted,
will guarantee the political predominance of indigenous
Fijians. A September 1988 draft proposed an electoral system
heavily weighted in favor of the indigenous Fijians and
containing numerous provisions unacceptable to the Indian
community, including one interpreted as establishing
Christianity as a state religion. The Government subsequently
formed an independent, multiracial committee to canvass public
views. After hearing many criticisms of the draft, the
Constitution Inquiry and Advisory Committee (CIAC) in
September 1989 called for extensive revisions to make the
document more democratic and remove or dilute several
provisions opposed by the Indian community.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political killings by the Government
or any political group.
b. Disappearance
There were no known abductions or disappearances.
841
FIJI
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is forbidden under Fiji's Fundamental Freedoms Decree
and is not practiced. Physical abuse of detainees occurs but
is neither usual nor condoned. An escaped prisoner died
during recapture several months ago; one guard was convicted
of assault and battery but acquitted on the murder charge. The
current situation represents a marked improvement over 1987,
when there were numerous credible reports of physical abuse of
detainees. Corporal punishment is allowed; strokes of the
cane are administered under medical supervision.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Reports of arbitrary arrest or detention declined markedly in
1989. However, antigovernment political activists were
occasionally detained for questioning at the airport when
entering or leaving the country. Those detained included the
deposed Prime Minister and at least one of his Ministers.
Detentions lasted a few hours at most; detainees were
reportedly abused verbally but not physically. In one case, a
political figure was arrested on a minor fraud charge on a
Friday and not allowed bail until the following Monday.
Exile is not practiced formally. It was reported that the
authorities have a short list of Fiji citizens restricted from
return to Fiji, but this remained unconfirmed. No Fiji
citizens were denied reentry in 1989.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The court system, reorganized after Fiji's withdrawal from the
Commonwealth of Nations in September 1987, remains modeled on
the British system. Magistrates' courts try minor offenses.
A high court has original jurisdiction in serious cases. An
appeals court and a Supreme Court complete the legal
structure. The Chief Justice chairs all three higher courts.
No special courts exist; military courts try only members of
the armed forces. The judiciary is independent, as
demonstrated by a magistrate's decision to discharge without
conviction about 20 political activists prosecuted for an
anticoup demonstration. Due process rights are similar to
those found in English common law. Right to a public trial is
guaranteed, defendants have a right to counsel, and there is a
public defender's office. Right of appeal is maintained. In
practice, many trials and appeals have been delayed due to
understaf f ing of the court system. Since habeas corpus and
bail are normal procedure, most defendants have not
experienced undue imprisonment before trial. There are no
political prisoners in Fiji.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
In general, privacy of the home is respected. The Internal
Security Decree of 1988, adopted following discovery of a
smuggled arms cache, allowed warrantless searches, but since
its suspension in November 1988 the practice has stopped.
Search warrants are required for searches in criminal cases.
Surveillance of persons believed to represent a security
threat is carried out to some degree. Many political
842
dissidents believe their telephones and mail are monitored,
but concrete evidence is lacking.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech has largely been restored. Political
figures and private citizens can and do speak out against the
Government. No arrests for making any kind of public
statement were reported in 1989.
Privately owned broadcast and print media operate without
prior censorship but with considerable self-restraint under
pressure from the authorities. Newspapers refrain from
printing editorials severely critical of the Government and do
little investigative reporting. Statements about the
political situation by opposition figures and foreign
governments are reported, however. The letters column of the
Fiji Times frequently carries political statements from
members of the deposed government and other persons and groups
opposed to the Government and the draft constitution. While
the press is still Ibss than fully free, the situation is
improved over 1987, when the newspapers were closed for 6
weeks. Journalists reportedly receive frequent phone calls
from government officials complaining about stories. However,
no journalists were detained in 1989; in 1988 two journalists
were detained in connection with published stories. Foreign
reporters are required to obtain a visa to enter Fiji. Some
reporters and television crews have been denied visas.
Fiji is home to the University of the South Pacific (USP) , a
regional institution. Prior to the coups and immediately
thereafter, the USP was a center of opposition political
activity. The Government made it clear that it wants the USP,
especially its expatriate staff, out of Fijian domestic
politics, and some politically active expatriate staff members
were denied extension of their work permits.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Assembly for political purposes is allowed but restricted.
Public gatherings require permission from the authorities, and
permits for large outdoor political meetings or demonstrations
generally are not granted. Permission was refused for an
anti-French demonstration during the visit of the Prime
Minister of France, and a political activist was detained
briefly at the airport when she was found with an anti-French
poster just before his arrival. A group of about 20 people
arrested and charged with parading without a permit for a
demonstration in downtown Suva in 1988 were discharged without
conviction in early 1989.
Political parties are currently operating, and party
headquarters, including those of the deposed coalition
parties, remain open. Organizations of a political nature are
allowed to operate and issue public statements. The
Government refuses to negotiate with the political parties
from the deposed coalition government.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
843
FIJI
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is guaranteed and honored in practice.
The revised draft constitution underscores the importance of
Christianity to Fiji and the Fijian people but guarantees
protection for all religions. Since the 1987 coups, most
commercial activities on Sundays have been banned. The Sunday
bans were relaxed substantially in mid-1989 to allow public
transportation and restaurants to operate and to allow
agricultural activities and some sports to continue. This
provoked a vehement protest from rightwing Methodist clergy,
who support reimposition of strict Sunday bans such as were in
effect after the September 1987 coup. Methodist clergymen
organized protest demonstrations, which led to some arrests.
The Sunday bans are opposed by Indians and urban residents,
but are popular among rural Fijians. Some Christian leaders
oppose any Sunday bans. Despite statements by General Rabuka
about "Christianizing" the Indian community, there has been no
attempt to translate this idea into public policy. No
significant restrictions affect foreign clergy, missionary
activity, charitable works, religious publishing and
education, or other typical nonpolitical activities of
religious organizations.
One foreign priest was deported in 1989 over the strenuous
objections of many of his parishioners. No official reason
was given, but it is generally believed he was deported as a
result of having participated in antigovernment political
activity, especially a public demonstration in 1988.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on freedom of movement within the
country. Opposition politicians and labor leaders were able
to travel abroad and return to Fiji in 1988-89, in contrast to
the situation which prevailed under the military government in
September-November 1987. Fiji citizens are free to emigrate.
According to the best available estimates, between 20,000 and
25,000 have done so since May 1987. Most of the emigrants are
Indians, many of them professionals, but Fijians and others
have also left. Several thousand have claimed refugee status,
especially when applying for admission to Canada, but neither
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees nor any government has
recognized those claims. There are no refugees in Fiji, and
no forced resettlement programs.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The right of all citizens to change their government through
genuinely democratic means remained uncertain in 1989. Fiji
is governed by an interim government comprising a Prime
Minister and a Cabinet appointed by the President. At year's
end, the Cabinet included senior politicians from Prime
Minister Mara's Alliance Party as well as technocrats, five
army officers, and some ethnic Fijian nationalists. There
were two Indian Ministers. At year's end, the Government was
scheduled to step down in January 1990 and hand over power to
a second interim government, which would implement a
constitution and take the country into elections. It was
expected that the new Cabinet would be headed by Ratu Mara.
Military members of the Cabinet were expected either to resign
their commissions or to return to barracks.
844
EUJ.
The proposed constitution provides for a bicameral
Parliament. Fijians would hold 37 of 69 seats in the lower
house. One seat would be reserved for Rotuma, a Polynesian
island culturally distinct from the rest of Fiji. Indians
would hold 27 seats, other ethnic groups 4. An upper house
with the power to veto legislation would be dominated by
Fijian traditional chiefs. A president chosen by the Great
Council of Chiefs (GCC) would act as head of state, but a
prime minister and cabinet would hold most executive power.
The GCC is an all-Fijian advisory body composed of Fiji's
highest traditional chiefs. Provincial representatives to the
GCC are designated by provincial councils. The GCC has no
administrative role in government, but its approval is a sign
of legitimacy within the ethnic Fijian community. The
President and Prime Minister are both members of the GCC by
virtue of their high traditional positions. According to the
interim government, the revised draft constitution is intended
to ensure political dominance by the indigenous Fijians, while
reinstating a form of parliamentary democracy and ensuring
protection for Indian communal interests. Indian political
leaders dispute this rationale, saying nothing less than fully
proportional representation is acceptable. The CIAC-proposed
revisions do provide additional protections for the Indian
community compared to the 1988 draft. For example,
constitutional amendment procedures would prevent the Fijian
members of Parliament from amending the constitution without
the concurrence of at least part of the Indian contingent; the
previous draft would have permitted the Fijians to pass
amendments without Indian support.
Elections are to be held by secret ballot, with voting only by
communal constituencies. This latter aspect is a major change
from the 1970 constitution, which provided for a complex
system of cross-voting allowing Indians a say in the selection
of some Fijian representatives and vice versa. The revised
draft calls for elections every 4 years but the Government may
call an election at any time.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no local human rights groups as such in Fiji, but
the women's rights movement, the labor movement, and various
political groups are involved in promoting a number of human
rights causes. The Government regards externally based
investigations of the political and human rights situation in
Fiji as a violation of its sovereignty. It did allow a visit
by a delegation from the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU) in late 1989.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The stated purpose of the 1987 military coups was to ensure
the political supremacy of the indigenous Fijian people and to
protect their traditional way of life and communal control of
land. To this end a number of measures have been taken that
favor the Fijian community over the other ethnic groups. The
most obvious is the reapportionment of the new Parliament to
guarantee a preponderance of Fijians. The Government is also
committed to raising the proportion of Fijians and Rotumans in
the public service to 50 percent or more at all levels. Many
Fijians felt that the precoup public service discriminated in
845
Elill
favor of Indians, who controlled most of middle management
because of their higher educational level. Current promotion
and hiring policies in the public service favor ethnic
Fijians. The CIAC recommended deleting a provision in the
1988 draft constitution that would have reserved certain
senior positions for ethnic Fijians.
Control of land is a highly sensitive issue. About 85 percent
of the land is held communally by indigenous Fijians. Most
cash crop farmers are Indians, who lease their land from the
Fijian villages. Individual title to land is not an
indigenous concept; lands owned currently by the crown (6
percent) and by individuals (9 percent) were transferred from
customary owners during the colonial period. The present land
ownership arrangements were instituted to protect the
interests of the indigenous Fijians. Many Indians,
particularly farmers, feel that the absence of secure land
tenure discriminates against them. The military coups were
prompted, in part, by Fijian fears that Indians sought to take
away their land.
A major complaint from ethnic Indians is inadequate protection
against harassment and crime, at least some of which is
racially motivated. In the latter part of the year, five
Indian temples and a mosque were subjected to acts of arson or
other desecration by a group of Fijian youths. Arrests have
been made, and at year's end investigations were continuing.
Gangs of Fijian youths sometimes stone or invade Indian homes,
stealing property and/or shouting racial abuse. The
perpetrators escape more often than not, and the Indian
community believes the authorities do not pay adequate
attention to the problem.
Corporal punishment is the norm in Fiji schools, and it can be
applied quite harshly. Some observers believe that in the
current racial atmosphere, some Fijian teachers are applying
harsher punishments to Indian students, and vice versa. This
trend may be linked to the above-noted increase in racial
violence by young people.
Women in both the Fijian and Indian communities have
functioned primarily in traditional roles, although some women
rise to high places in the public service, politics, and
business. Women can attain high status in Fiji's traditional
chiefly system, although it is unusual. The Prime Minister's
wife is, in her own right, Fiji's second highest-ranking
traditional chief. In general, women in the Fijian community
are more likely to rise to prominence in their own right than
are women in the Indian community. Women have full rights of
property ownership and inheritance, and a number have become
successful entrepreneurs. Women are generally paid less than
men, a discrepancy that is especially notable in the garment
industry. Garment workers, most of whom are female, are
subject to a special minimum wage considerably lower than that
in other sectors. Reliable current statistics on
representation of women in traditional men's occupations,
business management, and the professions are unavailable.
However, relatively few women are employed in these areas.
There is a small but active women's rights movement. A recent
area of focus has been violence against women. The movement
has pressed for more serious treatment of rape in the courts.
The crime tends to draw prison sentences of only a few years.
An admonition by the Chief Justice late in 1988 has resulted
in some increase in the average prison term for rape. The law
846
FIJI
allows corporal punishment for rape, but this is generally
used only in cases of offenses against minors. Domestic
violence is also a problem in Fiji and is a second major focus
of the women's movement. The authorities are generally
reluctant to intervene in cases of domestic violence unless it
is necessary to save the woman's life. Few cases result in
prosecution, as the victim generally does not press charges.
The Government has not been active in dealing with domestic
violence. Suva has a privately funded Women's Crisis Centre
which offers counseling and assistance to women in cases of
rape, domestic violence, and other problems, such as child
support payments.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers are free to form and join unions, elect their own
representatives, publicize their views on labor matters, and
determ.ine their own policies. Strikes are legal. At least a
dozen well-publicized strikes took place in 1989. Unions must
register with, but are not controlled by, the Government. The
central labor body, the Fiji Trades Union Congress (FTUC), is
closely associated with the opposition Fiji Labour Party and
the deposed Bavadra government. The labor movement is led
largely by ethnic Indians. Persons with close ties to the
Government have started rival unions primarily for ethnic
Fijians; these unions are more amenable to political
cooperation with the Government. The FTUC is free to
associate internationally and it belongs to the ICFTU.
The Committee on Freedom of Association of the International
Labor Organization (ILO) at its November 1989 meeting found
that Fijian law and practice excessively restricted trade
union's abilities to hold union meetings and public gatherings.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Fiji law recognizes the right to organize and bargain
collectively. Employers are reguired to recognize a union if
more than half the employees in a workplace have joined.
Recognition is determined by union membership numbers rather
than by an election. The Government will order a recalcitrant
employer to recognize a union, although union leaders accused
the Government of failing to apply the law correctly in one
recent case. Key sectors of the economy including sugar and
tourism are organized, and collective bargaining is the norm.
Currently, nationwide wage guidelines are in effect. These
guidelines replaced a mandatory wage cut and freeze put into
effect after the 1987 coups. The Government authorized a 6
percent across-the-board wage increase in 1989. The ILO's
Committee of Experts at its 1989 session noted that Fiji's
wage controls did not conform with the provisions of ILO
Convention 98 on collective bargaining and asked the
Government to indicate when it intends to take measures to
lift the legal restrictions on the free negotiation of wages.
Fiji's practice for wage bargaining has been to set national
wage guidelines after consultations between the Government,
employers, and unions. Wage negotiation on an industry-by-
industry basis is not practiced, and a government proposal to
introduce such negotiations has been resisted by employers and
unions. Union leaders fear that straight market-based wage
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FIJI
bargaining would open unacceptably large wage gaps between
skilled and unskilled workers.
Prior to the coups, a tripartite forum of employers, unions,
and government oversaw labor negotiations. The tripartite
forum has been abolished; its restoration is a key demand of
the FTUC. The Government has agreed to consider reestablishing
the forum, but at year's end had not done so. Legislation
protects workers from summary dismissal without just cause.
The courts often rule in favor of workers in such cases.
Trade union members arid properties are respected, however,
there have been a few incidents of vandalism against the homes
and cars of union leaders. The incidents, which were well
organized, remain unsolved. There is no evidence to link such
actions to the Government. The unions are generally
successful in preventing discrimination against workers for
union activities. Labor legislation is applied uniformly
throughout the country, including in export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor does not exist in Fiji. Both the 1970
Constitution and the draft constitution give protection from
forced labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children under 12 may not be employed in any capacity.
Children (under age 15) and "young persons" (age 15-17) may
not be employed in industry or work with machinery.
Enforcement generally is effective, with the possible
exception of family members working on family farms or
businesses .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
No national minimum wage has been established. Certain
sectors have minimum wages set by the Ministry for Employment
and Industrial Relations. These are in the $0.75-$1.00 per
hour range, except in the garment industry where it is only
about 35 cents. In late September, the Government and
employers agreed to raise this to about 45 cents; a date for
implementation had not been set as of year's end. The minimum
wage will support a barely adequate standard of living, except
in the garment industry, where the starting wage is based on
the assumption that workers are young people or married women
living at home and not expecting to support a household. The
more productive workers in the garment industry earn $1.00 an
hour or more, a living wage.
Fiji has no regulation specifying maximum hours of work for
adult males. Women are prohibited from night work in industry
and underground work in mines. Certain industries, notably
transportation and shipping, have problems in this area.
Excessive working hours for drivers have contributed to a
number of fatal bus accidents. Indians, who generally require
a cash income to survive, are more vulnerable to pressure to
work long hours than Fijians. Many Fijians can and will
return to their villages rather than work what they consider
excessive hours.
Fiji has workplace safety regulations, a workmen's compensation
act, and an accident compensation plan. A tribunal sets
awards for workers injured on the job. Government enforcement
848
FIJI
o£ safety standards suffers from a lack of trained enforcement
personnel, but the unions do a reasonable job of monitoring
safety standards in organized workplaces. A 1989 study of
working conditions in the garment industries resulted in the
Government ordering many employers to improve working
conditions. Union leaders complained that the Government's
action was too mild and that the employers should have been
subject to criminal prosecution.
849
INDONESIA
President Soeharto and the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI)
— which include the military services and the police — are the
preeminent institutions in Indonesia's Government, which came
to power in the mid-1960 's after an abortive Communist-backed
coup. Since 1967 executive authority has been exercised by
retired and active-duty military officers and civilian
technocrats under President Soeharto "s leadership. The partly
elected, partly appointed Parliament (DPR) considers but does
not initiate legislation. The People's Consultative Assembly
(MPR) — consisting of 500 appointed members and the 500 DPR
members — meets every 5 years to approve guidelines for
government policy and elect the President and Vice President.
Indonesia is the fifth most populous country in the world and
the largest in Southeast Asia. Since independence, Indonesian
governments have sought to create a unique national identity
and to accommodate a diversity of ethnic, linguistic,
religious, and social groups, while assuring internal security
and cohesion. The centerpiece of the Soeharto Government's
political program is "Pancasila," an eclectic state ideology
emphasizing consultation and consensus and composed of five
broad principles: belief in one supreme god, belief in a just
and civilized humanity, Indonesian national unity, democracy,
and social justice.
The armed forces number about 416,000. A little less than
half serve in the army, which is primarily concerned with
internal security. Under a "dual function" concept, many
military officers serve in Parliament and the civilian
bureaucracy at all levels. Frequent military operations took
place in East Timor and Irian Jaya, where Fretilin and
Organization for a Free Papua (0PM) rebels continued sporadic
activities in low-level insurgencies.
Although Indonesia's mixed economy involves the State in
nearly all sectors, the Government is pursuing a set of
policies designed to give greater freedom to the private
sector. Beginning with the collapse of oil prices in the
early 1980's, deregulation aimed primarily at stimulating
growth in nonoil sectors has been a major government
objective. A large devaluation in 1986, and a subsequent
flexible exchange rate, has helped strengthen the rupiah and
boost nonoil exports. The oil sector accounted for less than
50 percent of Government revenues and foreign exchange
earnings in 1988. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth in
1988 was 5.7 percent and the industrial growth rate much
higher. Despite substantial increases in real incomes in the
past 20 years, the country remains poor and wide disparities
in wealth continue. Corruption and influence peddling are
endemic and restrict growth and economic opportunity.
Despite progress in some areas, including greater freedom of
movement for Indonesians and foreigners to and within East
Timor, continued tolerance for ethnic, racial, and religious
differences, a broadened political debate, including enhancing
the role of parliament vis-a-vis the executive, new government
regulations that protect working women and formalize the
minimum wage structure, and the conviction and sentencing to
jail terms of several police officers for mistreatment or
killing of detainees, serious human rights problems remained.
These included harsh treatment of Muslim activists' efforts to
organize opposition, discrimination against ethnic Chinese,
reports of excessive use of force in quelling violence in
Lampung, periodic detentions of East Timorese suspected of
850
INDONESIA
Fretilin sympathies, killings of civilians in East Timor,
harsh sentences meted out in several subversion trials,
continued significant restrictions on freedoms of the press
and movement, and pervasive political controls which ensure
continued military domination of the Government.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Casualties in Lampung Province in a clash in February between
members of an Islamic sect and the military, responding to an
officer's kidnaping and murder, officially numbered 38, most
of them civilians. The background of the incident remains
obscure, but persistent allegations of a significantly higher
death toll than officially announced raise concern about the
military's possible use of excessive force in restoring order.
A presidential autobiography published in April explained that
the "mysterious killings" or summary executions of thousands
of suspected criminals from 1982 to 1985 were a deliberate
policy to stem increased crime. At that time, officials
attributed the killings to criminal gang warfare. An
estimated two dozen or more civilians were killed by the
military in East Timor in 1989.
b. Disappearance
Temporary disappearance of persons held for interrogation by
security forces occurred periodically, particularly in East
Timor and Irian Jaya. Reports were often unspecific and
difficult to confirm, but in some cases authorities appeared
to act outside the law.
No exact figures are available on the number of permanent
disappearances widely believed to occur yearly. Newspapers in
May publicized the cases of Nano and Soni Abdullah, brothers
who reportedly disappeared following arrest in Pekanbaru in
1984. Regular International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
access to prisons in East Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia has
helped to locate some missing persons in past years.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Credible reports of torture and mistreatment of criminal
suspects, detainees, and prisoners were frequent. Police
treatment of detainees, even in minor incidents, often results
in physical abuse. Several students detained in the wake of
the Pope's visit to East Timor in October were reportedly
beaten. The practice of "shooting to wound" suspected
criminals allegedly attempting to elude arrest in Medan
declined in 1989. The local press, nonetheless, continued to
report at least one incident each month in which police shot a
suspect in the leg, often repeatedly. Officials have publicly
acknowledged and condemned police brutality and unacceptable
prison conditions and in 1989 took disciplinary action in
several cases against criminal suspects. Among other
instances, the Yogyakarta military court dismissed two
policemen and sentenced them to jail terms of 2 years 3 months
and 2 years 6 months, respectively, for beating to death
17-year-old Bakri Budi Santoso, and a military court in
851
INDONESIA
Cianjur sentenced two police officers to 17 and 15 years,
respectively, for killing a student, Apud Mahpudin. There
were no known instances of officials being punished for
mistreatment of political prisoners or detainees. East
Timorese Bishop Belo and others alleged mistreatment and
torture by security forces in East Timor of persons detained
on suspicion of aiding or sympathizing with the Fretilin
guerrillas, charges denied by officials. Similar allegations
were made concerning mistreatment of persons in Irian Jaya
suspected of ties with or sympathies for the Organization for
a Free Papua (0PM) rebels. Rebels in both East Timor and
Irian Jaya reportedly harassed and terrorized civilians from
time to time.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The criminal procedures code (KUHAP) contains protections
against arbitrary arrest and detention and specifies the right
of prisoners to legal counsel and notification of family.
These safeguards are often disregarded in practice, notably in
cases of alleged subversion. KUHAP provisions are respected
more regularly in urban areas than in small towns or remote
areas. Security agencies arrest and detain persons to
intimidate and inhibit activities they consider undesirable.
Legal mechanisms for redress of such actions are inadequate.
The Jakarta district court rejected a suit by student
demonstrators against police for alleged unlawful detention on
the grounds that the students were interrogated as witnesses,
not suspects, and thus not entitled to challenge the legality
of their detention.
Detainees in cases of alleged subversion can be held up to a
year without charges. In the past the number of persons
detained without trial was estimated to be as many as 500,
although this figure could not be verified, and no more recent
estimates were available. Security forces in East Timor on
several occasions detained persons for days or weeks on
suspicion of subversive activity. Most were subsequently
released without charges. Implementation of a 1987
Presidential Decree on remission of prison terms produced
uncertainty about the status of some prisoners, including
several reportedly still in jail despite apparent expiration
of their sentences. Mrs. Sundari Abdulrahman, a former
official in the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) whose case
was under consideration by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, was
released from prison in August. A number of East Timorese
left prisons in Jakarta and Dili after finishing sentences for
involvement with Fretilin.
The precise functions and powers of the Agency for
Coordination of Assistance for the Consolidation of National
Security (BAKORSTANAS) remained unclear. In Lampung and
elsewhere, elements of it appeared to exercise the emergency
security provisions accorded its predecessor, the Command for
the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB) . KOPKAMTIB
was permitted exceptions from KUHAP procedures and wide,
special powers to detain and interrogate persons thought to
threaten national security, particularly in cases of suspected
subversion, sabotage, secession, or corruption. BAKORSTANAS
may have retained those powers. Indonesian law does not
provide for the right to judicial review of such actions or
for the right to protection or legal aid for the detainees.
Their cases are rarely if ever publicized.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see section 6.c.
852
INDONESIA
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
A quadripartite judiciary, consisting of general, religious,
military, and administrative courts, exists below the Supreme
Court, the highest court of appeal. Parliament passed a law
in December that will permit--once implementing regulations
are drawn up--the religious courts used by many Muslims to
effect judgments without consent of the general courts and to
exercise jurisdiction over a scmewhet widened field of family
law matters. The independence of the judiciary is
significantly constrained by the facts that judges are civil
servants of the executive branch and that the Supreme Court
cannot annul laws passed by Parliament.
Panels of three judges conduct most trials, hear evidence,
decide guilt or innocence, and assess punishment. The right
of appeal from district court to high court to Supreme Court
exists. The Supreme Court does not consider material aspects
of a case, only the application of law by lower courts.
Initial judgments are rarely reversed, although sentences are
occasionally changed. Most court sessions are open to the
public and most defendants, if they can pay, have access to
counsel. However, such access is in some cases significantly
delayed and there are occasional reports of official efforts
to influence the choice of counsel. If destitute, defendants
can find private legal help such as that provided by the Legal
Aid Institute (LBH) . Alternatively, the courts have
discretion to provide a limited amount of aid for those unable
to afford legal assistance. The State must assure legal
assistance in capital cases. Government support for programs
to improve legal awareness and literacy, legal training, and
legal research capabilities is a positive step toward
addressing the legal system's deficiencies.
Corruption permeates the Indonesian legal system. In civil
and criminal cases, bribes can influence decisions,
prosecution, conviction, and sentencing. Use in trials of
forced confessions and limitations on the presentation of
evidence by the defense are reportedly common. The Government
has occasionally taken action against flagrant offenders, but
by and large these abuses continue unchecked.
Conviction is virtually automatic for persons accused under
Indonesia's broad 1963 subversion provisions, which among
other things forbid advocacy or actions in support of
secession or creation of an Islamic state, as well as
criticism of Pancasilo. President Soeharto said in August
that comparative study of foreign ideologies, including
Communism, with Pancasila is permissible. The Government
tried or announced preparations to try some 70 persons for
subversion in 1989. A student and an employee at Yogyakarta's
Gajah Mada University were sentenced to prison terms of 7 and
8 years, respectively, for circulating, possessing, or
advocating banned writings. Appeals are expected. Trials of
some defendants from the February incident in Lampung produced
sentences of life imprisonment in five cases and 20 years in
another. All but one of these defendants refused the
Government's offer of legal assistance. Trials also began in
Jakarta and Sumbawa of persons charged with seeking to
establish an Islamic state.
The Government does not provide data on the number of persons
serving sentences under antisubversion laws. Some observers
estimate there may be at least 400. These estimates include
persons sentenced for involvement in the 1965 coup attempt and
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INDONESIA
alleged Muslim extremists, many of whom, some observers
believe, were convicted for peaceful protest activity.
The President (through the Coordinating Minister for Political
Affairs and Security), the Minister of Justice, and the
Attorney General, criticized as too lenient a district court
decision in March which sentenced a convicted smuggler to a
year's probation. Smuggling is classified as a subversive
offense and subject to a maximum penalty of death. In April a
national legal association called on its Jakarta chapter to
deny legal counsel to persons charged with smuggling and
corruption.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Judicial warrants for searches are required except for cases
involving suspected subversion, economic crimes, and
corruption. However, forced or surreptitious entry by
security agencies reportedly occurs regularly, especially in
East Timor. Security agencies also conduct surveillance of
persons and residences to intimidate and are believed to
monitor selectively local and international telephone calls,
without legal restraint. Correspondence generally is not
monitored, although letter mail to and from East Timor may
still be an exception. Government security officials try to
monitor the movements and activities of up to 2.5 million
former members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and
approximately 20 million former members of its front groups.
Even relatives of such persons can suffer adverse
consequences, e.g., loss of government employment.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Significant restrictions on freedom of speech and press
exist. Laws delimiting the rights of individual persons and
the Government are applied by different government agencies
with considerable discretionary authority and without
effective judicial review. Public statements or publications
which criticize or could be perceived as critical of the
Government, Pancasila, top leaders, their families, or
particular religious and ethnic groups are strongly
discouraged if not strictly forbidden. Trials and convictions
of some persons under the subversion law periodically
demonstrate these limitations.
The media generally avoid or exercise great caution in
disseminating views of government critics, including prominent
opposition figures, because of the risk of official disapproval
or informal government instructions not to publish them. The
general lack of specific, clear guidelines on what is
permissible has generated a significant degree of
self-censorship both in public speaking and in the press.
Nonetheless, the limits of government tolerance are regularly
tested, and public discussion and media reporting of a number
of topics generally regarded as sensitive to the Government
(including human rights issues) increased significantly in
1989. Some representatives of nongovernmental organizations
attending an April conference in Belgium went beyond the
governmental bounds, however, and officials publicly and
privately chastised them for voicing criticism outside
Indonesia of the alleged negative social and human rights
impact of certain development projects.
854
INDONESIA
The Government operates the national television network. It
was criticized by the Minister of Information for airing songs
the Government judged to be of low moral value and by
religious leaders for showing a film considered offensive to
Muslims. A private company which offers a subscription
television service to viewers in the Jakarta area received a
government warning for advertising and programming considered
culturally inappropriate. Satellite dishes are used by the
media and the elite to monitor television broadcasts from the
United States and other countries. Television signals from
neighboring countries are received in some parts of
Indonesia. While more than 400 private radio stations operate
in Indonesia, they may use only government-provided news
programs. The Minister of Information warned the many
Indonesians who listen to shortwave radio broadcasts not to be
unduly influenced by reports critical of the country.
While academic freedom is guaranteed, constraints exist on the
activities of scholars. They sometimes refrain from producing
written materials, including dissertations, which they believe
might provoke government displeasure. Publishers are unwilling
to accept manuscripts dealing with controversial issues.
The press is largely privately owned. Civilian and military
officials regularly maintain that, in accordance with
Pancasila, the press is "free" but also "responsible." The
Government expects the media to support national development
and stability; to be educational; and to uphold professional
standards. Government officials regularly advise editors and
reporters about news which cannot be reported and closely
monitor media outlets for material unacceptable to the
Government. The Government issues oral or written warnings
for published material found objectionable. If ignored,
warnings could result in a circulation ban or revocation of
the license to publish. The number of newspaper licenses is
limited, and regulations control the amount of advertising and
the number of pages. In 1989 the press received warnings for
reports on land disputes, student demonstrations, and
subversion trials; for speculation about future political
leaders; for publication of sexually provocative pictures; and
for misquotation of officials. The Attorney General banned as
culturally inappropriate an Indonesian-language translation of
a children's educational book depicting the human reproductive
process. Several other foreign and domestic books were banned
for assertedly subversive ideological content.
Chinese-language publications, with the exception of one
officially sanctioned daily newspaper, can neither be imported
nor produced domestically. Although organized private
instruction of Chinese is discouraged, there are some private
school classes, informal circles, and private teachers. No
laws prohibit the speaking of Chinese, but the Government lays
heavy stress on the learning and use of the national language,
Bahasa Indonesia.
The Government closely regulates visiting and resident foreign
correspondents and occasionally reminds the latter of its
prerogative to deny requests for visas or visa extensions.
One foreign correspondent was denied entry in 1989; no foreign
correspondents were denied visa extensions.
The importation of foreign publications and video tapes, which
must be reviewed by government censors, requires a permit.
Importers usually avoid foreign books critical of the
Government or dealing with topics sensitive to the Government,
855
INPONESIA
such as human rights. Foreign periodicals, readily available
in Indonesia, are subject to censorship prior to
distribution. Importation of some foreign newspapers and
magazines and all Communist publications is prohibited. In
1989 the Attorney General and Supreme Court banned first the
importation of "The Satanic Verses" and then its domestic
circulation. Censorship of imported newspapers and other
written materials generally was more relaxed in 1989.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
All organizations must have government permission to hold
regional and national meetings. Local jurisdictions often
require prior approval for smaller gatherings as well. While
obtaining such approval is fairly automatic and apparently was
eased in 1989, authorities withhold permission on occasion.
Officials refused to approve a Christian youth gathering in a
predominantly Muslim area in southeast Sulawesi. Student
gatherings have often been the target of disapprovals, and
overt political activity at universities remains forbidden
under the "campus life normalization" (or "NKK") law of 1978.
Nonetheless, student activism, including peaceful
demonstrations, increased markedly in 1989. Reactions from
civilian and military officials and university rectors varied
considerably. Sometimes students were applauded for bringing
issues to public attention; other times tolerated, warned, or
expelled; and on several occasions forcibly dispersed.
Several student protestors were hospitalized in September
following a clash with security forces in Yogyakarta.
Authorities detained and arrested several students for
participating in protests. Two of these went on trial on
criminal charges. A demonstration by about a score of
students displaying nationalist banners which took place at
the conclusion of the Pope's mass in East Timor was broken up
by security forces. Credible reports say several students
were detained; others sought refuge in the local bishop's
residence.
The 1985 "Social Organizations" (or "Ormas") Law requires all
organizations, including recognized religions and
associations, to adhere to Pancasila. This provision, which
limits political activity, is widely understood as prohibiting
groups which advocate m.aking Indonesia an Islamic state. The
law empowers the Government to disband any organization it
believes to be acting against the tenets of Pancasila and
requires prior government approval for any organization's
acceptance of foreign funds. Security forces have infiltrated
and broken up Islamic study groups which met privately to
advocate strict obedience to Islamic law.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution guarantees religious freedom for four
state-recognized religions--Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, and
Hinduism--and also permits the practice of mystic and animist
religion ("aliran kepercayaan" ) . Although most Indonesians
are Muslims, Indonesia has traditionally displayed a high
degree of religious tolerance, and the practice and teachings
of the other recognized faiths are respected. The Catholic
church operates freely in East Timor.
24-900 O— 90-
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INDONESIA
There are, however, a number of restrictions on religious
activity. According to official statistics, nearly 400
"misleading religious cults" are banned, including some
Islamic groups considered heretical. These bannings affect
perhaps 20,000 adherents or more. New bannings occur
periodically. Membership in Jehovah's Witnesses and the
Baha ■ i faith is banned, although several thousand Jehovah'-^
Witnesses are believed to practice in Jakarta alone. A
central Java court in 1989 sentenced two persons to jail terms
of 1 1/2 and 2 1/2 years, respectively, for spreading
Jehovah's Witnesses' teachings and allegedly causing unrest.
Authorities have occasionally harassed or discriminated
against Baha 'is. Twelve members of a banned Muslim sect were
reportedly arrested in south Sumatra in September en route to
Aceh for proselytizing. Because the first tenet of the
Pancasila is belief in a supreme being, atheism is forbidden.
The legal requirement to adhere to Pancasila extends to all
religious and secular organizations. The Govei nment often
tolerates private practice of banned religions, although local
authorities occasionally harass adherents or pressure them to
convert .
The Government strongly opposes Muslim groups which advocate
establishing an Islanic state or acknowledging only Islamic
law, both of which are outlawed. An estimated 120 alleged
Muslim extremists are serving prison terms on charges of
subversion. Several foreign Muslim fundamentalist teachers
reportedly found proselytizing while on tourist passes were
deported during the year with some publicity.
There is no legal bar to conversion between faiths, and
conversions occur. However, proselytizing between the
recognized religions or in areas heavily dominated by one
religion or another — excluding mystic and animist
religions--is considered potentially disruptive and
discouraged. Foreign missionary activities are relatively
unimpeded. In recent years, however, some foreign
missionaries have had difficulty renewing visas or residence
permits. On the basis of laws and decrees issued in the
mid-1970's, the Government does not allow foreign missionaries
to spend more than 10 years in Indonesia (15 in exceptional
circumstances only). With rare exceptions, enforcement of
this policy does not discriminate by sect or nationality.
Exceptions to the 10-year rule have also been granted to
foreign religious workers in the remote areas of Irian Jaya
and Kalimantan since late 1987. The Government says it
intends over time to reduce the number of foreign missionaries
in order to encourage employment of Indonesians. Foreign
missionary work is subject to the funding stipulations of the
"Ormas" law discussed above.
Indonesian Muslims, Christians, and Buddhists maintain active
links with coreligionists inside and outside Indonesia and
travel abroad for religious gatherings. The Government
permits a set number of pilgrims to make the hajj annually.
Such trips are available only though government-organized
tours The Pope visited Indonesia in October, offering mass
to Catholics in Medan, Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Flores, and East
Timor. During his visit, he praised Indonesia's respect for
the ethnic, cultural, and religious pluralism among its
citizens. More than 100,000 Catholics from East and West
Timor attended the service in Dili at which the Pope
officiated.
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INDONESIA
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Restrictions on freedom of movement exist. Permits to seek
work in a new location are required in certain areas,
primarily to control the further shift of population from
rural to urban areas.
The Government said noncitizen ethnic Chinese who did not take
advantage of a 1988 offer of immigration amnesty would be
tried as illegal immigrants. Estimates of the number of
persons potentially affected vary considerably, and no such
trials have yet taken place. In the past, some ethnic Chinese
encountered legal and bureaucratic obstacles to obtaining
citizenship, despite official encouragement of naturalization.
Officials barred 60 ethnic Chinese citizens from foreign
travel for a year for visiting China without proper
authorization.
By administrative action, the Government periodically
prohibits foreign travel of domestic critics and others in
disfavor. Although reliable figures are not available, it is
estimated that some 5,000 Indonesians--including some
prominent past civilian and military of f icials--currently may
not leave the country. Some critics, however, are free to
travel abroad, and a person banned at one time may be
permitted to travel subsequently. Students do not need
government permission to go abroad for study. In April the
Government abolished the exit visa requirement for active-duty
and retired members of the armed forces, state officials,
civil servants, and their families, a step potentially
affecting an estimated 11 percent of the population.
Restrictions on movement by Indonesian and foreign citizens to
and within parts of Irian Jaya continue, officially based on
the grounds of security risk or the cultural vulnerability of
indigenous peoples. Beginning in January 1989, restrictions
on movement to, from, and within East Timor eased considerably
under a policy of "normalizing" East Timor's status.
Nonetheless, frequent security checks affect virtually all
transportation and travel in East Timor outside Dili. Curfews
and other restrictions on movement are often in force at times
of military operations in a given area. Family visits back to
East Timor by East Timorese now living in Australia began in
1988 and continued in 1939.
Former political detainees, including those associated with
the abortive 1965 coup, must notify authorities of their
movements and may not change their residence without official
permission. Members or alleged supporters of the banned
Indonesian Comm.unist Party (PKI) outside Indonesia have been
allowed to return only on a case-by-case basis.
Under its refugee policy, Indonesia has given first asylum to
over 106,000 Indochinese refugees since 1975. The Indochinese
refugee population at Indonesia's Galang facility stood at
about 6,600 at the end of October. Of this number, 1,200 are
classified as refugees under the Comprehensive Plan of Action
on Indochinese refugees (CPA) adopted at the June
International Conference on Indochinese Refugees in Geneva;
the rest are classified as asylum-seekers pending screening by
Indonesian authorities for refugee status eligibility. Since
May Indonesia accepted refugee boats pushed off from Malaysia
with a total of 2,500 Indochinese asylum seekers.
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INDONESIA
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Parliament, political parties, and the general public have
little ability to influence government decisions or to change
the system or its leadership. President Soeharto and a small
group of active-duty and retired military officers and
civilian technocrats exercise governmental authority. The
military, under a dual-function doctrine of defense/security
plus social/political responsibilities, is preeminent in most
areas of government activity, although in some parts of the
Government its presence has declined in recent years. The
Constitution provides Parliament a mechanism to call the
President to account in extraordinary circumstances but
whether it could be used effectively is in doubt. Government
leaders do seek out and receive public opinion informally. In
several cases in 1989, petitions to ministers and the
Parliament about inequitable land decisions and other
demonstrable injustices received wide publicity. Reflecting a
strong cultural preference, Indonesian leaders emphasize the
importance of decisionmaking through "consultation leading to
consensus," rather than voting, to resolve disputes.
In 1989 lively public debate among elites on the need for
political openness to keep pace with and support economic
progress focused attention on the paternalistic political
system and the challenge of managing change. When asked
publicly whether there is a need for changes in electoral
procedures, political party leaders responded that the current
electoral system is appropriate and adequate.
The Parliament--whose membership must be acceptable to the
Government--considers bills presented to it by government
departments and agencies and does not draft laws on its own,
although it has the constitutional right to do so. The
Government seeks to resolve potential parliamentary concerns
before bills are officially presented. Parliament changes the
text and occasionally the intent of bills it reviews, and in
1989 significantly altered major bills on the national
education system and religious courts.
Only three political organizations are allowed by law. The
United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic
Party (PDI) are not considered opposition parties. By law,
they embrace the Pancasila, and they seldom espouse policies
much different from the Government's. The third, GOLKAR, is a
longstanding, government-sponsored organization of functional
groups which acts as a political party. Former members of the
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and some other banned parties
may not run for office or be active politically.
The leaders of the three legal political organizations are
approved, if not chosen, by the Government, and their
activities are closely scrutinized and often guided by
government authorities. GOLKAR maintains close institutional
links with the armed forces and KORPRI, the nonunion
association to which all civil servants automatically belong.
Civil servants may join any of the political parties with
official permission, but most are members of GOLKAR.
General elections for Parliament and for provincial and
district assemblies are held every 5 years. GOLKAR won 73
percent of the vote in the 1987 elections. All adult
citizens, except active-duty armed forces personnel, convicted
criminals serving prison sentences, and some former PKI
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INDONESIA
members, are eligible to vote. Voting is not mandatory, but
strong social pressures ensure participation. Protest votes
take the form of blank or deliberately spoiled ballots. As in
1988, voters in several villages in Java rejected government-
proposed candidates running unopposed for the position of
village head.
Under the 1985 election law, the Parliament elected in April
1987 consists of 500 members, 400 elected by the voters and
100 appointed by the Government from the armed forces. The
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) consists of Parliament
plus 500 other members appointed by the President and by
regional governments. The MPR, which convenes every 5 years,
ended its most recent session in March 1988 after approving
guidelines for government policy for the next 5 years and
reelecting President Soeharto to a new 5-year term, with
retired Lt . Gen. Sudharmono as Vice President. For the first
time an alternate candidate vied for the Vice Presidency in
1988, until he ultimately withdrew from contention.
Participation in the political process by Indonesia's many
ethnic groups and minorities varies. Some are well and
prominently represented; some are underrepresented and without
influence; and others have a significant voice only through
informal channels.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government considers outside investigations of alleged
human rights violations to be interference in its internal
affairs. AI has been refused access to Indonesia; Asia Watch
visited in 1988 and 1989. Access specifically to East Timor
by representatives of such organizations--which the Government
considers biased--has traditionally been restricted. However,
AI and Asia Watch have not yet tested the new East Timor
"normalization" policy, which appears to have loosened those
restrictions. Diplomats and some journalists are encouraged
to visit the province. The Government ignored calls by
domestic human rights groups and activists for impartial
investigations of the February Lampung incident and detentions
of radical preachers in Sumbawa in March. While various
domestic organizations and persons interested in human rights
operate energetically, the Government uses its considerable
powers to discourage sustained, meaningful human rights
activities, including maintenance of close ties with foreign
human rights organizations.
The ICRC is authorized by the Government to visit persons
jailed in connection with armed resistance in East Timor One
press report in 1989 suggested that many have not been visited
despite the Government's pledge. The ICRC provides medical
and food aid to prisoners and their families; carries out
medical and nutritional surveys in villages in East Timor;
arranged family reunification in East Timor and abroad (mainly
Portugal); and arranges repatriation to Portugal of former
Portuguese civil servants and their families in East Timor.
The ICRC opened an office in Irian Jaya in 1989 to assist
future border crossers returning from camps in Papua New
Guinea and to monitor conditions of persons jailed in
connection with 0PM activities. In 1988 and 1989, the ICRC
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INDONESIA
visited and interviewed all remaining prisoners convicted of
participation in the 1965 Cominunist-backed attempted coup. The
Government does not allow access by the ICRC or any other
international humanitarian group to the numerous Muslim
activists held prisoner.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Indonesia generally exhibits considerable tolerance for
ethnic, racial, and major religious differences, although
official and informal discrimination against ethnic Chinese is
a significant exception. They are pressured to take
Indonesian names. Since 1959 noncitizen ethnic Chinese have
been denied the right to run businesses in rural Indonesia.
Government regulations prohibit the operation of all-Chinese
schools and institutions of higher learning, formation of
exclusively Chinese cultural groups or trade associations, and
public display of Chinese characters. However, these
restrictions are not always observed in practice. Many people
of Chinese ancestry have been successful in business and the
professions. Social and religious groups which are, in
effect, all-Chinese are not proscribed and do exist.
Performances of a Chinese opera from Taiwan in Jakarta and of
a play about Chinese in Medan were canceled by the Government.
Women are equal before the law, with the same rights,
obligations and opportunities afforded men. Indonesia has
ratified the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination against Women. Some Indonesian women enjoy
a high degree of economic and social freedom. Women occupy
important midlevel positions in the civil service, educational
institutions, labor unions, the military, the professions, and
private business. Women make up approximately 37 percent of
the work force, with the majority in the rural sector.
Despite legal guarantees of equal treatment, women seldom
receive equal pay for equal work. The Minister for the Role
of Women, Mrs. A. Sulasikin Murpratomo, has called public
attention to women's undue burden of illiteracy, poor health,
and poor nutrition. Traditional practices ("adat") can also
in some cases undercut state policy. Spouses of civil
servants are strongly encouraged to participate in a
government-sponsored women's organization. Several voluntary,
private groups work actively to advance women's legal,
economic, and political rights. The media periodically report
instances of rape and other abuse against women and subsequent
legal proceedings against the perpetrators. However, reliable
data concerning the extent of violence against women is not
available. The Government has recognized publicly that
domestic violence is an emerging problem for Indonesian
society. In May it held a seminar to encourage efforts to
understand and overcome this problem. Several university
centers studying the role of women focus some attention on
domestic violence. One Jakarta-based organization provided
counseling to victims and families in 210 cases of domestic
violence in 1988 and in 94 cases as of April in 1989. The
Ministry of Religious Affairs also offers counseling to
married couples. However, cultural, social, psychological,
and other factors inhibit reporting of such abuse and recourse
to counseling and legal protection.
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INDONESIA
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Private-sector workers are free to form or join unions without
previous authorization, but such unions, in order to be able
to bargain collectively, must belong to the All Indonesia
Workers Union (SPSI), which, for all practical purposes, is
the only legal trade union organization in Indonesia. About 5
percent of the total labor force of nearly 75 million is
organized. The SPSI now consists of 9 departments covering
broad industrial sectors and 9 specialized institutes. It has
representation in all 27 provinces. It estimates that it has
about 10,000 local units at the plant level and over 3 million
members. A number of groups and professional associations,
e.g., the teachers' and journalists' associations and the
Joint Secretariat of Industrial Unions, function as
quasi-trade unions and operate openly, although they do not
have the right to engage in collective bargaining. The SPSI
and its local units draw up their own constitutions and rules
and elect their representatives.
The Government views unions as an essential component of its
development plans, with the role of increasing worker
participation in development, maintaining industrial peace,
and elucidating the Government's philosophy of Pancasila as it
applies to industrial relations. Labor-management relations
in Indonesia are supposed to be carried out within the
framework of Pancasila principles, which emphasize
consultation among the parties and avoidance of
confrontation. There is pressure on SPSI officials to join
GOLKAR, and GOLKAR members dominate the leadership.
The Ormas law discussed in Section 2.b. governs the activities
of the SPSI and the quasi-unions . Government approval is
needed for meetings outside SPSI headquarters. Permission is
routinely given to the SPSI and to nonregistered organizations
overtly functioning as unions. A union may be dissolved, as
with other mass organizations if the Government believes it is
acting against Pancasila tenets. There are no laws or
regulations laying out the procedures for the dissolution of a
union, and there have been no cases of union dissolution.
Although the SPSI maintains extensive international contacts,
it is not affiliated with any international trade union
organization, except the ASEAN Trade Union Council — a regional
body consisting almost exclusively of affiliates of the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). As
a fallout of the 1985 restructuring of the SPSI, there has
been no formal ICFTU presence in Indonesia since 1986.
International trade union secretariats retain links with some
elements of the SPSI, such as the port and maritime workers.
The "Joint Secretariat," grouping elements of the SPSI and the
unions not legally recognized by the Government, has links
with the World Confederation of Labor. The SPSI is seeking to
affiliate with the ICFTU.
All organized workers have a legal right to strike with the
exception of civil servants and employees in the 21 industries
designated by a Presidential Decree in 1963 as vital to the
national interest. Many of the installations and projects
covered by the decree no longer exist or have been absorbed
into other agencies and departments. Those that remain cover
about 170,000 workers.
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INDONESIA
State enterprise employees and civil servants must belong to
KORPRI, the Indonesian corps of civil servants--a nonunion
association chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs. The
central board of KORPRI and its secretariats at the provincial
level have employee relations bureaus, which are responsible
for settling employee disputes. Some government departments
have specific agreements with the Department of Manpower which
call for the convening of a labor committee to resolve
disputes .
A private-sector union must notify the local Department of
Manpower office that its attempts to resolve disagreements
through negotiations have failed and that the union will go on
strike. No approval is required. During 1988 and 1989, there
were 53 reported strikes involving 11,456 workers. Most
strikes are brief, spontaneous, and nonviolent. Some observers
believe that for every officially recorded strike, there may
be 4 to 5 others.
The strike outcomes varied. A review of approximately 20
strikes near Jakarta showed some employee demands were met.
Some involved conciliation by the local branch of the
Department of Manpower, some were resolved through
negotiations with management, and others resulted in the
firing of union officials for ostensibly work-related reasons.
Private-sector industrial disputes are submitted to tripartite
administrative tribunals. These tribunals hear arguments and
issue executable, enforceable decisions. Decisions of the
tribunals and private arbitrators can be enforced through the
courts. The Minister of Manpower can nullify decisions of the
administrative tribunals on legal or national interest
grounds. Although technically the Minister's decisions can be
appealed to the courts, in practice it is rarely done. Under
the law the parties can elect binding arbitration in lieu of
the tripartite settlement mechanism. However, this provision
is seldom used; most cases are handled by the Department of
Manpower's mediation and conciliation service.
Indonesia has ratified International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention 98 on the Right to Bargain Collectively, but has
not ratified Convention 87 on the Freedom of Association.
The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) believes that Indonesian workers are
denied the right of association. Specifically, it alleges
that the SPSI is dominated by the Government and is an agent
of government labor policy, that the Government unilaterally
denies the right to strike in certain industries, that the
Government regularly guarantees a nonunion environment to
foreign investors, and that public employees may not organize
or strike. The ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association
(CFA) has under consideration a 1987 complaint by the ICFTU
which alleges that Indonesian legislation restricts trade
union rights, particularly the rights of government employees,
contrary to the principles of freedom of association and the
provisions of ILO Convention 98. The Committee requested at
its November 1988 session that the Government take steps to
amend its legislation in some areas and to provide additional
information on others. The Government said in its February
response that freedom of association and collective bargaining
are fully respected and that Indonesia is now in the process
of developing "the most suitable pattern" of applying these
rights. In May 1989, the CFA still found that a large section
of the Indonesian work force does not have freedom to form or
B63
INDONESIA
join a workers' organization of their own choosing and
requested the Government to amend its legislation to permit
government employees to establish unions outside the KORPRI
structure and to remove other restrictions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is guaranteed by law; the Department of
Manpower vigorously promotes collective agreements as
instruments of Pancasila industrial relations. The
overwhelming majority of the SPSI's collective bargaining
agreements are negotiated and concluded bilaterally with the
employer. Once an employer has been notified that 25
employees have joined a union, he is under an obligation to
bargain. As a transitional stage to encourage collective
bargaining, regulations require that every company which has
25 or more employees must issue company regulations defining
the terms and conditions of employment. Of the approximately
10,000 local SPSI units, only about half have executed
collective bargaining agreements. In what the Department of
Manpower has characterized as an effort to promote voluntary
negotiations between employees and employers, it has
encouraged the organization of unions. The Minister of
Manpower has set a target of 2,000 collective bargaining
agreements over the next 5 years. By regulation, negotiations
are to conclude within 30 days. If not, the matter is to be
submitted to the Department of Manpower for mediation and
conciliation/arbitration. In practice, most negotiations are
concluded before the end of the 30-day period. Agreements are
valid for 2 years and can be extended for 1 year.
The law protects collective bargaining agreements and the
negotiating process by imposing obligations on both the union
and the employer. Both parties are obligated to execute the
agreements and to bargain in good faith. The law applies
equally in the export processing zones. Some companies in
these zones have SPSI units; however, none has negotiated a
collective bargaining agreement.
Regulations expressly forbid employers from prejudging or
harassing employees because of union membership, and employees
are urged to report harassment to the Government. The SPSI
claims, supported by reported incidents, that some employers
discriminate against its members and those wishing to form
SPSI units. Charges of antiunion discrimination are handled
by the administrative tribunals.
Workers can organize without restriction in a private
enterprise even if it is designated vital by the Government.
If the State has a partial interest, the enterprise is
considered to be in the public service domain, but this does
not legally limit organizing. There are a significant number
of government/private joint enterprises which have labor
unions and which bargain collectively.
The AFL-CIO also alleges that Indonesia denies workers the
right to organize and bargain collectively. The AFL-CIO has
charged that the Government routinely denies permission for
union meetings and subverts collective bargaining by routinely
substituting compulsory arbitration for genuine collective
bargaining. The 1987 ICFTU complaint alleged that Indonesian
regulations permit only the SPSI to register legitimately,
thereby failing to encourage and promote collective
bargaining, and that the laws do not satisfy the antiunion
discrimination requirement of ILO Convention 98.
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INDONESIA
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is strictly prohibited and does not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
In 1987 the Indonesian Department of Manpower issued new
regulations on child labor, acknowledged a class of children
under age 14 who for socioeconomic reasons must work and noted
that Indonesia's child labor laws have not been properly
enforced. These laws provide detailed safeguards, including
requirements for parental consent, prohibition of dangerous
work and night work and limiting the workday to 4 hours.
Employers must also cooperate with public authorities to
assure that children under 14 comply with the 1989 National
Education Law, which requires that children complete 9 years
of school beginning at age 7. However, these regulations are
inadequately enforced, and some observers have called for
national enforcement procedures.
The new regulations call for improved enforcement of the child
labor law. Employers are now required to report in detail on
every child employed, and periodic inspections are to be
carried out by the Department of Manpower. Employers not
complying with the law and regulations will be subject to
fines of $65 and/or up to 3 months in jail for each infraction.
The Manpower Department, as a follow-up to its new
regulations, has issued directives to remind local Department
of Manpower offices of their inspection obligations and to
increase inspection in the informal sectors. However,
according to the Department, as of March 1989 there were only
4,749 children registered as employed in Indonesia. Some
local observers claim that as many as 2 million youths under
the age of 14 are working one-half to full time or more,
though most of these are thought to be employed in family-run
businesses in the informal sector and at agricultural sites
where normal enforcement mechanisms are difficult to
implement. The Department of Manpower admits that employer
compliance with the new regulations is far less than ideal and
that it still lacks qualified inspectors to carry out the
inspections. It estimates that less than 50 percent of
companies employing children have registered.
Present efforts to control child labor focus primarily on
instituting educational programs for children who must work.
Future programs call for allocation of special funds to
provide educational opportunities for working children
cooperating with self-help institutes which will provide
educational programs, and increased government inspection.
The Government, however, still relies upon persuasion and
teaching employers rather than penalizing them.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The law establishes 7-hour workdays and 40-hour workweeks,
with one-half hour of rest for each 4 hours of work. The
daily overtime rate is one and one-half the normal hourly rate
for the first hour, and twice the hourly rate for additional
overtime. Regulations allow employers to deviate from the
normal work hours upon request to the Minister of Manpower
with agreement of the employees.
In the absence of a national minimum wage, minimum wages are
established for each region, and for sectors and subsectors
865
INDONESIA
within the region, by regional wage councils working under the
supervision of the National Wage Council. This is a
quadripartite body consisting of representatives from labor,
management, government, and universities. It also establishes
a basic "physical needs" figure for each province--a monetary
amount considered sufficient to enable a single worker or
family to meet basic needs of nutrition, clothing, and
shelter. The annually calculated figure reflects changes in
the local Consumer Price Index (CPI) for food, clothing,
housing, transportation, and other family needs. Factors
considered by the wage councils ir setting minimum rates
include changes in the local CPI, the skill level of workers,
the local supply of manpower, and the ability of firms to
pay. Minimum wage rates fall short of providing the decent
standard of living the Government envisages. GDP per capita
in 1988 was $434. Figures from 1983, the latest available,
show that 26 per cent of the urban dwellers and 44 per cent of
the rural population live below the absolute poverty level as
defined by the World Bank. The minimum wage in the capital
city of Jakarta ranges between $0.89 and $1.18 per day,
depending on the industry.
A 1989 regulation on minimum wages calls for a review of
minimum wages every 2 years, forbids employers from lowering
wages already higher than the minimum, and provides mechanisms
for enforcement and penalties for employer noncompliance. It
also gives the Department of Manpower a legal basis for
entering the place of work to carry out inspections.
Labor law and ministerial regulations provide workers with
vacation pay, maternity leave, social security insurance,
workplace accident insurance, 12 paid public holidays,
generous overtime and sick leave pay, guaranteed severance and
service pay, paid leave for personal and family occasions, and
protection from delay in payment. In addition, workers
usually receive transportation allowances, food allowances in
cash or in kind or both, and holiday bonuses. Workers in more
modern facilities often receive health benefits, social
security contributions, and free meals.
Observance of the minimum wage varies from sector to sector
and from region to region, and there are no reliable figures
on compliance. Employer violation of overtime and minimum
wage regulations, however, is considered to be fairly common.
Manpower officials, backed by the new minimum wage regulation,
have threatened to audit companies not paying the minimum wage
and to take tougher action.
Both law and regulations provide for minimum standards of
industrial health and safety. Five new health and safety
regulations have been promulgated in the last 4 years. A
national Health and Safety Council was created to oversee the
enforcement efforts of the over 6,000 company safety
committees. The Department of Manpower conducts yearly
national campaigns to promote public awareness of health and
safety needs among workers and employers and administers a
country-wide comprehensive inspection system.
Workers are obligated to report hazardous working conditions
and employers are prevented by law from retaliating against
those who do. An ILO-sponsored program to enhance the
technical capabilities of government inspectors and plant
personnel in the area of chemical and major hazards control
was signed in 1988, and the Government has sought additional
technical assistance from other countries to increase
866
inspection capabilities. Safety and health programs in the
country's over 100,000 larger, registered industries in the
nonoil sector are hampered by a limited number of qualified
inspectors--less than 1,300; the slowness with which the firms
established the required plant safety committees (only about
6,000 as of May 1989); and the need for more and better
training of government inspectors and plant safety personnel.
867
JAPAN
Japan is a parliamentary democracy based on a constitution
adopted in 1947. Sovereignty is vested in the people, and the
Emperor is defined as the symbol of state. On the national
level, power is divided among executive, legislative, and
judicial branches. Executive power is vested in a cabinet,
composed of a prime minister and ministers of state,
responsible to the Diet, Japan's two-house parliament. The
Diet, elected by universal suffrage and secret ballot,
designates the prime minister, who must be a member of that
body. Nearly 70 percent of the electorate usually votes in
general elections, contested by six political parties covering
a broad ideological spectrum. The judicial system has several
layers of courts, with the Supreme Court as final authority.
A well-organized and disciplined national police force
respects the human rights of the populace, although there have
been reports of incidents of misconduct by individual police
officers, including harsh treatment of prisoners in custody.
The police force is firmly under the control of the civil
authorities, and there is no evidence that it resorts to
extralegal measures in the discharge of its duties. The Civil
Liberties Bureau in the Ministry of Justice and the Human
Rights and Refugee Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
monitor problems relating to human rights practices in Japan.
Japan's free market economy has the world's second largest
gross national product. Despite a second quarter net drop in
gross national product caused by introduction of a 3-percent
consumption tax, the economy has continued to expand rapidly
due to increased consumer demand and capital investment.
The Constitution states, "all of the people are equal under
the law and there shall be no discrimination in political,
economic, or social relations because of race, creed, sex,
social status, or family origin." The human rights assured by
the Constitution and Bill of Rights are secured by a just and
efficient legal system. However, alien residents, the
"Burakumin" (a group traditionally treated as outcasts), the
Ainu (Japan's indigenous people), and women experience varying
degrees of discrimination. Current laws against
discrimination contain virtually no penalties for offenders.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudical Killing
There were no known cases of political or other extrajudicial
killing .
b. Disappearance
There were no known cases of abductions, secret arrests,
clandestine detention, or hostage holding by security forces
or any other organization.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment is guaranteed by the Constitution and respected
868
JAPAN
in practice. There is no evidence that penal treatment varies
by social class, sex, or religion.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Freedom from arbitrary arrest or imprisonment is guaranteed by
the Constitution and respected in practice. Japanese law
provides for judicial determination of the legality of
detention. Persons cannot be detained without charge, and
prosecuting authorities must be prepared to demonstrate before
trial that probable cause exists to detain the accused. The
length of time before a suspect is brought to trial depends on
the nature of the crime but rarely exceeds 2 months; the
average is 1 to 2 months. The Ministry of Justice has
stipulated that a detained person should be able to meet with
counsel within 48 hours of the accused's request, though this
time limit has not been honored in a few cases. Counsel is
provided at government expense when the arrested person cannot
afford one. Preventive detention does not exist.
Under the criminal procedure code, a suspect may be held in
police custody for up to 72 hours. This period may be
extended by a judge for up to 25 days if necessary. If an
indictment follows, the suspect is transferred to a criminal
detention facility. The Japan Bar Association opposes the
legislation, which was first presented to the Diet in 1982
(and defeated), on the grounds that police powers need to be
reduced and more fundamental revisions of the detention system
are necessary.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for the right to a speedy and public
trial by an impartial tribunal in all criminal cases, and this
right is respected in practice. The defendant is informed of
charges upon arrest and assured a public trial by an
independent civilian court with defense counsel and the right
to cross-examination. The Constitution assures defendants the
right not to be compelled to testify against themselves as
well as free and private access to counsel, although the right
to such access is sometimes abridged in practice. Defendants
are also protected from the application of laws retroactively
and have the right of access to incriminating evidence after a
formal indictment has been made. Judges are appointed by the
Cabinet for a 10-year term which can be renewed until the age
of 65. Justices of the Supreme Court can serve until the age
of 70, but face periodic review through popular referendum. A
defendant who is dissatisfied with the decision of a trial
court of first instance may, within the period prescribed by
law, appeal to a higher court. There are several levels of
courts, with the Supreme Court serving as the highest judicial
authority. There is no trial by jury in Japan.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Under the Constitution, each search or seizure must be made
upon separate warrant issued by a judicial officer. The
standards for issuing such warrants exist to guard against
arbitrary searches. There are no reports that the Government
or any other organization arbitrarily interfered with privacy,
family, home, or correspondence.
869
JAPAN
Section 2 Respect for Civil Rights, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution, an independent press and judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure
freedom of speech and press.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are guaranteed by the Constitution and
respected in practice.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in the Constitution and
respected in practice. While Buddhism and Shintoism remain
the two major religions, there are many others, including
several Christian denominations. Foreign missionaries are
welcome and receive special visa status. Some temples and
shrines receive public support as treasured national
properties .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Japanese citizens have the right to travel freely, both within
Japan and abroad, to change their place of residence, to
emigrate, and to repatriate voluntarily. Japanese nationality
can be lost by naturalization in a foreign country or failure
to elect Japanese nationality at the proper age.
In 1985 the Government agreed to the permanent settlement of a
total of 10,000 Vietnamese refugees of which about 6,200 have
been processed. An organization was set up by the Government
to train these refugees and find them jobs. Officials working
with the immigrants say they face frequent police harassment
and widespread discrimination in obtaining housing, jobs, and
health care.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Japanese citizens have the right and ability peacefully to
change their government. A parliamentary democracy, Japan is
ruled by the political party or parties able to form a
majority in the lower house of its bicameral Diet. The
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been in power on the
national level — through control of the lower house--
continuously since its establishment in 1955; however,
opposition parties took control of the upper house of the Diet
from the LDP in elections in July. Local and prefectural
governments are often controlled by coalitions. Elections on
all levels are held frequently, suffrage is universal, and
ballots are secret.
Postwar population movements have left some parliamentary
electoral districts overrepresented, in a number of cases by
more than a three-to-one ratio. The Supreme Court has called
for greater equality in the value of votes, but the lack of a
nonpartisan mechanism to make such changes has slowed the
process of adjustment.
870
JAPAN
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigations of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government does not obstruct or inhibit the investigative
activities of international nongovernmental organizations.
Japan is a member of the U.N. Human Rights Commission.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The exclusive nature of Japanese society, reinforced by
cultural and ethnic homogeneity and a long tradition of
isolation from other cultures, has impeded the integration of
minority groups Although the legal system has gradually
evolved toward granting equal opportunity to minorities,
entrenched social prejudice against both Korean residents
(most of whom were born, raised, and educated in Japan) and
the Burakumin (descendants of feudal era "outcasts" who
practiced so-called unclean professions such as butchering and
undertaking) has restricted the access of both groups to
private housing, employment, and marriage opportunities. The
Ainu, descendants of the original inhabitants of Japan, also
have complained of discrimination, especially regarding
employment opportunities. Societal alienation has also been
faced by the nearly 100,000 illegal immigrants, mostly from
south and southeast Asia, who have come in search of jobs,
enticed by a labor shortage and the high value of the yen in
the last few years. Although they suffer social
discrimination, as Japanese citizens Burakumin and Ainu enjoy
equal protection under the Constitution. The Government also
has enacted a special budget measure for area improvement
projects, which provides funds until 1992 to complete projects
started under a similar law which expired last year. That
law, first issued in 1969, was designed to help assimilate
Burakumin into mainstream society through a number of social,
economic, and legal programs.
In recent years the Government has enacted several laws and
regulations extending to permanent resident aliens, 82 percent
of whom are Koreans, equal access to public housing and loans,
social security pensions for those qualified, and certain
public employment rights. However, antidiscrimination laws
affecting Korean residents were initiated as government
guidance and are not backed up by penalty provisions, which
makes enforcement difficult.
The Government addressed an issue of concern to resident
Koreans in 1987 in revising the Alien Registration Law to
require a single fingerprinting of foreign residents rather
than repeated f iiigerprinting at 5-year intervals. Human
rights activists representing Korean residents have called for
complete abolition of the fingerprinting requirement.
In February, following the death of the Emperor, the Ministry
of Justice announced a general amnesty which pardoned, among
others, approximately 10,000 people who had violated an
earlier alien registration law. Some critics of the present
law plan to challenge the section that requires a person to
carry his registration card at all times.
According to law, aliens with 5 years' continuous residence
are eligible for naturalization and the simultaneous
acquisition of citizenship rights, including the right to
vote. In fact, however, relatively few eligible aliens have
871
JAPAN
been naturalized. Many permanent residents are unwilling to
seek naturalization, fearing their cultural identity would be
erased by that act. A high intermarriage rate and changes in
the naturalization law several years ago to allow Japanese
women, as well as men, to convey citizenship to the offspring
of mixed marriages will eventually reduce the number of
noncitizen Korean residents of Japan.
The position of women in society and the home, although
significantly improved during the last few decades, continues
to reflect deep-seated traditional values in which women play
a subordinate role. In this environment, violence against
women, particularly domestic violence, often goes unreported
due to social and cultural concerns for shaming one's family
or endangering the reputation of one's spouse or offspring.
Typically, victimized women more often return to the home of
their parents rather than file reports with authorities. The
Ministry of Justice maintains no statistics on reported crimes
specifically victimizing women and was unable to provide
estimates for those cases which go unreported. Local
governments have begun to respond to a need for confidential
assistance by establishing special women's consultation
departments in police and prefectural offices.
Discrimination by private employers against women is
prohibited by the Constitution. Women comprise 40 percent of
the employed population. Legislation over the past 30 years
has been adjusted to accord them the same legal status as
men. The Equal Employment Opportunity Law of 1985 was aimed
at eliminating sex discrimination in such areas as
recruitment, pay, and working hours. Under this law, the
Ministry of Labor attempts to induce corporate compliance with
its objectives by positive inducements, including subsidies;
it does not enforce them through fines or other punitive
measures. According to some experts on the situation of women
in the workplace, the law has been a valuable tool in
promoting change in employment practices. Other observers
believe that the law as written does not achieve sufficient
compliance from employers. In any case, significant
disparities in pay and access to managerial positions
persist. The public awareness of sexual harassment in the
workplace as a problem appears to be on the rise, as indicated
by an increased frequency of press reports in 1989.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of association as defined by the International Labor
Organization (ILO) is protected. The right of workers to
organize, bargain, and act collectively is assured by the
Constitution. Approximately 26.6 percent of the active work
force belongs to unions. Unions are free of government
control and influence. There is no requirement for a single
trade union structure, and tJiere are no restrictions on who
may be a union official. Most unions are involved in
political activity as well as labor relations. The right to
strike is implicitly assumed by the Constitution, and it was
exercised frequently in 1989. Public employees, however, do
not have the right to strike, although they do have recourse
to mediation and arbitration in order to resolve disputes. In
exchange for a ban on their right to strike, government
employees' pay raises are determined by the Government based
on a recommendation by the independent National Personnel
Authority (NPA) . The right of Japan's fire fighters to
872
JAPAN
organize has been debated in the ILO for over 30 years. At
the end of its 1989 deliberations, the ILO's Committee on the
Application of Standards expressed the firm hope that the
discussions with representative trade unions would be
intensified and that they would soon lead to the recognition
of the fire fighters' right to organize in conformity with
Convention 87 on Freedom of Association. Unions are active in
international bodies, most notably the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and maintain extensive
international contacts.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Constitution states that unions have the right to
organize, bargain, and act collectively and these rights are
exercised in practice. Antiunion discrimination is prohibited
by law and in practice. Members of the armed forces, police,
and fire fighters are not permitted to organize. Japanese law
also allows unions to lobby and to make political campaign
contributions. There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Labor Standards Law prohibits the use of forced labor, and
there are no known cases of forced or compulsory labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Under the revised Labor Standards Law of 1987, minors under 15
years of age may not be employed as workers and those under
the age of 18 years may not be employed in dangerous or
harmful work. Child labor laws are rigorously enforced by the
Labor Inspection Division of the Ministry of Labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor Standards Law provides for the phased reduction of
maximum working hours from the present 46-hour/6-day workweek
to 40 hours by early in the 1990's. Although introduced as a
means of increasing the leisure time available to the work
force, the law has been criticized by employee groups because
of the increased flexibility it gives employers in calculating
actual working hours and vacation benefits. Nevertheless,
despite the fact that 1988 (the last year for which figures
are available) was a year of strong business expansion, annual
hours worked showed a modest decline, reversing a trend which
saw them increase annually since 1975.
Minimum wages are set regionally, not nationally. For
example, effective October 1989, the Tokyo metropolitan area
minimum wage wac $3.75 hourly. This is the highest regionally
set minimum. The minimum wage for Kagoshima prefecture was
$3.18, Japan's lowest regional minimum wage. In addition,
regions have minimum wage rates for certain industries. These
vary from region to region, but they are higher than the
regional minimum wage rates, which are not industry-specific.
These wage rates are sufficient to provide workers and their
families with a decent living. The Ministry of Labor
effectively administers various laws and regulations governing
occupational health and safety, principal among which is the
Industrial Safety and Health Law of 1972.
873
KIRIBATI
Some 63,000 people, mostly of Micronesian and Polynesian
background, occupy Kiribati's 33 islands scattered across a
wide area of the Central Pacific. Kiribati gained full
independence from the United Kingdom in 1979 and became a
republic within the Commonwealth of Nations. It has a
nationally elected president and a 35-member legislative
assembly elected by universal suffrage. Local affairs are
handled in a manner similar to the procedures followed in New
England town meetings. The only security apparatus is a small
police force, responsible to and effectively controlled by
civilian authority.
The economy is very small; the majority of the population is
engaged in subsistence agriculture and farming. The islands'
isolation and their meager resources, including poor soil and
limited arable land, severely limit prospects for economic
development. Fishing is viewed as one of Kiribati's few
economic opportunities.
Kiribati society is egalitarian, democratic, and respectful of
human rights. There were no important human rights issues in
1989.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no politically motivated killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no disappearances, nor was there any evidence of
people being abducted, secretly arrested, or clandestinely
detained.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or other such
treatment are forbidden by the Constitution, and there were no
reported instances of such practices.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution contains safeguards against arbitrary arrest
and detention, which are observed in practice. There is no
exile, internal or external.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to a fair public trial is assured by law and
observed in practice.. The Constitution provides that an
accused person be informed of the nature of the offense with
which he is charged and be provided adequate time and
facilities to prepare a defense. The right to confront
witnesses, present evidence, and appeal convictions is
enshrined in law. Procedural safeguards are based on English
common law and are generally similar to those in Western
democracies. The judiciary is independent and free of
governmental interference. There are no special courts for
874
political or security offenses. Kiribati has no political
prisoners .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The privacy of the home is protected in law and respected by
the Government. There is no arbitrary intrusion by the State
or political organizations into the private life of the
individual. Membership in political organizations is entirely
voluntary.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press are provided for in the
Constitution and observed in practice. Kiribati's radio
station and sole newspaper are government owned. Churches in
Kiribati also publish newsletters and other periodicals.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Kiribati's Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
association, including the right to form or belong to
associations for the advancement or protection of the group's
interests. There are no significant restrictions in practice.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Complete freedom of religion prevails in Kiribati. There is
no state or preferred religion. Missionaries are free to seek
converts and actively do so.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Kiribati citizens are free to travel within the country and
abroad. There are no restrictions on repatriation. Kiribati
has no refugees or displaced persons.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Government is chosen by the people in free and open
elections. Executive authority is exercised by the President,
who is elected by the people. Three presidential candidates
are nominated by the elected House of Assembly from its
members. The current President has held that position since
independence. The only political party is one formed to
oppose some of his policies.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There have been no reported allegations of human rights
violations by the Government and no known reguests for
investigations. There are no local nongovernmental
organizations which concern themselves with human rights. The
Government has not ta''.cn an active interest in international
875
KIRIBATI
human rights matters. Kiribati is not a member of the United
Nations .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, creed, or national origin. The traditional culture, in
which males are dominant, has been an impediment to women
taking a more active role in the economy. This is slowly
changing, and more women are finding work in unskilled and
semiskilled occupations. Statistics on the participation of
women in the work force and comparative wages are unavailable.
Women have full rights of ownership and inheritance of
property. No information is available on violence against
women in this isolated, rural society. If wife beating
exists, it has not become a notable public concern. There
were no reports of discrimination in the provision of social
services by the Government. Kiribati has no significant
discrimination based on race, religion, language, or social
status. Kiribati society, being fundamentally egalitarian,
does not have the privileged chiefly class of some other
Pacific island societies.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Kiribati workers are free to organize unions and choose their
own representatives. The Government does not control or
restrict the unions. Trade union members and properties are
respected. The right to strike is provided for by law.
However, strikes are rare, the last one having taken place in
1980.
Kiribati has a relatively strong and effective trade union
movement. In 1982 the seven trade unions registered in
Kiribati merged to form the Kiribati Trade Union Congress
(KTUC) . It has approximately 2,500 members, most of them
drawn from the public service. The KTUC is affiliated with
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Kiribati
does not belong to the International Labor Organization (ILO).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is a guaranteed right. Negotiations are
generally nonconf rontational, in keeping with Kiribati
tradition. There have been no reports of antiunion
discrimination. Mechanisms exist, however, for resolving any
complaints of antiunion discrimination. Kiribati has no
export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced or compulsory labor in Kiribati.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Kiribati law prohibits the employment of children under age
14. Children age 15 are prohibited from industrial employment
and employment aboard ships. Children are rarely employed
outside the traditional economy.
876
KIRIBATI
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Although legislation authorizing che Government to set minimum
wages exists, it has not yet been implemented. The Government
has under consideration an ILO-funded study on procedures for
establishing minimum wages. Employment laws also provide
basic health and safety standards for the workplace.
Employers must, for example, provide an adequate supply of
clean water for their workers and must ensure the existence of
sanitary toilet facilities. Employers are liable for the
expenses of workers injured on the job. The Government's
ability to enforce employment laws is constrained by a lack of
qualified enforcement personnel, a lack it is attempting to
remedy by improvements in training of the relevant personnel.
Women may not work at night except under specified
circumstances (generally in service jobs such as hotel
clerks). Women are provided up to 12 weeks of maternity leave
and are entitled to not less than 25 percent of their regular
salaries during such leave. Nursing women are allowed
one-half hour twice a day during working hours to nurse a
child.
877
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA*
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) , formed in
1948 during the Soviet administration of the northern half of
the Korean peninsula, is a Communist dictatorship under the
rule of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) . The party exercises
absolute power on behalf of its leader. General Secretary Kim
II Sung, who is also President of the DPRK. Kim II Sung, who
has been in power for 41 years, has groomed his son, Kim Jong
II, as his successor. The younger Kim ranks second in the
party and, like his father, is accorded deity-like status.
The North Korean regime subjects its people to rigid controls.
For each person the regime establishes security ratings which
determine access to employment, schools, medical facilities,
and stores as well as admission to the KWP. Individual rights
are subordinated to the rights of the State and the party.
In the DPRK's centralized economy, the State directs all
significant economic activity. The type of economic reforms
taking place in some other Communist states is absent. The
people have a Spartan standard of living. Despite modest real
growth in its gross national product. North Korea remains a
less-developed country with serious distribution bottlenecks,
nonproductive allocation of resources, and a worsening foreign
debt.
In 1989 North Korea continued to deny its citizens the most
fundamental human rights. The Government did open its first
two Christian churches and allowed more foreign visitors. All
religious organizations are controlled by the party, however,
and only trusted cadres are allowed foreign contacts.
The Government imprisons persons who fail to conform to the
dictates of the State and often exiles them along with their
families to remote villages. The regime permits no
independent press or associations, and little outside
information reaches the general public except that which the
Government approves and disseminates. There is no evidence
that the Government has abandoned its intermittent use of
state-sponsored terrorism.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
According to several defectors who are believed to be
reliable, the regime has summarily executed some political
prisoners and assassinated political opponents of Kim II Sung
and Kim Jong II. For over 20 years North Korea has
*The United States does not have diplomatic relations with the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea. North Korea forbids
representatives of governments that do have relations with it,
as well as journalists and other invited visitors, the freedom
of movement that would enable them to assess human rights
conditions there. Most of this report, therefore, is based on
information obtained over a period of time extending from well
before 1989. While limited in scope and detail, the
information is indicative of the human rights situation in
North Korea today.
878
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
intermittently directed terrorist attacks against South Korea,
including the bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 off the coast
of Burma in November 1987, which killed all 115 people on
board, and the September 1983 bombing in Rangoon, Burma, which
took the lives of 17 high-ranking South Korean officials.
b. Disappearance
There is no information available on disappearance within
North Korea. There are several reports that over the past 10
years the DPRK has kidnaped South Koreans, Japanese, and other
foreign citizens outside of its borders. According to a 1988
report by Asia Watch and the Minnesota Law^'ers International
Human Rights Committee (MLIHRC) , these kidnapings were
apparently carried out to enhance Pyongyang's technical and
espionage capabilities and to provide "defectors" to testify
to the advances of DPRK society.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
As noted in the Asia Watch/MLIHRC report, "all available
evidence indicates that, at least through the early 1980's,
North Korean prisoners were routinely tortured or ill-treated
during interrogation and at times during later imprisonment."
The report noted that many prisoners have died from torture,
disease, starvation, or exposure. Little recent documentation
is available. However, Korean film producer Shin Sang-Ok and
his actress wife, Choi Un-Wui (hereinafter referred to as the
Shins), who claimed to have been kidnaped by North Korean
operatives overseas and who escaped from North Korean
officials in Vienna in 1986, attested to hearing repeated
stories of beatings during incarceration. Shin personally
experienced many other forms of cruel and inhuman treatment,
which he claimed sometimes amounted to torture. This
treatment involved denial of sleep, starvation rations, and
solitary confinement, as well as being required to sit
motionless for long periods of time.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Little information is available on specific criminal justice
procedures and practices in North Korea. North Korea has
refused to permit outside observation of its legal system and
practices .
North Korean law provides that prisoners may be held for
interrogation for a period not to exceed 2 months. This
period may be extended indefinitely, however, if the
Interrogation Department obtains the approval of the Chief
Prosecutor. There are reports of persons being detained for
12 months without trial or charge. Shin noted that it is very
difficult for family members or other concerned persons to
obtain information regarding charges being leveled against an
accused person or even where an accused person is being
detained. Habeas corpus or its equivalent does not exist in
law or in practice.
North Korean defectors to South Korea in 1989 estimated that
the regime holds at least 105,000 political prisoners and
their family members in "concentration camps," where they are
prohibited from marrying and required to grow their own food.
Based on defector testimony and other sources, the Republic of
Korea estimates North Korea detains about 150,000 political
detainees and family members in maximum security camps in
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DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
remote, isolated areas. North Korean officials deny the
existence of such gulags or prisons but admit the existence of
"education centers" for people who "commit crimes by
mistake." The Asia Watch/MLIHRC report lists 12 such prison
camps believed to exist in the DPRK. The camps include four
thought to have been added in 1982 to accommodate between
6,000 and 15,000 new prisoners resulting from a campaign by
Kim Jong II to purge his critics and rivals. The report
states that most maximum security prisoners allegedly have
been confined without trial or formal charges. Visitors and
any form of communication with detainees, although once
allowed, are said to be prohibited.
In 1989 North Korea continued illegally to imprison two
Japanese seamen, Isamu Beniko and Yoshio Kuriura. The DPRK
detained them in October 1983 in retaliation for the defection
of a DPRK army sergeant who stowed away on their ship, the
Fujisan Maru, and sought refuge in Japan. North Korea
announced that the 2 seamen were tried in December 1987 and
sentenced to 15 years' "reformation through labor" for
espionage and "abduction" of a North Korean citizen. North
Korea said it would release the two seamen only if Japan
"delivers" the defector, who was granted permanent resident
status in 1987. North Korea has refused to allow family
visits to the two seamen.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution states that courts are independent and that
judicial proceedings are to be carried out in strict
accordance with the law, which contains elaborate procedural
guarantees. According to the Asia Watch/MLIHRC report, these
safeguards are not followed in practice, and it appears the
party exercises pervasive control over the criminal justice
system. Article 138 of the Constitution states that "cases
are heard in public, and the accused is guaranteed the right
to defense; hearings may be closed to the public as stipulated
by law." There are numerous reports, however, of the Public
Security Ministry dispensing with trials in political cases
and instead referring cases to the Ministry of State Security
for imposition of punishment.
When trials are held, lawyers are apparently assigned by the
Government. According to the Asia Watch/MLIHRC report, defense
lawyers are not considered representatives of the accused, but
rather independent parties who are "expected to help the court
by persuading the accused to confess his guilt." The report
adds, "The counsel must... only present facts to mitigate
punishment . "
The Shins noted a distinction between political and common
criminals, asserting that the State affords trials only to the
latter. North Korea equates "political criminals" with those
who criticize the regime. Numerous other reports suggest that
political offenses include such forms of lese majesty as
sitting on newspapers bearing Kim II Sung ' s picture.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The regime subjects the people to a pervasive program of
indoctrination designed to shape and control individual
consciousness. Preschool children are drilled in homage to
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DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Kim II Sung and his family while school age children are
subjected daily to a half day of indoctrination. Youths and
adults are required to participate in daily ideological
training conducted during school or at places of employment.
Government-organized neighborhood units also provide
indoctrination for persons who neither work nor go to school.
The daily indoctrination requires rote recitation of Party
maxims and policies and strives for ideological purity.
Multiple North Korean security organizations enforce these
controls .
The Government prevents Japanese wives of Koreans repatriated
from Japan since 1959 from visiting Japan. Because their
letters are subject to strict censorship, many have lost
contact with their families.
Although the Constitution states that "citizens are guaranteed
the inviolability of person and residence and the privacy of
correspondence," the practice is otherwise. The Government
has developed a pervasive system of informers throughout the
society and, according to the Shins and several defectors,
electronic surveillance of residences is also pervasive. In
school, the authorities encourage children to discuss what
their parents have said at home. The Government conducts
monthly "sanitation" inspections to check on household
activities. Each house is required to display portraits of
Kim II Sung and Kim Jong II. The Asia Watch/MLIHRC report
concluded that "because of the surveillance and the attendant
risk of consequences, fear appears to govern all social
relationships . "
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although the Constitution states that "citizens have the
freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, association, and
demonstration," the regime permits such activities only in
support of government objectives. Other articles of the
Constitution that require citizens to follow the "Socialist
norms of life" and to obey a "collective spirit" take
precedence over individual political or civil liberties.
Amnesty International's 1988 Report stated that the Government
strictly curtails the rights of freedom of expression and
association guaranteed under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, to which North Korea acceded in
1981. According to these sources, persons criticizing the
President or his policies were liable to punishment by
imprisonment or "corrective labor." A defector interviewed by
Asia Watch/MLIHRC in 1986 reported that a scientist, whose
home was bugged through his radio set, was arrested and
executed for statements made at home critical of Kim II Sung.
Foreign media are excluded, domestic media censorship is
enforced, and no deviation from the official government line
is tolerated. The regime prohibits listening to foreign media
broadcasts except by high government officials, and violators
reportedly are subject to severe punishment. Most urban
households have radio and some have television, but reception
is limited to domestic programming. The Government controls
artistic and academic works, and visitors report that the
primary function of plays, movies, operas, and books is to
contribute to the cult of personality surrounding "the great
leader," Kim II Sung, and "the beloved leader," Kim Jong II.
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DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
No public meetings can be held without government
authorization. There appear to be no organizations other than
those created by the Government. The State even prohibits
apolitical groups such as neighborhood or alumni
organizations. Professional associations exist solely as
another means of government control over the members of these
organizations .
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Although the Constitution provides that "citizens have
religious liberty and the freedom of antireligious
propaganda," the regime, in fact, has severely persecuted
Christians and Buddhists since the late 1940's and
discriminates against persons whose family or relatives once
had a strong religious involvement.
Despite these purges, the regime today uses government-
sponsored religious organizations to proclaim the practice of
religious freedom. The DPRK claims to have 10,000 Christians
who worship in 500 home churches. A few Buddhist temples are
in operation, and the country's first two Christian churches
were built in late 1988. The churches are included in the
fixed itinerary for many foreign visitors to Pyongyang. Some
visitors attest to the authenticity of the church services and
to the faith of the several dozen worshipers observed. Other
visitors say the church activity appears staged. No North
Korean religious official is ever known to have preached that
there is any moral authority higher than that of Kim II Sung.
Worship of Kim, his family, and his juche (self-reliance)
ideology is the only completely functioning religion in North
Korea .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The DPRK regime strictly controls internal travel, requiring a
travel pass for any movement outside one's home village; these
passes are granted only for required official or certain
personal travel. Personal travel is usually limited to
attending the wedding or funeral of a close relative. Long
delays in obtaining the necessary permit often result in denial
of the right to travel even for these limited purposes. State
control of internal travel is also ensured by a ration system
that distributes coupons valid only in the region issued.
Reports, primarily from defectors, indicate that forced
resettlement, particularly for those deemed politically
unreliable, is common. Permission to reside in, or even enter
Pyongyang, the capital, is strictly controlled.
Foreign travel is limited to officials and trusted artists,
athletes, and academics. The regime does not allow
emigration, and only 1,000 or so defectors have succeeded in
fleeing the country. The regime retaliates against the
relatives of those few persons who manage to escape.
In 1989, in a rare departure from isolationist controls, the
DPRK sent students to a short seminar in Japan. Aside from
this, the regime does not allow students to study outside of
882
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Communist countries for any period. It tightened controls
over DPRK students studying abroad when six defected from
Eastern Europe in 1989.
From 1959 to 1982, 93,000 Korean residents of Japan, including
6,637 Japanese wives, voluntarily repatriated to North Korea
in response to nationalistic appeals. Despite DPRK assurances
that the wives, 1,828 of whom still had Japanese citizenship,
would be allowed to go home to Japan every 2 or '^ years, none
is known to have returned to Japan and most have never been
heard of again. The Asia Watch/MLIHRC report and other
sources say most of the returnees and their families are
categorized in the "wavering class," given poor food, clothing,
and housing, subjected to hard labor, and treated with
contempt. When reports of their harsh treatment became known
overseas, voluntary repatriation dried up.
North Korea has permitted entry to several thousand overseas
Korean residents in Japan, China, North America, and elsewhere
to visit their relatives. Recently the regime has granted
entry to greater numbers of other visitors, including
journalists, tourists, and 15,000 foreign participants in the
13th World Festival of Youth and Students held in Pyongyang in
July 1989. Visitors are closely monitored and itineraries are
usually fixed, although some visitors reported they were
allowed to walk freely around the vicinity of their hotels.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
There is no mechanism by which the citizenry can effect
transitions in leadership or changes in government. The
political system is completely dominated by Kim II Sung and
heir-designate Kim Jong II. The legislature, the Supreme
People's Assembly, which meets only a few days a year, has
never taken any action other than unanimous passage of
resolutions presented to it by the leadership. In an effort
to create an appearance of democracy, the DPRK has created
several "minority parties." They exist only as rosters of
officials who have token representation in the People's
Assembly and completely support the government line.
Free elections do not exist in North Korea. Although
elections to the Supreme People's Assembly were held in
November 1986, and to provincial, city, and county assemblies
in November 1989, in all cases the Government approved only
one candidate in each electoral district. According to the
government-controlled media, over 99 percent of the voters
turned out to elect 100 percent of the approved candidates.
Such "elections" are an exercise in which people are forced to
participate and to approve the party's candidates. Despite
the long and rigorous selection process for membership in the
KWP, most party members have no voice in decisionmaking,
serving only to carry out the decrees promulgated by party
leader Kim II Sung and his top subordinates.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
No organizations exist within North Korea to report on or
observe human rights violations. North Korea does not
participate in any international or regional human rights
organizations .
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DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The Government has not allowed Amnesty International (AI),
Asia Watch, the MLIHRC, or any other international
organization to visit North Korea to monitor human rights
practices. A DPRK representative called a preliminary version
of the Asia Watch/MLIHRC report "full of lies and
fabrications," and warned that if it were published, the human
rights organizations would "be held fully responsible for all
the consequences arising therefrom."
When Scandinavian delegates to the World Festival of Youth and
Students attempted to unfurl banners reading "Where is
Amnesty?", they were attacked and temporarily detained by the
police. DPRK officials later gave assurances that two AI
representatives would be permitted to enter, but DPRK delays
in processing the visa applications prevented the trip.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that "women hold equal social status
and rights with men." However, few women have reached high
levels of the party or the Government. Women are represented
proportionally in the labor force, with the exception of small
factories where the work force is predominantly female.
The regime discriminates against the physically handicapped.
Handicapped persons, other than war veterans, are reportedly
not allowed within the city limits of Pyongyang. According to
the Asia Watch/MLIHRC report, authorities check for
deformities in the capital city every 2 or 3 years and remove
the disabled, some of the elderly, widows, and the sick to the
countryside. The dwarf community has been banished to a
remote mountain settlement.
Nothing is known about the extent to which violence against
women is practiced or tolerated.
North Korea is a homogeneous country and is relatively devoid
of minority groups.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Free labor unions do not exist in North Korea. Because the
party by definition purports to represent the interests of
labor, trade unions exist in form only. They do not have the
right to strike.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers have no right to organize or to bargain collectively.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no prohibition on the use of forced or compulsory
labor. The Government routinely uses military conscripts for
forced labor. The Shins reported that conscripts are not told
where they will serve or for how long. AI's 1987 Report cites
reports that some "political prisoners" were allegedly
sentenced to "corrective labor" which could be served at a
person's normal workplace (working for some or no wages) or at
farms or mines in areas where conditions are very harsh.
884
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
No data are a\ailable on the r.inimum age for employment of
chi Idren.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
No data are available on minimum wages or occupational safety
and health. Wages are set by government ministries. The
State assigns all jobs; ideological purity, rather than
professional competence, is the primary standard used in
deciding who receives a particular job. Laborers have no
input into management decisions. Absence from work without a
doctor's certificate results in a reduction in a worker's
rations. The Constitution stipulates a workday limited to 8
hours, but several sources report that most laborers work 12
to 16 hours daily. The regime's propaganda euphemistically
refers to these extra hours as "patriotic labor" done on a
"voluntary" basis by the workers.
885
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The Republic of Korea (ROK) is moving away from its
authoritarian past and has made great strides towards
attaining full democracy. However, the process of
consolidating democratic institutions and practices is still
ongoing. In December 1987, Roh Tae Woo became Korea's first
directly elected President since 1971, defeating three
opposition candidates. In the April 1988 legislative
elections, the three opposition parties together gained
majority control of the National Assembly. Since that time,
the power of the Presidency has been reduced and the role of
the National Assembly greatly enhanced. The current National
Assembly is more independent of the Executive than were
previous assemblies.
Korea's powerful security services v/ere noticeably less active
during 1988 than they had been in the past. However, their
activities increased again in 1989. From April through June,
the Government temporarily grouped representatives of the
security agencies into the Joint Security Investigations
Headquarters (JSIH) . During this period, several hundred
people were arrested for alleged security law violations. The
arrests continued after the JSIH was disbanded in June. While
the police are relatively well trainfed and disciplined, there
were credible reports of the use of excessive force in a
number of instances.
After 3 years of unprecedented 12 percent annual GNP growth,
Korea's export-driven economy slowed somewhat to a still
healthy projected rate of 6 to 7 percent for 1989. Tensions
in labor-management relations continued, while urban housing
shortages, rural migration to the cities, and unbalanced
regional development continued to pose problems. However,
increasing domestic demand suggested continuing strong growth.
In 1988 President Roh released several hundred political
prisoners and the overall human rights situation improved
greatly. However, over the course of 1989, the National
Security Law and the Law on Assembly and Demonstrations were
used with increasing frequency against dissidents. Some
prisoners held on security charges or for labor law violations
were prevented from meeting with their lawyers. There were
some credible allegations of torture. The National Assembly
abolished the Social Safety Act but failed to amend the
controversial National Security Law and the Law on the Agency
for National Security Planning (NSP, formerly the KCIA) .
Nevertheless, on balance Korea remains a much more tolerant
and opan society than in the past. In particular, a
boisterous free press that frequently criticizes the
Government ensures that allegations of human rights violations
are widely publicized.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no documented cases of political killings by the
security forces in 1989. However, some dissident and student
activists have raised questions about the suspicious deaths of
two student leaders. In two cases, students were responsible
for deaths in connection with their political activities. In
May seven riot policemen were killed while trying to free
886
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
colleagues being held hostage by students in Pusan. In
October six student radicals beat to death a suspected student
informer .
On the night of May 3, police in Kwangju stopped a taxi
carrying wanted student activist Lee Choi Kyu. Lee allegedly
escaped from the police in the area of a nearby reservoir.
One week later his body was found floating in the reservoir.
An autopsy resulted in a conclusion of death by accidental
drowning. Some students and dissident activists claimed that
Lee was actually tortured and murdered. However, they
provided no persuasive evidence to back their claim. The
activists' attempt to bring a U.S. specialist to do a second
autopsy as reguested by Lee's parents was initially approved
by the Government. However, the Government later ordered the
American doctor not to examine the body because to do so, the
Government claimed, would have been a violation of the
doctor's visa status.
In August the body of another student leader was found in the
water off the southern coast. The government coroner ruled it
the result of accidental drowning, but in October opposition
members of the National Assembly raised guestions about the
circumstances of the death and demanded that the Government
undertake a new investigation. By year's end, the Government
had completed its new investigation, confirming the original
•conclusion of accidental death.
The seven policemen who were killed in Pusan in early May had
been storming a university building in which student
dissidents held five policemen hostage in a bid to have fellow
students released from jail. When the police stormed the
building, one student ignited a fire that resulted in the
deaths of the seven policemen. Seventy-one students were
tried; 35 received suspended sentences while the others
received sentences up to life imprisonment. Students and
supporters, angered by the sentences, stormed and occupied the
university president's office for 3 days before retreating.
In mid-October, six students at Yonsei University abducted a
student they accused of being an informer and beat him to
death. The six eventually turned themselves in to the police
and have been charged with murder. A trial was pending at
year's end.
In separate incidents in June, two criminal suspects died
shortly after being taken into police custody. Witnesses said
that both men died after being beaten by the police. Nine
people, including seven policemen, were arrested and charged
in connection with these two deaths. The seven policemen and
one civilian security guard were convicted. One policeman was
sentenced to 5 years in prison; the other defendants were
given 3-year sentences.
b. Disappearance
There were no documented cases of permanent disappearances
during 1989.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Some credible allegations of torture were made during the last
half of 1989 by persons arrested under the National Security
Law. They claimed that they were tortured while being
887
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
interrogated by the NSP or the prosecutors. The alleged
mistreatment reportedly included acute sleep deprivation,
being forced to stand during long periods of questioning,
verbal abuse, beatings, and the forced administration of
drugs.
In convicting former National Assemblyman Suh Kyong Won of
espionage in December, the court rejected Suh's claim that he
was tortured into making a confession (Section l.e). Suh's
aide was also convicted of espionage. In the aide's case, the
judges did not rule out the possibility that he was mistreated
while in custody.
In late October, an official of the Ministry of Finance vias
acquitted on charges of taking a bribe when the judge
determined that the official had been tortured into making
false statements. The official had testified that prosecution
investigators had repeatedly beat him in the face and head in
order to make him confess.
Regarding a January 1987 police torture case, the Seoul
District Civil Court in November ordered the Government and a
number of police officials to pay about $194,000 in
compensation to the father of student activist Park Chong
Choi, who died during police interrogation.
The police apparently employed excessive force on some
occasions throughout 1989. In August a group of teachers
collecting signatures supporting their effort to form a union
were reportedly dragged into a police bus and beaten with iron
rods wrapped in newspaper. On August 20, several
demonstrators were beaten, and four of them injured by police
on the grounds of Chonju's Catholic Cathedral. The police
asserted that they went onto the cathedral grounds because the
demonstrators were throwing rocks at them. Throughout most of
the year, student protesters threw rocks and firebombs at
police in demonstrations, except for a 4-veek period in May
following the deaths of the seven Pusan policemen.
Conditions in Korean prisons have reportedly improved
somewhat. However, a report of the Government's Board of
Audit and Inspection revealed a serious shortage of medical
personnel in the prison system. Moreover, human rights
activists still claimed that political prisoners were
sometimes subjected to sleep deprivation and psychological
pressure.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under the Roh administration, Koreans are freer to criticize
the Government than in the past. Nonetheless, over the course
of 1989, the National Security Law was used with increasing
frequency against people who expressed views the Government
considered dangerous. From April through June, the JSIH
investigated alleged security cases and arrested several
hundred persons.
The Government acknowledges that 2,094 people were arrested on
"security-related charges" from the beginning of President
Roh's administration in February 1988 until the end of August
1989. More than half (1,315) were arrested since the
beginning of 1989, including 284 for violating the National
Security Law. This represents a substantial increase over the
779 similar arrests recorded in the 10 months of Roh's
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA
administration in 1988, none of which were for violations of
the National Security Law.
According to the National Police, during the first 18 months
of the Roh Government, 190 people were arrested for publishing
or possessing books or articles originating in or praising
Communist North Korea, 15 for seeking contact with North
Koreans, and 37 for association with "antistate
organizations." In addition, approximately 35 teachers were
arrested in connection with attempts to form a teachers'
union. Union organizers were arrested for trying to exercise
the right of assembly. Allegedly, 150 to 200 trade unionists
were arrested on various charges in 1989.
A major step forward in the human rights area in 1989 was the
National Assembly's decision in May to abolish the Social
Safety Act (also referred to as the Public Security Law), long
opposed because of its broad authority to keep under
surveillance or in custody persons who had completed their
sentences for sedition, espionage, or other security
violations. Disposition of cases under the Social Safety Act
were administrative in nature, and the normal rules of
criminal procedure did not apply; there were limited appeal
rights. The 35 people held under the Act in the Chonju
Preventive Detention Center were all released by the end of
the year.
The Assembly also revised the Act for the Protection of
Society, which allows for preventive detention of habitual
criminals. The revised law more clearly defines those who may
be kept in protective custody, leaves the decision on whether
to impose a custody order in the hands of judges and not
administrative authorities, and requires yearly review of each
detention order. The Government announced that 1,200 of the
4,407 people held under this Act would be released by the end
of 1989. (In fact, 225 people were released.)
Warrants are required by law in cases of arrest, detention,
seizure, or search, unless a criminal is apprehended while in
the act of committing a crime. However, lawyers state that
warrants were not presented at the time of detention in many
cases throughout 1989. In some political cases, suspects were
detained for more than the legal limit of 48 hours without
being formally arrested. (Student activist Im Su Kyong, who
visited North Korea without government permission, was
detained on August 15 and not charged until August 20.) In
criminal cases indictments must be handed down within 30 days
of arrest or 50 days in National Security Law cases. However,
these requirements were not always observed.
The Constitution specifically provides the right to
representation by an attorney, but attorneys are not allowed
to be present during interrogation. Lawyers say that in
National Security Law cases they are very rarely allowed to
see their clients at all during the investigation phase, which
can last up to 50 days. In 1989 lawyers for the first time
sought court orders allowing them to see their clients.
However, on at least three occasions in July and August,
either the National Security Planning Agency or the prosecutor
refused to respect court orders calling on them to allow
prisoners arrested under the National Security Law to meet
with their attorneys. On September 1, the Government proposed
to the National Assembly an amendment to the National Security
Law which would legalize the prosecutor's current de facto
control over when, where, and for how long lawyers are allowed
889
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
to see clients being investigated for security law
violations. The National Assembly has not yet acted on this
proposal .
There is a functioning system of bail in Korea. Late in the
year bail was even granted in some National Security Law
cases. In early November, a Seoul judge granted bail to a
student activist who had been arrested for distributing
"materials benefiting North Korea," without having received a
bail request from the defendant. Later in the month three
minor figures in the Suh Kyung Won case were also released on
bail. The right to a judicial determination of the legality
of a person's detention was deleted from the Code of Criminal
Conduct in 1973, partially restored in 1980, and then fully
restored in late 1987.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of a Fair Public Trial
The Constitution gives defendants a number of rights in
criminal trials, including a presumption of innocence,
protection against self-incrimination, freedom from ex-post
facto laws and double jeopardy, and the right to a speedy
trial. When a person is physically detained, his initial
trial must be completed within 6 months of arrest. These
rights are generally observed.
The Chief Justice and the other Justices of the Supreme Court
are appointed by the President with the consent of the
National Assembly. Lower court justices are appointed by the
Chief Justice with the consent of the other Justices.
Trials are open to the public, but attendance is sometimes
restricted. A large number of police are present at some
trials; courtroom audiences sometimes create disturbances and
disrupt the proceedings. Judges generally allow considerable
scope for examination of witnesses by both the prosecution and
defense counsel. The right to an attorney is respected in
political cases once the initial investigation is completed.
Political and criminal cases are tried by the same courts;
military courts do not try civilians. Defendants have the
right of appeal, and appeals can result in reduced sentences.
Death sentences are automatically appealed.
Historically the executive branch exercised great influence on
judicial decisions. However, there were some indications of
increased judicial independence in 1989. In a number of cases
the Constitutional Court, which began operations in September
1988, found that the Government had violated the
constitutional rights of individuals. The Supreme Court
invalidated the results of elections for two National Assembly
seats due to election law violations by the victorious ruling
party candidates. Meanwhile, lower courts convicted two
brothers of former President Chun Doo Hwan and one of Chun's
closest aides on corruption charges and sentenced them to
prison. A Seoul court also acquitted a government official of
bribery charges when the judge determined that prosecution
investigators had beaten him in order to extract a confession.
However, criticism that the judiciary is still subject to
political influence in politically sensitive cases remains.
Human rights sources put the number of "political" prisoners
at around 800 at the end of 1989. This figure includes
persons who committed acts of violence such as firebomb
890
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
attacks on government facilities. In some cases, it appears
that the National Security Law was used to restrict the
exercise of the basic rights of free speech and assembly.
According to the Justice Ministry, 695 people were actually
imprisoned for "security-related offenses" during the first 8
months of 1989. As of mid-September, 219 were already tried
and convicted while the rest still awaited trial.
It is difficult to estimate accurately the number of political
prisoners since many people are detained and then released
without charges or charged and then released without being
tried. It is particularly difficult to determine if someone
is a political prisoner in cases involving the Law on Assembly
and Demonstrations and the Labor Laws. In November the
Government announced that 646 people were in custody for
"National Security" reasons, including 342 charged under the
National Security Law, 226 charged under the Law on Assembly
and Demonstrations, and 91 charged under various laws for
their participation in labor disputes. Without specific
information on each case, it is impossible to tell if someone
was arrested for exercising the right of free association or
for violent acts during demonstrations. However, it is
estimated that as of August 1989, the number of political
prisoners by international human rights standards is in the
low hundreds. This figure was not substantially changed by a
Christmas amnesty under which 27 people whom the Government
described as "radical leftists" were released from prison.
The Government asserts there are no political prisoners.
The most highly publicized National Security Law cases of 1989
involved unauthorized travel to North Korea. The Government
maintains that it must control all contact with North Korea,
which it defines in the National Security Law as an "antistate
organization." The Government approved the February visit to
North Korea of the honorary chairman of Hyundai, a large
industrial organization. However, subsequent visits by
dissident pastor Moon Ik Hwan, student activist Im Su Kyong,
and Catholic priest Mun Kyu Hyun were not authorized and the
three were arrested under the National Security Law upon their
return. The three were charged with visiting the North
without authorization, making statements praising North Korea,
and "supporting the northern line." In early October, Rev.
Moon Ik Hwan was convicted and sentenced to 10 years
imprisonment. Both the prosecution and the defense are
appealing this decision.
The Government also charged former opposition National
Assemblyman Suh Kyung Won with espionage after it was learned
in June that he had visited North Korea without government
permission. Suh admitted going to North Korea, but denied
that he had spied for the North. In December a Seoul court
rejected Suh's contention that he was forced to sign a false
confession and convicted him of espionage. Suh was sentenced
to 15 years in jail.
In addition, a number of people — including Kim Dae Jung, the
leader of Korea's largest opposition party--were charged under
the National Security Law for knowing about these unauthorized
trips and failing to inform the authorities. No further legal
action was taken against Kim Dae Jung. However, nine people
tried on this charge in connection with the Suh case were
convicted and given suspended sentences.
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
In general, the Government honors the right of personal
privacy and the integrity of the home and family. However,
many political and religious figures are still subjected to
varying degrees of government surveillance. Opposition
assemblymen have charged in the National Assembly that
telephone tapping and the opening or interception of
correspondence are prevalent. In August the chief of the
Korean National Police (KNP) told the National Assembly that
of some 53,116 people convicted of violating the National
Security Law, some 10,000 are still under surveillance. In
late July, police and agents of the NSP broke into the
campaign headquarters of a dissident candidate running in a
National Assembly by-election. The agents reportedly stole a
document on campaign strategy.
Listening to North Korean radio is illegal if the authorities
judge it is for the purpose of "benefiting the antistate
organization" (i.e.. North Korea). Reading or purveying books
or other literature considered to be subversive, pro-Communist
or pro-North Korean is also illegal. Beginning with Moon Ik
Hwan's visit to North Korea in early 1989, an increasing
number of people were arrested for these kinds of offenses.
The security presence in city centers, near university
campuses, government buldings, ruling party offices, and media
outlets is heavy. Citizens, particularly students and young
people, are sometimes stopped, questioned, and searched.
Government informants are known to be posted on and around
university campuses.
Parental rights to educate children are broad. Persons
thought to have politically suspect backgrounds, however, are
still denied some forms of employment and advancement,
particularly in government, the broadcast media, and
education. Many human rights activists say that big
corporations still retain an informal system of blacklisting
"undesirables . "
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Government continues to apply the National Security Law
against publishers, printers, and distributors who produce or
sell "subversive, ideological" literature. Restrictions on
the expression of ideas which the Government considers
Communist or pro-North Korean remain severe, despite
provisions in the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of
speech. The Seoul district court in late September ruled in a
civil case that the Culture and Information Ministry's policy
of banning "antistate" and "antisociety" books was illegal.
However, this did not prevent the Government from publishing
an updated list of banned books in late November.
Overall, the expression of opposition views is far less
restricted than under previous administrations, and debate is
allowed on previously taboo subjects, such as criticism of the
President and his family. The Government has allowed an
increase in media coverage of North Korea, within its
guidelines, producing a reaction by rightwing factions which
hope to counter such leftist journalism with new publications
of their own. The Government has also allowed somewhat wider
892
REPUBLIC QF KOREA
public access to selected North Korean publications. Many
newspapers and magazines, mostly leftwing and sharply critical
of the Government, appeared in Korea after the 1987 press law
took effect.
Although direct government control over the print media has
virtually disappeared, some institutions such as the Defense
Security Command, the NSP, and other government organizations
with responsibility for North Korean or Communist affairs
remain basically inaccessible to journalists.
The Government arrested editorial writer Lee Young Hee of the
newspaper Hankyoreh Shinmun for planning unauthorized coverage
of North Korea. Some see Lee's arrest as an effort to still
his editorial voice, though there has been no censorship of
the paper's scathing criticism of the Government. Lee was
convicted and given a suspended sentence. Also, a Hankyoreh
Shinmun reporter was charged with failing to report to
authorities an interview with Assemblyman Suh Kyung Won
concerning Suh's unauthorized trip to North Korea.
The move to unionize newspapers throughout the country, begun
in 1988, continued to be a major source of conflict in Korean
newspaper and broadcasting organizations. All major
newspapers and broadcasting corporations in Seoul now have
labor unions.
Despite indirect government ownership of the two Korean
television networks, the electronic media moved toward a
relatively neutral political stance while still remaining less
independent than the print media. Behind this trend, in part,
lies the increasing importance of labor unions in the
broadcasting industry.
The Government continues to limit academic freedom, both
directly and indirectly. Professors and university
administrators are expected to play an active role in
preventing campus demonstrations, a task many find
objectionable. There is rising sentiment for greater
university autonomy. There is also a threat to academic
freedom from radical leftist students who physically attack
the person or property of professors whose lectures or
writings contradict the students' ideology.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Most peaceful, nonpolitical assemblies take place entirely
without official supervision or restriction. However, the Law
on Assembly and Demonstrations prohibits assemblies considered
likely to "undermine" public order, and requires that
demonstrations of all types, including political rallies, be
reported in advance to the police. Violation of the law
carries a maximum sentence of 7 years' imprisonment or a
fine.
The Government continues to block many gatherings organized by
dissidents and particularly students, arguing that they might
incite "social unrest" and are therefore illegal. Police
usually try to prevent student demonstrations from moving off
campuses, and confrontations frequently ensue. These clashes
often involve violence on both sides.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
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RF.PIIRT.TC OF KOREA
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion in Korea. Full freedom prevails
for proselytizing, doctrinal teaching, and conversion. Korea
both sends and receives missionaries of various faiths, and
many religious groups in Korea maintain active links with
members of similar faiths in other countries. The Government
and the public do not discriminate against minority sects.
Adherence to a particular faith confers neither advantages nor
disadvantages in civil, military, or official life.
Churches and religious groups are subject to most of the
restrictions on political activities that apply to other
institutions. Many of the most vocal and well-organized
critics of the Government are religious in nature; these
include Catholic, Protestant, and Buddhist groups. Church
buildings and grounds are sometimes used as a refuge by
leftwing rioters during clashes with police. While the police
generally respect the principle of sanctuary, they entered the
grounds of the Catholic cathedrals in Seoul and Chonju in
1989. Occasionally, police have entered church buildings in
order to confront students, dissidents, or trade unionists.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There is universal freedom of movement and freedom to change
employment within the country. On January 1, the Government
dropped all age limitations on foreign travel. Previously
these restrictions had prevented most young and middle-aged
people from going overseas. Travel to North Korea is allowed
only with Government approval. Political opponents are
sometimes banned from overseas travel even if they are not
being sought by the authorities for the commission of a
crime. For the first 8 months of 1989, the Government
announced that 1,955 people were forbidden to go overseas.
This figure includes those involved in criminal offenses,
government and business figures under investigation in
connection with Fifth Republic corruption, dissidents and
student activists. Some students were barred from going
abroad in late June to prevent their participation in
Pyongyang's World Youth Festival. Other students were
prohibited from foreign travel because they were suspected of
organizing antigovernment demonstrations, trying to contact
North Koreans, or attempting travel to North Korea.
A small number of Indochinese refugees sought first asylum in
Korea in 1989. In midyear the Korean Government adopted a
policy of refusing landing to boats of Indochinese asylum
seekers. A group of 78 Vietnamese boat people set fire to
their boat in June to avoid being driven back out to sea by
the maritime police; they were eventually taken to the Korean
resettlement camp in Pusan. In late August, a boat carrying
about 150 Vietnamese boat people was not allowed to land.
Korean authorities did not admit that they denied landing.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Korean people have the right to freely and fairly choose
their own government. In 1987 they chose their President in a
free and fairly contested election. In 1988 legislative
elections, they chose a majority of opposition party members
to the National Assembly.
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The Constitution, as amended in 1987, provides for the direct
election of the President and for a mixed system of direct and
proportional election of legislators. The President serves a
single 5-year term and cannot be reelected. The Assembly's
term is 4 years. The new Constitution strips the President of
his power to dissolve the Assembly. There is universal
suffrage for all citizens age 20 or above, and elections are
held by secret ballot.
Political power has traditionally been centered in the person
of the president, strongly supported by the military and
security agencies. The situation began to change, however,
when the three opposition parties won a majority in the
National Assembly in the April 1988 general election.
There is as yet no local autonomy in Korea, although the
Assembly passed a law in December calling for local council
elections in 1990 and local chief executive elections in
1991. The President and the members of the Assembly are the
only elected officials in the country.
The National Assembly in 1989 continued its more independent
role. In addition to abolishing the Social Safety Act and
amending the Act for the Protection of Society, the Assembly
also amended the Law on Assembly and Demonstrations. Because
of the Assembly's more independent role, the President used
his veto power on a number of occasions during the year.
Nonetheless, the Assembly has been marked by differences of
opinion, not only between the ruling and opposition camps, but
also among the opposition parties themselves. These
differences have prevented the Assembly from amending other
laws remaining from former President Chun Doo Hwan's Fifth
Republic which many Koreans consider to be undemocratic.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
While the Republic of Korea does not welcome outside
involvement with respect to human rights, government and
ruling party officials have generally been willing to meet
with international human rights groups, including a group from
the Robert F. Kennedy Foundation that visited Korea in
November. That group was confronted with protesters during
its stay in Seoul, but the Government denied any involvement.
In addition, foreign human rights groups have been allowed to
observe elections, and the Government has regularly discussed
human rights with foreign diplomats. In the case of student
activist Lee Choi Kyu ' s death, the Government refused to allow
an American doctor to perform a second autopsy as requested by
the student's parents.
According to the Government, public prosecutors and the human
rights division of the Ministry of Justice are responsible for
protecting human rights and investigating violations. The
Government points to President Roh ' s June 29, 1987 pledge of
democratization and the developments that followed as proof of
the current Government's full commitment to democratization
and the safeguarding of basic human rights.
The Government justifies its broad security laws and the
resulting restrictions by arguing that Korea is in a special
situation. The Korean war ended with the signing of an
armistice, not a peace treaty, and North Korea remains a
formidable threat. The Government asserts that unauthorized
895
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
attempts to contact North Korea threaten the Government's
efforts to ensure peaceful reunification on the basis of
democracy and respect for human rights.
The National Assembly and the major political parties all have
committees concerned with various aspects of human rights. In
addition, several nonaffiliated private organizations are
active in promoting human rights. Chief among these groups
are the Lawyers Group for a Democratic Society, the Human
Rights Committee of the Korean National Council of Churches,
the Catholic Priests* Committee for Justice and Peace, the
Korean Bar Association, and the Korean Legal Aid Center for
Family Relations. These groups publish reports on the human
rights situation in Korea and make their views known both
inside and outside the country.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Republic of Korea is a densely populated and racially
homogeneous country. There are no ethnic minorities of
significant size. Nonetheless, regional rivalries exist in
Korea. Many Koreans believe that persons from the
southwestern region (North and South Cholla provinces) have
traditionally faced discrimination and that successive
governments led predominantly by figures from the southeastern
region (North and South Kyongsang provinces) have neglected
the economic development of the Cholla provinces.
Korea's conservative Confucian tradition has left women
subordinate to men socially, economically, and legally. Some
progress has been made since the founding of the Republic:
women can vote, becom.e government officials, and hold elected
office. Women enjoy full access to educational opportunities.
The National Assembly enacted an Equal Employment Opportunity
Law in 1988, which condemns sexual discrimination in hiring
and wages and calls for improved work conditions for women
(for example, no night work and limits on overtime). However,
it contains no enforcement provisions and has had only limited
practical effect so far.
Despite a constitutional guarantee of equal rights for men and
women, traditional social customs are still refLected in the
law, particularly in family law. Some forms of discrimination
still remain in family, law and women's rights groups actively
campaign for changes. For example, the father has final
parental rights over the children in divorce cases. In
December the National Assembly passed a revised family law
which for the first time mak^s it possible for a woman to head
a household and to inherit property upon the death of her
husband. (Women can hold property in their own names.) The
new law increases the wife's share of the estate to 50 percent
upon her husband's death and divides the remainder equally
among male and female children. The revised law also
abolishes the household head's right to designate where the
members will live, abolishes the requirement that a married
couple move to the husband's place of residence, and expands
the legally recognized family relationship to include the
wife's relatives.
Korea experienced a jump in traditionally low rates of violent
crime in 1989. Although violent crimes are directed against
women, reliable data on their prevalence are not available. A
number of cases have surfaced involving women being kidnaped
896
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
and sold into prostitution. Wife beatings and other abuses of
women are known to be a problem, but no reliable data on their
extent are available. The Government has made crimes against
women one of its top priorities in its law and order campaign
and arrested and prosecuted suspects in several cases.
However, a number of female kidnap victims have complained
that the police were unhelpful or unsympathetic to their
attempts to escape from their abductors.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution gives workers the right to free association.
When a new union is formed, it must notify the Government.
New unions continued to register in large numbers during
1989. As of February 1989, some 1.7 million workers, or 22
percent of the civilian work force, was unionized. Only one
union is permitted at each place of work, and there is no
minimum number of members required to form a union. Companies
have taken advantage of this provision of the law to form
small, company-controlled unions, which labor organizers have
often found difficult to replace with more representative
unions .
The majority of Korean trade unions are affiliated with the
Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) . The FKTU is
affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions. Most of its constituent unions maintain affiliations
with international trade secretariats. Some 15 percent of
unionized labor belongs to so-called "democratic unions,"
which are not affiliated with the FKTU. These unions are
grouped into regional councils, but have no national
organization. However, plans are underway for a new national
organization called the National Council of Labor Unions. (In
fact, the law prohibits the formation of a second national
union structure.) The non-FKTU unions are not affiliated with
international labor groups.
In the spring of 1989, the National Assembly passed several
amendments to the Trade Union Law, which would have lifted the
ban on union involvement in electoral politics and legalized
some public sector unions. However, President Roh vetoed the
bill. The President also vetoed amendments to the Labor
Dispute Adjustment Act which would have modified the
prohibition against third-parties--except for the Government
and the FKTU — intervening in labor disputes. So far the
Government and National Assembly have had little success
agreeing on reforms that would improve the legal framework for
labor-management relations, which basically remains unchanged
from the Fifth Republic.
Korea is not a member of the International Labor Organization
(ILO), but has sent observer delegations to the ILO annual
conferences since 1982. Korea is interested in joining the
ILO. In preparation for eventual membership, the Ministry of
Labor has prepared an analysis of how well Korea's labor laws
comply with ILO standards as well as proposals for closing
most of the remaining gaps.
Strikes are prohibited in government agencies, state-run
enterprises, and defense industries. Laws requiring that
enterprises in public interest sectors such as public
transportation, utilities, public health, banking,
broadcasting, and communications submit to government-ordered
897
RKPIIRT.TC OF KOREA
arbitration restrict the ability of workers in these
industries to strike. The Labor Dispute Adjustment Law
requires that unions notify the Ministry of Labor of an
intention to strike and mandates a 10-day "cooling-off period"
before a strike can actually begin. (The cooling-off period
is 15 days in public interest sectors.)
The Government began to take a more active role in
labor-management disputes in 1989. Riot police broke up a
number of illegal strikes, including those by Seoul subway
workers, workers at Poongsan Metal (a major ammunition
manufacturer), and a protracted strike at the Hyundai
shipyards. The Government has also taken a hard line against
attempts to form a teachers' union. Such a union is illegal
under current law. As of early September, over 1,300
unionized teachers had been fired and more than 40 arrested.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Constitution and the Trade Union Law guarantees the
autonomous right of workers to enjoy freedom of association,
collective bargaining, and collective action. Extensive
collective bargaining is practiced. Korea's labor laws do not
extend the right to bargain collectively to government
employees, including employees of state or public-run
enterprises and defense industries. A 1985 law provides that
workers in Export Processing Zones (EPZ's) are to receive the
same right to bargain collectively as other workers. In
practice, equal treatment in the two existing EPZ's began only
in the summer of 1987. But in response to a law suit filed by
a Japanese company operating in the Masan EPZ , the Ministry of
Labor concluded in August that a 1970 law required the
Government to treat companies operating in the EPZ's as
public-interest enterprises. This designation will make it
difficult for unions at EPZ companies to strike legally,
because in cases of labor-management disputes in public sector
enterprises, the parties can be required by the Government to
accept mandatory arbitration. While arbitration decisions can
be appealed in the courts, such disputes tend to be prolonged.
As part of its more active labor policy, the Government has
also begun an extensive public relations campaign to convince
workers that wage increases must be matched by similar
increases in productivity. The effort is intended to hold
wage increases in 1990 to under 10 percent.
There is no independent system of labor courts. The central
and local labor committees form a semiautonomous agency of the
Ministry of Labor that adjudicates disputes in accordance with
the Labor Dispute Adjustment Law. Each labor committee is
composed of equal representation from labor, management, and
"the public interest." The local labor committees are
empowered to decide on remedial measures in cases involving
unfair labor practices and to mediate and arbitrate labor
disputes .
Many major employers are strongly antiunion. In a number of
cases, "save the company squads" have been hired to beat up
union organizers and to intimidate workers. The authorities
have not been effective in investigating such incidents. In
one case, an employee of a striking Seoul taxi company was
killed by fellow employees. The union claimed the
assailants — who were arrested — were part of a "save the
company squad." The authorities claimed otherwise, describing
them as "anti-union workers." As in the past, there have been
898
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
cases of violence against property by workers, often causing
extensive damage. There have also been cases in which workers
have held company executives against their will for brief
periods of time.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution provides that no person shall be punished,
placed under preventive restrictions, or subjected to
involuntary labor except as provided by law and through lawful
procedures (Art. 12, Sec. 1). Forced or compulsory labor is
not condoned by the Government. The Government has
investigated a number of incidents in which private persons
sold women into prostitution and forced men to work
involuntarily on fishing boats. The Government has also
investigated a number of charges by workers that employers
were demanding compulsory labor in the form of overtime work
beyond the legal maximum.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Korean Labor Standards Law prohibits the employment of
persons under the age of 13 without a special employment
certificate from the Ministry of Labor. However, because
there is compulsory education until the age of 13, few special
employment certificates are issued for full-time employment.
Some children are allowed to do part-time jobs such as selling
newspapers. In order to gain employment, children under 18
must have written approval from their parents or guardian.
Employers may require minors to work only a reduced number of
overtime hours and are prohibited from employing them at night
without special permission from the Ministry of Labor.
Nevertheless, employers often treat employees under 18 as
"regular" workers and do not accord them the legal protections
to which they are entitled. A large proportion of production
line workers in labor-intensive industries such as textiles,
apparel, footwear and electronics are girls in their
midteens. These girls often work in small, cramped, and
sometimes dangerous workplaces.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Korea implemented a minimum wage law in 1988. The minimum
wage level is reviewed annually and in 1989 was set at the
equivalent of $215 per month. The law does not apply to all
places of business. Small companies and companies in the
service sector are exempt. Some exempted companies,
particularly small ones, still pay below-minimum wages.
The FKTU continues to claim that the current minimum wage does
not meet the minimum requirements of urban workers. According
to government statistics, the money an average Korean
blue-collar worker takes home in overtime and bonuses
significantly raises the total compensation package. The
National Bureau of Statistics announced that in the first
quarter of 1989 the average monthly salary for an urban head
of household was $891 (at won 671 per dollar), up 21.2 percent
over the same period in 1988. According to the Bureau of
Statistics, the average monthly income of an urban household
was $1,110, up 21.5 percent (in won terms) from the first
quarter 1988 figure. Pockets of urban poverty remain, but
abject poverty has largely been eliminated. According to the
Government's Economic Planning Board, 5.5 percent of the
population lived below the poverty level in 1987.
899
RKPUBLIC OF KOREA
The Labor Standards and Industrial Safety and Health Law
provide for a maximum 60-hour workweek. Amendments to the
Labor Standards Law passed in March 1989 will bring the
maximum regular workweek (excluding overtime) down from 48
hours to 46 and then to 44 hours over the next 2 years.
According to the Government, the average Korean worker works
51.3 hours each week.
The Government sets health and safety standards, but the
Ministry of Labor employs few inspectors, and the standards
are not effectively enforced.
900
LAOS
The Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) is a one-party,
Communist state. The Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP)
is the source of all political authority in the country, and
the party's leadership imposes broad and arbitrary controls on
the population of approximately 3.9 million people.
The LPRP came to power in 1975 after a protracted civil war,
during which it received strong support from North Vietnam.
Vietnam continues to exert considerable influence over Laos,
codified in the 25-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
signed in 1977. The number of Vietnamese troops and advisers
in Laos, however, has been declining since late 1987. The
total of 40,000 to 50,000 troops originally stationed in Laos
under the terms of the treaty has been greatly reduced. There
have been reports that all Vietnamese combat troops and most
military advisers have been withdrawn. In the last 2 years
the LPDR has been working to improve relations with the West
and to attract more Western assistance. The U.S.S.R. is also
very influential in Laos; it is the largest contributor of
economic and military assistance. Laos has begun to accept
Soviet concepts of perestroika (restructuring), although the
LPDR is seeking its own Lao formulation appropriate to its
highly underdeveloped conditions.
Established 14 years ago, the LPDR still has no constitution
and no published code of law. However, elections were held in
March for a national assembly to draft a constitution. All
candidates in this election were approved by the LPRP,
although a number of victorious candidates were not party
members. A constitution is not expected before mid-1990 at
the earliest.
Laos is one of the poorest countries in the world. The
Government's harsh policies, particularly in its first 5
years, combined with difficult economic conditions in general,
drove some 350,000 Lao into exile. Among those refugees were
most of the educated elite. Laos accelerated its economic
reform efforts in 1988 and 1989. These reforms are designed
to stimulate domestic and foreign investment and to improve
the efficiency of state-owned enterprises. Laos has also
opened its economy to Thai and Western businessmen. Although
the economy is improving as a result of these reforms and the
ability of many citizens to participate in an emerging private
or mixed state/private sector, the average standard of living
remains extremely low.
Although difficult for outside observers to judge accurately,
the human rights situation appeared to have improved in 1989.
Freedom of movement within the country and travel abroad has
increased, and the instruments of state control, principally
the police and other elements of the Ministry of Interior,
seemed to be less evident and perhaps less oppressive.
Nevertheless, there continue to be severe limitations on
freedom of speech and press and on freedom of assembly and
association. Most reeducation camps have been closed and the
bulk of the prisoners released. An unknown number of inmates,
but at least 34, are entering their 14th year of
incarceration, without benefit of judicial trial or legal
review for release. Many former camp prisoners apparently
have been able to obtain work; some of them now have
responsible, professional positions both with the Government
of Laos and with international organizations present in
Vientiane. Some, however, appear to be blacklisted and able
to find only menial positions. These persons seem to be able
901
LAOS
to obtain passports and visas as freely as any other Lao and
have been able to travel overseas, despite the fact that some
have not returned.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There are sporadic reports of shooting incidents involving
organized groups leaving or entering Laos illegally. At least
one group of Hmong tribesmen leaving Laos for Thailand was
reported to have been pushed back and then suffered casualties
from LPDR forces. In addition, in August the Government
claimed to have intercepted and killed or captured in southern
Laos over 60 armed Vietnamese hostile to the Hanoi Government
who had intended to reenter Vietnam. There are occasional
reports that government patrols have fatally shot persons
leaving or entering Laos illegally. In those instances in
which the Government confirms such incidents, it generally
claims that the persons were smugglers or members of the
resistance. An unknown but small number of people are killed
annually in military operations against resistance forces.
Many of the insurgents appear to be former Royal Lao Army
troops and Hmong tribesmen. Both sides are reported to use
brutal tactics, with antigovernment forces attempting
assassination and ambush of government military and civilian
personnel. There are also recurrent reports of attacks by
bandit groups in isolated or interior areas on vehicles
bearing government officials and on civilian buses. Official
policy calls for the execution of resistance leaders, but no
such executions were reported in 1989.
b. Disappearance
No disappearances were reported in 1989.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
A relatively small number of "reeducation" prisoners continue
to be held in harsh conditions but recent details are not
available. The police do not appear to use torture or
degrading or cruel treatment during arrest or detention,
although prison conditions are stark.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Government continues to maintain reeducation camps, or
"seminar camps," in which persons who served the Royal Lao
Government, or who have offended the current government, are
imprisoned. Even rough estimates for the population of these
camps are difficult to make, but range from a minimum of 34
political detainees left from the original population of Royal
Lao Government officials to over 1,000. The higher number
allegedly includes the original 34 plus many who were
imprisoned during the late 1970 's and the 1980's. Government
officials continued to claim, as they had previously, that
nearly all soldiers and officials sent to the camps in 1975-76
had been released and that very few remained. The accuracy of
that statement cannot be verified. There were reports of
releases of groups of up to 300 persons in 1988. There were
reports of additional, substantial releases of camp prisoners
902
LAOS
in 1989, but firm numbers were not available. Since 1979
conditions in the remaining camps reportedly have improved,
and the majority of the camps have been reported closed. The
Government claims that all reeducation camps have been closed.
However, this claim has not been verified.
Remaining detainees now live in a kind of internal exile in
isolated provincial areas with severe restrictions on their
freedom of movement. Many reportedly have been assigned to
collective farms or construction units inside their former
camps. Some are on probation or cannot obtain necessary
travel documents. Others who have lost property and families
are reported to have remained in areas near the camps to begin
new lives.
Those accused of hostility to the regime or of what the
Government calls "socially undesirable habits," such as
prostitution, drug abuse, idleness, and "wrong thought," are
sent to "rehabilitation" centers, usually without trial. Most
of these persons have been allowed to return to their homes
after periods ranging from a few months to several years of
hard labor, political indoctrination, and admission of guilt.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
A criminal code and laws establishing a judiciary were enacted
in November 1989 by the Supreme People's Assembly, although
they had not taken effect or been published by year's end. It
is not known what changes these laws may make to Lao legal
procedures. At present the courts are not independent and
there is no guarantee of due process. Prior to the recently
passed criminal code, the Government had promulgated interim
rules and regulations for the arrest and trial of those
accused of specific crimes, including armed resistance to the
Government. Although the regulations allow an accused person
to make a statement presenting his or her side of the case,
they provide no real opporti^nity for the accused to defend
himself and do not permit bail or use of a freely chosen
attorney. Rather, the Government has issued instructions on
how to investigate, prosecute, and punish wrongdoers. These
instructions are applied capriciously and inconsistently.
People can be arrested on unsupported accusations and without
being informed of the charges or the accusers' identities.
Investigations often take a long time unless family members
and friends take a strong interest in the cases. Government
officials and their families easily can influence judgments.
There is some provision for appeal, although important
political cases tried by "people's courts" are without an
appeals process. Death sentences must be approved by the
Council of Ministers. Regulations call for judgment to be
given in public. This generally amounts to a public
announcement of the sentence and not a true public trial.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There appears to have been some relaxation of state control by
the police and security elements. Knowledgeable observers
report seeing fewer obvious signs of monitoring and control of
citizens. However, search and seizure continue to be
authorized by the security bureaus themselves rather than by
judicial authority, and government regulations, which are not
always followed, provide little protection. International and
903
LAOS
domestic mail is selectively opened. Mail from China and
non-Communist countries is particularly suspect. Telephone
calls are frequently monitored. Privately owned land may npt
be sold but may be inherited. Inheritances cannot be passed
on to relatives who have left the country as refugees and
acquired other nationalities.
The Government continues to try to monitor some aspects of
family and work life through a system of neighborhood and
workplace informants.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Public expression of opposition to the Party and State is not
permitted, and participants in such activity have been
jailed. Newspapers and the state radio are instruments of the
Government, reflecting only its views. Ordinary citizens may
not import foreign newsmagazines or books; censorship is
strict .
The Government makes no attempt to stop citizens from
listening to foreign radio stations such as the Voice of
America, nor from setting up antennas to receive Thai
television.
Academic freedom does not exist.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Government controls all meetings and, except for
religious, athletic, and communal events, organizes them.
Persons do not have the right to promote nonregime-sponsored
activities nor to protest government policies. All
associations--such as those for youth, women, workers, and a
"peace organization" — are officially authorized to exercise
government control and disseminate government policy. The
LPRP organizes all professional groups, and their leadership
is ordinarily drawn from party ranks. Associations are
permitted to maintain relations with like-minded, politically
acceptable organizations in other countries, particularly
those in Communist countries. Ordinary Lao citizens are able
to meet with foreigners only in unusual circumstances, usually
involving their work. Nevertheless, contact with foreigners
is increasing.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Nearly all Lao are Buddhists or, in the case of most highland
groups, animists. In official statements, the Government has
recognized the right to free exercise of religious belief as
well as the contributions religion can make to the development
of the country.
Many Lao believe, however, that the Government is engaged in a
long-term effort to subvert religion because it considers the
maintenance of temples and the activities of monks non-
productive and because it objects to active groups with
independent beliefs. This effort includes carefully
controlling the education of young monks and compelling
Buddhist clergy to propagate elements of Marxist-Leninist
904
LAOS
doctrine. Further, since 1975 the Government periodically has
taken over Buddhist and Christian places of worship for use as
schools, offices, and fire and police stations, as well as for
political indoctrination centers and warehouses. Nonetheless,
since the Third Party Congress in 1982, the Government has
eased its stand on Buddhism. While it has not, so far as is
known, contributed to the restoration of temples and religious
institutions, it has not opposed efforts of the faithful to do
so, and both restoration and new building are now widely
evident .
Monks remain the only social group still entitled to special
honorific terms of address, which even high party and
government officials continue to use. Buddhist clergy are
prominently featured at important state and party functions.
Religious festivals are permitted without hindrance. The
Government does not object to the Lao custom of young people
entering religious orders for short periods.
Links may be maintained with coreligionists and religious
associations in other countries, usually other Communist
countries, only when approved by the Government. Most
traditional links to Thai religious sects have been severed.
Missionaries are not formally banned from entering Laos to
proselytize, but in most cases they are denied permission.
Despite the overall government attitude, many high party
officials still participate in religious ceremonies.
Roman Catholics and Protestants are permitted to worship, but
the activities of their churches are closely monitored.
Vatican officials visited in 1987 to meet with the Bishop of
Vientiane, as well as with local church and government
officials. Attendance at Christian services continues to
require discretion, although less so in 1989 than in 1988.
The Government tries through the media and other means to
persuade highland minority groups to abandon their
"old-fashioned" animist beliefs.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens must obtain permission from the authorities for
internal travel. Non-Lao residents in Vientiane must obtain
permission to travel outside the city. Permission is now much
easier to obtain than before, but is not necessarily automatic.
Government officials have cited threats of "disorders" created
by "reactionary elements" as the reason for the restrictions.
Foreign travel is increasingly permitted for officials,
students, and others who have family abroad or access to
foreign exchange. Most students continue to study in the
Communist countries, but the number of students going to the
West for higher education, although still small, has increased
dramatically. Passports and exit visas have become much
easier to obtain. The number of the relatively few travelers
to the West and to the United States has increased sharply.
Border crossing permits are available for those with business
in Thailand. The number of permits increased in 1989, in
keeping with the opening of additional border trade locations
and the reduction in the number of items restricted by the
Thai Government for trade with Laos. The permits are not,
however, granted automatically and may be denied arbitrarily.
Legal emigration is rarely authorized for ethnic Lao. To
guard against emigration, those permitted to travel must often
905
LAOS
leave their families behind as a guarantee of their return.
Since 1975, 343,000 Lao citizens have registered as refugees
in Thailand. An unknown number have crossed the border and
simply settled with relatives or kindred ethnic groups.
Some of those fleeing are fired upon and killed by border
patrols as they attempt to cross the Mekong River. Government
authorities have imprisoned many persons seeking to leave the
country illegally.
Laos and Thailand have agreed to take back, on a case-by-case
basis, those of their respective citizens who have illegally
crossed into the other country and now wish to return home.
Since May 1980, when agreement was reached with Thailand and
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on a
voluntary repatriation program, over 4,675 persons have
voluntarily returned to Laos under the auspices of the UNHCR.
Those accepted for return receive several days of political
indoctrination and then are released to return to their homes,
where they are placed under the control of village
authorities. The UNHCR provides basic necessities for the
returnees and monitors their treatment and living conditions
thereafter. There appears to be no official harassment or
maltreatment of these voluntary returnees, and UNHCR officials
have not been prevented from visiting them. In addition,
perhaps as many as 10,000 persons have repatriated themselves
without official involvement.
The Government has also agreed in principle to take back Lao
citizens in Thailand whom the Thai have determined do not meet
refugee status criteria. Procedures for the return of these
persons were worked out between the two countries in late
1986, and since that time 164 have been returned. Those in
Vientiane who follow refugee matters closely report that there
is no perceptible difference in the way the Government treats
those returnees who were screened out and those who returned
voluntarily.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government.
The LPRP fully controls the Government. The LPRP is run by a
small elite who also occupy many of the principal government
posts. There is neither freedom to participate in politics
outside the party nor popular choice of policies. The new
National Assembly elected in March includes a number of
assemblymen who are not formally LPRP members, although their
candidacies were approved by the party. Some 121 candidates
ran for a total of 79 seats, and each electoral district had
more candidates than seats. This election followed elections
for district and provincial officials in 1988. No other
parties were permitted to organize and voting was mandatory.
These elections, the first held since the LPDR was formed in
1975, represent an effort by the LPRP to legitimize the
Government and may represent some political liberalization.
The new National Assembly is expected to finish writing a
constitution in 1990 which may then be approved by a
plebiscite. This new constitution would serve as a framework
for the criminal code and laws establishing a judiciary and
would also serve as a basis for additional laws.
906
LAOS
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Laos generally does not cooperate with private international
human rights organizations. However, it does occasionally
permit visits by officials of international humanitarian
organizations and has communicated with them by letters. No
domestic human rights monitoring groups are permitted.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Approximately half of the population in Laos is ethnic Lao;
also called "lowland Lao;" 20 percent are tribal Thai; 15
percent are Phoutheung (or Kha); and another 15 percent are
other highland groups (Hmong, Yao, and others). The
Govexnment is attempting to integrate these groups through
voluntary programs and to overcome traditional antagonisms
between lowland Lao and minority groups. Although the LPRP
and the Government are dominated by lowland Lao, efforts have
been made to include minorities in the political and
governmental elites. For instance, 43 of the 121 candidates
for the National Assembly were from minority groups.
The Hmong are split along clan lines. During the years of
insurgency, many were strongly anti-Communist; others sided
with the Communist Pathet Lao and the Vietnamese. The
Government represses all groups that fought against it,
especially those continuing to resist its authority by force.
The Hmong tried to defend some of their tribal areas after
1975, and some continue to support anti-LPDR resistance
groups. Lao armed forces conduct operations against
resistance groups.
The Government wants to resettle in the lowlands some ethnic
minorities from mountainous areas. After resettlement they
would be under closer government control and engage in settled
agricultural production rather than the present slash-and-burn
techniques. For this purpose, the Government has reportedly
relied on a voluntary program based on material inducements
and has begun several large-scale projects with foreign donors.
Local ethnic Chinese have encountered government suspicion and
surveillance since 1979 when Sino-Lao relations deteriorated
seriously. This has abated, however, since relations between
Laos and the People's Republic of China were normalized in
1988. A majority of the Chinese community departed in the
post-1975 period, largely for economic reasons. Those who
remain have maintained government-approved Chinese schools in
Vientiane and Savannakhet and Chinese associations in several
provincial capitals.
Traditionally, women in Lao society have been subservient to
men and often discouraged from obtaining an education. Today
the active, government-controlled Lao Women's Federation has
as one of its goals the achievement of equal rights for
women. The Government claims that a higher percentage of
women make up the school population now than before 1975, and
that women are being encouraged to assume a greater role in
economic and state-controlled political activity.
There is no pattern of widespread domestic or culturally
approved violence against women. Both lowland Lao and hill
tribes tend to hold women in lower esteem than men.
907
LAOS
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The overwhelming majority of workers are employed by the
State, and they are very poorly paid. Labor laws do not
exist. Labor unions exist but are small and have no right to
strike. All unions are controlled by the Federation of Lao
Trade Unions, which in turn is controlled by the LPRP. The
Federation is a member of the Communist-controlled World
Federation of Trade Unions.
The LPDR is a member of the International Labor Organization
(ILO), but has not ratified ILO Conventions 87 on freedom of
association, 98 on the right to organize and bargain
collectively, or any other conventions related to the worker
rights covered in this report. In its 1989 report, the ILO
Committee of Experts cited the LPDR for failing to respond to
its requests for information concerning pending complaints.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions play no discernible role in ameliorating the low
salaries and wages, for instance, of public employees, the
largest single category of employment. Under the foreign
investment code published in 1988, some worker rights are
guaranteed, such as the right to have job responsibilities
defined, to be paid for that job and not another, to be paid
more for overtime, and for overtime to be approved by the
authorities as well as by the investor. There are no economic
incentive zones or special industries where labor standards
differ from those elsewhere in the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
While there is no published code of laws concerning protection
from forced labor, there is no general pattern of forced labor
in Laos. Prisoners in reeducation camps, or in prison camps
(the former for "ideological" crimes, the latter for
"economic" or "social" offenses) are expected to do hard
labor. In addition, there are reports that some of these
prisoners, when released, are restricted to the general area
of the camp (always in rugged and mountainous terrain) and
expected to work there on state enterprises.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
There is no minimum age for employment of children. In
practice children in this rural economy commonly assist in the
work of their families.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Workplace conditions are not systematically exploitative, but
they sometimes fail to protect workers adequately against
sickness or accident. There is no specific system of laws or
regulations relating to worker safety. Working hours do not
exceed 48 hours a week, except during urgent roadbuilding or
construction projects. It is unclear whether such urgent
labor is compulsory. There is no minimum wage legislation;
wages are low, particularly in the state sector and are, in
fact, not sufficient to live on unless supplemented by other
sources of income. Some workers receive paid 2-week vacations,
908
MALAYSIA
Malaysia has a parliamentary system of government based on
free elections contested by several parties, almost all of
which are racially based. Malaysia is a multiethnic society,
with Malays comprising a little more than half of the
population, and the remainder consisting of Chinese (about 33
percent), Indians (about 10 percent), and several other
minorities. The ruling National Front (composed of three
major and several minor parties) has won a two-thirds or
better majority in the federal Parliament in all general
elections since 1957, but opposition parties are active and
vocal participants in the political system, and they
occasionally control governments at the state level. Malaysia
is a federation of 13 states, with state governments retaining
power over several important areas, including land use and
religion.
From the late 1940's until recently, the defense forces were
directed primarily at containing a major Communist insurgency
that began in 1948 and peaked in the 1950's. The Government
states that because of the insurgency that still smolders in a
few border areas, the intercommunal rioting in which several
hundred persons died following the 1969 national elections,
and the country's serious drug problem, classified by the
Government as a threat to national security, internal security
remains a concern. The Government cites all three factors as
justification for laws allowing preventive detention, but
human rights groups charge that they are primarily used to
stifle dissent.
A strong free market economy, abundant natural resources, and
a relatively small population have helped Malaysia become one
of the most prosperous of the developing countries.
Detention without trial and restrictions on judicial review of
detentions, as well as restrictions on freedom of association,
and on freedom of the press, are the primary human rights
concerns in Malaysia. In late 1987, the detention without
trial of 106 persons under the Internal Security Act (ISA)
became a major focus of attention. By June 1989, all those
detainees had been released and restrictions on their
movements and activities rescinded. Amenc^.-nents to the ISA
enacted by Parliament that same month, however, further
restrict the judiciary's power to review detentions under the
ISA, the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Emergency Ordinance.
Restrictions on the independence of the Malaysian judiciary
remain a key area of concern. Many legal and other observers
see evidence that when hearing cases v;ith political
ramifications, the courts are increasingly reluctant to take
positions which could be seen by the executive branch as
challenging executive authority.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section i Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political or other extrajudicial
killings by the Government or by any other political
organization .
909
MALAYSIA
b. Disappearance
There was no evidence of abduction, secret arrests, or
clandestine detention attributable to the Government or to
nongovernmental or opposition forces. There have been reports
that, in a number of cases, security authorities waited days
after a detention before informing the detainee's family.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Allegations of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment are rare, although several Malaysian citizens who
were detained by the Government in October 1987 claim that
they were mistreated by security authorities, especially
during the initial stage of their detention. Their
allegations included charges of sleep deprivation, threats and
verbal abuse, and, in at least one case, beating. After their
release from ISA detention, some former detainees stated that
while there was no torture as such, treatment of detainees by
the authorities varied, with some receiving harsher treatment
than others.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Government can detain suspects without benefit of judicial
review under three laws: the 1960 Internal Security Act
(ISA), the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance of 1969, and
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1985.
The 1960 ISA, patterned after legislation instituted by the
British colonial administration during the Communist
insurgency of the 1950 *s, is aimed at controlling internal
subversion. It empowers the police to hold for up to 60 days
any person who may act "in a manner prejudicial to the
security of Malaysia." Further detention (in renewable 2-year
segments) must be authorized by the Minister of Home Affairs.
The Minister must inform detainees of the charges against them
and give them the opportunity to protest those charges to an
advisory board. The advisory board reviews each case at least
every 6 months. Advisory board decisions and recommendations
are not, however, binding on the Minister, are never
publicized, and are often not shown to the detainee. A number
of the ISA detainees have refused to participate in the review
process under these circumstances.
The Malaysian Government does not publish statistics or make
regular public statements on ISA detentions. Authoritative
information on the number of detainees is not available. In
March 1989, however, the Deputy Home Affairs Minister told
Parliament that 70 persons were under ISA detention at that
time. Prior to the ISA detentions of October 1987, the number
of long-term ISA detainees had dropped from nearly 500 in 1981
to about 25. In October and November 1987, however, Malaysian
authorities, citing a danger of serious racial strife,
detained another 106 persons, including government and
opposition members of Parliament, social critics, academics,
environmentalists, and religious activists. However, none
were charged in court for any unlawful activity. By June
1989, all of these detainees had been released and
restrictions on their movements rescinded. In 1988 the
Government detained 11 Malaysians from Sarawak under the ISA;
all were released by July 1989. Twenty-three from two
northern states also were arrested in 1988 under the ISA as
arson suspects. A spokesman for the opposition Islamic Party
910
MALAYSIA
of Malaysia announced that several of those arrested were
members of that party. The spokesman said the party would
investigate to determine whether the arrests were political,
without specifying when the determination would be made.
Human rights observers claim that the detentions were
unwarranted because the defendants could have been arrested
and tried under criminal statutes proscribing arson.
In March 1988 the High Court ordered the release of a
prominent lawyer and opposition leader detained under the ISA,
on the grounds that his arrest was unlawful. Eight hours
after his release he was rearrested under a new ISA detention
order. In July 1988 and June 1989, Parliament amended the ISA
to place additional limitations on judicial review of
detentions. The 1988 amendments validate detention orders
regardless of textual inaccuracies in place or fact, while the
1989 legislation restricts judicial review of government
detention orders to procedural matters only. The Government
defended the amendments by stating that court decisions should
not be permitted to replace executive decisionmaking in
national security matters. Opposition leaders and the Bar
Council publicly protested the 1989 ISA amendments as a
negation of the rule of law.
The Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance of 1969 stemmed
from that year's intercommunal riots. The State of Emergency
declared at that time has not been rescinded, although
Parliament regained its legislative power in 1971. The
Emergency Ordinance gives the Government the power to detain
anyone "in the interests of the public safety or the defense
of Malaysia." As under the ISA, detainees must be informed of
the charges against them, and they can appeal to an advisory
board. Since 1985 the Emergency Ordinance has been used in
some serious criminal cases not related to narcotics.
The Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act of 1985
was enacted by Parliament to give the Government specific
power to detain suspected drug traffickers. Suspects can be
held under this law for successive 2-year periods with
periodic review by an advisory board. Unlike the ISA and
Emergency Ordinance, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs Act
the opinion of the advisory board is binding on the Minister.
As of June 1989, there were about 1,200 drug suspects in
detention under this statute. As with the other two security
statutes, the Dangerous Drugs Act was amended in 1988 to
validate detention orders with certain defects and, in 1989,
to prohibit legal challenges to detention orders. Legal
observers have voiced the same strong concerns about these
amendments .
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to a fair trial is seriously restricted in
security-related matters where the ISA is invoked. Ordinary
civil and criminal cases, and some security-related cases, are
tried under a fair and open judicial system derived from
British jurisprudence. Charges must be levied against a
defendant within 24 hours of arrest, and police must decide
within 14 days whether to bring the case to court. Defendants
have the right to counsel, and lawyers are able to represent
clients without penalty to themselves. Bail is available, and
strict rules of evidence apply in court. Defendants may
appeal lower court decisions to the federal courts and, in
911
MALAYSIA
criminal cases, may also appeal for clemency to the King or
local state rulers, as appropriate.
Persons arrested and charged for firearms violations are
normally charged under provisions of the Internal Security Act
which carry a mandatory death sentence upon conviction. Other
security-related crimes, whether or not capital crimes, can be
tried under special procedures contained in the Essential
(Security Cases) Regulations of 1975. The accused is allowed
counsel but sometimes does not receive a statement of the
evidence prior to the trial which is by a single judge without
a jury; and witnesses may be examined in the absence of the
accused. Admissible evidence includes hearsay and secondary
evidence, testimony of children and spouses,
self-incriminating statements to police, and information from
seized records or communications. If the accused is found
guilty, the judge must impose the maximum penalty. According
to local legal sources, these special trial provisions are
rarely, if ever, used.
The Malaysian judiciary has traditionally been regarded by the
public and the legal community as committed to the rule of
law. The judicial system has exhibited over the years an
unusual degree of independence, not hesitating to rule against
the Government in criminal, civil, or occasionally even major
cases with political ramifications. An example of the latter
was the High Court ruling in February 1988 that the dominant
party in the Government coalition was illegally constituted.
However, in 1988 Parliament amended the Malaysian Constitution
to delete the clause vesting judicial power in the courts and
substitute a clause stating that the jurisdiction and power of
the courts are "conferred by or under Federal law." Although
the practical ramifications of this amendment remain unclear,
some members of the legal community charge that it strips the
judiciary of its constitutional basis of authority, making it
wholly dependent upon specific legislation passed by
Parliament .
In another development in 1988 affecting the judiciary, the
Lord President of the Supreme Court was dismissed by the King
on August 8 following the recommendation of a tribunal which
heard the Government's charges against him. The charges
included bias and prejudice in speeches critical of the
Government and writing a letter to Malaysia's King raising
objections to the Prime Minister's criticism of the judiciary,
thereby creating misunderstanding between the Prime Minister
and the hereditary rulers. Five Supreme Court Justices were
suspended for their actions related to the case. A second
tribunal appointed by the King ordered the immediate
reinstatement of three of the Justices in October 1988, while
the other two were dismissed from office. Most nongovernment
observers believe the purpose of the dismissals was
specifically to strengthen the Prime Minister's control of the
judiciary.
The case against the previous Lord President continued to have
ramifications in 1989. In March 1989, the Malaysian Bar
Council filed a contempt of court motion against the current
Lord President for his actions related to the dismissal of the
previous Lord President. In April the Supreme Court rejected
the Bar Council's contempt motion, and then in June agreed to
consider a counter motion filed against the Bar Council
Secretary by the Attorney General. The Government's contempt
motion has not yet been heard. The Supreme Court's handling
912
MALAYSIA
of the Bar Council's motion is cited by legal observers as
evidence that the 1988 confrontation between the judiciary and
the executive branches is causing reluctance by the courts to
take positions in politically sensitive cases challenging the
Government .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
These rights are, generally, protected by law. Under the
security legislation described above, however, the police may
enter and search without warrant the homes of persons
suspected of threatening national security and confiscate
evidence. Under this provision, police have searched homes
and offices, seized books and papers, and taken people into
custody without a warrant.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Despite constitutional provisions for freedom of speech and
press, there are some important limitations. For example, the
Constitution provides that freedom of speech can be restricted
by legislation "in the interest of security... (or) public
order." Thus the Sedition Act Amendments of 1970 prohibit
public comment on "sensitive" issues such as citizenship
rights for non-Malays and the special position of Malays in
society. Since 1970, however, the Government has brought only
a few cases under the Sedition Act, and in the most recent
incident in 1986 the defendant, the President of the Bar
Council, was acquitted.
Press freedom is subject to important limitations under the
Printing Presses and Publications Act of 1984, under which
domestic and foreign publications must apply annually to the
Government for a permit. In December 1987, Parliament amended
this Act to make the publication of "malicious news" a
punishable offense, to expand the Government's power to ban
publications, and to prohibit court challenges to suspension
or revocation of publication permits. An additional
inhibiting factor is that the Government or the business arms
of the leading political parties in the ruling coalition own
almost all the major newspapers as well as all the radio and
television stations.
At the time of the ISA detentions in October 1987, the
Government revoked the publication permits of three
newspapers. Although all three newspapers resumed publication
in March 1988, the revocations and the legislative amendments
described above have resulted in significant self-censorship
by journalists and editors of the daily newspapers.
Nevertheless, opposition parties, social action groups, and a
number of private publications regularly provide detailed
coverage of opposition political activities and print
viewpoints strongly critical of the ruling coalition and its
policies. A wide range of information is available to the
Malaysian public in newspapers and magazines published in all
of the country's four major languages, and major international
and regional news publications circulate freely.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the rights of freedom of
peaceful assembly and association, but there are significant
913
restrictions. Those rights can be limited in the interest of
security and public order, and the 1967 Police Act requires
police permits for all public assemblies. In the aftermath of
the intercommunal riots in 1969, the Government banned
political rallies altogether. While the ban on political
rallies has not been formally rescinded, both Government and
opposition parties have been able to hold what they refer to
as "discussion sessions" for electioneering during political
campaigns. In the eight national and state special elections
since August 1988, government and opposition candidates
campaigned openly and with minimal police interference despite
the existence of the Police Act and other restrictions; there
were no public complaints concerning the enforcement of the
Police Act. Some opposition politicians complained privately,
however, that police issuance of permits for campaign events
has not been as timely as they would have liked.
Other statutes limit the right of association, such as the
Societies Act of 1966, under which the Government can refuse
registration to organizations which comment unfavorably on
political or public issues. The threat of deregistration
under the Societies Act tends to inhibit political activism by
public or special interest organizations, but it does not
suppress such activity entirely. Another law affecting
freedom of association is the Universities and University
Colleges Act, which mandates government approval for student
associations and prohibits such associations from engaging in
political activity. In November 1988, police arrested 11
persons in Lake Garden Park who were participating in a
peaceful candlelight protest against the detentions that took
place in late 1987. Charged with illegal assembly under the
Police Act, the charges were later dropped.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The official religion of Malaysia is Islam, and ethnic Malays
are legally bound in some civil matters, e.g., family
relations and diet, by Islamic religious laws administered by
state authorities. An Islamic religious establishment is
supported with government funds, and it is official policy to
"infuse Islamic values" into the administration of Malaysia.
However, the Constitution provides for freedom of religion,
and the Government has refused to accede to pressures for the
imposition of Islamic religious law beyond the Muslim
community. Religious minorities, which include large Hindu,
Buddhist, Sikh, and Christian communities, practice their
faith with minimal interference by the Government.
There are persistent allegations, however, that some state
governments are slow in approving building permits for
non-Muslim places of worship. The Government has limited the
circulation of a popular translation of the Bible in Bahasa
Malaysia, and some states restrict the use of Christian terms
in Bahasa Malaysia. Conversion to religions other than Islam
is permitted but not encouraged; proselytizing of Muslims is,
and has long been, proscribed by law in some states and
strongly discouraged in other parts of the country.
Government attitudes on religious questions were evident in
the October 1987 ISA detentions when several Muslim and
Christian teachers and activists were detained.
914
MALAYSIA
In a development affecting the right of parents to teach
religion to their children, the state of Selangor passed a
bill in August 1989 which allows minors to convert to Islam
without parental approval. Although this legislation has yet
to be implemented and could be overturned at a later date, its
passage in the Selangor State Assembly has caused some
consternation among Malaysia's non-Muslim minorities.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government does not generally restrict the right of
individuals to travel within the country and live and work
where they please, but it did place significant restrictions
on the movement and activities of some ISA detainees after
their release from detention. The restrictions on all former
October 1987 ISA detainees were rescinded by June 1989. There
are also no government restrictions on emigration. Since
there are no known Malaysian refugees in other countries,
there is no problem of repatriation. There have been some
cases of Malaysian citizens being denied passports on security
grounds, but Malaysians are generally free to travel abroad.
There are restrictions on travel by Malaysians to Israel,
South Africa, Cuba, China, Vietnam, and North Korea.
Malaysia has provided first asylum to more than 250,000
Vietnamese refugees since 1975. It has cooperated closely
with international organizations and resettlement countries in
facilitating the eventual movement of the refugees to third
countries .
In June 1989, Malaysia chaired the second International
Conference on Indochinese Refugees (ICIR). At the Conference,
the resettlement countries and the countries of first asylum
agreed to institute a comprehensive plan of action for
granting asylum and resettlement to Indochinese asylum
seekers. Boat people arriving in Malaysia after March 14,
1989 would be screened; only those determined to be genuine
refugees would be eligible for first asylum and resettlement.
Malaysia began to screen boat people on August 28. No
determinations regarding refugee status had been made as of
mid-November .
The yearly arrival rate for Vietnamese boat people to Malaysia
remained high in comparison to the mid-80*s: about 17,000
arrived during the year ending September 30, 1989.
Resettlement did not keep pace with arrivals, and the camp
population grew to 21,000, resulting in severe overcrowding at
the principal camp of Pulau Bidong and concerns among relief
workers for the asylum seekers' health. Domestic opposition
to the Vietnamese presence prevented the expansion of camp
facilities. The Government did not follow through on its 1988
announcement that it would close Pulau Bidong within the year.
Despite the commitments which it made at the ICIR, the
Government began intermittently to deny first asylum to boat
people beginning in late May, claiming it could not accept new
boat arrivals indefinitely without some assurance all would
eventually be removed from Malaysia. According to the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) , a total of
2,470 persons had been pushed off through the end of October
1989. In most cases the Malaysians repaired and reprovisioned
the boats before returning them to sea. All such boats
reaching Indonesia have been permitted to land. Nevertheless,
one death reportedly occurred when a boat being towed to sea
915
MALAYSIA
overturned, and four persons (including a pregnant woman) died
of dehydration as a consequence of being pushed off.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Malaysia's parliamentary system is based on the British model.
The Prime Minister and Cabinet are responsible to Parliament,
from which they are drawn. National parliamentary elections,
which the Constitution requires at least every 5 years, have
been held regularly since independence in 1957 and have
included opposition candidates actively contesting
parliamentary seats. In addition, there are regular state and
local multiparty elections. Most observers consider Malaysian
elections to be generally free and fair, with votes cast
secretly and recorded accurately. Opposition candidates won
several hotly contested byelections in August 1988 and June
1989. Nevertheless, in several byelections in the last year,
there were allegations that government supporters attempted to
intimidate voters.
Through the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), Malays
dominate the ruling National Front coalition of ethnic-based
parties which has controlled Parliament since independence.
Non-Malays fill a number of cabinet posts. In August 1986,
the National Front won 148 of the 177 seats in the House of
Representatives. Although the opposition regularly criticizes
government policies within and outside Parliament, government
views generally prevail. Since 1957 there has been a peaceful
transfer of power in the office of Prime Minister three times.
Opposition parties, such as the Islamic Party of Malaysia
(PAS), have occasionally gained control of state governments.
Non-Malay parties have also controlled state governments; for
example, the ruling party in the important state of Penang is
largely Chinese-based, and in Sabah a predominantly Christian
party is currently in power.
A new Malay political party called Semangat 46 (Spirit of 46)
was registered in July 1989. This party is dominated by
former UMNO leaders who challenged Prime Minister Mahathir for
the UMNO leadership in 1987 and lost. There has also been
some movement toward an opposition coalition led by Semangat
46 to challenge the ruling coalition in the next general
election which must be held before October 1991. The new
party and the informal coalition have actively campaigned in a
series of national and state byelections since August 1988,
winning twice and losing the other six times.
Eleven Members of Parliament, 10 from opposition parties and 1
from the government coalition, were included among the persons
detained in October and November 1987. After their release,
all regained their parliamentary seats and party leadership
positions. Opposition leader and former detainee Lim Kit
Siang continues to criticize government policy and has also
directly challenged the Government in parliamentary sessions
since his release.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government rejects criticism of its human rights record by
international human rights organizations and foreign
governments. Prime Minister Mahathir, in a speech at the
916
MALAYSIA
Non-Aligned Movement summit in September 1989, stated that
developing countries cannot practice the Western liberal
"brand of democracy and human rights" to the detriment of
meeting basic human needs, such as food, shelter, and
schools. Malaysian officials criticize local groups for
"collaborating" with international human rights organizations
in their studies of the human rights situation. Nevertheless,
representatives of international human rights organizations
have visited and traveled in Malaysia and have been able to
meet with some relevant government officials. In 1989
representatives of the Committee on Human Rights of the New
York City bar met with the Attorney General and other
government officials. In 1988 the Government permitted
delegations from the International Committee of the Red Cross
and the Human Rights Commission of the International
Parliamentary Union to meet with ISA detainees as well as with
government officials. Foreign government officials have met
in Malaysia with their Malaysian counterparts to discuss human
rights .
In August 1989, a group of prominent Malaysians, including two
former prime ministers, applied to the Registrar of Societies
to establish a national human rights society. The Registrar
had not by year's end ruled on the application, although in
December 1988 the Deputy Prime Minister announced that the
Government would not object. In addition, a number of
organizations, including the Bar Council and various public
interest groups, devote some time to human rights activities.
The Government tolerates their activities but rarely responds
to their inquiries or occasional press statements. The
Government has not acceded to any of the international
covenants on human rights, generally maintaining that such
issues are internal matters.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Government implements on an extensive scale programs
designed to boost the economic position of the ethnic Malay
majority which remains poorer, on average, than other
Malaysians despite its political dominance. These Government
programs and policies limit, in varying degrees, opportunities
for non-Malays in higher education, government employment,
business permits and licenses, and ownership of new homesteads.
The question of the rights of indigenous peoples in Malaysia
received increasing attention in 1989. The focus of this
attention has been the impact of logging on the indigenous
peoples in the East Malaysian state of Sarawak. Between
November 1988 and January 1989, 128 members of the
semi-nomadic Penan group in Sarawak were arrested and charged
with illegally blockading logging roads and bridges. Another
117 Penans were arrested under the State Forestry Ordinance in
September for similarly blockading logging roads. While the
Penan demonstrators have not yet been brought to trial, the
prosecution dropped similar charges against another indigenous
group--42 Kayans--in April.
There are no laws or regulations restricting the political and
economic rights of women. The position of women in society is
conditioned by the cultural and religious traditions of the
country's major ethnic groups. With a general resurgence of
Islamic piety among Malays, many Malay women have in recent
years tended toward close conformity with Koranic stipulations
on women's roles. Women's groups are active both within the
91J
MALAYSIA
governmental and private sectors. Two important umbrella
organizations for women's rights are the National Advisory
Council for the Integration of Women in Development in the
Prime Minister's Department and the National Council of
Women's Organizations.
Violence against women, including wife beating, has resulted
in a number of steps to deal with the problem. According to
government statistics, reported domestic violence cases
increased from 279 in 1982 to 900 in 1988. There are
currently no specific laws on domestic violence. Cases of
wife beating or child abuse are tried under normal assault
provisions of the Criminal Code, which carry penalties of 3
months to 1 year in prison and/or fines up to $750. A women's
aid organization runs shelters for battered wives, and several
women's groups led a succesful effort in April to toughen the
laws against rape, mandating jail sentences of at least 5
years (maximum of 20 years) and allowing the imposition of
fines and/or whipping. Women's rights organizations also
began promoting new legislation to curb domestic violence
against women and children; an interagency group coordinated
by the Welfare ministry was formed to draft the legislation.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Trade Unions Act of 1959 and the Industrial Relations Act
of 1967 govern the right of workers to engage in trade union
activity. Unions may organize workplaces, bargain
collectively with an employer, form federations, and join
international organizations. The Industrial Relations Act
specifically prohibits any person from interfering with,
restraining, or coercing a worker in the exercise of the right
to form or participate in the lawful activities of a trade
union.
The Trade Unions Act, which is administered by the Director
General of Trade Unions (formerly the Registrar of Trade
Unions), sets rules for the organization of unions, their
recognition at the workplace, the content of their
constitutions, election of their officers, and their financial
reporting requirements. The Act's definition of a trade union
restricts it to representing workers in a "particular trade,
occupation, or industry or within any similar trades,
occupations, or industries," contrary to guidelines of the
Committee on Freedom of Association of the International Labor
Organization (ILO).
The Director General of Trade Unions may refuse to register a
trade union on a variety of grounds. He also has the power,
under certain circumstances, to withdraw the registration of a
trade union. A trade union for which registration has been
refused, withdrawn or canceled is considered an unlawful
association.
Malaysia's electronic components industry, dominated by
American and Japanese firms, has been the focus of
unsuccessful union organizing efforts since the late 1970's.
The Government has used its various powers to prevent the
formation of a union in the industry other than strictly "in
house" unions. In August 1989, the Director General of Trade
Unions refused to register the National Electronics Workers
Union on the grounds that it did not meet the definition of a
"trade union" in the Trade Unions Act because its members work
918
MALAYSIA
in the electrical and electronics industries, which the Labor
Minister has determined are different industries. Union
leaders have stated that they seek to represent only workers
in the elctronics industry. The Government has been
repeatedly criticized by the ILO for continued failure to
comply with ILO Convention 98 (right to organize and to
bargain collectively) .
Some critics of the Government's policy toward labor unions,
notably the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and Asia Watch, believe the
arrest of V. David under the ISA in the government crackdown
late in 1987 (see Section l.d. above) demonstrated labor
leaders' vulnerability to government pressures, which, critics
assert, inhibit their carrying out legitimate trade union
activities. Mr. David has declared publicly that questioning
during his detention related only peripherally to his role in
the Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC) and the Transport
Workers' Union (TWU) . He continues as MTUC Secretary General,
campaigned successfully for reelection to that position in
December 1988, and has been allowed to travel abroad to trade
union meetings.
Federations of trade unions may cover only a single trade or
industry or similar trades or industries. The only labor
federations currently registered are one for public servants,
one for teachers, and one for state-based textile and garment
workers' unions. The MTUC, the main labor body, is registered
as a society under the Societies Act (rather than the Trade
Unions Act). Previous MTUC efforts to register as a trade
union federation under the Trade Unions Act were turned down
because of its broad membership. In Noyember 1988, however.
Parliament approved legislation granting the MTUC the status
and rights enjoyed by Malaysian trade unions, although it
remains a society.
As of December 1988, there were 392 individual unions in
Malaysia with over 616,626 members (10.4 percent of total
employment) .
Unions are independent both of the Government and of the
political parties. While unions are not permitted to engage
in political activity, individual trade union leaders have
served in Parliament (V. David, the MTUC Secretary General, is
currently a Member of Parliament for an opposition party) and
individual union members belong to political parties.
Malaysian trade unions are free to associate with the
appropriate international trade secretariats, and a number of
Malaysian labor leaders play major roles in international
labor affairs. The MTUC is affiliated with the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The Secretary
General of the National Union of Plantation Workers is
President of the ICFTU, and the MTUC Secretary General has
actively participated in the ILO governing body.
While strikes are legal and do occasionally occur, critics
claim that this right in practice is severely restricted. The
Industrial Relations Act of 1967 requires the parties to
notify the Ministry of Labor that a dispute exists before any
industrial action may be taken. If government conciliation
fails to achieve a settlement, the Minister has the power to
refer the dispute to the Industrial Court, which effectively
becomes compulsory arbitration. A strike is prohibited while
the dispute is before the Industrial Court, and an award made
by the Industrial Court cannot be appealed. Industrial Court
919
MALAYSIA
awards are the exception rather than the rule, however,
representing only about 18.5 percent of all collective
agreements referred to the Industrial Court in 1988. The
remaining agreements were reached through bargaining between
management and labor.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is the norm in Malaysian industries
where workers are organized. Malaysia's system of
conciliation and arbitration seeks to promote negotiation and
settlement of issues without strikes.
In a complaint to the ILO, the MTUC alleged that the 1980
amendments contain prohibitive and oppressive antiunion
provisions which erode the basic rights of workers, restrict
union activities, and result in government and employer
interference in the internal administration of unions. In
1983 the ILO urged the Malaysian Government to amend these
laws further to bring them into conformity with the ILO
Convention on the right to organize and to bargain
collectively. Despite subsequent amendments, the MTUC still
believes the labor law to be deficient by ILO standards. Many
union leaders also believe that creation of the Industrial
Court to handle industrial disputes further weakened their
collective bargaining rights.
Labor standards in free trade zones are the same as those in
the rest of Malaysia. Workers at many companies located in
the free trade zones are unionized, especially in the textile
and electrical products plants. Enterprises granted "pioneer"
status (whether or not located in a free trade zone) are
protected from union demands for terms of employment exceeding
those specified in the Employment Act of 1955 during the
period of their pioneer status (normally 5 years). The
restriction does not apply to wages or benefits not covered by
the Employment Act (see Section 6.e. below).
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Malaysia is a party to ILO Convention 105 prohibiting forced
or compulsory labor and it has effective legal sanctions
against such abuses. The ILO has criticized Malaysia for
requiring prisoners and ISA detainees to work. Malaysia
defends the practice as part of its prisoner rehabilitation
program.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Employment of children is covered by the Children and Young
Persons (Employment) Act of 1966, which stipulates that no
child under the age of 14 may be engaged in any employment
except light work in a family enterprise, in public
entertainment, work performed for the Government in a school
or training institution, or employment as an approved
apprentice. It is illegal for children to work more than 6
hours per day, more than 6 days per week, or at night. The
law is effectively enforced through periodic inspections by
the Ministry of Labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Malaysian wages are relatively high for its level of
industrialization and higher than in all neighboring countries
except Singapore. The Employment Act of 1955 sets working
24-900 O— 90-
920
MALAYSIA
hours not to exceed 8 hours per day or 44 hours per week
(5 1/2 days), sets overtime rates for hours in excess of
those, and mandates public holidays, annual leave, sick leave,
and maternity allowances for workers. Most such provisions
are at least on a par with standards in industrialized
countries. Minimum standards of occupational health and
safety are set by law and enforced by a unit of the Ministry
of Labor. Severance benefits are provided under the
Employment (Termination and Lay-off Benefits) Regulations of
1980. The Employees Provident Fund (EPF) Ordinance of 1951
requires employers and employees to contribute to a fully
funded retirement program. Some 90 percent of workers are
covered by either the EPF or the Government's own pension plan
for public servants. The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1952,
and the Social Security Act provide disability and workman's
compensation benefits.
There is no national minimum wage legislation, but certain
classes of workers are covered by minimum wage laws: retail
clerks, hotel and restaurant employees, cinema workers, and a
few others, totaling approximately 140,000 workers. By local
standards, and taking into account various worker benefits
received by most workers, Malaysian wages provide a decent
standard of living for workers and their families. The
effective minimum wage for unskilled labor in the urban areas
is about $90 per month. Plantation work is increasingly being
done by contract workers, including numerous illegal
immigrants from Indonesia, in part due to a shortage of
Malaysians interested in such work. Working conditions for
contract workers often are significantly below those of direct
hire plantation workers, many of whom belong to the National
Union of Plantation Workers. Additionally, many of the
immigrant workers, particularly the illegal ones, may not have
access to Malaysia's system of labor adjudication. In 1989
the Malaysian Government, at least in part to prevent the
exploitation of these workers, moved to legalize large numbers
of illegal immigrant workers, granting 290,000 work passes to
Indonesian plantation workers in August.
921
THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
The Republic of the Marshall Islands is a nation of 31
low-lying coral atolls scattered over 750,000 square miles of
the Central Pacific, comprising a total land area of about 70
square miles. The population, of Micronesian origin, is
estimated at 43,000, two-thirds of which are concentrated on
Majuro and Kwajalein atolls. The Marshall Islands constituted
part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
administered by the United States from 1947 to 1986 pursuant
to an agreement with the United Nations. In October 1986, the
Republic of the Marshall Islands became a sovereign,
self-governing nation under the Compact of Free Association
with the United States.
Political legitimacy in the Marshall Islands rests on the
popular will expressed by majority vote in accordance with a
constitution uniquely blending American and British precepts.
The executive branch of the Government consists of the
President and his appointed Cabinet, all of whom are elected
members of the legislature. The legislature consists of the
Parliament, known as the Nitijela, and a Council of Chiefs
(Iroij), the latter serving largely a consultative function.
The Constitution established an independent judiciary. Under
the Compact of Free Association, the United States is
responsible for defense and national security. Consequently,
the Marshall Islands has no security forces of its own aside
from local police and other law enforcement officers, both of
which are firmly under the control of the civil authorities.
The economy depends mainly on transfer payments from the
United States, coconut oil and copra exports, limited tourism,
and the fishing industry.
No human rights abuses were reported in 1989.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no politically motivated killings by the Government
or by opposition political parties.
b. Disappearance
No politically motivated disappearances or abductions were
reported.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment are
expressly forbidden by the Constitution. There were no
reported instances of such abuses.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution contains safeguards against arbitrary arrest
and detention, and no such incidents were reported.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
922
THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to a fair public trial is expressly provided for in
the Constitution and observed in practice. There were no
reported denials of fair public trial.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The privacy of the home is protected by law and respected by
the Government. There was no known instance of arbitrary
intrusion by the State into the private life of the individual.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press.
These are accorded in practice. There is one privately owned
newspaper .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of peaceful assembly and association is provided for
in the Constitution and observed in practice.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Free exercise of religion is provided for in the Constitution
and observed in practice. There is no state religion. The
majority of the population is Christian. Missionaries are
free to seek converts and freely do so.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Citizens are free to travel within the country and abroad.
There are no restrictions on emigration or repatriation.
There are no displaced persons other than those from Bikini
atoll who left that atoll in 1946 because of scheduled nuclear
testing on their islands. Pending further rehabilitation of
the environment, the Bikinians remain resident elsewhere in
the Marshall Islands.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Government of the Marshall Islands is chosen in free and
open elections. There is no formal party system. Parties
have informally coalesced around political issues, such as the
form of the new Marshallese relationship with the United
States, and then dissolved when the issue was resolved.
In 1988 a law was passed prohibiting political activity by
aliens. An offending alien is subject to deportation on the
decision of the Cabinet. Although the law has never been
invoked, its invocation could result in deportation without
due process.
923
THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged violations
of Human Rights
There have been no reported allegations of human rights
violations by the Government or any known requests for
investigations. There are no local nongovernmental
organizations which concern themselves with human rights. The
Republic is not a member of the United Nations, and the
Government has not taken an active interest in international
human rights matters.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of
gender, race, color, language, religion, political or other
jopinion, national or social origin, place of birth, family
status, or descent.
Allegations of violence against women are rare and relate
mainly to domestic conflict. Assault is a criminal offense,
but in some cases women are reluctant to prosecute their
spouses. Women's groups have begun holding meetings to
publicize women's issues and to create a greater awareness of
the rights of women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides for the right of free association in
general. This freedom of association is interpreted by the
Attorney General of the Marshall Islands as allowing the
existence of labor unions, although none have been formed
yet. The Constitution is silent on the right to strike, and
thus far the Government has not addressed this issue.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There is no legislation on collective bargaining or trade
union organization. However, there are no bars to
organization of trade unions or to collective bargaining.
There are no special economic areas set aside, and labor
standards and practices are the same throughout the islands.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution specifically prohibits involuntary servitude,
and there is no evidence of its practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
There is no legislation concerning minimum age of employment
in this traditional society with its largely nonindustrial
economy.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The minimum wage is $1.50 per hour, which is adequate to
maintain a decent standard of living by local standards.
There is no legislation concerning maximum hours or
occupational safety and health.
924
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is a nation of 607
islands, mostly uninhabited, extending over 1 million square
miles of ocean in the Central Pacific. Four states, Pohnpei,
Truk, Yap, and Kosrae, comprise the federation. The four
states were formerly part of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, administered by the United States from 1947
to 1986 pursuant to an agreement with the United Nations. In
November 1986, the FSM emerged as a sovereign, self-governing
nation under the Compact of Free Association with the United
States. The population, of Micronesian origin, is estimated
to exceed 100,000.
Political legitimacy rests on the popular will expressed by a
majority vote in accordance with the Constitution, which is
based in large part on the U.S. model. There are three
branches of government: a president as chief executive and
head of state, a unicameral legislature elected from the four
constituent states, and a judicial system which applies
criminal and civil laws and procedures closely paralleling
those in the United States. Under the Compact of Free
Association, the United States is responsible for defense and
national security. Consequently, the FSM has no security
forces of its own aside from local police and other law
enforcement officers, both of which are firmly under the
control of the civil authorities. The economy depends heavily
on transfer payments from the United States, fishing, tourism,
and subsistence agriculture.
No human rights abuses were reported in 1989.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No political killings occurred.
b. Disappearance
There were no disappearances or abductions.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no reports of these practices.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Legal procedure follows U.S. law in its provisions for due
process. These provisions are carefully observed. There is
no exile.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Public trial is provided for in the Bill of Rights, and trials
are conducted fairly. Juveniles may have closed hearings.
The Chief Justice, currently a U.S. citizen, is appointed by
the President.
925
THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The law prohibits such arbitrary interference, and in practice
there is none.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These rights are constitutionally assured and faithfully
observed. Each of the four state governments controls a radio
station, broadcasting primarily in the local language. Yap
also controls a small television station. The Federal
Government and the governors of Kosrae and Truk publish
newsletters. Several private and municipal newsletters in
Truk and Pohnpei, however, do not hesitate to challenge
governmental policies. Religious groups operate private radio
stations in Pohnpei and Truk, and a commercial television
station broadcasts 12 hours a day on Pohnpei. Nongovernmental
media are expanding, albeit slowly.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These rights are also provided for in the Bill of Rights.
During political campaigns, citizens often take advantage of
them to question candidates at public meetings. Formal
associations are uncommon in Micronesia. Nevertheless,
student organizations and at least one lobbying group exist.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Federated States is extremely hospitable to diverse
religions, and missionaries of many faiths work within the
nation. The Bill of Rights forbids establishment of a state
religion and governmental restrictions on freedom of
religion. Most of the citizens are Christians.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions in any of these areas. The Compact
of Free Association permits citizens to travel to, reside in,
and work in the United States without having to obtain
immigrant visas.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Congress is elected by popular vote from each state;
Congress then chooses the President and Vice President from
its ranks by majority vote. State governors, state
legislators, and municipal governments are all elected by
direct popular vote. Elections are conducted honestly, and
political campaigning is unrestricted. Although there are no
restrictions on the formation of political groups, to date
there have been no efforts to form political parties.
926
THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Al«leged violations
of Human Rights
No violations have ever been alleged, nor are there any known
requests for investigations. There are no local groups that
concern themselves with human rights. The Federated States
does not belong to the United Nations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides explicit protection against
discrimination based on race, sex, language, or religion. The
various traditional cultures establish hierarchies of social
status, and these traditional rankings can influence access to
political office and education, even though such access is in
principle open to all. Traditional culture is greatly
respected by the peoples of the Federated States, and is
protected by Article V of the Constitution. Although the
traditional social orders are losing ground as westernization
takes a greater hold upon young people, male dominance is a
fact of life throughout Micronesia. Women are still at the
early stages of finding jobs beyond the entry level, in both
the public and private sectors. Allegations of violence
against women are almost exclusively concerned with domestic
conflict between husband and wife. Assault is a criminal
offense, but in such cases wives are very reluctant to bring
formal charges against their husbands. Local support groups
are beginning to hold meetings in some of the state capitals
to publicize domestic issues, including alcohol and drug
abuse. These meetings serve to create a greater awareness of
social problems, including the rights of all citizens.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
National government employees have the right, by law, to form
associations to "present their views" to the Government. The
Constitution states that "no law may deny or impair freedom of
expression, peaceable assembly, association, or petition."
These limits are observed by the Congress. There are as yet,
however, no trade unions in this largely nonindustrial society.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There is no law dealing specifically with trade unions or with
the right to collective bargaining. There are no special
economic areas set aside, and labor standards and practices
are the same throughout the islands.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution specifically prohibits involuntary servitude,
and there is no evidence of its practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
There is no law establishing a minimum age for employment of
children.
927
THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The minimum wage for national government •employees is $1.50
per hour. While there is no legally established minimum wage
for other types of employment, wages for unskilled workers
vary from $0.80 to $1.50 per hour under current customs and
practices. These wages are sufficient to provide an acceptable
standard of living under local conditions. There are no laws
regulating hours of work or prescribing standards of
occupational safety and health, but a federal regulation
requires that employers provide a safe place of employment.
928
MONGOLIA
The Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) is a highly centralized
Communist state, in which the Mongolian People's Revolutionary
Party (MPRP) , the Communist party, is the only political party
permitted to function. Since achieving power in the 1920's,
the MPRP has continued Mongolia's long tradition of
authoritarian rule, though there are recent signs that the top
leadership is sanctioning movement toward reform of the party
and government. The Politburo of the MPRP Central Committee,
headed by Jambyn Batmonkh, rules. Nominally, the People's
Great Hural, or National Assembly, enacts laws, but it
faithfully carries out the policies of the MPRP leadership.
However, the Great Hural has recently shown signs of movement
toward increased openness in criticizing government practices.
It meets for 3 days once a year. Between sessions, the
Presidium and the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) issue decrees
and executive orders.
The Mongolian State is modeled on the Soviet system, and the
political influence of the U.S.S.R. is great. While two
Soviet Army divisions were recently withdrawn, a significant
military presence remains, as do thousands of civilian Soviet
advisers and technicians. A Mongolian version of perestroika
(restructuring) and glasnost (openness) has begun; changes
along these lines have been noted. Consistent with this
policy. Chairman Batmonkh and other leaders have publicly
criticized political abuses of the past and called for
political and economic reform. Contact with and interest in
the non-Socialist countries is increasing.
The Mongolian security apparatus functions under the direction
of the Council of Ministers in accord with the Constitution.
The primary body with responsibility for state and public
security is the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). It
oversees subordinate bodies, including the Central Militia
Office and the network of local police departments. In
addition, the MPS administers the State Security
Administration, which is responsible for counterintelligence
and internal political security. The MPS also oversees the
Border and Internal Troop Administration, which performs
customs and immigration control, and border security duties.
In keeping with recent indications that a high-level political
review is under way in the Government of past policies and
practices, the MPS has stated publicly that it is reevaluating
its responsibilities, which will now include "establishing
reliable guarantees against permitting any kind of illegal
encroachments on human rights in the future...." There is
little information yet to assess MPS policy changes in this
area.
Mongolian economic life is dominated by the U.S.S.R. and
shaped by its trade, approximately 95 percent of which is
conducted with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Soviet
involvement in the economy primarily focuses on the mining of
nonferrous metals that are subsequently shipped to the
U.S.S.R. for processing. Mongolia is now making efforts to
diversify international trade with non-Socialist nations.
Despite increasing industrialization and urbanization, a
majority of the population is engaged in agriculture, with an
emphasis on livestock raising and associated light industry.
The United States and Mongolia established diplomatic
relations on January 27, 1987, and the U.S. Embassy opened
formally in September 1988. At this stage, the body of
reliable information concerning government control or
929
MONGOLIA
treatment of Mongolian citizens remains limited. Until
recently, there were no known domestic opposition groups.
However, on the eve of the Party's Seventh Plenum, a new group
surf aced--the Mongolian Democratic Association, composed of
students and intellectuals. Two demonstrations by this group
which were critical of current and past government practices
were permitted by the authorities; banners calling for
multiparty elections, an end to bureaucratic privileges, and a
more market-oriented economy were displayed.
Individual civil and political liberties are highly
restricted. Though the numbers are increasing, few Mongolians
are authorized to travel outside of Socialist countries.
Emigres from Mongolia are few. Political opposition to the
MPRP has recently been permitted, though the extent of the
party's control over this opposition remains unknown.
Freedoms promised under the Constitution, including speech,
religion, demonstration, and assembly, have been severely
restricted in the past, but there are now signs that the
authorities are relaxing these policies. The Party's official
daily recently published a lead editorial calling for
guarantees of human rights, including elections, and
"large-scale renewal" to ensure rights and freedoms.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There are no indications in recent years of political or
extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There are no indications in recent years of disappearance due
to political persecution.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Information is unavailable on this subject.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Government recently acknowledged that political arrests
and detention occurred in the 1930 's and has published
numerous official criticisms of those policies as violations
of human rights. In keeping with recent signs of increased
government openness in criticizing abuses of the 1930 "s and
1940's, the Minister of Public Security stated publicly that
his ministry is now "directing its activities at
rehabilitating honest citizens repressed during that period,
at establishing reliable guarantees against permitting any
kind of illegal encroachments on human rights in the future,
and cooperating with corresponding organizations in this
matter." The current extent of arbitrary arrest, detention,
or exile is unknown. There is little information available
yet on the practical effect of these new policy directives on
the Ministry of Public Security apparatus.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
930
MONGOLIA
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Current civil and criminal codes stipulate the right of the
accused to judicial process, a legal defense, and public trial
"except as stipulated by law." Closed proceedings are
permitted in the case of crimes against the State. The civil
code focuses on this category of crimes.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The right to privacy of person, home, and correspondence is
provided for in the Constitution, but little is known about
the application of these rights by the authorities. Job and
residence changes must be approved by the State. The State
also plays a role in finding or assigning jobs.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These freedoms have been tightly circumscribed. The
Constitution provides for freedom of speech but limits this
freedom by specifying that the exercise of individual rights
must be to "develop and consolidate the state system of the
MPR." Actions deemed by the MPRP to fall outside this
guideline may result in arrest and detention. Various party
and government organizations, including the Ministry of Public
Security and the local militia, control political and social
conduct. Citizen volunteer committees work with the militia
to monitor social and political conduct at the neighborhood
level .
Prior to the institution of Mongolian-style glasnost and
perestroika, fundamental public criticism of the Government
was not permitted. In late 1988, however, for the first time
a limited amount of direct criticism of past and present party
and government leaders, and of the Soviet Union, was carried
in public media. Letters published in the official press are
a form of managed criticism permitted by the Government. The
government-approved press serves largely as a propaganda
tool. Recent practice indicates that representatives of
non-Communist foreign media are able to travel to Mongolia.
Academic and artistic life also is controlled in accordance
with government policy. Information flow is tightly
monitored. Mongolian citizens have little access to books,
periodicals, or newspapers not printed in Communist countries,
but there are signs the Government is permitting more exposure
to some Western plays and literature.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of demonstration and assembly are provided for in the
Constitution, but, until recently, only government-authorized
organizations were permitted. Demonstrations are generally
carefully orchestrated by government authorities, but the
extent of government involvement in two demonstrations by the
new Mongolian Democratic Association in December 1989 is
unknown. Demonstrators--mostly students and intellectuals —
expressed criticism of past and current government practices,
called for plural elections, a more market-oriented economy,
intensification of perestroika and glasnost, and an end to
special privileges for government officials.
931
MONGOLIA
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Government controls religious activity through the Office
of Religious Affairs attached to the Council of Ministers.
This office works in close consultation with the showcase
Gandan monastery — the only monastery permitted to function.
The monastery houses approximately 200 monks. All other
monasteries have been closed since the 1930's. As a result,
Lamaist Buddhism, a central force in Mongolian life prior to
the establishment of the Communist Government, no longer plays
a significant part in the lives of most Mongolians. However,
rural people reportedly retain many Buddhist beliefs
privately. Vestiges of shamanism also remain.
In addition to the 200 monks at Gandan monastery, there are
reports of 100 itinerant monks — loosely affiliated with
Gandan. Gandan also runs a nominal religious school on a
small scale. Mongolians who regularly visit the Gandan
Monastery for worship are mostly of the older generation, but
there are signs of resurgent interest in religion among
Mongolian youth. Two other monasteries are being restored as
museums. During 1989 the traditional Mongolian script, long
suppressed in favor of Cyrillic, has been revived and is
taught in schools and on television. The destruction of
lamaseries in the 1930's has been criticized for excessive
brutality. Lunar New Year celebrations, carrying Buddhist
associations, were permitted in the cities in 1989 for the
first time in decades. Such developments appear to evidence a
modestly increased toleration of Buddhist and other
traditional practices. There are no mosques for the
traditionally Islamic Kazakh minority of 80,000 in western
Mongolia. This group has been permitted to retain cultural
customs, such as dress, based on religious background.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Travel within the country does not appear to be as restricted
as in the past, but residence changes must be approved by the
authorities. All Mongolians over age 16 must have internal
passports and must obtain permission from the Security Bureau
in order to travel within the country. Changes of residence
or employment must be approved by the Security Bureau and must
accord with central planning goals.
In general, few Mongolians have traveled abroad, even to the
Soviet Union. In recent years, however, as many as several
thousand Mongolian youths have gone to various places in the
Soviet Union yearly for specialized programs. There has also
been an increase in the number of senior scholars pursuing
extended study abroad. Most foreign travel remains restricted
to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Though overall
figures remain small, increasing numbers of Mongolians are
permitted travel to the West for official, academic, or
cultural purposes. There is no known routine emigration from
Mongolia, but there are also no indications that many people
wish to emigrate.
Although the 1960 Constitution assures the right "to reside in
the territory of the MPR" to foreign citizens, the Government
in 1983 began a systematic expulsion of the 6,000 to 7,000
ethnic Chinese. With the improvement of Sino-Mongolian
932
MONGOLIA
relations in recent years, Mongolia stopped expelling ethnic
Chinese in 1985; today the Chinese population numbers less
than 2,000. Increasingly, Mongolians are permitted to visit
and be visited by ethnic Mongolian relatives whose homes are
in China. A bilateral consular treaty regarding treatment of
their nationals was signed by Mongolia and China in July 1986.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government.
The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) has a
monopoly on political power, and there is no established
mechanis;n by which the citizenry as a whole can effect
transitions in leadership or changes in government. The MPRP
is established on the Soviet model with a narrow pyramid of
power topped by Party General Secretary Batmonkh. Lower
ranking members of the MPRP have had very limited ability to
influence the decisions of their superiors, but recent signs
indicate that the top leadership has sanctioned movement
toward decentralization of decisionmaking within the party.
People's Great Hural delegates, for example, are becoming more
outspoken on party policies. During a December 1989 session.
Great Hural delegates called for accelerated economic reform
and criticized "bureaucratism" in the Government and the
special privileges of high officials.
Elections are held at regular intervals, but only one
candidate has been listed for each office, so the choice has
been to vote for the candidate or cross the name out. Many
elections reportedly result in a 99.9 percent turnout, and the
sole candidate regularly receives the entire vote. However,
reforms announced in December 1988 called for the institution
of some elections with multiple candidates at all levels.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
No organization dedicated to the protection of human rights in
Mongolia is known to exist. There has been no known request
by an international human rights group to investigate alleged
human rights violations in Mongolia.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There appears to be little discrimination in education on the
basis of race, sex, or religion.
Government policy is to promote equal rights for women.
According to government statistics, the percentage of women in
the work force rose from 30 to 48.5 percent between 1960 and
1984. Women constitute about 30 percent of the MPRP
membership and 49.8 percent of trade union membership, and
some hold high professional positions in institutions such as
schools, research centers, and hospitals.
At present, there is no information to indicate a significant
incidence of societal violence against women. The extent to
which family violence, including wife beating, may occur is
unknown. Article 84 of the Constitution expressly calls for
equal rights for women in all sociopolitical spheres and
prohibits the "impairment of v;omen's equality in any form
whatsoever." In particular, the law provides for specific
protections for women with children and special assistance for
933
MONGOLIA
women during pregnancy and after childbirth. Because Mongolia
remains an underpopulated country with just over 2 million
inhabitants, official desire to increase the population is
strong .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers do not have the right to form and join unions of their
own choosing. The right to organize professional associations
and trade unions is provided for in the Constitution, but
these are government controlled and directed. It is not known
how such organizations work in practice, whether trade unions
have a right to strike, and whether any strikes took place in
1989. All worker committees are reportedly extensions of the
MPRP. However, there have been confirmed cases of direct
elections of plant or factory directors, and reports of labor
resistance to overbearing party interference in technical
matters of production. In the opinion of the International
Labor Organization (ILO), constitutional provisions imply that
no mass organizations, particularly trade unions, have any
possibility of working outside the party framework. The ILO
also notes that the Labor Code effectively prevents the
formation of any independent trade union organizations. All
unions are grouped in the Central Council of Mongolian Trade
Unions (CCMTU) , which itself is an extension of the MPRP. The
CCMTU is affiliated with the Communist-controlled World
Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There is no specific provision for collective bargaining in
the labor law. However, local worker committees and people's
courts are empowered by the law to form "Commissions for Labor
Disputes" to settle grievances. Trade union council
representatives and enterprise managers are represented
equally on these commissions. It is not known how these
comrrdssions function in actual practice. Information whether
export processing zones exist is not available.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
It is not known if forced or compulsory labor is practiced or
prohibited by law.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The law proscribes work for children under age 16, although
those aged 15 may work if allowed to by the local trade union
committee. Those under 18 are statutorily prohibited from
doing arduous work or from working in dangerous areas such as
mining .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Mongolian Labor Law sets maximum work hours for all
workers and exhorts state enterprises to observe work safety
requirements. The workday is prescribed as 8 hours for
adults, 7 hours for those aged 16 to 18, and 6 hours for those
aged 15. The Labor Law provides that "the monthly earnings of
a worker or employee may not be lower than the minimum amount
of earnings established by the State." No information is
available on the implementation of labor law in this area or
of the effectiveness of health and safety standards set by the
Government .
934
NAURU
The Republic of Nauru, an 8.22 square mile Pacific island with
about 9,000 inhabitants, gained independence in 1968, at which
time it adopted a modified Westminster form of parliamentary
democracy. Previously, Australia, acting on behalf of the
United Kingdom and New Zealand, administered the island, first
as a League ot Nations mandate and later as a United Nations
trust territory.
Nauru has two levels of government, the unicameral Parliament
and the Nauru Local Government Council (NLGC) , both popularly
elected bodies. Parliamentary elections must be held at least
once every 3 years. The Parliament consists of 18 members
from 8 constituencies and is responsible for national and
international matters. The President, who is both head of
state and head of government, is elected by Parliament from
among its members. The NLGC acts as the local government and
is responsible for public services. The judiciary is
independent .
Nauru has no armed forces, though it does maintain a police
force, now numbering 72 officers, under civilian control.
The economy depends almost entirely on the country's rich
phosphate deposits which are mined by the government-owned
Nauru Phosphate Corporation (NPC) . Its profits are the
primary source of revenue for the Government; Nauru has no
consumption or income taxes. A large percentage of the NPC's
earnings are placed by the Government in long-term
investments, meant to support the Nauruans after the phosphate
reserves have been exhausted.
Fundamental human rights are accorded by the Constitution and
generally respected in practice, although hard data and
systematic records are lacking. There were no formal reports
of human rights abuses during 1989, but concerns have been
expressed about discrim.inatory treatment of women.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no political disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits these practices, and this
prohibition is respected.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The constitutional prohibition of arbitrary arrest and
detention is honored. The police may hold a person for no
more than 24 hours without a hearing before a magistrate.
Exile is not practiced, though persons found to be "mentally
disordered" either by two medical examiners or, in the case of
a finding of not guilty due to mental incapacity, by a court
935
NAURU
may be sent to appropriate medical facilities in Australia.
Once treatment is completed such persons may return to Nauru.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Nauru maintains an independent judiciary, and constitutional
provisions for both a fair hearing and a public trial are
respected. Defendants may have legal counsel, and a
representative will be appointed where required "in the
interest of justice." Nauru has only two trained lawyers, and
many people are represented in court by "pleaders," trained
paralegals certified by the Government. There are no
political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution generally provides protection from these
abuses. Searches not sanctioned by court order are
prohibited, and there is no surveillance of individuals or of
private communications. However, Nauruan males must have
permission from the Government to marry a non-Nauruan; such
permission has not always been granted, though there were no
reports of any refusals in 1989. Nauruan females are
prohibited from marrying foreigners. Birth control measures
are not readily available (see Section 5).
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of expression is provided for in the Constitution, but
the island's one radio station and one newspaper (a weekly)
are owned and operated by the Government. While the
parliamentary opposition, private groups, and individual
persons may voice opposition to the Government, their
statements may not receive local media coverage. However,
Nauru's small population allows news and opinion to circulate
freely, rapidly, and widely by word of mouth. A sm.all
independent newsletter appearing every 3 or 4 weeks provides
an alternative to the state-owned media. Nauru has no
prohibitions against other newspapers, but, with a market of
only 528 households, the economic viability of independent
media is precarious. Foreign publications are freely
available.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The constitutionally granted right of peaceful assembly and
association is honored. No limitations exist on private
associations, and no permits need be obtained for public
meetings .
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is protected by the Constitution, and no
official religion is recognized by the Government. Several
different Christian denominations are established in Nauru.
Missionaries, foreign clergy, and religious publishing are all
936
NAURU
permitted. Adherence to a particular faith results in no
advantage or disadvantage in any secular pursuit.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Nauruans are free to move and travel both domestically and
internationally. Domestic travel is particularly accessible,
since any place on the island is within a 3-hour walk.
Foreign workers must apply to their employers for permission
to leave during the period of their contracts. They may break
the contract and leave without permission but would lose their
positions as a result. In most cases foreign employees whose
contracts are terminated by their employers must leave Nauru
within 60 days.
Nauru does not revoke citizenship for political reasons;
citizens who have left the country have the right to return,
and repatriates receive the same treatment as other citizens.
No restrictions on emigration exist.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
To Change Their Government
Citizens have, and exercise, this right. Though Nauru has no
organized political parties, persons with diverse points of
view run for and are elected to Parliament and to the NLGC.
Though one man held power much of the time since independence,
shifting parliamentary groupings, many reflecting family and
clan loyalties, have often resulted in changes in leadership.
In August 1989, Parliament elected a new president. This was
followed 4 months later by the regularly scheduled election
which resulted in two new members being chosen for Parliament
and the naming of the third president to lead Nauru within the
year. Nauru has also had changes in presidential leadership
on four occasions prior to 1989. Power has always been
transferred peacefully and in accordance with the
Constitution. Voting by secret ballot is compulsory for all
citizens over age 20 for parliamentary elections and for all
over age 21 for NLGC elections. All parliamentary seats have
been contested during recent elections. The only significant
non-Nauruan group in the nation, the 3,000 guest workers, have
no voice in political decisions.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There have been no allegations by outside organizations of
human rights violations in Nauru, nor any requests for
investigations .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution contains provisions assuring women the same
freedoms and protections as men. They are provided equal
opportunities by the Government in education and employment
and are free to own property and pursue private interests
except, as noted above, they are prohibited from marrying
foreigners .
Nauru's population has almost been eliminated on several
occasions, first by disease, and then during World War II as a
result of massive removals by the Japanese. The Government
937
NAURU
therefore went to great lengths to encourage large families.
Birth control has been available to women only after they have
five children, and then it is often difficult to obtain. The
island has no gynecological specialists and no women doctors.
Nauruan women complain that the emphasis on their reproductive
role limits their opportunities. Serious problems with
alcoholism are generally blamed for the physical abuse of
women in Nauru. During the tenure of former President
DeRoburt, such abuse, like other issues involving women,
received no attention from the Government, and no statistics
about the prevalence of such abuse exist.
Foreign contract laborers and their families live only in very
crowded conditions and suffer disproportionately from the
rationing imposed during times of water shortages.
Additionally, while regulations allow those from Kiribati,
Tuvalu, and other Pacific islands to bring spouses and two
children under age 18 to Nauru, this privilege is denied to
Filipino guest workers.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Trade unions do not exist in Nauru, and efforts to form unions
are officially discouraged. Pilots employed by Air Nauru went
on strike during 1988 partly in order to gain recognition as a
legal union. The DeRoburt Government refused to grant union
status to the airline pilots, denounced the strike as
interrupting a vital service, and dismissed the pilots.
Replacement pilots have not attempted to form a union. The
transient nature of the mostly foreign work force and the
relative prosperity of the Nauruans have tended to hamper
efforts to organize the labor force. No strikes took place in
1989. Nauru is not a member of the International Labor
Organization.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There are no laws discriminating against unions or their
members. There are no export processing zones on Nauru.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is forbidden by the Constitution,
and there were no instances of either.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Nauruan law sets 17 as the minimum age of employment for
children. This is enforced, except where children under age
17 work in the few small businesses owned by their families.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Nauruan wages provide a decent, if Spartan, living for all
workers, but the actual compensation varies widely. In 1989
Nauruans had a minimum wage of $3.88 per hour and a 35-hour
workweek. Foreign contract workers had a similar workweek,
but earned only $2.77 per day, except for skilled tradesmen,
who earned $7.70. Overtime rates of time and a half, with
double time for Sundays and holidays, considerably supplement
foreign workers' incomes. Also, free housing and food is
provided for foreign workers and their families.
938
HAUfiU
The Government sets health and safety standards. NPC the
island s major employer, has an excellent safety program that
includes worker education and the use of safety helmets
safety shoes, respirators for dusty conditions', and oth4r
accident and about 10 minor accidents in its work force of
939
NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand is a parliamentary democracy, with executive
authority vested in a 20-member cabinet led by a prime
minister. The 97 members of the unicameral legislature
include 4 elected by those members of the native Maori
minority who wish to be included on a separate electoral roll.
Maori comprise approximately 9 percent of New Zealand's
population of 3,372,000, while other Pacific islanders total
about 3 percent. The rights of the native Maori minority have
been the subject of increasing public attention in recent
years, particularly as the country prepares to commemorate 150
years of European settlement in 1990. The Department of Maori
Affairs is being phased out in favor of the Iwi Transition
Agency, charged with overseeing the devolution of
responsibility for Maori interests to Iwi (tribal)
authorities .
Nine and the Cook Islands are self-governing countries in free
association with New Zealand. The island group of Tokelau is
administered by New Zealand with limited but growing self-
government. Inhabitants of all three hold local and New
Zealand citizenship, and local law is compatible with New
Zealand and British common law.
The police and defense forces are responsible to and firmly
controlled by civilian officials.
Real annual economic growth has been low or negative in recent
years. However, the free enterprise economy affords the
opportunity for a reasonable standard of living for most New
Zealanders. Education is freely available to all.
New Zealand continued its excellent record in human rights
during 1989. New Zealanders enjoy personal freedom, freedom
of religion, freedom of the press, universal suffrage, and the
rule of law. Respect for minority rights, concern for the
economically deprived, and the humane treatment of prisoners
are established in principle and in practice.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Such killings do not occur.
b. Disappearance
There have been no instances of politically motivated
disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and other forms of mistreatment are prohibited by law,
and these prohibitions are respected in practice.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
New Zealanders enjoy freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention,
and exile. New Zealand law provides for the writ of habeas
corpus, and persons arrested in New Zealand are charged
940
NEW ZEALAND
promptly. Legal aid is provided by the court to those who
cannot afford to pay for a private attorney. Preventive
detention is prohibited.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
New Zealand law assures a prompt, public trial. The rights of
the accused are carefully observed and subject to public
scrutiny. The judiciary operates independently of executive
or legislative influence.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The right to privacy is assured by law. The Government does
not violate a person's privacy, the sanctity of the home, or
the integrity of correspondence.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press are assured by law and respected
in practice. More than 150 newspapers and 600 magazines are
published throughout the country, reflecting a wide spectrum
of political and social thought. The Government makes no
attempt to censor the press, and opposition viewpoints are
freely expressed.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Rights to peaceful assembly and association are recognized and
respected.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
New Zealand enjoys a long tradition of religious tolerance.
All faiths are given equal treatment under the law.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
New Zealanders are not subject to limitations on internal
movement or resettlement. Foreign travel is unrestricted, and
the right to return is assured. To the extent of its
resources. New Zealand accepts and resettles refugees and
asylum seekers.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The people freely elect their government. Two major parties.
Labour and National, dominate the political scene and have
formed governments chosen in triennial elections for more than
50 years. Smaller parties and groups are usually of little
consequence in the national electoral process. New Zealand
law provides for universal suffrage; citizens are eligible to
vote at age 18. No restrictions based upon race, sex, creed,
or national origin limit participation in the political
process. Women and Maoris, as well as other minorities.
941
NEW ZEALAND
regularly serve in Parliament and the Cabinet albeit in
numbers well below their proportion of the population. Voting
rates are high, and participation in political groups is
common. Opposition groups freely voice their views.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
New Zealand's commitment to human rights is clearly
demonstrated by the active efforts of local, national, and
international bodies organized to protect human rights and
prevent discrimination. The official New Zealand Human Rights
Commission and the New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties are
joined by such nongovernmental human rights organizations as
the Citizens Association for Racial Equality, the New Zealand
chapter of the International Commission of Jurists, the Race
Relations Conciliator, Amnesty International, and the National
Organization of Women. In May 1989, the Government sponsored
an international human rights conference in Wellington which,
while noting New Zealand's excellent human rights record,
urged the Government to do more to promote the rights of the
Maori and Pacific island minorities within the country.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Despite the historical absence of overt discrimination and the
achievements and status of many successful Maori in government
and public life, some of the indigenous population remain
marginally educated and economically disadvantaged.
Increasing urbanization (approximately 90 percent of young
Maori live in cities) and continued assimilation with New
Zealanders of European descent have created social stress
which is reflected in social indicators. A relatively high
percentage of Maori are unemployed and receive state
assistance. They figure disproportionately in crime
statistics and among the prison population.
Maori activists continue to press for the return of
government-held land and assets to Maori tribes in accordance
with the terms of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. Legislation
reallocating fishing quotas to Maori tribes in accordance with
the Treaty underwent several revisions in 1989. At year's end
that legislation was before a parliamentary select committee.
Numerous other claims are currently under investigation, and
sales of several state assets have been held up pending a
review of the effect of the sales on Maori rights and
interests. Some Maori activists have called for a boycott of
ceremonies commemorating the sesquicentennial of the Treaty on
the grounds that the Government has not honored its terms.
The Government established a Ministry of Women's Affairs in
1985 and has ratified the U.N. Convention for the Elimination
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. A Human Rights
Commission established in 1977 hears complaints about sex
discrimination, most frequently concerning wage inequities.
The Government has promised that "comparable worth"
legislation will be introduced during the current term of
Parliament. The Government has funded shelters and other
assistance for victims of domestic violence and has prosecuted
offenders .
Violence against women has received increased public and
governmental attention in recent years. The Crimes Amendment
942
NEW ZEALAND
Act of 1986 eliminated the crime of rape, replacing it with
the crimes of sexual violation and unlawful sexual
connection. The new law also increased protection for the
victim during trial by allowing suppression of the victim's
name and other details, and eliminated the exemption for
spousal rape. In 1987 the police changed their policy on
family violence, requiring that arrests be made instead of
attempting mediation at the scene by police officers not
trained for that role. Women have become increasingly
cognizant of their legal rights as evidenced by the number of
claims to the Accident Compensation Corporation for "loss of
the capacity for enjoyment of life." In 1981 there were three
such claims based on sexual abuse. In 1988 there were 1,500.
Services for victims are rapidly increasing as well; in
1987-88, 76 rape and sexual abuse counseling organizations
were funded by the Department of Social Welfare, up from 48
the year before.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
New Zealand workers have unrestricted rights to establish and
join organizations of their own choosing and to affiliate
those organizations with other unions and international
organizations. Their unions are protected from interference,
suspension, and dissolution by the Government and, in fact,
have considerable influence on legislation and government
policy. Unions have the right to strike. Public sector
unions, however, are precluded from striking if work stoppages
pose a threat to public safety. Unions freely maintain
relations with international bodies and participate in
bilateral exchanges.
For the past 2 years, the Committee on Freedom of Association
(CFA) of the International Labor Organization has examined a
complaint from the New Zealand Employers' Federation that the
1987 Labor Relations Act restricts freedom of association by
requiring that unions must have 1,000 members to be officially
registered. Noting that although unregistered unions are
legal, official unions have broader rights, the CFA has
requested the Government to reexamine the system established
under the 1987 Act.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right of labor unions to organize and bargain collectively
is provided by law. Unions actively recruit members and
engage in collective bargaining. Sixty-four percent of wage
earners are represented by unions. New Zealand unions operate
under a closed shop system where union membership is
compulsory if the majority of workers in a workplace vote in
favor of union coverage.
Mediation and arbitration procedures are independent of
government control. A system of labor courts hears cases
arising from disputes over interpretation of labor laws. In
addition, the Arbitration Commission and the Mediation Service
are available to handle wage disputes and assist in
maintaining effective labor relations. Labor laws are applied
uniformly throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
All New Zealand workers are protected from forced or
compulsory labor by law and in practice.
943
NEW ZEALAND
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children under the age of 16 may not be employed without
special government approval and must not work between the
hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. These laws are effectively
enforced.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
New Zealand enforces a 40-hour workweek, a minimum of 3 weeks'
annual paid vacation for all employees, and observance of 11
paid public holidays. The hourly minimum wage of $3.50 is
adequate to provide a decent standard of living. In most
cases, minimum wage recipients also receive a variety of
welfare payments. Most workers earn more than the minimum
wage.
New Zealand has an extensive body of law and regulations
governing health and safety issues. Rules are enforced by
Department of Labor inspectors who have the power to shut down
equipment if necessary, and unions may file safety complaints
on behalf of workers.
944
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Papua New Guinea is the largest of the South Pacific island
nations with some 1,000 different tribes and 369 languages.
It covers half of the second largest island in the world and
many outlying islands, constituting the largest part of
Melanesia. It has a federal, parliamentary form of government
based on the consent of a majority of the votes of all adult
citizens. The Constitution resembles those in other
English-speaking parliamentary democracies, with the
traditional culture emphasizing respect for landholding and
individual rights. A civilian government controls the
military, police, and intelligence organizations. The four
transfers of power since independence in 1975 have been
peaceful and in keeping with the Constitution.
The economic structure comprises a modern free-enterprise
system combining private, largely foreign, investment,
government-owned enterprises, and a traditional subsistence
farming economy that supports 80 percent of the population.
The private sector generates most of the wealth and
contributes 80 percent of state revenue. Most of the
remainder is aid from Australia. The country has rich
mineral, timber, hydroelectric, and petroleum resources now
under development.
There were reports of human rights violations in Papua New
Guinea in 1989 as the society came under severe new strains.
The Government had to deal with an insurgency and a growing
problem of law and order, while intertribal conflict continued
as a serious problem in the highlands. The Government also
showed growing concern over mistreatment of women. In
general, however, the country's network of democratic, social,
and political institutions sustained a continued respect for
human rights. These institutions included a responsive
parliament, an independent judiciary, and a free press. The
country continued to host, with the cooperation of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), some 10,000
Melanesians who have illegally crossed the border from Irian
Jaya, Indonesia.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The Government did not resort to political killings. In North
Solomons Province, however, a small group of armed insurgents
reportedly killed at least 10 noncombatants , and counter
operations by security forces also claimed several civilian
lives. (See Section l.g.)
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and other cruel or degrading treatment or punishment
are forbidden by the Constitution. An unusually high crime
rate has created what is proportionally one of the world's
highest convict populations. Treatment of prisoners is
monitored by the press and clergy, both highly sensitive to
945
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
allegations of police misconduct. Allegations of misconduct
are actively investigated by an Ombudsman Commission, and its
recommendations are enforced by the courts. Such actions
resulted in awards of civil damages and punishment of
offending police officials. Police in the highlands
reportedly have beaten villagers, a traditional law-and-order
practice, in their efforts to quell tribal fighting and other
violence there. There have been periodic reports from
Bougainville in recent months that captured militants were
tortured.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
No cases of politically motivated arrests occurred. The
courts strongly enforce constitutional protections against
arbitrary arrest and detention. Exile is not practiced, and
warrants are required for arrests. Suspects have free access
to legal counsel. Both in law and practice, accused persons
are informed of charges and their arrest is subject to
judicial review. They have the right of bail except in cases
where judges rule that risk of flight or further violence
requires continued confinement.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
There were no cases of denial of fair public trial. The court
system is similar to those in other countries with English
common law traditions. The law guarantees a public trial,
with observance of due process rights guaranteed in the
Constitution. Defendants have the right to an attorney, and
counsel is provided to poor defendants at government expense
in felony cases involving violence. The defendant and his or
her attorney can confront witnesses, present evidence, and
appeal convictions. In a police and judicial system short of
resources and confronted with a high crime rate, periods
between arrest and trial can be long. Such detention is
subject to judicial review, however, and a prisoner may not be
held without trial for more than 6 months. The courts are
independent of executive, political, or military authorities,
and there are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Authorities generally respected the sanctity of the home and
family and the privacy of correspondence. There were reports,
however, that security forces burned village homes in efforts
to quell tribal disturbances in the highlands and in
operations under the state of emergency on Bougainville.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Attacks on the Bougainville copper mine in the North Solomons
Province by militant landowners forced closure of the mine on
May 15. That led to a declaration of a state of emergency in
the province. The destruction of mine facilities and the
killing and wounding of at least 10 mine personnel by the
armed insurgents thwarted government efforts to reestablish
security or to conclude a new compensation package that would
permit the mine to reopen. The insurgents were also suspected
in the assassination of a local government minister who was
assisting in negotiating a compensation settlement with the
946
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
local landowners. The posture of security forces on the
island was generally defensive, aimed at protecting the mine
and its workers. The Government adopted a conciliatory
attitude, and there was no effort to deny the population
essential supplies. The security forces had several lapses of
discipline, however, which included burning of village houses
and mistreatment of persons. The provincial Premier,
suspected of carrying information to the leader of the
insurgency, was beaten. An aide who tried to defend him lost
an eye as a result of his injuries. Persons in areas directly
affected by the conflict were resettled in government-funded
camps .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure
freedom of speech and press. The Government imposed a ban on
travel to the troubled North Solomons Province by diplomats
and foreign journalists but lifted it after several weeks.
State-owned radio and television give significant coverage to
statements of opposition politicians and investigate public
issues. Pornography is prohibited. Films are censored for
suitability and classified according to sexual explicitness
and degree of violence. Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Demonstrations require legal permits, but these are almost
always granted. The rare denial or limit of a demonstration
that does occur comes in the general context of high local
tensions and not because of the particular cause itself. An
unsanctioned demonstration took place in February when
soldiers demonstrated at Parliament over postponement of a pay
raise.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is assured by law. There are no
restrictions on the practice of religion and no religious
discrimination. A wide variety of indigenous and Christian
denominations flourish. There are also small Buddhist and
Muslim minorities. Missionaries are allowed to work freely in
the country.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement within and outside the country is not
restricted by law. Foreign citizens who reside in Papua New
Guinea may become naturalized citizens by satisfying a
residency requirement and obtaining sponsorship of a village.
Acquired citizenship is revocable only for fraud.
The Government continued to observe a humanitarian policy
toward the approximately 10,000 persons from Irian Jaya living
in camps along the border and toward the related Irian Jaya
separatist movement, Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua
Movement or OPM) . The Government also continued to cooperate
with the UNHCR to determine which persons qualify as refugees.
947
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
At the same time it worked with Indonesian authorities to
encourage voluntary repatriation of those — probably the
majority — who do not fear persecution should they return. The
Government has repeatedly reaffirmed its policy to consider
the effects of repatriation on a case by case basis (with the
help of the UNHCR) and not to repatriate by force anyone
judged to be a refugee. It also continued to resettle the
border crossers from several camps to one large settlement
farther from the border, and to express concern over 0PM
activities. The Government has repeatedly emphasized that it
will not permit Papua New Guinea territory to be used as a
base for 0PM guerrilla operations against Indonesia. In
September the Government expelled a Swiss citizen, a supporter
of the 0PM who had illegally flown into Irian Jaya from
Australia and then crossed the border into Papua New Guinea.
The Government remains sensitive to arguments that Papua New
Guinea has a moral obligation to provide permanent asylum to
refugees from Irian Jaya or to help them find asylum in a
third country.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens freely exercise their right to change their
government through direct elections with a secret ballot and
adult suffrage. The voters elect a unicameral parliament made
up of 109 members from all 19 provinces and the Port Moresby
national capital district. Any citizen can stand for
election, and several foreign-born members sit in Parliament.
With a multiplicity of parties, the coalition that can command
a majority forms the government. However, the weak
development of parties and the shifting coalitions they
produce has led to instability such that no government yet has
survived enough no-confidence votes to fulfill its 5-year
mandate.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
It is believed that the Government would cooperate with any
proposed international or nongovernmental investigations of
alleged violations. However, as there have been no requests
for investigations by international or nongovernmental
agencies of human rights violations in Papua New Guinea the
question has not arisen. The press and concerned politicians
quickly publicize, and the Ombudsman Commission and the courts
investigate and take remedial action in, cases of alleged
government abuses.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
With its extreme ethnic diversity, Papua New Guinea is not
dominated by any ethnic group or geographic area. The
democratically elected Government, relying precariously on
loose coalitions, cannot afford to display ethnic favoritism.
The democratic system has extensive provisions for women's
rights. The achievements of women in the modern sector are
considerable, given the inherent tribal discrimination. They
serve as doctors, lawyers, business executives, and in
government .
Accurate statistics on women in the paid labor force are not
available, but the Department of Labor estimates this at 10
948
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
percent. Family law and marriage and property rights of women
are guaranteed in a legal system based on English common law,
although the majority of women still live according to the
older traditions.
Violence against women is widespread. Some tribal cultures
emphasize antagonism between the sexes. While women are
protected by their family and clan, attacks on women remain
common in intertribal warfare. In addition, "pack rapes"
against women occur freguently and are often reported by the
press. Both public organizations and the Government are
working to bridge time and gender gaps and to upgrade the
status of women. Several women's rights groups, most notably
the National Women's Association, actively promote the
evolution of the role of women and run campaigns against
crimes such as rape and wife beating. In March the Government
launched a new campaign against domestic violence with the
release of a video film produced by the Law Reform Commission
and the Women and Law Committee. This is reportedly the first
video program on this subject produced by a developing nation,
and copies were requested by the United Nations, the Pacific
Commission, and the Commonwealth Secretariat. In introducing
the film, the Minister of Justice noted that a happy and
stable family life is founded on mutual love and respect, not
on force or fear, and called on parents to show their children
a good example of how to settle arguments without fighting and
hurting each other. The film's first showing on television
was introduced by the Prime Minister and his wife, and the
Governor General and his wife participated in a panel
discussion of it.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Labor unions are protected by law and are active and important
in the country's economic and political life. Over 50 trade
unions exist, among which the most significant are the Public
Employees Association and the two mineworkers' unions. Both
public and private sector unions have the right to strike.
Although civil servants have never struck, private sector
unions do on occasion. In September they pressured the
Government to approve recommended increases in the minimum
wage. The Papua New Guinea Trade Union Congress is a member
of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Constitution ensures workers the right to engage in
collective bargaining, to join industrial organizations, and
to seek employment. These rights are freely exercised,
although for the past several years the Committee of Experts
of the International Labor Organization (ILO) has criticized
the Government's power to reject, at its discretion,
arbitration awards or agreements concerning wages. The
Committee, again in 1989, strongly urged the Government to
bring its legislation into conformity with ILO Convention 98
on Collective Bargaining, which Papua New Guinea has
ratified. There are no export processing zones in Papua New
Guinea .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution forbids slavery and all forms of forced or
compulsory labor, and no reports of their practice have been
949
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
received except when the latter is imposed as a condition or
sentence after due process of law.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum working age is 15. However, children between the
ages of 11 and 16 may be employed in family-related work
provided they have parental permission, a medical clearance,
and a work permit from a labor office. Such employment is
rare except in subsistence agriculture.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Working hour limitations, rest periods, holidays, leave,
wages, and compensation are regulated by the Employment Act of
1978. Minimum wages are established by the Minimum Wages
Board. These vary by industry and types of work, and whether
or not work is performed in an urban or rural area. They
provide a barely adequate living within the local context.
Standard hours of work are regulated as well and, although
variable for some occupations, may not exceed 42 hours per
week in an urban area or 44 hours in a rural environment. The
provision of housing or a housing allowance is a precondition
for most employment.
The Department of Labor is responsible for the enforcement of
laws and regulations concerning safety, health, and working
conditions. Enforcement of health and safety codes is an
important focus of organized labor activity. While the
Industrial and Welfare Act states that there should be regular
inspections conducted in all workplaces, the Department of
Manpower does not have the personnel to fulfill the Act's
requirements. There are only two inspectors covering the
whole country. Inspections are carried out only when a
specific request is made by an industry.
950
THE PHILIPPINES
The Philippines has a republican form of government with a
democratically elected President and a bicameral legislature.
President Corazon C. Aquino was sworn into office in 1986
after a popular and nearly bloodless uprising ended the
20-year rule of Ferdinand Marcos. A new Constitution was
ratified in 1987, followed by Congressional elections the same
year, local and provincial elections in 1988, and village
elections in 1989.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which now number
some 166,000 personnel, continued to be engaged against a
Communist insurgency active in many of the country's 73
provinces. The army, with 68,000 and the Philippine
Constabulary (PC) with 42,000, are the largest elements of the
AFP. The Integrated National Police numbers 40,000. The AFP
has established local militia units called Citizens Armed
Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU's), with 52,000 men. In
early December, elements of the armed forces identified with
the "Reform the Armed Forces Movement" (RAM) joined with
Marcos loyalists to launch a week-long coup attempt which
resulted in over 100 deaths, mostly civilians caught in the
crossfire. The Aquino Government was able to quell this
threat from the right, and trials of senior officers involved
are scheduled for early 1990.
During the year, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
and its armed wing, the New People's Army (NPA) , escalated
campaigns of urban terrorism, political assassination,
kidnaping, and extortion, resulting in widespread human rights
abuses. In Mindanao the Muslim secessionist movement stepped
up its violent activities after a lull of several years.
Elements of the Army and the PC have also been involved in
human rights violations.
The Aquino Government has made relief of the endemic poverty
of the Philippines one of its highest priorities. In 1986
government statistics showed that 59 percent of Filipinos
lived below the poverty level. Facilitated by an upturn in
the economy--estimated at 5.5 percent real growth for
1989--the number of people living below the poverty level has
declined to 46 percent, according to government statistics.
The Philippines has a population growth rate estimated at 2.4
percent, the highest in the region.
The dominant factors in the human rights situation in the
Philippines are the continuing CPP/NPA insurgency with its
campaign of terrorism (including assassination and kidnaping),
and the reaction to it by elements of the security forces and
CAFGUs *:hat the Government has rarely been able to control or
effectively try and punish. New evidence indicates, however,
that some disappearances attributed to the security forces
were in fact murders carried out by Communist guerrillas.
The Aquino Government continued to express firm opposition to
human rights abuses and devoted increased attention to human
rights training programs, better discipline, and improved
civil-military relations. While the incidence of
extrajudicial killings and other acts of violence, as measured
by local human rights groups, appeared to decline in absolute
numbers from 1988, violence remained at a high level.
The principal human rights concerns in 1989 included
extrajudicial killings, great difficulties in trying and
punishing those responsible for human rights abuses, and
951
THE PHILIPPINES
displacement of civilians caused by military operations
against rebel groups. Other areas of human rights abridgments
included brutal treatment of prisoners and arbitrary
detentions. The Aquino Government has restored freedom of
speech and press, assembly and association, the right of
citizens to change their government by democratic means and
workers' rights — all of which were either denied or sharply
abridged under the Marcos regime.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The number of political killings reported in the Philippines
declined notably in 1989, according to information from
governmental and nongovernmental sources, although
extrajudicial killings still occur frequently throughout the
country. In addition, it is estimated that more than a
thousand people lost their lives in 1989 due to the insurgency
and counterinsurgency, although no definitive figures are
available. In many of the cases of extrajudicial killing, the
identity and motivation of the perpetrators are subject to
dispute. In some incidents, there is evidence linking AFP
personnel or police to the killing, either during
counterinsurgency operations or in unauthorized or individual
criminal activities. The Government's pronouncements against
such abuses are clear, but convictions of persons accused of
unauthorized actions are rare. In other cases, the killings
are attributed to Communist insurgents engaged in a continuing
campaign of political assassinations of government officials,
including provincial leaders, military officers, and police.
The NPA has also acknowledged responsibility for several
"massacres" of civilians. The discovery of mass graves gave
substance to reports of an internal purge of suspected "deep
penetration agents" in the CPP organization. In other
instances, the evidence suggests that private vendettas and
criminal activities resulting in murder are sometimes
incorrectly attributed to political assassins of the left or
right .
The official fact-gathering human rights institution in the
Philippines is the constitutionally mandated Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) . Charged with investigating all alleged
violations of human rights within the country, CHR has been
criticized by some for being an apologist for the Aquino
administration. Partially in answer to those charges and to
produce more complete figures, CHR revamped its statistical
compilation procedures in 1989 and revised its statistics for
1988. Several private groups, of which Task Force Detainees
(TFD) is the best known, also record complaints of human
rights abuses. TFD reports only on abuses allegedly committed
by government forces and not by those of the NPA. Its
acceptance of sometimes poorly substantiated reports and its
close association with the CPP have led to charges that it
overstates the case against the Government. As a result,
quantifications of human rights abuses in the Philippines,
including political killings, are difficult to verify and are
subject to ideological manipulation.
Nevertheless, trends in the statistics from both CHR and TFD
clearly indicate that the number of political killings
decreased substantially during 1989. In the first 6 months of
952
THE PHILIPPINES
1989, the CHR central office received complaints regarding 292
victims of political killings (including multiple, individual,
and attempted killings), compared to 856 in 1988. TFD
reported 141 summary executions by government forces and an
additional 132 persons killed in massacres (politically
motivated killing of groups) from January 1 to November 14,
compared to 445 victims in 1988.
During 1989 the extent and seriousness of the NPA's violations
of human rights received greater attention and publicity in
the Philippine media. Earlier reports of an internal purge in
which several hundred people were detained, tortured, and
killed were given credence by the discovery of mass graves in
Quezon, Albay, Laguna, Bataan, and Zamboanga del Sur
provinces, tagged by the press as the "killing fields." A
former NPA member testified that about 150 CPP/NPA members
were killed between April and December 1988 in southern
Luzon. Documents seized from the NPA describe arbitrary
detention, torture, trial in kangaroo courts, and execution.
Although most of the bodies remain unidentified, preliminary
evidence indicates that the graves contain some persons whose
disappearances had earlier been attributed by TFD and others
to government forces or rightwing vigilante groups. In one
instance, of the 27 bodies identified 11 were civilians.
In June the NPA admitted attacking a United Church of Christ
Philippines (UCCP) mission in Davao Del Sur, Mindanao, killing
40 civilian churchgoers. Two of the victims were beheaded.
In another case, an NPA unit reportedly killed seven members
of a family and wounded five others in Zamboanga Del Norte.
The NPA has also reportedly killed a number of people who
refused to pay "revolutionary taxes." For example, the widow
of a sugarcane planter in Negros Occidental said the NPA
abducted her husband after he refused to pay a monthly tax of
about $140. His body, showing signs of torture, was found in
a field 2 days later.
The NPA also targeted government personnel for assassination,
particularly security officials and police, by its "sparrow"
hit teams. NPA units are believed responsible for the
assassination of at least 80 constabulary and police officers
in metropolitan Manila alone in 1989. Among those killed by
NPA units were four members of the Philippine Presidential
Security Group and three Americans: U.S. Army Colonel James
Rowe of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group
(JUSMAG) in April, and two civilian employees of a defense
electronics contractor in September. The NPA said it killed
Rowe because of his alleged involvement in counterinsurgency
operations. Although no one has yet claimed responsibility
for the September killings, which coincided with the visit of
Vice President Quayle, the NPA subsequently promised
additional strikes against Americans.
Muslim opposition groups stepped up their violent activities
in an attempt to disrupt the November plebiscite on the Muslim
Autonomous Act. They are believed responsible for a cargo
truck ambush that killed six people, a grenade attack on a
house that left seven dead, two casualties from shooting a
passenger bus, an ambush of National Power Corporation
vehicles that killed two Austrian consultants, and a bomb at
the Commission on Elections headquarters that killed one
person.
There continued to be credible reports of killings by the
military and CAFGU ' s in the field as well as a few by private
953
vigilante groups. The Government has acknowledged that in
some cases the rules of engagement have not provided
sufficient protection for innocent civilians. For example, an
exchange of fire between Philippine Marines and NPA insurgents
in Bulacan province in April resulted in the deaths of one
Marine and nine others, all but one presumed to be
noncombatants. Presidential and military investigating
committees found no evidence of an intentional massacre, but
recommended that the military examine its operational rules to
ensure the safety of civilians. NPA ambushes or military-NPA
encounters often occur in populated areas, and civilians are
periodically caught in the crossfire. The NPA has been known
to mingle with civilians when engaging the AFP. There is
credible evidence that military units in the field torture and
abuse suspected NPA sympathizers during interrogation,
sometimes leading to the death or execution and secret burial
of the victim.
The Government has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to the
rule of law and issued instructions that the human rights of
all Filipinos be respected. However, many cases have been
reported in which soldiers or policemen have carried out
murders, kidnapings, or other serious offenses, sometimes due
to personal vendettas or criminal activity. In other cases, a
commander of a small unit may lead his men in committing
abuses. There is little evidence in such cases that more
senior military officials act to halt the abuses. Few of the
alleged offenders are disciplined or dismissed, and even fewer
have faced judicial proceedings. According to the Department
of National Defense (DND) , only 27 complaints were filed in
the first half of 1989 against individual members of the
military/police/CAFGU for alleged human rights violations. Of
these, 3 were referred to civil courts, 6 were dropped, 13
were still under investigation, and 2 resulted in dismissal.
The CAFGU's were established in 1987 to increase the
Government's control over the local militia. Local officials
are responsible for screening volunteers, and the AFP trains
and leads the units through an officer (usually a lieutenant)
and several enlisted men. A total of 909 CAFGU companies have
been organized with 52,000 authorized personnel. A number of
human rights violations by the CAFGU's have been reported, and
private funding of some units by landowners or businessmen has
raised concern about the Government's ability to control the
units. Most notorious was an August grenade-throwing incident
in which nine people were killed.
In other extrajudicial killings in 1989, it was often
difficult to determine whether the motive was political,
personal, or criminal. The July stabbing of Wenefredo Oton in
Davao Del Sur may have been committed by an anti-Communist
group which suspected him of Communist sympathies, or by the
NPA because of his role in leading a fact-finding group to the
scene of the June UCCP massacre by the NPA.
A number of persons were killed during the March barangay
elections, including an incumbent barangay captain and six
candidates. (The barangay is the Philippines* smallest
administrative unit, equivalent to a village or city
neighborhood. See Section 3 for more information on the
barangay elections.) The timing hints at some political
motivation and the murders remain unsolved. At least 17 labor
leaders were killed in the first 8 months of 1989. Jose
Eduardo Oca of the Port Workers Union and Meliton Roxas,
president of the local union at the Nestle Philippines plant.
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THE PHILIPPINES
were prominent among those killed. Credible reports indicate
that management, rival unionists, the NPA, or rightwing
vigilantes were involved in various unsolved cases. The
Government apprehended and tried suspected killers of labor
unionists in several cases in 1989. By year's end, none of
these trials had been completed.
Church people were among the victims of killings. UCCP Pastor
Visminda Gran, a former candidate of the leftist Partido Ng
Bayan political party, and her husband Lovino Gran were killed
in their home in Biliango, Misamis Occidental, in May by
unidentified gunmen who stole numerous valuable articles; CHR
is investigating. In another case. Catholic priest Dionisio
Malalay and lay person Rufino Rivera were shot in April in
Tabina, Zamboanga del Sur, allegedly by a former PC member and
his cousin; the case is being tried in a civilian court in
Zamboanga del Sur.
During 1989 only one prominent case of politically motivated
killing resulted in conviction. Alan Climaco, who shot human
rights attorney Alfonso A. Surigao in Cebu in June 1988, was
convicted of murder in March, sentenced to life imprisonment,
and is currently serving the sentence. The Justice Secretary
in October ordered that murder charges be filed against Major
Rico Palcuto, a constabulary officer identified by Climaco as
the mastermind of the killing.
In a prominent case that underlines the great difficulties of
the Government in convicting offenders, a military court in
July claimed insufficient evidence in acquitting the nearly
two dozen soldiers accused of murder in a widely publicized
1987 incident in Lupao, Nueva Ecija, in which Philippine Army
soldiers shot 17 civilians following a reported NPA ambush.
Survivors identified four of the accused, but the military
court gave greater weight to the testimony of two defendants
who claimed that soldiers from a reinforcement unit (not among
the defendants) killed the civilians. In 1987 the Government
had said this case would be the first test of Philippine
justice under the new administration. Two military
prosecutors reportedly protested the court's decision to the
AFP Chief of Staff. Military investigation of the incident
continues .
b. Disappearance
Philippine law permits holding suspects in serious cases for
up to 36 hours without formal charges. In some cases,
citizens have been taken into custody by government
authorities and held incommunicado for several days before
being released or charged.
Although some Philippine human rights groups continue to claim
that disappearances are increasing, both CHR and TFD statistics
show that fewer disappearances were reported in 1989 than in
1988. Between January and June 1989, the CHR central office
received complaints concerning 41 missing persons, compared to
80 complaints in 1988. According to TFD, 60 persons were
reported missing from January 1 to November 14, 1989, compared
with 141 complaints in 1988. TFD believes that military
officers or anti-Communist groups were responsible for these
incidents, and that the missing persons may have been killed.
There is credible evidence that rightwing groups, possibly
with collusion by some military personnel, have been involved
in a number of disappearances. For example, two social
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THE PHILIPPINES
workers, Nona Santa Clara and Angelina Llenaresas of the
Ecumenical Council for Research and Development, were abducted
in April in Naga City, Camarines Sur, and taken away in a
military-type jeep. The whereabouts of the women are unknown.
The discovery of mass NPA graves in Laguna, Albay, Quezon,
Bataan, and Zamboanga del Sur, combined with reported internal
NPA purges, challenged the assumption that all disappearances
of leftist political personalities were the work of rightwing
vigilantes or rogue military or police personnel. For
example, the disappearances of Lilian Mercado and Efren
Bonagua of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan) and Pearl
Abaya of the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates
(PAKRA) in November 1988 were originally blamed on the
military. Indications now are that the three were taken into
custody by the NPA for interrogation on suspicion of being
government spies. Abaya and Bonagua are reportedly alive but
in hiding, while Mercado's status is unknown.
The Government has strongly condemned politically motivated
disappearances. President Aquino in December 1988 designated
city and provincial government prosecutors as "human rights
coordinators" who are to assist families in searching for
missing relatives in military camps and detention centers.
Hostage-taking by rebels and armed criminal gangs for ransom
and/or publicity is fairly common. According to newspaper
accounts, a barangay captain and a constabulary soldier in
Oriental Mindoro were abducted in January and held 59 days by
the NPA before being "acquitted" by a kangaroo court. A
ransom of $46,000 was asked for 10 nuns and church workers
abducted in February in Lanao del Sur, but negotiations led to
their release without ransom. A constabulary soldier was
detained by rebels in Camarines Sur for 40 days before his
release was negotiated in April. Also in April, the NPA
captured a group of hikers in Mindanao and released most of
them immediately, but held four of the group captive for 9
days. An Iloilo radio station owner kidnaped in September was
freed more than 2 months later after his family reportedly
paid a ransom of $552,000. In October in Lanao del Sur,
Muslim rebels held hostage the President of Dansalan
University, his wife and grandchild, and 12 national power
corporation executives. In October government forces seized a
1987 document allegedly written by CPP/NPA leader Jose Maria
Sison, in which he suggested that each of the 59 guerrilla
fronts abduct and indefinitely detain 10 political leaders and
military officers, to compel recognition of the movement.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture and makes evidence obtained
thereby inadmissible in court, but reports that torture is
employed persist. Guidelines issued by CHR in May 1988 direct
all law enforcement agencies and military elements to avoid
unnecessary force in investigation, arrest, detention,
interrogation, and other related activities.
The CHR central office received complaints of torture or
maltreatment of 44 people from January to June 1989. TFD
claimed to have documented 312 cases of torture from January 1
to November 14, 1989, compared to 784 cases in 1988. For TFD
to accept a complaint, a complainant need only assert that
government investigators used some coercion, such as the
threat of violence.
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THE PHILIPPINES
Juanito Itaas, an NPA member, allegedly involved in the April
killing of Colonel Rowe, claimed in September that the
military extracted his confession through torture; government
officials deny the charge. Michael Tupas claimed he was
tortured while detained in Bacolod, Negros Occidental in June,
but CHR's investigation is stymied by his inability to
identify his captors. Cornelio Salway, a former NPA member
who voluntarily surrendered in February to military forces in
South Cotabato, claims he was maltreated while in protective
custody; the military investigation found no basis for the
claim. American citizen Glen Doughty said in October that he
was beaten and had water poured into his nose after the PC
arrested him in Oriental Mindoro. Authorities stated that
they suspect Doughty is the NPA hitman who killed two
policemen in Metro Manila in 1985. (Doughty's claim of U.S.
citizenship was originally doubted by the PC since he has a
Filipino mother and speaks English with a Filipino accent.)
There have also been reports of torture by the NPA, in many
cases associated with the 1988-89 internal purge described
earlier. Three NPA members testified in June before a
congressional committee that they were dragged in chains,
deprived of food, and beaten for months because their comrades
suspected them of being government infiltrators. Other
abuses, including suspension by the wrists and suffocation,
have also been reported, although in these cases, too,
conclusive proof is lacking.
Although physical punishment is prohibited by law in the
Philippine penal system, it occurs frequently in jails and
prisons. Prison conditions are harsh, charges of brutality
are commonplace, and violence often flares. Inmates at the
Davao Penal Colony took prison visitors hostage in April and
August to demand transfer to a more humane facility. Sixteen
prisoners and five hostages, including an Australian
missionary, were killed by the inmates or by security forces
that stormed the prison. The AFP, CHR, and committees of the
Philippine Congress have been investigating the Davao Penal
Colony killings and examining allegations that police used
excessive force.
CHR in 1989 began a Visitorial Service Program to respond to
complaints of torture or mistreatment of prisoners and to
monitor prison conditions. CHR visited 305 jails nationwide
in the first 10 months of 1989 and reported that some remedial
actions had already been taken in response to its efforts.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The 1987 Constitution requires a judicial determination of
probable cause before issuance of an arrest warrant and also
prohibits holding prisoners incommunicado or in secret places
of detention. Nonetheless, there continue to be abuses.
Detainees have the right to a judicial review of the legality
of detention and, except for offenses punishable by a life
sentence, to bail.
CHR prescribed guidelines in 1988 on visitation rights of
detainees and on the conduct of investigations, arrests,
detentions, and related operations by government authorities.
The guidelines direct all law enforcement agencies,
commanders, and all units under their command to avoid
unnecessary force and to follow the rules of court and
National Police Commission policies on arrests and
investigations. However, human rights groups continue to
957
THE PHILIPPINES
receive complaints of abuses. The CHR central office received
complaints that 54 people were illegally arrested or detained
in the first half of 1989. CHR actively investigated these
reports and assisted in the release of 48 persons during the
same period. TFD claims 1,739 persons were improperly
arrested from January 1 to November 14, 1989. Many were
detained for a few hours as the result of mass arrests during
army sweeps of areas harboring suspected rebels, and most of
these were released within the time limits prescribed by law.
Statistics from both CHR and TFD on illegal arrest and
detention in 1989 show a decline of approximately 30 percent
from the comparable period in 1988.
In one incident. Catholic Priest Benjamin Alforque was
detained for several hours on the evening of April 25 as part
of the investigation of Col. Rowe ' s murder. The military
reportedly questioned Alforque about his visit to a CPP
safehouse, but Alforque claims that he was detained because of
an article he wrote criticizing the military.
The military has been criticized for not fully complying with
the law when handling suspected insurgents. Suspected
Communist insurgents sometimes are held and interrogated for
several days without legal proceedings. When CPP/NPA leaders
Satur Ocampo and Carolina Malay were arrested in July, they
were charged initially with firearms possession in furtherance
of rebellion, a nonbailable offense, and were allowed
visitation and lawyers. The Government does not recommend
bail for senior CPP/NPA members on the grounds that release
would be a clear and present danger to the community and that
bail would not be adequate to ensure their appearance at trial.
In order better to abide by constitutional and legal
prerequisites, the AFP has sought to file charges against
known CPP/NPA leaders in advance so that they can be held
legally if caught. These charges include murder, kidnaping,
physical injury, robbery, extortion, grave threats, and
arson. The AFP has offered monetary rewards for the capture
of rebels against whom it has filed charges.
Philippine authorities rarely use internal or foreign exile
for political purposes. However, former President Marcos (now
deceased), his immediate family, and some of his associates
were barred from return. The Government suspects these
persons of conspiring with political and military opposition
elements within the Philippines to destabilize the country.
In a September 15 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the
Marcoses' exile, citing the duty of the President to balance
the general welfare against the exercise of individual rights.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution calls for an independent judiciary and
provides that those accused of crimes shall be informed of
charges against them and shall have the right to counsel.
Trials in the Philippines are public; defendants are presumed
innocent and have the right to confront witnesses against
them, to present evidence, and to appeal their convictions.
The right of defendants to a lawyer is generally respected in
the larger metropolitan areas, but less frequently honored in
the provinces, where lawyers are often unavailable.
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THE PHILIPPINES
The weakest link in the prevention of human rights abuses is
the failure to prosecute and convict those accused of
violations. A major element of that failure is the strong
imperative of the military to protect its own members. Under
the authority of a Marcos-era presidential decree, military
courts continue to have jurisdiction over servicemen accused
of human rights violations. Some human rights groups charge
that military courts protect servicemen rather than render an
impartial verdict. President Aquino has waived military
jurisdiction in only a few cases. A bill to remove
nonservice-related offenses from court-martial jurisdiction
was approved by Congress and sent to the President shortly
before the December coup attempt. Following the attempted
coup and on the advice of military leaders, the President
vetoed the bill.
Ethical and legal lapses in the administration of justice are
common, ranging from attorneys' use of dilatory tactics to
corruption among some judges and prosecutors. Defendants
routinely pay off police and court officials. The conviction
rate for criminal offenses is very low. For example, only 3
to 5 percent of drug cases in civilian courts result in
convictions, a fact attributed by informed sources to bribery
of police and judicial officials and to the use of political
influence.
Prosecution is often stymied by witnesses who are unwilling to
testify because they fear reprisals. To address the problem,
CHR has a limited witness protection program in place, and
Congress is considering legislation to establish a more
comprehensive program.
Delays in completing trials present another serious problem.
Traditionally, trials have been noncontinuous , generally
scheduled at monthly intervals, and often last for years.
Those charged with crimes who cannot afford bail languish in
jail until their trials are completed. Of 14,245 inmates held
nationwide in June, 12,552 had not yet been convicted or
sentenced, according to press reports of prison statistics. A
prominent example of delay of justice is the Benigno Aquino
murder trial, which began in February 1987 and will likely
continue into 1991. Now nearly 3 years into the trial, the
defense has yet to begin its case.
President Aquino has made reform of the justice system a key
goal of her administration. In recent speeches, she has
frequently criticized the slow delivery of justice and the
unequal treatment of rich and poor. In August she took the
extraordinary step of placing top officials in the Department
of Justice on probation for failing to address the problems in
the criminal justice system. A test program for completing
trials within 90 days was extended to 1,200 of the nation's
1,600 courts. Prosecutors are now required to complete
pretrial investigations of crimes within 120 days.
Prosecutors who do not meet these time standards have had
their pay withheld. In the first half of 1989, prosecutors
reportedly received 25,000 new complaints while disposing of
38,000 cases. Despite this positive trend, a backlog of tens
of thousands of cases exists. The Government has disciplined
several inept or corrupt prosecutors. Judicial vacancies are
now being filled more promptly, with the exception of lower
level trial courts in the outlying regions which fail to
attract qualified candidates.
^959
THE PHILIPPINES
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Under the Constitution, search warrants may be issued by a
judge on a finding of probable cause. Restrictions on search
and seizure are generally observed. The Government does not
interfere in family life or the right of parents to raise
their children. The Government does not interfere with free
personal use of the mails or other public communication
systems, except upon issuance of a court order during the
course of an investigation.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
AFP efforts during 1989 to counter Communist insurgent
activities (ambushes, extortion, etc.) had a major impact on
civilian populations. In an effort to "dismantle" NPA
political bases at the barangay level, the AFP has displaced
large numbers of civilians in several provinces of Mindanao
and on the Visayan island of Negros. The Government made
efforts to provide food and medical supplies, but sanitation
conditions were often poor and the dislocations compounded the
already severe health problems among the poverty-stricken
civilians. The Government's Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) reported 188,000 affected persons from
January 1 to December 27 and an additional 30,000 affected by
the December coup attempt. DSWD provided relief services to
187,000 people during the year. The Ecumenical Movement for
Justice and Peace (EMJP) reported that 130,000 people were
displaced from January to September 1989. Information from
DSWD and EMJP shows that more than half of the people
displaced were in Mindanao.
In Southern Negros, an estimated 35,000 civilians were
evacuated from their homes in the spring and moved to
temporary refugee shelters. The Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) ran the shelters, and the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) was allowed free access. More than 90
children, already weakened by malnutrition and the process of
evacuation, reportedly died of measles, pneumonia, and other
causes while at the refugee shelters.
In Aklan on the island of Panay, TFD and EMJP sponsored a
factfinding mission in August. They reported that 215
fam.ilies left 9 villages due to military or NPA orders or fear
for personal safety. The report also stated that curfews were
in effect, that the military restricted food shipments based
on the number of family members to deny food to the NPA, and
that local citizens were required to carry residence
certificates signed by the military commander.
There were occasional reports of indiscriminate strafing of
civilians in villages suspected of supporting the rebels. In
one incident in Quezon early in the year, 142 families
reportedly left their homes after they were strafed.
Allegedly, the AFP suspected they were supplying food to the
rebels. The AFP lacked adequate medical resources to treat
its own casualties, and wounded rebels were generally treated
after wounded soldiers. There was no evidence, however, that
they were systematically denied medical care when supplies
were available. The Philippines is a party to Protocol II of
the Geneva Convention, which governs the conduct of forces in
an internal conflict.
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THE PHILIPPINES
The provision of medical care in rebel-controlled areas was a
contentious issue in 1989. The Medical Action Group (MAG), a
private organization which seeks to provide health care to
victims of human rights violations and the urban and rural
poor and which is alleged to be closely associated with the
CPP, protested Executive Order (E.O.) 212 which required that
treatment of rebels be reported to the Government's Department
of Health. MAG reported that in September Dr. Antonio
Principe was arrested in Davao City for violating E.O. 212,
and 11 health workers, including two Dutch nurses, were
briefly detained in Samar. The military suspected the health
workers of treating NPA rebels.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Restrictions on freedom of expression were virtually all
lifted in February 1986. The daily press which emerged is
lively and highly competitive. There are some 30 daily
newspapers in Manila and many more in the provinces. In all,
about 1.4 million newspapers are sold each day around the
country. Newspapers cover the political spectrum and do not
hesitate to criticize the Government. CPP publications are
illegal but circulate clandestinely, and Communist views are
expressed in other media. Journalists have been able without
penalty to meet and interview antigovernment rebels, including
military mutineers and Communists. During the early December
coup attempt, the Government closed three radio stations for
broadcasting rebel propaganda.
Radio and television are important news sources in the
Philippines. There are 338 licensed radio stations. An
estimated 82 percent of all households have radios. Four
million television sets bring programming to 40 percent of
Philippine families. In Metropolitan Manila, approximately 90
percent of the households have radios or televisions. Most
provincial television stations are affiliates of the five
Manila channels. Like the press, radio and television
stations report views across a wide political spectrum.
Radio station owners and managers have complained about NPA
efforts to intimidate them into broadcasting Communist
propaganda. Several radio facilities and transmitters have
been damaged by insurgents. In some areas, military personnel
are stationed at transmitter sites to protect them. Stations
that have broadcast material provided by the NPA have been
warned informally by local military authorities that they face
the risk of being closed down if they continue. Nonetheless,
during 1989 no newspapers, radios, or television stations were
closed by the Government for publishing or broadcasting
Communist propaganda. Although the Government sequestered
assets of some media organizations owned or controlled by
close associates of the late President Marcos, there is no
evidence in those cases of intent to control opinion, as
opposed to monetary assets.
Publications from abroad are not censored. Foreign
journalists are able to report freely and generally move about
the country, even in areas under rebel control. Major foreign
newspapers and television networks have bureaus in Manila.
Human rights groups have registered a few complaints about
harassment of journalists. For example, in an incident at a
funeral in March for an alleged Communist rebel, the military
roughly handled and briefly detained 10 newsmen. In May a
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THE PHILIPPINES
journalist in Masbate claimed that the provincial commander
forced him to eat a page of his newspaper after he had written
a critical article. Such harassment is not frequent or
systematic .
Libel suits may discourage some journalists from commenting on
sensitive topics, but the judiciary generally favors the press
in such cases. When the Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER)
was sued in February for describing a businessman's activities
as environmentally destructive, the judge made an unusual
decision impounding copies of the review but reversed himself
within a few days. The lawsuit was decided in FEER ' s favor.
Critics have charged that the Movie and Television
Classification Board (MTCB) , whose mandate is to monitor films
and television programs for pornographic content, has
occasionally stifled political expression. However, no
complaints were registered in 1989. The mandate of the MTCB
is questioned by many as a violation of free speech and
freedom of artistic expression, but it is likely to remain
unchanged because of strong public support for its role in
controlling distribution of pornography.
Academic freedom is respected in theory and practice.
Approximately 1.5 million students are enrolled in the
nation's 78 state colleges and universities and 1,000 private
schools and colleges. The Government does not censor subject
matter in classes, university publications, or conferences.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Permits from local authorities are required for outdoor
demonstrations in public places and are routinely issued.
Nevertheless, rallies and marches are often held without
permits. Manila area police were reportedly ordered in July
not to disperse peaceful rallies as long as they do not
disturb public order. Occasionally, however, police dispersed
crowds which had assembled without having first secured
permits and arrested demonstrators for illegal assembly or
public disturbance. Typically, those arrested were quickly
released and not brought to trial. Exceptions to the record
of generally peaceful demonstrations have been recent protests
in front of the U.S. Embassy by student and labor organizations
with ties to the CPP. In September police used tear gas to
disperse over a thousand demonstrators and briefly detained a
number of people during the visit of Vice President Quayle.
A broad range of private, professional, religious, social,
charitable, and political organizations flourishes in the
Philippines. Organizations are permitted to affiliate with
recognized international bodies in their fields. The
Communist Party of the Philippines is outlawed because it
advocates the violent overthrow of the Government, but
nonviolent Marxist parties are legal.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion. Freedom of religion is fully
respected, and no official discrimination is practiced against
any religious group or its members. Although over 80 percent
of the population is Roman Catholic, the country's sizable
Muslim minority, Protestant churches, indigenous Iglesia Ni
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Kristo, Aglipay Church, and other sects enjoy full religious
freedom. Foreign clergymen and missionaries of many faiths
practice their profession freely.
Religious minorities are represented among the leadership and
rank and file of broad-based political parties. Government
service is open to all on a nondiscriminatory basis, and there
are senior civil and military officials who belong to minority
religious groups.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Filipinos enjoy unhampered freedom to change their place of
residence and employment within the Philippines. They
regularly travel and work abroad. Movement within the country
is generally unimpeded, although the military and rebel groups
sometimes erect roadblocks in areas where they are conducting
operations. Routine constabulary checkpoints were
discontinued during the year.
The right to emigrate from the Philippines is unrestricted.
Citizens also have the right to return, although there have
been a few exceptions in cases which the Government said
affected national security. In 1988 the Government revoked
the passport of Jose Maria Sison, the founder of the outlawed
CPP, while he was living in Europe raising funds for the
Communist movement. As noted in Section l.d., the Government
prevented the return to the Philippines of the late President
Marcos, his immediate family, and some of his associates.
Although the Philippine Government does not accept refugees
for internal resettlement, it has made a significant
contribution by providing first asylum for 9,200 Indochinese
boat people in Palawan and permitting the United Nations to
operate a major processing center for 16,000 refugees in
Bataan Province. Approximately 25,000 refugees passed through
these facilities in 1989.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Constitution ratified in 1987 returned the Philippines to
the presidential system of government similar to that which
was in existence from 1946 to 1972. The Constitution
establishes a bicameral legislature and an independent
judiciary as checks on executive power. Presidential
authority to declare martial law is curtailed. The
Constitution calls for the creation of autonomous regions for
Muslims in the southern Philippines and for minority groups in
the Cordillera (mountainous region) of northern Luzon.
The Philippines has a multiparty political system, based on
secret ballots and free elections. Filipinos are free to
organize political parties as long as they do not seek to
overthrow the Government by force. Political parties have
traditionally been weak, nonideological alliances of
convenience. President Aquino herself has refused to join a
political party. Democratic opposition to the Government is
widely tolerated. In the House of Representatives, a single
progovernment party enjoys a 75-percent majority. The
23-member Senate is divided among 4 different parties and
independents. Most legislation is initiated by members of
Congress themselves, and debate is lively. Government-
sponsored legislation is often criticized, amended, or
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THE PHILIPPINES
defeated. The majority of provincial and city officials,
elected in 1988, are members of progovernment political
parties. Presidential, congressional, provincial, and
municipal elections are scheduled for 1992.
The Aquino Government took the final step toward full
restoration of elected officials at all levels in March when
it held elections for leaders in all but a handful of the
country's 41,000 barangays. An electorate of 29 million chose
nearly 287,000 Barangay officials from among 1 million
candidates. Relatively limited preelection violence and a few
reported isolated clashes with NPA elements in scattered parts
of the country occurred during the campaign. The new barangay
officials will serve until 1994.
The voting age in the Philippines is 18. There are few
restrictions on suffrage.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Representatives of international human rights groups are free
to travel in the Philippines and investigate alleged abuses.
Resident delegates of the ICRC monitor prison conditions and
assist persons displaced by conflict. Government
representatives discuss human rights problems with outside
governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and President
Aquino and CHR routinely meet with those who visit. CHR held
meetings with seven international delegations in the first 10
months of 1989.
The Philippine Government welcomes international sponsorship
of human rights programs. The U.N. Center for Human Rights,
along with CHR and other Philippine groups, sponsored a 3-day
national seminar-workshop on human rights training in August.
The ICRC, together with CHR and Department of National
Defense/AFP, held a course for military trainers (interrupted
by the coup attempt but completed afterward) on human rights
and international humanitarian law.
CHR considers human rights violations based on international
inquiries and referrals from nongovernmental organizations as
well as complaints filed locally by or on behalf of victims.
CHR has a total staff of 600, including a "quick reaction"
team in Manila, branch offices in each of the country's 12
regions, and provincial offices in areas where reports of
human rights violations warrant. When a complaint is filed,
CHR conducts an investigation, gathering evidence and
testimony from the complainant and the accused. In the first
10 months of 1989, CHR completed investigation of 874 cases,
and provided financial assistance to 174 individual victims or
their families and to 30,000 evacuees from one community. If
CHR determines that a prima facie case has been made, it
refers the case to the appropriate agency for prosecution and
monitors the results. CHR lawyers would gain prosecutory
powers under legislation now being considered in Congress.
CHR referred 70 cases for prosecution and 28 for
administrative action in the first 10 months of 1989. CHR
representatives regularly participate in fact-finding missions
and jail visits with nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and
other governmental agencies.
Philippine NGO's are active in the human rights field. These
groups are generally unhindered in conducting investigations
964
THE PHILIPPINES
around the country and are routinely able to obtain
safe-conduct letters from DND. Local military and civilian
officials have reportedly been uncooperative in some
instances. According to the Government, investigations by
these NGO's frequently do not produce enough evidence to make
the necessary prima facie case.
The best known local human rights NGO is TFD, established by
the Association of Major Religious Superiors in the
Philippines in 1974. Headquartered in Manila with branch
offices throughout the Philippines, TFD collects information
on alleged human rights violations and publishes statistics on
a quarterly basis of abuses it attributes to government
forces. TFD is an outspoken critic of the Government's
response to human rights violations, and some allege that it
is strongly influenced by the CPP. There is little
cooperation between TFD and CHR.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Women enjoy most of the same legal rights as men. However,
Philippine law and custom continue to discriminate against
women. This includes a limitation on their right to buy and
sell property. The House of Representatives approved
legislation in September allowing a woman to enter into
contracts without her husband's consent; the bill is now under
consideration in the Senate.
Women are prominent in Philippine society and well represented
in Government, business and professions, such as law,
medicine, education, and journalism. Women in the bottom 30
percent of society suffer particular hardship. Many of the
women have no opportunities except work as low-paid domestic
employees or prostitutes. Violence against women such as wife
beating is occasionally reported. There are no reliable
statistics on the extent to which this occurs, but women are
often reluctant to report and police to "interfere" in what
many see as a domestic matter. Criminal law prohibits
violence against women. To address the problems of women, the
Government is implementing its 1989-92 Philippine Development
Plan for Women. As part of this plan. President Aquino signed
legislation in May to strengthen measures prohibiting
discrimination against women workers with respect to
promotion, training, study, and remuneration for work of equal
value .
Muslim Filipinos on the southern island of Mindanao and the
adjacent Sulu archipelago constitute 5 percent of the Filipino
population. They comprise several tribes such as the Tausugs,
Maranao, and Maguindanao, each with its own language and
customs. They hold public office at the local and national
levels and are employed in government positions. Two of the
23 senators and several Congressmen are Muslims, and several
Muslims serve as ambassadors. However, informal discrimination
against Filipino Muslims persists. Philippine culture--with
its emphasis on tribal and regional loyalties-- creates
informal barriers when access to jobs or resources is provided
first to those of one's own group. Another factor is that
many Muslims prefer to educate their children in Muslim
schools, which has deprived them of the skills required to
advance in some occupations. One observer estimated that only
10 Muslims graduate from the Philippine Military Academy
annually, and noted that only 1 Muslim has reached general or
flag officer rank.
965
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President Aquino is committed to a peaceful resolution of the
long-simmering Muslim rebellion and to redressing the
historical neglect of the south. In August she signed
legislation allowing 9 cities and 13 provinces in the south to
join an autonomous region through a plebiscite. The law
respects Muslim rights to ancestral lands, requires the
establishment of Muslim Shari'a laws and court system, and
decentralizes government authority in several different
areas. A wing of the Moro National Liberation Front objects
to the establishment of an autonomous region on any basis
other than the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. In the plebiscite held
November 19, only 4 out of 13 provinces and none of the 9
cities voted to become part of the autonomous region.
Several million Filipinos belong to other non-Christian and
non-Muslim groups. They are most numerous in the Cordillera
of northern Luzon and in Mindanao. Modernization has reduced
their traditional isolation. Logging and mining have damaged
many of the ancestral lands of these tribal groups, and
lowland farmers have expanded into their areas. The cultural
minorities have not always been afforded equal legal
protection. The Government's offices of Northern and Southern
Cultural Communities are responsible for protecting the
interests of these groups. Members of tribal groups have been
elected to the Congress and local government offices.
Congress passed legislation in 1989 authorizing the creation
of an autonomous region in the Cordillera of northern Luzon.
A plebiscite will be held in early 1990.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of workers, including public employees, to join
trade unions is assured by the Constitution and legislation,
and is freely practiced without government interference.
About 10 percent of the nation's employed work force of
approximately 23 million workers is organized into over 3,700
trade unions, not including the 2.8 million workers who are
members of the National Congress of Farmers Organization
(NCFO) . Most of the trade unions belong to relatively small
federations which are members of two larger trade union
groupings, the largest of which is the Trade Union Congress of
the Philippines (TUCP) , an affiliate of the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
The second largest trade union grouping is the leftist KMU
(Kilusang Mayo Uno, or May First Movement) which is heavily
infiltrated and influenced by the CPP. Three much smaller
trade union groupings are affiliates of the Communist-
controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) . The
Federation of Free Workers (FFW) is a member of the World
Confederation of Labor (WCL) .
Strikes are legal, including in Export Processing Zones
(EPZ's), and they take place frequently. The rate of
unionization, the number of collective bargaining agreements,
and the legal minimum wage in the EPZ's is akin to that
prevailing in the rest of the country. The Aquino
administration pursues legal efforts to resolve disputes and
has rejected calls for "no-strike laws" despite the
disincentive that strikes pose to needed investment. On the
local level, there have been several cases of violence
provoked by unions or management. Sometimes the police or
military have been called in to break up illegal strike
966
THE PHILIPPINES
barricades, and on several occasions their attempts to enforce
the law have resulted in violent clashes with strikers. (See
Section l.a. regarding reported killings of labor leaders.)
The 1987 Constitution and E.O. 180 guarantee government
employees the right to form unions and bargain collectively.
E.O. 180 provides for a disputes settlement body. The right
to strike and the status of employees in government-owned
industries, however, have not yet been clarified. As of
December 1989, there were 121 unions in the public sector with
66,000 members. An extensive strike action carried out in
July-August by public sector workers and teachers was not
suppressed by the Government.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Labor's right to organize and bargain collectively is provided
for in law and strongly supported by the Government. These
rights were expanded and strengthened by the passage of the
Labor Law Reform Act of 1989, which balances the need for
greater stability in labor relations with full respect for
worker rights. Since President Aquino took office, the number
of collective bargaining agreements in force has increased
from 3,112 to 3,941. In the same period, the number of
registered unions increased by 7 . 8 percent.
It is an unfair labor practice to dismiss a union official or
a worker who is trying to organize a union. Nevertheless,
employers sometimes attempt to intimidate workers by threats
of firing or closure. There is a history of industrial
relations violence in the Philippines which has worsened as a
consequence of the insurgency and counterinsurgency .
Politicized unionists have been threatened, beaten, and
killed. The CPP/NPA, rival unionists, and hired gunmen have
all been implicated in such violence, as have civilian defense
groups and elements of the military.
In February and November 1989, the Committee on Freedom of
Association of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
considered "serious allegations" of military or paramilitary
repression of members of the National Federation of Sugar
Workers (a KMU-member union which is affiliated with the
International Union of Food and Allied Workers' Association or
lUF) in Negros Occidental province between 1986 and 1989. The
allegations include violent murders (including those of a
member of the KMU's national executive committee in Davao in
1988 and of a Nestle plant union leader in 1989), woundings,
disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests, and detentions,
general repression of the KMU, and also include charges that
the 1989 Labor Law Reform Act was intended to "contain labor
militancy." The allegations were contained in complaints
presented in one case by the lUF, and, jointly by the KMU and
the WFTU in another case. The Government responded that some
of the allegations of human rights violations were still being
investigated and described the machinery for accomplishing
this, indicated that one arrest cited in the complaint was for
seditious activity, and cited some cases where the killings
are believed to be the result of interunion rivalry. The
Committee deplored antiunion violence, urged the Philippine
Government to do all in its power to curb criminality by
members of the police and armed forces and to dismantle the
vigilante groups, and asked the Government to respond to the
allegations which it had not yet answered. It was left to the
ILO's Committee of Experts to consider in 1990 whether the new
Philippine labor law remedied previous defects.
967
THE PI-
CHR has also examined the alleged repression of NFSW workers
and leaders, but there has been no prosecution due to
insufficient evidence.
The Government is actively encouraging dialogue among the
military, labor, and community leaders on the worker
rights/human rights situation. CHR, together with the
Asian-American Free Labor Institute under a special grant from
the U.S. Agency for International Development, is sponsoring a
series of conferences/workshops on trade unions and human
rights. The objective is to establish local human rights
committees composed of unionists from every labor center plus
the independents and representatives of government, military,
police, and the community. The participants focus on methods
of resolving problems and improving communications among
themselves. Four such conferences were held in various
regions of the country in 1989. A fifth conference planned
for Manila was postponed until early 1990 as a result of the
coup attempt. KMU has so far chosen not to participate in the
workshops .
The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through the
National Labor Relations Commission, has a quasi-judicial
system of hearing and adjudicating workers' claims. It is
usually slow, but no slower than other elements of the courts
and the bureaucracy. With DOLE'S emphasis on mediation and
conciliation, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
has helped reduce the high number of illegal work stoppages.
Labor legislation is applied uniformly throughout the country,
including in the export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Compulsory or Forced Labor
The Philippines has ratified ILO Convention 105 which
prohibits forced labor. This Convention has the full force of
law in the Philippines. There are no reports of forced labor
being practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Constitution prohibits employment of children below age
15, except under the responsibility of parents or guardians
and then only if the work does not interfere with schooling.
It allows employment for those between the ages of 15 and 18
for such hours and periods of the day as are determined by the
Secretary of Labor, but provides that in no case may persons
under 18 years of age be employed in hazardous or deleterious
work.
The most serious violations of child labor laws occur in
piecework or contracting out of embroidery and other
garment-related production. Congressional and public
attention has focused on the use of children in an ecologically
damaging and dangerous form of fishing. The Aquino
administration has made a serious effort to investigate and
reduce violations of child labor laws outside of the
agricultural sector, but these efforts are hampered by the
limited resources of the Department of Labor and Employment.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The minimum wage in nonagricultural enterprises is $4.22 per
day. The agribusiness minimum is $3.75 per day. Despite the
minimum wage laws, substantial numbers of workers (mostly
968
THE PHILIPPINES
laborers, janitors, messengers, drivers, and clerk-typists)
earn less than the law stipulates. The average wage of
workers in large cities is close to the minimum wage, and in
the industrial sector the average wage is considerably above
it. In rural areas, wages often fall below the minimum wage.
The minimum wage works out to a monthly equivalent that is
below the poverty threshold figure established by the
Government, which is based on the minimum income required by a
family of six persons. By this measure, while there has been
improvement since 1985 when 59 percent of families were below
the poverty level, the situation remains serious. In 1988
nearly one-half of all families were still below the poverty
line.
The standard workweek is 48 hours. The law mandates a full
day of rest weekly. Employees with more than 1 year on the
job are entitled to 5 days of paid leave.
A comprehensive set of occupational safety and health
standards is in effect, and the standards for protecting
workers against hazards of the workplace and harmful
substances are relatively advanced. However, enforcement of
minimum wage and health and safety regulations is severely
hampered by having too few professional labor inspectors.
Nonetheless, compliance with health and safety rules is an
official priority, and regular inspections take place.
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Singapore, a city-state of about 2.6 million people, has a
republican form of government based on the Westminster
parliamentary system. The majority (75 percent) of the
population is ethnic Chinese, with Malays (15 percent) and
Indians (7 percent) constituting substantial minorities.
Politics have been dominated by the People's Action Party
(PAP), headed by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, which has held
power since Singapore gained autonomy from Great Britain in
1959. Thirty years of political stability and economic
success have provided a continuing source of popular political
support to the PAP. In the September 1988 general election,
the PAP received 61.9 percent of the popular vote and won 80
of the 81 parliamentary seats.
The Government maintains active internal security and military
forces to counter perceived threats to the nation's security.
The Internal Security Department (ISD) is responsible for
enforcement of the Internal Security Act (ISA), including its
provisions for detention without trial.
Singapore's economic system is one of the most open in the
world and it is marked by impressive economic gains — gross
domestic product (GDP) grew by 9 . 1 percent in the first half
of 1989. Singaporeans enjoy the third highest per capita
income in Asia (after Japan and oil-rich Brunei).
The major human rights issues in Singapore continue to be
detentions without trial under the ISA, mistreatment of
detainees, and restrictions on press freedom. Through the ISA
and other laws, the Government has broad powers to interfere
with privacy and to restrict freedom of assembly and of
movement. In practice, however, it rarely invokes its
draconian authority.
In January Parliament amended both the Constitution and the
ISA so as virtually to eliminate both judicial review of
detention orders and appeals of ISA cases to the Privy Council
(a panel of senior jurists in London which hears cases on
appeal from many Commonwealth countries) . These amendments
were designed to reassert the interpretation of the law
accepted until a December 1988 ruling by the Singapore Appeals
Court which ordered the release of four ISA detainees. Over
the course of 1989, six ISA detainees, including one who had
been held for more than 22 years, were released subject to
restrictive conditions on their movements and associations.
Two persons are still detained under that law.
The Appeals Court upheld in June a government restriction on
the circulation of a foreign journal for "engaging in domestic
politics," and in January a prominent government opponent was
disqualified from holding a "nonconstituency" seat in
Parliament as a result of his conviction in absentia on tax
evasion charges.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known instances of politically motivated killing.
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SINGAPORE
b. Disappearance
There is no evidence of abduction, secret arrests, or of
clandestine detentions that were not subsequently acknowledged
by the Government. Opposition elements did not engage in such
activities .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although torture is prohibited by law under sections 330 and
331 of the Penal Code and government leaders have stated that
they oppose its use, credible reports of mistreatment
continued to surface.
Vincent Cheng, a detainee held under the ISA, stated in an
affidavit made for a September habeas corpus hearing that
following his detention in May 1987 he had been placed in an
extremely cold room, deprived of sleep, subjected to prolonged
interrogation, and physically assaulted by an ISD officer.
His affidavit also said that statements he signed for the ISD
at that time were written under coercion and intimidation.
The Government in turn provided affidavits from the accused SD
officers denying that Cheng had been assaulted or forced to
sign any statement.
The allegations are similar to those made in 1988 by nine
others detained in May 1987 and later released. Eight of the
nine were redetained in April 1988 after they made a public
statement alleging that they vjere mistreated and denying
allegations of involvement in a Marxist conspiracy. A week
later the Government released sworn statements made by five of
those redetained which stated that they had not been
mistreated at any time while in detention. Human rights
groups contend that these statements were also written under
duress and coercion.
The Government continued to assert that torture is not
practiced in Singapore, but one Cabinet Minister publicly
acknowledged that "psychological pressure" is used. The
Government has answered charges of mistreatment by noting that
persons have the right to bring charges against those in the
Government who are alleged to have committed such criminal
acts. Human rights groups note, however, that few persons
would be willing to accept the possible risks of reprisal
involved in lodging such complaints. A complaint was filed
with the police in April 1988 alleging mistreatment of one
detainee during the 1987 detention. To date there has been no
public record of any investigation into this complaint.
The Penal Code mandates caning in addition to imprisonment as
punishment for certain offenses, including rape, theft,
robbery, extortion, housebreaking, and vehicle theft. The
courts routinely order caning for convictions for these
offenses. As of March, illegal aliens are subject to the same
punishment (see Section 6.e.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arrest without warrant and detention without trial are legally
permitted in some instances. Arrest without warrant is
authorized under section 43 of the Criminal Law (Temporary
Provisions) Act and sections 8 and 65 of the ISA. Detention
without trial is authorized under sections 8 and 74 of the
ISA. The Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act is used
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SINGAPORE
almost exclusively in cases involving narcotics and secret
criminal societies. Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) officers
and customs officials may arrest without warrant any person
suspected of manufacturing, importing, exporting, possessing,
consuming, or trafficking in controlled drugs under the Misuse
of Drugs Act. The Director of the CNB can commit suspected
drug users to a 6-month term in a drug rehabilitation center
in cases of positive urinalysis tests. Suspects have a legal
right to challenge the finding through the court system.
There is a functioning system of bail for criminal cases, and
those charged in both criminal and security cases are entitled
to legal counsel.
Section 8 of the ISA permits the Minister of Home Affairs to
order detention if the President determines that the person
poses a threat to national security. The President may
authorize detention for up to 2 years. After 2 years, the
President must redetermine whether the detainee should be
held, and may so order for up to 2 more years. There is no
limitation on the number of times a detention order may be
renewed. A detainee's case is reviewed periodically by an
advisory board, to which the detainee may make representations.
The board can make nonbinding recommendations that a detainee
be released prior to expiration of the detention order.
According to the Government, persons are released when the
Minister for Law and Home Affairs determines they no longer
pose a threat to national security and are unlikely to resume
subversive activity. The Minister may also revoke the order
of release. Under section 74 of the ISA, police may detain a
person for up to 48 hours; the Minister of Home Affairs can
then order the detainee to be held for up to 28 days longer.
ISA detainees are normally allowed access to lawyers and
visits by relatives once initial interrogation has been
completed (after 7 and 10 days respectively in the cases of
the 1987 and 1988 ISA detainees).
On January 16 Parliament approved amendments to both the
Constitution and the ISA which eliminated any judicial review
of the objective grounds for detentions made under the ISA.
These amendments came in response to a December 1988 ruling of
the Appeals Court ordering the release of four ISA detainees,
in which a judge opined that preventive detention was not a
subjective matter resting solely upon the judgment of the
executive and accordingly was open to judicial review.
The constitutional amendment prevents the courts from
reviewing the constitutionality of any law passed by
Parliament to prevent subversion and allows such statutes to
restrict, or even eliminate, judicial review in cases of
alleged subversion. This amendment became valid
retroactively, making it applicable to the detainees who
benefited from the December 1988 ruling. Using the power
bestowed by the constitutional amendment, the amendment to the
ISA stated that "there shall be no judicial review in any
court of any act done or decision made by the President under
the provisions of this act save in regard to any question
relating to compliance with any procedural requirement of this
act . "
These amendments subordinate the fundamental liberties
provided for by the Singapore Constitution to the actions
taken by the executive in national security cases. Critics
argue that the amendments are outside the rule of law inherent
in any constitution based on the Westminster model. A high
972
SINGAPORE
court judge rejected this latter argument on April 25 in
ruling on a motion for writ of habeas corpus for Teo Soh Lung.
Six ISA detainees were released in 1989, leaving only Vincent
Cheng and Teo Soh Lung in preventive detention. Those
released have had restrictions placed on their right to
travel, to make public statements, and to associate with
former detainees.
Three of those redetained in April 1988 were released on March
11, 1989. Eight days earlier they had withdrawn motions for
writs of habeas corpus, just days before the motions were to
be heard in the high court. In Parliament, it was suggested
that this indicates the Governm.ent offered to release them
sooner if they dropped their legal cases. The Minister for
Law and Home Affairs responded saying this suggestion was
totally untrue. Teo Soh Lung, who filed for a writ together
with the other three and did not withdraw the motion, is still
being held (the lone police complaint alleging ill-treatment
was filed in her case). In his September 1989 habeas corpus
hearing, Vincent Cheng stated in his affidavit that he was
told in May 1987 he would be held for only a year but "was
repeatedly threatened with prolonged detention should any
representations be made or legal proceedings be comrrienced, "
and that after he filed to start proceedings in March 1989 an
ISD officer asked him whether he intended to show by this that
he was not rehabilitated.
The Government denies that it pressures detainees by
threatening to prolong their imprisonment. But when asked in
court if some detainees have been punished not for what they
have done, but for what others might do in the future,
Singapore's Prime Minister said that the way in which the
Government responds "to pressure either by habeas corpus
proceedings, or by human rights groups, or by demonstrators,
or by church agitation decides whether or not others might
follow in the footsteps of those already detained."
Chia Thye Poh, a former Member of Parliament (M.P.) who had
been in preventive detention under the ISA since 1966, was
conditionally released on May 17. He was sent to a small
island adjacent to Singapore, from which he cannot leave
without permission from the ISD. The Government said that the
Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) organization with which Chia
was allegedly linked, allegations which the Government never
attempted to prove in court, "has now been weakened and
disrupted enough that his release . . . will not be a security
problem." Chia has consistently denied any ties to the CPM.
According to the Government, 1,228 persons were in detention
under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act as of August
15. Sixty percent of these were being held on narcotics-
related charges; the remaining 40 percent are held on secret
society and other criminal charges.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Singapore judiciary system is based on the British model.
There are two levels of courts: the Supreme Court, which
includes the High Court and the Appellate Courts, and the
subordinate courts. In normal cases, the Criminal Procedures
Code provides that a charge against a defendant must be read
and explained to him as soon as it is framed by the
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SINGAPORE
magistrate. The accused has the right to be represented by an
attorney (advocate). Trial is by judge rather than by jury.
Persons detained under the ISA and the Criminal Law (Temporary
Provisions) Act are not entitled to a public trial, which is
accorded in all other cases. Currently two persons are
imprisoned under the ISA (see Section l.d.).
At the discretion of the courts. Commonwealth Queen's Counsels
(QC) are allowed to argue cases in Singapore. Following a
habeas corpus hearing in March, however, the Government barred
the QC who had bf-eii i>'presenting ISA detainee Teo Soh Lung
from further appearances in local courts. The Government
contended thai he had involved himself in Singapore's domestic
politics by championing his client's cause outside of the
courtroom. It focused on comments he had made to a closed
seminar ir. London. The QC charged that the Government's
action gave "a clear message to the local legal profession to
keep off the grass." Commenting on the Government's action,
the British Government said it would have a negative impact on
Singapore's reputation for respect of the law.
In April Parliament greatly restricted appeals to the judicial
committee of the Privy Council in London. This made
Singapore's appellate courts the final courts of appeal in
most cases. Critics point out that this reduces the value of
an appeal, since a group of only nine justices man both the
High Court and the Appellate Courts. An independent Court of
Appeals has been proposed, but opponents argue that there is
insufficient legal talent in Singapore to staff such a court.
Judges are appointed by the President on the recommendation of
the Prime Minister in consultation with the Chief Justice.
Subordinate court judges (magistrates) and public prosecutors
are civil servants and can be transferred from the judiciary
to government service. In Parliament the Minister for Law and
Home Affairs has admitted that an unscrupulous government
could "pack the courts" to pursue political ends. In arguing
that judicial review was not an effective way to prevent abuse
of the Government's discretionary powers, he pointed out that
"under our system there is no limit to the number of judges
who can be appointed."
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government uses its wide discretionary powers when it
believes that the security of the nation is threatened. In
most cases, search warrants are required for intrusion into
the home. Law enforcement officers may, however, search a
person, home, or property without a warrant if they decide
there are grounds to do so. In ISA cases, warrantless
searches are common. Warrantless searches can also be made
under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act, which is
said mostly to deal with drug- and secret society-related
offenses. Judicial review of such searches can be undertaken
by the courts at the request of the defendant but is not
automatic. Divisions of the Government's law enforcement
agencies, including the Internal Security Department and the
Corrupt Practices Investigation Board (CPIB) , have wide
networks for gathering information. There are credible
allegations that the authorities monitor telephone and other
private conversations.
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Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution permits official restrictions on the freedom
of expression. In practice, freedom of speech and press is
circumscribed, and the Government forbids statements which it
thinks might arouse tensions among the various races or might
threaten national security or public order. Inflammatory
discussion of race, religion, and language is officially
forbidden.
Newspapers are published by private firms with close ties to
the national leadership. While there is no direct censorship
of the press, editors have acknowledged there are restraints,
such as the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act. A leading
Singapore journalist, in a November public statement,
described the local press as one working in tandem with the
Government. "Newspapers," he wrote, "pedal along with the
Government in the direction set by the political leadership."
The Government brought charges in 1988 against Chiam See Tong,
an opposition M.P., alleging that his party printed
unauthorized editions of the party's newspaper. He was
acquitted but the judge gave the prosecution the option of
amending the charges. On October 21 the Government relented
and told the court it would not proceed with the case.
A wide range of international magazines and newspapers can be
purchased uncensored in Singapore, although newspapers printed
in Malaysia are not circulated. Under the Newspaper and
Printing Press Act, the Government may restrict the sales and
distribution of foreign publications deemed to have "engaged"
in Singapore's domestic politics. The Government interprets
the statute as giving it the right to impose such restrictions
whenever a foreign publication fails to publish in full any
government reply to the publication's coverage of Singapore.
The Government has restricted the circulation of the Asian
Wall Street Journal (AWSJ) and the Far Eastern Economic Review
(FEER) since 1987. The former did not comply with the
requirement to publish government letters in full, while the
Government accused the latter of a negative slant in its
reporting on Singapore. On November 30, a High Court judge
held that FEER had libeled the Prime Minister in a December
1987 article and awarded him $115,000 in damages. In December
the Government applied for a contempt of court citation
against the AWSJ because of its report on this verdict. On
June 1, the Appeals Court dismissed an AWSJ lawsuit against
the Government which asserted that the circulation restriction
was illegal. In its decision giving a definition of "engaging
in domestic politics," the Court said, "it is simply involving
oneself in some matter, in this case the domestic politics of
Singapore, where such involvement is neither solicited nor
welcomed by those who are concerned with or affected by such
matters." The judges added that domestic politics included
"the political, social, and economic policies of the
Government . "
The Government has not allowed the FEER or the AWSJ to post
correspondents in Singapore since 1987. It refused to grant
visas to FEER and AWSJ correspondents to come to Singapore to
cover Vice President Quayle's visit in May and to a FEER
correspondent coming to cover the libel suit in September. In
October and November, the Government refused to extend the
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work permit of the Associated Press/Dow Jones correspondent,
and refused to issue a visa to a new correspondent. Dow Jones
is the parent company of FEER and AWSJ.
The government-owned Singapore Broadcasting Corporation (SBC)
has a monopoly on domestic radio and television broadcasting
and follows government guidelines similar to those pertaining
to local print media. Television broadcasts from Malaysia and
radio broadcasts from Malaysia and Indonesia can be received
uncensored in Singapore; the British Broadcasting Corporation
World Service also broadcasts locally on the FM band. An
official board of film censors approves motion pictures, as
well as video cassettes, and television programs. Other
government bodies censor other media; such censorship is aimed
at material which the Government believes would undermine
morals, advocate excessive permissiveness, promote drug abuse,
or increase social tension. Literature and films featuring
explicit sexual or drug-related themes are banned.
The members of the faculties at Singapore institutions of
higher education are government employees. A number of
university lecturers are concurrently PAP M.P.'s. Oral and
written criticism of government policies occasionally occurs
on campus, but criticism of government leaders and alleged
authoritarian tendencies is infrequent.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Assemblies of more than five people in public, including
political meetings and rallies, must have police permission.
However, the Government does not stop social gatherings
regardless of the number present.
Associations, societies, clubs, churches, and other
organizations with more than 10 members must be registered
with the Government under the Societies Act. The Government
denies registration to societies believed likely to be used
for unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to public
peace, welfare, or public order. (See Section 3 regarding
criticism by opposition groups of the Government's
discretionary power in this area.)
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is guaranteed by the Constitution and
usually respected in practice. However, all religious groups
are subject to government scrutiny and must be legally
registered. The Government restricts some religious sects by
application of the Societies Act and has banned others. A
Presidential Council on Minority Rights exists to ensure that
legislation does not infringe upon the rights of ethnic or
religious minorities. There is no state religion. The
Government has provided financial assistance to build and
maintain mosques. There is no religious test for employment
ith the Government or for membership in the PAP. Missionaries
are permitted to work and to publish religious texts.
The Government draws a sharp distinction between purely
religious activities and social activism flowing from
religious beliefs. Both remaining ISA detainees were arrested
in part because of alleged political activities while serving
on Catholic social work committees. The Government announced
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in October that it will introduce legislation to penalize
religious groups which engage in political activity.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Significant limitations on freedom of movement within the
country may be imposed under the ISA. The ISA allows the
Minister for Law and Home Affairs to suspend or revoke a
detention order or impose restrictions on activities, place of
residence, and travel outside of Singapore. All Singapore
residents over the age of 13 are required to register with the
Government, receive and carry an identification card, and
report changes of address within 14 days. A person may be
denied a passport at the Government's discretion, although in
practice this applies only to those convicted of a serious
crime. Males approaching the age of 18 (when national service
is generally performed) must obtain an exit permit from the
Ministry of Defense before traveling abroad. Each recipient
of government-financed higher educational benefits must sign a
bond obligation to serve the Government for a fixed period and
may not cease employment or emigrate within the prescribed
period without paying the balance of his or her bond.
The right of voluntary repatriation is extended to holders of
Singaporean passports. In 1985 Parliament provided for the
loss of citizenship by Singaporeans who reside outside
Singapore for more than 10 years consecutively. Action under
this law is discretionary and has been taken in at least one
case involving a well-known government opponent.
Singapore does not offer first asylum to refugees. Government
policy permits Vietnamese refugees rescued at sea to disembark
and remain for up to 90 days only if Singapore is the rescuing
vessel's next scheduled port of call and if a resettlement
country provides a resettlement guarantee. The Government has
agreed, in principle, to permit the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to screen such persons in
accordance with the Comprehensive Plan of Action adopted in
Geneva at the June 1989 International Conference on
Indochinese Refugees. However, refugees must still depart
Singapore within 90 days. To date, no screening has taken
place because no country has agreed to accept those who would
be screened out.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Singaporeans have the ability peacefully to change their
government, but the Government has used its extensive powers
to place formidable obstacles in the path of would-be
opponents. Voting is compulsory. Parliamentary elections are
held at least every 5 years. It is generally accepted that
the voting and vote-counting system is fair, accurate, and
free from tampering. While the mechanics of elections have
been honest and devoid of manipulation, human rights groups
contend that the overall election process has not been free
and fair.
Lee Kuan Yew has served as Prime Minister since 1959. Lee
heads the PAP, a broadly based institution and the dominant
political party in Singapore. It includes representatives
from all racial communities in Singapore and is rooted in
neighborhood, youth, and labor associations. The PAP
currently holds 80 of the 81 popularly elected seats in
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Parliament, with the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) holding
the remaining seat. Two Worker's Party (WP) candidates, the
highest vote-getters among losing opposition candidates in the
September 1988 elections, accepted "Non-Constituency M.P."
(NCMP) seats which allow them to participate in debate but not
to vote on many issues.
While opposition parties have contested every election, none
has been able seriously to challenge the PAP since the late
1960's. A variety of reasons are given for this. One reason
is performance. Under the leadership of the PAP, Singapore
has achieved rapid economic growth, enabling the Government to
provide a wide array of public services. Political parties,
while legally free to organize, are subject to strict
regulations on party constitution, fund raising, and
accountability. The PAP attributes the lack of effective
opposition to disorganization, lack of leadership, and lack of
alternative policy programs. However, critics add that the
Government's exercise of broad discretionary powers through
arbitrary detentions and criminal prosecutions, control of the
media, and restrictions on the right of assembly have vitiated
opposition efforts by hindering the formation of associations
or organizations that could provide a basis of support for
opposition parties.
Francis Seow, one of the two candidates who accepted an NCMP
position, lost his seat before Parliament's first session as a
result of a December 1988 conviction for tax evasion. At the
time of his conviction, Seow was in the United States,
undergoing medical treatment. He was not represented in court
by legal counsel when the court convicted him on five of six
charges. The sixth charge, which involves a possible prison
sentence, has been adjourned pending his arrest. On February
15, the prosecution revealed to the court that
government-hired investigators had followed Seow in the United
States for more than 7 weeks, and contended that Seow was
deceiving the court about his medical condition. On May 22, a
district judge issued an arrest warrant on the grounds that
Seow had deliberately stayed away from his tax evasion trial.
Seow has accepted a fellowship at Yale University and has not
returned to Singapore.
Pointing to the extraordinary measures taken by the Government
to prosecute Seow, the case against the SDP M.P. (see Section
2. a.), and the controversial 1986 conviction which cost a
former Worker's Party M.P. his seat in Parliament — a result
described as "a grievous injustice" by the Privy Council in
November 1988 — critics charge that the Government uses
judicial process to harass opposition politicians. The
Government denies that its criminal investigations are
politically motivated.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Governmental bodies, such as the presidentially appointed
Minority Rights Council, monitor alleged violations of
minority rights, primarily any concerning the Malay minority.
There are, however, no nongovernmental organizations which
actively and openly monitor alleged human rights violations, a
situation that human rights observers attribute to fear of
government retaliation, a fear fueled by the jailing in 1988
of those who publicly claimed mistreatment and of lawyers who
represented them. Amnesty International is not allowed to
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operate in Singapore. Observers from foreign human rights
groups have attended the habeas corpus hearings of ISA
detainees .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Because of Singapore's history of intercommunal tension, the
Government takes affirmative measures to ensure racial,
ethnic, religious, and cultural nondiscrimination. Social,
economic, and cultural facilities are available to all
citizens regardless of race, religion, or sex. Minorities are
constitutionally afforded egual rights and actively
participate in the political process. The Singapore
Constitution acknowledges the "special position" of Malays as
the indigenous people of Singapore, and charges the Government
to support and promote their "political, educational,
religious, economic, social, and cultural interests." While
precise statistics are not readily available, government
officials acknowledge that Malay Singaporeans are represented
disproportionately in the bottom quarter of Singapore's
economy.
Women have the same rights as men in employment, education,
childcare and custody, and in the running of a household, but
do not have equal rights with men in the transmission of
citizenship to their children or in the right to residence of
a foreign spouse in Singapore. Muslim women's rights are
protected by the provisions of the 1957 administration of
Muslim law, which permits Muslim women to apply for divorce
and to hold and dispose of property. Women can vote and hold
any public office.
There is no evidence of any widespread practice of violence or
abuse against women. Singapore's laws protect women against
domestic violence and against sexual or physical harassment.
Domestic violence can be dealt with under either the penal
code or the women's charter. Through the latter, a battered
wife can obtain court orders barring the spouse from the home
until the court is satisfied that he will stop his aggressive
behavior. The penal code prescribes mandatory caning and a
minimuni imprisonment of 2 years from conviction on a charge of
outraging modesty so as to cause the victim fear of death or
injury. Commenting on these laws, a local women's group has
stated that this "legislative recognition of the problem of
domestic violence and the need to protect battered women is
important in that it reinforces the principle of the
husband-wife relationship and seeks to restore the respect and
dignity to the victim of violence in the home."
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Singapore's Constitution gives all citizens the right to form
associations, including trade unions. Parliament may,
however, impose restrictions based on security, public order,
or morality. The right of association is delimited by the
Societies Act and labor and education laws and regulations.
In practice. Communist labor unions are not permitted. The
Trades Union Act authorizes the formation of unions with broad
rights, albeit with some narrow restrictions--such as
prohibitions on the unionization of uniformed employees and
the holding of union office by persons with criminal records.
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SINGAPORE
The National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) is a member of the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU); the
Asian and Pacific Regional Organization (APRO) of the ICFTU
has its headquarters in Singapore. Singapore is a member of
the International Labor Organization (ILO) and has ratified
ILO Convention 98 on the Right to Organize and Bargain
Collectively but has not ratified Convention 87 on Freedom of
Association.
The national work force comprises about 1.2 million workers,
of whom some 210,000 are organized into 89 trade unions. Some
70 of these, which represent about 98 percent of the unionized
workers, are affiliated with the NTUC, an umbrella
organization, which has a close relationship to the Government.
Several unions have been founded outside of the NTUC,
including ones for the catering staff and pilots of Singapore
Airlines and for Chinese-language teachers.
The Second Deputy Prime Minister, a PAP member, serves as NTUC
Secretary General, and several PAP M.P.'s are NTUC officials.
These close ties have led to charges that the NTUC defends the
interests of the Government and of the PAP just as much as the
interests of the workers. NTUC policy, for example, prohibits
unionists who actively support opposition parties from holding
office in affiliated unions. NTUC officials maintain that the
two organizations are separate but share the same ideology,
and that workers benefit from the close ties.
Workers have the legal right to strike but rarely do so — the
most recent strike took place in 1986. Reasons given include
a cultural aversion to confrontation and concern about
maintaining Singapore's reputation with investors.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is a normal part of management-labor
relations particularly in the manufacturing sector. On the
average, collective bargaining agreements are renewed every 2
to 3 years.
A National Wages Council (NWC) brings business, labor, and
government representatives together to establish guidelines
for annual wage packages. Those who argue that the NWC fairly
accommodates the interests of all concerned parties note that
wage increases in the 1980 's have exceeded gross domestic
product growth. Collective agreements negotiated between
labor and management generally follow the wage guidelines
issued annually by the NWC. In 1988, for the first time, the
NWC issued its guidelines in the form of qualitative
recommendations rather than the quantitative form used
before. The NWC found that both employers and workers reacted
favorably to a more flexible approach which allows management
to reward workers for performance and sacrifices made during
bad times, yet allows those in sectors experiencing downturns
to let wages reflect the circumstances.
In 1989 the ILO's Committee of Experts (COE) recognized that a
1988 law removed a previously existing prohibition on the
negotiation of annual wage supplements but retained this
restriction under certain circumstances. The COE also noted
certain issues, such as promotion and transfer, and dismissal
without notice of employees, are excluded by law from
collective bargaining, and that the Industrial Arbitration
Court has the power to refuse to register the collective
agreements of newly established enterprises when the
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conditions of employment they afford are more favorable than
those set forth by law. The Government countered that the
Court has never refused to register a collective agreement.
Section 80 of the Industrial Relations Act makes it an offense
to discriminate against anyone who "is or proposes" to become
a member or an officer of a trade union. The offense is
punishable by a $1,000 fine and/or a 12-month prison sentence.
Labor laws and regulations are enforced uniformly. There are
no export processing zones in Singapore.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Singapore law forbids the use of forced or compulsory labor,
and such labor is not found in Singapore.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Government enforces the Employment Act which sets the
minimum age for the employment of children at age 12.
Children under age 14 are not allowed to work in any
"industrial undertaking." Industrial employers must notify
the Ministry of Labor within 30 days of hiring a child between
the ages of 14 to 16. Ministry of Labor regulations prohibit
night employment of children and restrict industrial work to
no more than 7 hours a day. Children cannot work on
commercial vessels, with any live electrical apparatus lacking
effective insulation, or in any underground job.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Singapore labor market offers relatively high wages and
working conditions consistent with accepted international
standards. Singapore, however, has no minimum wage or
unemployment compensation. Because of a continuing labor
shortage, wages have generally stayed high, and unemployment
below 3 percent. In 1989 the Government continued
implementation of a flexible wage program wherein labor and
management in private firms agree to set bonuses based on a
company's annual performance. Because of Singapore's booming
economy in 1989 and the consequent high demand for labor, the
"flexiwage" system has not resulted in a loss of real income
for workers. The standard legal workweek under the Employment
Act (Section 38) is 44 hours.
The Government enforces comprehensive occupational safety and
health laws. Enforcement procedures, coupled with the
promotion of educational and training programs, have reduced
the frequency of job-related accidents by a third over the
past decade. The average severity of occupational accidents
has also been reduced.
Because of the domestic labor shortage, more than 150,000
foreign workers are employed legally in Singapore. Most are
unskilled laborers and household servants. The Government
controls the numbers of foreign workers directly through
immigration regulations and indirectly through levies on firms
hiring foreign workers. Social insurance and safety
regulations are applied without discrimination against foreign
workers. Foreign workers face no legal wage discrimination;
however, they are concentrated in low-wage, low-skill jobs.
Some foreign workers are members of labor unions, particularly
NTUC shipbuilding and construction unions.
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The Government acknowledged the problem of illegal aliens
working in Singapore by passing a law in March imposing a
caning penalty on aliens who overstay in Singapore by more
than 90 days. Parliament has passed a law to impose a caning
sentence on businessmen who employ more than 5 workers
illegally. An estimated 12,000 illegal aliens took advantage
of an amnesty period offered by the Government to leave the
country before the bill began to be enforced. The Government
has not yet executed the punishment prescribed under the new
law.
982
SOLOMON ISLANDS
Over 300,000 people occupy Solomon Islands, an archipelago
stretching over 840 miles in the South Pacific and the second
largest (after Papua New Guinea) of the Melanesian countries.
Its government is based on a modified Westminster parliamentary
system consisting of a single-chamber legislative assembly of
38 members. This system, adopted when the country became
independent in 1978, accords with both Solomon Islands'
experience and the Melanesian tradition of leadership based
upon individual achievement and political consensus.
Political legitimacy rests on direct election by secret ballot.
A police force of around 500 men is under civilian control.
There are no other armed forces. The courts are independent
and vigorously protect individual rights. There have been
three general elections since independence; the most recent
one in February 1989 resulted in the first one-party
government since independence.
Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy. About 85 percent
of the population engages to some extent in subsistence
production, obtaining food by root-gardening and fishing, and
has little involvement in the cash economy. In 1989 Solomon
Islands still faced a long-term decline in the terms of trade,
substantial domestic and external deficits, an increasing
foreign trade imbalance, and higher debt service costs. Poor
economic performance was exacerbated by a population growth
rate of about 3.5 percent, which ensured continued pressures
on public and private resources.
All basic individual rights are provided for in the
Constitution, implemented by the authorities, and defended by
the courts. There is a constitutionally provided Ombudsman to
look into and provide protection against improper or unlawful
administrative treatment. No human rights abuses were
reported in 1989.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Political and other extrajudicial killing has not occurred.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of political disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is prohibited by law and not practiced.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There is no evidence of politically motivated arrests.
Exile is not practiced.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
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SOLOMON ISLANDS
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system is a blend of British and traditional
systems. There is a high court plus magistrates' courts.
Accused persons are entitled to counsel. Provision is made
for writs of habeas corpus under the law. Coerced statements
are illegal. Violations of civil liberties are punishable
by fines and jail sentences.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
In addition to legal provisions, the traditional culture
provides strong protection against these types of abuses.
Sectian 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Constitutional provisions, an independent press, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure
freedom of speech and press. There are two private weekly
newspapers, weekly and monthly national government news-
letters, and one provincial government weekly. The
state-owned radio gives significant coverage to statements of
opposition politicians. The new Prime Minister conducted
press conferences with local journalists on a weekly basis.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right of association is provided for in the Constitution
and freely exercised. Demonstrators must obtain a permit, but
permits have never been denied on political grounds.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is guaranteed by law, there are no
controls on the practice of religion, and there is no
religious discrimination. Although Christianity is the
predominant religion and a wide variety of Christian
denominations are represented, indigenous beliefs also
continue to be practiced without restriction. Missionaries
work without restrictions.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no legal or administrative retrictions on freedom of
movement of Solomon Islands' citizens within or out of the
country. Natural-born citizens may not be deprived of
citizenship on any grounds.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Since independence, Solomon Islands has had three
parliamentary elections (the most recent in early 1989), and
several elections for provincial and local councils. Besides
the general elections, three additional changes of government
were accomplished by votes of Parliament. Suffrage is
universal over the age of 18.
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SOLOMON ISLANDS
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigations of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There were no allegations by outside organizations of human
rights violations in Solomon Islands nor any request for
investigations. There are no local organizations that monitor
and report on human rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no discrimination on the basis of race, religion,
language, or social status. Following his election in 1989,
the new Prime Minister announced a policy prohibiting the
employment of Freemasons in the Civil Service. Indigenous
Solomon Islanders are favored over naturalized citizens in the
matter of land ownership.
The law accords women equal legal rights, but the traditional
society, where males are dominant and women are seen in
customary family roles, has hampered them from taking more
active roles in economic and political life. A shortage of
employment opportunities throughout the country has inhibited
the entry of women into the work force.
While actual statistical data are scarce, incidents of wife
beating and abuse appear to be common. In the rare cases that
are reported, charges are often dropped by the women before
their court appearance. Police are reluctant to interfere in
what they perceive as domestic disputes. In addition, many of
the laws benefiting women are in the British tradition and are
viewed by many Solomon Islanders as "foreign laws" not
reflective of the customs and traditions of Solomon Islands.
The magistrate courts deal with physical abuse of women on the
basis of inherent common law powers and deal with it as they
would any other assault.
The government-supported National Council of Women is actively
involved in trying to improve the position of women in
society. Among other things, the Council is working to
familiarize women with a proposed amendment to the
Affiliation, Maintenance, and Separation Law which would
guarantee that women who bring cases to court be protected
against harassment from husbands or members of their husbands'
families, both at home and in places of employment, and would
guarantee women's right to child support and compensation. In
1989 the Council also undertook workshops and programs to
train women in various skills, to enhance their
self-confidence, and to strengthen their participation in the
political and economic life of Solomon Islands.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Solomon Islands' law recognizes the right of workers to
organize, to choose their own representatives, to determine
and pursue their own views and policies, and to engage in
political activities. Only private sector unions have the
right to strike — a right which has often been exercised.
However, a 4-month strike by publicly paid teachers was
successful in gaining wage concessions. The small percentage
of workers actually involved in the wage economy means that
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SOLOMON ISLANDS
there is an ample supply of replacement workers for employers
to draw on if disputes are not resolved quickly.
Solomon Islands joined the International Labor Organization
(ILO) in 1984, but has not yet ratified ILO Convention 87 on
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize
or Convention 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective
Bargaining. Solomon Islands' unions are free to affiliate
internationally and the largest trade union, the Solomon
Islands National Union of Workers, is affiliated with the
Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Solomon Islands' National Union of Workers and other
smaller unions freely organize workers. Unions exist and are
active in both the public and private sector. The Trade
Disputes Council exists to arbitrate between unions and
e.mployers. Workers are protected against antiunion activity,
and there are no areas where union activity is officially
discouraged. There are no economic incentive zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by law, except as part of a court
sentence or order, and this prohibition is observed.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Solomon Islands has comprehensive laws on worker rights.
Child labor is forbidden for children under the age of 12
except in the company of parents in light agricultural or
domestic work. Children under 15 are barred from work in
industry or on ships; those under 18 cannot work underground
or in mines .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Power to set minimum wages lies with the provincial
governments. At the present time, in Honiara and provincial
government stations, it is about 32 cents per hour. While
small, this provides an adequate standard of living within the
local context when supplemented by the subsistence farming and
fishing practiced by most families. As noted above, most of
the population is engaged in subsistence labor, and as there
is high unemployment and underemployment, workers are readily
available at this wage.
Labor laws regulate premium pay, sick leave, the right to paid
vacations, and other conditions of service. The standard
workweek is 45 hours and limited to 6 days weekly. There are
provisions for premium pay for overtime and holiday work as
well as provisions for maternity leaves. Both an active labor
movement and an independent judiciary ensure widespread
enforcement of labor laws in major state and private
enterprises. The extent to which the law is enforced in
smaller establishments and in the subsistence sector is
unclear. The Workmen's Compensation Act and subsidiary
legislation make provisions for compensation to workmen
injured at work. No data are available about health and
safety standards.
986
THAILAND
Thailand is a constitutional monarchy with a strong executive
branch, an elected house of representatives, and an appointed
senate. The civilian bureaucracy and the military play strong
roles in political life. The monarch exerts strong informal
influence. The Prime Minister and members of his Cabinet are
subject to votes of confidence by the House, but need not be
elected members of Parliament. The present Government, a
six-party coalition headed by General (retired) Chatichai
Choonhavan, an elected member of Parliament, took office
following free national elections in July 1988.
Thailand's security services operate within a constitutional
framework reflecting the strong executive branch orientation
of the Government. They have wide-ranging powers which they
sometimes utilize in an uneven way. The Government does not
sanction human rights abuses by the security services and has
taken steps to ameliorate those abuses that do occur.
Residual Communist insurgent and Muslim separatist groups use
terrorism to advance their respective aims. The Government
has made notable progress in reducing the influence of these
groups, but sporadic low-level violence continues in the south.
An emerging, middle-income, developing country, Thailand has a
free enterprise economic system. Individual economic
interests and the right to hold private property are strongly
protected. While the industrial sector is expanding rapidly,
over 60 percent of the Thai people still live in the
countryside, and agriculture remains the main source of
livelihood.
Thailand's citizens enjoy a wide range of civil and political
liberties. Autonomous political parties, gatherings, and
associations are allowed. The domestic press practices
self-censorship, particularly in regard to the monarchy and
military, and occasionally receives official warnings about
reports unfavorable to the Government. Issues of the
international press are sometimes banned. Despite this, there
remains a wide measure of press freedom. Human rights
activists in Thailand are able to bring issues to the
attention of the Government and public, and they lobby
successfully for corrective action.
Over the years, Thailand has provided first asylum to over a
million persons fleeing the Indo-Chinese states. In 1989 it
recommitted itself to providing temporary refuge to all
Vietnamese and Lao asylum seekers. The Government also agreed
to initiate refugee screening for Vietnamese asylum seekers
which would ensure the integrity and fairness of final
decisions on the refugee status of each person. It also
agreed to permit the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) early access to all new arrivals and
continued access following the determination of their status.
Thailand undertook these commitments in June 1989 when it
endorsed the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) for
Indo-Chinese refugees in Geneva. Thailand also continues to
cooperate fully with the international community in providing
assistance to the more than 300,000 displaced Cambodians
located in camps along the Thai-Cambodian border.
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RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Allegations of government involvement in political killings
are rare. In predominantly Muslim areas of south Thailand
where separatist groups are active, however, security forces
sometimes shoot first and ask questions later. On December
31, 1988, a contingent of Thai Marines mistakenly opened fire
on a group of Thai Muslim defense force volunteers in a
village in Narathiwat province, killing four of the
volunteers. The Government promised to discipline the Marines
if an investigation showed they had acted improperly, but by
year's end no results had been announced. While the results
of the investigation were not made public, members of the
Muslim community professed satisfaction with the Government's
response.
Communist insurgents and ethnic separatists continued to use
violence, including murder, in pursuit of their objectives.
Their targets have included low-level officials, as well as
police and security forces. In 1989 Muslim separatists
primarily attacked civilians, targeting places of
entertainment and businesses, often in support of extortion
efforts .
The number of journalists killed in rural areas has diminished
sharply in recent years. Nevertheless, a journalist was slain
in Samut Sakhon province in June. The press reported that
police believed the journalist may have been killed because of
his reporting on local business. In previous years, some
murdered journalists had exposed corruption or illegal
activity. Others apparently had engaged in blackmail or
extortion and were killed in retaliation.
In previou:. years, senior Thai officials have been quoted in
the press as acknowledging that police executions of habitual,
serious, criminal offenders without due process occasionally
occurs, particularly in southern Thailand, the area with the
nation's highest crime rate.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of abduction or kidnaping attributed to
government forces in 1989. Communist insurgents and Muslim
separatists sometimes use abduction of civilians and
government officials as a political weapon. In October a
Muslim separatist group kidnaped a public school teacher in
Yala province and held her until the Government released the
arrested wife of a separatist leader.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Thailand's criminal code forbids the use of cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, and the Government
maintains that it is opposed to such treatment or punishment.
However, there also continued to be many credible reports of
police beatings of prisoners and detainees. A Thai human
rights organization announced in August that it had compiled
at least 132 instances of injury and 27 deaths between 1983
and 1988 as a result of police brutality, most often during
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interrogations. In July the Bangkok police commissioner set
up a committee to investigate charges that two officers of the
juvenile welfare division had beaten a 14-year-old boy
arrested for sniffing paint thinner. Also in July, a man
filed a complaint alleging six policemen tortured him with an
electric baton following his arrest on fraud charges. In
August a Bangkok policeman was photographed by journalists
standing on the chest of a deranged man who had attempted
suicide by jumping off a house. The police suspended the
officer and launched an investigation into the conduct of two
others who were on the scene. Witnesses alleged the three
officers had been drinking before the incident.
Human rights advocates charge that offending policemen often
try to cover up abuses by offering payoffs to victims or their
families. Nevertheless, charges of police misconduct appear
freely in the press, and victims, often assisted by human
rights activists, have successfully won redress for documented
abuses in the courts. However, few police or security
officials are ever convicted for such abuses, and even when
convictions occur penalties are so light that they do not
serve as an effective deterrent.
In recent years, international attention has focused on
reports of torture, murder, and rape of Khmer residing in
displaced persons camps by Thai paramilitary forces charged
with providing security for the camps. Since the formation of
the Displaced Persons Protective Unit (DPPU) by the Government
in June 1988, violent incidents and abuse by security forces
have been "virtually eliminated" according to the
International Committee of the Red Cross.
The major complaints by camp residents about degrading and
abusive treatment now concern acts committed by Khmer against
other Khmer. The principal camp where such violations have
been reported is Site Two, where more than 140,000 Khmer
reside at close quarters. Up to 90 incidents of violence were
reported monthly in the Khmer camps in 1989, resulting in
fewer than 10 deaths per month. Suicide attempts also remain
relatively high.
The civilian population in camps controlled by the forces of
Democratic Kampuchea (DK) are another area of concern. While
conditions in the U.N. -assisted camps under DK control are not
markedly worse than those in other U.N . -assisted camps along
the border, thousands of civilians live in areas inaccessible
to the international community. Forced movement of the
population is relatively frequent, often resulting in exposure
to military risks such as shellings and land mines.
Discipline in Khmer Rouge camps is alleged to be harsh and
excessive by many voluntary and international agencies who
have interviewed former camp residents.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Thailand's criminal and civil codes follow Western European
models, and the rights of suspects are similar to those in
Western Europe. Except in cases of crimes in progress, arrest
warrants generally are required, and specific charges must be
brought against those detained within a limited time period.
There is a functioning bail system. Reports of arbitrary
arrest are infrequent.
A small number of Communist insurgents and Muslim separatists
remain detained without trial by order of the Prime Minister
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under martial law provisions. Although these provisions were
eased significantly in 1984 and most of those originally
detained under these provisions have since been released, some
20 remain in detention. Currently, the only legal basis for
arrest and detention without specific charges for long periods
(up to 480 days) is the Ant i -Communist Activities Act. No
arrests under this Act were made in 1989, and the Cabinet
voted to consider repealing the Act and replacing it with a
new internal security law. Additionally, the Government
dropped 3 cases involving 12 persons arrested in 1984, 1986,
and 1987 under the provisions of an amnesty law passed by the
Parliament in July.
Thailand does not use exile for political control. With
regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution grants citizens the presumption of innocence
and access to courts or administrative bodies to seek
redress. Suspects can be denied the right to legal counsel
during the pretrial or investigative period of their cases,
but before trial they have access to a lawyer of their own
choosing .
The legal system provides for trial by judges rather than
jury. Cases are heard by a panel of judges on the basis of
specific charges, usually well documented. Persons tried in
both military and ordinary criminal courts enjoy a broad range
of legal rights, including the right to counsel both in the
trial and appellate stages, but a serioi;s flaw in providing
due process rights is the lack of appeal from decisions of a
military court. Since 1984, the jurisdiction of military
courts has been limited to cases involving military
personnel. Most prisoners benefit from periodic amnesties
reducing the length of sentences, and any prisoner may apply
for a royal pardon. The courts are relatively independent of
external pressures. There have been allegations, however, of
government and private influence on certain cases, often those
involving narcotics. A pilot government program to provide
free legal advice to the poor continues. Most free legal aid,
however, comes from private groups, including the Lawyer's
Association and the Women Lav/yers' Association.
In 1988 eight persons, allegedly involved in printing and/or
distributing defamatory leaflets, were arrested for defaming
the royal family (lese majeste) . Three of the eight were
convicted and sentenced in November 1988; two to 3 1/2 years
and one to 4 1/2 years. As the trials were held in camera,
details are not available. No arrests for defaming the
monarchy occurred in 1989.
Twenty to 30 persons originally detained under the
Ant i -Communist Activities Act but later convicted of criminal
offenses did not come under the terms of the 1989 amnesty and
remain imprisoned. The Government disputes human right
advocates' categorization of all of these persons as political
prisoners, pointing out that some were convicted of such
charges as robbery and murder. Human rights groups maintain
that at least some of these prisoners were tried on trumped up
charges. Eighteen to 20 Muslim separatists remained *
imprisoned in 1989 on charges including extortion, unlawful
weapons possession, and murder. Some of them face consecutive
sentences totaling 200 to 300 years. Human rights advocates
note that such long sentences violate Thai legal norms.
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Fourteen members of a self-styled "revolutionary council" were
arrested in 1989 under sedition charges after they published
documents announcing the dissolution of the Parliament and the
establishment of a "revolutionary" regime. At preliminary
hearings in July, all 14 pleaded not guilty. Only two of the
members of the group succeeded in raising funds for bail. As
of December, the other 10 remained in jail.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence
Thai society is essentially an open one where membership in
political organizations is voluntary, and the police function
is seldom abused for security or political purposes. The
unmonitored exchange of ideas generally is permitted, although
those espousing leftist or controversial views are probably
watched by the security services. Thai law requires that
police possess a search warrant prior to entering a home
without the owner's consent. There are allegations that
officers sometimes endorse warrants in advance and then allow
their noncommissioned subordinates to apply them as needed.
Sections of the Anti-Communist Activities Act allow officials
involved in specifically designated "Communist suppression
operations" to conduct searches without warrants, but these
powers have been used sparingly.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution affirms citizens' rights to free speech and a
free press, but there are laws which restrict those rights.
The principal legal restrictions on these freedoms are
prohibitions against insulting or defaming the King, Queen,
heir apparent, or Regent (lese majeste), advocating a
Communist system of government, or publishing materials which
threaten national security or insult religion. Thai citizens
enjoy substantial freedom of speech in other respects, and the
Government permits criticism of its policies. However,
criticism is not entirely without risks, and prominent critics
occasionally have been the targets of violence by mysterious
assailants .
Television and radio stations are licensed by the Government
and operated by the Government, the army, and private entities
as commercial enterprises. Although the Government's
Broadcasting Directing Board in theory reviews all television
programs prior to broadcast, in practice most programs are not
prescreened, and stations present a range of viewpoints. In
September 1989, however, the Board decided not to allow
broadcast of a feature program on the Vietnam, war on the
grounds that the program supported the ideology of the
Communist Vietnamese Government and would be beneficial for
Thai Communists. Radio stations are required to carry a
government-produced newscast four times daily but are free to
originate other news and commentary. Opinions critical of
government positions have been broadcast but, in general,
controversial issues are treated cautiously, if at all.
While international publications generally circulated freely,
in November the Government briefly banned sale and
distribution of "The Asian Wall Street Journal" for having
published an article deemed insulting to Thailand's senior
Buddhist monk. The ban, which was lifted following an appeal
by the Journal's editor, came under the 1941 Press Law
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empowering the chief of police to prohibit the import of
printed matter dangerous to public order and morals. Earlier,
the Government used the same law to ban temporarily import of
the South China Morning Post for reporting an alleged coup
plot. The police also considered but in the end rejected
taking action against the Hong Kong based weekly magazine The
Far Eastern Economic Review for an article allegedly
implicating government tourism officials in promoting
prostitution. The privately owned Thai press presented a wide
range of political and social commentary. Technical
publications and pamphlets, including those of academics,
circulate freely, and the latter present viewpoints ranging
from the non-Communist left to the ultraright. Foreign and
domestic books normally are not censored, unless they are
critical of the royal family or the monarchy. However, in
March the police special branch announced it would take steps
to halt the sale of the controversial novel "The Satanic
Verses," following rallies by Thai Muslims demanding such a
ban. The police later raided several bookstores and arrested
the owner of a store found selling the book. Similarly, the
Interior Ministry ordered the seizure of the August edition of
Bangkok magazine which bore a cover photograph satirizing a
Buddhist monk. The police warned the publisher not to publish
anything insulting to religion or he would face legal action.
Additionally, some 219 publications, many of them treatises on
Chinese communism, remained banned under an executive order
dating from the martial law period.
The press continues to operate under the restrictions imposed
by the Press Law of 1941 and remnants of past martial law
orders. It practices self -censorship and is particularly
cautious about criticism of the military or monarchy. Current
legislation permits the Government to close newspapers and
revoke the licenses of editors of newspapers which publish
stories deemed to be libelous or contrary to national security
interests. In 1987 the Government closed one newspaper, which
resumed publication within a few weeks; in 1988 and 1989 none
were closed. Nevertheless, on several occasions in 1989, the
police warned the press not to print stories on controversial
subjects. Additionally, the army and some cabinet members
more frequently invoked existing restrictive laws to issue
warnings to publications printing critical articles.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution ensures the rights of assembly and
association. In practice, these rights are exercised freely
by politicians, students, labor, and other interest groups
without government interference. All associations, including
labor unions, must be registered by the Government. The
Government, however, does not use the withholding of
registration to inhibit freedom of association for any
groups. Permits are not required for assembly.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is generally practiced throughout Thailand
and protected by law and custom. Theravada Buddhism, the de
facto state religion, has had an abiding and profound
influence on Thai culture and history, and most Thai practice
it. The King is required by the Constitution to profess the
Buddhist faith and practice Buddhism. Nonetheless, Thailand
992
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is a secular society with church and state clearly separate.
There are no restrictions on religious ceremonies, the
teaching of religion, or conversion from one religion to
another, but controversies occasionally arise.
In 1989 the Government moved against Santi Asoke, a
nonconformist Buddhist sect. Police arrested the founder of
the order, Rak Rakphong, also known as Photirak, in June, for
failing to comply with the Buddhist Sangha Supreme Council's
order to leave the monkhood. The charge against Photirak
under the Sangha Act, which sets forth the regulations of the
Buddhist hierarchy, carries a penalty of 6 months in jail or a
$40 fine. At year's end, hearings in the case were continuing
in a Bangkok court, although press coverage of the proceedings
was limited under a gag order.
In August Photirak was also charged with 79 counts of inciting
his followers to violate Article 208 of the Criminal Code by
representing themselves falsely as monks even though they were
not legally ordained. The 79 followers were also detained for
falsely dressing as monks before being released on bail. This
offense is punishable by a maximum of I year in jail or an $80
fine. On September 8, in a preliminary hearing, public
prosecutors deemed the evidence insufficient to sustain the
charge.
Under applicable regulations, missionaries are permitted to
live and proselytize in Thailand, as has been the case for
more than a century. Thailand does restrict the number of
missionaries and places limited restrictions on their
activities, but foreign clergy in the country are permitted to
preach freely. There is no legal or organized discrimination
against, or persecution of, those affiliated with minority
religions, such as Christianity or Islam. Religious
publishing, regardless of faith, is allowed. As with private
associations, religious institutions are registered by the
Government. Most senior Thai officials and political leaders
are at least nominally Buddhist. Muslims living in the four
southern provinces, which have majority Muslim populations,
have the right to have civil law cases decided by Muslim
judges under Koranic law.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Longstanding restrictions on the travel and place of residence
of Chinese and Vietnamese aliens living in Thailand remained
in place in 1989. The right of citizens to change their
residence or workplace was unabridged. The only limitations
on travel of persons other than aliens and refugees were
restrictions on entry into certain rural areas believed by the
Government to be used as bases by Communist insurgents. Apart
from prohibiting direct travel between Thailand and Cambodia,
the Government did not restrict emigration or foreign travel,
except by government officials. Passport applications by
single Thai women and children under the age of 14 must be
approved by the Department of Public Welfare. In addition, a
1985 statute criticized by some women's rights advocates
requires that female passport applicants under age 36 sit
throi'gh a series of interviews regarding their employment
records and finances. These provisions are intended to
prevent the export of children for sale and women for purposes
of prostitution. The Government has not revoked citizenship
for political reasons.
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Thailand is not a party to international legal instruments
regarding refugees and their basic rights. However, it has
acted in the spirit of those agreements by providing first
asylum to approximately 710,000 refugees from Laos, Cambodia,
and Vietnam since 1975, and by permitting the temporary
relocation of 350,000 Khmer, classed as displaced persons, on
its side of the Thai-Cambodian border.
In 1988 the Government severely restricted first asylum and
began to push off boats carrying Vietnamese asylum seekers.
The push-off policy, which was never uniformly enforced, ended
in April 1989 after the Government committed itself to restore
first asylum at the preparatory conference on Indo-Chinese
refugees in Kuala Lumpur, and then at the UN International
Conference on Indo-China refugees in Geneva in June. There
were no confirmed reports of Thai Government pushoffs between
April and the end of December.
Attacks on Vietnamese asylum seekers by Thai pirates in the
Gulf of Thailand resulted in a dramatic upsurge in the number
of deaths, rapes, abductions, and missing persons in 1989.
The Government arrested 14 suspected pirates in 1989. By
year's end, two had been convicted and sentenced to long
prison terms.
Following the civil disorders in Rangoon in 1988, 3,000 to
4,000 Burmese students fled to the Thai-Burma border area.
Although most students reside in camps on the Burmese side of
the border, some live on the Thai side and in Bangkok on a
permanent basis. Thailand's official policy is to consider
undocumented Burmese as illegal immigrants subject to
deportation.
In practice, the Government usually has provided refuge to the
students when they have crossed the border fleeing military
hostilities or probable persecution. The Government has on
occasion arrested students and workers as illegal immigrants,
taken them to the border, and directed them to return to
Burma. These repatriations generally have been only to areas
in Burma controlled by ethnic minority insurgent groups
hostile to the Rangoon regime. There have been no confirmed
reports of forced repatriation into the hands of the Burmese
military or civil authorities. Those repatriated often return
to Thailand once there is no longer a Thai government presence
in the border area.
In late 1988 and early 1989, the Government initiated a
program to repatriate voluntarily Burmese students.
Approximately 160 students returned to Rangoon under Thai
military auspices. Some groups, including Amnesty
International and the ICRC, allege the returns were "less than
voluntary" and that the Government had pressured the students
to return to Rangoon. Some have alleged that a number of the
students who returned have disappeared and others have been
subject to human rights violations.
Lao asylum seekers in Thailand are screened by the UNHCR to
determine their eligibility for refugee status. The screening
program was revised following the 1989 International
Conference on Indo-Chinese refugees. Although there were
isolated reports of pushbacks of Lao asylum seekers by the
Government in 1989, there were fewer than in previous years.
Thailand is cooperating with UNHCR in a trilateral program
with Laos for the return of certain Lao asylum seekers.
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Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Constitution provides a means for citizens peacefully to
change their government, and the political system has become
more open in the past 10 years. However, in practice there
are still impediments. The traditional military-bureaucratic
elite retains considerable influence and remains a
significant, possibly decisive, factor in determining who
governs Thailand. Constitutional processes are shallowly
rooted. Most politicians and political parties have little
contact with the population at the grass roots except during
election campaigns, and critics charge they more closely
reflect private business interests than the popular will.
Many Thais assume that the military, rather than abjuring
intervention in the political process, has simply chosen to
exert its influence from behind the scenes. In 1989 the
Government continued to exercise caution regarding policies
and actions of which the military would strongly disapprove.
Prime Minister Chatichai, himself a Member of Parliament and
the leader of the party which won the largest number of seats
in July 1988, is supported by parties holding roughly
three-fifths of the seats in the House. The appointed Senate
has limited legislative powers and is composed largely of
active duty and retired military and government officials. In
the 1988 national elections for the House, which were open and
free, 16 political parties fielded a record number of
candidates. The election resulted in the formation of a
six-party coalition Government. Opposition parties regularly
present opposing views both within the National Assembly and
in the mass media. The National Assembly almost invariably
has dissenting votes on legislation and procedural decisions.
Elections are based on universal suffrage for adults over the
age of 20, and are required by the Constitution at least once
every 4 years. The Government encourages voter turnout but
does not use either direct or indirect pressure to compel
voting. Voter turnout for both national and local elections
generally exceeds 50 percent, and in the 1988 Parliamentary
election reached a record 64 percent.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government has responded to specific inquiries on human
rights matters from Amnesty International and the
International Commission of Jurists. With occasional
exceptions, it is generally willing to discuss human rights
problems with both domestic and international human rights
organizations. Also, human rights organizations of all kinds
are generally permitted to visit Thailand, meet with
appropriate government officials, and lobby for corrective
action.
Thai human rights organizations have had significant success
in recent years. They have, for example, successfully
encouraged the Government to tighten the discipline of police
and paramilitary forces fighting the Communist insurgency and
have brought pressure to alleviate widespread abuses in child
labor practices and in prisons. The number of nongovernmental
human rights organizations has increased. Local civil and
women's rights groups, active on a wide range of issues,
including combating prostitution and seeking improved
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enforcement of labor laws, have devoted most of their efforts
to the promotion of women's rights and identifying and
correcting human rights violations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Thailand has made considerable progress, particularly
considering its limited resources, in accomplishing the
integration of its minorities. In 1988 the Government began a
comprehensive new plan for improving the living conditions of
hill tribes and providing more of them with the opportunity to
obtain citizenship and otherwise integrate into the
mainstream. Although much of the plan appears to move toward
integrating the hill tribes into Thai society while leaving
them physically in place, there are provisions for resettling
those living in restricted areas such as national forests.
Thai officials have stated that any such relocations would be
accomplished by persuasion rather than by force.
Ethnic Chinese, found throughout Thailand, with a
concentration in Bangkok, are relatively well assimilated, but
there is a tradition of popular resentment directed against
their trading and financial activities. This resentment has
never provoked violent perseution and is dissipating as the
Chinese are assimilated into Thai society.
Muslims are a significant minority and represent a majority in
Thailand's southernmost provinces bordering Malaysia. The
Government has put much effort into regionally targeted
development efforts and the creation of educational
opportunities in order to integrate Thai Muslims into Thai
society. However, Muslims continue to be underrepresented in
government service, the professions, and in higher education.
The community of Vietnamese which fled Indochina in the 1940 's
and 1950's to northeastern Thailand lives under a set of laws
and regulations restricting their movements, residences,
education, and occupation. Persons who travel illegally can
be imprisoned. Since 1980 these Vietnamese have been
forbidden to buy new cars. While some of these restrictions
are laxly enforced, the approximately 40,000 Vietnamese in
this category remain worried that their situation could change
for the worse. Those born in Vietnam have no chance of
obtaining Thai citizenship under existing laws, although their
children born in Thailand can do so in some cases if they pass
a background investigation. In December 1988, Prime Minister
Chatichai directed relevant government agencies to draft a law
providing for the naturalization of long-resident aliens and
their children. No draft has emerged to date, however, and
the law is likely to make slow progress through the
bureaucracy and Parliament. In the meantime, the continuation
of restrictions represents, in part, a conscious Thai policy
to discourage further emigration from Vietnam, and in part a
reaction to the belief that the Vietnamese represent a kind of
"fifth column" within Thailand, as it is widely believed that
many of these Vietnamese owe allegiance to the Communist
Government in Hanoi.
The status and role of women have improved steadily over the
past several years. With few exceptions, women have equal
legal rights, with specific guarantees of property and divorce
rights, and there are no allegations that these rights are
denied. Thai law, however, denies Thai nationality to
children born of alien fathers and Thai mothers, regardless of
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place of birth. In March Prime Minister Chatichai approved
the establishment of a new body to promote women's rights, the
National Commission for the Promotion and Coordination of
Women" s Affairs .
Thai law contains prohibitions on both wife beating and child
abuse, and the Government has enunciated a policy emphasizing
ending physical abuse of women and children. Enforcement is
uneven, however. Human rights advocates point out that the
Thai legal system lacks any means to intervene short of
criminal prosecution of the abusive spouse or parent. Rules
of evidence often make prosecuting these cases difficult,
especially when the victims are children. For a combination
of these reasons and ingrained cultural attitudes, police are
frequently reluctant to pursue such cases. Women's and
children's rights groups actively and effectively assist
victims of abuse who come to their attention in pursuing legal
action. Reliable data on the extent of abuse of women and
children are not available. However, some critics believe
that wife beating is common.
Prostitution is a significant social problem in Thailand,
driven by a combination of longstanding cultural attitudes,
rural poverty, and the profits derived from the sex-based
component of the modern tourism industry. Despite periodic
well-publicized raids on brothels, overall enforcement of laws
prohibiting prostitution is lax, in part due to petty police
corruption. Children's rights advocates and the Government
differ on the number of minors engaged in prostitution, but
the official estimate is 30,000. Estimates of the total
number of women engaged in prostitution range up to 800,000.
Studies have shown that the majority of women engaged in
prostitution come from impoverished rural areas. In the case
of minors, the majority have been "sold" by their parents to
procurers or owners of brothels. Research by human rights
groups also suggests that most adults and minors engaged in
prostitution are not held against their will (although there
are such cases) and view the activity as a legitimate means of
improving the financial lot of their families. The social
stigma attached to money earned through prostitution has
decreased markedly in rural areas. Human rights advocates
also report that women engaged in prostitution are rarely
subjected to beatings or other violent mistreatment.
Women are well represented in the labor force and becoming
increasingly so in professional positions, particularly in the
commercial sector. According to the latest available Thai
government statistics, women accounted for almost 54 percent
of employment in trade, 47 percent in agriculture, 44 percent
in services, and 39 percent in industry. In general, women
are not barred legally from positions traditionally held by
men. However, women continue to be concentrated in
traditionally lower paid jobs, and there is a significant gap
in average salaries. No accurate statistics are available on
this gap, which appears to be narrowing. In rural areas, sex
stereotypes are more pronounced with respect to social roles.
These barriers are being modified as mass communications bring
different role models to even the most remote communities.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Labor Relations Act of 1975 affirmed the rights of
employees to form and join unions or employee associations of
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their own choosing; decide on the constitutions and rules of
their associations and unions; formulate their views without
government or employer interference; confederate with other
unions; be protected against discrimination, dissolution,
suspension, or termination by any outside authority because of
union activities; and have employee representation in direct
negotiations with employers. No Thai law, including the 1975
Act, however, explicitly protects workers from discrimination
due to their participation in organizing new unions which have
not yet been registered.
The 1975 Act specifically withholds union rights from
government workers. Civil servants, therefore, may not
unionize, though they may and do form "employee associations,"
which are influential in determining salary scales, benefits,
and conditions of employment. All state enterprise workers
may unionize, except those at the Bank of Thailand and the
airports authority. The state enterprise sector is the
backbone of the labor movement in terms of the number of union
members and of the relative strength of its unions.
In addition to a prohibition on strikes in "essential
services" (defined to include ports, education,
transportation, fuel and energy, telecommunications,
hospitals, and waterworks), the right to strike is denied all
state enterprise workers. Nevertheless, strikes do occur in
the public sector and are usually tolerated by the
Government. In 1989 industrial peace prevailed in the state
enterprise sector, except for the ports, which saw work
stoppages in August and September to resist proposed
privatization of a new deep-sea port near Bangkok. Though
such strikes are prohibited, no action was taken against the
port unions. Another stoppage took place in June at the
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, in protest of a
proposed change of board membership that also had strong
privatization implications. That stoppage ended when the
Government reconstituted the board of directors.
In most of the private sector, 24-hour notice to management is
the only legally mandated prerequisite to a strike. However,
the Government has the authority "to restrict the right to
strike whenever a strike would affect national security or
cause severe negative repercussions for the population at
large." The Government used this provision to end one strike
in the banking sector in 1989. It was also used to end
lockouts in two large manufacturing enterprises, which in both
cases had been precipitated by failed strikes protesting
working conditions. This in fact represented a pattern for
industrial disputes in the private sector: strikes leading to
lockouts terminated by government intervention, often then
leading to labor court cases filed by labor demanding an award
of severance pay to those workers who cease their employment
in the affected enterprise.
Thai labor has organized slowly since basic worker rights were
affirmed. In 1989 about 12 percent of the industrial work
force (defined by the Government as those working in
"enterprises," which represents less than 10 percent of the
total labor force) was unionized. Union membership and power
is heavily concentrated in the state enterprise sector. A
cultural factor in the slow growth of organized labor is the
historically benign and paternalistic relationship of
employers to employees. A provision of Thai labor law
permitting the formation of labor unions with as few as 10
members also contributed to a high degree of f ractionalization
998
THAILAND
at both the union and confederation levels. This manifested
itself in a steady increase in the number of registered unions
to alm.ost 600, while overall union membership remained
virtually constant at around 300,000. Critics believe that
this promotes the company unions beholden to management and
thus is an infringement of the right of association.
The law effectively guarantees unionists security of their
person and protection of their property, and there were no
allegations that Thai unionists were particularly subject to
violent incidents related to their union activities.
Thai unions generally operate independently of the Government
and other outside organizations. However, unionists, along
with employers, are represented in a variety of tripartite
committees charged with formulating and implementing national
labor policy. Despite a history of voluntary association and
common cause between unionists and military elements, the
importance of such connections continues to decline as the
relative political strength and independence of unions rose.
Leaders of the main labor federations recognized that
f ractionalization weakened their impact and continued to
coordinate on such national issues as minimum wage,
privatization, social security, "temporary" labor abuse, and
health and safety issues. Thai unions have tended to be
apolitical, in part because the 1975 Act withholds certain
protections in cases of "political" activity.
Continuing an effort begun in 1988 when the Chatichai
Government came to power, unionists frequently express their
views to the Government on key issues. Increases in the
minimum wage and salary levels for civil servants and state
enterprise workers went into effect in early 1989 after
extensive union lobbying late in 1988. Strongly supported by
labor, Thailand's Social Security Law passed the House of
Representatives in July, and awaits Senate consideration in
the spring of 1990. A legislative initiative to create a
labor ministry failed to be introduced into the Parliament in
1989 due to disagreement about its eventual scope. Two more
prominent unionists were appointed to the Senate in 1989, but
no unionists serve in the more influential House of
Representatives .
Unions have maintained relations freely with the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the Asean Trade Union
Congress, and various national labor bodies, including those
of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan,
and Israel. Thai unionists have also participated in meetings
and seminars sponsored by the World Federation of Trade Unions,
The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) repeatedly has alleged the existence
of severe limitations on the right of association in
Thailand. Among these have been restrictions on the right to
strike in the private sector, the prohibition of unionization
by civil servants, the prohibition of strikes in state
enterprises, the inadequate legal protection of union
activists against dismissal from their jobs, and the
requirement that union leaders also be full-time workers in
the plants or industries which they represent. The AFL-CIO
has also cited alleged widespread abuse of "temporary" labor
and reported abuses of child labor. The U.S. Government has
found that a basis for many of these allegations exists and
accordingly in 1989 continued to encourage the Thai Government
to improve worker rights.
999
THAILAND
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
All Thai workers are guaranteed the right of collective
bargaining. The law prescribes procedures to ensure employee
participation in the determination of working conditions,
wages, and benefits. In recent years, such bargaining has
focused more on benefit packages and working conditions than
on wages. There were no instances of industrywide collective
bargaining agreements. Both labor and management usually seek
to resolve potential differences informally before turning to
formal collective bargaining. The 1975 Labor Relations Act
defined the mechanisms for such negotiations and for
conciliation and arbitration under government auspices in
cases under dispute. The conciliation and arbitration
procedures are mandatory for state enterprises.
A system of labor courts implemented in 1980 exercises
judicial review over most aspects of labor law. Workers may
also seek redress for their grievances from a tripartite labor
relations committee under the Ministry of Interior. The law
does not fully protect workers against antiunion
discrimination and retribution. The law requiring union
leaders also to work full time in the plants or industries
which they represent tends to make them vulnerable to employer
action in cases of conflict, especially as they have no
explicit protection against dismissal for union activities
prior to the formal registration of their union. The Thai
Court Law of 1980 prohibits "unfair dismissal," but Thai
courts have not been uniform in their interpretation of this
law.
Employers continued to have at their disposal significant
means to prevent the unionization of their enterprises.
Employees who were determined to have been dismissed
"unfairly" by the labor court were seldom reinstated.
Instead, there was a widespread reliance on severance pay as
compensation to resolve labor disputes. Additionally, the
common use of "temporary" or contract labor was also an
effective means of discouraging or preventing unionization.
An Interior Ministry announcement on temporary employment
issued in October sought to enhance labor protection and to
improve benefits for temporary workers by eliminating the
legal distinction between temporary and permanent workers. By
year's end, however, it was unclear what practical effect the
announcement would have, and many unionist were highly
critical of the change.
There are several special export processing zones (EPZ's) in
Thailand, with many more planned to stimulate further the
growth of export-oriented industry. No separate labor
legislation is applicable within the export processing zones,
where wages and working conditions in fact usually exceed
national norms. There are trade unions and collective
bargaining in Thai EPZ's.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor except
in the case of national emergency, war, or martial law. There
were no allegations of forced or compulsory labor in 1989.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Child labor continued to be a source of considerable domestic
and foreign criticism in 1989, including from the AFL-CIO.
1000
THAILAND
Foreign interest groups have focused heavily on the
exploitation of working children. Thai law prohibits the
employment of children under age 12, and limits their
employment between the ages of 12 and 15 to "light work."
Employment of children at night (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.) is
prohibited. Complaints against Thailand alleged that Thai
standards are low and that ttieir enforcement is inadequate.
There was no substantial new evidence of the employment of
children under age 12 in 1989. However, there continued to be
strong anecdotal indications that children over age 12 were
employed in dangerous, unhealthful, or otherwise harmful
circumstances. Occasional fires or accidents involving
children working or living in factories and construction sites
have concentrated public attention on deficiencies.
Thai efforts to correct these problems again were hampered in
1989 by inadequate budget resources for inspection and
enforcement, and by low penalties and fines which did not
sufficiently deter potential violators. The Cabinet,
acknowledging the seriousness of child labor problems,
approved a threefold increase in manpower for the Department
of Labor division responsible for child labor issues.
Implementatation of the increase began in late 1989.
Additionally, large increases in manpower for general labor
inspection were also approved and funded. The Cabinet in June
also approved increasing the level of compulsory education
from 6 to 9 years, though implementation of this decision had
not begun by year's end.
A revision of Thai labor protection regulations applicable to
working children in the nonagricultural sector, approved in
principle by the Cabinet and expected in 1988, was still
pending in 1989. The key feature of the proposed revision was
an immediate increase in the minimum age to 13 and a long-term
increase to 15. In addition to improved inspection and
enforcement expected from the manpower increases noted above
and the increase in the level of compulsory education, the
Government, led personally by Prime Minister Chatichai,
initiated a broad campaign to sensitize the public to the
problems of child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Working conditions vary widely in Thailand. Medium and large
factories, which produce most of Thailand's export goods,
generally work 8-hour shifts under conditions which meet
international standards. Health and safety standards are
maintained voluntarily, minimum wages usually are exceeded,
children are not employed, and employees enjoy various
additional benefits. However, in Thailand's large informal
sector, which is susceptible to minimal inspection,
enforcement, and educational efforts by the Government,
internationally recognized health and safety standards are
generally little understood or upheld. As government health
and safety initiatives take firmer hold in larger enterprises,
the Government will need to develop special outreach programs
to bring both education and enforcement into the informal and
small enterprise sector. Government programs for industrial
safety have relied primarily on informational campaigns and
voluntary compliance. While the programs themselves have been
praised as among the best in the region, more resources are
required to meet health and safety challenges posed by rapid
industrialization. The national force of labor inspectors,
even after the increase approved in 1989 is fully implemen'-ed,
will remain inadequate to the task of investigating and
pursuing all potential violations under Thai law, especially
1001
THAILAND
in the absence of complaints. Another impediment is the fact
that many businesses in violation of the law are often
unregistered, evade taxes, and operate outside the sphere of
government inspection and regulation. The cooperative rather
than coercive nature of Thai labor inspection and enforcement
practices is criticized by some observers as being ineffectual.
Unskilled laborers who pour into Bangkok from the far poorer
countryside often are willing to work at less than the minimum
wage ($3 per day in the Bangkok area, less in most other
provinces). In rural Thailand too, many workers are also
willing to work for less than the minimum wage. The
established minimum wage levels are adequate to provide
workers and their families a decent standard of living, given
Thailand's level of economic development. Government
officials continued to report that large groups of
laborers — estimated at about one-third of the total — received
less than the legal minimum wage, and to exhort labor
inspectors to enforce prescribed rates more effectively.
The Government has yet to give full legal effect to the
48-hour workweek. Commercial employees are not permitted to
exceed 54 hours per week; employees in industry 48 hours per
week; those in "dangerous" work 42 hours per week.
Transportation workers are restricted to no more than 8 hours
per day.
1002
TONGA
The Kingdom of Tonga comprises 169 islands scattered over an
area of 360,000 square kilometers of the South Pacific. All
but a handful of the approximately 108,000 inhabitants are
Polynesian. Tonga is a constitutional monarchy, with
political life dominated by the King, the nobility, and a few
prominent commoners. In 1900 it became a protectorate of
Great Britain. In 1970 it became fully independent again and
a member of the Commonwealth of Nations.
The security apparatus is responsive to and controlled by the
Minister of Police, a senior member of the nobility.
Tonga's economy is based almost exclusively on the cultivation
of tropical and semitropical crops. An increasing demand for
imported manufactured goods and products unavailable locally
has led to a substantial trade deficit. This has largely been
offset by remittances from Tongans employed abroad, overseas
aid, and, to a lesser degree, tourism.
Despite its autocratic nature, the Government respects and
defends basic human rights. There were no significant human
rights issues reported during the year.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No such killings occurred.
b. Disappearance
There were no disappearances, and no evidence of people
being abducted, secretly arrested, or clandestinely detained.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or other such
treatment are forbidden by the Constitution, and there were no
reported instances of such practices.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The right to judicial determination of the legality of arrest
is enshrined in the Constitution and observed in practice.
There is no preventive detention and no exile, internal or
external .
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The court system is organized on the British model. The senior
resident judge is appointed from overseas, usually from Great
Britain. The right to a fair public trial is provided for by
law and honored in practice. No one may be summoned before
any court without first having received a written indictment
clearly stating the offense with which that person is
charged. Defendants are entitled to counsel, and lawyers have
free access to defendants. The judiciary is free of government
1003
TONGA
interference, and there are no special courts for political or
security offenses. There are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
By law no one may enter or search the home of another, or
remove any item of property unless in possession of a warrant
issued by a magistrate. There is no arbitrary intrusion by
the State or political organizations into a person's private
life.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is provided for in the
Constitution. The one radio station and the country's largest
circulation newspaper are government owned. Other components
of the media are privately owned. There were no known
instances of censorship. The Minister of Police has inveighed
and threatened action against the independent media in one or
two cases, but no action has ever been taken.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Peaceful assembly and association are provided for by
law. There are no significant restrictions.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in the Constitution and
observed in practice. Missionaries may proselytize without
impediment .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Tongan citizens are free to travel anywhere within the Kingdom
and abroad. There are no restrictions on repatriation. There
are no displaced persons in Tonga.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the ability to change their leaders or
the system of government. The King and a small group of
hereditary nobles dominate political life in Tonga. They
assert authority largely through their control of substantial
landholdings . The Constitution allows the monarch broad
powers, many of which do not require the endorsement of the
legislative branch. The King appoints and presides over the
Privy Council, which makes major policy decisions. (When the
King is not presiding, the Privy Council is called the
Cabinet) . The King also selects the prime minister and other
cabinet ministers, who hold office at his pleasure. Tonga's
unicameral legislature, the Legislative Assembly, consists of
9 cabinet ministers, 9 nobles elected by their peers (33 noble
titles are recognized by the Constitution), and 9 people's
representatives elected by all literate, tax-paying males and
all literate females. Those above 21 years of age are
eligible to vote. The King appoints a speaker from among the
1004
TONGA
nobles' representatives. Government ministers and nobles'
representatives generally vote as a bloc. People's
representatives sometimes vote against the Government.
Elections are held every 3 years. There are no political
parties .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There have been no reports of human rights violations. There
are no local nongovernmental organizations which concern
themselves with human rights. Tonga is not represented at the
United Nations. The Government has not taken an active
interest in international human rights matters.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Social, cultural, and economic facilities are available to all
citizens regardless of race, religion, or sex. However,
members of the hereditary nobility have substantial advantages
in Tongan society. These include control over most of the
land and a generally privileged status. Nonetheless, it is
possible for commoners to rise to cabinet positions in
government and to accumulate great wealth and status in the
private sector.
While the strong Polynesian cultural tradition has not
encouraged the rise of women to positions of leadership, some
have become members of the legislature and served in
responsible positions in skilled and semiskilled occupations.
No statistics are available on the employment of women in
professional occupations or on women's wages compared to men.
Little information is available on the incidence of domestic
violence in Tonga. The authorities generally do not take an
active role in such cases. Wife beating is generally settled
in traditional ways between the families and village chiefs;
abused wives sometimes return to their families if mediation
fails .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to form unions. Tonga passed a trade
union act in 1964, but to date no unions have been formed.
Tonga is not a member of the International Labor Organization.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Since no unions have been formed in Tonga, collective
bargaining is not a widespread practice, but it does occur
informally. Labor laws and regulations are uniformly enforced
in all sectors of the economy, including in export enhancement
zones .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by law and not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
No information is available on current Tongan child labor
legislation. In practice, child labor is not used in Tonga.
1005
TQNCA
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
By regulation the workweek in Tonga is limited to 40 hours. A
panel chaired by the Minister of Labor, Commerce, and Industry
has been empowered to set minimum wage guidelines but by
year's end had not done so. Although Tonga still does not
have a minimum wage law, it has for some years set minimum
daily wages for such sectors of the economy as manufacturing
and tourism. Workers are protected to a degree by the ease
with which they can return to their villages and live without
a cash income if wages offered are inadequate. Worker rights
legislation covering such matters as safety standards,
conditions of employment, and child labor is pending in the
Legislative Assembly. Industrial accidents are rare as few
industries exist that would expose workers to significant
danger. Legislation for the provision of social security
benefits to the work force has been under consideration by the
Government since 1983.
1006
VANUATU
Vanuatu is a South Pacific island nation with an estimated
population of 150,000. It became independent in 1980,
following more than 70 years of joint British-French rule. It
has a parliamentary system of government with a prime minister
and a 46-member parliament. Independence was accompanied by
temporary political turbulence which left a legacy of
suspicion towards outside interference. Most of the internal
strains from the 1980 secessionist rebellion have now
subsided, although island and regional loyalties remain
strong. The civilian authorities control the police and the
paramilitary mobile forces.
Political legitimacy in Vanuatu is based on majority rule,
supported by both Melanesian and Western tradition. Following
free and fair elections in 1983 and 1987, Vanuatu underwent a
period of domestic turmoil beginning in May 1988.
The Vanuatu economy is dependent on international trade and
therefore vulnerable to shifts in world market prices. Prior
to the political turbulence, tourism earned more foreign
exchange than all other exports combined. The downward trends
in tourism and foreign investment, started by cyclone Uma in
early 1987 and exacerbated by the violence in 1988 and
subsequent political uncertainty, continued into early 1989.
Tourism, however, picked up considerably after the
establishment of Air Vanuatu's direct weekend flights to
Australia in mid-1989.
Despite the political turbulence, human rights remained
generally unrestricted, although concerns have been raised
about restrictions on freedom of speech and press.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Neither the Government nor any organized group has resorted to
political or other extrajudicial killing.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishm.ent
Constitutional guarantees against torture and cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment are observed in practice and enforced
by the courts. Prisoners also have recourse to an Ombudsman.
In 1988 four members of the Vanuatu Mobile Force were
convicted by a local magistrate court on charges that they
beat a prisoner.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There were no reports of arbitrary arrests in Vanuatu. Arrest
is by warrant. There is no exile. During the period of
political turmoil, opposition figures charged that the
Government tried to interfere with their access to counsel by
revoking the residency permit of an expatriate lawyer who had
been a prominent advisor to the opposition. However, all of
1007
VANUATU
the "interim government" defendants had outside counsel
available to them in their trial and in the subsequent
(successful) appeal. The constitutional provision is observed
that suspects will be informed of charges and given a speedy
hearing before a judge.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The courts uphold constitutional provisions for a fair public
trial, presumption of innocence until guilt is proven,
prohibition against double jeopardy, the right of habeas
corpus, and appeal to the Supreme Court. The courts are free
of military or executive interference. Throughout the
constitutional turmoil of December 1988 and the subsequent
trial of the members of the "interim government," the courts
functioned freely and their authority was upheld without
question. The Government acquiesced without complaint in the
appellate court's ultimate dismissal of charges against the
four convicted members of the "interim government." There
were no reports of arbitrary or unfair exercise of judicial
authority in 1989.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There is no arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home,
or correspondence.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although the Constitution provides for freedom of expression,
the Government publishes and controls the country's only
national newspaper and manages the national radio station.
There is no independent newspaper or radio. During the
December 1988 "interim government" crisis and the subsequent
trial of the participants, the opposition alleged that its
members and their views were denied free access to the
government-run media. A statement by the then-president which
was critical of the Government was not aired, but the
criticism was subsequently broadcast live over the radio as
part of his speech at the opening of Parliament. One
Australian broadcast journalist, whose reports of the "interim
government" crisis were deemed inaccurate by the Government,
was ordered out of the country. Vanuatu citizens are not
allowed to buy television satellite dishes.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
There are no restrictions on the formation of political
parties or other groups in Vanuatu. There are two main
political parties and several smaller ones. The out-of-power
politicans who have left or been ejected from the ruling
Vanua'aku party have formed their own political parties and
are actively canvassing for support.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
1008
VANUATU
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is protected by law and respected in
practice. Missionaries of various Christian denominations
work without restriction.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
All Vanuatu citizens are free to travel internally and
externally and to return from abroad without restrictions.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Vanuatu is a multiparty democracy. Numerous candidates
competed in the parliamentary elections in 1983 and 1987; both
the campaign and voting were considered by outside observers
to have been fair. Elections to provincial and local councils
have also been freely contested and fair.
Beginning with a violent protest march by antigovernment
demonstrators in May 1988, Vanuatu underwent a period of
domestic turmoil. Subsequent ejections and resignations of
antigovernment members from Parliament led the President to
attempt to sack the Vanua'aku Party Government, install a
caretaker "interim government," and call for a new general
election. After the Vanuatu Supreme Court declared the
President's action illegal, the Government arrested the
President and his five-man "interim government" on charges of
sedition, incitement to mutiny, unlawful assembly, and
conspiracy to overthrow the Government. They were tried in
February 1989, and four of the six were convicted; however,
all were freed in April by the Appeals Court.
Major opposition parties remained outside of Parliament for
all of 1989, their members having resigned or been expelled.
They continued to demand general elections, and boycotted
by-elections held to fill the vacant seats.
To an extent unusual among Pacific Island states, the ruling
Vanua'aku Party is the primary policymaking body and' its
decisions are implemented by the Government. The Vanua'aku
Party has in the past used government power to restrict
opposition political activity, for example, by denying other
parties the use of the government-owned radio and press.
There have been reports in the past of harassment against
individual communities suspected of having supported
opposition candidates. There also have been complaints that
the Government arbitrarily revoked residency permits of
foreigners who displeased the party or government leaders.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There were no allegations by outside organizations of human
rights violations in Vanuatu. There are no local
nongovernmental human rights organizations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Most of the population is comprised of Melanesians whose
ancestors probably migrated from New Guinea. The small
1009
VANUATU
minorities of Chinese, Fijians, Vietnamese, Tongans, and
Europeans, generally concentrated in the two towns and on a
few plantations, experience discrimination with regard to land
ownership. Although there have been allegations of corrupt
practices by members of the ruling Vanua'aku party, there is
no evidence to suggest a pattern of discrimination in the
Government's provision of basic services.
While women have equal rights under the law, they are only
slowly emerging from a traditional culture characterized by
male dominance, a general reluctance to educate women, and a
widespread belief that women should devote themselves
primarily to childrearing . Nevertheless, an increasing number
of women are finding work in the unskilled, semi-skilled, and
service occupations.
While no accurate data are available, violence against women,
particularly wife beating, is reportedly common and often
alcohol related. Several severe cases have been reported
where victims have died. While there are no specific laws
against spouse beating, the courts have dealt severely with
such cases, using common law assault as a basis for imposing
punishment. On those islands where bride price is paid, there
is often a feeling that the bride is the property of the
husband and to be dealt with as he chooses. Very few cases of
wife beating are brought to the attention of the authorities,
and even fewer are actually prosecuted. Usually the cases are
dropped by the women involved before going to court. The
police are reluctant to intervene in what are considered
purely domestic matters. The National Council of Women is
working to educate women about their rights and to urge
establishment of legal protection for women against abuse and
neglect .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Vanuatu's workers have the right to organize unions, choose
their own representatives, and to strike, but strikes have
seldom occurred, due in part to high rates of unemployment.
Unions may not affiliate with international labor federations
without the permission of the Government. The fundamental
legislation establishing the right of workers to organize into
unions, setting out the scope of union activity, and providing
for the arbitration and conciliation of labor disputes
consists of the Trade Union Act of 1983 and the Trade Disputes
Act of 1983. There are some 20 trade unions, grouped under an
umbrella organization, the Vanuatu Trade Union Congress, which
is a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions. The trade unions are independent of the Government.
Vanuatu is not a member of the International Labor
Organization.
An American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations official who had been working with Vanuatu labor
leaders on a continuing basis to strengthen union activities
was declared a prohibited immigrant in late 1988, reportedly
because of allegations that he participated in or encouraged
the May 1988 demonstrations.
1010
VANUATU
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions in Vanuatu have and use the right to organize and
bargain collectively. The high percentage of the population
still engaged in subsistence agriculture and fishing, however,
serves as a deterrent to extensive union activity. There are
no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law, and there
have been no reports that either is practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children under 12 years of age are not permitted to work
outside of family-owned agriculture, where many children do
assist their parents. Employment of children 12 to 18 years
of age is restricted by occupational category and conditions
of labor--such as shipping and nighttime employment. In
general, however, the high level of adult unemployment
discourages any resort to child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
In comparison with other Pacific island countries, wages and
salaries are relatively high. Minimum wage legislation has
recently been introduced. The minimum wage is about 50 cents
per hour for nonagricultural workers, and about 45 cents per
hour for agricultural workers. Most workers are not in the
wage economy and are thus outside the scope of the minimum
wage law. For the remainder, these minimums provide an
adequate standard of living within the local context. There
are laws to regulate the rights to sick leave, annual
vacations, and other conditions of service. Information on
health and safety standards, legal workweek, and enforcement
of labor standards is not available.
1011
VIETNAM
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) proclaims itself a
proletarian dictatorship in its 1980 Constitution. It is an
authoritarian state ruled by the Vietnamese Communist Party
(VCP) through a 13-member Politburo and a Communist Party
Central Committee of approximately 173 members nominally
elected by a party congress held every 5 years. Government
policies, carried out under the Council of Ministers, reflect
guidelines — if not specific directives — laid down by the VCP
Politburo .
Strong nationalism has characterized Vietnam's history and
culture for more than 1,000 years. Resistance against Chinese
encroachment from the north and expansion at the expense of
declining civilizations (the Cham and Khmer) to the south and
west have resulted in cultural and political differences
between southern and northern Vietnamese. Most of the
political leadership comes from northern Vietnam. The
northern. Communist core views other regional, religious, and
ethnic groups with suspicion. The northern Vietnamese
political leadership has also long considered Indochina as a
single strategic unit in terms of military security.
The security apparatus consists of civil and military elements
under the control of the Government and Communist Party.
Police and nonmilitary law enforcement officers are controlled
both by the Government (Ministry of Interior) and the Party.
Both Interior Ministry and police officials generally are
responsive to Communist Party directives and influence, the
Minister himself being a member of the Politburo. The
military security apparatus is subject to a similar system of
party and governmental control. The Ministry of the Interior,
through its various agencies, has a decisive influence on
government employment, business licensing, and travel.
Although it is now easier for average Vietnamese to open a
business or hold private property, the Government continues to
regulate private enterprise through complicated bureaucratic
procedures .
Abuses of human rights include brutal treatment of persons,
arbitrary detentions, absence of fair trials, denial of
privacy, and severe restrictions on freedom of speech and
press, assembly and association, movement, worker rights, and
the right of citizens to change their government. Restrictions
on travel abroad were further relaxed in 1989 and, during the
first half of the year, there was some greater freedom of
expression in literature and the press, but there were signs
of a more restrictive policy in the second half. In July the
Government agreed to permit emigration of the vast majority of
former reeducation center detainees and their families.
Vietnam claims it withdrew its remaining troops from Cambodia
in September after a decade of occupation but continued to
obstruct efforts to achieve a comprehensive solution to the
Cambodia problem, effectively denying Cambodian political
rights. Also, there were few new releases of political
prisoners during 1989; the Government has stated it will not
discuss the release of the last 127 inmates incarcerated since
1975 in its reeducation centers.
1012
RESPECT FOR HU^4AN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Relatives of reeducation camp detainees as well as inmates
released in 1988 have reported that guards sometimes shot to
death those attempting to escape. Other prisoners reportedly
have died of malnutrition, exhaustion, and other effects of
extreme prison conditions. Statistics on the number of deaths
of political prisoners in reeducation camps are not available.
b. Disappearance
There is no recent evidence of political abductions by
government security organizations and no reports of
disappearances or hostage-taking by forces resisting
government authorities.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There are credible and consistent reports from refugees
concerning the severity of conditions in reeducation camps and
prisons. The authorities have attempted to produce conformity
among detainees through confinement, hard labor,
self-criticism, and indoctrination. Detainees face
substandard nutrition, poor or nonexistent medical care, and
severe and often arbitrary punishment for minor infractions of
camp rules.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Although the Vietnamese legal system ostensibly contains
procedural safeguards for citizens against arbitrary
government behavior, in fact, they are meaningless. Public
security officials are required to obtain warrants to arrest a
person for a major crime, including alleged political
offenses, but the officials are not required to show these
warrants to those they apprehend. Officials can hold suspects
for an indefinite period. Refugees have reported that
authorities sometimes wait several months before notifying
relatives of those arrested of the charges and location of the
detainee.
According to refugees, since 1979 the normal practice has been
to conduct summary trials of those apprehended on political
charges, imprison them for several months, and then move them
to reeducation camps. Reports indicate that inmates
considered particularly recalcitrant are sent to penal rather
than reeducation camps. The Government has said it
incarcerated some 100,000 persons in reeducation centers
following the Communist victory in 1975. The Government draws
a distinction between reeducation centers (trung tam) for
those associated with the former regime in the South, and
reeducation camps (trai) for those detained after
consolidation of VCP power throughout the country. In 1988
the Government declared that all of the center inmates and
their families would be released and permitted to emigrate.
As of mid-1989, the Government stated that only 127 persons,
mostly former high-ranking South Vietnamese military officers
and government officials, remain in reeducation centers and
will not be released until they are reformed. The Government
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VIETNAM
has announced numerous amnesties over the past 13 years, but
none during 1989.
For criminal acts, a suspect may be apprehended on a warrant
which stipulates the nature of the crime and which authorizes
detention for 2 months prior to trial. A 2-month extension of
the detention period may be obtained on application. There is
no provision for bail or legal counsel prior to trial.
Some former prisoners have reported that they were kept
incommunicado for relatively short periods of time, but there
is no evidence that any prisoners have been detained
incommunicado throughout their confinement. Exile is not used
as a matter of public control.
In December 1988, Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding
with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
which included a pledge to waive prosecution and punitive
measures for persons who departed the country illegally and
who return under the UNHCR voluntary repatriation program.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Vietnamese court system consists of the local people's
courts, military tribunals, and the Supreme Court, which can
review cases from either of the lower courts. In addition,
the National Assembly or Council of State may decide to
establish special tribunals, which may be superior to the
Supreme Court, if the National Assembly so chooses. In
addition, local mass organizations are empowered by the
Constitution to deal with minor breaches of law or disputes.
Although technically judges in all regular courts are elected,
candidates for election as judges are selected by the Party
organization and are therefore not independent. At present,
Vietnam has a penal code and family law but no labor or civil
law codes .
Trials are generally public, with legal counsel provided to
defendants. Acting for the Government, "people's assessors"
present the evidence against the accused. Defense counsel is
supposed to ensure that proper legal procedures are followed,
in accordance with the defendant's rights under the
Constitution, and to explain the proceedings to the
defendant. However, the defense counsel is not an advocate
for the defendant.
Sentencing is highly arbitrary, despite existing sentencing
guidelines. For example, according to various reports, the
sentences for former South Vietnamese of f icials--though never
formally tried — correlated directly to rank and position
held. Former intelligence and psychological warfare officers
were given longer than normal sentences. Court officials take
bribes to reduce sentences.
There are no reliable statistics on the number of political
prisoners. In addition to the 127 inmates who the Government
admits remain in reeducation centers, there are certainly many
others detained for political reasons.
1014
VIETNAM
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
In 1989 the Government continued to operate a nationwide
system of surveillance and control through household
registration and party-appointed block wardens who use
informants to keep track of each person's activities. It
works imperfectly in southern Vietnam, however, partly because
of a shortage of trusted party workers. In the recent past,
the security apparatus has reduced overt control efforts,
particularly over persons who have no ties to the previous
southern regime and who express no opposition to the current
Government. In addition, according to refugees, the
population is increasingly able to circumvent security
restrictions through bribery of party and government
officials. To enhance public control, the Government
established "People's Security Units" in some localities
during 1989.
There have been reports of official and nonofficial security
wardens conducting searches of homes, sometimes with warrants
issued by the authorities. There continue to be reliable
reports that Ministry of the Interior officials inspect and
sometimes confiscate mail and packages sent to Vietnam,
particularly those sent to politically suspect persons. Some
of the outgoing mail is subject to inspection and censorship.
Vietnamese are prohibited from receiving many publications
from abroad; nevertheless, they are widely available on the
black market.
Nearly all Vietnamese are obliged to belong to one or more
mass organizations. There are mass organizations for villages
and city districts, for school or work (trade union), for
youth, women, etc. These mass organizations disseminate
propaganda and policy guidelines, support party-sanctioned
activities, and play an active watchdog role. Not only is
membership virtually compulsory, but attendance at meetings is
advisable to prevent either being singled out for criticism or
to protect family members from criticism. Membership in the
Communist Party is essential for advancement in the state
sector. No opposition political activity is tolerated.
Communist Party General Secretary Linh attacked proponents of
a multiparty system at the Seventh Central Committee Plenum in
August 1989 and vowed that opposition political parties would
never be permitted in Vietnam.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Vietnamese Constitution theoretically provides for freedom
of speech and of the press; but in practice such freedoms are
severely limited. Some visitors to Vietnam in 1989 reported
that persons they met were more willing to express critical
views--even in the presence of others — than in previous years,
but public criticism of government and party rule is not
tolerated.
The Government owns and operates broadcast media and does not
permit airing of opposing views. The Government prohibits
persons from importing or viewing many foreign films.
However, continuing a trend of the past 3 years, foreign films
were widely available in VCR format on the black market,
especially in the south.
1015
VIETNAM
The Ministry of Culture and Information and Communist Party
organs control all newspapers, books, and other publications,
as well as all cultural exhibitions. In many Vietnamese
publications, criticism of the Party and the Government is
allowed only within limits set by the authorities,
highlighting alleged cases of government corruption, for
example. During the past 2 years, Saigon Giai Phong, a Party
daily newspaper in the south, and Tuoi Tre, the publication of
the Youth Union of Ho Chi Minh City, had increasingly
criticized government officials and policy. The editors of
both newspapers were suddenly replaced in August 1989.
Observers agree that since mid-1989 press news reports and
commentary have been more restricted.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right of assembly is restricted in law and in practice.
Persons wishing to gather in a group are required to apply for
a permit. Permits are issued by local authorities, who often
do not follow uniform procedure. According to refugees, in
some localities citizens must obtain permission for gatherings
of over three people.
Nongovernmental organizations, such as church groups, are
permitted but they can meet only for approved and narrowly
defined objectives, such as religious services. Religious
organizations were permitted to maintain affiliation with
coreligionists in foreign countries. Opposition political
parties or organizations are not permitted.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Continuing a trend of the past 2 years, the Government
continued to ease previous restrictions on religious
activities. There were no reports of arrests or trials of
religious figures in 1989. Persons are permitted to attend
religious services, although there are reports that government
O-fficials are present to observe who attends the services.
Seminaries and other places of religious instruction continued
to operate. Travel abroad for religious reasons or to meet
with coreligionists was eased considerably for most persons.
Foreign religious figures could travel freely to Vietnam
during 1989. However, the Government continues to prohibit
proselytizing and restrict the movement of some clerics.
The Government has been concerned that religious groups could
become seedbeds of subversion and political opposition. It
has consistently attempted to divide and control religious
groups, in part by establishing government-controlled
policymaking bodies such as the Catholic Patriotic
Association. The Government has attempted to prevent the
growth of religious groups by inhibiting the publication of
religious materials and the training of new clergy. The New
Testament is available and several American nongovernmental
organizations were allowed to import small numbers of Bibles
in 1989.
Buddhism is the dominant religion in the country. According
to some estimates nearly half of the population of Vietnam is
Buddhist. The Government has claimed that only 6 million
Vietnamese are practicing Buddhists. Up to another 6 million
of the population (9 percent) reportedly are Catholic.
24-900 O— 90-
1016
VIETNAM
Adherence to a religion is not compatible with inembership in
the Communist Party, which espouses atheism. Nevertheless,
visitors to Vietnam report that attendance at religious
services seemed to grow in 1989. They reported that even
government officials, who in previous years feared losing
their jobs if it was known that they attended religious
services, show no such inhibitions now.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Travel was freer within the country in 1989, continuing a
trend of the past 2 years. Vietnamese are required to obtain
permission to change their residence, but most reports concur
that this was less difficult during 1989.
In early 1988, the Government announced that it would
authorize private travel abroad for education, tourism,
medical treatment, and visits to close relatives. Such travel
would be restricted to 3 months, except in the case of travel
for education or medical treatment, and violators would be
barred from further travel for 3 to 5 years. Observers report
that the Government still restricts temporary travel abroad,
but made exit permits available to a large number of passport
holders during 1989.
The Government continued to permit emigration for family
reunification and of Amerasian Vietnamese and their close
family members. Vietnamese who emigrate are generally free to
return to Vietnam. In mid-1987 Vietnam relaxed its
restrictions on tourist permits for those who had fled the
country clandestinely, prompted in part by the need to earn
foreign exchange. Now, only those who allegedly committed
"serious crimes" are not allowed to visit. There is no
evidence of mistreatment of repatriates. In late 1988 Vietnam
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with UNHCR to increase
acceptance of voluntary repatriates, provided there was
financial assistance. In June 1989, Vietnam joined in the
adoption of the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) at the
International Conference on Indochinese Refugees in Geneva.
Under the CPA, the Vietnamese agreed to encourage volunteers
to return from first-asylum camps throughout the region.
Nearly 1,000 volunteers from Hong Kong were expected to return
by the end of 1989. UNHCR has reported no sanctions against
the voluntary returnees. In September 1989, five Vietnamese
volunteers who returned from Malaysia were detained for 2 days
upon arrival in their home village. Local authorities had not
been informed of their planned return and jailed the
repatriates before central authorities intervened. These
returnees are now fully integrated and freely exercising their
trade as fishermen.
In a significant positive development, in July 1989 the
Vietnamese agreed in bilateral talks with the U.S. Government
to permit emigration of former reeducation center detainees
and their families. Interviews of former detainees by U.S.
consular and immigration officers began in October in Ho Chi
Minh City. The first departures for the United States were
scheduled to occur in January 1990.
Sixty-five percent more Vietnamese refugees left Vietnam
clandestinely during 1989 than in the previous year. Many
people continued to use the established land routes through
Cambodia and passage by boat across the Gulf of Thailand to
various Southeast Asian first-asylum destinations. Others
1017
VIETNAM
traveled overland through China or made their way in small
boats along the Chinese coast to Hong Kong, which experienced
an 87-percent increase in its arrival rate. Poor economic
conditions, especially in the north, exacerbated the outflow.
Since the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam, large numbers of
Vietnamese have settled in Cambodia. Although some of these
persons are former residents who fled during the period of the
Lon Nol Government (1970-75) and later during the rule of the
Khmer Rouge (1975-78), others are first-time settlers.
In June 1988, Vietnam adopted a new nationality law. It
stated that those who wished to divest themselves of
Vietnamese citizenship could renounce it formally but that the
Government would need to approve the request.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens are not free to change their Communist-dominated
government. All authority and political power is vested in
the Vietnamese Communist Party. Political opposition is not
tolerated, nor are there any other political parties. The
Politburo of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Communist
Party is the supreme decisionmaking body in the nation. The
Politburo's powerful Secretariat oversees day-to-day
implementation of directives.
Debate of government policies or criticism of the role of the
Party is not permitted. Citizens may vote for members of the
National Assembly, ostensibly the chief legislative body, but
in fact subordinate to the Party. From the single list
presented to them, voters may only strike out the names of
candidates for whom they do not wish to vote. In several
cases during the most recent elections for the National
Assembly, however, no candidate received sufficient votes and
it was necessary to hold follow-up elections with new
candidates. These were held in November and the vacant seats
filled.
The Vietnamese Party hierarchy expressed alarm over the
disintegration of party rule in Eastern Europe and implicitly
has criticized Moscow's reaction. The leadership clearly is
worried about the ramifications for its control of a populace
long disillushioned with the VCP's rule. As a result, there
has been a more marked doctrinaire approach in opposition to
political reform, even though the economic renovation policy
remains in vogue.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government does not cooperate with international human
rights groups and strongly resents criticism of its human
rights policies.
Foreign delegations and journalists who have been allowed to
visit reeducation camps (no visits in 1989) have been shown
only model camps. Former detainees have described extensive
preparations to beautify camps prior to visits, temporary
removal of most detainees during visits, and careful briefing
of the remaining detainees by Communist Party cadres on what
to tell delegation members. The Government does not permit
the existence of private human rights groups in Vietnam.
1018
VIETNAM
Vietnam generally does not participate in international human
rights activities and prohibits such contact by private
citizens. For example, in late 1988 two brothers were
convicted and imprisoned for disseminating information on
political prisoners to overseas human rights organizations.
In 1988, however, the Government permitted the Vietnamese Red
Cross to participate in international meetings and, in a
meeting with a senior U.S. Government official in July 1989,
the Vietnamese Red Cross proposed expanded cooperation with
its U.S. counterpart in assisting persons seeking missing
relatives, including those in reeducation centers.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Gradual assimilation and cooption appear to be the
Government's long-term strategy for most minorities. The
Government has created special schools in the Hanoi area to
train minority cadres to be the "eyes and ears" of the Party
among their own people. Highland minorities in central
Vietnam are subject to repression if suspected of ties with
resistance groups. Officially programmed resettlement of
ethnic Vietnamese into the highlands is designed in part to
increase government control over minority groups. Minorities
in the south, such as the Chinese and the Indians, have been
encouraged to leave the country. Since the adoption of
economic reform , however, the Government has valued the
entrepreneurial skills of the Chinese population and has
allowed a limited renaissance of private enterprise in Cholon,
Ho Chi Minh City's Chinatown. It has also permitted the
reopening of private Chinese-language schools.
People released from reeducation camps face considerable
discrimination, according to refugees. They do not regain
their citizenship rights until 1 year after leaving the camps,
if then. In addition, their children generally are not
allowed to attend college.
According to a Western academic specialist on Vietnam, the
passing grade needed on entrance examinations is lower for
children of party officials. It is arbitrarily set high
enough to keep the children of suspect background (e.g.,
officials of the former South Vietnamese Government), out of
university. Study abroad is also restricted to politically
acceptable persons.
Women do not appear to face discrimination in general
employment. No statistics are available on the percentage of
women in the work force, or on women's occupations.
There are no statistics available on the frequency of violence
against women within the home. However, in 1987 Premier Do
Muoi issued a decree banning spouse beating.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Vietnamese workers are not free to form or join unions of
their own choosing. All workers automatically become members
of the "union" in their workplace, and dues are deducted from
their pay. These groups are organized by the Government and
belong to the government-controlled Federation of Vietnamese
Workers which is affiliated with the Communist-controlled
World Federation of Trade Unions. Strikes are considered
1019
VIETNAM
unpatriotic and officially forbidden; none are known to have
taken place in 1989. Vietnam is not a member of the
International Labor Organization.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Vietnamese workers do not have the right to organize unions of
their own choosing or to bargain collectively. No law
protects against antiunion discrimination by employers against
union members and organizers; in the context of mandatory
union membership the concept is meaningless. In Vietnam, if
one refuses to participate in the workplace union activities,
one risks punishment. There are no export processing zones in
Vietnam.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor is permitted by the Constitution, which
states in Article 58 that "people fit for work must work as
provided by law." Refugees report that every Vietnamese is
required by law to contribute 15 days of work per year to the
State or to pay a fee. In addition, unemployed persons,
especially unemployed young people, are compelled to work in
exchange for small wages and food. A number of government
projects have used forced labor provided by reeducation camp
prisoners .
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
According to existing regulations inherited from the former
French colonial administration, the minimum age for workers in
Vietnam is 17. Refugees report that children under age 15 are
exempt from compulsory labor requirements.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Government inherited from the former French colonial
administration a system of regulations pertaining to working
conditions, including a minimum wage, a maximum workweek of 8
hours per day, 6 days per week, and safety standards.
However, except for some safety standards, these regulations
have not been updated since at least 1975, nor are existing
standards enforced universally, if at all. As a result, for
example, the minimum wage is so low as to be meaningless. Pay
is generally low in Vietnam, inadequate to provide the vast
majority of workers and their families a decent living.
Moreover, wages frequently are paid late, sometimes by as much
as several months. According to reports from refugees, nearly
all workers experience delayed paydays in their workplace.
Observers agree that doctors, nurses, and teachers are most
often the victims of delayed paydays. Possibly as a result,
many are reportedly leaving these professions, and there is
currently an acute shortage of teachers.
Such safety standards as exist are developed jointly between
the Ministry of Labor and worker organizations at individual
workplaces. Enforcement of the standards is uneven at best.
1020
WESTERN SAMOA
Western Samoa, a small Pacific island country with a
population of around 169,000, is located approximately 1,600
miles northeast of New Zealand, the country from which it
became independent in 1962 and to which it still looks as a
model for governmental and educational systems. The
Constitution adopted at independence proclaimed the nation an
independent and sovereign state based on "Christian principles
and Samoan customs and tradition" and established a
parliamentary democracy on the Westminster model but with
certain concessions to Samoan cultural practices. It provides
for a Samoan head of state, a unicameral legislature elected
by the matai (the family heads), an independent judiciary,
protection of Samoan land and traditional titles, and
guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms. Executive
authority is vested in the Head of State, with the Government
administered by a Cabinet, consisting of the Prime Minister
and eight ministers chosen by the Prime Minister. All
legislation passed by the Legislative Assembly needs the
approval of the Head of State before it becomes law. The
present Head of State, Malietoa Tanumafili II, holds the
position for life. His successors will be elected by the
Legislative Assembly for 5-year terms.
The culture of Western Samoa is essentially Polynesian but
uniquely Samoan. Traditional authority is vested in the matai
(leader of an extended family). Each extended family, or
aiga, has at least one matai, who is appointed by a consensus
of the aiga or by other traditional means. Ownership of land
is legally vested in the matai. It is the matai's
responsibility to direct the economic, social, and political
affairs of the aiga. There are 362 villages in Western Samoa
with a total of over 20,000 matai. Each village is governed
by a Fono or council of matai, which can fine or otherwise
punish offenses against village rules. Western Samoa does not
have any defense force. The small national police force is
firmly under the control of the Government but has little
impact beyond the capital city.
The economy is primarily agricultural, with limited potential
for development. It is susceptible to shifts in world prices
for its export commodities, such as coconut oil. Western
Samoa is heavily dependent on foreign aid, particularly from
New Zealand, and on remittances sent to family members by the
approximately 300,000 Samoans living abroad in Australia, New
Zealand, and the United States.
Western Samoan society is based on a collective value system
where obligations and reponsibilities to the extended family
(aiga) are often given precedence over individual rights. The
rule of law is tenuous outside the capital, Apia, and most
disagreements are settled by traditional means (which can
include corporal punishment, banishment, and destruction of
houses) . Within this context there were no significant human
rights problems in 1989.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Such killings do not occur.
1021
WESTERN SAMOA
b. Disappearance
There have been no instances of politically motivated
disappearance .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment are prohibited by law, and there have been no
reports of such practices by police or other government
authorities. However, villages are controlled by customary
law and beatings, stonings, the burning of houses, and other
traditional punishments are meted out by the village council
on occasion.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The law contains safeguards against arbitrary arrest and
preventive detention, and these are observed. Some villages
have banished members who fail to comply with the rules of the
matai, the family head. This is one of the harshest forms of
punishment in this collective society.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Western Samoan law assures the right to a fair public trial,
and this right is honored. All charges are stated formally
and clearly. Defendants are entitled to counsel. There are
no special courts to deal with political or security offenses,
and the judiciary is independent of government interference or
influence. Decisions of village matai about customary law are
not subject to judicial review; however, the Government is
trying to curb the excesses of some village leaders. The
Government has a case pending against a group of village
curfew guards who stoned a government worker driving through
their village during prayers, a serious offense according to
local values.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government respects the privacy of its citizenry and does
not permit arbitrary interference with the family, home, or
correspondence. Samoan law provides for protection from
invasion of the home or seizure of property without
substantive and procedural safeguards, including search
warrants. Practically, there is little or no privacy in the
village. Village officials by law may not enter homes without
permission, but there can be substantial social pressure to
grant such permission.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental parts of
the Constitution. They are respected in law and practice.
The press is independent of the Government.
1022
WESTEPW SAMOA
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the right of peaceful assembly
and the right to form associations. There are no significant
restrictions .
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in the Constitution, along
with freedom of thought and conscience. There is no
government-favored religion. Nearly 100 percent of the
population is Christian. While the Constitution grants each
person the right to change religion or belief and to worship
or teach religion alone or with others, in practice the matai,
the extended family leader, often chooses the religious
denomination of the aiga, the family. There is strong
societal pressure to support church leaders and projects
financially with contributions often totaling more than 30
percent of income. Younger Samoans have begun to resist these
enforced payments.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no controls upon citizens of Western Samoa regarding
internal movement or resettlement. Emigration is actively
supported by the Government as a social "safety valve" which
allows the departure of disenfranchised, frustrated, and
potentially rebellious youths and because it increases foreign
income through remittances. Foreign travel is generally
unrestricted, but there is an exit permit requirement which
can only be denied because of pending court cases or
outstanding debts to the Government. The right to return is
guaranteed. There are no refugees from Western Samoa.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Samoan citizens do not have the right to change the government
through direct, multiparty election with universal adult
suffrage. Power in Western Samoa is vested in the Prime
Minister and the Legislative Assembly. Under the
Constitution, the Assembly is elected every 3 years.
Forty-five of its members are elected by the approximately
20,000 village chiefs (matai), and the other 2 seats are
filled by elections among those citizens who are not Samoan by
heritage. Although there is increasing pressure for popular
elections, this concept is seen by many as conflicting with
"Fa 'a Samoa" (the Samoan way). Political leaders have blocked
calls for a referendum on universal suffrage. Many Samoans
view the existing political structure as democratic, in that
the matai traditionally consult with their extended families
before making decisions such as selecting candidates for the
Assembly. The matai system is conservative but does allow for
change. While Samoans must show respect and obedience to
their matai in family and communal affairs, the matai have
well-defined responsibilities which, if not met, can result in
their removal.
Western Samoa has only rudimentary political parties. The
first one, founded in 1982, was the Human Rights Protection
Party (HRPP); its leader, Tofilau Eti, is currently Prime
1023
WESTERN SAMOA
Minister. Although a second party, the Samoan National
Development Party (SNDP), was formed during 1988, replacing
the previous Christian Democratic Party founded in 1985, the
political process in Western Samoa remains very much a
function of personality rather than party. As a result,
several previous elected governments fell before the end of
their prescribed 3-year terms when supporters defected to the
opposition.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no reports of any international or nongovernmental
investigations of alleged violations of human rights. There
are no official or private human rights organizations in
Western Samoa.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Samoa is a homogeneous society with no significant ethnic
minorities. Samoan politics and culture are the product of a
heritage of chiefly privilege and power, and persons of good
family have some advantages. There is clear discrimination
based on social status and sex, and women traditionally occupy
a subordinate role.
Abuse of women, including wife beating, is believed to be a
problem, but no reliable data about the extent of it is
available. As noted above, traditional punishments sometimes
involve beatings; this is generally directed more at men than
women. While abuse of women is prohibited by law, it does
occur and is often unreported or ignored. Some view wife
beating as a male prerogative. There are many cases of rape
that go unreported. The few convictions generally result in
light punishment.
The Constitution makes special provision to preserve the
political rights of non-Samoans . Persons of mixed ancestry
who are culturally Samoan are fully accepted and can attain
positions of considerable wealth and influence. Thirty
percent of the members of Parliament are of mixed ancestry.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Western Samoan workers have complete and unrestricted rights
to establish and join organizations of their own choosing.
While trade unions have not emerged in the private sector, the
Government does not restrict efforts to develop them. A
public service association representing government workers, an
increasingly important sector of the work force, does exist.
The Supreme Court has upheld the right of government workers
to strike, subject to certain restrictions imposed principally
for reasons of public safety. The Public Service Association
freely maintains relations with international bodies and
participates in bilateral exchanges. Western Samoa does not
belong to the International Labor Organization.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
While workers have the right to engage in collective
bargaining, there is little practice of this right because of
1024
WESTERN SAMOA
the absence of unions in the private sector. However, the
Public Service Association engages in collective bargaining on
behalf of government workers. Arbitration and mediation
procedures are in place to resolve labor disputes, although
these rarely arise. Labor law and practice are uniform
throughout the country, including in the one export processing
zone.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
While the Government does not demand compulsory labor and it
is prohibited by law, in this collective society people are
frequently called upon to work for their villages. Most
people do so willingly, but, if not, they are compelled to do
so by the matai.
d. Minimum Age of Employment of Children
Under the terms of the Labor and Employment Act of 1972 and
Regulations of 1973, it is illegal to employ children under 15
years of age except in "safe and light work." The law does
not apply to service rendered to the matai, some of whom
require children to work at what might be considered child
labor, primarily on village farms.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor and Employment Act of 1972 and Regulations of 1973
established for the private sector a 40-hour workweek and a
minimum wage of $0.35 an hour. This low minimum wage suffices
for a minimum standard of living when supplemented by the
subsistence farming and fishing in which most families
engage. The law also establishes certain rudimentary safety
and health standards. Independent observers report, however,
that the safety laws are not strictly enforced except when
accidents highlight noncompliance. In addition, many
agricultural workers, among others, are inadequately protected
from pesticides and other dangerous conditions because of
limited employer awareness of the hazards. Government
education programs are addressing these concerns. The law
does not apply to service rendered to the matai. Government
employees are covered under different, more stringent
regulations, which are adequately enforced.
1025
EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA
ALBANIA*
Albania, which proclaims itself a People's Socialist Republic,
is a one-party state ruled by a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship.
Ramiz Alia, who came to power in 1985, exercises personal
leadership through the Communist party known as the Albanian
Party of Labor (APL) . Internationally, he has pursued a
policy of cautiously expanding diplomatic, cultural, and
commercial links abroad, especially with Balkan and Western
European states.
A large, effective security service, the Sigurimi, assists the
APL in maintaining repressive controls over the Albanian
people, who are permitted only very limited civil and
political rights.
Albania has a centrally controlled economy under which the
State owns the means of production, and the Government directs
all significant economic activity. Within a strategy of
economic self-reliance, the Government emphasizes a policy of
rapid industrialization and development. In recent years,
however, the rate of economic growth has declined. Refugees
have reported increased shortages of basic foodstuffs.
Information on internal conditions within Albania is limited.
Although the Albanian population continues to be shielded from
foreign influences, the Government now tacitly allows citizens
to receive foreign broadcasts from Italy, Greece, and
Yugoslavia. The Government has liberalized visa issuance for
tourists from most Western countries and allowed a limited
number of its own citizens to visit neighboring countries in
tour groups. In other areas, significant human rights
violations, corroborated by private international
organizations and refugees, continue to occur. The Government
has repeatedly refused to cooperate with any international
organization which investigates human rights complaints. In
1989 the United Nations Human Rights Commission publicly
censured Albania for its human rights record and for its
failure to cooperate with the Commission.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No evidence came to light of political killings by the
authorities during 1989.
b. Disappearance
There is no recent information available on whether
disappearances occur.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The criminal code prohibits and provides punishment for the
use of physical or psychological force during investigations.
*Because the United States has not had diplomatic relations
with Albania since 1939, it is difficult to comment
authoritatively on conditions in Albania.
1026
ALBANIA
Nevertheless, former political prisoners have often
reportedthat they were beaten or otherwise ill-treated during
investigative proceedings to force them to make confessions.
Although some of the worst abuses of the past may have ended,
there continue to be allegations that Albanian investigators
resort to threats and beatings to obtain confessions or
collaboration. In the absence of independent means of
investigation, it is difficult to corroborate such reports.
In the past, private international humanitarian organizations
have reported harsh prison conditions in Albania, including a
severe hard-labor regime with inadequate food and clothing,
long-term solitary confinement, cramped cells without room to
lie down, and unheated, unfurnished cells lacking any sanitary
facilities. The Burrel prison and Spac, Ballsh, and Qafe e
Barit labor camps, in particular, have been noted for their
harsh conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution provides that no one may be arrested without
court or prosecutorial approval or be sentenced to jail
without a court verdict or for an act which is not a crime.
The criminal code, however, is explicitly ideological and
officially characterized as a "weapon in the class struggle."
Its provisions defining political offenses are loosely
formulated, allowing the courts to interpret them broadly to
punish whomever the regime desires.
The criminal code lists 34 crimes, 12 of which are political
offenses, for which the death sentence may be imposed. Among
these capital offenses are such nonviolent political offenses
as: unauthorized departure or "flight" from the State,
agitation and propaganda against the State, creation of a
counterrevolutionary organization or participation therein,
concealment of a person who commits a crime against the State,
activity against the revolutionary movement of the working
class, and refusal to carry out a duty or coercing others to
refuse to do so.
The criminal code also provides that banishment (generally to
a state farm or enterprise) or internment may be imposed
administratively, without trial, for up to 5 years on persons
whom the authorities consider a threat to the Communist system
and on the families of fugitives. In 1988 a new decree (No.
7071) was officially reported concerning "internment and exile
as administrative measures." However, the text of the decree
was not published, and it is not known how this decree differs
from Decree No. 5912 of 1979.
There are numerous reports that families of escapees from
Albania have been imprisoned or interned as a deterrent to
other potential illegal emigrants. Amnesty International (AI)
has reported a number of such cases in recent years, but
another source claimed that close relatives of recent escapees
are no longer interned.
AI reports that political detainees lack adequate legal
safeguards during pretrial investigations. It also notes that
political prisoners awaiting trial are not guaranteed visits
from relatives during the investigation or access to a legal
advisor unless the court "deemed it necessary." By law,
investigations into crimes against the State must be completed
within 3 months, but extensions are easily obtained, and no
effective maximum period of investigation is enforced. Most
1027
ALBANIA
investigations into political offenses are completed within 4
months, but AI has charged that some investigations have
dragged on for more than a year.
Political detainees have been held in solitary confinement for
up to 6 months during pretrial investigations without access
to lawyers or relatives. The criminal code provides that
accused persons must be informed when investigation of their
cases is concluded and allowed to examine all the evidence to
be brought against them. Usually, however, they are not
allowed to examine all the materials and are shown only a copy
of the indictment. While investigators are theoretically
bound by rules of procedure, and the accused may appeal to
higher authority against investigators who violate proper
procedures, these controls do not appear to be effective.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system includes the Supreme Court and regional
and district courts. Like all organs of the Government, the
judicial system is under the total control of the APL. Courts
may not render an independent verdict in conflict with the
wishes or policies of the regime.
AI reports that persons accused of political crimes lack
adequate legal safeguards during their trials. Defendants at
political trials have usually been denied defense counsel and
have had to conduct their own defense. Major important trials
of state officials are closed when it suits the purposes of
the regime, but most political trials of ordinary citizens are
held in open court. Most such trials last no more than 1 day,
and there have been no known acquittals.
The number of persons in prison is unknown; they include 300
members of the pre-World War II elite, as well as pro-Soviet,
pro-Chinese, and other political prisoners. Many persons are
serving sentences for expressing dissatisfaction with
conditions in Albania or for trying to flee the country.
Former political prisoners report about 1,200 political
prisoners each were being held in the Ballsh and Spac labor
camps during the early 1980's. Some 300 more were imprisoned
at Burrel, and others were held in Tarovic, Kosove, and Tirana
prisons .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution proclaims the inviolability of the home and
the privacy of correspondence, but at the same time it
provides that these and other civil rights are subordinate to
the general interest and may not be exercised in opposition to
the Socialist order. Observers generally believe that the
authorities can, and do, violate the privacy of the home when
and as necessary to achieve their ends. The Government uses
its pervasive informer network to report on, among other
things, the private lives of its citizens.
Contact with the outside world is carefully monitored.
Albanian citizens are required to report to the police any
contact with foreigners, but many welcome casual contact with
foreign tourists. Refugees have reported difficulties they
had while in Albania in receiving telephone calls from
relatives living in the United States. Sometimes packages of
1028
ALBANIA
food, medicine, and clothing sent to them were returned by the
Albanian authorities. After 1986 it became significantly-
easier to receive letters and packages from relatives abroad.
Though it is technically illegal to receive television or
radio broadcasts from neighboring Italy, Yugoslavia, and
Greece, the Government tacitly allows its citizens to do so.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution states that citizens enjoy these freedoms but
may not exercise them in opposition to the Socialist order.
Any citizen who publicly criticizes the Government is subject
to swift and severe reprisals under an article of the
Constitution which forbids anti-State agitation and
propaganda. AI states in its 1989 report that the majority of
political prisoners were imprisoned for attempting to exercise
their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of movement.
All news media are government controlled and never criticize
the state and party leadership or their policies. However,
there are indications that media criticism of some aspects of
Albanian society, such as the pervasive problem of corruption,
has increased. As weapons of revolutionary change, art and
literature are subject to rigid state control and censorship.
The authorities also manipulate scholarly inquiry and
publications for political purposes, particularly in such
fields as linguistics, literature, economics, history,
geography, folklore, and ethnology.
Although there are restrictions on contacts with foreigners,
such restrictions have been relaxed lately. Western visitors
report that Albanian citizens are increasingly bold in talking
to Western visitors and tourists. Tirana's participation in
Balkan cooperation should increase Albania's exposure to
external influences.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The security police deal severely with group activities that
do not have government sanction or that appear to be in
opposition to the leadership. There are no independent
associations or organizations.
Western news services reported demonstrations took place in
the northern Albanian city of Shkoder and in some other
locations at the end of December. Some reports say that the
demonstrations were violently repressed by the Government.
Other reports indicate that four young ethnic Greek men,
identified as Costas, George, Takis, and Odysseas Prassos,
were brutally punished by the Albanian authorities. Two
allegedly died after being dragged by tractors through several
villages. Some accounts indicate they were punished to
forestall demonstrations in the area; others say they were
caught attempting to leave the country. The Government has
denied both the reports of demonstrations and of the deaths.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Religious activity in Albania is expressly prohibited by the
Constitution and by government policy. Historically, about 70
1029
ALBANIA
percent of all Albanians were Muslim, nearly 20 percent were
Orthodox, and a little more than 10 percent were Roman
Catholic. Estimates of the number of Jews in Albania range
from 500 to 2,500.
In 1967 the Government proclaimed Albania the first atheist
State in the world, abrogated all laws dealing with church-
state relations, and began actively to eradicate all vestiges
of religion. More than 2,100 mosques, churches, monasteries,
and other institutions were closed, their fixed assets were
seized by the authorities without compensation, and many
religious leaders were persecuted, imprisoned, or even
executed for continuing their religious functions. All
religious literature was banned, as were any personal
manifestations of religious belief or practice. In 1975 a
Legislative Decree stipulated that names for newborns were to
be chosen from a list of "appropriate" names (that is, names
without religious overtones). At the same time, a number of
geographical names with religious significance were changed.
While a few outstanding historic churches and their religous
art are being restored as museums, most churches and mosques
have been converted to other uses.
The regime continues to suppress religious activity by
threatening harsh penalties for believers who practice their
faith and by obliging citizens to inform on believers.
Refugees have said that people who were known to practice
religion in their homes were publicly ridiculed, summoned by
the authorities for interrogation, and threatened. Despite
years of antireligious pressure, it is clear that some
Albanians have continued to practice their faith in their own
homes, particularly in villages and in more remote mountainous
areas. Tourists have reported seeing Muslims praying along
roadsides with apparent impunity. There have been some signs
that the regime, eager to improve its relations with Western
European countries as well as with its Balkan neighbors, is
quietly toning down its antireligious campaign and even
permitting some private expressions of religion. In March the
United Nations Human Rights Commission voted to censure
Albania for its failure to comply with the U.N. Charter's
provisions protecting human rights. The Government responded
that there was genuine freedom of conscience in Albania. It
said that no one can force people to believe in God or to
perform religious rites and that, ultimately, religious belief
was a personal and family matter.
This is the first public statement by the Government which
seems to concede, at least in principle, the right of its
citizens to religious belief. Another positive development
was the official decision in 1988 to permit the visit of an
Orthodox priest and an Islamic imam of Albanian descent to
visit Albania. A Jesuit priest who left Albania in 1940 was
also permitted to visit his family. In 1989 Mother Theresa,
who is of Albanian descent, was permitted to visit Albania.
Although her visit was given prominent coverage in the local
press, she was not identified as a Roman Catholic nun but only
as a "well-known Albanian charity worker."
In 1989 several Roman Catholic priests were reportedly
released from prison. The single surviving Roman Catholic
prelate. Bishop Nikoll Mehill Troshani, who had been
imprisoned during the 1940 's and 1950 's and again arrested in
1974 after holding religious services, was reportedly released
from a forced labor camp in 1988. It was confirmed that
Father Pjeter Mashkalla died in the Ballsh labor camp on
1030
ALBANIA
July 28, 1988. He had been imprisoned from 1946 tc 1971 and
from 1973 to 1983, and was again arrested in 1985 after
celebrating Christmas eve Mass. No new information is
available about the fate of another imprisoned Roman Catholic
priest, Ndoc Luli.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution does not guarantee freedom of movement.
Movement within the country and travel abroad are controlled
very strictly, and transgressors against the laws have been
severely punished in the past. The criminal code states that
flight from the State or refusal to return to the fatherland
by a person sent abroad on service or allowed to leave the
State is considered treason and punishable by imprisonment for
not less than 10 years or by death. AI stated in its 1989
report that many prisoners apparently had been imprisoned for
trying to leave Albania illegally. Until recently, Albanians
were allowed to leave the country legally only on official
business or, very rarely, for family reasons. In 1988
organized groups of Albanian tourists visited Yugoslavia and
Western European countries. Albania has publicly stated that
it wishes to increase the number of its university students on
exchange programs in Western countries. Neither Albanian law
nor practice allows the right to emigrate.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
No such right exists in theory or in practice. The system of
government is a Communist dictatorship, headed by Ramiz Alia
in his capacity as First Secretary of the APL and Chairman of
the Presidium of the People's Assembly. The Constitution
establishes the APL as the sole political entity and Marxism-
Leninism as the only political ideology. The APL is governed
internally by the principle of "democratic centralism," under
which decisionmaking power is concentrated in the hands of a
small elite.
The Constitution provides that the People's Assembly (a
unicameral parliament) is the supreme organ of national
government in Albania; similar bodies, called people's
councils, exist at the local level. Candidates for these
assemblies are first designated by a mass organization known
as the Democratic Front, which is controlled by the APL. They
are then "elected" without opposition by universal suffrage.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government denies violating human rights and refuses to
cooperate with any investigation of allegations to the
contrary, including confidential investigations by the United
Nations Human Rights Commission.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Greeks are the largest ethnic minority, but smaller numbers of
Serbs, Macedonians, Vlachs, Gypsies, and Jews also live in
Albania. Estimates of the size of the Greek population vary
from 40,000 (from an official Albanian census) to as high as
400,000 (from groups promoting the interests of ethnic Greeks
1031
ALBANIA
in Albania) . Neutral organizations have estimated that the
ethnic Greek population is 50,000.
The Constitution grants national minorities "guaranteed
protection and development of their culture and popular
traditions, the use of their mother tongue, and its teaching
in the schools, and equal development in all fields of social
life." While there are differences of opinion over the extent
to which minorities may exercise their cultural, educational,
and linguistic rights, they are clearly restricted. While
Greeks and Macedonians may be educated in their mother tongues
through the primary level, there are no radio or television
programs in these languages. A Greek-language newspaper,
Laiko Vima, is published in the southern town of
Argyrokastro . Cross-border ties between Albania and Greece
increased significantly after the November 1987 visit to
Albania of the Greek Foreign Minister, and relatives and
friends of the Greek minority in Albania are being permitted
to send remittances to Albania.
Several reports indicate persecution, harassment, and
discrimination against minorities solely because of their
ethnic status. There have even been reports of mass removals
of segments of the Greek population out of traditionally Greek
lands in the south to areas more distant from the
Albanian-Greek border. Furthermore, insofar as the ban on
religious practice has removed the Greek Orthodox church from
Greek communities in Albania, an important part of that ethnic
group's community life and links to Greece has been
eliminated. The leadership of both the APL and the Government
are overwhelmingly ethnic Albanians of Muslim background. The
Chairman of the People's Assembly, a Greek woman, is one
notable exception, however.
Scholars of the Albanian language have noted that northern
Albanians, who historically spoke the Gheg dialect of their
language, have been educationally disadvantaged by the
adoption of "unified literary Albanian," basically a version
of the Tosk dialect, spoken in southern Albania. Most members
of the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor are Tosk
speakers .
The Constitution states that women shall enjoy "equal rights
with men in work, pay, holidays, social security, education,
in all social-political activity, as well as in the family."
Information on the extent to which these rights are exercised
is not available, but the regime appears to have advanced the
status of women. Women are said to participate equally in
obligatory labor and military service programs. No
information is available on the extent to which violence
against women is practiced or what, if anything, the regime
has done on the issue.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers do not have the right to associate freely and to
strike. Nearly all Albanians belong to trade unions that are
part of the United Trade Unions of Albania (UTUA), an arm of
the APL. These unions have no significant independent voice
in the field of labor relations, but they play a key role in
indoctrinating and propagandizing the workers, in maintaining
labor discipline, and in organizing the periods of so-called
voluntary manual labor in which all Albanians are expected to
1032
ALBANIA
take part. There is a seat reserved for the UTUA as an
affiliate of the Communist-controlled World Federation of
Trade Unions, but the Albanians have not participated in this
Soviet labor front organization since the mid-1960's. Albania
withdrew from the International Labor Organization in 1967.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers do not have the right to organize freely and to
bargain collectively. There are no special economic zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Little information on forced labor is available. It is
believed that one form of punishment is internal banishment to
a labor camp. The prisoners do not have a choice of work but
are paid for their labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
According to the Labor Code of 1980, amended in 1981, the
minimum age for employment of children is 15. Those under 16
years of age may not work more than 6 hours per day.
Information on enforcement of this law is unavailable.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
According to the Labor Code, the workweek is 48 hours.
Pregnant women, children under 16 years of age, and persons
with a doctor's certificate may not work between 10 p.m. and 6
a.m. Women, young persons under 18 years of age, and those
with a doctor's certificate are prohibited from working
underground. Workers in arduous and dangerous jobs are
provided appropriate protective clothing and special food
rations. The Labor Code contains regulations pertaining to
occupational health and safety, but there is no available
information on the effectiveness of enforcement. Minimum wage
information is not available.
1033
AUSTRIA
Austria is a constitutional, parliamentary democracy. The
coalition government (Socialist Party and People's Party),
formed after the November 1986 national election, continued in
office in 1989. The loosely united Green Party and the
liberal/nationalist Freedom Party constituted the opposition.
The police and security organs are effectively subordinated to
the executive and judicial authorities.
Austria has a developed economy, and Austrians enjoy a high
standard of living.
Since World War II, Austria has served as a country of first
asylum for approximately 2 million refugees from Eastern
Europe. Austria continued in this role during 1989.
Human rights are highly respected in Austria, and individual
rights and political freedoms are constitutionally guaranteed.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of politically motivated killings either
by government authorities or opposition groups. On July 13,
three Iranian Kurdish activists were murdered in Vienna,
almost certainly by non-Austrians .
b. Disappearance
There were no political abductions.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is banned by Article II of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which
is incorporated into the Austrian Constitution, and is not
practiced.
In 1989 a leading Green parliamentarian called for reform of
the procedures used in handling citizen complaints against the
police. He cited government records showing that during the
years 1986-88 there had been 844 citizen complaints alleging
unnecessary use of force by police. Judgments against the
police were forthcoming in only six cases.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary detention or exile. In
criminal cases the law provides for investigative or pretrial
detention for up to 48 hours, by which time an investigative
judge must decide on the legality of extending the period of
detention. Provided the investigative judge agrees, the
accused may be held pending completion of an investigation for
a maximum of 2 years. Grounds for investigative detention are
enumerated in the law, as are conditions for release on bail.
Domestic critics of the use made of pretrial detention
continue to point to a study which showed that of those so
detained in Vienna, for example, only 57 percent were
eventually found guilty of crimes justifying prison
1034
AUSTRIA
sentences. In recent years, the number of those in
investigative detention and in jail serving prison sentences
declined. On September 1, the total number of those in
custody was 5,771, of whom 1,646 were in investigative
detention. During 1989 work continued on a comprehensive
reform of the law on detention for infractions of
administrative law.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is independent of the executive and legislative
branches of government. Trials are public. Judges are
appointed for life and may not, in principle, be removed from
office. Jury trials are prescribed for major offenses, and
those convicted have the right of appeal. Written charges
must be presented to the accused, who has the right to be
represented by a lawyer.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The law provides for the protection of personal data
collected, processed, or transmitted by government agencies,
public institutions, and private entities. Constitutional
provisions also protect the secrecy of the mail and telephone.
The privacy of family life is respected. There is no effort
by the Government to monitor or control family life.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These freedoms are guaranteed by the Constitution and
respected in practice. Austria has a free, independent, and
multifaceted press, ranging from conservative to Communist.
Publications may be removed from circulation if tney violate
legal provisions concerning morality or public security. As a
matter of practice, such cases are extremely rare. Opposition
viewpoints are given wide attention in Austrian publications.
Freedom of academic expression is respected. Austria's
well-established democratic political system, its active and
independent press, and its effective judiciary combine to
assure continued freedom of speech and press.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
association. Public demonstrations require a permit from the
police authorities, who may consider only the public safety
aspect of the proposed demonstration and not its political
purpose. Permits are routinely issued.
The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 makes an exception to
freedom of association in the case of Nazi organizations and
activities. The Constitutional Law of 1945, as amended in
1947, also prohibits Nazi organizations and activities. The
law on the formation of associations stipulates that
permission to form an association may be denied if it is
apparent that the organization will pursue the illegal
activities of a prohibited organization.
1035
AUSTRIA
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
This right is provided for in the Constitution, although the
Treaty of St. Germain, which also is a constitutional
provision, restricts this freedom to the practice of religions
which are compatible with public safety and morality. In
order to qualify as a recognized religious organization under
Austrian law, a religious group must register with the
Government. Although 88 percent of the population is Roman
Catholic, most of the world's major religions are represented.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions concerning freedom of movement
within the country or the right to change residence or
workplace. Austrian residents are free to travel abroad and
to emigrate. Citizens who have left the country have the
right to return.
Austria serves as a country of first asylum for refugees from
Eastern Europe and as a transit point for Soviet Jewish
emigrants on their way to Israel or other countries. A mass
exodus of East Germans from Hungary through Austria on their
way to the Federal Republic of Germany began on September 1
with the permission of Hungarian authorities. In 1989 more
than 50,000 East Germans transited Austria.
During 1989 the Interior Ministry reported that approximately
21,800 persons applied for asylum in Austria. At year's end,
18,252 asylum applicants were being cared for by Austrian
authorities .
Austrian authorities have been using an accelerated procedure
for distinguishing between genuine political asylum seekers
and "economically motivated" immigrants. Those arriving from
Poland and Hungary are informed that they have very little
chance of receiving asylum. In August 1988, 25 percent of
applicants were granted asylum. This decreased to 15 percent
in July 1989 and to 5 percent in August. Those denied Austrian
asylum under this procedure generally have been allowed to
remain in Austria but without any official financial support.
Austria's legal guest worker population stood at 174,266 in
November, not including resident dependents.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Austria is governed through a democratic parliamentary
system. Under the Constitution, national elections must be
held at least every 4 years. Elections are free and regularly
draw high levels of participation. There is universal
suffrage for those over 19 years of age. The most recent
national elections (1986) resulted in a change of government.
No party won an absolute majority. The Socialist Party, which
won 80 seats in Parliament, went into a coalition with the
People's Party, which won 77 seats. As for the two other
parties represented in Parliament, the liberal/nationalist
Freedom Party won 18 seats, and the Greens won 8. Several
small parties participated in the elections, including the
Communist Party, which did not receive sufficient support to
elect candidates to the Parliament.
1036
hUSIRlh
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Allegations of improper activities on the part of the
authorities are discussed and investigated by the press,
public groups, and private persons without government
hindrance. Both international and local human rights groups
operate freely.
Austria recognizes the competence of the European Commission
of Human Rights in Strasbourg for implementing the European
Human Rights Convention. Austria concerns itself extensively
with international human rights matters, especially the human
rights situation in Eastern Europe.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Austria has an extensive public welfare system, the benefits
of which are available to all citizens on a nondiscriminatory
basis. In employment and in other areas, there is extensive
legal protection against discrimination because of race, sex,
religion, language, or social status. In practice, there is
no pattern of such discrimination.
The commemorative events and media analyses associated with
the 50th anniversaries of the annexation of Austria by Germany
in March 1938, the Kristallnacht pogrom in November 1938, and
the outbreak of World War II in September 1939 included many
examinations of anti-Semitism in Austrian history and
contemporary Austria. The public discourse on the issue
during this period was unprecedented in the postwar era.
Opinion surveys indicate the continued existence of
anti-Semitic sentiments among some Austrians. The Government
has condemned this phenomenon in very strong terms and has
recommitted the country to combating all its manifestations.
Legal restrictions on women's rights have long been
abolished. Women are entering the work force in increasing
numbers and have made substantial progress toward economic
equality in the postwar era. Nevertheless, in practice
inequality still exists in political, economic, and social
fields, despite legislation enacted in 1977 and 1979 to reform
family law.
The issue of violence against women was addressed by the
Government in 1989 as the coalition parties reached general
agreement on several legal reforms. These would make spousal
rape criminal and provide an expedited procedure for barring
husbands from their homes when they had threatened their wives
with violence. The latter procedure would be available even
in the absence of a divorce action, a significant change in
existing law.
The human rights of Austrian minorities are fully respected.
However, in 1989 the Slovenian-speaking minority in the
province of Carinthia remained concerned about the future of
instruction in the Slovenian language in local elementary
schools. The Slovenes feared that changes in the province's
bilingual education system, advocated by some German-speaking
groups, might curtail the use of Slovenian in many provincial
elementary schools. A 1988 compromise plan to retain
Slovenian/German bilingual education in a majority of
1037
AUSTRIA
instances has yet to take concrete form. In 1989 Slovene
access to the government-owned television broadcasts
increased. The Government also pledged to construct a new
secondary school for the Slovene community. Slovene leaders
ended their 10-year boycott of participation in a federal
advisory committee on Slovene issues.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to associate freely and to strike.
Their right to join trade unions and to engage in activities
in pursuit of trade union aims is protected under general
constitutional guarantees of freedom of association. In
practice, Austrian trade unions have an important and
independent voice in the political, social, and economic life
of the country.
More than 60 percent of the work force is organized in 15
national unions, each of which is a member of the Austrian
Trade Union Federation (ATUF) . This organization has a
strong, centralized leadership structure. Individual unions
and the federation are independent of government or political
party control, although there are formal factions within these
organizations that are closely allied with political parties.
Strikes in the postwar period have been comparatively few and
usually of short duration. High on the list of reasons for
Austria's record of labor peace is the system of "social
partnership" — Austria's nearly unique unofficial forum for
cooperation among labor, management, and government. At the
center of the system is a parity commission for wages and
prices, chaired normally by the Federal Chancellor, which has
an important voice on major economic questions.
The ATUF is a member of the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions and the European Trade Union Confederation.
However, the ATUF ' s Christian faction is also affiliated to
the World Confederation of Labor, while the left-wing faction
is affiliated to the Communist-controlled World Federation of
Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions have the right to organize and bargain collectively.
The labor movement enjoys widespread acceptance and almost all
large companies, private and state owned, are strong and well
organized. Workers councils representing all of the workers
in a unit operate at the enterprise level, and workers are
entitled by law to elect one-third of the members of the
boards of major companies. Collective agreements are
negotiated by the ATUF on behalf of its member unions with the
National Chamber of Economics and its associations
representing the employers within a framework of wage-price
policy guidelines set by the Joint Parity Commission. A 1973
law imposes on employers the obligation to prove that job
dismissals are not motivated by antiunion discrimination. In
1989 the International Labor Organization's Committee of
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
asked the Government to apply these protections also to
enterprises with fewer than five employees.
Workers are further protected by membership in the Austrian
Chambers of Labor--compulsory for all employees except civil
1038
AUSTRIA
servants. These chambers fulfill several functions that are
handled by trade unions in other countries, such as carrying
out studies and preparing legislative proposals, but the ATUF
is exclusively responsible for collective bargaining. The
leaderships of both the chambers and the ATUF are elected
democratically.
Austria has no export processing zones. Labor law and
practice are uniform throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced labor in Austria. It is prohibited by law.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum legal working age is 15. The law is effectively
enforced.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no national minimum wage in Austria, but a worker
whose annual income falls below a poverty line (approximately
$381 per family member per month at the current exchange rate)
is eligible to receive social welfare benefits. In addition,
nationwide collective bargaining agreements set minimum wage
rates by job classification for each industry. The average
Austrian has a high standard of living by any international
comparison, and most of the least well-paid workers still
enjoy a decent minimum standard.
Although the legal workweek has been established at 40 hours
since 1975, more than 50 percent of the labor force enjoys
collective bargaining agreements setting a maximum workweek at
38 or 38.5 hours.
Legislation under which a labor inspectorate attached to the
Ministry of Social Affairs conducts inspections of
occupational health and safety conditions ensures the
effective protection of workers in these areas.
1039
BELGIUM
Belgium is a longstanding parliamentary democracy under a
constitutional monarch. The constitutional role of King
Baudouin I is largely ceremonial. The Council of Ministers
(the Cabinet), led by the Prime Minister, is responsible for
government decisions. The Cabinet holds office as long as it
retains the confidence of the democratically elected bicameral
Parliament .
National, municipal, and judicial police forces bear the
primary responsibility for domestic security in Belgium. The
armed forces play no role in domestic law enforcement.
Belgium is a highly industrialized state with a mixed,
free-market economy. A vigorous private sector, government
participation in certain industries, and an extensive social
welfare system combine to support a relatively high standard
of living for most Belgians.
Respect for human rights is provided for in the Constitution
and laws and observed in practice. The Government is
sensitive to allegations of human rights violations and in
1989 took steps to adjust national policies criticized by the
European Court of Human Rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
Abductions, secret arrests, and clandestine detentions did not
occur .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Government does not practice or condone torture or inhuman
treatment .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment is provided for
by law. Arrested persons must be brought before a judge
within 24 hours. Thereafter, pretrial confinement is allowed
only under certain legally specified circumstances. The
premise for such confinement is subject to monthly review by a
panel of judges.
Bail exists in principle under Belgian law but is rarely
granted in practice. There is no limit on the length of time
an accused may be held prior to coming to trial. In 1988 the
European Court of Human Rights criticized Belgium for placing
juveniles in prisons until accommodations could be found in
special juvenile correction institutions. Since that time,
several legislative amendments have been proposed in the
Parliament to put an end to this practice. Exile of Belgian
citizens is not permitted by law.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
1040
BELGIUM
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
A fair public trial, including the right to counsel, is
assured by law and honored in practice. A suspect is charged,
if the evidence so warrants, once a preliminary judicial
investigatory phase is completed. Charges are clearly and
formally stated, and defendants enjoy the right of appeal.
Imprisonment for political beliefs is prohibited.
In March the European Court of Human Rights citicized Belgium
for withholding evidence from defense attorneys for as long as
1 month after detainees had been arrested. In response, the
Ministry of Justice has proposed legislation which would bring
Belgian law in this area into compliance with the European
Convention on Human Rights.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy by the State
is guaranteed by law and respected in practice. Search
warrants issued by a judge are required unless the residents
of a domicile agree to a search. Monitoring of telephones and
interference with mail are strictly prohibited.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These freedoms are assured by law and respected in practice.
Varying political, religious, philosophical, and artistic
views are permitted free public expression, subject only to
slander and libel laws. There is no political censorship of
the media. Statutes protect citizens' rights to reply to
media criticism. Publications and productions held to
undermine "public order" (e.g., explicit pornography and
incitement to violence) are prohibited, however, and civil
servants are restricted from criticizing government policy.
Academic freedom is respected.
The Government operates several radio and television networks
but does not control program content. Programs are supervised
by boards of directors which represent the main political,
linguistic, and opinion groups. A government representative
sits on each board but has no veto power. Private radio and
television stations operate with government licenses. Most
urban homes have access by cable to television from other
European countries.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Public assembly is subject to regulations concerning public
order, but is otherwise unrestricted. Groups protesting
government policies or actions are free from harassment and
persecution. Permits are required for open-air assemblies,
but are granted routinely. Belgians are free to form
organizations and to establish ties to international bodies.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Belgium has a long tradition of religious tolerance. The
Christian, Jewish, and Muslim religions are accorded a
1041
BELGIUM
"recognized" status in law, and granted a government subsidy.
Minority "nonrecognized" religions enjoy full freedom to
practice and are not subject to harassment or persecution.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Belgians are completely free to travel both within Belgium and
internationally, and may return to Belgium at any time.
Citizens are free to choose their places of work and
residence. The Government does not force refugees to return
to countries where they face persecution.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Participation in the political system is open to all adult
citizens. Direct popular elections for parliamentary seats
(excluding 76 of the 182 Senate seats apportioned by other
means) are held at least every 4 years under a system of
universal, secret, and compulsory suffrage for all adults (age
18 and over) . Unweighted voting (one person/one vote) has
been in effect since 1919 for men, and since 1949 for women.
Under law and practice, opposition parties are free to operate
without constraints or repression. Seventeen political
parties, representing the full range of the political
spectrum, competed in the last general elections in December
1987.
The existence of Dutch- and French-speaking regions poses
significant problems for the State. All major institutions,
including political parties, are divided along linguistic
lines. There are special provisions for Dutch-, French-, and
German-speaking councils at the regional level. Regional and
linguistic needs are taken into account in national political
and economic decisions.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
No requests have been made for outside investigation of the
human rights situation in Belgium. Several active independent
human rights groups exist. All consider the Government open
to discussion of any human rights question. The Ministry of
Justice and other governmental agencies are sensitive to
allegations of human rights abuses and take steps to correct
perceived shortcomings in national legislation. The
Government is a party to various international human rights
treaties and has been active in the United Nations and other
international forums in promoting human rights. It has also
promoted independent investigation of alleged human rights
violations .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Religion, Sex,
Language, or Social Status
Belgium is a culturally vibrant, pluralistic society in which
individual differences in general are respected, and
linguistic rights in particular are protected. Some 57
percent of Belgians are native Dutch speakers living primarily
in the northern provinces that constitute Flanders. The 42
percent of the population who are French speakers live mostly
in the capital, Brussels, and the southern provinces called
Wallonia. A small minority of German speakers lives along the
1042
eastern border. Language differences have been the subject of
hundreds of laws over the last century, leading to a fairly
rigid structure designed to protect each language group from
cultural, economic, or political dominance by the others.
Food, shelter, health care, and education are available to all
residents regardless of race, sex, religion, language, social
status, or ethnic background. Some 27 percent of the
residents of Brussels, the nation's largest city, are
foreigners. Many of these are north African and Turkish
immigrants. Encouraging the further assimilation of the
immigrant population--generally poorer, less skilled, and less
educated than average--is increasingly the focus of public
debate .
Belgium is a leading advocate of women's rights both within
the country and in international meetings on the subject. A
number of commissions have been established to ensure that
women's rights are protected and to oversee women's education
and working conditions. To show the importance attached by
the Government to promoting women's rights internationally, a
Consultative Commission for the Condition of Women was
established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Physical abuse of women is punishable by law both in theory
and in practice. Until recently, however, little factual
evidence was available concerning the extent of abuse.
According to a 1988 government study, 25 percent of Belgian
women had encountered some form of physical abuse, while 13
percent had suffered "moderately serious" physical abuse, and
3 percent "very serious" abuse. In reaction to the study, the
Government improved coordination among the various
institutions involved in combating the abuse of women,
provided better training to police on domestic and sexual
violence, and organized an extensive publicity campaign
designed to raise national awareness about the abuse of women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to associate freely and to strike.
With 75 percent of its labor force organized, Belgium is one
of the most unionized countries in the world and has a long
tradition of democratic trade union elections. Labor unions
striking or protesting government policies or actions are free
from harassment and persecution.
Labor unions are strong and independent of the Government but
have important informal links with and influence on many of
the major political parties. Unions in Belgium are affiliated
with the major international bodies representing labor, such
as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and
the World Confederation of Labor.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is recognized
and exercised freely. The right to due process and judicial
review are guaranteed for all protected activity. In the
first instance, the Labor Court reviews matters relating to
collective bargaining. Parties then have the right of
judicial review by the regular courts. Effective mechanisms
exist for adjudicating disputes between labor and management.
1043
BELGIUM
There are no export processing zones, and labor legislation
and practice are uniform throughout Belgium.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law and does not
occur in Belgium.
d. Minimum age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment of children is 16, and it is
observed in practice.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Belgian working hours, mandated by law and through collective
bargaining agreements, are among the shortest in Europe,
averaging about 38 hours a week. There are provisions for a
minimum wage, currently $880 per month for full-time workers
over age 21. This provides an adequate minimum standard of
living. Workers typically receive at least 4 weeks of
vacation and a bonus equal to 1 month's wages each year.
Unemployment benefits are also guaranteed. Government
policies to promote employment and an extensive system of
unemployment compensation and other social benefits have
served to minimize serious individual financial hardship.
Health and safety legislation exists, supplemented by
collective bargaining agreements. Health and safety
committees are mandated by law in companies with more than 50
employees. The Labor Court monitors compliance with national
laws and standards.
1044
BULGARIA
After 35 years as leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party
(BCP) , Todor Zhivkov, who was also Chief of State, was ousted
on November 10 by a group of Politburo colleagues headed by
Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov. Under the new leadership of
Mladenov, the BCP renounced its leading role in the State
guaranteed by the Constitution and opened the door to
political pluralism and democratic elections. The Government,
with Prime Minister Georgi Atanasov still in charge, agreed to
hold talks with the opposition on the country's future.
While the Ministry of the Interior maintained strict domestic
control through the militia, state security officers, internal
security troops, border guards, special purpose forces, and
informants, one of the new leadership's first acts was to
disband the Ministry's department which monitored the
political activities of citizens. It is not yet clear,
however, whether its functions have actually been abolished or
merely transferred to other institutions.
Mladenov and his colleagues have espoused economic
restructuring and have pledged that the country will adopt a
free market economy. At year's end, however, they continued
to rely on a centrally planned economy in which almost all
production and commercial facilities are state owned. State
controls continue to hamper the limited sector of small-scale
private agricultural plots and small businesses.
Under Zhivkov 's rule, the human rights situation continued to
be characterized by harsh repression. The exercise of such
basic human rights as freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and
religion in a manner the Communist Party deemed unacceptable
was prohibited and punished. The authorities pursued their
forcible assimilation campaign directed at the ethnic Turkish
minority (about 10 percent of the population), which began in
1984. Hunger strikes and demonstrations by ethnic Turks in
dozens of communities in May and again by Pomaks (Bulgarian
Muslims) in September led to clashes with security forces and
resulted in a number of deaths. The regime used a new
passport law adopted in May 1989 to expel several thousands of
ethnic Turkish activists. Other ethnic Turks began to stream
across the border in an exodus which reached 310,000 by
mid-August, when the Turkish Government reinstituted a strict
visa regime. Meanwhile, Bulgarian dissidents and Pomaks were
usually denied the right to travel.
After November 10, the new leadership took tentative steps to
redress many human rights abuses. Bulgarians began to enjoy
the freedoms of speech, assembly, and association. Many
dissidents received passports and permission to travel
abroad. In a major decision, the Government on December 29
condemned the forced assimilation policy and pledged to take
measures to guarantee the freedom of citizens to follow their
religious and traditional customs and to reassume their Muslim
names, forcibly changed at the beginning of the assimilation
campaign. If implemented fully, this decision should
effectively end the assimilation policies directed against
ethnic Turks and Pomaks.
In addition, the National Assembly amended the penal code,
deleting many political offenses and amnestying those
convicted of those offenses. It also promised liberal laws on
assembly and association. The media, although still
controlled by the Government, began to report objectively on
opposition views.
1045
BULGARIA
The following report primarily describes the human rights
situation as it existed before the ouster of Zhivkov on
November 10. Some of the institutions and practices that led
to widespread human rights abuses apparently were being
changed at year's end, and the next annual report is likely to
include a significantly different assessment of human rights
practices .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from: ,.'.
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing '
There were no reports of politically motivated killings, but a
number of peaceful demonstrators were killed by internal
security troops in May and September (see Section l.g.)-
There were reports of prison deaths caused by torture and
beatings .
b. Disappearance
Despite reports that many people were missing for periods of a
month or more following May and July demonstrations by ethnic
Turks and Pomaks, there were no known permanent disappearances
at the hands of security forces.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishtnent
Although torture does not appear to be practiced
systematically in Bulgaria, many ethnic Turks who fled to
Turkey recounted tales of beatings and torture during the May
1989 demonstrations. Most people reported beatings by members
of the police and security forces who used their fists and
chairs and kicked people, causing broken ribs and other
injuries. Beatings with a wooden truncheon covered with
rubber were reportedly frequent both in Razvigor, a pretrial
detention center in Sofia run by the state security service,
and regular prisons. Prisoners were thereafter immersed in a
trough of cold water to minimize marks from the beatings.
Some persons recounted tales of drugs in their food,
psychological torture, electric shocks, cigarette burns, and
attacks by dogs. Some state they were beaten repeatedly; a
few reportedly died from their beatings.
Since 1977, prisons have been under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. Conditions are Spartan. During
Zhivkov's regime, political prisoners in many cases were
quartered with common criminals, at whose hands they suffered
abuse. Other reports indicated that guards routinely beat
prisoners or arbitrarily punished them with solitary
confinement. Nikola Chamurliski, who was sentenced to 20
years in 1974 for "economic espionage," reportedly refused to
work and thus suffered regular beatings and received little
food; he is said to be extremely ill in Pleven prison. One
ethnic Turk recounted spending 3 months at Belene prison in
1984 in cells with no heat at temperatures of -30 degrees C.
Prisoners were allowed little daily exercise; family visits
were infrequent and depended on the "strictness" of the prison
regime to which the prisoner had been sentenced. In Razvigor
detention center, cells are reportedly 2.5 by 1.5 meters,
without any windows. Lights are kept burning continuously.
People are held individually and are not permitted to speak to
1046
or even see other detainees. Toilet facilities consist of a
bucket in the corner; bathing is permitted once a week, and
detainees are shaved by a guard twice a week.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Although Bulgarian law provides for a judicial determination
of the legality of a person's detention, the judiciary under
Zhivkov was not independent of executive power and was unable
to provide any effective check on executive actions. Persons
were detained arbitrarily, without public notice, although the
public prosecutor had to be informed within 24 hours of such
detention. Human rights activists Dr. Konstantin Trenchev,
Anton Zapryanov, Todor Gagalov, Nikolai Kolev, Khristofor
Subev, and Anton Nikolov were detained in May; their friends
and families learned of their whereabouts only after several
days, when they inquired of the authorities. Newly appointed
leader Mladenov promised a "rule of law" but at year's end
extensive reform of the legal system had not yet been
announced.
Preliminary detention is limited theoretically to 10 days.
Under Zhivkov's rule, the preliminary investigation could take
2 months, during which time detainees could be held in custody
if "major state interests impose it." Bulgarian law permits
detention for up to 6 months following arraignment and prior
to an indictment. Dr. Trenchev and other activists were
detained incommunicado and without charges for more than 3
months. They were allowed access to a lawyer only after 2
months, when the preliminary investigation had been completed.
They were ultimately released on bail of about $105 each,
under obligation to appear at a hearing when called. Under
the criminal code, the accused must be informed of the charges
against him, but this requirement was not always observed.
During Zhivkov's rule, persons could also be subjected to a
system of administrative control short of imprisonment,
whereby they were detained at their place of residence and
required to appear frequently at the local police station.
Under the law, the militia is authorizes to place under
administrative control or house arrest not only those who have
engaged in criminal activities, but also those who have
protested "against organs of power" or shown "antisocial
manifestations." Poet Petur Manolov, then secretary of the
Independent Society for the Protection of Human Rights in
Bulgaria, was confined to Plovdiv in early 1989 on these
grounds.
Another form of punishment and control is compulsory domicile
or internal exile. During Zhivkov's rule, this was a
frequently used tool to isolate political activists from their
friends and prevent their being in touch with Western media or
foreign embassy representatives. If such persons left despite
these prohibitions, they faced possible imprisonment. Ethnic
Turk Dzhemil Mekhmedov, arrested in 1985 after protesting the
then compulsory name-change campaign, was taken from his
family and home village of Ezerovo and placed under compulsory
domicile in ethnically Bulgarian villages in the northeast.
In June he was allowed to leave for Turkey with his family.
Activist Nikolai Ganchev Kolev, accused of not performing
"socially useful labor," was detained in March, appeared
before a local magistrate, and was sent, without any trial or
access to a lawyer, to Bobov Dol for compulsory domicile and
labor for a year and a half. Kolev was allowed to return to
1047
BULGARIA
Stara Zagora in April following hunger strikes in his defense
and was detained again in May.
Exile or expulsion was utilized as a means of political
control from late 1988 until Zhivkov's ouster. Independent
Society member Eduard Genov and his family were the first to
be expelled in October 1988. Ekaterina Markova and Kristo
Svatovski followed him in November, along with Grigor Simov
Bozhilov who was turned back at the Austrian border. Tseko
Tsekov left Bulgaria in December. Dimitur and Diana
Boyadzhiev, of the independent trade union "Podkrepa"
(Support), reached Vienna in March 1989, as did Orthodox
priest Blagoy Topuzliev. Rumen Tsankov Dimitrov of the "Green
Mass" left Bulgaria in April; the group's chairman, Stefan
Cholakov, left in May. Petur Manolov, despite his strong
desire to remain in Bulgaria, was expelled in May following
months of sustained, intensive pressure and harassment,
including threatening telephone calls, physical intimidation,
isolation, and other forms of abuse. Independent Society
activist Vladimir Krustev was expelled in August.
It is not possible to estimate reliably the number of persons
subject to arbitrary arrests, other forms of detention, or
summary exile up to November 10, 1989. The exact number of
Turkish detainees who may still be incarcerated or in internal
exile as a result of the 1984-1985 name-change campaign is
unknown, although some were expelled and/or allowed to leave
the country between June and August 1989, and others were
released from prison after the change of leadership in
November and the subsequent amnesties.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Bulgarian law and general practice provide for public trial in
criminal cases. Defendants are entitled to legal counsel, but
only after the preliminary investigation and indictment.
During Zhivkov's regime, when defense attorneys were provided,
they often cooperated with the prosecution. As a result, one
human rights activist in 1989 refused to retain an attorney
and chose to defend himself. Lawyer Angel SokolRrsky, who had
been disbarred for his overly energetic defense of a client
prosecuted for political reasons in 1987, was reportedly
reinstated in April 1989. Some defense attorneys enjoy
reputations for courage and honesty, despite pressures by the
security apparatus.
Special court procedures apply in cases involving state
security. Article 262 of the penal procedural code declares
that a closed trial may be held when necessary "for the
preservation of a state secret or of socialist morality."
There is also a system of military courts and a military
division of the Supreme Court, in which crimes committed by
military personnel and employees of the Ministry of Internal
Affair^ are tried.
During Zhivkov's regime, the judicial system generally sought
to appear to be observing legal norms, but the courts
sometimes applied statutes retroactively or extended them to
cases of dubious applicability. The penal laws were codified
and published, but their circulation was severely
circumscribed. Many Bulgarians are unaware of the provisions
of their Constitution, which was among the documents
confiscated from Petur Manolov in January and dissident priest
24-900 O— 90 34
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BULGARIA
Blagoy Topuzliev when he left Bulgaria in March. There are
also separate and sometimes unpublished laws affecting, for
example, the military, the people's militia, religious sects,
and telephone communications. In addition, there are-
extensive ministry regulations and generally "understood"
administrative measures that remain unpublished. Under
Zhivkov, such regulations were frequently invoked in judicial
proceedings, and the defendant had little opportunity to
question their validity or applicability. Defendants have the
right to produce "proofs," as well as the right to appeal a
sentence, within 7 days. Of the 21,956 persons sentenced in
1988, however, only 301 were subsequently acquitted.
Political prisoners in Bulgaria include those captured while
trying to escape across the borders and ethnic Turks detained
for opposition to the name-change campaign begun in 1984. The
number of such detainees is unknown. Credible reports,
including those documented by Amnesty International (AI) and
Helsinki Watch, indicate that many ethnic Turks remained in
prison or exile during 1989. Bulgarian human rights activists
noted that there were approximately 250 political prisoners in
1989 prior to Zhivkov's overthrow. The amnesties announced in
November and December 1989 are believed to have led to the
release of many, perhaps most, of these prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Before November, the authorities interfered in the private
lives of citizens in many ways. In November, however, the
Government announced that the arm of the internal security
forces which monitored the "ideological" activities of
citizens had been abolished. No announcement has yet been
made about the other functions of the security forces, which
have directed an elaborate system of informers in virtually
all workplaces, residential areas, and social organizations to
monitor the daily lives of Bulgarians for signs of dissent.
The Constitution charges parents with the "obligation" of
attending to their children's Communist education, which was
also considered the purview of the State alone. In Kurdzhali
in 1988, Turkish children aged 3 to 6 were reportedly required
to live in nursery schools during the week and go home only on
weekends as part of an official effort to "Bulgarianize"
them. The Islamic rite of male circumcision was effectively
banned during most of 1989, although the announced end to the
campaign to assimilate the Turkish minority should lead to the
lifting of that ban. Citizens who did not become members of
Communist-dominated mass organizations were denied advancement
at work and other benefits.
The monitoring of private telephone conversations and/or
correspondence was also common. When one dissident protested
to state authorities about the monitoring and cutting off of
his telephone conversations, he was told in a letter of reply
that his line was "in order" and his complaints were "illegal
and unfounded," and he was warned that such violations of the
law would be punished. Four of the five human rights
activists invited to the Paris Conference on the Human
Dimension in May did not receive their invitations because of
Bulgarian postal interference.
Sanctity of the home is nominally safeguarded by law, and
police may not legally search property without prior
permission from a court or prosecutor. However, searches may
1049
BULGARIA
be undertaken in situations the police deem urgent before
judicidl permission is given. Dissident Petur Manolov's home
was searched in January 1989, no warrant was presented, and
many documents, including his personal telephone directory and
a Bulgarian translation of the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, were confiscated. Following a lengthy hunger
strike and resultant international publicity, all of his
documents were returned. The homes of Dr. Konstantin Trenchev
and his parents were searched on May 27, and he was given a
lengthy itemized receipt for the documents that were taken.
To date none of Dr. Trenchev ' s papers have been released by
the authorities.
Bulgaria ceased jamming Radio Free Europe broadcasts in
December 1988. The British Broadcasting Corporation's World
Service, Deutsche Welle, and Voice of America broadcasts are
also heard without interference. The availability of Western
publications remains tightly controlled; only Western
Communist party newspapers, such as L'Unita and the Morning
Star, are regularly sold at newsstands.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Numerous reports indicated that Bulgarian security forces
utilized excessive force in putting down mass demonstrations
by ethnic Turks in May, just as they had in 1984-1985.
Apparently prompted by independent human rights groups,
Bulgaria's signing of the Vienna Concluding Document of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Paris
Conference on the Human Dimension, and the passage of the new
passport law (all widely reported on Western radio stations),
hundreds of ethnic Turks began hunger strikes in May to demand
the restoration of their Turkish names and their human
rights: freedom to speak their language, practice their
religion, and maintain their cultural traditions. The hunger
strikes were followed by nonviolent marches and demonstrations.
Up to 5,000 internal security troops using tanks and
helicopters were called in to quell the demonstrations which
took place in many northeastern and southern towns and
villages. Although the Government acknowledged that 7 had
been killed and 28 wounded, outside conservative estimates run
to approximately 30 people killed and 100 wounded.
In a televised speech in May, then chairman Todor Zhivkov
declared that every Bulgarian citizen could exercise his right
to travel and called upon Turkey to open its frontier to all
Bulgarian Muslims. The Government organized mass public
demonstrations in May and June denouncing Turkey.
Following the initial expulsion of perhaps 3,000 ethnic
Turkish activists, some of whom were suddenly taken from
prison or internal exile, thousands of ethnic Turks began to
apply for their passports under the new passport law (see
Section 2.d.), remove their savings from the banks, and pack
up all they could carry. From June through August, until the
Turkish Government reinstituted a strict visa regime to
control the massive flow of immigrants, more than 310,000
Bulgarian Turks streamed across the border in cars, pulling
hand carts, and on foot. (Over 70,000 of these subsequently
returned to Bulgaria.) In September Pomaks (ethnic Bulgarian
Muslims) in many villages peacefully demonstrated for similar
reasons, including the right to travel. Again, Bulgarian
authorities used force to end the demonstrations, killing up
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to 10 persons and injuring scores. In December the new regime
responded to a peaceful demonstration by Muslims in Sofia by
agreeing to repudiate the assimilation policy.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although the Constitution provides for freedom of speech and
press, other laws provide severe punishment for the voicing of
any belief or conviction which is contrary to official policy
or critical of the State. Under Zhivkov's rule, Bulgarians
were detained, tried, imprisoned, and exiled for criticism and
actions which were political in nature. The penal code
provides punishment for "crimes against the People's
Republic," "antistate agitation and propaganda," slander
against the State, spreading untrue allegations about the
Government, and committing acts that create distrust toward
the Government. In November the National Assembly repealed
some of these articles and released those who had been
convicted under them.
The unauthorized disclosure of information, particularly
unpublished economic or demographic statistics, is illegal.
Reportedly, a law specifying what constitutes an official
secret is being drafted, and a new press law is being
considered. Many press articles before November endorsed the
practice of "responsible" glasnost (openness), i.e., freedom
of speech with self-imposed limits for the good of society.
After the removal of Zhivkov, the press became much more open,
even reporting objectively on some of the actions of dissident
groups .
Bulgaria's radio, television, and press remain state owned and
state controlled. Although censorship officially did not
exist, the media, as well as writers, artists, and those in
academic life, operated within implicit party and government
guidelines and practiced self-censorship. Before November,
forbidden topics typically included unauthorized criticism of
party and state leaders, of Communist ideology, and of other
Communist countries. Ordinary citizens could express
criticism and send complaints to newspapers as well as to
National Assembly deputies, but only those on approved topics,
such as inadequate service by public agencies and housing
shortages, were publicized. Authorized criticism rarely
extended beyond specific shortcomings or failures of lower
level administrative officials. When television commentator
Kevork Kevorkian, moderator of the popular show "Every
Sunday," questioned a visiting Soviet official on the
continuing need for such slogans as "Proletarians of the
World, Unite!," he was temporarily removed from the air.
Following his further public complaints in July that he was
not being allowed to broadcast what he wished, the show was
canceled. The show was brought back in November, allegedly
after Mladenov's personal intervention.
Bulgaria began to move toward Soviet-style glasnost late in
1989, but the country's record was generally checkered. In
January the official press viciously attacked the country's
first independent human rights organization while ignoring the
arrest of its members. An article criticizing the National
Assembly as a "rubber stamp" was published in July, as was
increased criticism on the lack of glasnost in various
government branches and enterprises.
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BULGARIA
Until Mladenov's ascendancy, there was no unofficial
publishing in Bulgaria. One Bulgarian produced an independent
newsletter, "The Alternative," in July on a computer; the
first issue included the text of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, an editorial on the paper's intent and function
in a "totalitarian Communist system," the Intellectual Club's
May declaration on glasnost, and Blaga Dimitrova's hitherto
unpublished speech at the March Congress of Writers on the
misuse of language in Bulgarian society.
Dissatisfied intellectuals had formed a group in late 1988
calling for increased glasnost and more rapid perestroika
(restructuring). Several members of this "Independent
Discussion Club in Support of Glasnost and Preustroistvo" were
subsequently expelled from the BCP as a result of their
activities. In May they circulated an appeal to the National
Assembly for greater glasnost, including the right of citizens
to express their opinions and to receive and circulate all
kinds of information. Although this appeal was broadcast on
Radio Free Europe, it was never acknowledged or officially
published in Bulgaria.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly and
association, but in practice during the Zhivkov regime only
public demonstrations of support for the Government or party
were allowed, and the party decided which social and political
organizations could exist. New, more liberal legislation
governing assembly and association was being considered by the
National Assembly at year's end.
Under Zhivkov, all authorized associations were government
controlled, and the law provided punishment for anyone
founding an illegal organization. Seven Bulgarians founded
the country's first independent human rights organization, the
"Independent Society for the Protection of Human Rights in
Bulgaria," in January 1988. In June of that year, the
Government founded a "Committee for Human Rights," which has
refused to assist members of independent organizations on the
grounds they were not legal. Independent groups have
proliferated since that time: in November 1988, the
"Independent Discussion Club for the Support of Glasnost and
Preustroistvo" (intellectuals), the "Democratic League for the
Defense of Human Rights" (a primarily ethnic Turkish group),
and the "Party of the Green Masses" (an alternative political
party); in January 1989 the "Association to Support Vienna
'89" (another ethnic Turkish group); in February the
independent trade union for scientific, technical, cultural,
and educational professionals "Podkrepa" (Support); in March
the "Committee for Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience,
and Spiritual Values"; in April the "Moslem Initiative Group"
and "Eco-glasnost" (an environmental group); in the spring the
"Citizens' Initiative" (an autonomous branch of the
"Independent Society" in Ruse); and in July "Committee 273,"
to support all those detained under Article 273 of the
Constitution for antigovernment propaganda.
Most of these groups applied for registration in order to
receive the status of a juridical person, which is the only
way to have a bank account amd own property. The Government
refused registration to all and deemed all of them illegal,
until, in December, a Sofia court ordered that Eco-glasnost be
permitted to register. The Government also refused to allow
any of the independent groups the use of restaurants or public
1052
BULGARIA
halls for their meetings. It prevented the party conference
of the Green Masses in both April and June and broke up an
outdoor assembly of Eco-glasnost in July. Members of
Eco-glasnost were beaten by police and forcibly removed from
one Sofia park to another while they were collecting
signatures for a petition during the October meeting of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the
environment. In December the National Assembly passed a
resolution condemning the police action and calling for an
investigation and compensation for the victims.
c. Freedom of Religion
The new leadership has not yet addressed church-state
relations. Although the Constitution provides for freedom of
worship, the authorities under the old regime espoused atheism
and discouraged religion. Openly expressed religious
conviction was incompatible with party membership or
attainment of responsible government or other positions.
Church-state relations are regulated by a division of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before November, it reviewed all
clerical appointments and had imposed clergy on local
congregations over the opposition of parishioners. No church
buildings could be constructed without official permission,
and the committee determined whether or not existing numbers
of churches for various denominations were adequate.
Religious and prayer groups could be organized and services
conducted privately, according to officials. No religious
groups could engage in open proselytizing, and foreign
missionary activity wss banned. Authorities confiscated
imported religious materials. No parochial schools could
exist .
A number of faiths are recognized or tolerated. The Bulgarian
Orthodox Church, which was the established church before the
Communists took power, is the largest, with a reported
following of 6 million nominal adherents out of a population
of 9 million. Functioning as a quasi-official church, it
receives government financial support and echoes government
propaganda. The church is allowed to print a newspaper,
although the last Bulgarian-language Bible, only 2,000 copies
of which were published, appeared in 1982; no Bibles may be
imported. In 1989, for the first time since 1946, the
Patriarch was permitted to present Christmas greetings on
televison and radio. The Orthodox Church is allowed to
distill and market some alcoholic beverages and sell some
religious articles, such as candles and small jewelry
crosses. There is a seminary for Orthodox priests whose
curriculum is approved by the State.
The independent "Committee for Religious Rights, Freedom of
Conscience, and Spiritual Values," founded by Orthodox priest
Father Khristofor Subev, was repudiated and denounced by the
official Orthodox church hierarchy. Father Subev was sent
into internal exile in January after having led illegal
processions of believers, carrying icons, through the streets
of Veliko Turnovo. His group called for an end to political
interference in church affairs and religious life, for freedom
of conscience, freedom of religious information, legalization
of religious charitable work, and religious tolerance. In
December his group demonstrated in Sofia without repercussions.
Approximately 60,000 Roman Catholics are divided between
followers of the Latin and Uniate rites. Bulgaria reportedly
1053
BULGARIA
has only 32 Catholic priests now, as opposed to about 200 when
the Communists took power. Importation of the French
newspaper La Croix has been forbidden, but selected priests
have been able to travel to Rome and to receive the Vatican's
official paper, L 'Osservatore Romano. The Government in 1988
made grants to the three Catholic dioceses of Sofia, Plovdiv,
and Ruse.
Other religious denominations in Bulgaria have few adherents.
There are 10 Armenian churches in the country, and the
Armenian community publishes a biweekly newspaper. Various
Protestant groups, including Baptists, Pentecostalists,
Methodists, and Seventh-Day Adventists, reportedly suffer
continuing problems with the authorities. In February
government officials characterized Pavel Ignatov and his
Church of God congregation as schismatics and dismissed
allegations of repressive measures against the group. In May
a member of Ignatov 's congregation reported that, following
the Easter visit of an American pastor, Timothy Kornet, the
man who had interpreted for Kornet was thrown out into the
street with his pregnant wife, and pastor Ignatov lost his
job. In April a group of evangelical Protestants primarily
from Denmark called "Pilgrims of Jerusalem" traveled around
Bulgaria holding religious services. The Government expelled
them after 2 months.
Although some reports indicated that the Dunovist sect, an
indigenous movement which flourished in pre-Communist
Bulgaria, is outlawed, government officials claimed that
Dunovists are legal. The Ba'hai faith is outlawed.
The Jewish minority numbers approximately 3,000 people. It
receives some financial support from the Government and
publishes a biweekly paper stressing Communist themes. A
Jewish social, cultural, and educational organization exists,
but it is atheistic and political in orientation. Visits
between the Bulgarian Jewish community and Israeli Jews of
Bulgarian origin are frequent, although subject to government
control. The cantor of Sofia's synagogue went to New York in
1988 and 1989 for cantorial training. No kosher meat is
available, but Jews are permitted to bake and distribute
matzoh without hindrance.
Ethnic Turks (approximately 1 million) comprise the majority
of Bulgaria's Muslims, the remainder being Slavic Pomaks
(about 200,000) and Gypsies. On December 29, the Government
announced that it condemned the actions taken since 1984 to
assimilate the minority and pledged to take measures to ensure
that true freedom of faith, voluntary choice of name, and the
right to speak languages other than Bulgarian in everyday
communications would be guaranteed. There has been some
popular opposition to this announcement, and some local
officials reportedly have refused to comply. The effects of
this assimilation policy were far-reaching: most mosques were
closed, and many were used for storerooms or nursery schools.
Those that remained open usually operated only for Friday noon
prayers rather than the mandatory five times a day. Chief
Mufti Nedyo Gendzhev, elected in November 1988, reportedly
instructed local imams to keep people under 60 years of age
out of those mosques that remain functioning.
As part of the Government's campaign to eradicate the cultural
identity of the Turkish community, many Muslim rites were
forbidden. Muslim wedding ceremonies were not permitted, and
Turkish weddings could not take place in the streets, as is
1054
BULGARIA
the tradition; they had to be conducted in closed halls, and
the singing and playing of Turkish songs was forbidden. Many
Muslim cemeteries were destroyed or defiled, and separate
Muslim cemeteries were reportedly abolished. Muslim funerals
were generally not permitted, although there were credible
reports that Muslim funerals, or at least burials in
non-Christian places, were again permitted beginning in
September. Sermons had to be delivered in Bulgarian, and the
Chief Mufti's office records had to be kept in Bulgarian.
Public use of the Turkish language was forbidden, as was the
wearing of traditional forms of dress. Violators were subject
to substantial fines. Circumcision, which some newspaper
articles have derided as "unhygienic," is hypothetically
permitted only in hospitals, without the religious ceremony
which accompanies it. In practice, it was forbidden.
In defense of its treatment of the Muslim minority, the
Government prominently publicized the amount of money spent to
restore Shumen ' s Tombul mosques, and there were claims that
three more mosques are to be restored and two new ones built.
After years of refusing permission, the Government allowed six
Bulgarian students studying at the Higher Islamic Institute in
Tashkent to make the hajj in 1988. Five Bulgarians made the
hajj in 1989; one, the Imam of Kurdzhali, later sought asylum
in the Turkish Consulate in Jeddah. A school for imams has
operated in Sofia since 1986, although its 6-month course
includes heavy political content. Copies of the Koran cannot
be found in Bulgarian bookstores. In February the Chief Mufti
claimed work was in progress on a third Bulgarian translation
of the Koran, but by year's end there was no indication when,
or if, it would be published.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government controls where people live, work, and travel.
Citizens are required at all times to carry with them personal
identity cards stating their legal place of residence and
work. Without this card they cannot register at a hotel,
purchase domestic airline tickets, or seek any kind of social
service such as medical assistance. Changing one's place of
residence or work is a complicated process unless it is at the
Government's initiative or convenience. Moves to Sofia and
other major cities from smaller settlements are especially
difficult, and in some cases prohibited, because of the
authorities' desire to control urban growth. This concern
gave rise to the practice of "zhitelstvo, " or the right of
residency. A newspaper article in 1989 criticized existing
restrictions, and quoted an advisor to the Council of
Ministers as saying that limitations on residence "run counter
to the legally established human rights and to the
Constitution. "
Bulgarians may travel within the country without restriction
except in border zones, which are heavily patrolled by armed
guards where the country adjoins Greece and Turkey. In August
1988, the Government announced a 75-percent reduction in the
permanently restricted area, encompassing regions closed to
foreigners. Although some of the newly opened areas included
those with large ethnic Turkish populations, a significant
area along the Turkish and Greek borders remains closed.
During and subsequent to the demonstrations in May, diplomatic
travellers were turned away from areas clearly within the
unrestricted zone.
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A Bulgarian citizen needs both a passport for external travel
and an exit visa specifying the destination for each trip. In
May the National Assembly passed the long-promised passport
law mandating the issuance of 5-year passports for all
citizens. Although according to the law passport applications
may be refused only in specific circumstances, these include
"the protection of national security," which is susceptible to
broad interpretation. Since November, many dissidents and
members of independent groups have been given passports and
permission to travel. At year's end, however, many Pomaks had
still not been issued the passports they had requested.
Exit visas, which under Zhivkov's rule were still required for
all non-Communist countries, could also be refused for a
variety of reasons. According to other legal changes,
Bulgarians who traveled abroad and did not return by the time
specified were no longer subject to criminal penalties and
possible imprisonment but only to administrative measures and
fines ($210 for overstaying 1 month and upwards) . Those who
overstayed abroad prior to September 1, 1989, were not subject
to the fines or criminal penalties.
The Government also substantially reduced the number of
unsettled divided family cases involving the United States and
Western Europe. Thousands of divided family cases remain
between Bulgaria and Turkey, however. This already severe
problem was exacerbated in 1989 when the Government decided
selectively to apply the new passport law before it went into
effect officially on September 1. Between June and August,
more than 310,000 Bulgarian Turks crossed the border into
Turkey. In most of these cases, however, family members were
left behind--persons required for the harvest, young men of
military age, or others kept behind for arbitrary reasons.
In theory, all Bulgarians now have the right to leave their
country and to return. Changes in the citizenship law passed
in May ensured that a Bulgarian could only be stripped of his
citizenship while abroad, and then only for committing "a
severe crime" against Bulgaria. The law now allows dual
citizenship as well.
Those who return to Bulgaria are said to retain all their
rights. Some reports, however, indicated that returning
ethnic Turks may not return to their home villages but are
resettled and dispersed throughout the country.
It is Bulgarian policy to return to their home countries
potential refugees from other Warsaw Pact states who try to
cross the Bulgarian border into Turkey, Yugoslavia, or
Greece. A Romanian who sought political asylum from the U.S.
Embassy in Sofia and who was then caught trying to cross the
Bulgarian border to Yugoslavia was forcibly returned to
Romania, where he faced imprisonment. In September 1988, 13
Magyar Romanians sought refuge in the Hungarian Embassy in
Sofia; that situation was resolved in February 1989 when they
were permitted, through the auspices of the International Red
Cross, to leave Bulgaria for a third country, from which they
then traveled to Hungary.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
In December the BCP proposed that the guarantee of its leading
role in the State be removed from the Constitution. The
National Assembly voted in support of this change and will
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take the formal vote to amend the Constitution in January
1990. The Assembly also called for a new election law leading
to "free, democratic elections" by May 1990. Meanwhile, the
BCP leadership effectively governs Bulgaria, although the
National Assembly has begun to exert some influence.
Political pluralism and free participation in the political
process did not exist under Zhivkov's regime. In November
1988, two Bulgarians, Stefan Cholakov and Rumen Tsankov-
Dimitrov, founded the Party of the Green Masses, a social
democratic organization. They applied for registration and
legalization; Cholakov was detained on January 6, 1989, and
Tsankov-Dimitrov on December 26, 1988. Both men were held
without charges for 2 months. In an announcement on April 2,
the two founders noted that up to that time they had received
no answer" other than our detention." Both subsequently left
Bulgaria .
The former regime pretended to a form of pluralism through the
participation of a second political party, the Bulgarian
National Agrarian Union, in the Government and National
Assembly. However, the Agrarian Union professed no
differences of view with the BCP on any issue. Since
November, there has been a change in the leadership of the
Agrarian Union, and some members of the Union have called for
it to assume a more independent position. Still, Agrarian
Union officials have not strayed far from the BCP on any
issues yet. The Communist and Agrarian Parties, together with
labor, youth, and other groups, comprise a mass organization
known as the Fatherland Front, which is wholly controlled by
the BCP. The Fatherland Front has been the only organization
permitted to present candidates for election. Following
constitutional changes in 1987, so-called multicandidate
elections were held on the local level in February 1988. Less
than 20 percent of these elections involved more than one
candidate; all candidates were prescreened by election
commissions and all supported the BCP. There have been no
elections since that time.
Through most of 1989, the National Assembly functioned as a
rubber stamp, approving party policies and proposals. A
newspaper article in July criticized the legislative body for
its invariable unanimity. While the Assembly, since November,
has begun to assert its right to function as a genuine
legislature, it has not so far opposed any measure proposed by
the new leadership. It took the initiative, however, to call
for an investigation into the October 20 police action against
members of Eco-glasnost .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Under Zhivkov's regime, the Government dismissed any criticism
of its human rights record as part of an "anti-Bulgarian
campaign" and/or interference in its internal affairs.
Bulgaria signed the Vienna Concluding Document of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe but did not
change its traditional response to charges of human rights
abuses. Bulgarian officials noted that, although they were
obliged to respond to requests for information, no specific
time period was spelled out. In some individual cases,
however, in which Western government or private groups have
pressed for a response, the Government has provided
information. The Government responded to a March U.S.
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BULGARIA
demarche on Iliya Minev, chairman of the Independent Society,
who was then on a hunger strike. Western publicity and
criticism on the eve of the London Information Forum led to
the release in April of Nikolai Ganchev Kolev, who had been
sent into internal exile. Authorities did not respond to an
August demarche on Dr. Trenchev and the other five activists
detained along with him. The six detainees were released on
September 4, presumably in response to intense outside
interest. The new leadership has repeatedly emphasized its
determination to bring Bulgarian law and practice into line
with its commitments to the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe and has taken some initial steps in this
direction.
In March a Bulgarian official unsuccessfully tried to prevent
condemnation by the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC) of Bulgaria's treatment of its ethnic Turkish minority.
He reiterated the standard government line that there are no
Turks in Bulgaria and that the QIC's accusations were
interference in Bulgarian internal affairs.
Bulgaria's treatment of its ethnic Turkish minority prompted
many international inquiries in 1989. A Council of Europe
delegation visited Bulgaria in July to analyze the situation.
The United States Congress passed a resolution, also in July,
condemning Bulgaria's "expulsion" of thousands of ethnic
Turks. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization in August
issued a statement critical of Bulgaria's policy. The
Government allowed a visit by a World Health Organization
(WHO) team in August to investigate Turkish allegations of
harmful vaccinations given to Bulgarian ethnic Turkish
emigres. The WHO reported that its commission found that no
injections containing harmful substances had been administered
to the Turkish-speaking population.
In September 1988, AI representatives visited Bulgaria (having
sought permission since 1985) and met with Bulgarian officials
responsible for human rights matters. They also met with
Konstantin Tellalov, chairman of the government-sponsored
Committee for Human Rights. Members of Helsinki Watch visited
Bulgaria in October and spoke to both government officials and
private citizens. Bulgaria is a member of the United Nations
Human Rights Commission.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on these
criteria. In recent years, the Government under Zhivkov
denied the existence of any minority ethnic groups and hence
even the possibility of discrimination. Census reports, which
in the early 1960 's noted the existence of significant numbers
of Gypsies, Macedonians, and ethnic Turks, more recently
reported an almost totally homogeneous Bulgarian populace.
The Zhivkov regime admitted the existence of differing
religious groups, such as "Bulgarian Muslims," but rejected
the possibility of any religious intolerance or discrimination
against them. It did not publicly distinguish between those
Muslims who are of ethnic Turkish origin and those who are
ethnically Bulgarian (Pomaks), although credible reports
indicated that the latter are still not being permitted to
emigrate to Turkey.
During Zhivkov's rule, ethnic Turks, comprising at least 10
percent of the population, were subject to severe restrictions
1058
BULGARIA
and discrimination in a systematic effort to destroy their
cultural identity (see Section 2.c.)- During the forced
assimilation campaign of 1984-85, all Turks were assigned new
Bulgarian given and family names. Only these names appeared
on their new identity cards, issued from January to March 1985.
Because no adult Bulgarians received new identity cards during
this period, the date of issuance effectively functioned as a
code, signaling to the authorities that its bearer is an ethnic
Turk. Pomak names were "Bulgarianized" in 1974; one Pomak
claimed his name was changed three times: in 1972, 1974, and
1975. Gypsies' names were changed to Bulgarian names in the
1970's.
In the army, Gypsies, ethnic Turks, and soldiers imprisoned
for various crimes, who must complete their military service
after completing their sentences, are reportedly assigned only
to "black" work in labor brigades in the interior of Bulgaria;
they are not allowed to bear arms.
There is pervasive social discrimination against the small
Gypsy population, which generally lives in shantytowns and
occupies the lowest rung of the socioeconomic ladder. There
are no reliable estimates as to their numbers; some officials
have claimed as few as 40,000, and some dissidents have
claimed as many as 1 million.
The Constitution declares that "women and men enjoy equal
rights," and there does not appear to be overt discrimination
as regards educational and professional opportunities. There
is no evidence of systematic violence against women or of
widespread wife beating. According to the Ministry of the
Interior, of the more than 68,000 crimes committed in Bulgaria
in 1988, less than 2 percent were "violent" or "premeditated,"
including murder and rape.
Section 6 Worker rights
a. The Right of Association
The Communist Party organizes and totally controls all trade
unions, which are grouped together in the Central Council of
Bulgarian Trade Unions (CCTU) . The unions' role is to promote
government and party objectives. Workers have not been
permitted to organize outside the official union structure,
nor allowed to strike. In November the CCTU declared that it
was now completely independent of the BCP and the state
organs, and that it would devote itself to promoting the
rights and economic interests of workers.
The country's first independent trade union was founded in
February. Dr. Konstantin Trenchev founded an "independent
association of the scientific-technical, humanitarian, and
creative-artistic intelligentsia in Bulgaria." Called
"Podkrepa" (Support), the union has gathered significant
support, especially in November and December; it now
reportedly has 70,000 members. Although the group has no
official recognition as a trade union, the Bulgarian media
after November reported objectively on its activities.
Podkrepa has engaged in dialog with the official unions on
several occasions.
The CCTU is affiliated with the Communist-controlled World
Federation of Trade Unions.
1059
In its 1989 report, the ILO's Committee of Experts again
criticized the monopoly on organizing workers that Bulgarian
law grants to the official unions, as well as the subservience
of the official unions to the BCP. The Committee called on
the Government to indicate measures taken or contemplated
which would recognize the right of workers to organize
independent unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There is no collective bargaining in Bulgaria. A new labor
code, in force since January 1987, and a "restructuring" of
unions in the spring of 1987 were intended to shift the focus
of union decisionmaking from the apex to its base. Despite
the much heralded arrival of "self-management," there is no
indication, thus far, that the role of the official unions has
changed substantially.
Bulgaria has one functioning duty-free zone in Ruse, and plans
to establish three more in the future. Workers in these zones
are subject to the same laws and regulations as other workers
in Bulgaria.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution declares that "every able-bodied citizen is
obliged to do socially useful work." Those who do not work
may be charged with "vagrancy" or social parasitism; Article
39 of the Statutes of the People's Militia authorizes the
imposition of "administrative measures," such as house arrest,
on "people who lead nomad lives or beg as opposed to doing
social labor." Compulsory labor may be required of prisoners
or those in internal exile. Political detainees in 1989
reported that they had worked in various capacities while in
detention and that those who refused to work were beaten and
given less food. Human rights activist Eduard Genov, interned
in the village of Mikhalkovo prior to being exiled, reportedly
worked in a mine. During Zhivkov's regime, the Government
also abused compulsory military service obligations by
utilizing ethnic Turks, Gypsies, former prisoners, and others
who were not fully trusted in labor brigades.
As a result of the exodus of thousands of ethnic Turks which
caused serious dislocations in the Bulgarian economy, the
Government in July enacted a labor mobilization decree which
authorized the State to send people wherever their labor was
needed. Students were sent to factories to fill the vacancies
left by ethnic Turks, in addition to performing the usual
harvest work assigned them in the late summer and fall.
d. Minimum Wage for Employment of Children
The Labor Code adopted in 1986 stipulated 16 years as the
minimum age for all but certain light work. Persons from 16
to 18 years of age may not be assigned work designated as
heavy, harmful, or dangerous; their workweek is either five
7-hour days or six 6-hour days. These restrictions are
effectively enforced. Seven years of compulsory education for
children begin either at age 6 or 7.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The minimum wage, as of September 1, 1988, was $82 per month
at the official commercial exchange rate. The average monthly
wage is the local currency equivalent of $140 at the
1060
BULGARIA
commercial rate of exchange. The minimum wage is not
sufficient for a single wage earner to provide a decent
standard of living for a family. In families with two working
spouses, the average wage provides, at best, a modest standard
of living.
The workweek for adults is 42.5 hours (5 days of 8.5 hours) in
most professions and occupations. The civil mobilization
decree of July 1989, however, provided for compulsory 6-day
workweeks and 9-hour days in many professions. Paid vacations
range from 14 workdays annually for those who have worked less
than 10 years to 18 workdays annually for those who have
worked more than 15 years. Additional paid vacation is
granted those in certain difficult or dangerous occupations.
Bulgarian practice appears generally to conform to these
guidelines, although participation in unpaid supplementary
"brigades" can lengthen working hours on various occasions
during the year.
Bulgaria has a national labor safety program, and the official
trade unions are assigned a role in promoting job safety.
Standards of enforcement vary greatly, however, and questions
of worker health and safety are not satisfactorily resolved.
1061
CANADA
Canada is a constitutional monarchy with a federal
parliamentary form of government. Representatives in the
multiparty political system are elected by universal suffrage
at local. Provincial, and Federal levels. The national
Constitution defines government responsibilities and is
subject to interpretation by an independent judiciary.
Federal and Provincial election mandates last a maximum of 5
years. Elections are completely free and often result in a
changeover of power to opposition parties.
Federal, Provincial, and municipal police forces are
responsible for national and local law enforcement. An
elected civilian government controls the armed forces, which
have no role in domestic law enforcement except in strictly
defined national emergencies.
Canada has an open economic system that encourages private
ownership, investment, and entrepreneurship.
Canada's human rights performance in 1989 was exemplary. The
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, added to Canada's revised
Constitution in 1982, provides fundamental rights and freedoms
to everyone. Government and private organizations try to
ensure that these rights are respected in practice at all
levels of society. Canada actively promotes respect for human
rights around the world.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no politically motivated killings. However,
Canadian authorities and the general public are concerned
about the potential for terrorist activity by Sikhs and
members of other resident ethnic groups with active ties to
troubled homelands. United Kingdom authorities have approved
the extradition to Canada of a Sikh, formerly resident in
British Columbia, who stands accused of having placed a bomb
on a Canadian airplane in 1985 that killed two baggage
handlers in Tokyo's Narita Airport.
b. Disappearance
Secret arrest, clandestine detention, and politically
motivated disappearances did not occur.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
These abuses are prohibited by law, and none was reported.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Canadian law prohibits arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and
this prohibition is respected in practice.
In January 1989, a law came into effect which strengthened the
authority of the Federal Government to detain claimants to
refugee status and swiftly deport those found inadmissible.
1062
A 1988 law authorizes the Federal Government to take special
measures to ensure safety and security during national
emergencies. The intent of the law is to define the kinds of
emergencies under which the Government may assume
extraordinary powers, including the suspension of basic civil
liberties. This law replaced the older and more loosely
defined War Measures Act. The 1939 Official Secrets Act
prohibits the private possession, distribution, and
publication of information deemed prejudicial to the interests
of the State and provides that persons under suspicion may be
arrested without a warrant.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judicial system is based on English common law on the
Federal level and in most Provinces. In the Province of
Quebec, the judicial system is based on the Napoleonic Code.
Judges i»i Canada are appointed. In criminal trials, Canadian
law provides for a presumption of innocence of the defendant
until proven guilty, as well as the right to a public trial
and to counsel. Free counsel is provided to indigents.
The Official Secrets Act provides that trials concerning
national security be held in secret with certain presumptions
in favor of the State. Prosecutions under this statute are
extremely rare, and convictions hard to sustain on appeal.
There are no political prisoners in Canada.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Federal and Provincial governments do not interfere with a
person's basic rights. Obtrusive searches may only be carried
out when there is a reasonable basis for assuming that the
person is involved in criminal activity. Police officials
face the possibility of judicial penalties if they invade a
person's privacy without first obtaining a search warrant.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is provided for by the
Constitution and respected in practice. Laws prohibiting
certain forms of hate literature and pornography, restrictive
decisions by provincial film censorship boards, and
legislation which specifically protects language and cultural
rights are the sole exceptions to these freedoms. The
Canadian Human Rights Act makes it illegal to make repeated
communications by telephone that expose persons to hatred or
contempt. In July 1989, the Human Rights Tribunal, created by
mandate of the Canadian Human Rights Act, ordered a white
supremacist group in Alberta to stop playing an anti-Jewish
taped message over the telephone.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly is guaranteed. Permits are not required
for meetings.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
trade unions, see Section 6. a.
1063
CANADA
c. Freedom of Religion
There is complete freedom of religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on movement within or outside
Canada, including the rights of emigration and repatriation.
Canada continues to be a haven for many refugees and displaced
persons. Widespread concern that many economic refugees have
taken advantage of Canada's generous refugee law and made
spurious requests for asylum led to the passage of a new
refugee law, which went into effect on January 1, 1989. By
successfully discouraging claimants from such countries as
Portugal and Trinidad, where the conditions that generate
valid claims for refugee status are generally lacking, this
law brought about a 50-percent reduction in asylum
applications. As of August, 78 percent of applications
processed since the beginning of the year had been accepted.
The backlog of refugee applications prior to 1989 is being
processed under separate procedures.
Section 3 Respect for Political- Rights : The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Canada is governed by Federal and Provincial governments that
are freely elected by the Canadian people through universal
suffrage. Legislative elections must be held at least every 5.
years, and voter participation rates are high. The Governor ,'.,
General is the Queen's representative as Head of State. In
practice, power is exercised by the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet, who usually are elected members of the 295-seat House
of Commons. Three main parties are represented in the
Commons, and several others function at the Provincial level.
All Provinces and territories have similar freely elected
legislatures .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Canada actively promotes human rights in international forums,
and the Federal Government encourages nongovernmental
organizations to pursue investigations of human rights abuses
throughout the world. The Canadian Human Rights Commission
and its Provincial counterparts investigate and resolve
complaints of discrimination in public and private sector
activities under governmental jurisdiction.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Food, shelter, health care, and education are available to all
inhabitants regardless of race, religion, sex, ethnic
background, or political opinion. Article 15 of the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms guarantees equal benefits and
protection of the law regardless of race, national or ethnic \
origin, color, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical
disability. These rights are respected in practice. However,
a variety of groups continued in 1989 to express concern that
the adoption by Canada of a constitutional accord, known as
the "Meech Lake Accord," granting Quebec special status as a ..
"distinct society" could endanger the rights of women and of
linguistic and cultural minorities throughout Canada. The
1064
CAMADA
accord, signed by the Prime Minister and the Provincial
Premiers and approved by Commons in 1987 but not yet approved
by all the Provincial legislatures, is seen by some groups as
threatening the promise of equal rights for women and
minorities set forth by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Women's groups have been effective in bringing the issue of
family violence to the fore. In a June 1987 report, a
Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women estimated
that 1 in every 10 women is physically, psychologically, or
emotionally abused by her spouse or partner. Federal and
Provincial governments have attempted to address the issue of
family violence. In June 1988, the Federal Government
appropriated $40 million for the construction of new shelters
for battered women and their children, for police education on
how to deal with domestic violence, and for research.
Ontario Province enacted a far-reaching law that took effect
on January 1, 1990, which requires that all employers (public
and private) with more than 10 workers provide equal pay to
men and women for work of comparable skill and provides a
formula for evaluating and comparing jobs traditionally held
by women with those traditionally held by men. Women enjoy
marriage and property rights equal to those of men.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers in both the public and private sectors have the right
to associate freely and to strike. The Canada Labour Code,
which covers all employees under Federal jurisdiction,
protects these rights at the Federal level, while Provincial
labor legislation protects all other organized workers. Trade
unions are independent of the Government and may freely
affiliate with international organizations. About 36 percent
of Canada's nonagricultural work force is organized into trade
unions. All workers' rights protected in law are respected in
practice. The Canadian Labor Congress is a member of the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and many of
its member unions are branches of American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations unions.
In practice, certain groups of essential public sector
employees are not allowed to strike. Restrictions vary from
province to province. The 17 , 500-member British Columbia
Nurses Union struck legally in June 1989, while 1,000 Quebec
nurses struck illegally in September 1989.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers in both the public and private sectors have the right
to organize and bargain collectively. Collective bargaining
is protected by law and freely practiced, though some
essential public sector employees have limited collective
bargaining rights, which vary from province to province.
Antiunion discrimination is banned by law, and there are
effective mechanisms for resolving complaints. All labor
unions have full access to mediation, arbitration, and the
judicial system. Canada has a limited number of export
processing zones, and labor laws and practices within them are
consistent with Federal and relevant Provincial laws and
practice.
1065
CAHADA
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is illegal and is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Child labor legislation differs among the provinces. The
Federal Government generally prohibits those under 17 years of
age from working for the Federal Government while school is in
session. Provinces generally prohibit those under age 15 or
16 from working without parental consent, working in any
hazardous employment, or working at night. These prohibitions
are effectively enforced through inspections conducted by the
Federal and Provincial labor ministries.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Labor standards vary from province to province, but all limit
the standard workweek to 40 or 48 hours. Minimum wages are
established in both Federal and Provincial jurisdictions. The
Federal minimum wage, covering about 10 percent of the
Canadian work force, is about $3.40 per hour. A lower minimum
wage covers minors. Collectively, only 1 percent of workers
governed by the Federal minimum wage are paid at the minimum.
Eight percent of all workers are paid at the respective
minimum wage covering their class of employment. Lower
minimum wages for minors are being phased out. A family with
only one employed member working at the minimum wage would be
below the poverty level. All Provinces have established
minimum wages higher than the Federal minimum.
The Federal Government establishes health and safety standards
for the approximately 10 percent of workers covered by Federal
labor legislation. Provincial legislation provides for health
and safety standards for other workers. Federal and regional
authorities enforce these standards through inspections.
1066
CYPRUS
Cyprus has been divided since the Turkish military intervention
of 1974, an event which followed a coup d'etat directed from
Greece. Since that time, the southern part of the country has
been under the control of the Government of the Republic of
Cyprus, and the northern part under an autonomous Turkish
Cypriot administration supported by the presence of Turkish
troops. In 1983 that administration proclaimed itself the
"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," which has been
recognized only by Turkey. In 1985 it held a constitutional
referendum and "presidential" and legislative elections.
The internal political systems of the Republic of Cyprus and
the Turkish Cypriot administration are democratic and based on
free elections, and they guarantee basic human rights to their
populations in both theory and practice.
Free enterprise, private initiative, and the right to own
property are characteristic of both Cypriot economies. The
economy in the south has prospered in recent years, benefiting
especially from tourism and manufactured exports. The economy
in the Turkish Cypriot area is closely linked to that of
Turkey and has significant underemployment. State enterprises
play a large role in the Turkish Cypriot economy.
The conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities
during the 1963-/4 period, the Turkish intervention in 1974,
and the subsequent presence of Turkish troops in the north
have led to continuing charges of human rights violations.
These events resulted in the uprooting of Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots from the northern and southern parts of the
island respectively, and the loss of lives, homes, and
livelihoods .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no political or extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of persons abducted, secretly arrested,
or held in clandestine detention during 1989. However, the
issue of persons missing during the 1963-74 period remains a
source of dispute between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot communities. The Tripartite Committee on Missing
Persons established under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary
General in 1981 continued its investigations into this issue
during 1989 .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Both the Cyprus Constitution and the basic document governing
the Turkish Cypriot community specifically prohibit torture.
Freedom from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment is guaranteed by law and respected in practice in
both communities.
1067
CYPRUS
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.
Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention is guaranteed by
law and respected in practice by the Government of Cyprus and
Turkish Cypriot authorities. Preventive detention is not
legally authorized, nor has it been reported in practice. No
one may be held for more than 1 day for investigation of a
crime without referral of the case to the courts for extension
of the period of detention. Most periods of investigative
detention do not exceed 8 to 10 days before formal charges are
filed. Attorneys have free access to detainees. No instances
of exile were reported.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
In both parts of Cyprus, fair public trial is guaranteed by
law and exists in practice. The judiciary is independent of
executive or military control. Defendants have the right to
be present at their trials, to be represented by counsel (at
government expense for those who cannot afford one) , to
confront witnesses, and to present evidence in their own
defense. Cases are generally tried before a judge or panel of
judges, although a request for a jury trial is usually
granted. There are no special courts to deal with security or
political offenses. Civilians are not tried by military
courts. There are no political prisoners in Cyprus.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.
Both the Cyprus Constitution and the basic document governing
the Turkish Cypriot community include provisions protecting
the individual against arbitrary interference. A judicial
warrant is required, for example, for a police official to
enter a private residence. Abuses of privacy run counter to
the democratic traditions of both communities. However,
Turkish Cypriots continue to complain that mail coming through
the Republic of Cyprus postal system is often delayed, opened,
or not delivered.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These rights are provided for by law and are widely and freely
practiced throughout the island. The press is free and
represents the entire political spectrum. There is no press
censorship, but the authorities exercise monopoly control over
radio and television. Legislation was passed by the Republic
of Cyprus in 1986 giving each party represented in Parliament
a seat on the board controlling the Cyprus Broadcasting
Corporation. A draft bill in the Greek Cypriot House of
Representatives would authorize private broadcasting. In
addition, the proliferation of party and independent newspapers
in both communities enables ideas and arguments to circulate
freely.
Opposition papers on both sides of the island frequently
criticize the authorities. When a prominent Turkish Cypriot
politician in 1989 made statements and published articles
critical of Turkey's relationship with northern Cyprus, the
Turkish Embassy requested that he surrender his Turkish
passport to it, which he did. Since most states do not
o
1068
CYPRUS
recognize "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" passports,
this severely restricted his freedom of movement outside of
northern Cyprus.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
trade unions, see Section 6. a.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The freedom to associate, organize, and hold meetings is
guaranteed by law and respected in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is respected in Cyprus. In the south, the
vast majority of the population is Greek Orthodox; in the
north, Sunni Muslim. The Greek Orthodox Church in the south
has the character of a state institution. Missionaries are
permitted to proselytize in both communities. There is,
however, some hesitation on the part of the Government of
Cyprus to allow such activities to go on in an unrestricted
manner owing to the primacy of the Greek Orthodox Church.
Approximately 100 Turkish Cypriots who still live in the south
of the island are allowed to practice their religion freely.
In the north, non-Muslims include approximately 700 Greek
Cypriots, over 300 Christian Maronites, and some foreign
residents — all of whom are free to practice their religions.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Turkish and Greek Cypriots enjoy general freedom of movement
within their respective areas. Turkish Cypriot authorities
regulate travel into and out of the Turkish Cypriot area. In
general, they have barred Greeks, Greek Cypriots, and
sometimes third-country nationals with Greek surnames from
entering the north and Turkish Cypriots from visiting the
south. In late November, Turkish Cypriot authorities
announced the easing of requirements for travel documentation
for Greek Cypriots wishing to visit the north. While
significant restrictions remain--including a requirement that
Greek Cypriote have "legitimate business" to conduct in
northern Cyprus--the period since November saw a marked
increase in the flow of Cypriots in both directions across the
U.N. buffer zone.
The applications of Greek Cypriot residents of enclaves in the
north to visit the south are usually granted, but the
applicants must return within a designated period or risk
losing their right to return, along with their property;
foreigners coming from the south must obtain permission to
enter the north. At the same time, the Government of Cyprus
bars entry into the Greek Cypriot area by foreigners who
arrive at Turkish Cypriot ports of entry. Those who have
entered through the south but wish to stay overnight in the
north are discouraged from doing so by the Cyprus Government.
The right to travel abroad and to emigrate is observed,
although persons facing military service or legal action in
either part of Cyprus may not be allowed to travel without
specific permission. Turkish Cypriots have difficulty in
traveling to some countries because travel documents issued by
the Turkish Cypriot authorities are not widely recognized. In
such cases, they travel on Turkish passports, to which they
1069
CYPRUS
are considered entitled by Turkey. Citizens may repatriate
freely.
The Government of Cyprus does not honor the practice of
accepting third-country persons as refugees, arguing that it
already has enough responsibilities in caring for the Greek
Cypriot refugees (displaced persons) from the 1974 Turkish
intervention. The Greek Cypriot authorities endeavor to
remove or deport all such third-country refugee claimants as
soon as possible, even prior to a determination by the local
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees representative
that the claim is valid, or prior to acceptance for
resettlement by a third country.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Both the Government of Cyprus and the administration of the
Turkish Cypriot community are democratically elected. In
their lively multiparty political systems, parties compete
actively and without restriction for popular support.
Suffrage is universal, and elections are held by secret
ballot. Elections for the office of President of the Republic
of Cyprus are held every 5 years, and elections for the House
of Representatives every 5 years or less. The Turkish
Cypriots elect a leader every 5 years, and a representative
body every 5 years or less. Greek Cypriots and Maronites
living in the north--the latter having chosen before
independence in 1960 to be regarded as members of the Greek
Cypriot community — do not participate in Turkish Cypriot
elections but elect their own village officials. They are
eligible to vote in Greek Cypriot elections but must make
their way to the south in order to exercise that right.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There have been no requests from international human rights
organizations to investigate human rights conditions in
Cyprus. Representatives of such human rights organizations
have open access to both the south and the north.
The question of human rights in Cyprus is closely connected to
the political differences that divide the two communities. In
1986 a group of Greek Cypriots announced the formation of a
"Committee for the Restoration of Human Rights Throughout
Cyprus." This Committee ascribes the problem of human rights
on the island to the 1974 Turkish military intervention and
the continued presence of Turkish troops in the north. The
Turkish Cypriot Human Rights Committee in turn denounces the
Greek Cypriot charges, stating that the Turkish troops are
present to protect Turkish Cypriot human rights. Such
exchanges continued in 1989.
The Republic of Cyprus has applied to have the question of
human rights in Cyprus placed on the agenda of the European
Commission of Human Rights. In addition, the Government of
Cyprus has repeatedly raised in international forums the
question of persons missing since 1974.
1070
Section 5 Disci imination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Food, shelter, education, and health care are usually
available to members of both communities regardless of race,
religion, ethnic background, or political opinion.
Nevertheless, there have been complaints that the welfare of
minorities in the north is impaired by Turkish Cypriot
restrictions on housing, education, and movement. The United
Nations Force in Cyprus monitors the welfare of the Greek
Cypriots and Maronites in the north, as well as that of the
Turkish Cypriots in the south.
Throughout Cyprus, women generally have the same legal status
as men. In the north, legal provisions exist requiring equal
pay for men and women performing the same job. In the south,
until recently, government workers received equal pay for
equal work, regardless of sex. In October a new law was
passed requiring equality of pay between men and women working
in the private sector.
Social taboos, traditions, and family honor shroud incidents
of wife and family abuse on Cyprus. Moreover, it is
understood that police files on incidents of domestic violence
are sometimes destroyed under the pretext that it is "a
personal matter." Several directors of the Crisis Center for
Family Violence in the south, nevertheless, have recently
reported that the number of domestic abuse cases, including
wife beating, is on the rise. The Crisis Center, as well as
several other support groups, has been established in part to
draw public attention to this problem and to encourage
governmental action in dealing with it.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Trade unions and confederations are free to organize in both
the north and south. For several years, however, the
Committee of Experts of the International Labor Organization
(ILO) has noted that Cypriot labor legislation restricting the
rights of trade unions to elect their representatives freely
is not in conformity with ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of
Association which Cyprus ratified in 1966. More than 80
percent of Greek Cypriot workers and 40-50 percent of Turkish
Cypriot workers belong to independent trade unions. Union
officials in the north, however, allege that the ruling party
has tended to exert its influence to split the labor movement,
especially in the government service sector, by supporting the
establishment of rival syndicates. In both communities, trade
unions freely and regularly take stands on public policy
issues affecting the workers.
All Cypriot workers have the right to strike. In general,
strikes are infrequent and usually of short duration. Both
the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot authorities
have the power to curtail strikes in what they deem to be
essential services. The Government of Cyprus did so once in
1989, in relation to a strike by the staff of the Cyprus Ports
Authority. In the north, authorities moved to ban a
veterinarians' strike which had run for 2 weeks. In 1989 the
Committee of Experts noted that essential services should be
more strictly interpreted in Cyprus as those whose
interruptions would endanger the life, personal safety, or
health of the whole or part of the population.
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Unions in both parts of Cyprus freely take part in
international meetings. Most unions are affiliated either
with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions or
with the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade
Unions. Labor unions, more than most other organizations on
Cyprus, attempt to maintain contact and cooperation across the
dividing line.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Under law and in actual practice, trade unions and
confederations are free to organize and to bargain
collectively in both parts of Cyprus. In both the north and
the south, parties to a dispute may request mediation by the
authorities. In both sectors, legislation prohibits dismissal
for participation in trade unions. There are no export
processing zones on either side of the demarcation line.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law, and no
instances were reported.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Government of Cyprus has set the minimum age of employment
of children in an "industrial undertaking" at age 16. In the
north, the age is 15. The law is effectively enforced in both
sectors by government labor inspectors.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
In the south, minimum wage laws exist for apprentices between
the ages of 16 and 18. The wage set for this group is equal
to about $250 per month. Minimum wages for other groups are
fixed through collective agreement. In the north, the minimum
wage equals about $100 per month. It is effectively enforced,
but by itself is not adequate to provide a decent living for
workers and their families. The Government of Cyprus has set
40 hours as the maximum number of hours of work per week
except for shop workers and drivers, who work no more than 42
1/2 hours. In the north, the maximum number of hours of work
per week in the winter is 38, and in the summer 36.
Occupational safety and health regulations are effectively
administered in both sectors, though the standards are not
equivalent to those in Western industrialized countries.
1072
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Until December 1989, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was
ruled as a centralized totalitarian state by the Communist
Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ) . The CPCZ leadership decided
all important political, economic, social, and cultural
questions and sharply limited the scope of individual human
rights. A brutal police attack on peaceful student
demonstrators on November 17, however, sparked massive street
demonstrations which led to the overthrow of the old Communist
leadership. In December the first Czechoslovak government
since 1948 in which a majority of ministers were not
Communists was installed, and the human rights activist,
Vaclav Havel, was elected President.
The new Government is led by Communist Prime Minister Marian
Calfa but includes ministers associated with the Civic Forum,
a new prodemocracy opposition group. The Government committed
itself to free elections, an economic reform program leading
to a market economy, and an overhaul of Czechoslovak laws
governing human rights.
The Government also pledged to gain control of the Ministry of
Interior, which includes a large, well-funded internal
security establishment used as an instrument of control by the
CPCZ. The new First Deputy Prime Minister, Jan Carnogursky,
who had been imprisoned for a portion of 1989 for his human
rights activities, was given primary responsibility for
restructuring the Ministry. In December the Government also
acted to disarm the People's Militia, the CPCZ ' s private
army. The militia has since been disbanded.
Czechoslovakia's centrally planned economy has allowed
virtually no private enterprise or ownership in manuf acuturing,
retail operations, agriculture, or services. In recent years,
the economy, characterized by excessive central planning,
obsolete equipment and infrastructure, and an almost complete
lack of incentives for innovation and initiative, had become
less competitive in world markets. The ministers responsible
for economic affairs in the new Government have committed
themselves to creation of a mixed economy responsive to the
demands of the marketplace.
The human rights situation worsened until November 1989. The
4-month imprisonment of playwright Vaclav Havel for his
peaceful participation in a January demonstration drew
international condemnation, but dozens of lesser known persons
were also sentenced to prison or fined for exercising their
freedoms of speech, assembly, and association provided in the
Constitution. Other human rights concerns included arbitrary
detention, arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home,
and correspondence, and restrictions on freedom of religion
and worker rights.
The following report primarily describes the human rights
situation as it existed before the November 17 student
demonstration which precipitated the overthrow of the CPCZ
leadership. Most of the practices that led to widespread
human rights abuses appeared to have been abandoned by year's
end, and important changes were being considered. The next
annual report is likely to include a significantly different
assessment of human rights practices.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No substantiated reports suggesting political or extrajudicial
killings came to public attention in 1989. A report that a
person named Tomas Smid had been killed by police during the
November 17 demonstration proved false, and the special
commission investigating the events of November 17 had not
found evidence that anyone had died as a consequence of the
police attack.
b. Disappearance
At year's end, the Government was unable to substantiate
reports that several students involved in November
demonstrations and strikes had disappeared.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The former government did not appear to practice a systematic
program of torture. However, several persons detained for
their participation in week-long demonstrations in January,
commemorating the death of student Jan Palach 20 years
earlier, were severely beaten by police. Czechoslovak
security officers on several occasions also attacked and beat
human rights activists, such as Petr Placak, Josef Kuhn, and
Stanislav Penc. In addition, Stanislav Devaty, while jailed
and awaiting trial, was chained to a bed in a cold cell for
several hours while dressed only in his underwear.
A 1989 Helsinki Watch report strongly criticized prison
conditions in Czechoslovakia. Generally, prison conditions
have been poor, especially the "third category" of imprisonment
(the harshest regime). Cells are usually small and unheated,
family visits and correspondence are strictly limited, and
prisoners report such punishments as reduction in pay and
limitations on free time, bathing, and exercise periods if
they fail to meet unrealistically high production standards.
Informed sources also reported that prisoners were assigned
hazardous work such as polishing crystal and costume jewelry
in environments lacking sufficient ventilation to prevent
glass fragments and chemicals from being inhaled. Sanitary
and medical facilities and diet were reported to be inadequate.
Former prisoners have reported that prison guards sometimes
encourage hardened criminals to prey on persons serving
sentences for political offenses. Prisoners or former
prisoners who complained publicly of mistreatment had been
severely punished and sometimes sentenced again for having
complained.
No consensus exists among independent observers regarding
whether or not there was widespread abuse of psychiatry in
Czechoslovakia. However, one case of possible psychiatric
abuse involved Augustin Navratil, the Catholic activist who
drafted a 31-point petition for religious freedom. In October
1988 Navratil was committed involuntarily to inpatient
psychiatric care for an indefinite period. This decision was
made despite an examination in September by Western physicians
who reportedly found Navratil 's mental condition to be within
1074
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
"normal parameters." Navratil was released from psychiatric
care in early 1989.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Until November, Czechoslovak citizens, especially human rights
activists, were frequently arrested, detained, interrogated,
and subjected to personal and home searches for the expression
of personal views. Judicial and police authorities often
explained such actions in legal terms and performed them with
warrants. They also arrested and detained citizens without
warrants. Under existing law, a person may be detained for
cause for up to 48 hours without being charged, although in
practice this limit was not always observed, and the
authorities used the discretionary powers of the prosecutor
general to extend such detentions. Searches, detentions, and
frequent interrogations were among the tactics used by the
regime when it decided to harass rather than to prosecute.
Dozens of activists from Charter 77 and other independent
initiatives were detained during the days before the August 21
anniversary of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the
October 28 anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovak
Republic. Other activists had been warned that they would be
detained if found in Prague and chose to remain outside the
city. None of those detained were charged with violations of
criminal law.
Detentions were also used before November as a means of
preventing human rights activists from attending meetings or
harassing them after a meeting. Members of the reform
Socialist club Obroda were detained and subjected to
interrogation on several occasions to prevent their attendance
at Obroda meetings. Security forces prevented the three
Charter 77 spokespersons, Vaclav Havel, Dana Nemcova, and
Tomas Hradilek from meeting together in September, and Havel
was detained in August in an apparent attempt to prevent his
attendance at a meeting of the Czech chapter of PEN, an
international writers' organization. Police detained members
of the Czechoslovak Helsinki Committee in September as
committee members left a meeting and then interrogated them
and confiscated their papers. One independent observer
believes there were hundreds, perhaps up to 1,000, such
detentions until November.
According to law, a detainee could be held in investigative
detention for 2 months if the authorities decided to press
charges. A detainee could generally receive visits by family
members only after a trial. Investigative detention could be
extended beyond 2 months at the request of the prosecution,
and detainees were sometimes held for long periods without
being brought to trial. Cultural activist Petr Cibulka was
held in detention for over a year while awaiting trial and was
allowed only one visit, from his mother, during the entire
period of detention.
Although the former government did not formally impose
internal exile or house arrest, it introduced in 1984, for the
first time, a regime of "protective supervision" which
combined features of both. Protective supervision included
travel restrictions, curfews, frequent searches of persons,
homes, and guests, and the obligation to report regularly--
sometimes as often as once a day--to the police. The
imposition of such a regime, intended for habitually violent
offenders, against persons who never committed or advocated an
1075
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
act of violence was a form of harassment that sharply
curtailed their freedom of movement and isolated them from
normal contact with those outside their home.
Since 1986 there have been no reports of the Government's use
of forced exile to rid itself of critics. Prior to that time,
people working or visiting abroad with official permission
were at times stripped of their citizenship and refused the
right to return. The authorities on occasion exerted heavy
pressure to emigrate on those who had already served a jail
sentence. If they refused, they and their families suffered
harassment, denial of jobs and schooling, and the threat of
rearrest. After a year or more of this treatment, some
ex-prisoners applied for emigration passports.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
According to Czechoslovak law, people charged with criminal
offenses are entitled to fair and open public trials. They
have a right to be informed concerning the charges against
them, to retain counsel, and to present a defense. In
practice, however, the exercise of these rights was often
reduced to a mere formality, especially where political
offenses were concerned.
The judiciary was not independent of the regime and the
Communist Party. In theory, judges could be removed only by
the Federal Assembly (national parliament) or by the Czech or
Slovak National Councils (regional parliaments). In practice,
they were subject to direct control and supervision by the
CPCZ, to which most judges belonged.
Defendants may either choose their own lawyers or request
court-appointed lawyers. However, lawyers were subject to
direct and indirect pressures from political authorities and
in the past did not always vigorously represent their clients.
In 1989, however, most independent observers believe defense
lawyers generally offered vigorous defenses in cases involving
political charges. Defendants occasionally succeeded in
having charges dismissed or reduced at the original trial, but
the prosecution could file an appeal, which sometimes resulted
in an increase in the sentence or additional charges.
In 1989 it was easier for friends of defendants, press
representatives, diplomats, and representatives of human
rights organizations to attend trials with political content.
Courtroom size on several occasions prevented all interested
observers from attending a trial, but there was no evidence of
manipulated assignment of courtrooms to limit attendance. The
authorities also resorted to a ticketing system for admission
to trials of particularly prominent human rights activists,
such as Vaclav Havel. In the Havel trial, there were no
diplomats in the handful of foreign observers who were
admitted.
Persons arrested for expressing personal views that took issue
with the Communist regime's official position generally were
charged with "subversion," "incitement," or "damaging the
interests of the republic abroad." Those arrested for
religious activities usually were charged with "obstructing
state supervision of churches and religious societies."
The former authorities also resorted to arbitrary or
trumped-up criminal charges (e.g., "hooliganism" or "illegal
enterprising") to punish those whose real offense was to
1076
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
engage in unauthorized political or cultural activity. The
hooliganism charge was used against some of those detained in
connection with January and August 1989 demonstrations in
Prague. A charge of illegal enterprising was the
prosecutorial tactic employed against Petr Cibulka.
The new Government has announced plans to revise the existing
penal code during 1990, focusing on both procedural and
substantive provisions of the law. Special attention will be
devoted to those provisions used in the past to prosecute
human rights and religious activists.
Figures available from the Committee for the Defense of the
Unjustly Persecuted (VONS) , which documents individual cases
to the best of its ability, suggest there were at least 25
political prisoners in Czechoslovak jails in 1989. However, a
sweeping amnesty signed in December by former President Gustav
Husak provided for the release of virtually all persons who
might have been imprisoned for political offenses. Among
those not covered by the amnesty were those convicted of
espionage. Indications are that the new Government, pursuant
to a request by VONS officials, will review the cases of
several persons whose convictions for espionage might have
been politically motivated.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The former government monitored and controlled the activities
of citizens whom it suspected of engaging in antiregime or
independent activity. Consequently, it also interfered with
privacy of communications.
Those who were considered opponents of the regime bore the
brunt of heavily intrusive surveillance. They, their families,
and their friends were subjected routinely to such measures as
electronic surveillance, home searches, tapping of telephones,
and interception and destruction of mail. The new Government
has begun the task of dismantling the special security units
which carried out these activities against human rights
activists and others considered enemies of the Communist
regime. It also transferred control of wiretap facilities
from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of
Transportation and Communication and ordered sealing of the
facilities .
Discrimination in employment was a regular aspect of the
harassment and persecution of dissidents and their families.
Instilling fear among intellectuals and white-collar workers
that their children might be denied higher education was a
factor in discouraging open dissent. These tactics were
discontinued after November.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although the Constitution provides for freedom of speech and
freedom of the press, it states that these freedoms must be
exercised "in accordance with the interests of the working
class." In effect, persons who voiced opinions publicly that
differed from party policy or that questioned the legitimacy
of party rule faced fines and imprisonment, especially when
they asked others who shared their opinions to join them.
1077
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Before November, for example, Stanislav Devaty was sentenced
to 20 months' imprisonment for circulating a petition in
support of political prisoners. Ivan Jirous and Jiri Tichy
were sentenced to 16 and 6 months respectively for circulating
a petition criticizing the Communist management of
Czechoslovakia since 1948, and Renata Panova was sentenced to
3 months' imprisonment for the distribution of political
leaflets .
As a consequence of the November demonstrations and the
installation of the new Government, persons were able to
exercise their right to freedom of speech without official
interference. The Government promised to enact new laws
formally guaranteeing freedom of speech no later than February
1990.
The former government also attempted to repress a petition
campaign centered around a document entitled "Nekolik Vet"
(Several Sentences). The document called, among other things,
for a release of political prisoners, respect for human rights,
a public discussion of a new constitution, and reevaluation of
the 1968 Soviet-led invasion which crushed the Prague Spring.
The petition was signed by about 40,000 people before the
events of November 17. Dozens of persons who collected
signatures for the petition were fined for their activities,
usually between $300 and $500 (i.e., in excess of 1 month's
wages for the average worker.) Two of the petition's four
"guarantors" of the signatures, Stanislav Devaty and Sasa
Vondra, were sentenced to prison terms after the petition drive
began, although their convictions were technically based on
other charges.
All domestic radio and televison broadcasting facilities are
government owned. Self -censorship of news and entertainment
programs under CPCZ guidelines was practiced, and there was no
opportunity for views contrary to CPCZ policies to be
expressed. However, beginning in late November a dramatic
change occurred as television and radio workers challenged the
former regime, and radio and television newscasts began
presenting objective reports of events. Opposition political
groups were also given air time to present their views.
In December 1988 the former government ceased jamming Radio
Free Europe broadcasts for the first time in two decades.
Voice of America and other Western radio broadcasts also were
not jammed. Many people who live near the country's western
or southern borders can routinely receive Western television
broadcasts while those in the interior of the country may do
so by means of special antennas or satellite dishes.
All officially recognized newspapers and magazines were
published and controlled by mass organizations of the National
Front (e.g., the Union of Socialist Youth, Revolutionary Trade
Union Movement, or Sports Federation.) These in turn were
controlled by the Communist Party. Legally published religious
literature and periodicals were subject to strict censorship
and were available only in limited editions. Publishing houses
and the news media, all state owned, employed self-censorship
under CPCZ guidelines. Editors who were insufficiently
vigilant suffered fines or dismissal. Nonetheless, even
before the events of November 17, some journalists took an
increasingly more critical line concerning government and
party policies. In the wake of November 17 the self-
censorship seen before all but disappeared.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The independent newspaper, Lidove Noviny, began publication in
1988. Although authorities refused to register the publication
officially and in 1989 imprisoned its two editors, Jiri Ruml
and Rudolf Zaman, the monthly continued to appear. Other
samizdat (self-published) material included a newsletter
entitled Informace O Charte 77 (Information About Charter 77),
which carried Charter 77 documents and VONS communiques
reporting human rights violations. In addition, an independent
new agency called the East European Information Agency was
formed in December 1988 and functioned throughout 1989,
providing reports to Western and other new media.
Some samizdat literature was sent abroad, where it was
reprinted in emigre publishing houses and then brought back to
Czechoslovakia. Persons engaging in independent publishing
activities in 1989 included Frantisek Starek, who received a
30-month sentence, plus 2 years' protective supervision, in
connection with the samizdat publications Vokno and Voknoviny
that he compiled and distributed.
During 1989 only a limited number of Western non-Communist
periodicals were imported, and these were usually not
available to ordinary citizens. No Western non-Communist
newpapers or newsmagazines were available to the general
public. Access to Western political publications was limited
to persons who had obtained special permission from their
employers or their universities documenting their need for the
material for official purposes.
At the end of 1989 virtually complete artistic freedom had
come to exist in Czechoslovakia. A public reading of a play
of Vaclav Havel, whose plays had been banned, had been given,
and plans were under way by several theaters to feature works
by Havel during 1590. In addition, one student group was
performing "Animal Farm," a previously banned work. Several
samizdat publications, such as the newspaper Lidove Noviny,
had also announced plans to begin regular publication.
Academic freedom, as it is known in the West, did not exist.
All universities and research institutes were operated by the
State or party, and all teaching and research was required to
conform to official requirements. In areas such as foreign
policy or contemporary history, these requirements narrowly
circumscribed the content of research and teaching to the
virtual exclusion of independent investigation, but discussion
concerning economic and environment issues was much freer than
several years ago. Somewhat greater freedom was also allowed
in scholarship not involving politically sensitive subjects.
Admission to study at the university level was based on party
connections and political reliability as well as merit.
Communist Party membership typically was a prerequisite to
advancement beyond lower level teaching positions, as was
basic conformity to orthodox opinions, at least superficially.
Academics were among those who were required to report
contacts with Westerners and an "official reason" was
typically needed to associate with Western diplomats.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Although the Constitution provides for freedom of assembly,
that freedom was severely limited in practice until November.
Public meetings could be held only with the permission of the
police, and this permission depended upon whether or not the
proposed meeting supported state objectives. A 1988 Prague
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ordinance banned independent demonstrations in the city's
historic Wenceslas and Old Town Squares, although state-
sponsored rallies continued to take place there. When the
authorities wished to have a large rally, such as May Day or
"peace" demonstrations, they exerted pressure on people to
attend.
In January 1989, police used tear gas, water cannon, dogs, and
baton charges to disperse crowds which peacefully gathered in
Prague's Wenceslas Square for a week-long series of
demonstrations to commemorate the anniversary of the 1969
self-immolation of Jan Palach. Vaclav Havel, Jana Petrova,
Miroslav Sramek, and Otakar Veverka all were convicted for
their participation in the demonstrations and served from 1 to
6 months in prison. Stanislav Penc, Petr Placak, Jana
Sternova, and Sasa Vondra were convicted for laying flowers on
Prague's Wenceslas Square to commemorate Jan Palach' s death,
but the sentences were suspended.
On May 1, a few hundred demonstrators attempted to mount a
counterdemonstration on Wenceslas Square in juxtaposition with
an officially sponsored May Day rally. Police broke up the
counterdemonstration and detained approximately 50 persons.
Among those detained was a British reporter who tried to
interview demonstrators.
On August 21, the 21st anniversary of the 1968 Soviet-led
invasion that put an end to the Prague Spring, the authorities
suppressed a peaceful demonstration in Prague. Several
thousand persons marched for more than 3 hours until police
finally dispersed the crowd, detaining 320 persons.
On October 28, the anniversary of Czechoslovakia's founding as
an independent state, a crowd of about 10,000 people gathered
in Wenceslas Square to call for freedom and democracy. Police
equipped with riot gear broke up the demonstration, arresting
at least 250 persons.
The November 17 demonstration started as an officially
sanctioned rally to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the
death of Jan Opletal, a student leader killed by the Nazi
Gestapo. The event was jointly sponsored by the Socialist
Youth Union and an independent student group. After the
completion of the official portion of the program,
demonstrators numbering up to 50,000 persons attempted to
march to Prague's Wenceslas Square, but were prevented from
doing so by a line of police equipped with riot gear. After a
peaceful stand-off of about an hour between the police and
demonstrators, the police and special antiterrorism units of
the Interior Ministry attacked the demonstrators, using
truncheons, tear gas, and dogs.
A special commission of the Federal Assembly investigating the
events of November 17 determined that at least 291 persons,
including 7 American journalists, were injured by the police
attack. Early reports that a student had been killed during
the attack proved false, and the special commission at year's
end had not unearthed evidence that anyone had died as a
consequence of the attack. Former Prague Communist Party
leader Miroslav Stepan and at least eight police officers
faced criminal charges for their role in the police attacks.
After November 17, massive demonstrations occurred in Prague
for 10 consecutive days, with crowds at times reaching
one-half million persons. Large demonstrations in Bratislava
24-900 O— 90 35
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
and other Czechoslovak cities occurred as well during this
period, and all of them without police interference.
The new Government has committed itself to sponsoring
legislation which would guarantee Czechoslovaks the right to
peaceful assembly. Such a right already existed in fact at
the end of 1989. The mayor of Prague promised that police
would not interfere with peaceful demonstrations, and several
took place without incident.
The former government did not permit the establishment of
independent associations. All social and other groupings were
required to register with the National Front, an umbrella
organization including the CPCZ and all legal political and
social groups.
In May 1987, the founding committee of a proposed organization
to be named the Society of Friends of the United States (SPUSA)
submitted a request for approval of its bylaws to the Ministry
of Interior. The organization was to be a voluntary, social
association within the framework of the National Front, and
dedicated to developing friendship, trust, and understanding
between Czechoslovakia and the United States. Following final
rejection of its application, SPUSA reorganized itself as an
informal "association." SPUSA was characterized by the
authorities as an antistate organization. SPUSA cofounder
Stanislav Devaty was sentenced to up to 20 months'
imprisonment in August, and other SPUSA activists were
subjected to repeated harassment by security officials.
Other citizens' groups subjected to official harassment or
unable to secure official recognition include the Independent
Peace Association, the Movement for Civil Liberties, Obroda,
the John Lennon Peace Club, and the Democrative Initiative.
Citizens interested in the environment and in the visual and
performing arts (including rock and punk groups,) although
also harassed, had some success in organizing independent
activities .
The former authorities in 1989 permitted establishment of an
"Art Forum" for the promotion of independent cultural
activities. The Art Forum was set up under the direction of
Karel Srp and Joska Skanik, formerly imprisoned leaders of the
Jazz Section.
After November, a multitude of independent organizations,
including political parties, were created by Czechoslovak
citizens. The new Government has not interfered or attempted
to regulate the formation or activities of such groups.
In 1989 meetings between citizens and foreign visitors to
Czechoslovakia generally passed without incident. Police in
July did detain Jiri Hajek, the Foreign Minister during the
Prague Spring, preventing him from lecturing to a group of
visiting West Germans concerning the 1968 reform program.
Other Czechoslovaks invited to speak to the same group were
warned they would be detained if they attempted to deliver a
lecture. In October Jeri Laber, a Helsinki Watch official,
was briefly detained with members of the Czechoslovak Helsinki
Conunittee when they attempted to meet in a Prague restaurant.
c. Freedom of Religion
"Scientific atheism" was part of the official ideology, and
freedom of religion, provided for in the Constitution, was
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strictly limited in practice. The former regime actively
discouraged all religious activity, especially among the
young. Teachers, policemen. Communist Party officials, and
members of certain other professions encountered problems in
their careers if they were seen in church.
The former government exercised strict control over all
religious affairs. Churches were required to register with it
in order to function legally in Czechoslovakia. Groups which
proselytize, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons, were
banned outright, and their members suffered frequent
harassment and arrest. Jehovah's Witnesses were reported in
several prisons, most apparently because of a refusal to serve
required military service, but there was no reliable estimate
of their number.
Organized religious practice was hampered by both written and
unwritten restrictions. For example, the ability of clergymen
to engage in religious work, including charitable endeavors
outside church premises, was severely restricted. The State
approved the assignments of clergymen and used its power to
harass those it deemed too popular or active. In addition,
clergymen were paid by the State and were required to obtain a
state license in order to practice. Such licenses were often
withdrawn without explanation. In 1989 two ministers of the
Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, Zvonimir Sorm and Pavel
Pokorny, lost their licenses as a consequence of their
relations with independent political groups. Estimates of the
number of clergymen who had lost their licenses vary, but they
are known to have included several bishops. Those who
continued to practice despite revocation of their licenses
were liable to criminal prosecution.
Religious instruction in the home was forbidden, although in
1989 there were no reports of interference by the former
government with such instruction. In the past, parents were
required to apply to local authorities if their children were
to receive religious education at state schools, but changes
in 1989 provided that requests for religious instruction were
to be made directly to a church representative. A student was
to be registered automatically for religious instruction if
both parents agreed. Instruction for Catholic children was
provided at school but was limited to 1 hour per week for
grades 2 through 7. Instruction for Protestant children took
place at church, as arranged between the leaders of each
religious denomination and the former government. School
authorities warned parents that participation in religious
classes could be damaging to a child's education and career
prospects .
Although the former government stated its intention to
increase the supply of religious literature, printing was
severely restricted, and Bibles were in short supply. Bibles
and other religious literature were smuggled in from abroad
and produced by underground samizdat methods. Government
efforts to confiscate smuggled religious materials or shut
down samizdat sources of materials appeared to have been less
extensive in 1989 than in previous years.
The authorities did not facilitate travel by religious
officials to and from Czechoslovakia unless the proposed visit
served the purpose of the State. In the case of the Catholic
Church, the former government did not invite Pope John Paul II
to visit Czechoslovakia despite Cardinal Tomasek's request
that an official invitation be issued and the existence of
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
petitions supporting such a visit signed by thousands of
persons. Priests and other religious leaders were frequently
denied permission to travel outside the country, although in
1989 denial of permission to travel was less frequent, and
Cardinal Tomasek and some 10,000 Czechoslovaks were allowed to
travel to Rome for the canonization of Agnes of Bohemia.
The State maintained all church property. In practice, this
meant that the vast majority of church property was very
poorly maintained. For many years, no proposed construction
of new Catholic churches had been approved. However, some
Protestant congregations--including Baptists--had been allowed
to build new churches.
The Roman Catholic Church is the largest of Czechoslovakia's
19 officially registered religious bodies. There are an
estimated 6 to 7 million Roman Catholics in the country, and
up to 300,000 members of the affiliated Greek Catholic
(Uniate) Church. The Greek Catholic Church was reestablished
in 1968 after having been forcibly united with the much
smaller Orthodox Church in 1950. However, the Greek Catholics
have been unable to reclaim much of their property, which
remains in the possession of the Orthodox Church.
In early 1989, only 2 of the country's 13 dioceses had
bishops. During the course of 1989, the former regime
approved the apoointment of four new bishops to fill empty
bishoprics. Students in Czechoslovakia's 2 remaining Catholic
seminaries (out of a prewar total of 13) needed state approval
to be admitted and ordained. Although the State in recent
years had raised the limits on the number of Catholic
seminarians, large numbers of qualified applicants were denied
admission to theological studies.
In 1950 all male religious orders were dissolved. A few
female religious orders were allowed to continue functioning
and for the first time since a brief period in 1968 were
allowed to admit a limited number of new members. Despite
these limitations, some Catholic monastic orders continued to
operate clandestinely.
In Slovakia there were several Catholic pilgrimages in 1989 in
which several hundred thousand people took part. There was no
substantial police interference with the pilgrimages, except
for one in Nitra where the authorities controlled the
pilgrimage's program.
"Pacem in Terris," the state-sponsored "peace association" of
Catholic clergy, had been a major instrument of state control
over the Catholic Church. The association had been losing
ground since 1982 when the Vatican banned clerical
participation in political organizations worldwide, and
Cardinal Tomasek and the overwhelming majority of Catholic
clergy in Czechoslovakia disassociated themselves from "Pacem
in Terris."
Protestant denominations registered by the authorities also
operated under state-imposed constraints. Proselytizing was
forbidden; religious ceremonies were mostly restricted to
church premises; and education of the clergy was closely
controlled. In 1989 the former government recognized another
Protestant denomination, the Apostolic Church of Bohemia.
Two Jewish community councils, one in the Czech lands and the
other in Slovakia, serve the Jewish community of several
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
thousand. These councils have been central religious
organizations financially supported and controlled by the
Government. There are synagogues and prayer houses open for
worship and two rabbis, one in Prague and one in Kosice.
Religious ritual articles and kosher meat are available in
limited supply. There is no rabbinical seminary. In late
December, the Czech Jewish Community (Council of Jewish
Communities of Bohemia and Moravia) in its first free election
in decades elected a highly respected former leader ousted
earlier by the regime because of his independence.
Officials of the new Government indicated they would support
repeal of a 1949 law regulating relations between the State
and churches, and churches therefore will be free to conduct
their own affairs without state interference.
Towards the end of 1989, the Minister of Culture of the new
Czechoslovak government advised Roman Catholic Church
officials that they were free to fill empty bishoprics without
gaining prior approval of the State, and the Vatican thereupon
named three new bishops, leaving four empty bishoprics at the
end of 1989. In addition, priests and ministers who had
previously lost their licenses to practice have been allowed
to return to religious work, including Father Vaclav Maly, a
former Charter 77 spokesman. The Catholic Church also
announced plans to open three additional seminaries. Those
priests who were still members of "Pacem in Terris" notified
Cardinal Tomasek in December that the organization had ceased
its activities and disbanded.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
For all Czechoslovaks, freedom of movement has been restricted
near military installations and along the borders with Austria
and the Federal Republic of Germany. Movement within the rest
of the country was not restricted for most citizens. However,
the former government restricted the movements of Charter 77
activists and other "suspect" persons, especially to prevent
their participation in independently organized activities.
During 1989 the former government eased regulations affecting
travel to the West. It also announced that it would lift the
exit permit requirement for private travel in 1990, an action
which in fact was taken after the events of November.
Travel by citizens of Czechoslovakia to East European
countries also was regulated. The new Government at year's
end had not taken action to alter these regulations.
Citizens deemed politically unreliable were often denied
permission to travel outside of Czechoslovakia. They often
were not provided with substantive reasons for the denials,
making it difficult to appeal the denials to higher
administrative authorities. In 1989 Czechoslovak authorities
temporarily stripped Charter 77 founder Jiri Hajek of his
passport after Hajek traveled to Norway to attend a conference
of the Socialist International, but the passport was later
restored to him. The new Government issued passports to many
persons who had formerly been denied them.
The right to emigrate has been extremely limited. In general,
only those wishing to join a foreign citizen spouse, or, in
the case of retired persons, foreign citizen children abroad.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
have had this right. In 1989 the former government eased a
series of restrictions affecting family reunification.
Emigration passports have not been valid for return without
special endorsement, and in some cases permanent exile has
been a condition for emigration or study abroad. Czechoslovak
authorities in 1989 decided administratively not to prosecute
persons who traveled or remained abroad without permission.
The law which punishes unauthorized travel remains on the
books, although authorities have indicated plans to
decriminalize such travel.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens have not had the right to change the political
leadership or the system of government. The Communist Party
leadership made all significant decisions regarding
government, economic, and social affairs. Real power was
exercised by only a few top-level officials in the party
presidium and secretariat. They determined who would be
placed in decisionmaking positions not only within their own
ranks but also throughout the Government, the economy, the
media, and mass organizations.
Ordinary citizens, especially those who were not CPCZ members,
had no role in selecting their leaders or in participating in
political or economic decisions. Four minor political parties
were permitted to exist and publish their own newspapers, but
they were required to accept the leading role of the CPCZ and
to conform to Communist Party directives. All parties and
mass organizations were incorporated in the National Front,
which was completely controlled by the Communist Party. Among
its tasks was the nomination of a single slate of candidates
to stand unopposed at all elections.
Under the enormous pressure exerted by massive street
demonstrations after November 17, the CPCZ agreed to delete
from the Constitution all references to the "leading role" of
the Communist Party. After roundtable talks with the umbrella
opposition group Civic Forum, an agreement was reached that a
government of National Understanding would be formed in which
members of the Communist Party would be a minority. Human
rights activist Vaclav Havel was elected President, and
Alexander Dubcek, CPCZ leader at the time of the Prague Spring
in 1968, was elected Chairman of the National Assembly. The
new Government of National Understanding has committed itself
to changes leading to a democratic, pluralistic society, and
has promised free, multicandidate elections during 1990.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The former government in Czechoslovakia generally reacted
negatively to expressions of concern about human rights
violations either by other governments or by nongovernmental
institutions. Officials of the former government, however,
discussed the subject of human rights with U.S. officials.
During 1989 representatives of the International Helsinki
Federation and Amnesty International were permitted to travel
to Czechoslovakia.
Three groups within Czechoslovakia have been and continue to
be concerned primarily with human rights issues. One is
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Charter 77, composed of persons who signed a document, first
made public in January 1977, which called on the former
government to honor its commitments under international
agreements on human rights, including the Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as
human rights provisions in the Czechoslovak Constitution. The
second group, VONS, has used public records and reports from
friends and relatives of the accused to issue communiques in
cases where it believes the police, the courts, or the prisons
have abused citizens' rights. The third group, the
Czechoslovak Helsinki Committee, was founded in October 1988
and has documented the degree of Czechoslovak compliance with
the human rights provisions of the Helsinki and subsequent
international agreements. Members of all these independent
groups were targets of official harassment.
The Committee of the Czechoslovak Public for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Cooperation, an officially organized and
recognized group, was founded in 1989. Members of the
committee met with independent human rights activists, but the
committee clearly was limited in its ability to be an
outspoken advocate for human rights under the former regime.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Health care, education, retirement, and other services are
provided without regard to race or sex. Membership in the
Communist Party conferred special access to goods and services
(including education, medical services, and consumer items),
and party officials received particularly favorable treatment,
but such special access is being brought to an end.
Women are equal under the law, and there are small numbers of
women in the professions. Women receive pay equal to that of
their male colleagues if they hold the same job.
Reliable statistics concerning the level of violence against
women, such as wife beating, are not available, but anecdotal
evidence suggests that violence against women is not
widespread. Although there are reports that police on
occasion have refused to respond to reports of intrafamily
violence, prosecutorial authorities generally accept and
conscientiously prosecute charges involving violence against
women.
Czechoslovakia has two major nationalities--Czechs and
Slovaks — and two substantial minorities — Hungarians and
Gypsies. Czechoslovakia provides certain guarantees for
minorities, but interethnic relations are still colored by
historic animosities. Hungarians, who are concentrated in
southern Slovakia, form the country's largest minority
(600,000, according to official statistics). The State
provides some primary and secondary education in Hungarian and
permits a limited number of ethnic Hungarians to pursue higher
education in Hungary. Ethnic Hungarians complain, however,
that Hungarian-language instruction at the elementary and
secondary levels is being reduced, and that the lack of
opportunities for higher education in Hungarian is creating a
growing shortage of qualified Hungarian-language teachers.
Gypsies, who number about 300,000, are the only other sizable
minority. They tend to suffer disproportionately from high
rates of poverty, crime, and disease. Their problems appear
to result more from traditional and popular prejudice than
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
from government policies. Some observers, however, complain
that government policies attempted to pressure Gypsies to
assimilate rather than preserve their distinct identity.
Approximately 30,000 Vietnamese laborers are temporarily
working and residing in Czechoslovakia. Reportedly, they are
allowed to retain two-thirds of their salary. The remainder
is shared by the Czechoslovak and Vietnamese Governments.
There are also reports that any Vietnamese who marries a
Czechoslovak citizen is required to pay about $5,000 to the
Government of Vietnam to secure permission to stay in
Czechoslovakia .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have not had the right to associate freely or to
strike. They could not establish and join organizations of
their own choosing without previous authorization. An attempt
to establish an independent trade union in the early 1980*s
was suppressed. The Czechoslovak labor union umbrella
organization, the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (ROH),
has been a mass organization strictly controlled by the
Communist Party. Membership in official trade unions was
virtually obligatory for workers. The ROH was affiliated with
the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions,
whose headquarters are in Prague.
Efforts to form independent labor unions were under way at the
close of 1989. These efforts were attempting to transform
strike committees which had been formed at various enterprises
into the basic units of a new labor organization. In
additici, a grass roots revolt by the membership of the ROH
had led to a turnover in its leadership, and some persons
advocated using ROH structures as the basis for a new
independent labor organization. The Government of National
Understanding at year's end had not presented legislation
which would formally allow or regulate the formation of
independent labor organizations. Legislation permitting
workers to strike is anticipated in 1990.
In 1989 both the Committee of Experts and the Conference
Committee on Application of Conventions and Recommendations
(CACR) of the International Labor Organization (ILO) examined
the single trade union system embodied in the Labor Code which
accords special status to the ROH, as well as the absence of
freedom of association for workers of collective farms. A
government representative stated that the Government was
looking for a solution, but the CACR regretted that no changes
had yet been made with a view to implementing ILO Convention
87.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers have not had the right to organize or engage in
collective bargaining. Special economic incentive zones do
not exist in Czechoslovkia .
Amendments in December 1988 to the labor code generally
strengthened the powers of management, which now may:
terminate a worker's employment with 2 months' (instead of
6 months') notice, giving no reason; terminate a worker's
employment for any serious infringement of work discipline
instead of for major or repeated inf ringement(s) ; search the
1087
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
work force coming to and leaving work; check for alcohol
intoxication and drug use; reduce workers' wages for producing
substandard products; extend a worker's probationary period
from 1 to 3 months; and determine independently timework,
piecework, and other wages, bonuses, and rewards. Under the
amendments, workers became eligible for leave after 60 days on
the job instead of 5 months, and maternity leave without pay
was lengthened to 3 years.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced labor in Czechoslovakia. However, "work
education" was required of prisoners. Former prisoners report
that convicts faced higher norms (quotas), lower pay, and
poorer working conditions than did ordinary workers.
The current Constitution affirms the right to work. In
practice, persons considered politically unreliable by the
former regime were barred from professional positions and
forced into menial, low-paid jobs such as coal stokers and
nightwatchmen. The ILO has condemned this practice and has
called for amendment of the so-called parasitism law. .
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for full-time employment is 16, although
younger persons may accept part-time employment. The law is
effectively enforced.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The average workweek is 42.5 hours. Beyond 45 hours, workers
are paid overtime, and there are additional bonuses for some
shift and weekend work. The retirement age is 60 years for
men, while women may retire between the ages of 54 and 57,
depending on the number of their children. The average
pension is 55 percent of the average wage, an amount which can
be insufficient to meet a citizen's needs if not supplemented
from other sources. A welfare system does exist to supplement
these resources if need can be demonstrated.
There has been a nominal labor shortage induced by low
productivity and the underutilization of the labor force. The
need for unskilled and semiskilled labor has been filled in
part by workers from Communist countries.
Working conditions appear generally acceptable, although far
less attention is paid to occupational safety and health than
in most advanced industrial economies. Industrial equipment
which is obsolete by Western standards complicates issues of
occupational safety. The problem of environmental pollution,
especially in heavily industrialized areas and in industries
in which environmental safeguards have been neglected, has
become acute for the general population.
Czechoslovakia does not have a state-wide, legally mandated
minimum wage. However, individual ministries establish wage
scales of economic enterprises. Workers appear to be able to
secure minimally acceptable standards of living for themselves
and their families based on these wage scales.
As of December 1989, the Government of National Understanding
had not introduced legislation which would alter statutory
provisions governing working conditions.
1088
DENMARK
Denmark is a constitutional monarchy with a strong tradition
of democratic parliamentary rule. Queen Margrethe II as
titular Head of State has a mainly symbolic role. A cabinet
led by the Prime Minister and accountable to the unicameral
Folketing (parliament) leads the Government. A minority
coalition government led by the Conservative Party has ruled
since 1982.
Denmark has a unified national police force. A small
intelligence service operates as a section of the police. Its
director is a civil service lawyer, and it is subject to an
intelligence oversight committee of the Folketing.
An advanced industrial state, Denmark has a mixed economy
combining private and public ownership. The Government is
seeking ways to reduce the public sector's share of the
economy. Personal freedoms and the right to pursue private
interests and to hold private property are protected by law
and respected in practice.
Deeply-rooted democratic principles, an egalitarian tradition,
a lively press, and highly developed educational and social
welfare systems have made Denmark a leading defender of human
rights in the world. This continued in 1989. The
Constitution establishes the Folketing 's "Ombudsman," to whom
any citizen may protest if he or she feels wrongly or
unreasonably treated by any national or municipal authority.
Denmark participates actively in a number of international
commissions concerned with the protection and preservation of
human rights. It will host in 1990 the second meeting of the
Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no political or extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no abductions, disappearances, secret arrests, or
clandestine detentions.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There was no torture or inhuman treatment. An innovative
Center for Torture Victims, supported by the Foreign Ministry
and located at Copenhagen's municipal hospital, treats
patients in the refugee community, assists torture victims,
and contributes to hindering the use of torture worldwide.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
No person in Denmark may be deprived of personal liberty
without due process of law. Arrestees must appear before a
judge within 24 hours. They may be held indefinitely in
preventive detention, frequently in isolation, although a
judge must periodically review and approve such detention.
Bail is permitted. There are no exiles.
1089
DENMARK
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Danish legal system consists of a series of courts, local
and regional, up to the Supreme Court. Trials are usually
public; judges may make exceptions to this rule in a few
circumstances, such as paternity and divorce trials. In
criminal cases, trials are only closed when necessary to
protect a victim's privacy, such as in rape or child
molestation cases or when a witness' identity must be
protected.
The rights of the accused are carefully protected. Defendants
have the right to be present, to confront witnesses, and to
present evidence. They enjoy the presumption of innocence.
Indigent defendants have the right to an attorney at
government expense and may also change this attorney. The
judiciary is fully independent. There are no political
prisoners .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
A constitutional prohibition against searching homes, seizing
and examining papers, and breaching secrecy of communications
without a judicial order is respected in practice.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure
freedom of speech and press. There is no censorship.
Criticism of the Government is not a punishable offense.
Academic freedom is respected.
There is one large state-owned radio and television company.
Editorial control is exercised by a board independent of the
Government. A second channel, one-third government
subsidized, opened in 1988. Programs critical of the
Government appear on both channels.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Danes may freely assemble and form associations. Public
meetings require permits, which are routinely given. Police
may by law be present at any event which may endanger the
peace. Any organization may affiliate with international
bodies in its field.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Under the Constitution, the Evangelical Lutheran Church is the
state church and receives a large subsidy. However, religious
freedom is guaranteed to all. No religion is banned or
discouraged; conversion is unrestricted. No one may be
discriminated against for religious beliefs. Missionaries are
freely given entry but are restricted in practice from staying
more than 2 years. A number of foreign clergy serve
expatriate and Danish congregations.
1090
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Danes have full freedom of travel and movement. Refugees are
never repatriated against their will.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Danes have the right to change their government. The Prime
Minister is appointed by the monarch after consultation with
the parties in the Folketing. The Folketing's 179 members are
elected in free and open elections under a complex system of
proportional representation designed to help small parties and
to reflect the popular vote. In the 1988 election, 12 parties
competed, of which 8, representing a wide range of political
beliefs, achieved more than the 2 percent of the vote needed
to obtain representation in the Folketing. The current
Government is a three-party minority coalition.
Danes over 18 years of age may vote. Resident foreigners may
vote and run in local elections. Elections occur at least
every 4 years, or by a decision of the Prime Minister, a
parliamentary vote of no confidence, or the Government's
resignation.
The territories of Greenland and the Faroe Islands have
democratically elected home-rule governments with broad powers
encompassing all but foreign and security affairs. They each
have two seats in the Folketing. Greenlanders and Faroese are
full Danish citizens and enjoy the same level of human rights
as in Denmark.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Denmark is party to various international human rights
conventions that promote and protect human rights. Human
rights organizations operate freely. The Danish Center of
Human Rights is a private government-funded institution for
conducting research and providing information on human rights
issues.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Denmark provides food, shelter, health care, and education to
all inhabitants regardless of race, religion, sex, ethnic
background, or political opinion. However, the inflow of
ethnically dissimilar refugees (mostly Iranians, Palestinians,
Lebanese, and Sri Lankans) who require public assistance has
provoked tensions between native Danes and immigrants. These
tensions worsened perceptibly during 1989. A December 1988
poll sponsored by the European Community (EC) showed Danes in
first place among EC countries for their support of racist
movements, tied for first place in their support for
restricting the rights of foreigners, and in second place in
their opposition to immigrants. A group called "Stop
Immigration" contested the 1989 Copenhagen city council
elections but won no seats. A Pakistani woman was nominated
by a leftwing party to run for a safe seat on the city council
and should become its first elected immigrant member.
1091
DENMARK
Denmark has eliminated laws containing sex discrimination
provisions. Women hold positions of authority throughout
society though they are much less represented at the top of
the business world.
There is no tolerance, in law or in practice, of violence or
abuse against women. Crimes against women are considered
serious and are investigated with increasing vigor. However,
independent experts estimate that less than 2 percent of all
cases of domestic violence are reported to authorities.
Denmark has no rape and domestic violence prevention
programs. There are, however, 30 special crisis centers
nationwide for counseling and housing of victims which are
supported by municipal governments and voluntary workers and
donations .
In 1989 Denmark became the first nation ever to grant
homosexual partnerships legal standing and to give homosexual
partners many of the same legal rights as heterosexuals.
Also, a 1922 law requiring mentally ill and retarded persons
to obtain special permission in order to marry was repealed.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
All workers, including military personnel and the police, have
the right to associate freely in unions of their choosing.
Some 90 percent of Danish wage earners belong to unions.
Unions are independent of the Government and may freely
affiliate with international organizations. All but civil
servants have the right to strike, and this right is
frequently exercised.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers and employers acknowledge each other's right to
organize. Collective bargaining is widespread. Salaries,
benefits, and working conditions are agreed upon in
quadrennial negotiations between the Employers Association and
the Confederation of Labor Unions, which has 1.4 million
members (half of Denmark's labor force), and are used as
guidelines by the rest of the labor market. In case of
disagreement, an issue may be referred to a labor court made
up of management and labor representatives and an independent
member. The decisions of the court are binding.
The conditions surrounding the establishment of a Danish
International Ship's Register in 1988 were the subject of a
complaint to the International Labor Organization (ILO). The
ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association in 1989 urged the
Government to enact legislation which would ensure that full
and voluntary collective bargaining is open to all seafarers,
including foreign nationals, employed on Danish-flag ships.
There are no export processing zones in Denmark or its
territories .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited and does not exist.
1092
I2EHMAEK
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for full-time employment is 15. The law
describes detailed specific limitations to work which may be
one by those aged 15 to 18. The law is rigorously enforced.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Danish law prescribes acceptable conditions of work, including
safety and health; the duties of employers, supervisors, and
employees; work performance; rest periods and days off; and
medical examinations. It also establishes a labor inspection
service which ensures compliance with labor legislation.
There is no minimum wage, but the lowest hourly wage set in
any national labor agreement is $9, which is adequate to
ensure a family a decent living. Danes are guaranteed 5
weeks' paid vacation a year and a 38-hour workweek.
Similarly, work conditions are negotiated by means of
collective bargaining in Greenland with some variations from
the pattern in Denmark due to different levels of
development. A major issue in collective bargaining
negotiations in Greenland is the wage differential between
indigenous and temporary Danish workers which arises because
of the need to attract skilled workers from Denmark. This
caused a major long-term strike by government workers in
1989. All parties in the Greenlandic Parliament have agreed
to discontinue the differential soon. Another major
difference is that no unemployment compensation is paid in
Greenland unless a collective bargaining agreement
specifically includes it. The Greenlandic tradition of
spending part of a year hunting and fishing has slowed the
evolution of a concept of unemployment. Because of this
phenomenon and the lack of resources, Greenland has postponed
establishing a legislatively mandated unemployment
compensation system.
1093
ESTONIA
Estonia, an independent state between the two World Wars, was
annexed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.)
in 1940 as a constituent republic. The United States does not
recognize the forcible incorporation of Estonia into the
U.S.S.R.
Like the other Baltic states, Estonia has generally been
subjected to the same centralized rule, the same Constitution
and judicial system, and the same restrictions on civil and
political liberties as the Soviet Union. Political power has
been exercised by the leadership of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, which tightly controlled the activities of local
government and Communist Party structures in Estonia.
Estonians have taken advantage of liberalization in the Soviet
Union since 1988 to exert greater control over their own
affairs. Responding to mass public pressure demanding
political democracy and respect for human rights, the Estonian
Supreme Soviet (parliament) adopted a "Declaration of
Sovereignty" and constitutional amendments in November 1988,
declaring that its laws superseded those of the U.S.S.R.
Supreme Soviet. In response to both the Estonian declaration
and related developments in other Republics, the Supreme
Soviet Presidium voted on November 10, 1989, to instruct all
15 Republic Supreme Soviets to bring their laws into
conformity with all-Union law and the Soviet Constitution. By
the end of 1989, however, no action had been taken to enforce
this declaration. The Estonian Supreme Soviet declared in
November 1989 that Estonia had been illegally incorporated
into the Soviet Union in 1940.
The primary law enforcement organization is the militia
(police). The powerful Committee for State Security (K.G.B.),
special troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (M.V.D.),
and the regular Soviet armed forces, which maintain a
significant presence in Estonia, can be assumed to take orders
from authorities in Moscow. Although K.G.B. surveillance is
assumed to continue, there were few reports of human rights
violations in 1989 by the security and military apparatus.
The standard of living in Estonia is higher than the Soviet
average, but the margin is shrinking. Estonians resent the
fact that much of the national income they create is
transferred to other Republics and that most major economic
enterprises are controlled by central ministries in Moscow.
They also complain about a continuing decline in the quality
and quantity of food supplies and consumer goods. In May the
Estonian Supreme Soviet adopted a plan for a transition to
economic autonomy to begin on January 1, 1990, with future
relations between the Estonian and Soviet economies to be
based upon mutual agreements. The U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet in
November voted to grant Estonia control over its land,
resources, banks, and a portion of state-run industry.
For the second year in a row, the human rights situation in
Estonia improved markedly. As in the latter half of 1988, the
authorities tolerated public expressions of Estonian national
sentiment and independent political views which had previously
been repressed. For the first time since annexation by the
Soviet Union, relatively free multicandidate elections were
held both to the U.S.S.R. Congress of People's Deputies and to
local government councils. The independent prodemocratic mass
organization, the Estonian People's Front, was officially
registered as a sociopolitical movement, and the right of ^
1094
ESIQHIA
other independent organizations to freedom of association was
generally respected. Limited progress was made, both in
Estonia and the Soviet Union, toward legislative reforms that
would help to institutionalize human rights improvements.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no confirmed cases of such killing in 1989. The
15-year-old daughter of former political prisoner Enn Tarto,
an advocate of Estonian independence, was shot to death in
1989 under mysterious circumstances.
b. Disappearance
There were no known instances of permanent or prolonged
disappearances .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
In Estonia, as in the Soviet Union, harsh treatment of
prisoners occurs during both interrogation and confinement in
labor camps, prisons, or psychiatric hospitals. Physical and
psychological abuse of prisoners, as well as detention under
extremely unhealthful conditions, are common. Estonians in
1989 remained concerned about reports that Estonian youths are
subjected to physical abuse, beatings, and degrading treatment
in the Soviet armed forces.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Soviet laws are written and interpreted so broadly that
persons may be arrested and convicted for trying to exercise
their basic human rights. During 1989, however, the
authorities in Estonia did not use these laws to arrest
political activists.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Despite provisions for judicial objectivity in both the
Estonian and Soviet Constitutions, the State retains the
ability to control the judicial process and arbitrarily
determine the outcome of trials. Procedural safeguards, such
as the right to a public trial and to a defense attorney, are
generally respected but are not sufficient to guarantee fair
trials. Reforms to strengthen the rights of defendants have
been proposed but were not implemented in 1989.
There were no known trials on purely political charges in
1989, and no Estonians were known to be imprisoned for purely
political reasons at the end of 1989.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government continued to interfere in personal life through
the use of informers, monitoring of mail and telephones,
surveillance, and other means. The security apparatus did
1095
ESTONIA
little, however, to intimidate Estonians or to hinder the
virtual explosion of social and political activism which began
in 1988 and continued through 1989. Advocates of Estonian
independence reported that obvious surveillance of their
movements declined in 1989.
Contacts between Estonians and visitors from foreign countries
continued to be monitored, despite a considerable increase in
such contacts during 1989. Although many Estonians continued
to assume that telephones and mail were monitored, they
exhibited little fear of using these means of communications
to express their views.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Soviet Constitution provides for most internationally
accepted political liberties on the condition that exercise of
them does not threaten the security of the Socialist system.
The Estonian Constitution was amended in 1988 to include the
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, as well as other internationally recognized
human rights instruments, as "an inseparable part of the legal
system. "
In previous years, the authorities had interpreted all such
constitutional guarantees to fit the convenience of the
State. Vague Soviet laws prohibiting "anti-Soviet agitation
and propaganda" and "anti-Soviet slander", which had
frequently been used in previous years to punish Estonian
human rights and political activists, were replaced in 1989 by
a more limited provision which specifically outlaws calls for
the "violent overthrow" of the Soviet system.
In 1989, freedom of speech was widely respected. The
authorities tolerated public expression of virtually any
viewpoint, including criticism of Soviet officials and calls
for tne immediate withdrawal of Soviet "occupation" troops
from Estonia. Several hundred thousand Estonians signed a
petition calling for annulment of Estonia's 1940 "request" to
join the U.S.S.R. Display of Estonian national symbols, which
had been repressed until mid-1988, was extremely widespread
and officially sanctioned in 1989
The range of subjects covered by official Estonian television,
radio, and publications continued to expand in 1989. Print
and electronic media devoted considerable attention to the
50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Nonaggression Pact
between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The media also
publicized the secret protocols that became the basis for the
Soviet occupation and annexation of the Baltic states. The
Pact and the protocols were widely republished in 1989 by
Estonian newspapers, which also provided extensive treatment
of the Soviet Union's 1940 occupation. Reports in the
Estonian media on events in other areas of the Soviet Union,
including such incidents as the April 9 killings by Soviet
military forces in Tbilisi, tended to be much more timely and
open than the reports provided by the central Soviet media.
The Estonian media provided extensive information about the
positions of candidates in the spring elections for the
U.S.S.R. Congress of People's Deputies and in the December 10
local elections, and they regularly reported on the views of
Baltic deputies to the Soviet Parliament. These views
1096
ESIQNIA
frequently differed from those of the political leadership in
Moscow, particularly when the Central Committee of the Soviet
Communist Party issued a harshly critical statement about the
Baltic opposition movements on August 26. The Baltic
responses included calls for the repeal of Article 6 of the
Soviet Constitution, which provides for the "leading role" of
the Communist Party.
While self-censorship was exercised in varying degrees by
individual editors and journalists, no political subject
remained off-limits in 1989. Articles advocating the
reestablishment of Estonian independence appeared in numerous
publications, as did articles opposing the service of young
Estonians in the Soviet armed forces.
Among the issues on which Estonians expressed themselves most
strongly in 1989 was the state of the environment. They were
particularly concerned about the impact of oil shale mining in
northwestern Estonia as well as the harmful environmental
effects of aircraft using a military airfield near the
historic university town of Tartu. Official censorship was
apparently used to prevent the publication of such "state
secrets" as operational military information, but the military
draft and the environmental consequences of military bases
were subjects addressed by the media. There was one report
that military authorities had threatened to draft journalists
who had written critical articles about the military.
Despite the extraordinarily open nature of the Estonian press,
most publications remained under the formal control of the
Communist Party or other official organizations. Independent
publications were produced legally by the Estonian People's
Front, the Estonian Heritage Society, a Jewish cultural
society, and some other nonofficial organizations.
Unauthorized (samizdat) publications were also produced and
distributed by various groups without hindrance from the
authorities, although the opinions in such publications were
increasingly available in the official press.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The peaceful assembly of citizens is controlled by the
authorities, who retain the power to prohibit public
gatherings. Soviet guidelines on demonstrations and meetings
are contained in a 1988 decree confirmed by the U.S.S.R.
Supreme Soviet, but the Estonian Supreme Soviet declined to
adopt relevant implementing legislation.
In practice, the people of Estonia were allowed to hold mass
meetings and demonstrations without hindrance from the
authorities in 1989. Many of these meetings took place on
anniversaries of historical events, commemoration of which had
been repressed in previous years.
The Presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet declared February
24, the independence day of the interwar Estonian Republic, to
be officially commemorated as the "Day of Restoration of
Estonian Statehood." Leading Estonian Communist Party and
government leaders participated along with People's Front
leaders in public ceremonies attended by thousands of people
as the blue, black, and white flag of the independent
Republic, now recognized officially as Estonia's national
flag, was raised over the symbolic Tall Hermann tower in
central Tallinn. It replaced the red state flag of the
Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic.
1097
ESTONIA
Hundreds of thousands of Estonians joined hands August 23 in
the first link of a 2-million-person human chain that extended
through Latvia and Lithuania as a sign of protest marking the
50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Participants
in the demonstrations and related meetings ranged from members
of the Estonian People's Front and many other nonofficial
organizations, including the Estonian National Independence
Party (ENIP), to the leaders of the Estonian Communist Party
and Government. The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist
Party criticized these events in an August 26 statement as
"nationalist hysteria."
The Estonian Constitution provides for the right to associate
in public organizations and movements (such as the People's
Front), but this right had been limited in previous years by
legislation and repressive practices. A new law concerning
official registration of public organizations was adopted in
1989, requiring the Government to review applications promptly
and explain the reasons for any refusals. The People's Front
was officially registered, as were the ecological "Green"
movement and many other groups, but ENIP and other political
parties were not registered.
While continuing to exercise a measure of control over mass
organizations associated with the Communist Party, the
authorities have acquiesced in the rapid growth of both
registered and unregistered clubs, professional associations,
and other organizations. There were no reports of significant
harassment of any of these groups.
In 1989 a coalition of ENIP, the Estonian Heritage Society,
and the Christian Union began an effort to form Estonian
Citizens' Committees and eventually to convene a Congress of
Estonia. Estonian citizens were defined as persons who had
been citizens of the Estonian Republic in 1940 as well as
their descendants, while other residents of Estonia were
invited to submit applications for Estonian citizenship.
Despite criticism from the authorities, who feared that the
Citizens' Committees would represent a form of parallel
political power, over 500,000 persons had registered by year's
end.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Although the Soviet Constitution provides for the right to
profess, or not to profess, any religion, both the party and
Government promote atheism. The authorities continued to
improve their relations with organized religion in 1989.
Christmas was celebrated as an officially sanctioned holiday
for the second consecutive year, and religious services were
sometimes shown on television. Top Estonian political leaders
held highly publicized meetings with leaders of the Republic's
religious communities, and there were no reports of significant
church-state conflicts. Nevertheless, state control of
religion continued to be formally governed by repressive 1929
Soviet legislation, as neither the U.S.S.R. nor Estonian
Supreme Soviet adopted a new law to guarantee freedom of
conscience.
1098
ESTONIA
t
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement is neither guaranteed by law nor fully
permitted in practice, although Soviet officials have publicly
pledged to bring their legislation into conformity with
international standards. The right to emigrate by choice is
not recognized by Soviet law, and persons wishing to leave
temporarily are generally required to present an invitation
from abroad. Many Soviet Jews in Estonia were denied
permission to emigrate in previous years, but the upsurge in
Soviet Jewish emigration has had a positive effect on Jewish
emigration from Estonia as well.
Although travel abroad is limited by restrictive legislation
and arbitrary enforcement, bureaucratic procedures are
considerably less cumbersome in Estonia than in the Soviet
Union as a whole. For the second consecutive year, there was
a dramatic upsurge in the number of Estonians visiting the
United States and other Western countries in 1989. Leading
figures in all of the Republic's main political movements,
including the People's Front and groups favoring immediate
Estonian independence, visited Western countries to present
their views. An unprecedented number of Estonian-Americans,
other emigres, and persons of Estonian descent were able to
visit Estonia in 1989, with many visitors permitted to visit
areas that are formally "closed" to foreigners.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Until 1989 the peoples of Estonia and the Soviet Union had not
been free to change government leaders or the system of
government. For the first time in postwar Estonian history,
however, representatives to the U.S.S.R. Congress of People's
Deputies (the federal legislature) and to Estonia's local
Soviets (government councils) were chosen in 1989 by secret
ballot, on the basis of universal suffrage, in relatively free
multicandidate elections.
Although alternative parties could not formally participate in
the Estonian elections, nominating procedures were
sufficiently flexible to permit nomination of candidates with
a very broad range of political views. Unlike many areas of
the Soviet Union, there was no apparent manipulation of the
candidate registration process to exclude "troublesome"
candidates from the ballot in Estonia. While many Communist
Party leaders were elected or reelected to their posts, others
— including the chief of the K.G.B. for Estonia--were
defeated. Most of the successful candidates campaigned with
the active support of the Estonian People's Front, which was
able to nominate candidates on its own authority in the local
elections. In heavily Russian districts, however, successful
candidates included leaders of the predominantly Russian-
speaking "Intermovement" and "United Councils of Work
Collectives . "
The spring elections to the U.S.S.R. Congress were boycotted
by the Estonian National Independence Party, which opposed
participation in elections to the legislature of Estonia's
"occupying power." Participation in these elections was
nevertheless very high, over 80 percent. Several
predominantly Russian organizations favored a boycott of the
December 10 elections to local government councils as a
protest against the residence requirement for candidates to
1099
ESTONIA
local office as well as other legislation which allegedly
discriminates against non-Estonians. While the boycott
reduced the turnout somewhat, a majority of voters took part
in the local elections.
Although the Estonian Parliament and Government were not
democratically elected, in 1989 they were frequently
responsive to the sentiments of popular movements and the
general public. Draft laws were circulated and amended on the
basis of constituents' expressed interests, and the agenda for
government action was heavily influenced by the People's
Front, a leader of which — Edgar Savisaar — was appointed as a
Deputy Prime Minister in 1989. The Estonian Supreme Soviet
condemned the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and endorsed reports
which characterized the Republic's incorporation into the
Soviet Union in 1940 as illegal.
Multicandidate elections to the Estonian Supreme Soviet were
scheduled to be held on March 18, 1990, potentially providing
the people of Estonia with their first opportunity in postwar
history to determine the composition of their own parliament
and government.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Soviet Government has adopted a more forthcoming approach
to foreign criticism of its human rights record in recent
years, acknowledging that human rights are a legitimate
subject of official diplomatic contacts. In the case of
Estonia, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet's Presidium was involved
in a dispute with Estonian authorities over alleged human
rights violations. The central Government accused the
Estonian Supreme Soviet of violating the human rights of its
non-native population by adopting a 2-year residence
requirement for voters in Estonian local elections.
Although there were few other allegations of human rights
violations in Estonia in 1989, the Estonian Government
generally welcomed foreign and nongovernmental observers on
any subject.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or other grounds is
prohibited in the Constitution. Tensions between ethnic
Estonians and Russians, however, are always near the surface
in Estonia where a lov; Estonian birthrate and an official
Soviet settlement policy have caused the ethnic Estonian
proportion of the population to fall from 92 percent in 1939
to approximately 60 percent in 1989. These tensions were
expressed in heated debates over a number of issues. Ethnic
Estonians continued to complain that they could not always
conduct business in their own language, that immigrants from
the Soviet Union receive favored treatment in the provision of
housing and other social services, and that nonresidents
frequently visited Estonia in order to buy out the Republic's
relatively well-stocked stores.
The Estonian Supreme Soviet adopted a detailed language law to
provide Estonian language training and to require that
incumbents of certain management and service positions will
eventually be bilingual. Regulations were issued to prevent
1100
ESTONIA
nonresidents of Estonia from purchasing goods which are in
short supply, and measures to control immigration were under
consideration in 1989. Ethnic Russian and other Russian-
speaking residents of Estonia were generally concerned by the
Estonian language law, and many also objected to the Estonian
economic autonomy plan, which asserted the "priority"
interests of the native Estonian population and called for the
the Republic to assume control over enterprises which are
currently subordinate to Moscow-based ministries. Russian-
speaking workers constitute a significant percentage of the
work force at such enterprises.
In the absence of a citizenship law, the Estonian Supreme
Soviet adopted a requirement of 5 years' residence in a local
district, or 10 years in Estonia, in order to stand as a
candidate for local office.
Although the number of persons negatively affected by the
local elections law was relatively small, representatives of
the Russian-speaking population complained that it would have
the effect of retroactively disenfranchising voters who had
recently moved to Estonia. They also noted that it would
affect very few ethnic Estonians, most of whom could meet its
requirements for a total of 5 or 10 years' residence in the
Republic. In July and August, at least 40,000 predominantly
Russian workers staged a political strike in the Estonian
cities of Tallinn and Kohtla-Jarve to protest the residence
requirements in the local election law. The strike was halted
when the Estonian Supreme Soviet agreed to defer consideration
of the residence requirements but was resumed after adoption
of the election law. The Estonian Government responded by
issuing a decree to ban the strike, but the decree was not
enforced.
Meanwhile, the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet ruled
that the residence requirements were discriminatory and that
they violated the Soviet Constitution as well as the
U.S.S.R. 's international human rights commitments. The strike
was ended when the Republic's leadership agreed to enter into
negotiations with strike leaders, eventually proposing a
one-time suspension of the residence requirement for voters.
This proposal was accepted by the Estonian Supreme Soviet in
October, with the proviso that the election law will
subsequently be brought into line with a new citizenship law.
The compromise did not satisfy the Russian strike leaders, who
continued to complain about the residence requirements for
candidates in local elections as well as about other
provisions of the election law.
While major ethnic tensions in Estonia divide the Estonian and
Russian populations, most ethnic groups have formed officially
recognized cultural societies which work closely with the
Estonian People's Front on proposals to enhance their cultural
autonomy. A law to protect the rights of national minorities
was adopted by the Estonian Supreme Soviet in December.
Over the past 10 years, discrimination and persecution has
been directed against Estonians who sought to express their
national and cultural identity, against independent political
and religious activists, and against Jews and Pentecostals
wishing to leave the country.
Women nominally enjoy the same legal rights as men, and an
extensive system of day-care service and maternity benefits
assists women in obtaining and retaining jobs.
1101
ESTONIA
Estonian statistics on the problem of violence against women,
including wife beating, are unavailable. The official Soviet
press in 1989 discussed the issue, and the Soviet Council of
Ministers established a special branch (headed by a woman) to
study the problems of women. Human rights and women's rights
groups in Estonia are aware of the issue but have focused
their efforts thus far on the broader questions of
independence and freedom.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Soviet labor law and practice has generally been enforced in
Estonia. There has been no right of association as defined by
the International Labor Organization (ILO). Although the
Constitution grants Soviet citizens the right to form trade
unions, attempts to exercise this right independently of the
state-controlled union had always been repressed. New
professional associations with no ties to Moscow were created
in 1989, but it is not yet clear whether they will effectively
exercise trade union functions.
A dual effort to reform Estonian labor legislation and
practice began to take shape in late 1989, with adoption of a
new law on trade unions and moves toward comprehensive
overhaul of the official trade union organization. The law
cites ILO standards and provides for trade unions to exist as
independent organizations with the right to strike to defend
workers' interests. It is too soon to judge the practical
effects of these proposed changes, which are consistent with
the stated goals of the Estonian economic autonomy plan.
In addition to the politically motivated strikes by at least
40,000 predominantly Russian workers protesting against the
new Estonian election law, a few other brief strikes were
reported in the Estonian press. There were no reports of
repression against strikers in 1989.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers in Estonia generally have not been able to organize or
engage in collective bargaining. Virtually all workers in the
Soviet Union automatically become members of an affiliate of
the official Soviet trade union organization, the All-Union
Central Council of Trade Unions, in order to be entitled to
government social welfare benefits. There are no economic
incentive zones in Estonia.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Soviet law contains no prohibition on forced or compulsory
labor. Most prisoners are confined to camps where they are
forced to labor, often under harsh and degrading conditions.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The statutory minimum age for employment of children is 16.
There is no indication of widespread violations of these norms.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Labor conditions in Estonia are similar to those in the Soviet
Union. According to the Soviet State Statistical Committee,
the average monthly wage in Estonia for blue- and white-collar
1102
ESTONIA
workers in September 1989 was $430 and for collective farm
workers $488 at the official exchange rate. The minimum
monthly wage in the U.S.S.R. was $140. (The ruble is not a
convertible currency, and its value here in terms of the U.S.
dollar does not represent actual purchasing power for
international purposes.)
The standard workweek is 40 hours. The average workweek is 40
hours for most white-collar workers and 41 hours for most
blue-collar workers. Soviet law establishes minimum
conditions of health and safety. Press reports suggest,
however, that legislation on maximum hours of work and health
and safety standards are widely ignored.
1103
FINLAND
Finland is a constitutional republic, a democratic state built
upon the principle of the rule of law. Sovereign power in
Finland rests with the people as represented by their
delegates assembled in Parliament. Supreme executive power is
vested in the President. The Cabinet, consisting of the Prime
Minister and 16 ministers and responsible to Parliament, works
with the President in governing the country. Judicial power
is exercised by an independent judiciary consisting of the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court.
The security apparatus is controlled by elected officials and
supervised by the courts.
Finland has a mixed economy with state-owned, privately owned,
and publicly owned companies. Citizens are free to pursue
their legitimate private interests, hold private property, and
engage in economic activity without government interference.
During 1989 there were no reported violations in Finland of
fundamental human rights. National minorities and women enjoy
the same economic and political rights as all other citizens.
Finland joined the Council of Europe in May, and this event
brought to light certain deficiencies in Finnish human rights
legislation. During the next 2 years, Finland hopes to enact
human rights legislation to meet the standards prevailing in
other European countries and to ratify the European Convention
on Human Rights without reservations.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Killing for political motives did not occur.
b. Disappearance
There were no reported cases of disappearances, abduction, or
clandestine detention.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment is guaranteed by law and is respected
in practice. By law, prisoners must be treated justly with
respect for their hum.an dignity and without distinction on the
basis of race, sex, language, nationality, religious or
political conviction, social position, wealth, or any other
grounds .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment or exile is
guaranteed by law and respected in practice. A reform of
pretrial procedures took effect on January 1, 1989. The
stated purpose of the reform was to achieve uniformity with
the practice in other Western countries. The law shortens the
detention period to 7 days and gives the accused access to a
lawyer during that time. The accused must be given a court
hearing within 8 days of notification of the arrest, if in a
1104
FINLAND
city, or within 30 days, if in rural areas. The State pays
legal fees for the indigent defendant.
Circumstances surrounding the arrest are subject to judicial
review at the time the accused is brought to trial. The
accused may apply to the same court for civil damages for loss
of freedom in the event the accused is found to have been
innocent of the crime charged and the arrest is deemed invalid.
The institutions of habeas corpus and bail do not exist as
such in Finland. While those accused of serious crimes must
by law remain in custody, those charged with minor offenses
may be released on personal recognizance at the court's
discretion.
Preventive detention is authorized only during a declared
state of war for narrowly defined offenses, such as treason,
mutiny, and arms trafficking. Supervisory personnel from the
Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior as well
as the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Chancellor of Justice
have authority to enter prisons and to order the release of
prisoners held without charges. Exile has not been used as
punishment in Finland and, by law, Finnish citizens may not be
exiled.
Legislation with regard to conscientious objectors to
Finland's obligatory military service took effect in 1987 for
a trial period of 5 years. While Jehovah's Witnesses are
exempted from military service under the law, other Finnish
citizens must serve in the military or become conscientious
objectors. The law abolished the Investigative Board--a
controversial entity which decided unilaterally the status of
conscientious objectors — and lengthened the alternative
civilian service for conscientious objectors to 16 months,
twice the minimum length of military service. The passage of
the law is reportedly a result of the Investigative Board's
increased disposition to reject a growing number of
applications for civilian service in recent years. Under the
old law, those who refused unarmed service within the defense
forces and were not granted alternative civilian
service--including Jehovah's Witnesses--went to jail. A
reduction of the period of alLernative service is under
current discussion in Finland.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to fair public trial is guaranteed by law and
respected in practice. Finnish citizens and aliens legally
residing in Finland have the right to effective counsel. The
law provides that charges must be clearly stated and that
civilians may not be tried by military courts except in time
of war. There are no separate "security" courts. Local
courts may decide to conduct a trial behind closed doors in
juvenile, matrimonial, and guardianship cases, or when
publicity would offend morality or endanger the national
security of the State. In national security cases, the judge
may withhold information from the public pertaining to charges
against individuals, verdicts, and sentencing. Sanctions may
be imposed if such information is made public. Provisional
tribunals are constitutionally prohibited.
1105
FINLAND
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The right to privacy and the sanctity of the home, including
prohibition of eavesdropping and mail tampering, are
guaranteed by law and respected in practice. The security
police are subject by law to judicial scrutiny.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Law and practice, an effective judiciary, an independent
press, and a functioning democratic political system assure
freedom of speech and press. There have been no instances of
abuse or legal decisions restricting freedom of the press.
The press occasionally exercises restraint in treating issues
deemed to be potentially harmful to the national interest, but
is under no compulsion from the Government to do so. Full
academic freedom prevails.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of peaceful assembly and association is guaranteed by
the Constitution. However, only Finnish citizens may
associate with a group whose aim is to influence political
issues. Public demonstrations require prior permission from
the police.
The Government encourages voluntary organizations and
subsidizes private groups formed to achieve a public purpose.
They are permitted to maintain relations with other
international groups in both Communist and Western countries.
Organizations with more than one-third foreign membership
require government permission to operate in Finland.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Finland has two state religions: Lutheran and Eastern
Orthodox. Taxes are collected by the Government from members
to support churches belonging to these religions. All other
religious groups enjoy unrestricted freedom of worship.
Approximately 89 percent of the population belongs to the
Lutheran Church.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Finns are free to travel within the Nordic countries — Finland,
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland — without passports and
need not apply for exit visas for travel to other countries.
Over 200,000 Finns have emigrated to Sweden in the past two
decades — primarily to seek employment — and over one-half of
them have since returned. No restrictions are placed on
emigration or repatriation.
Debate on the criteria used by the Finnish Government in
deciding to grant political asylum continued in 1989. The
Government maintains that, "in accordance with the Geneva
Agreement, Finland grants asylum to individuals arriving (in
Finland) who have the characteristics of refugees as
determined by the Agreement." The Ministry of the Interior
1106
FINLAND
categorically denies that any agreement exists with the Soviet
Union regarding repatriation of would-be Soviet refugees.
Finland has not turned back any citizen of the Soviet Union or
a Communist country who has asked for asylum, although in some
incidents over the past few years persons who unwittingly
crossed over into Finnish territory have been returned.
Decisions on who is a legitimate refugee are made by the
Minister of the Interior. In the case of an economic refugee
who does not wish to return to his home country and is not
accepted as a refugee in Finland, the Finnish Government
permits the refugee to apply elsewhere. Even economic
refugees will not be forced to return to Communist countries
if they ask to go elsewhere and are accepted by a third
country. Finland does not grant asylum to people wishing to
escape economic hardship.
Current law does not define the grounds on which the applicant
for political asylum may be repatriated. Guidance is provided
by the U.N. Convention (and Protocol) Relating to the Status
of Refugees, of which Finland is a signatory. Legislation has
been proposed which will state less ambiguously the grounds
for repatriation.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Finland is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy in which all
citizens over the age of 18 are free to elect their
representatives from among multiple lists of candidates
representing a wide spectrum of political ideologies. The
Finnish people freely choose by direct election a 200-member
unicameral Parliament every 4 years. At present, there are
seven political parties and a group of Greens represented in
Parliament. Four of the parties form a so called "Red-Blue"
coalition, headed by a Conservative Prime Minister. A reform
of the presidential elections to change them in the direction
of a direct popular vote was applied for the first time in the
1988 election. Two ballots were cast, one for the favored
presidential candidate, the other for an elector in case none
of the presidential candidates received an absolute majority
of the votes cast. In the latter case, an electoral college
of 301 electors would conduct the final vote. Presidential
elections are held every 6 years.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Finland has not been the subject of an international
investigation of alleged human rights violations. Within
Finland, several organizations monitor human rights
performance, including the Finnish Red Cross, the
government-sponsored Equality Council, and the Women's Rights
Union. A Finnish Helsinki Watch Group was established in July
1985 but was not very active during 1989. In conjunction with
the Swedish-language University in Turku, a Human Rights
Institute was founded in the spring of 1985 with the stated
purpose of conducting human rights research, performing
studies, and distributing information on human rights.
Finland participates actively in international human rights
organizations .
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Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Religion, Sex,
Language, or Social Status
Food, shelter, education, and health care are available to all
inhabitants regardless of race, religion, sex, ethnic
background, or political opinion.
Although fewer than 20,000 aliens live in Finland, instances
of violence have been recorded against resident Vietnamese
refugees in Helsinki. The Government has strongly condemned
these acts and has asked the police to make a more determined
effort to apprehend the perpetrators.
Lapps constitute less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the
Finnish population. They benefit from legal provisions
protecting minority rights and customary practices. There is
no discrimination in practice.
The government-established Council for Equality coordinates
and sponsors legislation to meet the needs of women as
workers, mothers, widows, and retirees. In 1985 Parliament
passed two bills concerning the status of women. The first
was a Comprehensive Equal Rights Bill which mandates equal
treatment for women in the workplace. The second was a Family
Name Bill which permitted women to retain their maiden names
after marriage as their only surname. The law also made it
possible for a man to take his wife's name. The Government's
Equality Ombudsman monitors compliance with regulations
against sexual discrimination. Of the few cases reported in
1989, the most significant concerned a complaint that a man
was elected to an office for which a woman may have been more
competent .
The first shelter for female victims of violence was opened 10
years ago. During 1988, 1,193 women (of which 79.9 percent
were married) were treated in 10 shelters throughout Finland.
The shelters also treated 70 men and two minors under the age
of 18. Some critics suggest that the number of actual cases
may be greater than those reported. Prosecution of
perpetrators of intrafamily violence is low--except in cases
of aggravated assault--because of the propensity of Finns not
to file complaints against family members.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Trade unions are constitutionally guaranteed the right to
organize, assemble peacefully, and strike — rights which are
respected in practice. They enjoy a protected status and play
an important role in political and economic life. A
1-million-member blue-collar confederation, the Central
Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK), dominates the
trade union movement.
Three other central organizations cover white-collar,
professional, and technical employees. All trade unions are
democratically organized and managed and are independent of
the Government. Finnish trade unions engage freely in Nordic
and international labor activities.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively exists in law
and practice and is exercised extensively. There are no
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export processing zones in Finland. Finland is a highly
organized society in which more than 80 percent of both
workers and employers are members of trade unions and
employers' collective bargaining associations. With very few
exceptions, all collective agreements since 1968 have been
based on incomes policy agreements between central employees*
and employers' organizations and the State. The central
agreement covers the general level of wage and salary
increases, other terms of employment, and a "social policy
package" which provides for vacation, holidays, sick pay,
maternity and paternity leave, travel costs, taxes, rents,
etc. Workers are protected against antiunion discrimination.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it
is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
While the minimum age for employment in Finland is 18, there
are some paid training/apprenticeship programs starting at age
16. There is compulsory education legislation in Finland, and
child labor is not a problem.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no legislated minimum wage in Finland although all
employers--including nonunionized employers--are required to
pay the minimum wages agreed to in collective bargaining
agreements in their industrial sector. Collective bargaining
agreements provide minimum wages of about $9 per hour, which
is adequate to ensure a family a decent living. The standard
legal workweek must not exceed 40 hours in Finland.
Extensive legislation protects the worker's health and safety
and ensures reasonable working conditions. All aspects of
Finnish labor law are effectively monitored and enforced by
the Ministry of Labor. Compliance with labor legislation is
effected through the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and
the National Board of Labor Protection. Regional and local
supervision is delegated to 11 labor protection districts,
each employing several inspectors.
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France is a democratic republic with constitutional provisions
for human rights, civil liberties, freely functioning
political parties, and regular elections. There is universal
suffrage and voter participation is high.
The highly developed industrial economy features a mixture of
public and private enterprises. The Government has halted the
previous government's policy of denationalizing key
industries, banks, and certain services while declaring that
there will be no new nationalizations.
The military/security apparatus consists of the three
traditional services, the 90, 000-strong gendarmerie (national
police/paramilitary force), and the police in major cities.
These highly professional forces have a tradition of respect
for human rights.
France's cabinet-level Secretary of State for Human Rights,
who reports directly to the Prime Minister, is tasked with
promoting human rights in France. Through a firm
counterterrorist policy, France has reduced, but not
eliminated, violent incidents perpetrated by small extremist
groups. French authorities have taken steps to protect the
rights of women and minority groups. France's overall human
rights record is excellent.
The promotion of human rights is also a principal tenet of
French foreign policy. There is a cabinet-level
Minister-Delegate for Foreign Affairs with specific
responsibilities for international human rights matters.
RESPECT FOR HUMAM RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There is no evidence that French security services engaged in
political and other extrajudicial killings in 1989. There
were no major international terrorist murders, and the few
incidents of violence perpetrated by the country's domestic
terrorist groups, primarily Basque, Breton, and Corsican
separatists, were mostly minor and nonlethal. The judicial
system continued its vigorous prosecution of terrorists.
The president of the New Caledonian proindependence Kanak
National Liberation Front (FLNKS) , Jean-Marie Tjibaou, was
assassinated in May by a proindependence extremist at a
political meeting. The assassin was immediately shot and
killed by Tjibaou's bodyguards.
b. Disappearance
There is no evidence that French security services have
engaged in abduction or secret arrests.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
France does not condone or practice torture or cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment. However, there have
been a few documented cases of police brutality, including the
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beating of one American in a drug-related case in 1988.
Investigation of this case is still under way.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
French law guarantees freedom from arbitrary arrest and
imprisonment. There is no direct equivalent of habeas corpus
in the French legal system, but there is a limit of 2 days —
4 for drug and terrorist cases — before a suspect must be
transferred to a magistrate for investigation.
The judiciary plays a determining role in the detention
process. Government authority to hold a person beyond the
prescribed periods is severely restricted, and such detention
must be ordered by the competent court.
There is no provision for exiling persons. There is no
evidence that the authorities detain any person for political
reasons .
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right of fair public trial is guaranteed by law and
respected in practice. Suspects are presumed innocent until
proven guilty and have the right to legal counsel as soon as
their cases are transferred from the police to the
magistrate. For misdemeanors, pretrial confinement normally
is limited to 4 months, with extensions in special
circumstances of approximately 8 to 12 months. However, in
drug cases (all of which are handled by the courts as
misdemeanors), pretrial confinement may be unlimited. For
felonies, pretrial confinement also is not limited. This
pretrial period may be lengthy, depending upon the seriousness
and complexity of the case. Evidence is gathered and assessed
by an independent examining judge. Defendants are free to
request and present evidence during this important
investigatory period.
Trials in France are normally open and public, but provisions
exist for the defense to request a closed proceeding. The
press has free access to records of court proceedings,
although under French law the prosecutor may not disclose
information about cases being tried or investigated.
French law provides for the right of appeal, except in jury
trials of felony cases. An appeal to the Court of Cassation
is possible in felony cases, but this court rules only on
procedure; no appeal that involves review of the facts of the
case is possible.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
French law guarantees freedom from invasion of privacy, and
this freedom is respected in practice. The search of a
private residence requires a search warrant and must take
place between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. except in special
circumstances, such as drug cases, when the search may be
undertaken at any time. Telephone conversations may be
monitored in conjunction with criminal proceedings with a
court order and in national security cases with administrative
approval from the agency conducting the investigation.
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Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These freedoms are guaranteed by law and respected in
practice. Newspapers and magazines are free from government
control and present views ranging across the political
spectrum. There are two state-owned and three private
television networks, in addition to private cable channels.
Private radio stations have operated in France since 1983.
Hundreds are now on the air and offer a wide array of
independent, uncensored programming. Academic freedom of
expression is respected in both public and private academic
institutions .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of peaceful assembly and association is widely
respected, although, except for a specific reference to trade
unions, it is not mentioned in the Constitution. Groups
wishing to organize public meetings, protest marches, or
demonstrations must obtain a permit from the local
authorities. Permits are routinely granted for both political
and apolitical gatherings. Private associations, whether
political or apolitical, must register with the prefecture in
the department in which they are established, but they do not
require the prefecture's authorization to exist. Such
registration is considered routine. Informal associations,
such as those without officers, bylaws, or dues, need not
register.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Roman Catholics ■comprise by far the largest religious group in
France. Separation of church and state is guaranteed by law.
All religious groups function freely without persecution.
Private and parochial schools receive substantial subsidies
from the Ministry of National Education.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
French law provides for freedom, of internal movement, foreign
travel, emigration, and repatriation. Arriving refugees,
intending emigrants, and intending repatriates can undertake
foreign travel and, in most instances, return to France.
France has an extensive record of refugee aid and resettlement.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The people have the right and ability to change their
government by peaceful means, not only through the election of
national representatives but also through amendment of the
Constitution by means of a national referendum. This right
was exercised with the adoption of a new Constitution in 1958.
The Constitution guarantees the equality of all citizens
before the law, without regard to origin, race, or religion.
All French citizens who have reached majority may vote, except
for most convicted criminals, bankrupt persons, and persons
certified to be mentally incompetent. These provisions are
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FRANCE
fully respected in practice. Presidential elections are held
every 7 years, and elections for the National Assembly are
held every 5 years, unless the Government is dissolved, in
which case elections may be called sooner.
A wide variety of political parties compete freely in
elections. In addition to national, presidential, and
legislative elections, there are regularly scheduled local
elections. For several years, the Government has been
transferring selected powers from the executive branch to
locally elected assemblies. Many special interest
groups--business , labor, veterans, consumer advocates,
ecologists, and others--organize freely and regularly support
candidates for elective office.
The Matignon Accords of 1988, which call for a territorial
referendum in 1998 to decide the future of New Caledonia,
continued to be implemented in 1989. Municipal elections in
March and provincial elections in June were conducted fairly.
Despite the assassination of FLNKS leader Tjibaou in May (see
Section l.a.), the level of ethnic violence in the territory
has substantially diminished.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
France has traditionally been a leader in the human rights
area. Human rights organizations, including the International
Federation for Human Rights, operate freely in France.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The authorities do not condone discrimination based on race,
religion, sex, ethnic background, or political opinion.
Although incidents of racial, religious, or political
discrimination occur, particularly against the large immigrant
community of Arabs and Africans, authorities consistently
condemn such incidents. Food, shelter, health care, and
education are available to all inhabitants.
Women have equal status under the law but are engaged in
continuing efforts to maintain and strengthen their rights. A
cabinet-level Secretary of State for Women's Rights, appointed
in 1988, operates under the direct supervision of the Prime
Minister. The Government also has taken steps to close
loopholes in French legislation on sex discrimination in the
workplace and to eliminate sexist advertising. In 1985 it
passed legislation to ensure more equality in marriage
rights .
The Government does not tolerate violence and abuse against
women, and such violence, including wife beating, is
prohibited under article 309 of the penal code. In 1987, the
latest year for which statistics are available, 7,840 women in
France lodged legal complaints of wife beating against their
husbands under the provisions of article 309.
The rights of linguistic and ethnic minorities are protected,
both in metropolitan France and in overseas territories
subject to French authority. The right of legally admitted
immigrants to coexist peacefully without assimilating
completely into French culture is recognized. Legislation has
been passed simplifying the deportation of illegal immigrants
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and tightening immigration procedures. In metropolitan France
in 1989, extreme rightwing gangs in a number of instances
assaulted members of minority groups, mainly Arabs, The
authorities fully investigated such cases and vigorously
prosecuted those apprehended.
An accord was signed in 1988 between ethnic Melanesians and
European settlers on the status of New Caledonia in an effort
to reduce deep-rooted antagonisms between the two ethnic
communities .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution affirms the principle of freedom of labor
union association, the right to a job, the right of equal
opportunity for education and training, social security, and
workers' participation in the operation of the enterprise in
which they are employed.
Although only 10 percent of the work force is unionized, trade
unions exercise significant economic and political influence.
They participate actively in numerous tripartite (government,
employer, and worker) bodies dealing with social matters,
including labor courts and the Economic and Social Council, a
constitutionally mandated consultative body. All unions are
technically independent of the political parties, but many of
the leaders of France's largest union, the General
Confederation of Labor, belong to the Communist Party. (The
General Secretary traditionally is a member of the Communist
Party Political Bureau.) Leaders of most other unions are
members of one or another faction of the Socialist Party,
although members of other parties are also active in the labor
movement. There are no restrictions on the unions'
international activities, and all three world trade union
confederations have French affiliates. French workers are
free to strike, with a few exceptions in cases where strikes
are determined to be a threat to public safety.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers have the right to organize and bargain collectively.
The principle of free collective bargaining was reestablished
after World War II by a law of 1950, with separate statutes
applying to public enterprises. The legislation.- as amended
in 1971 and 1978, encourages collective bargaining at the
national, regional, local, or plant level. French law
strictly prohibits antiunion discrimination. The law further
sets forth procedures for dealing with labor disputes and
defines two forms of collective contracts — extendable and
ordinary. Amendments added in 1982 require at least annual
bargaining on wages, hours, and working conditions at both
plant and industry levels. France has no export processing
zones, and labor law and practice are uniform throughout the
country.
The Government encourages management and labor organizations
to negotiate on issues important to public policy--such as
adjustment plans for dislocated workers, training, retraining,
unemployment compensation, and supplementary retirement
schemes. The "social partners" sometimes invite the
Government to participate in these negotiations, particularly
if legislation will be needed for implementation or if public
financing is involved.
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The 1950 law sets forth procedures for resolving labor-
management disputes. These are frequently arbitrated by labor
inspectors. Conciliation boards, composed mainly of
management and labor representatives, have proved
ineffective. The Higher Court of Arbitration is rarely used.
Mediation of wage issues at the national, regional, or local
level has been more successful. Outside mediators, drawn from
the upper ranks of the civil service, impose solutions that
are binding unless formally rejected by either side within 8
days. In 1988, 1,242,000 man-days of work were lost because
of strikes, as opposed to some 969,063 man-days in 1987.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law and is not
practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
With a few minor exceptions for those enrolled in recognized
apprenticeship programs, children under the age of 16 may not
be employed. Certain categories of work considered to be
arduous and night work (10 p.m. to 5 a.m.) may not be
performed by persons under the age of 18 or by women in
manufacturing, mining, the public sector, unions, and
nonprofit organizations. However, women with managerial
responsibilities may perform night work. This prohibition
does not apply to women in commercial establishments,
entertainment, or the health sector.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
France has a minimum wage of about $4.60 an hour, which is
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living. The
standard workweek is 39 hours, and overtime is controlled. In
general terms, French labor legislation and practice,
including that pertaining to occupational safety and health,
are fully comparable to those in other industrialized market
economy countries. The minimum wage is somewhat less in the
overseas departments, and not all social legislation applies
in overseas territories.
1115
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was created in 1949 as a
Communist state out of the Soviet occupation zone of Germany.
Approximately 350,000 Soviet troops are still stationed on its
soil. The country has been ruled by the Communist Party,
known as the Socialist Unity Party (SED) , Its General
Secretary since 1971, Erich Honecker, was replaced in October
by Egon Krenz as a result of the crisis caused, in part, by
large-scale popular demonstrations in East German cities and
the flight of East Germans to the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) via Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Krenz was replaced by
Gregor Gysi on December 3, 1989, following the resignation of
the party leadership. Until November, the SED made all
important political decisions; the other four political
parties, whose existence was tolerated, had no power or
independence. In December, however, the Parliament eliminated
the constitutional provision granting the SED the "leading
role" in the State.
Despite such formidable barriers as the Berlin Wall, deep
historical, cultural, linguistic, and family ties remained
between the people of the GDR and those of the FRG. Concern
that such ties and constant exposure to Western values could
undermine support for the Communist system was a central
reason for the Government's tight control over its
population. Control was maintained with an efficient and
pervasive security apparatus administered by the Ministries of
the Interior and State Security, which together employed
approximately 300,000 people. Nevertheless, in the process of
sanctioning increased glasnost (openness) and responding to
the popular demand for the right to travel, the Communist
leadership in November opened gates in the Berlin Wall
allowing millions of East Germans to visit West Berlin with a
minimum of formality. The Berlin Wall thereby lost its
significance as a barrier to the free movement of East Germans
into and out of West Berlin.
The GDR has had a highly industrialized, centrally planned
economy in which the bulk of industry and agricultural
property has been state owned. Although private property has
been permitted, controls were placed on its acquisition,
inheritance, and the income derived from it. Small private
businesses, which may have up to 10 employees, are being
licensed in increasing numbers.
Until November, the GDR continued to restrict the fundamental
freedoms of speech, press, religion, assembly, and travel.
However, it permitted record numbers of East Germans to
emigrate and make short-term visits to the FRG. Other areas
of human rights concern included arbitrary arrest and
detention, the absence of fair trials for political prisoners,
and arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, and
correspondence .
Beginning in October, the authorities allowed increased
freedom of speech and press, tolerated large street
demonstrations, and did not interfere with the establishment
of new political and other organizations. In December, they
disbanded the Ministry for State Security and promised the
release of the last political prisoners. Travel regulations
for East Germans have been simplified. The new Prime
Minister, Hans Modrow, named a cabinet with 11 non-Communist
members among the 28 ministers, and free elections have been
scheduled for May 6, 1990.
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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
The following report primarily describes the human rights
situation as it existed before the peaceful revolution in
October which is now transforming the GDR. Some of the
institutions and practices that led to widespread human rights
abuses apparently were being changed at year's end, and the
next annual report is likely to include a significantly
different assessment of human rights practices.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
A 1982 law instructed border guards that they should open fire
only as a last resort to prevent a person from leaving the
country without permission. By mid-1987, there were reports
that the practice of opening fire on would-be escapees had
been virtually suspended, except in cases of military or
police deserters or self-defense. Though GDR leaders
repeatedly stated in 1989 that there is no shoot-to-kill
order, there was an increase in shooting incidents at the Wall
early in 1989, and one civilian was killed. There have been
no verified instances of shooting since April when border
guards reportedly were ordered not to shoot at civilians
except in self-defense.
Several years ago, the regime removed lethal barriers, such as
automatic shooting devices and minefields, which had existed
on the GDR-FRG border (but never within Berlin). However, it
expanded its system of barriers on the inner-German border to
a depth of approximately 20 kilometers, and within Berlin
increased the height of the border fence to 3 meters. The
opening of the Berlin Wall and simplified travel regulations
have rendered these measures obsolete.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of permanent disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Specific laws state that the life, health, and ability to work
of arrestees and prisoners must not be jeopardized. A law
promulgated in December 1988 makes it a crime, with penalties
up to 10 years' imprisonment, for an official performing state
functions to mishandle a person psychologically or physically.
There were no known instances in 1989 of this law being
applied; previously, punishment of officials for abusing
prisoners or detainees was rare.
In the past, prisoners have complained of cruel treatment and
have reported excessively harsh conditions and psychological
strain in prisons. Recently emigrated prisoners reported the
selective easing of conditions within prisons. In particular,
they noted an improvement in the guards' behavior. No report
of physical abuse by prison officials came to light in 1989.
In September, the GDR ratified the U.N. Convention Against
Torture.
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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Until November, security agencies had blanket authority to
detain and interrogate persons on suspicion alone. People who
became particularly active in officially disapproved ways were
sometimes subjected to repeated harassment, such as recurrent
police interrogations, despite the absence of formal charges.
They might be arrested with or without warrants, merely for
expressing dissenting views. A person held in detention has
the right to a judicial review of continued detention, but in
political cases this right might not have been effectively
observed. Beginning in November, the authorities generally
avoided actions directed at dissidents.
Although the Criminal Procedure Code sets a limit of 3 months
on investigatory proceedings, prosecuting authorities appear
to have no difficulty in extending this period. Under the old
regime, in most political cases, it often took many weeks
before interested parties were notified of the arrest.
Charges filed in clearly political cases were often based on
laws which were written in vague and general language. The
penal code provides, for instance, that the transmission of
information "detrimental to the interests of the German
Democratic Republic," even if it is not classified, may be
considered treason. Laws against "antistate agitation" and
"asocial behavior" (parasitism) were often applied selectively
against people who become politically active. The broad and
vague wording severely restricted the possibility for
defense. East German attorneys report that prisoners brought
to trial under these laws were only occasionally acquitted.
No effort to enforce these laws has been evident since
October, and a revision of the penal code can be expected in
1990.
Until November, the authorities in selected cases issued
passports and exit visas to dissidents and exiled them to the
FRG.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Under the old system, the public was usually excluded from
trials involving security and political issues. Although the
Criminal Procedure Code guarantees a defendant access to a
defense attorney, and this right exists from the beginning of
the investigative proceeding, the authorities were not
required to inform a detainee of this provision, and the right
was not always exercised in a timely manner. Prisoners are
allowed to select their own attorneys. However, until
investigatory proceedings were completed, prisoners were
permitted to see their lawyers only in the presence of the
police and to discuss only matters not related to the case.
The prosecutor could restrict contacts between the defense
attorney and his client. The number of instances in which
such restrictions were applied reportedly has been declining,
at least in nonsensitive cases. Discussion of a case itself
often took place in a brief interview shortly before the
trial. Attorneys could not make photocopies of their clients'
files. Files could be reviewed only in court, and notes had
to be taken in longhand or with the aid of a dictaphone.
GDR attitudes regarding the Criminal Procedure Code are
changing. A 1987 official commentary to the Criminal Code and
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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
the Criminal Procedure Code stated a presumption against
restrictions forbidding a defense attorney from discussing the
case with his client. Another official commentary advancer.
the defense attorney's ability to gain more and earlier access
to investigative documents. A court handed down a decision
which freed a person from pretrial detention, and a Supreme
Court justice published an article critical of excessive use
of pretrial detention by many prosecutors and lower courts.
The plenum of the Supreme Court has established new evidentiary
rules which require prosecutors to meet a higher standard of
proof in criminal cases. More changes to the GDR criminal
justice system may occur due to the reforms which have
occurred since October.
Trials in sensitive cases had been short and perfunctory.
Constitutionally, the courts were under the control of the
Council of State. In reality, they were controlled by the
SED, which in effect appointed the judges. Military courts
try civilians only in military espionage cases.
Until November, the Government did not admit to holding
political prisoners. It did not publish statistics which
would assist in determining the number of political
prisoners. However, the FRG Ministry for Inner-German
Relations has announced that it bought freedom for some 1,247
political prisoners from the GDR in 1987 and for some 1,200 in
1988. The Ministry continued this practice in 1989, but cited
no figures. The Salzgitter Center, an FRG government office
which monitors GDR human rights abuses, hRs registered some
25,000 prosecutions for political offenses in the GDR over the
past 25 years. Such prosecutions have generally resulted in
prison sentences of 18-24 months.
Estimates of the number of political prisoners vary widely,
both because of the difficulty in obtaining information and
the use of different definitional criteria. Official West
German sources speak of more than 1,000 who were being held.
The private West German-based August 13 Work Group estimated
there were some 3,000 political prisoners, while other human
rights groups' estimates ranged as high as 7,000. Most
persons who fell into the political category were imprisoned
as a result of pursuing their right of emigration by what the
GDR considered extra-legal means, such as attempts to cross
the Berlin Wall or the FRG-GDR border or to demonstrate
publicly for emigration. Following the December 19 meeting
between FRG Chancellor Kohl and GDR Premier Modrow, the GDR
agreed to release all political prisoners before Christmas
1989.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Until November, the secret police, assisted by informers,
opened mail, installed listening devices, placed people under
surveillance, subjected them to interrogation and intimidation,
and arrested them without due process. By law, the police
need court authorization to enter and search a house. They
sometimes authorized entry themselves, however, and the courts
retroactively gave approval. Evidence thus obtained could be
used in court.
Young people are not forced to join the SED's youth movement,
the Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend--FDJ) , but school
and government authorities made it clear that failure to do so
would limit educational and job opportunities. Soys aged 15
1119
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC _
and 16 normally had to attend a 2-week paramilitary training
camp where they learned such skills as using weapons and
throwing grenades. Since November, the FDJ has become
increasingly less important in the GDR.
West German television can be viewed by 80 percent of the GDR
populace, and the State does not try to jam or otherwise
hinder foreign broadcasts.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Until November, freedom of speech remained severely
circumscribed. There were restrictive laws relating to free
expression, and public dissent could result in prison
sentences. Perhaps out of a conscious effort to seem less
repressive abroad, however, the authorities appeared
increasingly reluctant to punish dissenting speech publicly.
Most persons engaging in such activities were merely picked up
and detained briefly by the police without charges being
filed, as occurred in March, when there was a demonstration in
Leipzig against new travel and emigration regulations and
surveillance of would-be emigrants. It was also increasingly
common for the State to fine rather than imprison individuals
who attempted to exercise their right to freedom of
expression. For example, some activists staging an
independent Rosa Luxemburg/Karl Liebknecht demonstration in
Leipzig in January were fined approximately $515 (at the
official exchange rate) apiece, while persons attempting to
deliver protest letters to the Chinese Embassy in June were
fined amounts ranging from $256 to $769. After November, free
speech was increasingly tolerated although the restrictive
laws were still in effect.
Western journalists' ability to report on events in the GDR is
J-imited by laws restricting their ability to travel without
prior permission and to contact potential sources directly.
Some East Germans considered contact with foreign journalists
disadvantageous and tried to avoid it.
Until November, the Government controlled all media and
licensed all publications prior to distribution. The media's
basic function was to support and strengthen the Socialist
order. Over the past several years, articles have appeared in
established journals on previously taboo social subjects, such
as alco-holism, homosexuality, child abuse, and juvenile
delinquency. Late in 1989, the authorities encouraged
increased openness in the media, which was reflected in part
in detailed descriptions of the corruption of ousted SED
leaders.
Government censorship of church newspapers, which began in
1-988, continued into early 1989. Particularly affected was
the coverage of church convocations which discussed subjects
such as education policy, environmental protection, military
service, and conscientious objection. In March, however,
possibly as a goodwill gesture, the State stopped this
practice. There has been no censorship of church publications
since then.
There was little underground literature circulated by
dissidents, in part because church-connected groups could
circulate materials with considerable freedom within church
confines, in part because of the small size of the GDR
1120
GERMAM DEMOrRATTC REPUBLIC
dissident community, and in part because of the pervasiveness
of the security apparatus. From time to time, however,
unofficial activist groups produced, independently of both the
church and the State, underground newspapers in limited
quantities. One example is the monthly bulletin, Grenzfall,
which covers peace, ecology, human rights, and independent
activities in the GDR. Monthly publication of Grenzfall was
suspended in January 1988 after some members of the group were
arrested in the wake of a human rights demonstration and
subsequently emigrated to the FRG. An issue appeared in
February 1989 after a year's hiatus.
Circulation or importation of most printed materials required
an official permit. Since former SED General Secretary
Honecker's September 1987 visit to the FRG, however. East
Germany relaxed somewhat the stringent controls governing
importation of printed materials from the West. Private
persons could import certain specialized publications, even if
the publications did not have a special postal license.
However, the regulation elastically excluded literature
"directed againS't the preservation of peace and containing
other agitation" or "contravening the interests of the
Socialist State and its citizens."
The GDR also controlled the distribution of Soviet
publications. Until November, it was often difficult for East
Germans to open new subscriptions to Soviet periodicals. The
State banned single issues of several Soviet publications, for
example, an issue of a German-language Soviet newspaper, Neue
Zeit, containing an interview with Polish activist Lech Walesa
in February 1989. After November, East Germans were permitted
to subscribe to Soviet periodicals without restriction.
Western newspapers and magazines were generally unavailable to
the public at large. Small quantities of Western journals
were for sale for hard currency in international hotels upon
request. Some libraries, university departments, and official
institutes also received Western journals, but circulation was
highly restricted. Until November, GDR and Western travelers
could be interrogated or arrested simply for possessing
unlicensed printed material.
The SED conceived of art and literature as a means of
promoting political goals. The value of works was judged on
whether they ultimately conveyed a positive view of Communist
society and goals, though they could be quite critical of
individual aspects. Overly critical views or perceptions were
discouraged or censored. Publishing houses practiced
self-censorship, and works had to receive official clearance
before they were published, performed or exhibited. Even
before the November events, some previously banned books
appeared in East German editions and a number of plays were
staged on overtly political themes sharply critical of
practices and positions inherent in Socialist societies.
Until November, academic freedom was severely limited and even
formally restricted by law. The State viewed education as an
instrument for "building socialism." All areas of academic
inquiry were strictly controlled. Teachers who allowed open
classroom discussion of unapproved themes or topics or who
deviate from the party line were disciplined. Many books were
prohibited totally; others permitted only in university
libraries to which carefully screened and authorized personnel
were allowed access.
1121
OERMAN DEMnrRATTr REPUBLIC
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Although the Constitution provides for freedom of assembly,
only the churches maintained the ability to organize meetings
without prior state approval. The Government made no move to
interfere with events held on church property, including
protest gatherings in June over the events in China and an
August 13 meeting calling for the destruction of the Berlin
Wall.
In contrast, an independent organization, Neues Forum, which
wanted to work outside the church to create a broad-based
independent dialogue and a more attractive Socialist State,
was refused permission to assemble in September. The
authorities overturned this decision in November, however, and
legalized Neues Forum.
The formation of private organizations or clubs also required
government permission. Professional associations for writers
and artists were headed by party members and ultimately
controlled by ttre State. Dissidents and critics had been
expelled and deprived of important professional privileges.
After the street demonstrations in Leipzig in September and
October which spread to other cities, the opening of the
Berlin Wall, and the discussions between representatives of
the Government and of dissident groups, freedom of assembly
and association have expanded in fact although not yet in
law. For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies
to labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religious belief and
worship. The State officially promotes atheism but in
practice tolerates and even provides some financial subsidies
for religious activity. Until late in 1989, overt adherence
to religious beliefs could result in disqualification for
preferred jobs and educational opportunities, although the
largest religious community, the Evangelical (Lutheran)
Church, had some success in pleading the cases of its members
who suffered such discrimination.
New churches continue to be built, and old ones restored, in
limited numbers with government approval. The Greifswald
Cathedral was recently reconsecrated after extensive
renovations funded by both West and East German Lutheran
churches and the GDR.
Clergy are trained in both state universities and church-run
seminaries. The Government has demonstrated some flexibility
in its treatment of minority religions. Relations with the
Catholic Church and the small Jewish community remain stable.
The State is encouraging the first kosher cafe to open in East
Berlin and recently promised to increase its financial support
for the restoration of Berlin's largest synagogue and the
establishment of a Jewish cultural center and museum.
While the Government has not rescinded a ban on organized
activities by Christian Scientists, it has made no effort to
interfere with those activities. Members of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints continue to practice their
faith relatively unimpeded. Under a special program beginning
in March, young East German members of the church may go on
1122
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
mission to the West for 2 years, while Mormon missionaries
from the West may proselytize in the GDR.
Until November, the churches remained under continuing
government pressure to watch their words and deeds, and the
secret police continued to monitor church-sponsored events
closely. Nonetheless, the Evangelical (Lutheran) Church
remained the only institutional forum in which divergent
opinions could be expressed with relative freedom. With the
exception of church-sponsored events held on church grounds,
groups were not allowed to organize events without official
approval .
The church-state dialogue on issues such as freedom of
religion and thought, conditions of military service,
conscientious objection, and compulsory military training in
the schools, was postponed by the State in the fall of 1987.
Due to the reforms which have occurred, this dialogue may now
be resumed.
Western clergy were permitted to attend the important
Europe-wide ecumenical convocation in the GDR in 1989, and
more than 300 East Germans, selected by the East German
Evangelical (Lutheran) Church, were permitted to attend the
massive church meeting (Kirchentag) in West Berlin.
For many years, young men subject to universal conscription
who are religious conscientious objectors have been able to
choose alternative service in unarmed construction units.
However, those opposed to any military service whatever were
incarcerated. In the past 3 years, the Government has
followed a policy of ignoring such persons, i.e., neither
drafting nor prosecuting them. Conscientious objectors may
still face discrimination in schools and jobs.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Most East Germans can travel freely within the country, except
within special border zones or near military installations.
Technically, they are not free to change their place of
residence without government approval, but normally this
amounts only to a requirement to register with the police.
All East Germans must carry identification cards which the
police have the right to check at will. Because of their
criminal or political records, including the filing of
emigration applications, approximately 60,000 East Germans
carry a special identification card called PM-12, which in
many but not all cases restricts domestic as well as foreign
travel. Until November, foreign travel was tightly
controlled, and exit visas were required.
A new law on short-term visits and permanent emigration to the
West came into effect on January 1, 1989. Under this law, the
categories of persons eligible to submit applications for
travel and the circumstances under which applications could be
made were somewhat broader and more clearly defined, though
private travel remained limited to persons visiting relatives
in the West. The new law also more clearly defined — though it
did not greatly expand — the categories of persons who could
apply for family reunification and created a new category of
emigration for humanitarian reasons. One provision of the new
law permitted emigration by minors so that they could be
reunited with their parents.
1123
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
The bureaucracy was required to accept applications, reach
decisions within fixed time periods, and provide clear legal
statements for rejections. After July 1, people had the right
to appeal decisions to the courts, which, however, could
review cases only for procedural errors. Additional
amendments enacted in mid-March, in an attempt to respond to
popular criticism that the new law was proving more
restrictive than the relatively ad hoc liberal practices of
the past several years, broadened the categories of persons
who could make private visits to the West. The grounds for
refusal, however, included some flexible clauses reserving for
the authorities considerable discretionary power.
A crisis began in the summer when would-be emigrants staged
sit-ins at the FRG's permanent mission in East Berlin and in
the FRG embassies in Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw. Many
additional people sought to escape via the Austrian-Hungarian
border. By mid-September, more than 20,000 had crossed the
border without proper GDR documentation. After the Hungarian
Government opened its border to Austria in September, more
than 100,000 East Germans succeeded in reaching the FRG
without GDR permission In addition, more than 15,000 East
Germans were transported from Prague to the FRG by East German
trains after special arrangements were reached to resolve the
Prague and Warsaw embassy situations. Subsequently the GDR
imposed controls on the travel of East Germans to
Czechoslovakia. In November, GDR authorities opened gates in
the Berlin Wall and along the inner-German border to enable
East Germans to visit West Berlin and the FRG by simply
showing their passports. Millions have now done so.
Until late in the year, most emigrants could return to the GDR
only with great difficulty. In general, only East Germans in
binational marriage cases were permitted to keep their GDR
passports and travel freely between East and West. Other
emigrants usually had to wait 5 years before they could return
for family visits. Persons who received permission for an
extended stay in the West but who made no attempt to change
their citizenship, such as writers Jurek Becker and Monika
Maron, apparently were allowed to return at any time for a
visit. Those who left the country illegally before January 1,
1981, were eligible to apply for permission to visit, but
reportedly only half of those who had applied had obtained
permission. Persons who fled after 1980 faced possible
criminal prosecution if they returned to the GDR.
Repatriation was even more tortuous and seldom occurred. The
GDR authorities deliberated such cases carefully. When
persons were permitted to return, they were treated by the
State as regular East Germans, though they often faced
suspicion and hostility from fellow East Germans who knew of
their circumstances.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Until November, East Germans were not free to change the
system of government. The SED leadership made all important
decisions, controlled the Government and its operations,
determined who would fill executive positions in the
government apparatus, and ensured that its party members
occupied a majority of them. Although four other parties were
represented in the Government, they were not permitted to
challenge Communist leadership or control. In the first
indications of change in this situation, the unicameral
1124
legislature, the Volkskammer , in November elected the chairman
of the Democratic Peasants Party as its presiding officer and
in December elected the chairman of the Liberal Democratic
Party to succeed Egon Krenz as chairman of the Council of
State (chief of state). Furthermore, the Volkskammer in
December voted to amend the Constitution eliminating the SED"s
"leading role" in the State.
All parties and mass organizations (such as trade unions) were
represented in the National Front, which was controlled by the
SED. For election purposes, the National Front prepared lists
of approved candidates according to a formula which ensured
the SED's domination. Candidates exceeded the number of
available seats, and a candidate high on the list could be
rejected on election day if more than 50 percent of the voters
crossed his name off the ballot. In such a case, a candidate
lower on the list could be elected. This was, however,
extremely rare. For the first time in 20 years during the May
elections, two candidates lost. In December 1989, the
National Front was dissolved.
Charges of fraud during the May 7 local elections raised
questions about how far the East Germans' right to
self-determination extends. Although there is no question
that the majority of people voted for the official ballot,
unofficial poll watchers maintain, and most people believe,
that the official count showed many fewer "no" votes and a
higher participation rate than was actually the case. The
Government dismissed such allegations. Officially, 98.7
percent of those eligible to vote participated, and 99.91
percent of the voters "approved" the ballot.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Although the GDR is a signatory of the Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) , it
had generally taken the position that inquiries into its human
rights policies constituted interference in its internal
affairs. Requests by private human rights groups in the West
for information on human rights conditions went unanswered,
and the Government discouraged visits by such groups. Within
the GDR, members of unofficial human rights groups, such as
the Peace and Human Rights Initiative and the Solidarity
church working group, faced surveillance and harassment by the
secret police and could have been arrested if their activities
were deemed threatening to the Government. Such groups were
often the only source of current informa*-ion available to
outside observers on human rights developments in the GDR.
Until November, their ability to disseminate information was
restricted by official harassment.
The Vienna Concluding Document of the CSCE permits signatory
states to question human rights implementation in other member
countries. Spain, in its capacity as president of the
European Community, invoked the human rights issue against the
GDR in the spring of 1989 in a case in which an escaping East
German was arrested by GDR river police just after reaching
West Berlin. The GDR responded to the note but insisted that
the matter lay entirely within its sovereign competence and
did not immediately resolve or otherwise provide information
about the case. The person in question was ultimately allowed
to emigrate to the FRG.
1125
ORRMAN DEMOrRATIC REPUBLIC
The government-sponsored Committee for the Protection of Human
Rights does not attempt to safeguard the human rights of East
Germans. Instead, it criticizes human rights conditions in
other countries while claiming there are no problems in the
GDR. East German refusal, until recently, to recognize human
rights problems has also meant that there were few effective
executive, legislative, judicial, or administrative remedies
for addressing human rights violations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
An extensive social welfare system provides free medical care
to the population without discrimination. Men and women are
treated equally in most respects, and women's marriage and
property rights are generous. Women and men receive equal pay
for equal work. Violence against women, including wife
beating, is not condoned either legally or in practice.
Although it occurs, no statistics or reliable information is
available as to its extent. In the event of such abuse, women
have the right to seek redress in the courts.
The Democratic Women's Federation of Germany officially
represents women's interests within the SED. Its functions,
however, are nominal.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers do not have the right to establish and join unions and
federations of their own choosing. The Free German Trade
Union (FDGB) is an appendage of the SED. It consists of 16
unions covering all workers and professionals and represents
some 90 percent of the work force. All large industrial and
retail enterprises, which employ some 85 percent of the labor
force, are owned by the State. The FDGB's role has been to
enforce and promote official government and party policies,
which were considered to correspond with the interests of the
masses, rather than to promote members* interests, which might
conflict with those policies. The FDGB is affiliated with the
Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
Following the upheaval which began in October 1989, labor
entered a period of transition. In the intervening period,
independent trade union groups have emerged demanding respect
for freedom of association and the right to strike, and
scattered wildcat strikes have occurred. However, neither
these groups nor the rights they demand have thus far achieved
any basis in law. Meanwhile, the FDGB has experienced a
dramatic loss of membership and two spontaneous changes of
leadership under the pressure of mass demonstrations and
accusations of corruption. The former president of the
organization remains in detention on corruption charges. The
FDGB has scheduled an extraordinary convention for January
1990 in an apparent attempt at reform intended to make the
organization more responsive to workers' interests.
Except as noted above, workers do not have the constitutional
right to strike. There were no published reports of strikes
in 1989.
In its 1989 report, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Committee of Experts (COE) reiterated its rejection of the
trade union monopoly granted to the FDGB. The Committee found
1126
HERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
that the situation in the GDR was not compatible with ILO
Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and called on the
Government to provide legislation granting the workers,
including members of collective farms, freedom to establish
organizations of their own choosing.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There is no legal provision for collective bargaining, nor
does it exist in practice. Although worker representatives
are allowed to sit on the enterprises' boards, in reality they
rubberstamp the boards* policies. There are no export
processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is not legally prohibited but it is not practiced
in the GDR.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children from age 14 may work part time during vacations and
to further their education. Children can work full time with
parental permission between ages 14 and 18. Youths under the
age of 18 may not work between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. Youth
commissions within the FDGB effectively enforce the child
labor laws.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Under the law, a full-time worker is entitled to a minimum
wage of approximately $216 per month. This provides
subsistence-level living for workers and their families.
The maximum workweek is 43 3/4 hours, with a maximum of an
additional 120 hours overtime per year permissible by law,
except under extraordinary conditions. A 2-day weekend is
common. The GDR guaran'cees persons the right to a job, and
there is essentially no unemployment.
Labor law obliges enterprises to protect their employees*
health and safety in the workplace. In reality, working
conditions are often difficult, especially in mining and heavy
industry. The Government has had some success, however, in
reducing the relatively high rate of accidents in the
workplace.
1127
FEPEPAL REPUPLIC QF GERMftNY
The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is a constitutional
republic and parliamentary democracy. National power is
divided among executive, legislative, and judicial branches.
The head of the Federal Government, the Chancellor, is elected
by the Bundestag, the lower house of Parliament. The powers
of the Chancellor and of the Parliament, which are substantial,
are set down in the Basic Law (constitution) . There is a
division of governmental authority between national and state
governments. The latter retain significant autonomy,
especially in matters relating to law enforcement and the
courts, culture and education, the environment, and social
assistance.
Organized essentially at the state (land) level and operating
under the direction of state governments, well-trained and
disciplined police scrupulously respect citizens' rights, as
well as those of other persons resident in the FRG to the
extent they are protected by law. In dealing with hostile
elements, including terrorists, special care is taken to
respect the rights of the accused.
The industrialized economy of the FRG provides one of the
highest standards of living in the world.
The foundation of the Basic Law, adopted in 1949, rests firmly
on the principles of liberty, equality, and the free exercise
of individual rights. The "basic rights" enumerated in that
document are theoretically subject to interference only on the
basis of a law, and in practice these human rights are
scrupulously protected.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Politically motivated killing by the Government or by
mainstream political organizations is unknown. Terrorist
groups on the far left (the Red Army Fraktion — RAF), the far
right (neo-Nazi groups), and Middle Eastern terrorists
continue to engage in political violence.
b. Disappearance
Governmental or police authorities do not abduct, secretly
arrest, or otherwise illegally detain persons.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Police authorities do not physically or mentally torture
prisoners, nor do they engage in cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment. Use of excessive force against prisoners or
detainees is not legally sanctioned or officially encouraged.
On the rare occasions when it occurs, it is subject to
impartial investigation and legal sanction.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
No person may be arrested in the FRG except on the basis of an
arrest warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. Any
person detained by the police must be brought before a judge
1128
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
and charged no later than the day following the day of
apprehension. The court must then issue an arrest warrant
with stated reasons or order the person's release.
There is no preventive detention in the normal sense. The
law, however, provides that a prisoner may be held in custody
(but no longer than 24 hours) while awaiting a formal charge
if there is evidence that he might seek to flee the country to
avoid prosecution. The right of free access to legal counsel
has been restricted only in the cases of some terrorists who
have used contacts with lawyers to promote and continue
terrorist activity even while in prison. Only judges may
decide on the validity of any deprivation of liberty. Bail
bond exists in the FRG but is seldom employed. There is no
exi le .
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Trials are public. The Basic Law assures due process and
prohibits double jeopardy. The judiciary is free of both
government interference and intimidation by terrorists. There
are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The inviolability of the home is ensured by the Basic Law and
fully respected in practice. Prior to forcible entry by
police into a home, a warrant must be issued by a judge or, in
an emergency, by a public prosecutor. Electronic surveillance
or monitoring of mail may be undertaken only after
authorization by a court order.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The provisions of the Basic Law, an independent press, an
effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic political
system combine to ensure freedom of speech and press.
Criticism of the Government is unrestricted. The media and
artistic works are not censored. Academic freedom is
complete. There is no censorship of foreign or domestic
books. Newspapers and magazines are privately owned.
Radio and television networks and stations function, for the
most part, as corporations under special public laws. They
are governed by independent boards made up of representatives
of churches, political parties, and other organizations.
A few experimental private television cable stations and local
television cable networks have been set up. Legislation has
been enacted in all states except Bremen and Hesse to
facilitate and encourage private television stations using
cable, satellites, and other "new" media.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The rights of assembly and association are fully respected, as
is the right to demonstrate. Organizers of street
demonstrations are required to obtain police permits
beforehand and may be asked to pay a deposit to cover the
repair of any damage to public facilities. When demonstrators
1129
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
have not obtained the required permits, police have exercised
considerable restraint, showing concern primarily for the
continued functioning of public facilities and for the safety
of the general public.
Membership in nongovernmental organizations of all types,
including political parties, is entirely open. Parties found
to be "fundamentally antidemocratic" may be outlawed. Under
this constitutionally based provision, the Federal
Constitutional Court in the 1950 's declared both a neo-Nazi
and a Communist party to be illegal.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The full practice of religion is allowed. Major religious
groups participate in a state-administered church tax system.
The Government subsidizes church-affiliated schools and
provides religious instruction in schools and universities for
Protestants, Catholics, and m.embers of the Jewish community.
The major religious groupings are active in FRG public
political debates. Political parties are legally barred from
refusing members on the basis of religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
German citizens are free to move anywhere within the country
and to leave and return at any time. The Basic Law provides
that Germans who arrive in the Federal Republic from the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) , as well as from Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, are treated as German citizens
and therefore may take up residence without restrictions.
Continuing a trend begun in 1986, the number of ethnic Germans
from Eastern Europe coming to settle in the FRG grew steadily.
By June, nearly 152,000 had come, including nearly 100,000
from Poland, 41,000 from the Soviet Union, and 11,000 from
Romania. In addition, nearly 56,000 Germans from the GDR had
arrived by July 31. With the opening of the Hungarian-
Austrian border in September and unimpeded travel to the FRG
through Czechoslovakia in November, the number of East German
refugees increased dramatically to an official total of
343,854 by year's end.
The right of asylum of those who are politically persecuted is
also guaranteed by the Basic Law and respected in practice.
By August, the total number of asylum seekers in the FRG was
estimated to be 800,000, with Poles, Yugoslavs, and Turks the
three largest groups.
Once formally granted asylum status, and to a lesser extent
while being processed, asylees have essentially the same
access to social welfare benefits as German citizens. Short
of the right to vote, they enjoy complete civil rights. While
only about 10 percent of the asylum seekers are successful
with their requests for political asylum, denial of political
asylum does not automatically result in deportation. Eighty
percent of those whose petitions are denied are typically
allowed to remain in the country for other, humanitarian
reasons. Persons from Eastern European countries are normally
allowed to remain whether or not official asylum status is
granted. Extraditions have been extremely rare.
1130
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Under the parliamentary democracy established by the Basic
Law, the FRG is ruled by a government chosen by the people
through orderly elections based on universal adult suffrage.
The Bundestag (lower house) is elected through a mixture of
direct constituency candidates and party lists. Members of
the upper house of Parliament, the Bundesrat, are appointed by
the state governments. Around 87 percent of voters normally
participate in national elections, but local contests attract
significantly lower participation.
Candidates for public office are usually members of political
parties but are not required to be. New political parties are
free to form and enter the political process, but the Basic
Law and the state constitutions stipulate that parties must
achieve at least 5 percent of the total vote in order to be
represented in the Federal and state Parliaments. The FRG has
been ruled since its creation by governments headed by one of
the two major parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) or
the Social Democratic Party (SPD) . The current Government is
led by a coalition of the CDU joined by its Bavarian sister
party, the Christian Social Union (CSU) , and the Free
Democratic Party (FDP) . The SPD and the Greens, a party
represented in the Bundestag since the elections of March
1983, comprise the opposition. Although party discipline
plays an important role, voting on issues in the Bundestag is
ultimately a matter of individual decision.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There were no allegations of violations of human rights in
1989. A number of human rights organizations, both
international and local, freely conduct their activities in
the Federal Republic. The Government considers the
international promotion of human rights one of its highest
priorities .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no legal and relatively little de facto
discrimination in the availability of shelter, health care,
and education to all inhabitants, regardless of race,
religion, sex, ethnic background, political opinion, or
citizenship.
Due to increased unemployment, the Government has pursued a
three-pronged policy with regard to foreign workers:
integration of longtime residents, limitation of further
entries, and repatriation aid for those willing to return to
their home countries. At the end of June, foreign workers
totalled 1.592 million, or 5.8 percent of the work force, and
36 percent were organized in trade unions. A national debate
has been under way over whether the rights of guest workers
should be broadened to permit unlimited residence and the
right to vote or reduced by limiting the right of entry for
dependent children.
Since the passage of an equal employment rights law in 1982,
women are guaranteed equal employment at the workplace. They
are increasingly rising to management and leadership positions
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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
in the private and public sectors. Protective legislation
bars women from working in certain heavy industrial occupations
and also generally bans night work. Young women experience
difficulties in gaining access to training in some
traditionally male fields. Recent court rulings and government
pilot programs, however, have helped break down some of these
attitudinal and institutional barriers. Women enjoy full and
equal protection under the law, including property and
inheritance rights. Consistent with the special status which
mothers enjoy pursuant to the terms of the Basic Law, the
Government provides financial benefits for mothers, including
maternity leave and child allowances. There are several
active women's rights groups.
Violence against women is acknowledged, and the women's
movement has urged public discussion of the problem and
tougher penalties for crimes against women. Reliable figures
concerning domestic violence, including wife beating, are not
available. Women's groups have taken the lead in calling for
tougher punishment for domestic violence and other crimes
against women. They have also sponsored the creation of a
number of refuges for women who are victims of such violence.
These refuges receive support at the state and local level
varying from 100 percent of expenses in Berlin and Hamburg to
more limited support in other states. According to the
Interior Ministry, the official number of rape cases reported
in 1988 fell to 5,251, the lowest level since 1958. In a
parliamentary speech in May, the CDU Minister for Youth,
Family, Women, and Health referred to a recent study by the
Allensbach Public Opinion Research Institute which said rape
occurs at least once in every fifth marriage. Claims by some
women's organizations that many rapes are not reported and
that rape in marriage is serious enough to require making it a
punishable offense have so far not persuaded legislators to
make marital rape a punishable offense.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right to associate freely, choose representatives,
determine programs and policies to represent members'
interests, and to publicize views is recognized and exercised
freely. The right to strike is guaranteed by law, except for
civil servants and personnel in sensitive positions, such as
members of the armed forces. Strikes occurred in 1989,
notably in the printing industry and in the retail trade, in
which work time reduction was one of several issues.
The country has a long-established and highly organized labor
movement, with about 41 percent of the eligible work force
unionized. The German Trade Union Federation represents over
83 percent of organized workers. Reborn in the wake of World
War II, the unions are particularly conscious of their historic
role as the protector of worker rights and a bulwark of the
democratic system. In order to avoid the political divisions
which plagued the post-World War I labor movement, the unions
adopted the principle of a "unified union," independent of any
political party but in which the two major parties are
represented. They actively participate in the International
Labor Organization and in international and European trade
union organizations.
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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is guaranteed
by law and is widely practiced. Each year approximately 7,000
contracts are renegotiated, affecting some 20 million workers,
or 90 percent of the dependent work force.
No government mechanism to promote voluntary worker-employer
negotiations is required because of a well-developed system of
autonomous contract negotiations. There is a two-tiered
bargaining system, whereby basic wages and conditions are
established at the industry level and then adapted to the
circumstances prevailing in particular enterprises through
local negotiations. A distinguishing characteristic of FRG
industrial relations is the legally mandated system of works
councils which provide a permanent forum for continuing
selective worker participation in the management of the
enterprise. Workers are fully protected against antiunion
discrimination, and there is a well-developed labor court
system to process complaints. There are no export processing
or free trade zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is barred by the Constitution and
is nonexistent in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Federal law generally prohibits the employment of children
under age 15 with a few exceptions: children aged 13 and 14
may do farm work for up to 3 hours per day or may deliver
newspapers for up to 2 hours per day; children aged 3 through
14 may take part in cultural performances under stringent
conditions with regard to number of hours, time of day, and
form of activity.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
While thers is no legal minimum wage, minimum wages are set by
contract within each industry sector. At the lower end of the
minimum wage scale is the $5.40 per houi wage (at current
exchange rates) for agricultural workers. Such minimum wage
levels provide an adequate standard of living for workers and
their families. The number of hours of work per week is
regulated by contracts which directly or indirectly affect 80
percent of the working population. Negotiation of a 35-hour
workweek is a major goal of FRG unions. The average workweek
is nearly 39 hours. Federal legislation sets occupational
safety and health standards. For each occupation, there is a
comprehensive system of worker insurance carriers who enforce
requirements for safety in the workplace.
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GREECE
Greece is a constitutional republic and parliamentary
democracy. The party or coalition with the majority of seats
in Parliament names the Prime Minister, who forms the
Government. Parliamentary elections in June and November 1989
were freely and vigorously contested by a full spectrum of
political parties and resulted in an orderly, democratic
change of government. The President, the largely ceremonial
Head of State, is elected by Parliament.
Activities of the police and security services are monitored
by the Government and the independent judiciary. The
generally alert press reports rare abuses, including the
improper expulsion of political refugees and isolated
instances of rough treatment of ordinary criminals.
A developed country and a member of the European Community
(EC), Greece benefits from EC subsidies designed to bring its
per capita gross national product into line with that of other
EC members. Economic development is hampered by a public
sector bloated by generations of politically motivated hirings
and by consequent massive budget deficits.
The Constitution provides a full range of fundamental human
rights. Some members of religious and ethnic/cultural
minorities, however, continue to complain about the behavior
of some government officials who, they allege, restrict their
rights and discriminate against them. About 420 Jehovah's
Witnesses are in prison due to the absence of nonmilitary
alternative service to conscription. Treatment of the
respective Muslim and Greek minorities in Greece and Turkey
continues to be a subject of dispute between the two countries.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Neither government forces nor legal opposition organizations
engage in politically motivated killings. In 1989 domestic
terrorist groups assassinated a prominent deputy of the
conservative New Democracy party and two judicial officials.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of official abductions, secret arrests,
or clandestine detentions during 1989.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution provides for freedom from torture. A
November 1984 law makes the use of torture an offense
punishable by sentences ranging from 3 years to life
imprisonment. Greek human rights groups contend that police
overreliance on confessions occasionally leads to physical or
reported psychological intimidation of ordinary criminals.
Amnesty International reported several allegations of torture
or ill-treatment of prisoners in 1989.
Poor treatment of the severely mentally handicapped in a
psychiatric institution on a remote island sparked a storm of
protest from psychiatrists and journalists in 1989. Current
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GREECE
Greek law on commitment to psychiatric institutions is
criticized for not insisting on adequate judicial review, but
there were no allegations of abusive commitments in 1989.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution states that a judicial warrant is required
for any arrest except during the actual commission of a
crime. Occasionally, suspects are briefly and informally
detained pending confirmation of their identity, but there is
no evidence of any serious infringement of civil liberties. A
person arrested on the basis of a warrant or while committing
a crime must be brought before an examining magistrate within
24 hours and charged. The magistrate must issue a warrant of
imprisonment or order the release of the detainee within 3 days
of the examination unless special circumstances require a 2-day
extension of this time limit.
A Dutch national was imprisoned by administrative order for
8 months during 1988 and 1989 over a disputed customs
obligation. New legislation passed in October deprived tax
authorities of the power to order imprisonment without
judicial review for unpaid debts to the State.
The effective maximum duration of detention pending trial is
18 months for felonies and 9 months for misdemeanors. Most
trials occur within 12 months of the charges being submitted.
Release pending trial, with or without bail, is granted in
limited cases by decision of a judicial council.
Exile is unconstitutional and does not occur, except in the
form of loss of citizenship for dual nationals (see Section
5). With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section
6.C.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for fair and public trials. Greece
has a regular system of civil and criminal courts. The
independence of the judiciary, though provided for by the
Constitution, is occasionally subject to political
intervention. Judges are sometimes accused of allowing
political criteria to influence their judgments. A new law on
judicial codes passed in October was designed to strengthen
the independence of the judiciary by eliminating the role of
politically appointed judicial officials in assigning judges
to specific trials.
Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence. Defense lawyers
are available to all accused persons, at public expense if
necessary. A defendant or his attorney may confront
witnesses. Court sessions are public, unless the court
decides that privacy is required for the protection of victims
or in matters of national security. The latter provision is
not abused. A defendant may appeal a court verdict to an
appeals court. Pending the passage of long-delayed enabling
legislation, the decisions of military courts are not subject
to review by the Supreme Court, and the courts themselves are
criticized for inadequately safeguarding the rights of those
accused. Military courts have no jurisdiction over
civilians. Greece has no political prisoners.
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GREECE
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the home
and of the individual's personal and family life. No house
search may be made except in the presence of a judicial
representative and with a judicial warrant issued in
conformity with strict legal standards. Alleged abuses of
this provision have provoked swift official investigation.
There is no compulsory membership in political groups. The
Constitution guarantees privacy of correspondence and of
communications. An investigation by Parliament in August
concluded that the previous Greek government (1981-1989) had
engaged in system.atic wiretapping of opposition political
parties, politicians, and newspaper publishers. Former Prime
Minister Andreas Papandreou and two senior officials were
remanded to a special judicial tribunal for trial on these
charges .
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and the press is provided for in the
Constitution and respected in practice. Censorship is
prohibited. Opposition viewpoints are constantly presented in
the active Greek press and criticism of the Government is
unhampered.
Greek law prohibited privately owned television stations until
new legislation was passed in September. Two private stations
are scheduled to begin transmitting broadcasts in November,
though municipal television stations had operated on a
quasi-illegal experimental basis irregularly during the year.
Although the activities of opposition political leaders are
covered by state-controlled radio and television, opposition
parties assert that news and information programming tends to
reflect the political perspective of the governing party.
During elections, air time is allocated to all political
parties. Legislation passed in 1988 legalized municipal and
privately operated radio stations, which air a wide range of
viewpoints. Since 1988, the Government rebroadcasts foreign
satellite television programs in major cities.
The Constitution allows for seizure, by order of the public
prosecutor, of publications which insult the President, offend
religious beliefs, contain obscene articles, advocate the
violent overthrow of the political system, or disclose
military and defense information. No periodicals or
newspapers are known to have been seized in 1989. Academic
freedoms are protected by democratically chosen faculty
organizations, though such groups tend to be highly
politicized.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly, but the
police may impose limits on outdoor public meetings if they
determine that a serious disturbance of social and economic
life is threatened. This exception was not abused in 1989.
The right of association is guaranteed by the Constitution and
observed in practice. All citizens are free to establish and
join organizations of their own choosing, including trade
1136
GBE££E
unions, political groups, and private organizations, without
previous authorization or government interference.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion and prohibits
discriminatory practices against religious minorities, which
include communities of Muslims, Jews, and non-Orthodox
Christians. The Constitution nevertheless establishes the
Greek Orthodox Church, to which 98 percent of the population
at least nominally adheres, as the "prevailing" religion. In
addition, the Constitution prohibits proselytism by any
religious group. The number of foreign missionaries arrested
has decreased since the courts ruled that distribution of
literature alone does not constitute proselytism. In the
first 9 months of 1989, about 110 Jehovah's Witnesses were
arrested for proselytism, and 5 were sentenced to fines (about
$3,000 each) and brief imprisonment. The Jehovah's Witnesses
allege that on at least two occasions in the past 12 months
Orthodox priests incited crowds to beat up women distributing
religious tracts. They also claim that, in defiance of Greek
law, many public schoolteachers refuse to excuse children of
Jehovah's Witnesses and other faiths from mandatory religion
classes, in which their beliefs are attacked in state-approved
textbooks as heretical.
The Constitution declares that "no person shall be exempt from
discharging his obligations to the State or may refuse to
comply with laws by reason of his religious convictions."
Although Greece provides for alternative noncombatant military
service, it has no provision for nonmilitary alternative
national service to its universal conscription of men.
Jehovah's Witnesses and a small number of other conscientious
objectors of military age who refuse alternative noncombatant
military service are tried and sentenced by military courts to
military prison for a term twice that of normal service. In
September there were about 420 Jehovah's Witnesses serving
sentences of between 3 and 5 years. A portion of this
sentence may be served in a minimum security (civilian)
agricultural prison, where each day served is credited as
2 days toward fulfillment of the sentence. In 1989 the
average time actually served was reportedly about 38 months.
Two conscientious objectors unconnected with the Jehovah's
Witnesses were released in 1989 after having served two-thirds
of their sentences. Parliament in 1989 did not debate
long-pending legislation to create nonmilitary alternative
service.
In late 1987, a lower court in Crete held that Jehovah's
Witnesses do not constitute a "known" religion and are thus
not entitled to legal protection on the grounds that their
doctrine of refusal to serve in the military violates Greek
law. The Supreme Court's consideration of the appeal of this
decision was postponed until late in 1989. Jehovah's
Witnesses complain that the Government does not recognize that
Jehovah's Witnesses' clerics are entitled to the same
exemption from military service as that accorded to Orthodox
and other recognized clerics. In addition, Jehovah's
Witnesses in military prison are reportedly denied access to
religious services.
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GREECE
Some non-Orthodox churches experience difficulties in building
or acquiring new meetingplaces when necessary permits from the
Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, which must
consider the opinion of the Orthodox Church hierarchy, are
denied. Jehovah's Witnesses complain that their requests for
use of public facilities are routinely denied.
Greece has a Muslim minority of approximately 126,000, made up
of ethnic Turks, Pomaks, and Gypsies, located principally in
Thrace in northeastern Greece. Their freedom of religion was
guaranteed under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, and some 250
working mosques exist. Members of the Muslim community insist
that, in accordance with a never-implemented law of 1920, the
community itself should elect the Muftis (religious leaders)
of the two major towns (Xanthi and Komotini). An interim
Mufti appointed by the Government has not been accepted by
many in the community, and the issue remains at an impasse.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution ensures freedom of movement within the
country, foreign travel, and emigration, and these rights are
generally respected. Persons intending to emigrate and
emigrants who return to Greece experience no discrimination.
However, the Greek citizenship code makes a legal distinction
between Greek citizens of ethnic Greek descent and those of
nonethnic Greek descent. Citizens of nonethnic Greek descent
may be deprived of their citizenship by a simple
administrative decree if they move abroad with the apparent
intent not to return. Every year a small number of Greek
Muslims who have moved to Turkey find that they have been
stripped of their Greek citizenship. There is no prior
hearing or judicial review and no effective right of appeal.
The Muslim community protests this practice as discriminatory.
Greek Civil War refugees of Slavic ethnicity (stripped of
their Greek citizenship for participation in the Communist-led
insurrection of 1946-49) were expressly excluded from the
general amnesty and return of exiles completed in 1982. In
1989 the head of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) denounced the
Government's refusal to allow their return as "racist."
Greece is a first-asylum country under the 1951 Geneva
Convention on Refugees but makes no provision for permanent
settlement of refugees in Greece. In October 1989, the
Minister of Labor promulgated a decree allowing bona fide
refugees to work, an important step forward in improving the
inadequate institutional framework for refugees. Refugee
organizations note that Greece has no objective criteria for
distinguishing asylum seekers from economic migrants. Greek
border officials returned an escaped political prisoner
involuntarily to Turkish authorities in August. The
Government characterized this and other reported expulsions as
contrary to its policy but refused to release the report of
its investigation of the incident.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Greece is a multiparty democracy in which all citizens enjoy
full political rights, without regard to race, sex, religion,
or political persuasion. Greek citizens freely choose the
officials and laws governing them. The President is elected
by Parliament to a 5-year term. Members of the unicameral
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GREECE
Parliament are elected to maximum 4-year terms by compulsory
universal suffrage (over age 18) and secret ballot.
Opposition parties function freely, have broad access to the
media, hold public meetings, and serve as a check on actions
by the Government. In June the 8-year government of the
Panhellenic Socialist Movement was voted out of office and
replaced by an interim coalition of the conservative New
Democracy Party and an alliance of Communist and leftist
parties. New parliamentary elections November 5 under the
same proportional electoral system again did not produce a
majority government.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government has not objected to visits and investigations
by human rights organizations, although visits by U.S. and
other foreign diplomats to the border regions, where the bulk
of the Muslim minority population resides, are subject to
prior notification to and occasional refusal by the
Government, as well as surveillance by the security services.
Domestic human rights organizations are allowed to operate
freely and actively assist those who believe their rights have
been violated. The Government also participates in
multilateral human rights organizations.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The subject of minority rights is a sensitive one in the
Balkans, where real or alleged human rights abuses have been
used in the past to justify irredentist claims. Greece has a
significant Muslim minority, primarily in western Thrace, and
there are smaller communities in the Dodecanese Islands and in
Athens and other industrial areas. Pomaks (Bulgarian-speaking
Muslims) occupy the mountainous border with Bulgaria, and
Gypsies are scattered throughout Greece. There are remnant
populations speaking Albanian, Vlach (related to Romanian),
and Slavic dialects.
The Treaty of Lausanne includes provisions protecting the
political and cultural rights of the Muslim (Turkish, Pomak,
and Gypsy) minority in western Thrace, as it did the rights of
the Greek minority in Istanbul. By and large these rights are
respected. Muslim villages in Thrace regularly elect Muslim
mayors, and an independent Muslim deputy was elected to the
Parliament in June 1989 by an overwhelming majority of the
local Muslim population in his district. In the November
parliamentary elections the independent Muslim Deputy, Ahmet
Sadik, and one of his two running mates were disqualified on
the basis of a missing affidavit in their applications. This
exclusion and a sudden strike by customs officials which
closed the border with Turkey just before these elections (and
the June elections as well) have fueled allegations by critics
that local authorities may have played a role in attempting to
block the Muslim party. The remaining independent Muslim
candidate was nevertheless elected.
Greek authorities insist on the religious, not ethnic,
character of the minority (as specified in the Lausanne
Treaty). The Greek Supreme Court upheld a ruling that local
minority associations cannot call themselves "Turkish," a
decision the associations have appealed to the European
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GREECE
Parliament. The independent Muslim candidates campaigned on a
platform of insisting not only on equal treatment, but also on
the Turkish ethnic/cultural (rather than Muslim religious)
identity of the minority. Most Greeks assert that the
Government of Turkey actively intervened to support the
independent Muslim candidates, giving as evidence the
extensive coverage the Muslim campaign received in the Turkish
media .
Members of the Muslim community complain that Greek officials
encourage an overly traditional, religious education in
Turkish-language schools and obstruct entry of teachers and
educational materials from Turkey. Greek officials contend
that the Government of Turkey has not acted to revise
materials found unacceptable under the terms of a 1968
agreement on reciprocal imports of textbooks. Access to
Turkish-language secondary schools is restricted by government
insistence that entrance exams be given in Greek. In the
current impasse, Turkish-language schools in Greece are
considered inadequate to prepare students for a modern
economy, while Muslim Greeks who study in Turkey complain that
their professional credentials are not accepted by Greek
professional bodies.
Muslim leaders complain about barriers to land purchases and
discrimination in approval of building permits, business
licenses, and many other permits. The Government insists that
ethnic Greeks and Muslims receive equal treatment, though it
acknowledges that widespread illiteracy in Greek among members
of the minority hinders their access to the State's
machinery. Muslim leaders complained in early 1989 that a
major expropriation of chiefly Muslim-owned land for an
agricultural prison had been decided upon without advance
warning or consultation with the local population.
Efforts by other smaller ethnic/cultural groups to maintain
distinct cultural identities are reportedly met with suspicion
by security authorities. One dual U.S. -Greek national of
Vlach ethnicity, who maintained property in Greece and
published a Vlach-language publication in the United States,
was stripped of his Greek citizenship without his knowledge in
1986 and in 1989 was expelled from Greece for "anti-Greek
activities . "
Some conservative elements of the Greek public adopt a
critical view of the open exercise of unfamiliar religions.
According to Jehovah's Witnesses' reports, supported by press
accounts and official documentation, at least 40 families of
Jehovah's Witnesses in Thessaloniki were systematically denied
municipal documents needed for the exercise of their civil
rights in 1989. Under pressure from the European Parliament,
however, the municipality of Thessaloniki ceased this practice
as of November 10. According to the Watchtower Society, all
pending cases have been satisfactorily resolved.
Both the Constitution and the revised family law provide women
the same individual, political, and social rights as men.
Women's rights advocates agree that the legal protections for
women are sweeping and progressive, though attitudes and
social practice lag behind. The law mandates equal pay for
men and women in equivalent jobs. Over the past decade the
Government has made substantial progress in reforming
marriage, divorce, and property laws, and has expanded
services to women in unemployment, family planning, and child
care .
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GREECE
Women's rights figures say that Greece is comparable to other
Western European countries in the incidence of violence
against women, with no special pattern of abuse and a low rate
of alcohol-related crimes. Rape, incest, and wife beating
exists, but the nearly complete absence of reliable statistics
makes exact comparisons impossible. The social infrastructure
for battered women is almost nonexistent, despite past funding
by the European Community, and police and local authorities
have no training and little enthusiasm for intervening in
domestic conflicts.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
All workers except the military and police are entitled to
form or join unions of their own choosing. The right of
association is provided for in the Constitution and in
specific legislation passed in 1978 and amended in 1982. In
1988 an estimated 35 percent of wage and salary earners were
organized in unions.
Unions receive most of their funding from a Ministry of Labor
organization, the "Worker's Hearth," though a few unions have
their own additional sources of funding. The Committee of
Experts of the International Labor Organization (ILO) for some
years has expressed concern that procedures for collecting
union dues are not compatible with the provisions of ILO
Convention 87 on Freedom of Association, which Greece ratified
in 1962. Unions are highly politicized, with competing unions
linked to political parties, but they are not controlled by
the parties or the Government in their day-to-day operations.
There are no constraints on service as a union official. Over
4,000 unions are grouped into regional and sectoral federations
and 2 umbrella confederations for civil servants and for
private sector workers. There are no restrictions on
international contacts. Greek unions and federations are
affiliated with the European Trade Union Confederation and the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
Some 250 to 300 strikes took place during the past year. The
right to strike is restricted only by the Government's power
of civil mobilization of workers when there is a danger to
national security, life, or property, or to the social and
economic life of the country. Although there were no reported
abuses in 1989, the extent of the Government's powers is
considered to exceed the standards of ILO Convention 87 by the
Committee of Experts which has urged the Government to bring
its legislation into conformity with the principles of the
Convention. Employees in public services must notify
employers of their intention to strike 4 days prior to the
strike and must continue to provide certain basic services.
Union leaders, particularly those of the stronger private
sector unions, complain that a high percentage of labor
agreements are reached through compulsory arbitration.
Legislative remedies were discussed but not enacted in 1989.
Security personnel (military, police, fire, port police) are
prohibited from forming unions and from striking. Police
personnel staged protests during 1989 against government
efforts to prevent union organizing activities.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is ensured by
legislation passed in 1955. Antiunion discrimination is
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GREECE
prohibited. Complaints of discrimination against union
members or organizers may be referred to the labor
inspectorate or to the courts. Litigation is lengthy and
expensive, however, and penalties for employers are seldom
severe.
There are no restrictions on collective bargaining for private
workers, though social security benefits, legislated by
Parliament, are excluded from the process. Civil servants
negotiate their demands with the Ministry of Interior but have
no formal system of collective bargaining. Greece has no
export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is strictly prohibited by the
Constitution and is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for work in industry is 15. Additionally,
legislation and regulations provide alternate minimum ages for
work in specified areas or for specific jobs. For example,
those performing loading or unloading work must be at least
18, while workers at the ports of Piraeus and Thessaloniki
must be 21. In family businesses, theaters, and the cinema,
the minimum age is 12 years. Enforced by occasional labor
inspectorate spot checks, these age limits are generally
respected. However families engaged in agriculture, food
service, or merchandising often have younger family members
assisting at least part time.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The minimum daily wage in Greece as of September 1989 was $16,
sufficient for a decent standard of living. Minimum wages and
salaries, established by the National Collective Bargaining
Agreement and by branch collective bargaining agreements, are
generally respected by employers. The workweek is 40 hours in
the private sector and 37.5 hours in the public sector, and
business hours are strictly regulated by the Government. The
law mandates an annual paid holiday of 1 month per year and
sets maximum limits on overtime.
Minimum standards of occupational health and safety are
provided for by legislation. Although the Greek Confederation
of Labor characterizes health and safety legislation as
satisfactory, it charges that enforcement of the legislation
is inadequate, citing the high number of job-related
accidents. Enforcement reportedly suffers because of
inadequate inspection, failure to enforce compliance with
regulations, and outdated industrial plants and equipment.
Complaints about unsafe working conditions are usually made
anonymously.
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HUNGARY
Hungary is undergoing an historic transition in which reform-
minded Communists, now calling themselves Socialists, endorsed
in 1989 the country's transition toward free, multiparty
elections scheduled for March 25, 1990. The reform Communists
abandoned the party's claims to a leading role in the State
and established the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) to replace
the Hungarian Socialist Workers (Communist) Party (HSWP) which
dissolved itself. The Parliament adopted sweeping amendments
to the 1949 Constitution, and the country's name was changed
from the Hungarian People's Republic to the Republic of
Hungary. Communists in 1989 had to retreat on fundamental
issues, such as the legitimacy of opposition political
parties; its paramilitary Workers Militia was disbanded.
The strong state security apparatus has been nominally
detached from Communist party control. Its activities, less
obtrusive in 1989, were opened to very limited public scrutiny
for the first time. The Soviet Union in 1989 announced cuts
in its military forces stationed in Hungary of some 20
percent, reducing them to about 55,000, and the Hungarian Army
announced manpower reductions of 35 percent, to about 85,000.
Eventual neutrality was accepted as a policy goal by
reform-minded Communist party leaders.
The economy has structural problems headed by inefficient
state industries, a $20 billion gross debt, which is Eastern
Europe's largest per capita, and deficits in a government
budget which consumes 63 percent of gross domestic product.
The Government, which is committed to social tolerance as well
as market reforms, must cope with widespread unhappiness over
a high inflation rate (officially 16-17 percent). The
Government was concerned that growth in unemployment and
widening income differentials might trigger social unrest.
There was impressive practical and legislative progress in
Hungary's human rights record throughout 1989. Hundreds of
public demonstrations and opposition political meetings took
place without police interference under the law on assem.bly
adopted in January. The country took an important step in
coming to grips with its Communist past as over 100,000 people
took part in the June 16 public funeral services for Imre
Nagy, Prime Minister during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, and
colleagues who were executed in 1958. Hungary stood out among
Warsaw Pact members by acceding to the International Covenants
on Human Rights as well as the 1951 U.N. Convention on the
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Additional Protocol. The
Government in 1989 dismantled the "iron curtain" border with
Austria and courageously opened the border for over 50,000
East Germans to travel to the Federal Republic of Germany
(ERG) despite the provisions of an Hungarian-East German
agreement and vociferous protests from East German authorities.
Under the new law on associations, the roster of new political
parties swelled to about 50. Radio Free Europe opened its
first East European office in Budapest in September. The
Parliament in September passed a law significantly broadening
freedom of speech. With the virtua] withering away of the
official press, the proliferating independent journals have
become watchdogs against official abuses. In multiparty
parliamentary by-elections, the first in over 40 years, the
opposition Hungarian Democratic Forum won four clear victories
over the HSWP. The State Office for Religious Affairs, a
Stalinist vestige, was abolished, and negotiations were opened
to restore full diplomatic relations with the Vatican.
1143
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RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
}
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There is no evidence that such killings occurred.
b. Disappearance
There were no reported disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
No known instances of torture have occurred in Hungary in
recent years. Citizens, in principle, may bring complaints
against the police.
There are three levels of punitive incarceration: "workhouse,"
which allows some privileges such as visiting, outside work,
and leave; "jail," which is more punitive; and "prison," which
means a maximum-security penitentiary. With varying degrees
of frequency, depending on levels of imprisonment, prisoners
have rights to visitation by family members, other relatives,
and friends. There does not appear to be systematic
mistreatment of prisoners, and no such cases were reported in
1989.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Hungary's legal system underwent considerable change in 1989
with the adoption of amendments to the penal code in
September, which restricted the definition of "anti-State
crimes" to offenses which threaten the political system in
respect to the principles of the Constitution, or the
independence or territorial integrity of the State. Attacks
on leading officials are no longer accepted within the meaning
of "anti-State crimes," and criminal proceedings may no longer
be pursued against those who publicly urge a change in the
political system.
Citizens are no longer subject to arbitrary arrest. The
amended Constitution provides that any past victims of
unlawful arrest or detention shall be entitled to
compensation. Upon arrest, a detainee must be informed in
writing of the offense he or she is suspected of having
committed and may be held at a police station for a maximum of
72 hours before charges must be filed. There is no right of
bail or provisional pretrial liberty. A Supreme Court ruling
is needed to extend incarceration for over 1 year while
criminal proceedings are in progress. No cases of police
violation of arrest procedures came to light in 1989.
The new law on criminal procedure adopted by Parliament in
September limits the issuance, extension, and withdrawal of
orders for detention without authorization by magistrates,
allows for the presence of defense attorneys during police
questioning, and limits detention without charges to 1 month.
The law limits the jurisdiction of military courts to members
of the armed forces and border guards. Policemen must be
tried in civil courts.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
24-900 O— 90 37
1144
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e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for a Constitutional Court
consisting of 15 members elected by Parliament. One-third of
the 15 were elected by the current Parliament, and the
remainder will be elected by the new Parliament. The Supreme
Court exercises guidance over the Budapest, county, and local
courts. No judge, member of the Supreme Court or
Constitutional Court can be a member of a political party or
engage in political activity.
The Constitution establishes the presumption of innocence
until criminal responsibility is established. Trials are
open. Defendants have a right to counsel at all phases of
proceedings. Decisions of the courts, public administration,
or other authorities that infringe on individual rights can be
appealed. In general, judicial procedures are investigative
rather than adversarial in nature. There is no trial by jury.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The amended Constitution provides for personal freedom, the
protection of privacy, and the inviolability of domicile, but
these provisions continued to be violated when the State
believed that it was in its interest to do so. Search
warrants are generally obtained. House searches are conducted
by court order and must be carried out in the presence of two
witnesses. A written inventory of items removed from the
premises must be prepared.
Since the 1960's, Hungarian authorities have become more
tolerant with respect to a person's private activities.
Formal systems for gathering personal information, such as the
widespread use of informers and block wardens and overt
intrusions of the police into daily life, have been
substantially curtailed. It is widely assumed, however, that
the authorities tap private telephone lines and open
correspondence when they wish to do so.
Parents are not discouraged from enrolling their children in
religious instruction classes. Officially encouraged
membership in political organizations ceased to be a feature
of Hungarian life in 1989. Hungarian citizens* ability to
receive foreign publications is effectively limited only by
the need for hard-currency funds to pay for subscriptions,
although new banking regulations make it possible for
Hungarian citizens to maintain bank accounts denominated in
Western currencies.
Hungary does not jam foreign radio broadcasts. Since the
spring of 1989, accredited Radio Free Europe correspondents
have regularly covered Hungarian events from within the
country, and in September Radio Free Europe opened its first
East European office in Budapest.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The latitude for freedom of expression expanded further in
1989. In October Parliament passed a law broadening freedom
of speech. The Government and HSP have virtually no control
over the press and diminishing influence over radio and
television. The state media became increasingly free in 1989
1145
HUNGARY
to raise hitherto unreported issues, air opposition views, and
criticize the Government. An independent press began to
function. In December the Prime Minister announced he wanted
to include a law ensuring freedom of the press in the current
Parliament's agenda. In the meantime, supervisory boards for
radio and television were established to select directors.
The boards include representatives from major sectors of
society, including opposition parties, and control of the
national radio and television became major public issues.
The television programs A Het (The Week) and Panorama offer
searching and relatively balanced examinations of current
events which are close to West European network quality.
Opposition spokesmen have frequently appeared in radio and
television news broadcasts, although some opposition parties
charge that they do not receive sufficient air time. The June
16 funeral services for former Prime Minister Imre Nagy were
broadcast live and in full on Hungarian radio and television.
Wide-ranging interviews were held on official television with
the Czechoslovak Communist Party leader in 1968-69, Alexander
Dubcek, and Romania's ex-King Michael, which complicated
Hungary's relations with neighboring Czechoslovakia and
Romania. Despite financial and practical obstacles, a
virtually independent radio station. Radio Calypso, and a
television station, NAP-television, were launched.
Scores of independent and semi-independent newspapers and
periodicals were launched in Budapest and in several county
seats, while some county councils continue to retain influence
over provincial newspapers. Independent publications
established with the support of major Budapest banks and
state-owned companies include Mai Nap, Hungary's most
successful and nominally independent daily paper, financed by,
among others, the Hungarian Credit Bank, the Hungarian post
office, and a major paper firm. British publishing magnate
Robert Maxwell subsequently acquired 50 percent of the stock.
Meanwhile, Australian publisher Rupert Murdoch purchased a
stake in Reform, a weekly illustrated journal featuring news,
political scandals, and sex.
By early 1989 censorship of the press and, to an increasing
degree, radio and television was abandoned. Investigative
journalism includes probing questions on officials'
performance. From different ends of the political spectrum,
conservative Communist officials as well as several opposition
parties have expressed unhappinsss with the editorial
management of Hungarian television.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
In January Parliament passed new laws on assembly and
associations. The former provides that organizers of public
gatherings must give at least 72 hours' notice and that
assembly shall be unrestricted, with the condition that it
"shall not result in any crime or call for committing crimes,
and shall not harm the rights and freedom of others." Police
may also move or alter the times of public meetings which
would jeopardize the operations of legislative bodies or
courts or seriously disrupt normal traffic flow. No actual
permits are required.
Hundreds of demonstrations and opposition political meetings
took place in 1989 without any recorded police interference.
The first of the opposition demonstrations around Budapest was
the March 15 national holiday commemorating the 1848
1146
HUNGARY
Revolution (which included a symbolic takeover of the
Hungarian Radio-Television building), and the June 16 funeral
ceremonies for Imre Nagy. Police also allowed a June 15
demonstration outside the Soviet Embassy chancery by 100 young
people from the Young Democrats' radical faction and other
groups calling for Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary, as
well as several processions by radical oppositionists during
the summer along Budapest's Ferenc Munnich Street. The
radicals objected to the street's name, derived from a
conservative Communist prime minister, and sought to restore
the former name with printed signs and paint. Although the
sites of changed street signs included the back of the
Interior Ministry building itself, police limited their
response to charging two persons for defacing public property
in removing the old street signs. For these gatherings, as
well as the June 5 demonstration by young people outside the
Chinese Embassy, organizers failed to provide the 72 hours'
notice required by law, and police waived the requirement.
The new law on association provides that 10 or more people may
establish associations (identified as "political parties,
trade unions, mass movements, federated organizations,
associations, or other organizations"). The law requires that
exercise of the right of association "shall not commit or abet
in committing a criminal offense and shall not disturb the
rights and freedoms of others." Court registration is
required on the basis of 10 or more founding members, the
adoption of a constitution, and election of executive
officers.
Although Parliament's adoption of the new law on parties came
only in October, the list of declared political parties
swelled throughout the year to about 50. Polls indicate that
6 of these have significant national support. Most of the 50
are opposition parties although some, such as the Ferenc
Munnich Society and Workers' Marxist-Leninist Party, represent
conservative Communist factions. The new parties may
establish bank accounts, receive assistance from domestic and
foreign nongovernmental sources, set up headquarters, field
candidates in parliamentary by-elections, and conduct
political campaigns. There have been no apparent efforts to
restrict these parties' affiliations with international bodies
or limit their contacts with foreign political parties. For
example, the U.S. National Democratic Institute sponsored a
seminar on political campaign strategies in September with
attendance from a range of Hungarian opposition parties;
political activists from the United States, Chile, the United
Kingdom, Poland, and Yugoslavia took part.
While there were no reports of denials of registrations of
private organizations during 1989, legal and bureaucratic
obstacles continue to hinder the establishment of nonprofit
foundations by private sector economic groups, trade unions,
and political parties. Norms of accepted political activity
remain uneven throughout Hungary, and it is still possible
that activities which would pass without notice in Budapest
could generate official sanctions in the countryside or in
traditional Communist strongholds, like Miskolc.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
1147
HUNGARY
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of conscience and freedom of religious practice are
affirmed in the Constitution, and Hungary's control over
organized religious activities has virtually been lifted.
Under opposition pressure, the Government abolished its State
Office of Religious Affairs, a Stalinist vestige established
in 1950 to regulate and control the activities of accepted
religious denominations. In its place, the Government
established the National Council of Churches, a consultative
body chaired by the Prime Minister with the participation of
denominational leaders.
The authorities are consulting with religious leaders on a new
law governing church-state relations, scheduled for
implementation in 1990. Although Communist party members and
teachers were traditionally barred from religious activity,
the HSWP Central Committee said in June that religious
convictions were not incompatible with party membership.
Despite the tolerant atmosphere, vigorous expression of
religious beliefs can still inhibit a person's professional
advancement in some fields.
All denominations willing to make minimal concessions to
governmental authority are recognized in Hungary. They
include the Roman Catholic Church, Hungarian Reformed and
Lutheran Churches, the Jewish community, and, more recently,
the Nazarenes, Islamic, and Mormon communities, and a small
Hare Krishna sect. Recognition excludes the Jehovah's
Witnesses, who on principle reject governmental authority.
Religious denominations generally have good access to
religious materials, including Bibles and prayer books. The
disposition of church possessions and properties seized in the
late 1940 's is under discussion, and some schools and other
properties reverted to church control in 1989.
Church activities in education and social work are encouraged
by the Government. An outstanding issue in church-state
relations remains the thousands of so-called "basic
communities" — small, countercultural, pacifist Catholic
communities inspired by Piarist Priest Gyorgy Bulanyi. The
"basic communities" have long operated in defiance of both the
Government and the Catholic Church. In 1989 over 20 religious
orders banned since 1950 were allowed to function again.
An important irritant in relations between the Hungarian
Government and the churches — particularly the Protestant
fundamentalist groups which affirm conscientious objection to
military service — was removed in March when all 73
conscientious objectors then in jail were released.
Alternatives to obligatory military service have been
instituted for conscientious objectors.
For the first time since 1948, the reliquary hand of St.
Stephen was carried in the procession around the Catholic
Basilica in Budapest in services for St. Stephen's Day on
August 20. During the Mass, Cardinal Paskai referred several
times to his predecessor. Cardinal Mindszenty, who played a
role in the 1956 Revolution, became a refugee in the American
Embassy during 1956-71, and later died in exile. The Vatican
announced the Pope's intention to visit Hungary in 1991, and
the Prime Minister expressed readiness to begin negotiations
to reestablish diplomatic relations between Hungary and the
Vatican, which were severed in 1946.
1148
Reverend Billy Graham on July 29 addressed a capacity crowd of
90,000 at Budapest's People's Stadium. With the Government's
agreement. Reverend Graham's address was announced with
posters and newspaper and television advertisements.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
All adult citizens are issued an identity booklet which they
should carry at all times. They must register with local
police when moving from one locality to another. However, no
permission is required for movement within Hungary, except to
Budapest, where housing shortages have led the Government to
restrict the number of new inhabitants.
Operation of the new passport law which came into effect on
January 1, 1988 has made foreign travel available on demand to
virtually any Hungarian. Hungarian passports are valid for 5
years from the date of issuance for travel to any country for
a period of 90 days.
No cases were reported in 1989 in which a person was denied a
passport for transparently political reasons, although
passport issuance is withheld for cause, including pending
legal actions. According to Interior Ministry statistics,
3,552,804 new "World Passports" were issued in 1988, with
8,205 refusals for all reasons, and 1,173,925 "World
Passports" were issued in the first 6 months of 1989, with
4,945 refusals for all reasons. Hungarians have become
travelers. According to tourist authority statistics,
Hungary's 10.6 million citizens made 9.9 million trips abroad
in the first 8 months of 1989.
In a new law on emigration and immigration. Parliament
provided for the repeal of statutes mandating fines of up to
$90 and denial of tourist passports for 2 years to those who
overstayed their authorized 90-day periods abroad without
seeking extensions from Hungarian consular officials abroad.
Senior Interior Ministry officials stated in September that
these sanctions were being waived pending formal entry into
force of the new legislation. The new law establishes that it
is the fundamental right of Hungarian citizens, for whatever
reason, to emigrate from Hungary and return. The law limits
emigration by persons who are facing criminal charges for
crimes punishable by more than 3 years' imprisonment and other
reasons, including possession of state secrets. This last
provision may delay departure for 3 years from the date of
ceasing to possess state secrets and, along with the other
restrictions, is subject to appeal before a court.
The new law specifically guarantees the right of every
qualified Hungarian residing abroad to resettle in Hungary.
The authorities' recent behavior in this respect has been
convincing, visitors who took part in the June 16 funeral of
Imre Nagy included numerous 1956 exiles headed by General Bela
Kiraly whose forces fought against the Red Army. The criminal
records of many who participated in the 1956 uprising have
been expunged. There is currently no reason to expect that
any group of returnees would face political persecution in
Hungary.
Since early 1988, Hungary has given refuge to over 30,000
people from Romania, mainly ethnic Hungarians, although the
recent flow has included substantial percentages of ethnic
Romanians. A nationwide system administered by local
1149
HUNGARY
authorities assists all refugees, including nonethnic
Hungarians, to find jobs and housing.
In March Hungary became the first Warsaw Pact country to
adhere to the 1951 U.N. Convention on the Status of Refugees
and the 1967 Additional Protocol, which obliges Hungary not to
expel or involuntarily repatriate refugees to countries in
which they have a well-grounded fear of persecution. The last
documented case of an official effort to repatriate refugees
involuntarily to Romania was in January, and it involved three
men who had repeatedly sought to cross the Austrian border
illegally. The Prime Minister overruled the repatriation
order. However, before Ceausescu's overthrow in Romania in
December, undocumented reports persisted that Hungarian
authorities on the Romanian border continued to repatriate
involuntarily some would-be refugees on the basis of local
decisions not subject to appeal. These were said to include
some ethnic Romanians, Gypsies, unaccompanied minors, couples
leaving minor children behind in Romania, and persons
suspected of having been sent to Hungary by the Romanian
secret police. Since December, the Hungarian Government has
worked closely with the new Romanian Government in preventing
members of Ceausescu's secret police from fleeing to Hungary.
During 1989 Hungary also began to receive a limited number of
refugees from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. An office
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) opened in
Budapest in October in a major effort to assist the large
numbers of Romanians present. On May 6, the Hungarian army
began to dismantle the barbed wire and electrified fences of
the "iron curtain" border with Austria. In September
Hungary's commitment to the Helsinki Accords and the U.N.
Convention on the Status of Refugees was demonstrated by the
Government's decision to suspend the terms of a bilateral
agreement with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and open
the Hungarian-Austrian border to over 50,000 East Germans who
refused to return to the GDR voluntarily so that they could
resettle in the FRG .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
During 1989 the reform leadership of the nominally ruling
Communist party (since October, the Socialist party)
repeatedly committed itself to the transition to a democratic
multiparty system. Hungary is no longer a recognizable
one-party Communist state, and, if current trends persist,
there will be further fundamental changes in the political
system in 1990. Citizens may well be able, under the law, to
change the system of government and their political leaders.
Communists lost four multiparty parliamentary elections since
July to Hungarian Democratic Forum candidates, Hungary's most
influential opposition party.
In May the HSWP Central Committee stripped former secretary
general (1956-1988) Janos Kadar of all party positions,
including that of party president. In June it elected a
four-member Presidium headed by party Chairman Rezso Nyers.
In October the party congress voted to dissolve the party.
Its successor, the Hungarian Socialist Party, excluded Karoly
Grosz, former secretary general (1988-89) and prime minister,
from its 24-member Presidium.
1150
HUNGARY
Negotiations between the Government and Opposition Roundtable
(a group of eight opposition parties) from June to September
resulted in a limited accord clearing the way for multiparty-
elections. The September 18 document, signed by Rezso Nyers
and Imre Pozsgay on behalf of the Communist party, concluded
that the talks "served to create the political and legal
conditions for peaceful transition, to develop a democratic
constitutional state on the basis of a multiparty system, and
to extricate the nation from its social and economic crisis."
The opposition parties which signed the accord claimed
important progress in securing the departure of party units
from workplaces, reducing the Communist party's paramilitary
Workers' Militia and bringing it under military control, and
promoting the depoliticization of the military and judiciary.
The Association of Free Democrats and the Young Democrats
(FIDES2) neither signed nor vetoed the accord because of
objections to holding direct presidential elections before the
multiparty parliamentary elections.
The Free Democrats and FIDESZ launched a campaign to hold a
national referendum on November 26. The referendum confirmed
overwhelming popular support for political changes already
undertaken (e.g., withdrawal of party units from workplaces,
disclosure of Communist party assets, and disbanding of the
Workers' Militia), but only a razor-thin majority voted in
favor of delaying the Presidential election until after the
March 1990 Parliamentary elections.
Voting was compulsory until the 1960 "s and was subsequently
officially encouraged, but low turnouts have been a feature of
recent by-elections. Suffrage is universal, and election is
by secret ballot. Polling places were monitored, and ballots
were counted by local officials together with representatives
of the Communist party and opposition parties.
Parliamentary elections take place every 5 years. Nearly 50
percent (176 of 386) of the members of the new Parliament will
be chosen on the basis of individual local candidacies, with
152 chosen by proportional representation within each of the
19 counties and Budapest, and 58 chosen on the basis of
national proportional representation. In elections based on
individual candidacies, the winner must obtain a majority of
votes from a 50-plus percent turnout or, failing that, a
plurality from a 25-plus percent turnout in the second round.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In 1989 Hungary was not the subject of any resolutions,
investigations, or other actions by international or
recognized nongovernmental organizations dealing with human
rights. However, Hungary cosponsored a United Nations human
rights resolution calling for a special rapporteur for Romania
to investigate the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in
Transylvania .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
In theory and practice, Hungary is sensitive to the cultural
aspirations of its recognized ethnic minorities. Schools
provide instruction in the mother tongue, and varieties of
ethnic expression are encouraged on a nondiscriminatory
basis. A major reason for this policy is the hope of creating
1151
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a "demonstration effect" which will indirectly benefit the
millions of Hungarians living as minorities in adjacent
countries .
Hungary has some 500,000 people, or about 5 percent of the
population, who identify themselves as Gypsies. Athough they
are not recognized as an official minority, the Government has
various programs designed to raise their standard of living
and promote their absorption into the mainstream of Hungarian
life. Gypsies are, on the average, considerably less educated
and poorer than the majority Magyar population or the
recognized ethnic minorities. Male Gypsy life expectancy — 55
years--is 8 years below the national average for males. Half
of Gypsy school-leavers fail to complete the minimum eight
grades; Gypsies reportedly account for over half of Hungary's
unemployed; and the crime rate is nearly twice as high among
Gypsies as non-Gypsies. Media reporting of Gypsy issues makes
clear that there is abundant popular prejudice against them
and that they suffer effective discrimination in housing and
jobs. Gypsies have established a number of rights
organizations, including the Cultural Federation of Hungarian
Gypsies, established in 1986.
The year saw an important revival of Jewish cultural life with
the foundation of the Raoul Wallenberg Society, the Jewish
Cultural Association, and the lies Monus Association. The
Jewish Cultural Association is a grouping of young Jewish
intellectuals who are in opposition to the Jewish community's
established leadership. The lies Monus Association, named
after a Jewish Social Democrat who died in a German death
camp, seeks to cooperate with the political left in Israel,
including trade unions, cooperatives, and kibbutzes.
Manifestations of anti-Semitic sentiments during the year were
criticized by the Communist party and government leadership.
Israeli leaders, including the Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister, visited Hungary in 1989, and in September Hungary
became the first of the Warsaw Pact countries which broke
diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967 to restore full
relations .
Women enjoy the same legal rights as men and benefit from a
good national system of child-care facilities. Inheritance
and property rights of women are identical to those for men.
The women's movement is in its infancy. The first feminist
group, a chapter of the Democratic Trade Union of Scientific
Workers, was established in Szeged in September. According to
Hungarian feminists, wife beating is common in society,
especially among lower income groups. Husbands' sexual abuse
of wives is not an acknowledged legal concept. Rapes are
frequently unreported. There were 321 convictions for rape in
1988; the crime is a felony, and punishment is from 2 to 8
years' imprisonment or from 5 to 10 years in cases involving
"criminal partnership."
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Legal norms and actual practice in the organization of trade
unions continue to be in flux. The official trade union
organization, SZOT, remains under pressure from several
directions. As the traditional "conveyor belt" for securing
worker compliance with central economic planning, SZOT remains
1152
HUNGARY
the nominal representative of Hungary's 4.5 million actively
employed persons through its 19 affiliated unions.
During 1989 it sought to refurbish its image as defender of
workers' interests through means such as a national warning
strike in August to protest a 6-percent meat price increase.
The warning strike and similar tactics were denounced by the
independent unions and characterized by reform Communist Prime
Minister Miklos Nemeth as "social demagoguery . " While SZOT's
relations with the country's Prime Minister and other reform
Communists are strained, the institutional links with the
ruling party remain. SZOT remains affiliated with the
Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
Hungary's first independent trade union, a grouping of
scientific and technical workers (TDDSZ) formed in 1988, has
been joined by democratic unions of teachers, film workers,
teachers of the handicapped, ambulance drivers and
pharmacists, railway workers, and building maintenance
workers. Also, there are independent local unions of
transport cooperatives (bus drivers), and a small blue-collar
union, Workers' Solidarity, which has some 3,000 members.
These unions are independent of the Government, the Communist
party, and SZOT. In April the Democratic League of
Independent Trade Unions was formally established to
coordinate the work of independent unions; representatives
took part in the June-September negotiations between the
Communist party and the Opposition Roundtable. Several SZOT
branch unions and locals, including the official Film Workers'
Union, work cooperatively with the independent unions.
Together with the double-affiliated SZOT branch unions,
Hungary's independent unions have over 40,000 members. They
have contacts with Western Europe's Christian-Socialist
unions, Poland's Solidarity, the American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations, the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and the World
Confederation of Labor. Two of the independent unions have
affiliated to an ICFTU-associated International Trade
Secretariat (ITS), and there have also been contacts between
SZOT branch unions and other ITS's. There is no legal
impediment to these affiliations.
Strike legislation adopted by Parliament in March authorizes
strikes if conciliation procedures have broken down. Strikes
are excluded: if workers' complaints are under legal
adjudication; if the objective is to alter a currently valid
collective labor contract; or if the strike would "threaten
life, health, bodily safety, or the environment in a direct
and serious manner, or hinder disaster relief efforts." The
law specifically authorizes solidarity strikes. The right to
strike is denied to members of the judiciary, military
personnel, and the police. In addition to the national
warning strike mentioned above, several small-scale strikes
occurred in 1989.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The end of Hungary's system of centrally mandated wages became
effective in January when the Government implemented a system
of "interest coordination," in which labor and management
negotiate specific wages in individual enterprises based on
government suggestions, which are backed up with tax
incentives. The new system thus provides for a limited
element of collective bargaining. Managers have some
1153
HUNGARY
flexibility in job categorization and in payment of
allowances, which also gives importance to worker-management
discussions in individual enterprises. There is some evidence
that employers consult representatives of independent unions
as well as those of SZOT in individual workplaces. While
experience is lacking, there are no apparent safeguards
against antiunion discrimination by employers against union
members and organizers. The 1989 strike law rules out
punitive measures against employees who take part in strikes.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Hungary took a step forward when Parliament in 1989 repealed
the so-called Parasitism Statute of the penal code, v;hich
provided for sanctions against persons lacking visible means
of support who were convicted of refusing to work twice within
2 years. Possible punishments included a year's imprisonment,
reformatory work, a fine, or expulsion to another part of the
country. More than 2,000 people were convicted under the
Parasitism Statute in 1987. Gypsies were prosecuted under the
law, but there was no evidence of its use against political
dissidents .
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 15 years. There are no
reports of significant abuses.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Hungarian workplaces are obligated under law to provide
workers with safe working conditions, a hot meal at heavily
subsidized prices, and such pay-related benefits as overtime.
The Government guarantees all Hungarians the right to 15 days
of paid vacation per year and 1 additional day for each 3
years of service. The minimum wage is equivalent to $66 per
month at the official exchange rate, which is not sufficient
to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and his
family .
The State in principle provides most workers with free
education, health care, and pensions, but in reality the
standard of such services is declining. The average official
workweek is approximately 45 hours, although most Hungarians
supplement their incomes by working after hours in
cooperatives and private second jobs. Many must do so in
order to provide a minimal standard of living for their
families. The Government sets occupational health and safety
standards, but safety conditions in Hungarian firms are not up
to the standards of Western industrialized countries.
1154
ICELAND
Iceland is a constitutional republic and a multiparty,
parliamentary democracy. Its literate and educated people
participate in high percentages in regular fair and free
elections which determine the distribution of power among
political parties and leaders. Freedom of the press and
freedom of association are sacrosanct.
The civil and criminal justice systems offer equal protection
to all. The nation has no indigenous military forces or
political security apparatus.
Iceland has a mixed, open economy in which all of its citizens
enjoy the right to hold private property.
Icelanders have long been strong defenders of human rights
both at home and internationally, and the country has an
exemplary human rights record.
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Political killings do not occur.
b. Disappearance
There were no instances of abductions or disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment are all prohibited by law and do not occur in
practice .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Due process is provided by law and observed in practice. The
Icelandic Constitution states that any person arrested by the
authorities must be brought before a judge without undue delay.
The judge must, within 24 hours, rule whether the person is to
be detained. Although the Constitution allows for the
imposition of bail, no such condition is usually applied. Any
judicial ruling by the judge may be appealed immediately to a
higher court. Preventive detention is not practiced. There
were no allegations of arbitrary arrest.
There is no exile. With regard to forced or compulsory labor,
see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Defendants may confront witnesses and otherwise participate in
public trials, which are fair and free from intimidation. In
addition, defendants are guaranteed the right to competent
legal counsel of their own choice. In cases where defendants
are unable to pay attorney's fees, the State does so. The
courts are free of political control. Although the Ministry
of Justice administers the lower court system, the Supreme
Court carefully guards its independence and fairness. Juries
are not normally used, but multijudge panels are common,
especially in the appeals process. Due process is rigorously
observed. There are no political prisoners.
1155
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f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Under the Constitution and in practice, there is deep respect
for the autonomy and rights of individuals. A warrant from a
court is required for entry into a home except in cases of hot
pursuit. Arbitrary intrusions by official entities, political
organizations, or any other organized group into the private
beliefs or personal liberties of individuals do not occur.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution expressly forbids censorship and other
restrictions on the freedom of the press and a person's right
to express his thoughts. Citizens and the media exercise this
freedom extensively. Academic freedom of expression is
vigorously exercised.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the right to assemble unarmed,
except when it is feared that such gatherings may cause riots.
In practice, plans for public meetings are virtually never
forbidden, and the authorities only rarely modify them.
In addition, the Constitution provides citizens the right to
join together formally or informally to form associations
without governmental authorization. A varied and wide spectrum
of voluntary organizations plays a vital role in Icelandic
politics and society. Icelanders are free to maintain
international contacts.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Although the Lutheran Church is the established church of
Iceland and most citizens are nominally members, there is
complete freedom for other faiths. A variety of both Christian
and non-Christian faiths are allowed to proselytize freely.
They may maintain ties with and receive support from
coreligionists abroad. Religious affiliation is not a factor
in political or economic life.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Icelanders have freedom to travel at home and abroad, to
emigrate, and to return to Iceland at will. Refugees are
never compelled to return to a country in which they would
face persecution.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The political system is an open, fully functioning,
parliamentary democracy in which voters freely choose the
members of the Althing (parliament) who, in turn, make the
laws of the land and determine the composition of the
Cabinet. Parliamentary elections are held at 4-year intervals
unless the Althing dissolves itself before the end of its full
term. Voting in elections and membership in the various
1156
ICELAND
political parties are open to all citizens who are 18 years of
age or older. Primary elections are used to select most
Althing candidates. Multimember districts and proportional
representation increase the chances for minority points of
view to be represented. In addition, there is a strong
cultural insistence on having the views of all significant
groups represented in the Althing. Because no party gained a
majority of seats in the April 1987 election, a three-party
coalition government was formed in July 1987. This coalition
broke up in September 1988 and was succeeded by a center-left
Government comprising the Progressive Party, the Social
Democratic Party, and the People's Alliance with Steingrimur
Hermannsson of the Progressive Party as Prime Minister. The
Citizen's Party joined the coalition on September 17, 1989.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
No serious human rights violations have been alleged. In 1987,
however, one Icelander complained to the European Commission
of Human Rights that it was a violation of his rights to have
an official of the same agency which accused him of violating
a traffic law also pass judgment on and sentence him (i.e.,
impose a monetary fine for speeding) . The Commission
determined that the case was admissible, but no further action
took place in that forum pending discussions between the
complainant and the Icelandic Ministry of Justice.
Furthermore, a law will come into effect in 1992 that will
transfer all judicial authority from local officials, who also
serve concurrently as chiefs of police, to a new system of
eight district courts.
Several human rights organizations are active in Iceland. The
Government and populace support international efforts to
improve human rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Iceland's ethnically homogeneous population is fiercely
egalitarian and opposed to discrimination regardless of
whether it is based on sex, religion, or other factors.
Violence against women, both physical and mental, occurs. The
problem is not widely publicized, but the Women's List raises
it periodically in political debate. A public women's shelter
operates in Reykjavik and offers protection to approximately
200 women per year. Fifty percent of those who make use of
the shelter cite alcohol abuse by their male partners as a
contributing factor to the violence they suffer.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers and employers in Iceland make extensive use of the
rights to (a) establish organizations, (b) draw up their own
constitutions and rules, (c) choose their own leaders and
policies, and (d) publicize their views. The resulting
organizations are not controlled by the Government or any
single political party but instead reflect the views of their
members. Icelandic unions participate actively in European
and international trade union organizations.
1157
ICELAND
With the exception of limited categories of workers in the
public sector whose services are essential to public health or
safety (e.g., air traffic controllers), unions have possessed
and used the right to strike under the law in Iceland for many
years. However, the right to strike was abridged through
February 15, 1989, after the Government promulgated a
provisional law on May 20, 1988, intended to cool down the
overheated economy (also see Section 6.b.).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Over 90 percent of all eligible workers in Iceland belong to
unions. There are no impediments to union membership in law
or in practice. Virtually all unions utilize the right to
bargain collectively on wages, working conditions, and related
issues. Labor courts adjudicate disputes over labor contracts
and over the rights and provisions guaranteed under the 1938
Act on Trade Unions and Industrial Disputes.
Under the provisional law of May 20, 1988, those unions which
had not yet concluded labor contracts were prohibited from
making agreements giving workers larger increases in wages and
benefits than was provided under the contracts concluded prior
to May 20. The provisional law, later amended, also set aside
through February 15, 1989, any provisions of labor contracts
which would have permitted workers to cancel or renegotiate
these contracts in the event that the consumer price index
exceeded the predicted levels (called red lines) on specified,
quarterly dates. (Red line provisions are common in Icelandic
labor contracts.) The Icelandic Federation of Labor (IFL)
protested this law publicly and sent a complaint to the
Committee on Freedom of Association of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) citing all three provisions as
infringements of workers rights. After receiving the
Government's position and views, the ILO found the
Government's measures to be violations of bargaining rights,
but nevertheless found them justifiable in view of the
condition of the Icelandic economy.
On August 26, 1988, the Government promulgated another
provisional law affecting many labor contracts. This law
froze wages and prices through September 30, 1988. A third
provisional law, promulgated on September 28, extended this
freeze through February 15, 1989, thereby depriving most
workers of two or more wage increases scheduled under existing
labor contracts. The IFL publicly protested these laws.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law and does not
exist in Iceland.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The employment of children below the age of 16 in factories,
on ships, and in other places which are hazardous or require
hard labor is prohibited by law, and this prohibition is
observed in practice.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Icelandic workers are protected by laws which effectively
ensure their health and safety as well as guarantee them
1158
ICELAND
unemployment insurance, paid vacations, pensions, and
reasonable working conditions and hours. Although there is no
minimum wage law, union membership is so pervasive and
effective that labor contracts, in effect, guarantee even the
lowest paid workers a sufficient income to give them and their
families decent living conditions. Food, shelter, health
care, and education are all guaranteed without discrimination
to those lacking adequate income because they are too old, too
young, sick, or otherwise disadvantaged.
1159
IRELAND
The Republic of Ireland is a parliamentary democracy with a
long tradition of orderly transfer of power. Individual
liberties and civil rights are guaranteed by the 1937 Irish
Constitution and subsequent Supreme Court interpretations.
A civilian police force maintains public safety. Successive
Irish governments have had to deal with the spillover into the
Republic of violence from Northern Ireland. That violence led
Irish authorities to adopt special legislation in 1984 granting
the police increased powers to detain and interrogate those
suspected of acts of terrorism. During 1989 Irish officials
continued to apply such special legislation with restraint.
The Irish economy, based largely on free enterprise, has grown
rapidly as a result of long-term policies of industrialization
and diversification. It performed well in 1989 despite
continued fiscal austerity and unemployment of about 17
percent. Exports were strong, and the budget deficit was
reduced.
The Government and people of Ireland attach great importance
to the observance and maintenance of human rights, both in
theory and practice at home and abroad, and there were few, if
any, reports of human rights abuses during 1989.
Discrimination (and violence) against women remains a human
rights problem,
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from.:
a. Political Killing
In the past, politically motivated killings have occurred in
Ireland as a spillover from the violence in Northern Ireland.
In these cases, such groups as the Provisional Irish
Republican Army (PIRA) or the Irish National Liberation Army
(INLA) usually claim responsibility. In 1989 two such
killings took place in the Republic's border area with
Northern Ireland. The Government uses the full force of law
to pursue and prosecute such cases wherever possible.
b. Disappearance
People are not abducted, secretly arrested, or held in
clandestine detention by the Irish authorities.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment is respected in practice by the Government.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution provides that a person shall be deprived of
personal liberty only in accordance with the law. The same
section of the Constitution provides for a judicial
determination of the legality of a person's detention and
requires in such cases that the arresting authorities make
written explanation to the court about the person concerned.
Neither in law nor in practice is anyone subject to arrest for
the expression of political or religious views.
1160
IRELAND
Short-term detention without charge exists but is restricted.
It is permitted for a maximum of 48 hours in cases covered by
the Offenses Against the State Act of 1939, legislation
designed to "prevent actions and conduct calculated to
undermine public order and the authority of the State." This
legislation was reactivated in 1972 and broadened to include
other "scheduled offenses" against peace and order. The
police may now arrest and detain for guestioning anyone
suspected of any offense involving firearms, explosives,
membership in an unlawful organization, or malicious damage to
property. After the 48-hour period, the person must be
brought before a magistrate, presented with written charges,
and given legal representation.
The Omnibus Criminal Justice Act of 1984 gives some increased
powers to the police in the area of detention for
interrogation. Critics of the 1984 act have argued that those
increased powers, which did not come into effect until 1987,
following implementation of the companion complaints
procedure, are out of proportion to the threat addressed and
are unhealthy for democracy. Defenders of this legislation
counter that two issues of human rights are at stake: the
right of citizens to be protected against crime, along with
the safeguarding of individual rights from abuse by police.
Neither incommunicado detention nor exile is used. With
regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Fair public trial is guaranteed by the Constitution and
respected in practice. A defendant has the right to legal
counsel. The courts are independent, and jury trial is the
norm. The Constitution provides, however, for the creation of
"special courts" to deal with cases where the "ordinary courts
are inadequate to secure the effective administration of
justice, and the preservation of public peace and order." The
Offenses Against the State Act of 1939 formally set up such
courts and provided that they may try persons for offenses
against national security, particularly cases of political
violence perpetrated by terrorist groups likely to intimidate
regular juries. Rather than having juries, these courts have
panels of judges, each consisting of an uneven number of
judges, but in any event not less than three. Their verdicts
are by majority vote. Rules of evidence generally are similar
to those of regular courts, except that the sworn statement of
a police chief superintendent that the accused is a member of
an illegal organization is considered prima facie evidence of
such membership. Court sessions are usually public but may
exclude certain persons, other than genuine press
representatives. There is provision for free legal aid and
appeal against conviction or sentence.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Though not specifically provided for in the Constitution, the
basic human right of noninterference with personal privacy,
family, and home is affirmed by the Supreme Court and
generally observed. The Constitution, however, provides that
the State shall enact no law "providing for the grant of the
dissolution of marriage." A proposal to amend the
Constitution to permit divorce in limited circumstances was
overwhelmingly defeated in a 1986 nationwide referendum. In
the same year, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that
1161
IRELAND
the absence of divorce is not a breach of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Rights, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These freedoms are guaranteed by the Constitution and
generally respected in practice. The State endeavors to
insure that organs of public opinion, while preserving liberty
of expression (including criticism of government policy), are
not used to undermine public order, morality, or the authority
of the State. Furthermore, "publication or utterance of
blasphemous, seditious, or indecent matter" is an offense
punishable by law.
Ordinarily, official censorship is directed largely toward
pornographic material. Nonetheless, the state-owned radio and
television network, on the basis of the constitutional
provisions dealing with public order and the authority of the
State, denies air time to members of a list of organizations
including (Provisional) Sinn Fein, the legal political wing of
the illegal Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) . In 1982
this prohibition was challenged before the Irish Supreme Court
and upheld on constitutional grounds. All political parties
not on the list are given access to both publicly owned radio
and television facilities and major independent daily
newspapers. Criticism of the Government in such media is
allowed and it flourishes. Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are guaranteed by the Constitution and
respected in practice. Certain terrorist organizations, such
as PIRA and INLA, however, are illegal, and membership in them
is an offense against national security. Political parties or
groups associated with such organizations, such as
(Provisional) Sinn Fein, are not proscribed.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Ireland is 94 percent Roman Catholic. The Constitution
provides for freedom of religion, and there are no
restrictions upon freedom of worship. Discrimination in
employment, education, and other fields based on religious
grounds has not been alleged. Some Irish laws, such as the
prohibition against divorce, reflect the point of view of the
majority of the population. The area of family law--including
the rights of illegitimate children — is the subject of current
debate in which minority religious communities have felt fully
at liberty to take a vocal and active role.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There is complete freedom of movement within the country, as
well as freedom to engage in foreign travel, emigration, and
voluntary repatriation. Irish authorities have accepted
asylum-seekers only on a limited basis and firmly apply
international definitions to those who claim refugee status.
1162
lEELAKD
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Ireland has enjoyed a consistent history of orderly transfer
of power by elections since the end of the Irish civil war in
1923. The country has several political parties and provision
for independents to stand for election to either house of the
Irish Parliament. The constitutional requirement that
elections be held at least every 7 years has always been met.
Ireland uses a proportional voting system, and the secrecy of
the ballot is fully safeguarded. There is universal suffrage
for those over 18 years of age.
Section 4 Government Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Irish governments generally cooperate with independent outside
investigations of alleged human rights abuses, although they
have not always been receptive to prisoners' rights groups.
The Irish Council for Civil Liberties operates freely and
without hindrance as the principal independent organization
interested in domestic human rights issues.
Ireland has held the vice-chairmanship of the U.N. Human
Rights Commission, reflecting concern by both the Government
and people for worldwide respect for basic human rights. This
concern is reflected as well in support for Amnesty
International's activities in other countries.
Section 5 Discrimination Based On Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Government social services provide adequate shelter, nutrition,
health care, and education without regard to race, religion,
sex, ethnic background, or political opinion. People whose
means are inadequate and who are not entitled to other benefits
may receive pensions or other payments from public funds.
The Anti-Discrimination (pay) Act of 1974 and the Employment
Equality Act of 1977 seek to provide protection and redress
against sex and pay discrimination. Their operation is
monitored by the Employment Equality Agency. The number of
cases has fallen in recent years, but this has not been
accompanied by real progress in eliminating the differential
in the key index of average hourly earnings in industry. In
June 1988, women's hourly earnings in the manufacturing sector
were 67 percent of men's earnings.
According to women activists, violence directed specifically
against women, including wife beating, is not acceptable in
Irish society. Nevertheless, violence against women occurs,
although its extent is not reliably known. Police frequently
are reluctant to bring domestic problems into court, and women
do not readily seek redress under the law for abuses committed
against them. The women's movement continues to highlight
family law, rape law reform, and social welfare discrimination
as problem areas.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to associate freely and to strike.
There is no basic law governing trade union activities. The
1163
IRELAND
right to join a union is guaranteed by law, as is the right to
refrain from joining. Most businesses (covering over 56
percent of the labor force) are unionized.
The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), which represents
unions in both the Republic and Northern Ireland, has 81
member unions with 663,000 members. Both the ICTU and the
unaffiliated unions are independent of the Government and of
the political parties. The ICTU is affiliated with the
European Trade Union Confederation.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Labor unions have full freedom to organize and to engage in
free collective bargaining. Most terms and conditions of
employment are determined through collective bargaining. As
part of the industrial relations machinery, the Labour Court,
consisting of an employer representative, a trade union
representative, and an independent chairman, may investigate
trade union disputes, recommend the terms of settlement,
engage in conciliation and arbitration, and set up joint
committees to regulate conditions of employment and minimum
rates of pay for workers in a given trade or industry. There
are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law and does not
exist. For a number of years, however, the Committee of
Experts of the International Labor Organization (ILO) has
urged the Government to bring an 1894 merchant seaman's law,
still on the books, into conformity with ILO Convention 105 on
the Abolition of Forced Labor which Ireland has ratified. The
Government has assured the Committee that the provisions in
question regarding disciplinary measures for seamen have not
been used in recent times and that steps are under way to
amend the legislation.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 14 years with the written
permission of the parents. Irish laws limit the hours of
employment for 15-year-olds to 8 hours per day and 40 hours
per week. Those from 16 to 17 years of age may work up to 9
hours per day and 40 hours per week. These provisions are
effectively enforced.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no general minimum wage legislation. However, some
workers are covered by minimum wage laws applicable to
specific industrial sectors, mainly those which tend to pay
lower than average wages. The 1988 average weekly wage of
$310 for production and transport workers was generally
adequate to provide an acceptable standard of living. Working
hours in the industrial sector are limited to 9 hours per day
and 48 hours per week. Overtime work is limited to 2 hours
per day, 12 hours per week, and 240 hours in a year. Four
basic laws dealing with occupational safety provide adequate
coverage. An extensive system of public health insurance
offers health protection.
1164
rrALX
Italy is a democratic multiparty republic with a parliamentary
system of government. Parliament is directly and freely
elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage. Executive
authority is concentrated in the Council of Ministers, which
is currently led by Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti from the
Christian Democratic Party. The judiciary is independent of
the executive. The Chief of State, the President, is elected
by Parliament and representatives of Italy's 20 regions.
Terrorist violence of both the left and right has remained at
low levels in recent years, due to the effective work of
police and magistrates and its overwhelming rejection by the
people as a whole. Although terrorism has yet to be
completely overcome, its considerable reduction has freed
increased law enforcement resources for the struggle against
organized crime, which remains a serious problem.
Italy has an industrialized market economy ranking among the
top 10 in the world in gross national product. It is
characterized by sizable government ownership in the primary
industrial sectors and by a dynamic private sector, comprising
especially small and medium-sized companies.
In 1989 Italian citizens began to face directly the need to
confront the problem of racism. The issues of violence
against women and child abuse also were raised. The human
rights situation in general was good, and the trend toward
more openness in dealing with sensitive human relations
problems may require new legislation.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Neither government forces nor legal opposition organizations
engage in these kinds of killing, and there were none in 1989.
b. Disappearance
There were no cases of politically motivated disappearance or
kidnaping .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Freedom from torture is provided for by law and respected in
practice. Cruel and degrading punishment is forbidden by law,
and cases of violations have been rare. There were no
allegations of ill-treatment of prisoners during 1989.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Police procedures are carefully controlled by law and judicial
oversight. Arbitrary arrest is not practiced. Anyone
detained by the authorities must be charged within 48 hours.
In normal criminal cases, the permitted duration of pretrial
detention varies according to the gravity of the crime. Under
reforms passed in 1984, the maximum time that any person may
be held in pretrial detention, even for the most serious
crimes, is 5 1/2 years and no more than 2 years at each step
of the trial and during the long appeals process.
1165
ITALY
In September the Government issued a decree permitting the
detention of persons convicted of Mafia-type organized crimes
and crimes involving drug trafficking for an additional 6
months. This extension applies only to appeals, not to trials
of first instance. The step was taken to avoid the release
from prison of many convicts whose appeals were still pending
after 2 years. In Italy, an appeal results in a new trial
which must be completed within 2 years after the appeal is
filed.
Lengthy pretrial detention remains a problem in Italy. As a
safeguard against abuse, "liberty tribunals" are empowered to
review evidence in cases of persons awaiting trial and to
decide whether continued detention is warranted.
Exile as a form of punishment is unknown. With regard to
forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
A fair trial is assured by law and observed in practice in
almost all cases. Counsel is provided for the accused, free
of charge if necessary. Trial procedures are often
cumbersome, with the result that trials frequently last an
inordinately long time. An "adversarial"-type trial system is
to be implemented before the end of 1989. It is hoped that
this system, similar to that in use in the United States, will
result in speedier trials.
The judiciary is independent of the executive, and there are
no political or security courts. All cases may be appealed to
the highest appellate court, the Court of Cassation. There
are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The concept of the privacy of the home is legally safeguarded
and respected by the authorities. Searches and electronic
monitoring may be carried out only under judicial warrant and
in carefully defined circumstances.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Free speech and a free press are assured under Italy's
democratic political system, which allows expression of a wide
spectrum of political views. Although there is no censorship,
publications may be seized for violation of obscenity laws or
for defamation of state institutions. These powers are seldom
invoked. Government-run radio and television are politicized
at the administrative level but are open to widely differing
views. A large number of private radio and television
stations have been broadcasting since the early 1980 "s and
providing competition for the state-owned broadcasting
system. Public and private stations air vigorous debate on
political and social issues.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Italian citizens are unhampered in exercising their right of
free assembly, which is limited only in cases where national
security or public safety is endangered. Permits are not
required for meetings, but organizers of public demonstrations
1166
UALX
must notify the police in advance. Professional and employee
associations organize and represent their constituencies
freely. For a discussion of freedom of association as it
applies to labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
People are free to profess and practice any religious faith.
All religions are free to organize and proselytize within the
limits imposed by the laws governing public order. The
Government has reached agreements with some religious groups
to define their rights and status.
Italy's relations with the Roman Catholic Church are governed
by a 1984 agreement (Concordat) between the Italian Government
and the Holy See, ratified in 1985. The agreement, which
replaced the Concordat of 1929, recognizes the rights and
place of Catholicism but no longer accords it the status of a
state religion. The Roman Catholic Church continues
informally to enjoy special standing in Italy because of the
presence of the Vatican and because the overwhelming majority
of Italians are, at least nominally, Roman Catholic. Starting
in 1990, the clergy will be supported entirely by voluntary
contributions instead of by a subsidy provided by the State.
Roman Catholic religious instruction is offered in the public
schools as an optional subject.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Italian citizens may txavel freely both within the country and
abroad. Emigration is unrestricted. Citizens who leave are
guaranteed the right to return, and the Constitution forbids
deprivation of citizenship for political reasons. Although it
does not normally offer permanent resettlement to political
refugees, Italy has provided temporary haven for many persons
fleeing persecution who are eventually resettled in third
countries. There were no cases of forced repatriation of
political refugees in 1989.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Italy has a democratic, multiparty parliamentary system.
Although the Constitution outlaws the Fascist party, a wide
range of organized and active political parties exists from
the far left to the far right of the political spectrum.
Election campaigns are free and open, and voting is by secret
ballot. The two chambers of Parliament and regional,
provincial, and municipal councils are elected at regular
intervals. Opposition groups are active and are frequently
able to alter or reject government policies.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Nongovernmental organizations are free to investigate
conditions in Italy, attend trials, and publish their findings.
The Government actively promotes human rights around the world
and participates fully in various international human rights
organizations, including the United Nations Human Rights
Commission.
1167
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There is no legal discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, sex, ethnic background, or political opinion.
In 1989 there was an increase in race-related incidents
involving persons of African origin residing, often illegally,
in Italy. In one such incident, a black refugee from South
Africa working as a migrant farm worker near Caserta, was
murdered in the course of a robbery by a band of Italian
youths. The case focused Italian Government and media
attention on the problem of Third World immigrants living in
Italy whose numbers have been growing rapidly over the past
decade. The Government is contemplating immigration
legislation which will limit entry of non-European Community
residents into Italy.
Intolerance by northern Italians toward their fellow citizens
from the south has also become more apparent during the past
year, with the murder of a southerner vacationing in the north
evidently motivated by such feelings. Discrimination based on
race is deplored by the Government and by the great majority
of Italians. In both incidents, the perpetrators were
apprehended and prosecuted.
The condition of women in Italy has improved greatly over the
past 20 years. Women participate freely in political and
social life. Since 1963 it has been illegal to dismiss a
female employee within 1 year of her marriage date e-<cept "for
cause. "
Women enjoy equal rights with men in marriage. In the event
of divorce, a woman is entitled to a share of the survivor's
pension and any inheritance in the event of the death of her
ex-husband. The property of a married couple is considered
community property unless husband and wife agree to keep their
property divided. All assets acquired prior to marriage are
exempt from the community property provision.
Violence against women and children became a major topic of
governmental and media attention during 1989. Demands were
made by women's groups for stiffer penalties against rapists;
the Parliament is considering this possibility. Media
attention was also focused on the subject of wife beating and
child abuse. There are no reliable statistics available on
the subject, however, since most incidents of this nature are
not reported to the police. A telephone "hot line" service
established in 1988 reported receiving 8,000 telephone calls
during its first year from abused women throughout Italy.
German speakers in the Alto Adige region bordering on Austria
have claimed for many years that they were discriminated
against on the basis of language — particularly in legal
proceedings and in the schools — and a recently enacted package
of reforms is aimed at providing further protection for them.
Italian speakers have complained that the new concessions to
the German-speaking minority have in fact resulted in reverse
discrimination. Italian speakers, who are a minority in many
parts of the region, have claimed that they are discriminated
against in obtaining housing and employment.
1168
ITALY
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Workers' Statute of 1970 provides for the right to
establish a trade union, to join a union, and to carry out
union activities in the workplace. Trade unions are not
government controlled, and the Constitution fully protects
their right to strike, which is frequently exercised. In
practice, the three major labor confederations have strong
ideological ties to the three major political parties and
perform certain services for the Government, (e.g.,
administering certain social welfare benefits), which
compensates them accordingly. Moreover, the Workers' Statute
favors the three confederations to the extent that it is
difficult for small unions, including the so-called "base
committees" (COBAS) to obtain recognition. This was a major
issue in the numerous strikes called by the COBAS in 1989.
Overall, there was some increase in the number of hours lost
to strikes during the year. However, the major cause was a
4-hour general strike in May called by the three
confederations to protest government plans to increase health
benefit contributions. Italian unions engage freely and
actively in international trade union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right of workers to organize and bargain collectively is
protected by the Constitution and is freely practiced
throughout the country. Labor-management relations are
governed by legislation, custom, collective bargaining
agreements, and labor contracts. A key element of
labor-management-government cooperation affecting the
industrial relations climate has been the 1986 agreement on
indexing wages (scala mobile) to the cost of living every 6
months. National collective bargaining agreements de facto
apply to all workers regardless of union membership.
Collective bargaining at the national level (involving the
three confederations, the public and private employers'
organizations and, where appropriate, the Government), occurs
irregularly and deals with issues of universal concern,
particularly the system of wage indexation.
Sectoral negotiations, involving national-level industry
unions and employers' organizations, typically occur three
times a year and set agreements covering all aspects of labor
relations which apply to all workers, whether unionized or
not. Voluntary, nonbinding mediation is provided by the
Ministry of Labor and is often effective in bringing labor and
management together. There are no areas of the country, such
as export processing zones, where union organizations and
collective bargaining are impeded or discouraged. The law
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against union
members and organizers.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.
Forced or compulsory labor, which is prohibited by law, does
not exist in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Under current legislation, no child under 15 years of age may
be employed (with some specified exceptions). The Ministry of
1169
Labor, having consulted with the labor organizations, may, as
an exception, authorize the employment on specific jobs of
children over 12 years of age. The minimum age is 15 for men
employed in <3angerous, fatiguing, and unsanitary work, and 16
for men employed underground; in quarries, mines, and tunnels
without mechanical vehicles; in weight lifting and carrying;
in loading and unloading sulphur ovens in Sicily; and in
occupations harmful to the workers' morale. No worker under
18 years may be employed in driving and pulling trucks and
carriages, or in jobs for the manufacture, handling, and
salvaging of explosives. Minimum age and compulsory education
laws are effectively enforced.
No women, regardless of age, are permitted to be employed
underground, in quarries, mines, or tunnels. Only women over
21 are allowed to work in dangerous, fatiguing, and unsanitary
jobs, on the cleaning and servicing of engines, or on moving
machinery.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Minimum work and safety standards are established by law and
buttressed and extended in collective labor contracts. The
Basic Law of 1923 provides for a maximum workweek of 48
hours — no more than 6 days per week and 8 hours per day. The
8-hour day may be exceeded for some special categories. Most
collective labor agreements provide for a 36- to 38-hour
week. Overtime may not exceed 2 hours per day or an average
of 12 hours per week.
There is no minimum wage set under Italian law; basic wages
and salaries are set forth in collective labor agreements.
National collective labor agreements contain minimum standards
to which individual employment agreements must conform. In
the absence of agreement between the parties, the courts may
step in to determine fair wages on the basis of practice in
related activities or related collective agreements.
Basic health and safety standards and guidelines for
compensation for on-the-job injury are set forth in an
extensive body of law and regulations. In most cases, these
standards are exceeded in collective bargaining agreements.
Enforcement of health and safety regulations is entrusted to
labor inspectors, an autonomous group within the Labor
Ministry who have the same status as judicial police
officers. Inspectors make periodic visits to companies to
ensure observance of safety regulations. Violators may be
fined or even imprisoned. Trade unions also play an important
role in reporting safety violations to inspectors.
Despite these enforcement provisions, according to government
statistics, the number of deaths from on-the-job accidents has
risen from 1,704 recorded in 1985 to 1,905 in 1988. Part of
the problem is an inadequate number of inspectors. There is
also pressure on workers in southern Italy, due to high
unemployment, to accept unsafe conditions as a necessary evil
if they are to have a job. There are many substandard
workplaces in Italy, especially in the south.
1170
LATVIA
Latvia, an independent state between the two World Wars, was
forcibly annexed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(U.S.S.R.) in 1940. The United States does not recognize the
forcible incorporation of Latvia into the U.S.S.R.
Like the other Baltic states, Latvia has been subjected to the
same centralized rule, the same constitution and judicial
system, and the same restrictions on civil and political
liberties as in the Soviet Union. Political power has been
exercised by the leadership of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, which has tightly controlled the activities of
local government and Communist Party structures.
Since 1988 Latvians have seized greater control over their own
affairs. Responding to mass public pressure demanding
democracy and respect for human rights and following the
example of the other Baltic states, the Latvian Supreme Soviet
(parliament) adopted a "Declaration of Sovereignty" and
constitutional amendment in July 1989, declaring that its laws
took precedence over those of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. In
response to both the Latvian declaration and related
developments in other republics, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet
Presidium voted on November 10, 1989, to instruct all 15
Republic Supreme Soviets to bring their laws into conformity
with all-Union law and the Soviet Constitution. By the end of
1989, however, no action had been taken to enforce this
declaration .
The primary law enforcement organization in Latvia is the
militia (police). The powerful Committee for State Security
(K.G.B.), special troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(M.V.D.), and the regular Soviet armed forces, which maintain
a significant presence in Latvia, take orders from authorities
in Moscow. Although K.G.B. surveillance of political and
human rights activists is assumed to continue, there were few
reports of human rights violations in 1989.
The standard of living in Latvia is higher than the Soviet
average, but the margin is shrinking. Latvians resent the
fact that much of their national income is transferred to
other republics and that most major economic enterprises are
controlled by central ministries in Moscow. They are also
concerned about a continuing decline in the quality and
quantity of food and consumer items. In July the Latvian
Supreme Soviet adopted a plan for transition to economic
autonomy to commence January 1, 1990. The U.S.S.R. Supreme
Soviet in November voted to grant Latvia control over its
land, resources, banks, and a portion of state-run industry.
The human rights situation in Latvia continued to improve in
1989. The authorities tolerated public expression of Latvian
national sentiment and independent political views which
previously would have been repressed. For the first time
since annexation by the Soviet Union, relatively free
elections were held for representatives to the U.S.S.R.
Congress of People's Deputies and local government councils
(Soviets) . Most successful candidates were supported by the
Latvian Popular Front, which declared at its second congress
in October that its goal is an independent Latvian state. The
Latvian Supreme Soviet on December 28 voted to repeal the
constitutional provision giving the communist party the
leading role in Latvia. Limited progress was made, both in
Latvia and the Soviet Union, toward legislative reforms that
would help to institutionalize human rights improvements.
1171
LATVIA
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political ■ and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known cases of political or other extrajudicial
killing in 1989.
b. Disappearance
There were no known instances of permanent or prolonged
disappearances .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
In Latvia, as in the Soviet Union, harsh treatment of prisoners
occurs during both interrogation and confinement in labor
camps, prisons, or psychiatric hospitals. Physical and
psychological abuse, as well as extremely unhealthful
conditions, are common. Latvians remained concerned in 1989
about allegations that Latvian youths are subjected to brutal
and degrading treatment in the Soviet armed forces, leading in
some cases to physical injuries, psychological trauma, and
even suicide.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Soviet laws are written so broadly that many people have been
imprisoned for trying to exercise their basic human rights.
In 1989, however, the authorities in Latvia rarely used these
laws to arrest political activists.
In one exceptional case, several picketers were detained in
Riga in March for violating rules on holding demonstrations
and meetings. The detentions led to an outcry of protest from
Latvian activists, and the picketers were soon released.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Despite provisions for judicial impartiality in both the
Latvian and Soviet Constitutions, the State retains the
ability to control the judicial process and arbitrarily
determine the outcome of trials. Nominal safeguards, such as
the right to a public trial and to a defense attorney, are not
sufficient to guarantee fair trials when the accused are
charged with political crimes. One law was passed by the
U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet to increase the independence of the
judiciary. Other reforms to strengthen the rights of
defendants have been proposed but not yet enacted. There were
no known trials on purely political charges in 1989, and at
year's end no Latvians were known to be in prison for purely
political reasons.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government continued to interfere in personal life through
the use of informers, monitoring of mail and telephones, and
surveillance. Security police in 1989 did little, however, to
intimidate Latvians or to hinder the rapid growth of social
1172
LATVIA
and political activism. Advocates of Latvian independence
reported that overt surveillance of their movements declined
in 1989. Contacts between Latvians and foreign visitors
continued to be monitored, but at the same time the authorities
facilitated a very considerable increase in such contacts.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Soviet Constitution provides for most internationally
accepted political liberties on condition that their exercise
does not run counter to the interests of the working class.
In Latvia this notion continued to be interpreted more
liberally in 1989 than it had been in early 1988. In addition,
the Latvian Constitution was amended in 1988 to include the
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, as well as other internationally recognized human
rights instruments, as "an inseparable part of the legal
system. "
Freedom of speech was widely respected in 1989. The
authorities tolerated criticism of Soviet officials, demands
for independence, and calls for the immediate withdrawal of
Soviet "occupation" troops from Latvia.
The range of subjects covered by official Latvian media
continued to grow. Print and electronic media highlighted the
50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Nonaggression Pact
between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, together with the
secret protocols that became the basis for the Soviet
occupation and annexation of the three Baltic states. The
Pact and protocols were reprinted in 1989 and widely circulated
in the Latvian press, which also provided extensive commentary
on the Soviet Union's 1940 occupation.
The Latvian media gave wide coverage to political campaigning
in the elections for the U.S.S.R. Congress of People's Deputies
and the December 10 local elections. They routinely presented
the views of Baltic deputies to the Soviet Parliament, even
when these views sharply contradicted those of the political
leadership in Moscow. The media did not shy away, for example,
from publicizing deputies' calls for the repeal of article 5
of the Soviet Constitution, which enshrines the leading role
of the Communist Party in virtually all aspects of Soviet life.
On December 28, the Latvian Supreme Soviet voted to remove
mention of the leading role of the Communist Party in Latvia
from the Latvian Constitution. Articles advocating the
reestablishment of Latvian independence appeared in numerous
publications. Official censorship was apparently used only to
prevent the publication of military information that the
Government considered (on grounds of alleged secrecy) too
sensitive for public release.
Although most publications remain under the formal control of
the Communist Party, independent journals are produced legally
in Latvia by such organizations as the Latvian Popular Front,
whose journal Atmoda claims a circulation of 165,000.
Unauthorized publications (samizdat) were also produced and
distributed without hindrance from the authorities. The
opinions in such publications are increasingly expressed in
the official press as well. A new draft press law, now under
consideration by the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, may ease
restrictions on the right to publish such journals.
1173
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The peaceful assembly of citizens is controlled by the
authorities, who retain the power to prohibit public
gatherings. Soviet guidelines on demonstrations and meetings
are contained in a 1988 decree confirmed by the U.S.S.R.
Supreme Soviet, but the Latvian Supreme Soviet adopted a more
liberal version in 1989.
In practice, Latvians held frequent mass meetings and
demonstrations, largely without hindrance from the authorities.
Many such meetings took place on the anniversaries of
historical events, the commemoration of which had been
repressed in previous years. Leading Latvian Communist Party
and government officials participated, along with Popular Front
leaders, in public ceremonies attended by thousands of people,
such as the March 25 remembrance of Latvians deported to
Siberia in 1941. Hundreds of thousands of Latvians joined
hands August 23 in a human chain that extended through Estonia
and Lithuania as a sign of protest marking the 50th
anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
Participants included members of the Latvian Popular Front and
many other nonofficial organizations (e.g., the Latvian
National Independence Movement) as well as leaders of the
Latvian Communist Party and Government. An estimated 500,000
people participated in a peaceful rally in Riga on November
18, the independence day of the interwar Latvian Republic,
which was celebrated in Latvia as a legal holiday for the
first time since 1939.
The Latvian Constitution formally provides for the right to
associate in public organizations, but this right has been
circumscribed in the past by proscriptive laws and repressive
practice. Throughout 1989, however, the authorities
acquiesced in the rapid growth of both registered and
unregistered clubs, professional associations, and other
popularly based organizations. There were no reports of
significant harassment against any of these groups.
A coalition of organizatiorvs , including the Latvian National
Independence Movement and the human rights group Helsinki-86,
undertook in 1989 to form Latvian Citizens' Corwnittees and
eventually to convene a Latvian Citizens' Congress. Latvian
citizens were defined as persons who had been citizens of the
Latvian Republic in 1940 and their descendants, as well as
others who were committed to the independence of Latvia.
Despite an official ban by the authorities, who feared that
the Citizens' Committees would represent a form of parallel
political power, well over 700,000 persons had registered
without hindrance by late 1989.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Soviet Constitution provides for the right to profess, or
not to profess, any religion. Both the party and Government,
however, while promoting atheism continued to improve their
relations with organized religion in 1989. Christmas was
again celebrated as an officially sanctioned holiday (official
recognition came only in 1988), and religious services were
sometimes shown on television. High-level Latvian political
leaders held widely publicized meetings with leaders of local
religious communities, and there were no reports of significant
1174
LATVIA
church-state conflicts. State control of religion nevertheless
continued to be formally governed by repressive 1929 Soviet
legislation, as neither the U.S.S.R. nor Latvian Supreme
Soviet adopted a new law to guarantee freedom of conscience.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement is neither guaranteed by law nor fully
respected in practice, although Soviet officials have publicly
pledged to bring their legislation into conformity with
international standards. The right to emigrate by choice is
not recognized by Soviet law, and persons wishing to leave
temporarily are generally required to present an invitation
from abroad. Some Soviet Jews in Latvia were denied permission
to emigrate in previous years, but the upsurge in Soviet Jewish
emigration has had a positive effect on Jewish emigration from
Latvia as well.
Although travel abroad is limited by restrictive legislation
and arbitrary enforcement, bureaucratic procedures are
considerably less cumbersome in Latvia than in the Soviet
Union as a whole. For the second consecutive year, there was
a dramatic increase in the number of Latvians visiting the
United States and other Western countries, including leading
figures in the Popular Front and groups favoring immediate
Latvian independence.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Until 1989 the peoples of Latvia and the Soviet Union had not
been free to change government leaders or the system of
government. For the first time in postwar Latvian history,
however, representatives to the U.S.S.R. Congress of People's
Deputies (the federal legislature) and to Latvia's local
government councils were chosen by secret ballot on the basis
of universal suffrage in relatively free multicandidate
elections, in which over 70 percent of eligible voters
participated.
As in the other Baltic states, alternative parties could not
formally participate in the Latvian elections, but nominating
procedures were sufficiently flexible to permit nomination of
candidates from a wide political spectrum. There was no
evidence of manipulating the registration process against
opponents of the existing regime. Most successful candidates
campaigned with the active support of the Latvian Popular
Front, which was able to nominate candidates on its own
authority in the local elections. Latvian Popular Front
representatives won 26 of 34 contested seats. In heavily
Russian districts, however, successful candidates included
conservative party leaders.
Helsinki-86 and some other proindependence groups refused to
take part in elections to fill seats in the legislature of an
"occupying pov;er," but some leaders of the Latvian National
Independence Movement did participate. They gained significant
media coverage but were not successful in defeating the First
Secretary of the Communist Party, as they had hoped.
Elections to the Latvian Supreme Soviet are scheduled for
March 18, 1990.
1175
LATVIA
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Soviet Government has adopted a more forthcoming approach
to foreign criticism of its human rights record in recent
years, acknowledging that human rights are a legitimate
subject of official diplomatic contacts. Although there were
few allegations of human rights violations in Latvia in 1989,
the Latvian Government generally welcomed foreign and
nongovernmental observers on any subject.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or other grounds is
prohibited by the U.S.S.R. Constitution. Tensions between
ethnic Latvians and Russians are always near the surface,
however. A low Latvian birthrate and an official policy of
encouraging ethnic Russian settlement in Latvia has lowered
the ethnic Latvian proportion of the population to
approximately 52 percent. In 1989 these tensions were
expressed in heated debates over a number of issues. Ethnic
Latvians continued to complain that they could not always
conduct business in their own language, that immigrants from
the Soviet Union receive favored treatment in the provision of
housing and other social services, and that nonresidents
frequently visited Latvia in order to shop in the Republic's
relatively well-stocked stores.
The Latvian Supreme Soviet adopted a detailed language law
requiring that people holding certain specified management and
service positions be bilingual and providing Latvian language
training for those incumbents who are not. Regulations were
issued to prevent nonresidents of Latvia from purchasing goods
which are in short supply, and economic measures to control
immigration were adopted in 1989. Work also continued on a
law to define the criteria for Latvian citizenship.
Ethnic Russian and other Russian-speaking residents of Latvia
were generally '-oncerned by the Latvian language law and
proposals for a citizenship law, fearing that they could be
disenfranchised or in some other way converted into
second-class citizens.
While major ethnic tensions in Latvia divide the Latvian and
Russian populations, most ethnic groups, including Russians,
have formed officially recognized cultural societies which
work closely with the Latvian Popular Front on proposals to
enhance their cultural autonomy.
Over the past 10 years, discrimination and persecution has
been directed against Latvians who sought to express their
national and cultural identity, against independent political
and religious activists, and against Jews and Pentecostalists
wishing to leave the country.
Women nominally enjoy the same legal rights as men. Under the
Constitution, they are accorded the right to participate as
equals in all spheres of Soviet life. An extensive system of
day-care service and maternity benefits assists women in
obtaining and retaining jobs. Equal pay for men and women in
the same job has been the rule since World War II.
24-900 O— 90 38
1176
LATVIA
Latvian statistics on the problem of violence against women,
including wife beating, are unavailable. The official Soviet
press in 1989 discussed the issue, and the Council of Ministers
established a special branch (headed by a woman) to study the
problems of women. Human rights and women's rights groups in
Latvia are aware of the isgue but have focused their efforts
thus far on the broader question of independence and freedom.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Soviet labor law and practice have generally been enforced in
Latvia. There has been no right of association as defined by
the International Labor Organization. Although the
Constitution grants Soviet citizens the right to form trade
unions, attempts to exercise this right independently of the
state-controlled union had always been repressed. New
professional associations with no ties to Moscow and an
independent "Latvian Workers' Union" were created in 1989, but
it is not yet clear whether they will effectively exercise
trade union functions.
The Latvian press reported a few brief strikes. There were no
reports of repressive actions against strikers in 1989.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Legislation governing collective bargaining and organizing is
pending in the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. To date, workers in
Latvia generally have not been able to organize or resort to
collective bargaining. There are no economic incentive
zones. Virtually all workers in the Soviet Union
automatically become members of an affiliate of the official
Soviet trade union orgnization, the All-Union Central Council
of Trade Unions, in order to be entitled to government social
welfare benefits.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Soviet law contains no prohibition on forced or compulsory
labor. Most prisoners are confined to camps where they are
forced to labor, often under harsh and degrading conditions.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The statutory minimum age for employment of children is 16.
There is no indication of widespread violations of this norm.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Labor conditions are similar to those in the Soviet Union.
According to the Soviet State Statistical Committee, the
average monthly wage in Latvia for blue- and white-collar
workers in September 1989 was $410 and for collective farm
workers $402 at the official exchange rate. The minimum
monthly wage in the U.S.S.R. was $140. (The ruble is not a
convertible currency, and its value here in terms of the U.S.
dollar does not represent actual purchasing power for
international purposes.)
The average workweek is 40 hours for most white-collar workers
and 41 hours for most blue-collar workers. Soviet law
establishes minimum conditions of health and safety. Press
reports suggest, however, that the laws on maximum hours of
work and health and safety standards are widely ignored.
1177
LITHUANIA
Lithuania, the largest of the three Baltic states, was an
independent state between the two World Wars. It was forcibly
annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 as a constituent republic
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). The
United States does not recognize the forcible incorporation of
Lithuania into the U.S.S.R.
Like the other Baltic states, Lithuania has generally been
subjected to the same centralized rule, the same constitution
and judicial system, and the same restrictions on civil and
political liberties as in the Soviet Union. Political power
has been exercised by the leadership of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, which tightly controlled the activities of
local government and Communist Party structures in Lithuania.
Since 1988 Lithuanians have taken advantage of liberalization
in the Soviet Union to seize greater control over their own
affairs. Responding to mass public pressure demanding
political democracy and respect for human rights, the
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet (parliament) adopted a "Declaration
of State Sovereignty" and constitutional amendments in May
1989, declaring that its laws superseded those of the U.S.S.R.
Supreme Soviet. In response to both the Lithuanian
declaration and related developments in other Republics, the
U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Presidium voted on November 10 to
instruct all 15 Republic Supreme Soviets to bring their laws
into conformity with all-Union law and the Soviet
Constitution. By year's end, however, no action had been
taken to enforce this declaration.
A commission of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet approved a
report which characterized the 1940 incorporation of Lithuania
into the Soviet Union as illegal. The Supreme Soviet also
repealed the constitutional provision which provided for the
"leading role" of the Communist Party, paving the way for a
multiparty political system, and the Lithuanian Communist
Party declared itself to be independent of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union. Two competing political parties, the
independent Lithuanian Communist Party and the Lithuanian
Democratic Party, were officially registered by year's end.
The primary law enforcement organization in Lithuania is the
militia (police), the officers of which are predominantly
Lithuanian. The powerful Committee for State Security
(K.G.B.), special troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(M.V.D.), and the regular Soviet armed forces, which maintain
a significant presence in Lithuania, can be assumed to take
orders from authorities in Moscow. Although K.G.B.
surveillance continues, there were few reports of human rights
violations in 1989 by the security and military apparatus.
The standard of living in Lithuania is higher than the Soviet
average, but the margin is shrinking. Lithuanians resent the
fact that much of the national income they create is
transferred to other republics and that most major economic
enterprises are controlled by central ministries in Moscow.
They also complain about a continuing decline in the quality
and quantity of food supplies and consumer goods. In May the
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet adopted a plan for a transition to
economic autonomy to begin on January 1, 1990, with future
relations between the Lithuanian and Soviet economies to be
based upon mutually acceptable agreements. The U.S.S.R.
Supreme Soviet in November voted to grant Lithuania control
over its land, resources, banks, and a portion of state-run
industries .
1178
LITHUANIA
The human rights situation in Lithuania improved markedly for
the second year in a row in 1989. As in the latter part of
1988, the authorities tolerated public expressions of
Lithuanian national sentiment and independent political views
which previously had been repressed. For the first time since
annexation by the Soviet Union, relatively free multicandidate
elections to the U.S.S.R. Congress of People's Deputies were
held. The Lithuanian Popular Front, Sajudis, a mass,
prodemocratic organization, swept the elections after
declaring that its goal is to restore the independence of
Lithuania. Limited progress was made, both in Lithuania and
the Soviet Union, toward legislative reforms that would serve
to institutionalize human rights improvements.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known cases of such killings in 1989.
b. Disappearance
There were no known instances of permanent or prolonged
disappearances .
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
In Lithuania, as in the Soviet Union, harsh treatment of
prisoners occurs during both interrogation and confinement in
labor camps, prisons, or psychiatric hospitals. Physical and
psychological abuse of prisoners, as well as detention under
extremely unhealthful conditions, are common. Lithuanians
remained concerned in 1989 about allegations that Lithuanian
youths are subjected to brutal and degrading treatment in the
Soviet armed forces, leading in some cases to physical
injuries, psychological trauma, and even suicide.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Soviet laws are written and interpreted so broadly that
persons may be arrested and convicted for trying to exercise
their basic human rights. During 1989, however, the
authorities in Lithuania did not use these laws to arrest
political activists.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Lithuanian Communist Party and Government in the past
frequently subverted constitutional provisions for the
objectivity and independence of the judicial process.
Procedural safeguards, such as the right to a public trial and
to a defense attorney, are generally respected but are not
sufficient to guarantee fair trials. Reforms to strengthen
the rights of defendants have been proposed but were not
implemented in 1989. There were no known trials on purely
political charges in 1989, and no Lithuanians were known to be
imprisoned for purely political reasons at year's end. Many
Lithuanians were juridically rehabilitated in 1989 following
1179
LITHUANIA
judicial review of cases in which they had been convicted on
political charges in previous years.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Cocrespondence
Through the use of informers, monitoring of telephones and
mail, surveillance, and other means, government authorities
have the ability to interfere in every aspect of personal
life. Constitutional provisions to the contrary, Soviet
investigative agencies do not abstain from forced entry and
illegal searches. The security apparatus did little, however,
to intimidate Lithuanians or to hinder the virtual explosion
of social and political activism which began in 1988 and
continued in 1989. Advocates of Lithuanian independence
reported that obvious surveillance of their movements declined
in 1989. Contacts between Lithuanians and visitors from
foreign countries continued to be monitored, but the
authorities facilitated a very considerable increase in such
contacts during 1989. Although many Lithuanians continued to
assume that telephones and mail were monitored, they exhibited
little fear of using them to express their views.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Soviet Constitution provides for most internationally
accepted political liberties on condition that their exercise
does not threaten the security of the Socialist system. In
previous years, the authorities had interpreted all such
constitutional guarantees to fit the convenience of the
State. Vague Soviet laws prohibiting "anti-Soviet agitation
and propaganda" and "anti-Soviet slander," which had
frequently been used in previous years to punish Lithuanian
political and religious activists, were replaced in 1989 by a
more limited provision which specifically prohibits calls for
the "violent overthrow" of the Soviet system.
In 1989 freedom of speech was widely respected. The
authorities tolerated public expression of virtually any
viewpoint, including criticism of Soviet officials and support
for total Lithuanian independence. Approximately 1.6 million
Lithuanians signed a petition which called for the withdrawal
of Soviet "occupation" troops from Lithuania. In the fall
over 1.000 young Lithuanians tore and burned their draft
letters to underscore their refusal to serve a 2-year
conscription term based on a provision of the Geneva agreement
of 1949 that an occupying army m.ay not forcibly conscript the
men of the occupied territories. Display of Lithuanian
national symbols, such as the prewar flag, which had been
repressed until mid-1988, was extremely widespread and
officially sanctioned in 1989.
The range of subjects covered by official Lithuanian
television, radio, and publications continued to expand in
1989. Print and electronic media devoted considerable
attention to the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Nonaggression Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany,
together with the secret protocols that became the basis for
the Soviet occupation and annexation of the three Baltic
states. The Pact and the protocols were widely republished by
Lithuanian papers, which also extensively described the Soviet
Union's 1940 occupation.
1180
LITHUANIA
Lithuanian media provided extensive information about the
positions of candidates in the spring elections for the
U.S.S.R. Congress of People's Deputies, and they regularly
reported on the views of the Baltic deputies to the Soviet
parliament. These views frequently differed from those of the
political leadership in Moscow. The Central Committee of the
Soviet Communist Party issued a harshly critical statement on
August 26 about the Baltic opposition movement's failure to
curb "extremist" and "separatist" forces. Nevertheless, the
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet on December 4 voted to replace the
provision in its Constitution which provided for the "leading
role" of the Communist Party with one legalizing political
parties and organizations.
While self-censorship was exercised in varying degrees by
individual editors and journalists, no political subject
remained off-limits in 1989. Articles advocating the
reestablishment of Lithuanian independence appeared regularly
in state-supported publications. Official censorship was
apparently used only to prevent the publication of such "state
secrets" as operational military information.
Despite the open nature of the Lithuanian press, most
publications remained under the formal control of the
Communist Party or other official organizations. Dozens of
independent publications were also produced legally by Sajudis
and some other nonofficial organizations. Unauthorized
(samizdat) publications appeared without hindrance from the
authorities, but the opinions in such publications were
increasingly available in the official press.
In Kaunas a university has been established which is
independent from Republic or all-Union educational ministries,
and the Republic's Academy of Sciences is urging complete
independence from Moscow.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The peaceful assembly of citizens is controlled by the
authorities, who retain the power to prohibit public
gatherings. Soviet guidelines on demonstrations and meetings
are contained in a 1988 decree confirmed by the U.S.S.R.
Supreme Soviet.
In practice, the people of Lithuania were allowed to hold mass
meetings and demonstrations without hindrance from the
authorities in 1989. Many of these meetings took place on the
anniversaries of historical events, commemoration of which had
been repressed as recently as 2 years ago.
The Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet declared that
February 16, the independence day of the interwar Lithuanian
Republic, should be officially commemorated as the "Day of
Restoration of Lithuanian Statehood." Lithuanian Communist
Party and government leaders participated along with the
representatives of Sajudis and the Lithuanian Liberty League
and religious leaders in public ceremonies attended by tens of
thousands of people to mark the event.
Hundreds of thousands of Lithuanians joined hands with
Latvians, Estonians, and others on August 23 in a
2-mi llion-person chain that extended from Tallinn, Estonia,
through Riga, Latvia, to Vilnius, Lithuania, as a sign of
protest marking the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact.
1181
LITHUANIA
The Lithuanian Constitution provides for the right to
associate in public organizations, but this right had been
limited in previous years by legislation and repressive
practices. While continuing to exercise a measure of control
over mass organizations associated with the Communist Party,
the authorities have acquiesced in the rapid growth of Sajudis
as well as many other independent clubs, professional
associations, and organizations which refer to themselves as
"political parties." There were no reports of significant
harassment against any of these groups. Even the official
Communist youth organization, the Komsomol, decided in June to
break all its official ties to the central Komsomol
organization in Moscow. The Lithuanian Communist Party in
December declared itself independent of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union. An emergency session of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee plenum met in
December to discuss Moscow's reaction to the Lithuanian
Communist Party vote. As 1989 closed, the CPSU Central
Committee plenum had decided to send a high-level delegation
to Lithuania in early 1990, but further action was not taken.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor Unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Although the Soviet Constitution provides for the right to
profess, or not to profess, any religion, both the party and
Government promote atheism. The authorities continued to
improve their relations with organized religion in 1989.
Christmas was celebrated as an officially sanctioned holiday
for the second consecutive year, and All Saints' Day was also
celebrated for the second time since 1940. The Lithuanian
Catholic Church began to publish a monthly journal on official
printing presses, and religious television programming began
to be shown on a regular weekly basis. The Lithuanian
Catholic Church also gained greater control over the
selection, training, and appointment of priests, which had
previously been the subject of considerable government
interference. Top Lithuanian political leaders held highly
publicized meetings with leaders of the Republic's religious
communities. Some church property, including churches,
chapels, and monasteries, has been returned to the church. A
second seminary was allowed to open.
State control of religion nevertheless continued to be
formally governed by repressive 1929 Soviet legislation, as
the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet has not yet adopted a new law to
guarantee freedom of conscience. The Lithuanian Supreme
Soviet, however, in November amended its Constitution to
guarantee freedom of thought, profession of religion, and the
independence of church organizations.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement is neither guaranteed by law nor fully
respected in practice, although Soviet officials have publicly
pledged to bring their legislation into conformity with
international standards. The right to emigrate by choice is
not recognized by Soviet law, and persons wishing to leave
temporarily are generally required to present an invitation
from abroad. Many Soviet Jews in Lithuania were denied
permission to emigrate in previous years, but the upsurge in
Soviet Jewish emigration has had a positive effect on Jewish
1182
LITHUANIA
emigration from Lithuania as well.
Although travel abroad is limited by restrictive legislation
and arbitrary enforcement, bureaucratic procedures are
considerably less cumbersome in Lithuania than in the Soviet
Union as a whole. For the second consecutive year, there was
a dramatic increase in the number of Lithuanians visiting the
United States and other Western countries in 1989. Leading
figures in all the main political movements, including Sajudis
and other groups favoring Lithuanian independence, visited
Western countries to present their views.
The number of visits by Lithuanian-Americans, other emigres
and persons of Lithuanian background to Lithuania rose
dramatically for the second consecutive year, with many
visitors permitted to travel to areas formally "closed" to
foreigners, although some Lithuanian-Americans have still been
denied visas.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Until 1989 the peoples of Lithuania and the Soviet Union had
not been free to change government leaders or the system of
government. For the first time in postwar Lithuanian history,
however, representatives to the U.S.S.R. Congress of People's
Deputies (the all-Union legislature) were chosen in 1989 by
secret ballot, on the basis of universal suffrage, in
relatively free multicandidate elections.
Although alternative parties could not formally participate in
the Lithuanian elections, nominating procedures were
sufficiently flexible to permit nomination of candidates with
a very broad range of political views. In Lithuania, unlike
many areas of the Soviet Union, there was no apparent
manipulation of the candidate registration process to exclude
"troublesome" candidates from the ballot. Of 42 seats, 36
were won by candidates, includiung some Communists, endorsed
by Sajudis, and the remaining 6 were retained by Communist
Party leaders. While many Communist Party leaders were
elected or reelected to their posts, others — including the
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of
Lithuania — were defeated. Most successful candidates
campaigned with the active support of Sajudis, which
voluntarily withdrew its front-running candidates to allow the
election of the party's two top leaders.
The spring elections to the U.S.S.R. 's legislature were
boycotted by the Lithuanian Liberty League and some other
proindependence organizations, which opposed participation in
elections to the legislature of Lithuania's "occupying
power." Participation in the elections was nevertheless very
high — over 80 percent. Although the Lithuanian Parliament and
Government were not democratically elected, in 1989 they were
frequently responsive to the sentiments of popular movements
and the general public. Draft laws were circulated and
amended on the basis of public debate, parliamentarians
frequently voted on the basis of their constituents' expressed
interests, and the agenda for government action was heavily
influenced by Sajudis, a leader of whi ch--Kazimiera
Prunskiene--was appointed as a Deputy Prime Minister in 1989.
A commission of the Supreme Soviet condemned the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and characterized the Republic's
incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940 as illegal.
1183
LITHUANIA
Multicandidate elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet were
scheduled to be held on February 24, 1990.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of A.lleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Soviet Government has adopted a more forthcoming approach
to foreign criticism of its human rights record in recent
years, acknowledging that human rights are a legitimate
subject of official diplomatic intercourse. Although there
were few allegations of human rights violations in Lithuania
in 1989, the Lithuanian Government generally welcomed foreign
and nongovernmental observers on any subject. Its decision to
allow eight Lithuanian-American activists to visit Lithuania
for the February 16 Independence Day ceremonies, however, was
apparently overruled by Moscow, and their visa applications
were denied. At the end of 1989, a subsequent application by
a member of this group was again denied, as were the
applications of other American activists.
The Government did not interfere with the activities of
various independent human rights groups in Lithuania,
including those led by such former political prisoners as
Helsinki Final Act monitor Viktoras Petkus. The last person
regarded by most of these groups as a Lithuanian political
prisoner, Boleslavas Liziunas, was pardoned and freed in 1989.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or other grounds is
prohibited in the Constitution. The relative homogeneity of
Lithuania's population, its strong sense of national identity,
and the binding force of the Lithuanian Catholic Church have
helped to preserve many of the country's social and cultural
traditions. Nevertheless, the disruptive effects of an
antireligious ideology, forced collectivization, and a policy
of industrialization have been severe. Lithuanians complain
that immigrants from the Soviet Union receive favored
treatment in the provision of housing and other social
services and that nonresidents frequently visit Lithuania in
order to shop in the Republic's stores.
Regulations were issued to prevent nonresidents of Lithuania
from purchasing goods which are in short supply, and economic
measures to discourage immigration were adopted by major
Lithuanian cities in 1989. The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet
adopted a law granting Lithuanian citizenship to virtually all
permanent residents of the Republic, while providing stringent
requirements for new immigrants to become citizens.
Among non-Lithuanian residents of Lithuania, about 20 percent
of the population (mostly Poles and Russians), there has been
some concern about the rise of Lithuanian nationalist
sentiment in 1988 and 1939. Some non-Lithuanians formed
organizations known as "Yedinstvo" (Unity) and the "Committee
to Defend Soviet Power," ostensibly to oppose discriminatory
and separatist tendencies among Lithuanians. Members of these
groups claimed, for example, that a newly adopted Lithuanian
language law was discriminatory against residents of Russian
and Polish background.
Local government councils of two predominantly Polish
districts in Lithuania declared themselves to be "autonomous"
1184
LITHUANIA
in 1989. This step was criticized and rejected by the central
Lithuanian authorities.
Most ethnic groups have formed officially recognized cultural
societies which work closely with Sajudis on proposals to
enhance their cultural autonomy. A law to protect the rights
of national minorities was adopted by the Lithuanian Supreme
Soviet in November.
Over the past 10 years, discrimination and persecution has
been directed against Lithuanians who sought to express their
national and cultural identity, against independent political
and religious activists, and against Jews and Pentecostalists
wishing to leave the country.
Women nominally enjoy the same legal rights as men, and an
extensive system of day-care service and maternity benefits
assists women in obtaining and retaining jobs.
Lithuanian statistics on the problem of violence against
women, including wife beating, are unavailable. The official
Soviet press in 1989 discussed the issue, and the Soviet
Council of Ministers established a special branch (headed by a
woman) to study the problems of women. Human rights and
women's rights groups in Lithuania are aware of the issue but
have focused their efforts thus far on the broader question of
independence and freedom.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Soviet labor law and practice has generally been enforced in
Lithuania. There has been no right of association as defined
by the International Labor Organization. Although the
Constitution grants Soviet citizens the right to form trade
unions, attempts to exercise this right independently of the
state-controlled union had always been repressed. New
professional associations and an independent "Lithuanian
Workers' Union" with close ties to Sajudis were created in
1989, but it is not yet clear whether they will effectively
exercise trade union functions.
Soviet authorities permitted the travel to the United States
of a member of the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies, who
is the leader of an independent union in Lithuania, in order
to attend the convention of the American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations.
A few brief strikes were reported in the Lithuanian press in
1989. There were no reports of repression against strikers.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers in Lithuania have not generally been able to organize
or resort to collective bargaining. There are no economic
incentive zones or special industries in which labor standards
differ from those elsewhere in Lithuania. Virtually all
workers in the Soviet Union automatically become members of an
affiliate of the official trade union organization, the
All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, in order to be
entitled to government social welfare benefits.
1185
LITHUANIA
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Soviet law contains no prohibition on forced and compulsory
labor. Most prisoners are confined to camps where they are
forced to labor, often under harsh and degrading conditions.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The statutory minimum age for employment of children is 16.
There is no indication of widespread violations of this
norm.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Labor conditions in Lithuania are similar to those in the
Soviet Union. According to the Soviet State Statistical
Committee, the average monthly wage in Lithuania for blue- and
white-collar workers in September 1989 was $396 and for
collective farm workers $282 at the official exchange rate.
The minimum monthly wage in the U.S.S.R. was $140. (The ruble
is not a convertible currency, and its value here in terms of
the U.S. dollar does not represent actual purchasing power for
Internationa] purposes.)
The average workweek is 40 hours for most white-collar workers
and 41 hours for most blue-collar workers. Soviet law
establishes minimum conditions of health and safety. Press
reports suggest, however, that the laws on maximum hours of
work and health and safety standards are widely ignored.
1186
LUXEMBOURG
Luxembourg is a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary
democracy. The Grand Duke is the Chief of State, but his
duties are mostly ceremonial. Real power rests with the
12-member Government, headed by the Prime Minister and
responsible to Parliament, which receives its authority
through free and fair elections.
The police and gendarmerie maintain internal order. Both
organizations are under the control of the Government and
respect human rights. The country is free from strife, and
residents enjoy fair and efficient judicial and penal systems.
The Grand Duchy is a highly developed, industrialized state
with a free enterprise economic system and a high standard of
living .
Luxembourg continued its commitment to human rights in 1989.
Individual human rights are ensured by the Constitution and
protected in practice, and Luxembourg actively promotes human
rights internationally. It continues efforts to treat its
relatively large foreign population fairly and to engage labor
unions in the industrial decisionmaking process.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Politically motivated killings did not occur.
b. Disappearance
There were no known abductions or hostage-taking cases.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is prohibited by law and does not occur.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Due process is provided by law and observed in practice.
Luxembourg law is a composite of local practice, legal
tradition, and foreign systems — French, Belgian, and German.
Except in cases of hot pursuit, a warrant must be obtained
from the judiciary before an arrest may be made. Any person
detained by the authorities must be charged and appear before
a judge no later than 24 hours after arrest. Immediate access
to a lawyer of one's own choosing is accorded by law. No one
is held incommunicado. Bail may be granted, depending on the
circumstances. Preventive detention does not exist, but
persons may be incarcerated pending trial, if so ordered by a
judge. Exile is not imposed.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Luxembourg's judiciary is independent and free from executive
or military interference. Due process is ensured. Military
courts exist, but civilians are not subject to their
jurisdiction. The right of defendants to have legal counsel,
at public expense if necessary, is assured. Charges are
1187
LUXEMBOURG
formally and clearly stated. Defendants have the right to be
tried in public, to confront witnesses, and to present
evidence. They are presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Verdicts may be appealed by either the defendant or the
State. An appeal results in a completely new judicial
hearing, and sentences may be increased as well as reduced.
There are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Luxembourg law and customs are based on regard for personal
freedom. The State, political organizations, and other
entities do not arbitrarily intrude into the private lives of
Luxembourg residents. Police must have a warrant, issued by
the judiciary, to enter a private home. Statutes prohibit
other violations of the home such as demolition, and the
sealing of doors and windows. Wiretaps are not legal.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press,
which is respected in practice. Except for restrictions on
pornography, there is no censorship of the media. The
broadcast industry is privately owned, except 4 percent which
is indirectly controlled by the French Government. The
industry operates independently from the Luxembourg
Government. The print media are privately owned and
controlled. Academic freedom is respected.
While not limiting free speech, a rarely used law contains a
provision which may reduce public debate on a given issue. It
provides that a law may be promulgated by the Grand Duke after
certain bodies (the Chamber of Commerce, the Council of
State — a parliamentary consultative body made up of
representatives of all elements of Luxembourg society — and the
appropriate committee of the Chamber of Deputies) have given
their opinions on a report which has been submitted by the
relevant minister (s) and approved by the Cabinet. This
procedure avoids a parliamentary debate and was used in 1989
to pass a law clarifying bank secrecy.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of peaceful assembly and association is assured
constitutionally and respected in practice. There are no
limitations on orderly public meetings. All groups enjoy the
right of free assembly, and permits are routinely issued when
required.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion in Luxembourg, and one may freely
practice the religion of one's choice, including: maintaining
places of worship, training clergy, publishing religious
material, providing religious education, and participating in
charitable activities. Statistically, 90 percent of the
residents are Roman Catholics.
1188
LUXEMBOURG
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on movement within the country
(including changing residence or workplace), foreign travel,
or emigration and repatriation. Refugees are treated fairly,
and they are not forced to return to countries in which they
fear they would be persecuted.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The citizens of Luxembourg have the right and ability to
change their government peacefully. All Luxembourg citizens
18 years of age and older may participate in national
elections, held every 5 years, and in local elections, held
every 6 years. Voting is by secret ballot with multiple
candidates for most positions. Luxembourg's large foreign
population (26 percent) does not have the right to vote, but
it may exert considerable influence on the political process
indirectly by joining labor unions or other organizations.
Representative bodies, including Parliament, are free to
debate and vote against the Government. Opposition groups,
including political parties, function openly and freely,
without fear of government repression.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There were no requests for the investigation of human rights
abuses.
Luxembourg has consistently supported international and
nongovernmental investigation of alleged human rights
violations .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Discrimination based on the above factors is prohibited by
law. Adequate food, shelter, health care, and education are
available to all inhabitants regardless of race, religion,
sex, ethnic background, or political opinion.
Equal pay for equal work is mandated by law. Women and men
enjoy the same property rights. Property acquired during a
marriage is divided equally upon dissolution of the marriage,
unless a prenuptial agreement exists which stipulates how
property is to be divided. Family members are protected by
law.
Violence against women is not widespread, and it is not
tolerated by the Government. Wife beating is prohibited by
law. Several women's rights groups are active in Luxembourg,
including those which aid battered women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to associate freely, choose their own
representatives, publicize views, and determine their
programs. Slightly more than 50 percent of the labor force is
unionized. Membership is not mandatory. The two largest
1189
LUXEMBOURG
industrial unions are linked to, but organized independently
of, Luxembourg's Socialist Party and Christian Social Party.
With the exception of government workers who provide essential
services, all workers have the right to strike. Government
workers who may legally strike must observe certain
conditions, such as a cooling off period, before implementing
their action. Strikes are rare, however, and there were none
in 1989.
Unions are free from government interference and maintain
unrestricted contact with international bodies in their
fields. Luxembourg unions maintain affiliation with the
European Trade Union Confederation and the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Constitution ensures freedom of union activity and
protects union leaders and members from discrimination.
Unions have the right to organize and bargain collectively on
behalf of their members, and this right is applied uniformly
throughout the country. Worker representatives are required
in all businesses of 15 or more employees. In businesses with
over 150 employees, 50 percent of the joint works councils are
elected by the employees. In businesses with more than 1,000
employees, one-third of the membership of the boards of
directors must be employees or their elected representatives.
An effective system exists to hear and adjudicate
employment-related complaints.
There are no export processing zones, and labor law and
practice apply uniformly throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law and does not
exist in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The employment of children under the age of 15 is prohibited.
Children are required by law to remain in school until they
are 16 years old. Child labor and education laws are strictly
enforced. Adolescent workers (ages 15 to 17) are provided
special protection by law, such as limiting overtime and
specifying the number of hours which may be worked
continuously.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Luxembourg's health and safety standards are among the highest
in the world. A safe working environment is mandated by law
and enforced throughout the country by a stringent inspection
system, which may impose severe penalties. Pregnant women who
work receive special consideration in the workplace. The
normal workweek is 40 hours, spread over 5 days. Premium pay
is required for work outside the normal workweek. Work on
Sunday is generally prohibited, except in certain
circumstances, such as continuous process industries (steel
and chemical), and for certain workers such as maintenance and
security personnel. All workers receive a minimum of 5 weeks
of paid vacation a year, in addition to paid holidays. The
minimum wage is $4.50 per hour for all workers 18 years of age
and older. Younger workers receive a lower minimum wage.
This is $2.70 per hour for workers 15 years old. The minimum
1190
LUXEMBOURG
wage increases annually until the worker is 18. A supplement
is added for workers with dependents. It would be difficult
to support a family on the minimum wage. However, few workers
receive the minimum wage, and Luxembourg wages are among the
highest in the world.
1191
MALTA
Malta is a constitutional republic and parliamentary
democracy. Executive power is vested in a president who
appoints as prime minister the leader of the party which gains
a plurality of seats in the quinquennial elections for the
unicameral legislature. The two major political parties
reflect widely divergent political views. After 16 years of
Labor Party rule, the election in 1987 brought the Nationalist
Party to power with a one-seat majority in Parliament.
Law enforcement and internal security are the responsibility
of the Malta police under the command of a civilian
commissioner. The Deputy Prime Minister, who is also Minister
of Justice, has jurisdiction over the police. A specially
trained riot police, the Special Assignments Group (SAG),
forms part of the regular police force. Human rights, a
subject included in the curriculum of the police academy, are
generally respected by the police force.
The Maltese economy is a mix of state-controlled and private
firms. Malta is heavily dependent on its ability to export
and on tourism. Foreign private investment in export-
oriented, light manufacturing industries is being actively
promoted, and the Government is also developing Malta as a
center for offshore business activities.
Constitutional protection for the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the individual is upheld by an independent
judiciary. The current Maltese Government is strongly
committed to human rights. Women encounter a degree of
culturally based inequality. In 1989 the National Council of
Women complained publicly about discrimination against women
in the newly enacted dual citizenship law.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No known incidents of political killing occurred.
b. Disappearance
No cases of disappearance are known to have occurred.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were accusations by the opposition party against the
police for using excessive force in controlling unruly crowds
on two separate occasions during the year. Measures for
prison reform taken in 1989 Included training wardens and
providing higher wages and better working conditions for
prison guards. The Government announced its intention to
bring the penitentiary system "up to European standards."
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention is provided for in
the Constitution and is generally respected in practice.
Police officers above the rank of inspector may issue arrest
warrants without court order. The police may, on the basis of
reasonable suspicion, arrest a person for questioning. Within
1192
48 hours, persons so arrested must be brought before the court
and charged or released. There is no right to legal counsel
during this 48-hour period. Persons incarcerated pending trial
have access to counsel, and periodic hearings are mandatory.
Provision for bail exists. While previously the granting of
bail to defendants accused of murder and crimes against the
security of the State was prohibited by law, the Constitutional
Court in April, acting on an appeal filed by three persons
charged with attempted murder^ ruled that the criminal code was
in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. The
court decreed that judges may now exercise their discretion on
whether to grant bail or not, and remanded the cases to the
lower courts. The Constitutional Court in another case
ordered two police officers to pay a citizen compensation for
an illegal arrest and detention which occurred in 1983.
There are no known cases of incommunicado detention or
political exile. With regard to forced or compulsory labor,
see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution requires a fair public trial before an
impartial court. Recommendations to reform the Constitution
and to strengthen both the independence and peer review of the
judiciary are under review by political parties and the public.
Defendants have the right to counsel of their choice, at public
expense if necessary. They enjoy a presumption of innocence,
may confront witnesses and present evidence, and have the right
of appeal. The courts' jurisdiction is limited in certain
areas. Lay tribunals (e.g., the Industrial Tribunal, the
Commissioners for Justice, and the Inheritance Partition
Tribunal) have exclusive authority over certain judicial
functions, although their independence is not legally
guaranteed. Defendants in cases before the Industrial Tribunal
or the Public Service Commission may not be represented by
lawyers .
Maltese criminal law has on several occasions in the past year
been challenged in the Constitutional Court for not conforming
to certain provisions of the European Convention on Human
Rights. In every instance the court has ruled in favor of the
appellants. There are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Protection of the privacy of the home is ensured in the
Constitution and generally respected in practice. Search
warrants may be issued, on reasonable suspicion of crime, by
public officers above the rank of inspector, without a court
order. In a 1989 decision in a case against a former
parliamentary Secretary for Housing dating back to 1974, the
Constitutional Court ruled that the requisition order and
eviction of the complainant from his home had violated his
constitutional rights. The court ordered payment of
compensation.
Political party membership and participation is voluntary.
However, there is strong societal (family, employment)
pressure for affiliation with particular parties.
Electronic surveillance is prohibited by law. However,
prompted by the opposition's charges that wiretaps were being
1193
MALTA
unlawfully used against it, the Minister of Justice said he
would introduce legislation permitting the Government to use
wiretaps in exceptional circumstances when state security was
threatened.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of expression (speech and press) is protected by the
Constitution and generally respected in practice. The only
exception is the 1987 constitutional amendment which bans
foreign participation in local politics (e.g., guest foreign
speakers sponsored by a political party) during the period
prior to an election.
The broadcast media (television and radio) are state owned.
During 1989 opposition viewpoints received prominent,
frequently extensive, coverage on a par with coverage provided
to the Government, irrespective of news value, although both
majority and opposition political parties complained of bias
in news coverage. A constitutionally mandated Broadcasting
Authority exists to ensure impartiality in broadcasting, and a
parliamentary select committee has reported on ways to
strengthen the broadcasting authority.
Ten privately owned daily, weekly, and monthly newspapers
freely express partisan views. Several newspapers are
associated with political parties. Academic freedom generally
is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right of peaceful assembly is ensured in the
Constitution. In 1989 police permits were routinely issued
for political meetings and other public activities of
political parties or groups of citizens. On two occasions
during the year, violence erupted, prompted by longstanding
animosity and polarization between the two leading political
parties. The first incident occurred during a wedding in an
opposition party stronghold attended by prominent government
officials, where opposition party adherents proceeded to
attack the wedding party. The second instance was in
connection with ceremonies and festivities on March 31, the
day which the opposition party claims as Malta's independence
day. On both occasions, the Special Assignments Group (SAG)
was called in to control the crowd and particular individuals'
violent behavior. Some people were affected by the tear gas
and injured by police batons. The opposition party later
accused the SAG of police brutality and of using excessive
force.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The right to practice the religion of one's choice is
protected constitutionally and is respected. The
overwhelmingly dominant religion is Roman Catholicism; small
numbers of people practice other religions. State subsidies
are granted only to Catholic schools. In the state schools,
students have the option at some stage to opt for religious
instruction in the Catholic faith.
1194
MALTA
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no restrictions on movement within the country,
foreign travel, or emigration. In July a law was enacted
enabling returning Maltese emigrants, who have acquired the
citizenship of another country and resided abroad for a
minimum of 6 years, to hold dual citizenship. The law does
not apply to children of emigrants nor to women who left Malta
to marry a foreigner and obtained the citizenship of their
husbands .
Foreign nationals claiming refugee status while visiting Malta
generally are not permitted to remain in Malta but are allowed
to stay until settled in a third country. The Emigrants'
Commission, established in 1987 as the local representative of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) , has
worked well in providing a5;sistance and counseling for
refugees until they are accepted by the UNHCR.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Malta is a parliamentary democracy in which the incumbent
Nationalist Party and the opposition Malta Labor Party
dominate public life. Political activity is often intense,
and partisan feelings can be very pronounced, heated, and
polarized. Elections with universal suffrage, in which all
parties participate freely, are held every 5 years. During
the 1987 election, 96.11 percent of those registered actually
voted.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government places no restrictions on investigations by
international human rights groups. It is strongly committed
to human rights and is active in international human rights
forums. Several local human rights groups and persons
interested in promoting and protecting human rights operate
freely.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Maltese citizens have a legal right to housing, employment,
and education on a nondiscriminatory basis. In practice,
however, there is discrimination in employment, the provision
of public services, and the granting of import licenses based
upon political party affiliation and extended family ties. In
conformance with its election campaign pledge to obtain
redress for individual injustices incurred under the previous
government, the present Government set up a commission shortly
after its election in 1987 to probe alleged injustices brought
to its attention. Because of its heavy workload, another two
commissions were added in 1989 to investigate injustices with
respect to appointments of public officers, granting of
licenses permits and government contracts, and provision of
public services.
For reasons derived from tradition and culture, Maltese society
has only recently begun to associate women's rights with human
rights. There are laws on equal opportunity and equal pay for
equal work, but discrimination occurs. Job advertisements may
1195
MALTA
specify whether the positions are for men or women. The low
rate of participation of women in the work force can be partly
attributed to a tax structure which discourages married women
from working. As of January 1990, however, a new tax law will
eliminate the tax disincentive for married women.
Married women lose entitlements and seniority personally
acquired (retirement, health benefits, social security) upon
marriage. Legally, the husband is head of the family unit
with dominant responsibility for economic and financial
questions, as well as all major decisions concerning children.
Married women can own businesses and hold checking accounts
only with the consent of their husbands. They must be
represented by their husbands in business or financial
litigation. This inequity has been challenged by women's
organizations, among others the Commission for the Advancement
of Women, which was formed in collaboration with the Government
in March. The Commission has drafted a new family law aimed
at eliminating the inferior status and discriminatory treatment
of women, which it hopes the Government will act upon. The
Government has responded by setting up a Secretariat for the
Equality of Women within the Ministry of Social Policy, which
will monitor legislation relating to women and draw up
initiatives leading to the equality of women. Married women
are also discriminated against in the recently enacted dual
citizenship law (see Section 2.d.). The National Council of
Women has complained to the Government and threatened to take
its case to the European Commission of Human Rights.
There are no laws specifically prohibiting abuse of women. A
church refuge for battered women exists and is partially
supported by the Government. In 1989 the Government increased
its contribution to the refuge. A privately organized
association of battered women also exists.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right, respected in practice, to associate
freely and to strike. The only groups restrained from
striking are the uniformed personnel of the armed forces and
the police. In 1989 there were 23 trade unions registered in
Malta representing over 51 percent of the work force. The
General Workers Union (GWU) and the Union Haddiema Maghqudin
are the two largest unions. The GWU has been institutionally
tied to the Malta Labor Party since 1978, and it has
participated in the Labor Party Government. The other labor
unions are independent of political parties, and the current
Government encourages the development of free trade unions
without party affiliation. Maltese unions belong to a variety
of international trade union groupings.
There were occasional sporadic strikes of short duration
during 1989, most of them politically motivated. Under the
Industrial Relations Act of 1976, the responsible minister may
refer disputes to the Industrial Tribunal for binding
settlement, in effect limiting the right to strike. In 1989
the Committee of Experts of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) asked the Government to take the necessary
measures to bring this legislation into conformity with ILO
principles. It also noted with satisfaction the efforts made
by the Government to refund the salaries of worker-students
involved in a teachers' strike in 1984.
1196
MALTA
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers are free, in law and in practice, to organize and
bargain collectively. Voluntary worker-employer negotiations
and collective bargaining are encouraged by the current
Government. The 1976 Act provided for the creation of a joint
negotiating council for the public sector, but this has not
yet been formed.
According to the Industrial Relations Act, an employer may not
take action against any employee because he or she belongs to
a trade union. Complaints may be addressed through a court of
law or an industrial tribunal composed of one member each
named by the employer, union, and the Government. Complaints
of discrimination may also be lodged with the Commission
against Injustices which was set up in 1987.
There are no export processing zones in Malta.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is constitutionally prohibited and does not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children younger than 16 years may not legally be employed.
This injunction is generally respected and enforced.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The legal minimum wage in Malta in 1989 was $86.65 per week.
The minimum wage is generally enforced. Given government
subsidies in housing, health care, and free education, the
minimum wage provides a basic standard of living.
Maximum hours of work are regulated by wage council orders for
various trades. For most sectors, the maximum is 40 hours per
week, but in some trades the maximum allowable is 43 or 45
hours per week. Government labor regulations prescribe daily
rest periods of 1 hour. Annual paid vacation according to law
is currently 22 working days.
Occupational safety standards and health regulations,
especially in the dockyards and construction sectors, are
being reviewed and updated. The Government is in the process
of organizing the recently established authority for workers'
health, safety, and welfare, which will be responsible for
educating workers and enforcing occupational safety standards;
enforcement heretofore has been lax. Following two serious
occupational accidents, one of which resulted in death, the
Department of Labor took legal action against the employers.
1197
THE NETHERLANDS
The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy with a
parliamentary legislative system. Executive authority is
exercised by a council of ministers representing the governing
political parties. A bicameral parliament, in which the full
range of the political spectrum is represented, is selected
through nationwide proportional voting.
The police and security organs are effectively subordinated to
the executive and judicial authorities.
The Dutch have a mixed free market economy with extensive
involvement by governmental entities. The Netherlands has a
complex social welfare system providing a high level of social
benefits .
The Dutch attach great importance to human rights in their
foreign and domestic policies. The principal internationally
recognized rights are protected by Dutch law and widely
respected in practice by both the State and the general public.
The press, public interest groups, and both domestic and
international human rights organizations are quick to
challenge practices which they believe violate established
human rights norms. Such complaints characteristically
receive a full airing in the media, through the judicial
process, and in Parliament.
There are no significant differences in human rights practices
between the Netherlands proper and the autonomous regions of
the Kingdom: Aruba and the five-island Netherlands Antilles.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Killing for political motives by government or domestic
political groups did not occur.
b. Disappearance
Abductions, secret arrests, and clandestine detention by
police or other official security forces did not occur.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and cruel or inhuman punishment are prohibited by law
and did not occur in practice.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment is guaranteed
by law and respected in practice. Preventive detention is
permitted only in times of emergency, upon declaration, for a
limited time, by national or municipal authorities. The
practice of preventive custody is frequently used in drug
smuggling cases.
Under normal circumstances, a person may be held no longer
than 6 hours, or 9 if the arrest was made at night, unless
charges are brought. Persons suspected of having committed
1198
THE NETHERLANDS
serious crimes may be held in custody for 48 hours without
charge with the agreement of the public prosecutor, who is
also authorized to decide on an extension of another 48
hours. Any further decision on extending detention is made by
an investigating judge. In January the Netherlands was
criticized by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg
for holding suspects in custody up to 4 days and 9 hours
without access to a judge. The Court considered the Dutch
practice a violation of the European Convention on Human
Rights which guarantees arrested persons "immediate" access to
a judge. The Dutch Justice Ministry is currently
investigating how its procedures may be brought in line with
the Court's verdict. Search and arrest warrants issued by the
judiciary are required in most criminal cases.
Forced exile from the Netherlands is unknown. With regard to
forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to a fair public trial is guaranteed by law and
respected in practice. Defendants have the right to counsel,
and a system of free or low-cost legal assisx-ance exists for
those unable to pay. Charges must be formally stated. The
judiciary is independent. There are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
A judicial warrant is required to enter a person's home or to
monitor private communications. The State respects individual
freedom of choice in family matters.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure
freedom of speech and press. Dutch media policy allocates
broadcasting time to a wide range of social and political
groups, ensuring that minority viewpoints are heard. There
are no prepublication restraints on any media, but there
exists a broad social understanding which precludes the
mainstream media from disseminating sensitive inform.ation
involving national security, defense, or the royal family.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly and association are effectively
unrestricted. Permits are required from local governmental
authorities for large-scale assemblies and for demonstrations
of a political nature. Permits are granted on a routine basis
but may be denied when authorities believe that "public order
and safety" cannot be guaranteed as a result of a rally or
demonstration. Membership in, or the formation of,
organizations is not impeded by the Government except under
exceptional circumstances.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
1199
THE NETHERLANDS
c. Freedom of Religion
There is full freedom of religion. State subsidies in the
educational field are provided to religious organizations
which maintain educational facilities. The subsidy is granted
on a fixed per student basis to both parochial and
nonparochial educational institutions.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There is freedom of domestic and foreign travel, emigration,
and repatriation. Due to the Netherlands' shortage of housing
in its major cities, there are some restrictions on the
allocation of government-subsidized housing.
The Netherlands has elaborate procedures for deciding asylum
applications, designed to give full respect to the due process
rights of applicants and to take into account conditions in
the applicants' countries of origin. In close cooperation
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the Netherlands
annually offers permanent resettlement to 500 refugees,
principally Iranians, Vietnamese, and Cambodians, who are in
temporary asylum in other countries. The Dutch provide
housing and social services to asylum applicants awaiting
decisions as well as to those awarded refugee status.
Applicants denied refugee status are requested to leave the
Netherlands, but a significant portion do not depart. The
Dutch Government rarely sends asylum seekers back to their
country of origin.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Netherlands is a functioning multiparty democracy.
Election results are decided on the basis of proportional
representation. There is universal suffrage for persons over
18 years of age, and foreign residents have the right to vote
in municipal elections. Dutch citizens elect the Second
Chamber of Parliament every 4 years (or more frequently in the
event a government resigns or is toppled by a parliamentary
vote of no confidence). The most recent national elections,
held in September, led to the formation of a center-left
government with Prime Minister Lubbers remaining in office.
Eleven political parties have seats in Parliament,
representing all points of view from the far right to the far
left.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government is responsive to allegations of human rights
violations arising both domestically and internationally. The
Dutch consider themselves to be in the forefront of
international concern over reported human rights abuses, and
Dutch authorities readily assist international and
nongovernmental organizations in their investigation. Support
for human rights is a key tenet of Dutch foreign policy. The
Netherlands is a strong advocate of human rights, both
bilaterally and in international forums, including the United
Nations and its agencies and the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. The Dutch have repeatedly spoken out
against human rights violations in all parts of the world.
1200
THE
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Dutch view the problem of fully integrating racial and
ethnic minorities into national economic and social life as
one of their most difficult domestic issues. Hundreds of
thousands of persons from the former Dutch colony of Suriname
and the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba have come to live in
the Netherlands since 1975. In addition, there are
significant numbers of foreign workers and their families,
mostly from Turkey and Morocco. These groups face some
private discrimination in housing and employment, as well as
practical limits on opportunities for social and economic
advancement as a result of educational levels that are
inadequate when compared to those of the majority of Dutch
citizens. Unemployment among minority groups runs
significantly higher than among the population as a whole.
The Government's longstanding policy of combatting
discrimination is outlined in its 1983 "Minority Note," a
comprehensive plan of action to address the problems of
minorities in the fields of health, education, employment, and
the law. The National Advisory and Consultation Board on
Minority Policy, which is incorporated by legislation into the
administrative structure of the country, is chaired by the
Minister of Internal Affairs and includes representatives of
seven ethnic minority groups. It acts as a consultative body
to the Cabinet on minority issues and as a conduit into the
Government for the expression of minority concerns.
Administrative tribunals have been set up for filing claims of
discrimination against employers and government and in housing
matters. They provide a practical means of redress for
discrimination claims.
Women enjoy full legal rights and enter marriage with the
choice of pooling wealth or maintaining separate assets.
According to a recent study ("Violence Against Women in
Heterosexual Relationships") financed by the Dutch Ministry of
Welfare, Health, and Culture, 20.8 percent of Dutch women in
heterosexual relationships are or have been the victims of
unreciprocated violence. Slightly over half of these (or 11
percent of women) experience or have experienced repeated
violence severe enough to be considered wife beating. The
Government supports programs to prevent or reduce violence
against women. Battered women find refuge in a network of
government-subsidized women's shelters which offer the
services of social workers and psychologists. In addition,
battered women who leave their husbands immediately become
eligible for an array of social benefits, including a basic
(and livable) subsidy as well as an allowance for any
dependent children.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The right of Dutch workers to associate freely is well
established. The active trade union movement includes in its
membership approximately 30 percent of the employed labor
force. Unions, while entirely free of government and
political party control, may and do participate in political
life. They are free to form federations and to maintain
relations with recognized international bodies. All union
members, except civil servants, have the legal right to
1201
THE NETHERLANDS
strike. Even Dutch military personnel are free to join
unions. Legislation is pending which would grant the right to
strike to civil servants not involved in "lifesaving"
activities .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is recognized
and well established in the Netherlands. Neither in law nor
in practice is discrimination against union members practiced.
Dutch society has developed a social partnership between
government, private employers, and trade unions which grew out
of post-World War II reconstruction efforts. This "harmony
model of industrial relations" involves all three participants
in negotiating collective bargaining agreements. Every year,
the three participants develop a "central accord" with
agreed-upon social and economic goals for the nation.
Sectoral collective bargaining then takes place under the
umbrella of the "central accord."
There is a disagreement between the Government and the major
Dutch trade union confederation (FNV) over the degree of
government participation in the collective bargaining process
permitted by a series of laws passed in the 1980*s. This
legislation moved the status of quasi-public workers from
being "trend followers of the private sector" to being "trend
followers of the public sector." The status of quasi-public
workers is now closer to the status of government workers
whose salaries and terms of employment are determined by the
Government. A predecessor confederation of the FNV, the NW,
unhappy with this situation, appealed to the International
Labor Organization (ILO) under Convention 87. An ILO
fact-finding mission in 1985 essentially agreed with the
union's position. The Government continues to maintain that
its role in the discussion of salaries and terms of employment
does not constitute interference in the collective bargaining
process, and the FNV itself does not consider this
disagreement to be a worker rights issue.
There are no export processing zones in the Netherlands.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited by law and does not
exist .
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment of young people is 16. At 16
years of age, youths may work full time only if they have
completed the mandatory 10 years of schooling. Those still in
school at age 16 may not work more than 8 hours per week.
Laws prohibit youths under the age of 18 from working at
night, overtime, or in areas which could be dangerous to their
physical or mental development. The Netherlands has a reduced
minimum wage for employees under age 23. The purpose of this
law is to provide incentives for the employment of young
people, one of the groups with the highest rate of
unemployment. Full-time workers 16 years and older receive a
paid vacation of at least 20 days per year.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Dutch law and practice adequately protect the safety and
health of workers. The average workweek for adults is 38
1202
THE NETHERLANDS
hours. There is minimum wage legislation, and the minimum
wage is approximately $6.00 per hour. This minimum wage,
together with social benefits available to all minimum wage
earners, provides an adeqisate living for workers and t.^>eir
families. For unemployed workers, an extensive system of
unemployment benefits allows recipients to maintain an
adequate standard of living.
1203
NORWAY
Norway is a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary
democracy with King Olav V, the titular Head of State, having
a largely symbolic role. Norway is governed by a prime
minister, cabinet, and a 165-seat Storting (parliament) that
is elected every 4 years and cannot be dissolved.
The police, security forces, and the military are scrupulous
in their protection of human rights. The Government
(including the judicial system and the Storting) exercises
firm control over these organizations and investigates
thoroughly any allegations of human rights violations.
Norway is an advanced industrial state with a mixed economy
combining private, public, and state ownership. Personal
freedoms, such as freedom of association and of speech, and
the right to pursue private interests and to hold private
property, are protected by the Constitution and respected in
practice .
Deeply rooted democratic principles, a strong egalitarian
tradition, an independent press, and highly developed
educational and social welfare systems have made Norway a
leading advocate of human rights in the world.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Such killings have not occurred.
b. Disappearance
Secret arrests and detentions have not occurred.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment do not exist in Norway's penal system. Generous
furlough and visitation rights characterize the system, which
emphasizes rehabilitation. The maximum sentence for any crime
is 21 years.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Norwegian law provides for arrest warrants, which are used
except in circumstances such as hot pursuit. Persons may be
detained for up to 4 hours without being charged. A person
charged with a crime has the right, observed in practice, to
appear before a judge for arraignment within 24 hours. If
charges are formalized at the arraignment, the judge then
determines whether the detainee should be kept in custody or
released (bail need not be posted) pending trial. A strong
case must be made to justify detention. Possible grounds
include fear of flight, the needs of the investigation, and
fear that a detainee will commit further crimes.
Any person held in pretrial detention appears before a judge
every 4 weeks for a determination of the necessity of
continued detention. There is no legal limit on the length of
1204
NORWAY
time a prisoner may be held before trial; however, lengthy
pretrial detention is rare. Preventive detention also exists
but is used infrequently.
There is no exile. With regard to forced or compulsory labor,
see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to a fair, public trial is ensured by law and
honored in practice. Only in certain cases, including those
involving state security or private family matters, are trials
closed. In criminal cases, all Norwegian citizens and aliens
are entitled to free counsel. Indigent persons are granted
free counsel in certain civil cases as well.
The judiciary is independent of both the legislative and the
executive branches of the Government and tries military and
security as well as civil and criminal cases. The Labor Court
mediates industrial relations disputes.
In recent years, the legality of imprisoning those refusing
both military service and alternative civilian service has
become a public issue. Persons refusing both kinds of service
have been held in prison for up to 16 months (a period
equivalent to military service) without a trial. Detention is
based on an administrative rather than a judicial decision,
and prisoners held in this manner receive salary and benefits
normally accorded to military recruits during their period of
confinement. Recent administrative decisions by the Justice
and Defense Ministries have expanded the grounds for
conscientious objector status.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The privacy of the family and the person is free from
arbitrary interference by the Government. Police may conduct
searches of the home only with court approval or in instances
of hot pursuit or when they fear evidence is being destroyed.
There were no allegations of extralegal official entry into
Norwegian hemes in 1989. In most cases, wiretaps are
prohibited by law, but they may be used in cases involving
state security or narcotics offenses and when officially
approved by the court pursuant to carefully drawn legal
guidelines. Correspondence may be opened only by court order
in cases involving state security.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is protected by the Constitution
and respected in practice. In addition to restrictions on
slander and libel, Norwegian law forbids racist or sexist
remarks in print or public speech. It is foibidden to publish
information concerning national defense which could prove
damaging to Norwegian security.
Norway's state broadcasting company maintains a near monopoly
on television broadcasting and nationwide radio programming,
but the Government does not exercise editorial control over
programming. Private local radio stations exist throughout
the country, and licenses have been granted to private groups
to operate local cable stations. A private television
1205
network, TV Norge, has been on the air for almost 1 year. It
broadcasts in the Olso area and is available on cable
throughout Norway. Norway has an active and diversified
press, and many papers are sustained by government subsidies.
Some newspapers are loosely connected to various national
political parties.
Certain restrictions apply to the showing of films. The
government Film Control Board has the authority to censor or
ban any film deemed overly violent, pornographic, or
blasphemous. The blasphemy clause in the censorship law has,
however, not been used in the last 20 years. There is no
evidence that any films have been censored because of
political content.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Norwegians exercise these freedoms without restraint. Permits
for public demonstrations are granted routinely.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The state church is the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Norway,
which is financially supported by the State and to which 93
percent of the population nominally belongs. There is a
constitutional requirement that the King and half of the
Cabinet belong to the state church. The Workers' Protection
and Working Environment Act permits prospective employers to
ask job applicants in certain fields, such as education,
whether they respect Christian beliefs and principles.
Approximately 4 percent of the population are registered
members of 20 other denominations which operate freely and may
proselytize. Foreign clergy are welcome in Norway. No
religious community is required to register with the
Government unless it desires state support, which is provided
to all registered denominations on a proportional basis in
accordance with membership. Although the state religion is
taught in all public schools, children of other faiths are
allowed to be absent from such classes upon parental request.
If there are enough students of the same faith, the school
will arrange religion classes in that faith. Workers
belonging to minority denominations are allowed leave for
religious holidays.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government does not impede foreign or domestic travel.
The right to voluntary repatriation is guaranteed. Refugees
and asylum seekers are provided generous benefits, including
social services, free medical care, and education while
awaiting decisions on their asylum applications.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Norway is a multiparty democracy. Seven parties are
represented in the Storting where distribution of seats is
based upon proportional representation by district. The
Storting may reject or modify government proposals; if a
government loses a vote on a major issue of confidence, it
1206
resigns, and a new government is formed. The minimum voting
age is 18, and voter turnout in the 19S9 parliamentary
elections was over 82 percent. Foreigners v;ho have resided in
Norway for at least 3 years, and are otherwise eligible, have
the right to vote in local elections only.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmenta] Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Norway cooperates with nongovernmental investigations of
alleged violations of human rights. In recent years, Norway
has cooperated with both the European Commission of Human
Rights and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Norway is itself an active participant in international human
rights organizations. A number of public and private
organizations monitor alleged human rights abuses either
inside or, more often, outside the country.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Through a highly developed social welfare system that reflects
a long tradition of egalitarianism, the Government provides
for the health, education, retirement, and other needs of its
people regardless of race, religion, sex, ethnic background,
or political opinion.
Apart from an extremely small Finnish population in the
northeastern corner of the country, the Sami (Lapp) people
were Norway's only significant minority group until the influx
of iiTUTiigrants during the 1970's. In recent years, the
Government has taken steps to protect the cultural rights of
the Sami by providing Sami-language instruction at schools in
Sami-inhabited areas, radio and television programs broadcast
cr subtitled in the Sami language, and subsidies for the
publication of newspapers and books oriented toward the Sami.
Norwegian Samis elected their own constituent assembly, the
Sameting, for the first time in 1989. The 39-seat body is a
consultative group which will meet regularly to consider
issues of importance to the Sami people. Various Sami and
other leaders have raised the possibility that the Sameting
could eventually be transformed into a constitutional
law-making body within certain territorial and functional
boundaries .
There is continuing political debate on whether current
restrictions on non-Nordic immigration, in effect since 1975,
are racially motivated and whether immigrant minority groups
such as Pakistanis, Vietnamese, Turks, and Africans are
treated equally by Norwegian authorities. The Government
provides legal protection for the rights of all minorities and
has taken active measures to help these groups adjust to
Norwegian society, including free Norwegian-language
instruction for any foreign resident.
In recent years, Norway has experienced a dramatic increase in
the number of persons seeking political asylum. As a result,
the Storting passed a bill in 1988 that would no longer allow
asylum applicants who are not bona fide refugees to remain on
humanitarian grounds. The new law (expected to be fully
operational by early 1990) introduces new measures, however,
designed further to safeguard the rights of those asylum
seekers allowed to remain in Norway. With the rise in the
1207
NORWAY
number of asylum seekers, refugee policy has become a
significant political issue; reducing or ending the inflow of
refugees remains the single most visible issue for the
Progress Party, which posted big gains in the 1989
parliamentary elections. At the same time, some human rights
groups and political parties urged the Government to accept
more refugees and expressed concern over the adequacy of the
treatment given those seeking political asylum in Norway.
Although there have been problems in dealing with individual
refugee cases, Norway has a well-organized system which
includes advance planning, careful dispersion of refugees
throughout Norway, and generous welfare, educational, and
vocational training programs. The current backlog of refugee
cases pending judicial processing is expected to ease
significantly as the new procedures mandated by the 1988 law
are implemented fully.
Women are protected under the Equal Rights Law of 1978 and
other regulations. Under that law, "women and men engaged in
the same activity shall have equal wages for work of equal
value." A state Equal Rights Council monitors enforcement of
the 1978 law, and an Equal Rights Ombudsman processes
complaints of sexual discrimination. The Government provides
liberal maternity leave and time off for either parent to care
for their children.
Norway has an extremely low crime rate, and, in that sense,
crime against women is not widespread. A recent general
increase in the crime rate has included crimes against women,
although police authorities believe that much of the increase
in reported rapes and incidents of wife beating is due to a
greater willingness among women to report these crimes than
has been the case in the past. The police vigorously
investigate and prosecute such crimes and have instituted
special programs for rape and domestic violence prevention and
for counseling of victims. Public and private organizations
run several free shelters which give battered wives an
alternative to returning to a violent domestic situation after
an incident of wife beating.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to associate freely and to strike. The
Government, however, has the right to invoke compulsory
arbitration under certain circumstances, with the approval of
the Strorting. This procedure, which has been invoked several
times in the 1980 's, particularly in the oil industry, has
been criticized by the expert committees of the International
Labor Organization, which are of the opinion that the
situations were not a sufficient threat to public health and
safety to justify the action.
With membership totaling about 60 percent of the work force,
unions play an important role in political and economic life
and are consulted by the Government on important economic and
social problems. Although the largest trade union federation
is associated with the Labor Party, all unions are free of
party and government control. They maintain strong ties with
international bodies, such as the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions. There were several small but no major
strikes in 1989.
24-900 O— 90
1208
NORWAY
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
All workers, including government employees and military
personnel, have the right to organize and bargain
collectively. There are no export processing zones, and labor
legislation and practice is uniform throughout Norway.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor is prohibited by law and does not exist.
d. Minimum Age of Employment of Children
Children are not permitted to work full time before the age of
15. Minimum age rules are observed in practice.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Ordinary working hours do not exceed 37.5 hours per week, and
25 working days of paid leave are granted per year (31 for
those over 60) . There is no minimum wage as such in Norway,
but wages normally fall within a "national wage scale"
negotiated by labor, employers, and the Government. The
average annual wage, not including extensive social benefits,
is approximately $26,000, which is adequate to provide a
family a decent living.
Under the Workers' Protection and Working Environment Act of
1977, all employed persons are assured safe and physically
acceptable working conditions. According to the Act, working
environment committees, composed of management, workers, and
health personnel, must be established in all enterprises with
50 or more workers, and safety delegates must be elected in
all organizations. The Directorate of Labor Inspections
ensures effective compliance with labor legislation.
1209
POLAND
For the first time since World War II, Poland is ruled by a
coalition government led and dominated by non-Communists.
This far-reaching and fundamental change stemmed from the
so-called roundtable talks in early 1989 between the Communist
authorities and the opposition led by Lech Walesa, the leader
of the Solidarity movement. The agreements reached provided,
among other things, for legalization of the Solidarity trade
union, establishment of the post of President of the Republic,
creation of a freely elected upper house of parliament or
Senate, partially free elections to the lower house or Sejm,
permission for the publication of opposition periodicals, the
easing of censorship, access for the opposition to the
Communist-controlled radio and television, and an independent
judicial system.
Parliamentary elections in June produced an overwhelming
Solidarity victory, and General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the
Communist President, was compelled in September to appoint a
non-Communist, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Solidarity adviser, as ,
the first non-Communist Prime Minister to head a Warsaw Pact
government. This event marked the end of the de facto
one-party system.
The Minister of Internal Affairs, a Communist, continued to
supervise the uniformed police, the powerful security
apparatus, and the militarized riot police. However, in
October he announced the dissolution of the riot police, which
had been responsible for serious human rights violations.
The new Government inherited an extremely difficult economic
situation characterized by spiraling inflation, a deepening
budget deficit, and nagging consumer shortages. In addition,
the Government must deal with industrial obsolescence, a weak
infrastructure, bad management, and low labor productivity.
Its plans include stabilization measures to rein in inflation
and longer-term institutional reforms aimed at restructuring
the centrally planned economy into a market economy and
encouraging private enterprise.
The transformation of Polish society includes the lifting of
many previous restrictions on a citizen's right to free speech
and free assembly. For example, in September the 1939 Soviet
invasion of Poland was marked by wreathlaying and anti-Soviet
street demonstrations without police interference. Freedom of
association is being pursued pending passage of a liberal law
on associations. Political crimes are to be eliminated from
the criminal code. A non-Communist was appointed head of the
Polish Radio and Television Committee, and censorship was
significantly reduced.
In sum, Poland made dramatic progress in human rights in
1989. In a few months, the country overturned 40 years of
domination by the communist party and formed a government
which is pledged to respect human rights and civil liberties.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
No conclusive instances of political killing were reported.
However, three Catholic priests known for their opposition
1210
POLAND
activity died under suspicious circumstances in the first half
of 1989. Some Poles fear that security forces acting either
under orders or unofficially in some kind of vigilante "death
squad" operation were responsible for the priests' deaths.
Preliminary investigations by the police suggest accidental
circumstances (e.g., fire, burglary), but official
investigations into these alleged political murders are
continuing, and a parliamentary committee has been created for
this purpose.
b. Disappearance
Instances of prolonged or permanent disappearance were not
reported.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no reported allegations of torture during 1989.
There were a few reported instances of police beating people
in melees following demonstrations in the first months of
1989. A particularly violent protest action occurred in
Krakow in May. Youth activists, staging an anti-Soviet
demonstration in front of the Soviet Consulate General, began
pelting the building and the responding police forces with
bricks, bottles, and stones. The police resorted to heavy use
of tear gas and water cannon, and a number of demonstrators
were injured in the clash. However, more recent
demonstrations and protest actions have met with no police
resistance .
The Minister of Internal Affairs in October announced the
dissolution of the Zomo units, riot police that were most
closely associated with the martial law crackdown. In its
place, the Minister plans to establish a special unit of the
civil militia to perform crowd control and other similar
activities .
Demonstrations and riots by inmates of Polish prisons became
increasingly frequent and violent in 1989. The convicts are
demanding improved health care and living conditions,
amendments to the criminal law, and the abolition of the death
penalty. Solidarity legislators have acted as mediators in
the ongoing negotiations between the Government and the
prisoners .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Polish law allows for a 48-hour detention period before the
authorities are required to bring formal charges. Before the
signing of the roundtable accords, the detention provision was
used as a preventative or deterrent measure against prominent
opposition activists. Since April, however, this provision
has not been used in practice and is being reviewed.
In theory, the law provides that once a prosecutor presents
the legal basis for a formal investigation, a detainee may be
held in indefinite "investigatory" or "temporary" arrest until
an indictment is filed. During this period, access to counsel
is not guaranteed. Legal provisions for bail are rarely used,
but suspects, as well as those already convicted, sometimes
are furloughed for humanitarian reasons.
Those elements of the Criminal Code that had been used in the
past for political purposes were the focus of attention at the
1211
roundtable working group set up to negotiate legal and
judicial reforms. The roundtable reached agreement on
eliminating these provisions, but the actual amendment of the
criminal code was deferred until a later date when a thorough
redrafting of the code would be possible.
Polish law contains no provision for forced exile. In 1989
many prominent opposition leaders traveled to the West and
returned without incident.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Most cases are tried in open court. The court having
jurisdiction over a case, however, retains the option of
closing a trial to the public in some circumstances, such as
divorce cases and trials in which state secrets may be
disclosed. Once a formal indictment is filed, the defendant
is allowed ample time to study the charges and consult with up
to three attorneys of his or her choice. A defendant who
cannot afford to pay is provided an attorney at public
expense. Once the defendant is prepared, a trial date is
set. Defendants must be present during the trial and may
present evidence in their own defense. All are presumed
innocent until proven guilty.
The court of original jurisdiction has 7 days from the date of
the oral decision in which to prepare a written decision.
Under Polish law, defendants have the right to appeal within
14 days from the time that the court issues a written
decision. Appeals may be made on the basis, among other
grounds, of new evidence, procedural irregularities, or a
perceived offense against the law.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government allegedly no longer monitors mail and telephone
calls. Postal workers may inspect packages to be mailed
abroad for customs purposes. The slowness of postal and
telecommunications services result from an inefficient system
coupled with a chronic lack of resources rather than from
direct interference by the Government.
Polish citizens are not forced to participate in any political
organizations. The Government does not interfere with the
right to marry or to have children as one chooses, nor does it
prevent the teaching of religion to children at home or in
churches. In early 1989, some searches without warrants
occurred in violation of the law requiring warrants.
The Government does not jam Western radio broadcasts. More
and more Western dailies and periodicals are available in
outlets frequented by tourists, such as hotel kiosks and
international reading rooms. Personal and institutional
subscriptions may be ordered but are limited severely by the
availability of hard currency.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution of 1952 provides for freedom of speech.
Since the signing of the roundtable accords in April, Polish
1212
POLAND
citizens have been able to express their opinions publicly or
privately without restraint. Poles likewise have been openly
distributing pamphlets and speaking publicly at antigovernment
and anti-Soviet demonstrations without reprisals.
The roundtable accords also granted the opposition full access
to the mass media. While censorship laws thus far remain on
the books, the Solidarity-led Government has effectively
narrowed their application. Many of the former underground
periodicals surfaced with legal publications: 1 month after
the signing of the accords, for example, a Solidarity daily,
Gazeta Wyborcza began publication, and a Solidarity weekly,
Tygodnik Solidarnosc, which was launched in 1981 and closed
down by martial law , resumed publication. Gazeta Wybcrcza
reaches over 500,000 readers, almost double the circulation of
the Communist party daily. To compete, party journals have
begun to carry differing opinions on a variety of issues,
contributing thereby to an invigorated and vibrant press.
The current journalistic atmosphere also has fostered open
discussions in Poland of what has come to be referred to as
the numerous "blank spots" in Polish history, especially with
respect to its relations with the Soviet Union. Many
heretofore taboo episodes in bilateral relations are now being
debated in journals and newspapers and on the airwaves.
Both television and radio have taken on a new character, as
opposition figures regularly appear on the state-run media.
Under the roundtable agreement. Solidarity's Citizens'
Committee has guaranteed full access to both television and
radio. Accordingly, "Studio Solidarnosc," a weekly opposition
television program, began on May 9. Radio Solidarity
similarly originated a daily broadcast in May. The newly
appointed head of the Polish Radio and Television Committee, a
Solidarity supporter, stated his intention to establish a
politically independent and pluralist television and radio
service based on competence, not political affiliation. In
one of his first steps, he removed three newscasters most
closely associated with martial law. Moreover, the new
government spokesman, another opposition activist, declared
that her role is to provide information, not block it as in
the past.
The Main Office for the Control of Press, Publishing, and
Public Performances continues to exist but has greatly reduced
its activity in light of legislative changes implemented by
the roundtable agreement. Formally, the office oversees
censorship of all media and deletes material which it
considers libelous or detrimental to national security
interests. The new Government, however, intends to amend the
law by eliminating censorship of books, monthlies, and less
frequently issued periodicals.
Poland is the home of the only independent university in
Eastern Europe, the Catholic University of Lublin. Its very
existence, as well as its extensive ties to institutions and
persons in the West (it counts Pope John Paul II among former
faculty members), is visible evidence of the national and
religious traditions which still help to shape Polish higher
education. There are also a number of diocesan seminaries,
independently administered by the Bishop Ordinary of Poland's
dioceses .
Amendments adopted in 1985 to the 1982 Higher Education Law
increased governmental control over universities and other
1213
POLAND
college-level institutions. Hence, the Minister of Science,
Higher Education, and Technology must approve all candidates
for university rector and other high offices before their
names can be submitted to university senates for election.
The new Government and the new Minister have indicated an
intention to move rapidly to restore greater autonomy to
educational institutions. An association that aims to
establish private schools in Poland successfully registered
with the courts, and a group of teachers was granted
permission to found a private high school in Warsaw.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Since April, most groups and associations have been free to
organize and assemble. Major rallies were held during the
national electoral campaign, and peaceful demonstrations were
staged without police interference.
May Day observances in Warsaw turned into a Solidarity
election campaign parade and rally, drawing perhaps as many as
100,000 people. The May Day celebration in Gdansk featured a
a campaign rally led by Solidarity leader Lech Walesa.
Neither of these parades encountered government intervention.
Many protests by young people also took place. The Freedom
and Peace Movement held rallies, set up picket lines in front
of the Parliament building, and staged a 2-week hunger strike
to press for changes in military service requirements. The
group also led violent anti-Soviet demonstrations in the
southern city of Krakow, which resulted in some clashes with
police and some short detentions. But the most recent
anti-Soviet demonstrations — those that took place after the
Solidarity Prime Minister took control of the Government — met
with no police response.
Since the signing of the roundtable agreement, the
opportunities for Poles to engage in political and professional
association activity are virtually unrestricted. Although
associations and clubs by law must register with the courts,
in practice most groups seeking legal status have been
approved. Among the most significant of Poland's new
independent associations is the Citizens' Committee, a brain
trust of Solidarity activists. In June a Warsaw court
registered the Association of Polish Writers (SPP), which more
than 500 writers reportedly joined. A week later, the
Association of Polish Journalists, comprising journalists
associated with Solidarity, was reestablished. A group
dedicated to exposing the truth about the massacre at Katyn of
Polish military officers by the Soviet secret police applied
for and received legal status, and the Independent Association
of Students, denied permission in May to register, later won a
4-month struggle to organize legally.
Although the roundtable agreement did not resolve the question
of the legalization of political parties, subsequent events
rendered the issue moot. Pluralism in the form of competing
political parties became a fact, and new parties were formed
or planned. The National Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ),
heretofore affiliated with the Communists, announced its
intention to form a new party. Rural Solidarity has called
for the establishment of a new rural-based political party,
the Polish Peasants' Party-Solidarity, to address more
specifically the concerns of agriculture-based workers.
Finally, a group of Catholic activists formed a new political
1214
party, the Christian-National Union. The party's organizers
reportedly enjoy a close relationship with Poland's Primate.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution ensures "freedom of conscience and belief,"
and Polish citizens enjoy freedom to practice their religious
beliefs. Churches may organize, select and train personnel,
solicit and receive contributions, publish, and engage in
consultations with coreligionists without government
interference. There are no restrictions on establishing and
maintaining places of worship.
Poland is predominantly Roman Catholic. The Catholic Church
maintains over 16,000 churches, schools, and other institutions
and continues a vigorous program of building new churches. It
regularly organizes religious gatherings, such as pilgrimages
and conferences, without interference. It also publishes
significant numbers of books and periodicals, as does the
independent Catholic press. Sunday Catholic mass and services
of other religions are broadcast regularly on the state-run
radio. In July the Government established diplomatic
relations with the Vatican after years of negotiations.
Earlier in the year, negotiations led to a new legal status
for the Catholic Church, the first such agreement in the Warsaw
Pact area. The Church has been a stout defender of human
rights and took an active role in bringing about the historic
roundtable talks, in which the Church participated as mediator.
There is no government-sponsored discrimination against
minority religions. Eastern Orthodox, Ukrainian Catholic, and
the much smaller Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim congregations
meet without interference but find it difficult to maintain
their places of worship and train their clergy, mainly because
of their small size, wide dispersion, and limited financial
resources. Jehovah's Witnesses held an international congress
in Poland in August, attracting 40,000 delegates from 22
countries .
The largest minority is the Orthodox faith, with between
800,000 and 1.5 million faithful concentrated in Poland's
eastern provinces. The Orthodox Church maintains 350 places
of worship and continues to build churches and renovate
monasteries. It sponsors the publication of a number of books
and several periodicals and broadcasts its masses on Polish
radio four times a year. Some Orthodox believers complain of
Polish ethnic prejudice (most of the Orthodox faithful in
Poland are of Byelorussian, Ukrainian, or Russian origin) .
World attention focused on Polish-Jewish relations after a
group of Americans protesting the presence of a Carmelite
Convent adjacent to the Oswiecim (Auschwitz) death camp
scuffled with Polish workmen. The June incident gained
momentum after the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Jozef Glemp,
delivered a homily at a religious celebration at Czestochowa
on August 26, in which he called on the Jews not to look down
on Poles and not to use their control over mass media to
inflame anti-Polish feelings. Opinion leaders immediately
condemned the Cardinal's position; the Solidarity daily
published a highly critical front-page editorial deploring the
language and sentiments expressed by the Primate. The Church
has since confirmed its intention to move the Convent.
1215
POLAND
1
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no legal restrictions on travel within Poland.
There also are no legal restrictions on changing one's
residence, but in practice the acute housing shortage makes
this difficult, and in some areas virtually impossible.
Although Polish citizens and legal permanent residents in
Poland are required to register with the local police each
time they change their place of residence, this regulation is
rarely followed and even more rarely enforced.
With the liberalization of policies governing passport
issuance in July 1987 and again in January 1989, the vast
majority of Polish passport applicants now are able to obtain
passports valid for up to 10 years for travel to the West.
Foreign travel is not restricted, and it is no longer a
punishable offense for Polish citizens to remain abroad
"illegally" after their tourist exit permission has expired.
Poles who emigrated on passports issued for tourist travel,
whether as a tourist or through a refugee camp in Europe, may
return to Poland with no sanctions or limitations on future
travel. Many Poles who obtained refugee or asylee status
abroad are now returning to Poland to visit family and
friends, and some are choosing to remain in Poland.
As of July 1, 1989, there were no unresolved cases on the list
of divided families maintained by the U.S. Embassy.
Under laws dating back to 1962, only the Council of State may
revoke citizenship. Involuntary revocation must be based on
one of the following activities: actions violating the duty
of allegiance to the Polish State; actions detrimental to the
substantial interests of Poland; departure from Poland after
May 9, 1954, and failure to return when so requested by the
Polish Government; evasion of military service; or conviction
abroad of a crime also recognized as a felony under Polish
criminal law. The Government rarely revokes citizenship.
Legislation is being drafted which would revise the statutes
concerning the acquisition, loss, and revocation of
citizenship .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Poland was ruled for more than 40 years by the Polish United
Workers' (Communist) Party (PZPR) . Forced by a series of
crippling labor strikes in 1988 and a rapidly deteriorating
economy, government authorities in February met with
representatives of the opposition to debate questions
concerning the future political, economic, and social
configuration of Poland. The resulting agreement, signed in
April, provided for a wide range of measures aimed at creating
a more pluralistic and democratic political and economic order.
In the political area, the oppositon obtained the right to
contest 35 percent of the seats in the lower house or Sejm as
well as all 100 seats in the resurrected upper house or
Senate. In the June elections. Solidarity won 99 of the 100
seats in the Senate and all 161 seats it contested in the Sejm.
Solidarity's resounding victory at the polls forced a
resolution of the issues of power sharing and Poland's
political future. Although the PZPR, together with its
coalition partners, the United Peasant Party and the Democratic
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EQLAJm
Party, still had a working majority in the Sejm, it quickly
began to lose control of the political situation. General
Wojciech Jaruzelski, Communist Party First Secretary since
1981, stood for the new post of President of the Republic and
was elected by the Sejm by a margin of one vote. After the
inability of Jaruzelski "s nominee. General Czeslaw Kiszczak,
the Minister of Internal Affairs, to form a government because
of the defection of the PZPR"s coalition partners to the
Solidarity side, Jaruzelski nominated Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a
Solidarity adviser, who was confirmed as Prime Minister.
Mazowiecki formed a government based on a broad coalition in
which the PZPR continues to control two vital portfolios, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs, with authority over the police
and security apparatus, and the Ministry of Defense, with
control over the armed forces. Moreover, the PZPR will
continue to exert influence in the government and throughout
the bureaucracy through its past control over key
administrative positions. Free local elections are scheduled
for the summer of 1990, and free multiparty parliamentary
elections are anticipated in 1993 at the latest.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights.
There is no government-controlled or sponsored organization in
Poland devoted exclusively to human rights issues, although
there are reports that some are being formed. As yet, no
independent human rights groups have sought to register with
the courts.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status.
There is no legally sanctioned discrimination against women,
and women's rights have not become a major public issue in
Poland. Spouse abuse is a criminal offense; reported
incidents are often attributed to alcoholism. Persons
convicted of spouse abuse are subject to imprisonment from 6
months to 5 years. As spouse abuse is not discussed openly,
and most women do not report such incidents to the police, the
extent to which it occurs is not known.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The roundtable agreement, implemented by the Act of April 7
amending the Trade Union Act of 1982, cleared the way for Poles
to be represented by trade unions or professional associations
of their choice by agreeing to eliminate laws that conflict
with International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions,
particularly 87 and 98 regarding basic trade union rights.
However, many laws infringing on ILO conventions, including
the law on compulsory labor, have not yet been repealed. The
Mazowiecki Government, in cooperation with Solidarity deputies
in the Polish Parliament, has begun preparation of new labor
legislation including a draft labor code.
After more than 6 years of illegal status, the Independent
Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity was registered on April
20. Affiliated with the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions and the World Confederation of Labor, Solidarity
currently has a membership of 2.2 million, compared to 9.5
million members in 1981 before martial law. The Communist-
1217
POLAND
inspired trade union organized in 1982, the National Alliance
of Trade Unions (OPZZ) , is affiliated with the Communist-
controlled World Federation of Trade Unions. As heir to
traditional state-sponsored unions, the OPZZ "owns" or controls
state assets and allocates benefits and perquisites, including
vacations, sanatoria visits, and, in many regions, preferential
access to housing; it claims 6.5 million members,
approximately 3 million of whom are white-collar administrators
and pensioners. The Trade Union Act of April 7, 1989,
abolishes restrictions on the establishment and functioning of
trade unions, especially the limit of one union per enterprise.
In addition, the law: ensures the equality of all unions;
grants the freedom to choose the principles of union structure,
including the right to establish unions on a territorial basis;
establishes principles of cooperation between unions in matters
related to the representation of workers' individual and
collective rights and interests vis-a-vis management and the
organs of workers' self-management. A law adopted on the same
day implements constitutional guarantees of equal rights of
all citizens to participate in the public life of the
country. The May 29 amnesty annulled convictions related to
strikes or protests occurring after August 31, 1980.
A number of "illegal" strikes occurred in 1989, largely to
protest deteriorating living standards and to press wage
demands, but also to protest unsafe working conditions. The
Communist Government's policy of allowing state firms to set
prices, thereby dramatically increasing food prices in August,
met with strikes in the transportation service, shipyards,
steel mills, and mining, among other industries. For the most
part, demands for increased wages were met.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
An amendment to the Labor Code which came into force in 1987
and is still on the books, enshrines the right to collective
bargaining at the industry level and the right to conclude
wage agreements at the enterprise level, but in the context of
a planned Socialist economy. According to this system,
collective agreements had to be submitted to the Ministry of
Labor, Wages, and Social Affairs for registration in order to
ensure that their contents were in conformity with the 5-year
national socioeconomic plan adopted by the Sejm. If they were
not, the dispute was submitted to arbitration by the Supreme
Court, or, at the request of one of the parties to the
agreement, to arbitration by a mixed commission of government
and trade union representatives. This issue, among others
involving freedom of association, has been under review by
supervisory bodies of the ILO for a number of years. In its
1989 report, the ILO Committee of Experts requested the
Government to clarify the current status of the centralized
wage policy and the requirements to register negotiated vjage
schedules, which had been the subject of longstanding
allegations of government interference in the collective
bargaining process, in violation of Convention 98 on
collective bargaining.
Polish wage levels have been calculated according to a very
complex formula based on a theoretical base wage, extensive
bonuses and overtime, and production quotas. Specific
industrial sectors and enterprises are increasingly expected
to accept responsibility for setting wage levels. Throughout
1989 wage tables were generally negotiated at the enterprise
or sectoral level — instead of through a national plan.
1218
POLAND
In keeping with the roundtable agreement, the new Polish
Parliament passed legislation in July 1989 requiring state and
private firms to index wage levels to offset increases in
retail prices. The formula for calculating indexation assured
that workers were compensated for at least 80 percent of the
inflation rate for the relevant period. During the strikes in
August, the Rakowski Government met with leaders of both
Solidarity and the OPZZ union to reach wage agreements. The
Mazowiecki Government amended the indexation law in October to
provide for monthly rather than quarterly compensation, but
wage adjustments were not to exceed the inflation rate.
Polish law provides guarantees against antiunion
discrimination, backed by civil and penal sanctions. However,
ILO supervisory bodies criticized and queried the Government
in 1988 and 1989 regarding job dismissals on grounds related
to participation in social activities or acts of protest
against the authorities and also with respect to difficulties
encountered by interned, arrested, or sentenced Solidarity
trade unionists, who were subsequently amnestied, in finding
employment. In May 1989, as a result of the roundtable
agreement, an Act was adopted which provides that such persons
may apply to establishments which had dismissed them for
reemployment in accordance with their skills and professional
experience. Under the Act, all workers whose employment was
terminated after December 13, 1981, due to their trade union
activity carried on in contradiction with the then-existing
laws are ensured continuity of employment regardless of
whether they return to the previous enterprise or not.
There are no special economic incentive areas or export
processing zones in Poland as yet, but their establishment is
under consideration by the new Government.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Under legislation dating from the early 1980 "s, persons who
are registered as unemployed and who refuse to seek employment
without adequate justification, may be listed as "habitual
parasites" and compelled to accept assigned employment,
usually in street cleaning, park maintenance, or garbage
collection, under threat of penal sanction. Sanctions under
this law have not been implemented in the current political
climate. Moreover, the law has never specifically been
applied as a means of political coercion, curtailment of the
free expression of political or ideological opinions, or
racial or social discrimination. The new Government plans to
review the law.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The labor code generally forbids the employment of a person
who has not reached the age of 15. The employment of a young
person, defined as someone aged 15 to 18, is permitted,
provided that person has completed basic schooling. Special
exceptions sometimes are required if a particular job might
pose a health danger. The labor code specifies that a young
person without professional qualifications may be employed
only for the purpose of vocational preparation, although again
there is provision for special exceptions. These laws are
enforced effectively.
1219
POLAND
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
A 6-day workweek was introduced at the end of 1985, canceling
the 5-day workweek which was conceded to Solidarity in
principle in 1981 but never implemented. In practice, most
families find that both the husband and wife must be employed
in order to sustain an acceptable standard of living. In 1989
the base wage, used primarily for statistical purposes, was
about $20 to $35 per month. The structure of the wage scale
throughout Polish industry, however, is a major irritant to
workers. Polish workers earn most of their pay from overtime
and bonuses (basic pay is approximately only 30 to 50 percent
of average pay), thereby increasing pressure on workers to
work overtime to keep pace with inflation. As a result, less
than 10 percent of workers work as few as 8 hours per day.
Indeed, where employment is deemed the most unsafe — in the
coal mining industry, for example — workers generally work more
than 10 hours per day and 6 days a week.
The Polish legal code spells out minimum conditions for the
protection of workers' health and safety, and the Council of
Safety at Work was set up in May. Although in most respects
these standards meet the int-ernational norm, several Western
and other independent observers reported substandard safety
conditions and work environments, most notably in the mining
sector. The Social Labor Inspectorate (SLI), the compliance
arm of the Government, is empowered to monitor the
implementation of collective agreements and insure that
regulations concerning safety and the employment of women and
children are followed. Both the Council of Safety at Work and
the SLI are frequently criticized for a lack of efficiency and
being too close to management; its representatives have been
appointed by state and party authorities.
1220
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The Republic of Portugal is a parliamentary democracy with a
president of the republic and legislative assembly freely
elected by secret ballot. Former Prime Minister Mario Soares
was elected Portugal's first civilian President in 60 years in
1986. In 1987 Prime Minister Anibal Antonio Cavaco Silva was
reelected and formed the first majority Government since the
1974 revolution.
Macau, a small Portuguese-administered island group off the
coast of China, has limited representative government. Macau
is regarded by both the Portuguese and the Chinese Governments
as Chinese territory operating under Portuguese administration.
Under a 1987 agreement between the two Governments, Macau will
become a special administrative region of China in 1999.
Internal security is primarily the responsibility of the
Ministries of Justice and Internal Administration. Security
forces are fully controlled by and responsive to the
Government .
Portugal has a market-based economy and is a member of the
European Community. An increasing percentage of the
population is employed in industry and services, while
employment in the agricultural sector continues to decline.
Unemployment in 1989 was low by European standards at under
7 percent; however, underemployment remains a chronic
problem. Current government policies aim at encouraging
investment, reducing inflation, and cutting the public sector
deficit. In order to reduce government obligations, the
Government initiated in 1988 a privatization program for state
firms nationalized following the 1974 revolution.
The human rights situation in 1989 was stable. Government
authorities continue to demonstrate respect for human rights.
Civil rights are outlined in the Constitution in accordance
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. An ombudsman,
elected by the Assembly of the Republic (legislature) to serve
a 4-year term, is Portugal's chief civil and human rights
officer. Any citizen may apply to him for relief. The
Ombudsman receives about 3,500 complaints annually; the vast
majority concern cases of alleged maladministration by the
cumbersome bureaucracy.
The fundamental rights and guarantees contained in the
Portuguese Constitution apply also to Macau. Violent
repression of dissidents by authorities in the People's
Republic of China (PRC) in the spring of 1989 left many in
Macau concerned about the future, and Portuguese officials
actively tried to reassure Macau residents that Portugal will
remain concerned with their well-being. Under the terms of
the 1987 agreement, Macau's current social, economic, and
legal systems are to remain basically unchanged during the
first 50 years after 1999.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Government-sanctioned political killings do not occur. There
were no killings attributed to domestic terrorist groups.
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PORTUGAL
b. Disappearance
Government or police authorities do not abduct, secretly
arrest, or otherwise illegally detain persons. There were no
abductions by terrorist organizations.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution forbids torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, as well as the use in criminal
proceedings of evidence obtained under torture. There were no
reports of complaints of such treatment in 1989.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under Portuguese law, a prosecuting judge reviews the case
against a person arrested and accused of a crime to determine
whether that person should be detained or released on bail. A
person may not be held for more than 48 hours unless a
prosecuting judge orders preventive detention. Preventive
detention is limited to a maximum of 4 months for each crime.
Because of the cumbersome, backlogged judicial system,
detention beyond 4 months is not unusual for major crimes such
as murder or armed robbery. Detainees and persons in
preventive detention have access to lawyers, who are generally
effective in protecting their clients' rights.
Exile and incommunicado detention are illegal and not
practiced in Portugal. With regard to forced or compulsory
labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Portugal has an independent and impartial judicial system.
All trials are public except those which may offend the
dignity of the victim, such as in cases involving the sexual
abuse of children. The accused is presumed innocent until
proven guilty.
A clear procedural distinction is made between arrest and
trial. A panel of three judgei: (which does not include the
prosecuting judge) presides over cases which go to trial. A
ministerial delegate assists the judges in reviewing the
evidence. At the request of the accused, a jury may be used
in trials for major crimes. The judges or jury may render the
verdict. Sentence may be passed only in the presence of the
defense attorney.
Portugal holds no political prisoners. Some radical leftist
opponents of the regime have claimed that certain persons
imprisoned for participation in terrorist organizations were
political prisoners, including 64 persons found guilty of
membership in FP-25 (translated as the "Popular Front of the
25th of April," referring to the April 25, 1974 revolution)
and sentenced to prison terms in 1987. Most noteworthy of
these was Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, one of the leaders of the
April 25, 1974 coup and convicted leader of the FP-25's
shtidowy "Global Project" organization, which advocates the
overthrow of the Government by armed rebellion. Otelo Saraiva
de Carvalho and 27 other defendants were released from prison
in May on constitutional and procedural grounds, but an
appeals court reaffirmed their convictions in September.
1222
PORTUGAL
Carvalho and the other defendants remain at liberty, however,
pending a ruling by the Supreme Court.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution forbids forced entry into homes and searches
without a judicial warrant. In addition, entry into a
person's home at night requires the consent of the occupant.
The State does not tamper with private correspondence or
telephones except with a court order.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freecom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and press is provided for in the
Constitution and respected by the State. The constitutionally
mandated Couni-il of Social Communication acts as a watchdog to
protect freedom of speech and access to the media. The
Council, whose members are elected by the Assembly of the
Republic, makes recommendations to the Assembly and has
enforcement powers. The academic community is free to express
its views.
"Fascist organizations," however, are prohibited by law. In
addition, a person may be prosecuted for "insulting" civil or
military authorities if the "insult" is intended to undermine
the rule of law. There were no prosecutions for "insult" in
1989.
Although the State owns both television channels, the
provision of the Constitution making television a state
monopoly was removed in 1989. There is as yet no firm
schedule for the introduction of implementing legislation to
authorize the operation of one or more private television
stations, but the Government is committed to this step.
In principle, the Government does not exercise direct control
over the stafce3-owned television system, though it does wield
considerable influence through personnel appointments.
Opposition par*-ies sometimes charge that the state network
ignores or distorts opposition views and activities. Station
news directors defend their decisions as based on editorial
judgments, not political partisanship. All political parties
use their lesjai right to "antenna time" during prime
viewing/listening hours.
During 1989 the Government passed legislation permitting
private radio stations to operate. As of October, more than
100 such local stations had been authorized and were on the
air, breaking what had previously been the dominant role of
the Catholic Church and two government networks.
The entire spectrum of political thought is represented in the
Portuguese press. There is no press censorship. More than a
dozen new national publications appeared in 1988-1989 and
several more are planned. Their rise and fall is determined
by economic and editorial competitiveness.
As a result of postrevolutionary nationalization of the banks,
to which many of the newspapers were indebted, the State
acquired title to a number of newspapers. These papers are
editorially independent but state owned. The Government in
1223
PORTUGAL
1989 sold three of these publications and announced that the
two remaining state-owned papers would also be sold.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Persons have the right, in law and practice, to associate
formally or informally and to promote nonviolent causes.
Public meetings or protests require 24-hour advance notice to
the civil governor of the region in which the event is to be
held. Permission is routinely granted. The official
registration of a new political party requires 5,000
signatures .
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Portugal does not have a state religion. The Government does
not interfere with the free practice of religion, missionary
work, or religious publications. Organized religious groups
may establish places of worship, train clergy, and proselytize
without government interference. These freedoms extend to
foreign clergy, many of whom work in Portugal. To qualify as
tax-exempt institutions, religious groups must be established
as nonprofit, private societies.
Roman Catholicism is the prevailing religion in Portugal.
Catholic religious instruction is offered as an elective
course in public schools. Other denominations offer religious
education in their own institutions without interference.
Success in a civil, military, professional, or political
career does not depend upon adherence to a religious creed.
There were no reported cases of religious persecution.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution provides for freedom of movement, foreign
travel, and emigration. There are no restraints on domestic
travel or on the right of a person to change domicile. Some
currency restrictions still affect travel. Citizenship is not
revoked for political reasons.
Displaced persons who qualify as refugees as defined by the
United Nations are entitled to permanent resident status and
work permits. Displaced persons are not forced to return to
the country from which they fled.
The Macau Government has followed an unofficial policy since
1982 of towing all Vietnamese boat people arriving in Macau
into or near Hong Kong territorial waters. This policy has
the tacit cooperation of the Hong Kong Government. In July,
according to reports by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees and the Hong Kong Government, a boat carrying
approximately 35 Vietnamese broke apart while being towed at
high speed by Macau marine police. The Macau authorities
reportedly towed the boat to a deserted Chinese island nearby
and abandoned the refugees with no food, water, or other
provisions. Two of the boat people eventually succeeded in
reaching Hong Kong and gaining assistance from Hong Kong
marine police. There were no fatalities. The Macau
authorities denied any knowledge of this incident.
1224
PORTUGAL
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Portugal is a multiparty, participatory democracy. Candidates
for president and for legislative, regional, and municipal ■
offices are freely nominated and elected by secret ballot on
the basis of universal suffrage. The unicameral Assembly of
the Republic is the legislative body. The Prime Minister is
the head of the Government. Opposition parties and candidates
operate freely and enjoy access to the media. General
elections are held at least every 4 years. The President has
a 5-year mandate and may not serve more than two consecutive
terms .
In Macau, representative government exists on a limited
basis. The 17-member Legislative Assembly is an
organizational hybrid in which 6 members are chosen by means
of universal, direct elections, 6 are indirectly elected by
local communities' economic or cultural associations, and 5
are appointed by the Governor. There is also popular
representation in the Consultative Council, an advisory group
to the Governor. The Macau Government, by tradition, also
consults informally on a regular basis with local business and
cultural leaders.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Portugal cooperates with independent outside investigations of
human rights conditions and actively participates in the
monitoring of human rights by the Council of Europe. Portugal
was elected to the United Nations Human Rights Commission in
1988 and plays an active role. International and local human
rights groups operate freely in Portugal.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
There are no laws discriminating against any racial, ethnic,
or religious group, nor does any group benefit from a
privileged status in Portugal.
The civil code guarantees full legal equality for women.
Women are increasing their representation in universities,
business, science, government, and the professions.
Traditional attitudes of male dominance persist but are
changing gradually. The Commission on the Status of Women, an
official organization established in 1976, is a leading
advocate for women's rights.
Various women's groups in Portugal have drawn attention to the
largely hidden problem of violence against women, particularly
in the family. Portuguese law provides for criminal penalties
in cases of violence between couples without referring
specifically co wife beating. Women's groups point out that
traditional attitudes discourage many women who suffer such
violence from seeking recourse in the judicial system and
complain that Portugal lacks official institutions established
specifically to provide relief to battered women.
Reported cases of violence against women in Macau are not
common. Macau's criminal statutes prohibiting domestic
violence are enforced, and violators are prosecuted. Abuses
are reported by police and doctors to the Social Welfare
1225
PORTUGAL
Department where they are investigated. If hospital treatment
is required, a resident medical social worker offers the
victim counseling and information on social welfare services.
Battered women may be placed in public housing until their
complaints are resolved, although there are no facilities
reserved for battered women.
Because Macau's governmental and legal systems place a premium
on knowledge of the Portuguese language and metropolitan law,
top leadership positions in the territorial administration are
almost without exception filled by officials recruited from
Portugal. Nevertheless, efforts are under way to change
this. Legislation is now being drafted in both Chinese and
Portuguese, and both languages have equal status in the
Legislative Assembly and Consultative Council.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to associate freely and to establish
committees in the workplace "to defend their interests." The
Constitution ensures the right to establish unions by
profession or industry. Trade union associations are
guaranteed the right to participate in the preparation of
labor legislation. Strikes are permitted for any reason,
including political causes. Lockouts are prohibited. These
constitutional guarantees are respected in practice.
Neither the Government nor unions publish membership
statistics. It is estimated that approximately one-third of
Portugal's work force is unionized. There are two labor
federations. The General Confederation of Portuguese Workers
Intersindical (CGTP-IN) is controlled by the Communist Party
and engages freely in cooperative activities with the
Communist labor international, the World Federation of Trade
Unions. The General Union of Workers (UGT) is a pluralist,
democratic federation affiliated with the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the European Trade
Union Confederation. The UGT and the CGTP participate jointly
in the annual meetings of the International Labor Organization.
Both federations and their affiliates function free of
government control but are closely associated with political
parties. The CGTP-IN generally supports the Communist Party's
policies and causes. UGT leaders are associated with either
the Socialist or Social Democratic Parties. Although some UGT
leaders serve in Parliament, the federation pursues a
generally independent path that occasionally puts it in
conflict with the Socialist and/or Social Democratic Parties.
The labor movement in Portugal exercises significant influence
on social and economic policymaking.
In Macau, current laws recognize the freedom of workers to
join unions and to strike. The Government neither impedes the
formation of unions nor practices discrimination against union
members. The PRC Government and the Chinese Communist Party
do not exercise any direct control over Macau labor unions.
Chinese mainland influence is considerable in a number of
sectors, however. This influence has resulted in a quiescent
labor movement in keeping with PRC aims to maintain domestic
stability in Macau in the period up to 1999. Such influence
indeed complements the local traditional view of unions as
centers for social and cultural activities.
1226
PORTUGAL
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Unions are free to organize without government or employer
interference. Collective bargaining is guaranteed by the
Constitution and practiced extensively in the public and
private sectors. When collective bargaining fails, the
Government, at the request of management and labor, may make a
mediator available. When collective bargaining disputes lead
to prolonged strike action in key sectors (for example, health
and transportation), the Government is empowered to order the
workers back to work for a specific period. The Government
has rarely done so in practice. Union officials and members
are protected by law against antiunion discrimination, and
this law is observed in practice. There are no export
processing zones in Portugal.
In Macau, unions tend to resemble traditional neighborhood
associations, promoting social and cultural activities rather
than issues related to the workplace. Local custom, moreover,
favors employment without the benefit of written labor
contracts, the exception being the import of labor from China
which is under contract. Unions traditionally have not
attempted to engage in collective bargaining. Accordingly,
while the Macau Government does not impede or discourage
collective bargaining, there are no government mechanisms to
promote voluntary negotiations. There are no export
processing zones in Macau.
A legal requirement for Government approval before collective
agreements in public enterprises can become effective is the
subject of a pending union complaint before the ILO.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
In both Portugal and Macau, forced labor is illegal and does
not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum employment age is 14 years. The Government has
cited plans to boost the minimum age to 16 years once new
educational reforms take effect. Child labor is not common
but does exist. The UGT and CGTP-IN have charged that a
number of "clandestine" companies in the textile, shoe, and
construction industries in northern Portugal exploit child
labor. The Government has acknowledged that abuses exist and
has vowed to eliminate them but had not -taken any steps by the
end of the year.
In Macau, minors under the age of 14 are forbidden by law to
work. Nevertheless, child labor reportedly is not uncommon in
Macau .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
A national monthly minimum wage for full-time workers was
first established in Portugal in 1974. Minimum wages for
rural workers and domestic employees were legislatively
established in 1977 and 1978 respectively. Except in 1982,
minimum wages have been increased every year. The current
minimum monthly wage for general workers is $203; for
agricultural workers and domestics, it is $193 and $155
respectively. The minimum wage is generally enforced. Even
with rent control and various social assistance subsidies, it
is difficult for a single income family to maintain a decent
1227
PORTUGAL
standard of living on a minimum wage income, particularly in
urban areas. Various social assistance subsidies are
available to ameliorate the situation somewhat.
Workers receive a Christmas bonus equal to 1 month's salary.
Workers are required by law to be granted an individual
written contract which must include their professional
category and salary, the work site, the starting date, and the
duration of the contract (in the case of temporary workers).
Employers are required to contribute to an employee's social
security fund. The average workweek is 42 hours, and the
Government has submitted a draft bill to reduce the maximum
workweek to 44 hours. Current legislation limits regular
hours of work to 8 hours daily and 48 hours per week.
Overtime is limited to 2 hours per work period, up to 160
hours annually. Work on a normal day off is restricted to 8
hours. These limits are respected in practice. Workers are
guaranteed 21 days of paid annual leave per year. The
Ministry of Employment and Social Security monitors compliance
with the above regulations through its regional inspectors.
Employers are required by law to hold accident insurance or to
assume responsibility for accidents at the work site.
Portugal has developed a compendium of legislation that
regulates safety and health. Labor unions deem these
regulations inadequate and continue to urge the Government to
enact and enforce stiffer legislation.
In Macau, existing labor legislation provides for a 48-hour
workweek (normally 8 hours per day and no more than 10.5 hours
per day), overtime, annual leave, medical and maternity care,
and employee compensation insurance. The Labor Department is
responsible for processing complaints. However, government
enforcement of the labor laws appears lax at times, partly
owing to limited fiscal resources and personnel skills but
also to a lack of policy emphasis. In the absence of any
statutory minimum wage or publicly administered social
security program, some large companies have provided private
welfare and security packages. Candidates for public office
in Macau have called for reform of the existing labor law, for
medical insurance, a social security system, and increases in
employee compensation. To offset the current labor shortage,
the Macau Government allows the importation of labor from
China under contract. There are heavy fines on employers
harboring illegal immigrants. The number of imported workers
in Macau is between 1,500 and 3,000 out of an estimated work
force of 195,000.
1228
EQH&IilA
After 24 years of highly centralized and personal rule,
Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Socialist Republic of
Romania and Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party,
was overthrown on December 22 by a spontaneous popular revolt,
and a group of reform Communists, dissidents, intellectuals,
students, and army generals called the National Salvation
Front (NSF) took power. Ceausescu and his wife, Elena, the
second most powerful figure in the country, were tried and
convicted of genocide and other crimes by a secret military
court and were executed on December 25. A provisional
government formed by members of the NSF renamed the country
Romania, declared its goal to be a pluralistic democracy, and
called for free elections in April 1990.
Under Ceausescu, the powerful Department of State Security,
known as the Securitate (organizationally under the Ministry
of Internal Affairs), had among its major functions providing
protection for the leadership and suppression of dissent and
opposition of any kind. The NSF decreed the dissolution of
the security services, which even after Ceausescu "s death
continued to battle the army and engage in acts of terror
against the population.
The State controls all means of production. Only vestiges of
private enterprise exist. In April the Government announced
that it had paid off Romania's foreign debt, but there was no
change in the stringent austerity program which has caused
great hardship for the population. Shortages of consumer
goods, rationed but often unavailable basic foodstuffs,
rationed electricity, periodic lack of cooking gas, and
breakdown of heating facilities characterized daily life. One
of the NSF's first actions was to cancel the restrictions on
heating and electricity and to divert food stocks reserved for
export sale to domestic consumption.
Human rights were tightly circumscribed under Ceausescu 's
rule, and their observance in 1989 showed no improvement prior
to the December revolution. Major problems included physical
and mental abuse of prisoners, arbitrary arrest and detention,
lack of fair trials, pervasive interference with privacy,
family, home, and correspondence, and oppressive restrictions
on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association and
worker rights, strict controls on religious activities, and
denial of the right of citizens to change their government.
Constant harassment by security forces stifled the expression
of views different from those of the leadership. At least two
secret trials of dissidents or of those related to dissidents
occurred in 1989. Among the NSF's early decisions were those
permitting the formation of political parties, freedom of
speech, the press, assembly, association, and religion, and
authorizing the release of all political prisoners. The NSF
has also renounced the Communist Party's leading role in the
State. At year's end, however, there was concern about the
ability of other groups to mount effective opposition to the
reform Communists and dissident members of Ceausescu 's old
regime that continued to lead the NSF. Ceausescu' s severe
repression so stifled dissent that there was no organized
dissident activity to form a base of opposition.
Members of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Transylvania
continued in 1989 to object to government policies which, they
claim, erode their ethnic identity. The NSF promised full
rights and equality for the members of all ethnic minorities.
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Rural "systematization, " or the restructuring of rural Romania
to eliminate half of Romania's 13,000 villages and move their
inhabitants to regional "agroindustrial" centers, made little
headway in 1989. The systematization of urban areas,
including Bucharest, which had abruptly displaced thousands of
people from their homes and had destroyed many historic
buildings, homes, and churches, attracted international
criticism. The NSF disavowed both programs.
The Government under Ceausescu tightly controlled religious
practice. It did not approve longstanding applications for
church building permits or for expansion and renovation of
church premises, nor did it authorize a second printing of
5,000 Bibles which it had promised in 1988 to the Baptist
Union. At year's end, Christmas services were broadcast in
Romania for the first time in more than 40 years, and the NSF
undertook to end restrictions against religious freedom.
The Government approved more emigration applications of
Romanian citizens to the United States than in 1989 or 1988,
but the authorities, contrary to the 1985 bilateral agreement,
frequently denied jobs, housing, schooling, and medical care
to those who applied for emigration, even before they had
received U.S. entry documents. The NSF announced that it
would permit freedom of travel and simplify the issuance of
passports .
The following report primarily describes the human rights
situation as it existed before December 22 when Ceausescu was
overthrown. Some of the institutions and practices that led
to widespread human rights abuses apparently were being changed
at year's end, and the next annual report is likely to include
a significantly different assessment of human rights practices.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
In their futile effort to crush antigovernment demonstrations
in Timisoara, Bucharest, and other cities in mid-December,
security forces loyal to Ceausescu indiscriminately killed
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of unarmed civilians.
Under Ceausescu's rule, allegations continued to be made that
some prisoners are mistreated to the point of causing their
death. There are also credible reports that several priests
who allegedly showed too much independence were beaten and one
was killed in incidents which the Government attributed to
common criminals. No suspects had been arrested by year's end.
b. Disappearance
Under Ceausescu's rule, there were some politically motivated
temporary disappearances in 1989 but no confirmed, unresolved
cases. Family and friends of persons arrested on political
charges were frequently left unaware of their arrest, their
circumstances, and their location for long periods of time.
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c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were numerous reports during Ceausescu's rule that
persons were mistreated while in Romanian prisons or police
custody and that police authorities acted brutally to obtain
information. Romanian authorities also used physical and
mental degradation to intimidate those suspected of
wrongdoing. Persons detained for questioning were often held
incommunicado and kept for long periods without sleep, food,
or access to toilet facilities. Those caught attempting to
leave the country illegally, for example, were reportedly
subject to physical and mental harassment, prior to being
tried and sentenced. Reliable witnesses also reported
incidents in which police administered severe beatings to
persons arrested for minor infractions.
The most common complaints about mistreatment cited long
periods of isolation, excessive use of force by guards, cells
which are badly ventilated and poorly heated, bad food in
inadequate quantities, difficult working conditions, and
segregation of prisoners deemed "dangerous to the State"
because of their religious beliefs or for other reasons.
Political prisoners who did not cooperate with their jailers
reportedly were treated with great cruelty. They were
generally kept apart from other offenders and restricted to
their cells. Prison guards are said to have engaged in
abusive behavior and allowed, and in some cases even
encouraged, favored prisoners to punish those less favored.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, Exile
Romanian law provides for either a judge or a prosecutor to
issue an arrest warrant. Once arrested, a person may be held
without trial for up to 1 month before a hearing, but the
prosecutor may obtain an extension for an additional
3 months. Thereafter the court may order further extensions
in 30-day increments. There is no limit set by law on the
total length of time a person may be iield prior to trial.
There is no provision for bail, although those accused of
minor or nonviolent offenses can be set free on their own
recognizance at the judge's discretion.
The law also provides for preventive detention. During
Ceausescu's rule, persons detained for investigation often
were held incommunicado. They were detained for varying
periods of time, sometimes as long as several days, and then
released without charge. Such arbitrary detention could be
repeated several times, and the person could be called back
repeatedly and threatened with further harassment or
punishment .
During Ceausescu's rule, four persons were arbitrarily
detained when they attempted to exercise their basic right to
freedom of movement within Romania. One activist pastor was
called in for questioning by police in order to make him miss
a U.S. Embassy reception. Three other persons were detained
(one on a charge of speeding) to prevent their attendance at a
trial, and one of the three missed his own sentencing. This
treatment was particularly common for religious activists and
former political prisoners.
The Ceausescu regime did not use exile as a form of punishment,
In many instances, it compelled persons to change their
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residence and employment. This action effectively constituted
internal exile and was accompanied by extrajudicial house
arrest or forced domicile. In the case of such house arrest,
the detainee was severely restricted in his movements, and
contact with others, especially foreigners, was either
partially or completely shut off.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is constitutionally charged with defending the
Socialist order and educating citizens to respect the law. No
court has the authority to review the constitutionality of the
laws. Theoretically, judges are independent and subject only
to the law, but the outcomes of politically sensitive cases
during Ceausescu's rule often appeared predetermined and at
times contradicted evidence offered during the trial.
Most trials were held in public, though secret trials were
common where state security was involved and could also be
permitted in certain other cases. The law states that a trial
may be held in secret if a public trial would be contrary to
the interests of the State, Socialist morals, or the dignity
of the individual. Under Ceausescu's rule, some former
prisoners reported they were tried in secret by military
courts on essentially political charges. Detailed sentences
or records of trials for political crimes were generally not
available, even to the accused. Four journalists who
attempted to print an antigovernment manifesto were apparently
tried in secret, convicted, and punished, and after release
kept from all foreign contact. A Foreign Ministry official,
who was arrested in January and charged v;ith espionage, was
tried and convicted in a secret trial before a military
court. After Ceausescu's overthrow, he was released.
In one trial of a religious dissident prosecuted on charges of
theft of state property, the authorities excluded all
observers from the first session and tried to pack the court
and exclude supporters of the defendants at the second session.
The ability of an accused person to defend himself or herself
effectively was severely limited during Ceausescu's rule,
especially in politically sensitive cases. The law in most
cases requires that a defendant be represented by counsel,
although some sources claimed that defendants did not always
have an opportunity to consult with their attorneys before
trial. The court may appoint an attorney to represent the
defendant. In theory, a defendant has the right to choose
another attorney, but in practice this right was severely
restricted. Privately hired attorneys often refused to accept
political cases. Acquittals in such cases were rare, and when
defendants pursued their right to appeal, they sometimes
received longer prison terms from the higher courts.
Many criminal laws are so worded that the authorities could
charge persons coming under official scrutiny with some kind
of offense. Examples of typical charges were "defaming the
Socialist order" for speaking frankly to a foreigner;
"disturbing the peace" or "illegal assembly" for private
prayer meetings in the home; "social parasitism" if unemployed
but technically guilty of no other offense; and "distributing
literature without a license" — a felony — if caught attempting
to transport or hand out free Bibles.
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The authorities frequently used "punishment at the workplace"
as an alternative to incarceration. Those prosecuted and
convicted for nonpolitical crimes, including most prosecutions
motivated by the campaign against religion, were sometimes
released from prison to forced labor, v;hich allowed them to
serve their sentence at their usual job, with lesser
compensation, and live at home.
Prior to Ceausescu's overthrow, the number of political
prisoners, including those convicted of trying to leave the
country illegally and those tried with apparent political
motivation for common crimes, was estimated at about 1,000.
The NSF authorized the release of all political prisoners. On
Christmas Day, Ceausescu and his wife, Elena, were tried by a
secret military court and sentenced to death. The secret and
summary nature of the proceedings did not accord with
international norms of fair trial. Subsequent to the
execution of Ceausescu and his wife on December 25, the NSF
abolished the death penalty.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Under Ceausescu's rule, Romanian laws and regulations
governing the security apparatus sanctioned a high degree of
interference with the individual and the family, which was
somewhat mitigated by uneven enforcement, official corruption,
and limitations on resources. Through intimidation and
promises of material advantages, the security apparatus
developed an extensive network of informers.
Deliberate and arbitrary interference with the privacy of the
family, home, and correspondence was frequent. Searches were
made of private homes, persons, and personal effects without
search warrants or probable cause that a crime may have been
committed. The authorities occasionally entered homes on the
pretext of looking for building code violations, excessive
consumption of electricity, illegal use of electrical
applicances, etc. These searches facilitated the discovery of
forbidden books and publications, religious materials, or any
other evidence of "wrongdoing." Militiamen at checkpoints
located on roads leading out of cities and at major highway
intersections in the countryside randomly stopped and searched
vehicles as a matter of course.
Until Ceausescu's overthrow, there was continued concern about
the long-range plan to "systematize" or restructure rural
Romania by eliminating approximately 6,000-7,000 of the some
13,000 Romanian villages and concentrating the population in
over 500 towns to be redeveloped as "agroindustrial centers."
There was also international concern and criticism over urban
"systematization, " especially in Bucharest where entire
neighborhoods were torn down with a minimum of prior
notification to residents, and many historic buildings,
including churches, were destroyed. The NSF disavowed both
programs .
The authorities had the capability to monitor domestic and
international telephone calls and, under Ceausescu's rule,
appeared to do so regularly. Under the NSF, the practice of
monitoring calls appears to have been abandoned.
Romania's official policy during Ceausescu's regime was to
encourage a higher birthrate, and it was considered the duty
of every Romanian woman to produce five children. In order to
1233
ROMANIA
prevent abortion, the authorities could compel a woman to show
a doctor's certification as to whether she was pregnant or
not. The NSF restored the right of a woman to choose whether
to have an abortion or to carry the baby to term.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Under Ceausescu's rule, these freedoms, while recognized in
principle, were severely restricted. Public expression of
viewpoints at variance with official policy was almost always
severely punished. While the Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and press, it prohibits their use for any
purpose "hostile to the Socialist system," as defined by the
State and party. Similarly, the penal code prohibits
"propaganda with a Fascist character," any action aimed at
changing the Socialist system, and acts endangering state
security. These offenses are punishable by prison terms of up
to 15 years. A 1971 law prohibits citizens from giving
interviews to foreign media which "defame Socialist reality."
Under Ceausescu's rule, all media were state owned, rigidly
controlled, and used primarily as vehicles for government and
party propaganda. Government control of all necessary
materials, such as newsprint, further limited the ability of
the press to act independently.
The unauthorized importation or distribution of foreign
publications was forbidden. In 1989 there were frequent
reports of confiscations of foreign, including religious,
materials at the border. Publications from the West or from
other Communist countries were not generally available,
although foreign cultural centers and libraries which are open
to the public were allowed to distribute limited quantities of
Western periodicals with government approval. Romanian
libraries carefully controlled access to "restricted"
materials, such as prewar historical texts. For live theater,
official boards had to approve all new productions before the
opening performance. Serial numbers and type-face samples of
all typewriters had to be registered with the authorities, and
the use of duplicating machines was strictly regulated.
Western radio broadcasts in the Romanian language were not
jammed and were a major source of both foreign and domestic
news for the Romanian people. Academic freedom did not
exist. Academics, writers, and journalists who dissented from
officially sanctioned views were dismissed from their
respective institutions.
The NSF restored freedom of speech and the press. While it
controlled the national television and radio stations and
their output of information, it did not interfere with the
establishment of independent newspapers.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Under Ceausescu's rule, the Government attempted to control
all group activity, and its permission was required for
holding public meetings and forming associations. Peaceful
assembly and association without permission were usually
short-lived and could bring severe penalties to those
involved. "Formation of a group" was a punishable offense
applicable to groups as small as three persons.
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Citizens were required to obtain permission in advance to
attend functions hosted by non-Romanians. Secret decrees
promulgated late in 1985 and never officially published
further discouraged contacts with foreigners and strengthened
the requirement that all such contacts be reported to the
authorities within 24 hours. In particular, Romanian writers,
scientists, and professionals were reportedly forbidden to
speak with their foreign counterparts without government
permission.
The NSF has not interfered in any activities by independent
interest groups. Political parties are in the process of
being established with the NSF's consent.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of conscience, and the
penal code prescribes a penalty of up to 6 months'
imprisonment or a fine for anyone who impedes or disrupts any
recognized religious sect. However, the Communist Party under
Ceausescu's leadership officially promoted atheism, and the
Government exercised broad control over religious practice.
Although many Romanians feared that open exercise of their
beliefs damaged their chances of social or professional
advancement, religious practice remained very active.
There are 14 recognized religions, by far the largest being
the Romanian Orthodox Church, to which about 80 percent of the
population belongs. During Ceausescu's regime, most other
denominations were of the opinion that the Orthodox Church
received favored treatment from the Government, especially in
the realm of finances and education. The Government
subsidized clerical salaries (which some denominations did not
accept), issued licenses to preach, controlled permits for
church construction or renovation, severely limited the number
of new admissions to seminaries, and controlled the
importation and printing of religious materials, including
Bibles. Government restrictions were usually directed against
groups whose beliefs, in the Government's view, inspired
"antisocial" or "antigovernment" behavior. Several of these
were unrecognized religious groups, such as the Nazarenes and
Jehovah's Witnesses. In 1989 there were no reports of
significant restrictions on meetings held by these groups.
The Ceausescu regime remained in disagreement with the Roman
Catholic Church, a majority of whose members are ethnic
Hungarians, on a number of issues, and the Church technically
remained without a government-approved charter. However, the
church enjoyed de facto recognition and operated as if it were
fully recognized.
The Government under Ceausescu did not recognize the Uniate
Church, also known as the Catholic Church of the Byzantine
Rite. This denomination was outlawed in 1948, and many of its
leaders were imprisoned. Despite its unrecognized status,
there remain adherents to this faith throughout the country.
The Government also took active measures to suppress a revival
movement within the Romanian Orthodox Church known as "The
Lord's Army." Members of this group often met in small
gatherings for prayer and Bible study, and they reported being
fined for holding illegal assemblies. They also reported
1235
ROMANIA
being subject to other harassment, such as loss of jobs or
surveillance.
The rapid growth of evangelical denominations has led to
pressures for more religious training, more printing of
religious materials, and the expansion and construction of
more churches. Conflicts between evangelical groups and the
authorities arose frequently, and the Government's response
was at times harsh. Activists who were vocal were kept under
surveillance and often were subject to loss of jobs and social
benefits, police intimidation or arrest, and in some cases,
beatings .
Many religious denominations were able to publish a newspaper
or newsletter on a regular basis. They were also permitted
from time to time to publish other religous materials,
although usually in small quantities. A second printing of
5,000 Protestant Bibles, under negotiation since 1987 between
the Government and the Baptist Church, has still not taken
place. The shortage of religious materials overall led some
Romanians to risk severe penalties for smuggling Bibles and
other religious literature.
Religious groups continued to be concerned over issues of
maintenance, repair, and construction of church buildings.
Extensive urban renewal projects, undertaken in Bucharest and
other cities, continued to threaten churches of various
faiths. The Government was often slow to approve the purchase
or construction of replacement buildings for the affected
congregations, for example, the second Baptist Church in
Oradea. There is still no replacement for the large
Seventh-Day Adventist Church in Bucharest, demolished in
August 1985, although the denomination recently purchased a
site. The congregation continues to meet in a temporary,
tent-like structure inadequate to its needs. A replacement
was finally found for the seminary demolished in 1988, and
classes began in the fall of 1989.
Any repair or addition to a church building requires a
building permit approved by both the local city council and
the Government's Department of Religious Affairs. Church
members state there were unreasonable delays in obtaining
these approvals. A church could be demolished, or the
congregation fined large sums, for infractions of the building
codes. In past years, churches of various denominations were
demolished or threatened with demolition under these
regulations. The Comanesti Baptist Church was demolished in
May, and four members of the church building committee were
tried and convicted of theft of construction materials. The
congregation was finally allowed to resume services in
December in a private home but did not receive authorization
to remodel the house to suit their needs. Their pastor was
still not allowed to officiate at their services.
There is an active Jewish community organization which
provides religious education to its members and enjoys
relatively unrestricted freedom of emigration. Jewish leaders
emphasize that, due to the level of emigration to Israel
permitted by the Romanian Government, their numbers are
declining, and they are permitted to maintain enough
synagogues to meet their needs.
Leaders of religious denominations generally received
permission to travel abroad on official business without
difficulty. Foreign visitors preached occasionally in
1236
ROMANIA
Romanian churches. There were three reported cases in 1989 of
unofficially invited clergymen who were either told or asked
to leave Romania by the authorities after their visits to
Romanian churches.
After the NSF took power, the Romanian Orthodox Church had its
Christmas service broadcast over nationwide television. The
NSF plans to eliminate restrictions on religious freedom.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Except for certain very limited military or other restricted
areas (access prohibited) and border areas (access limited to
residents of the areas and those with economic need to travel
there), there are no official restrictions placed on travel
within Romania. Most foreigners, including Western diplomats,
are permitted to travel freely but often were kept under
surveillance.
The right of citizens to change their place of residence is
restricted. All citizens are required to have residence
permits and may not legally move from one town to another, or
between districts within a city, without official permission.
Workers are technically free to change jobs, although
antiunemployment laws and governmental controls may limit this
freedom in practice.
Under Ceausescu's rule, travel outside Romania was treated as
a privilege, frequently arbitrarily withheld, even for those
who could "guarantee" their return by leaving a close family
member behind. Employees generally had to obtain the approval
of their "workers' committee" to apply for tourist passports.
The NSF announced freedom of travel for all Romanians and the
issuance of passports without delay.
In principle, the Government under Ceausescu continued to
oppose emigration for any purpose but family reunification and
sought to discourage those wishing to emigrate. The
authorities sometimes refused arbitrarily to accept emigration
applications from some Romanians. Romanians who applied for
emigration or who held emigration approval were frequently
harassed and discriminated against.
In February 1988, Romania renounced U.S. most-favored-nation
tariff status, which was tied to Romania's emigration
performance by U.S. trade legislation. The Government pledged
to continue approving emigration applications for the purpose
of family reunification, and the rate of approvals for
emigration to the United States during 1989 was higher than
either in 1987 or 1988.
A Romanian citizen who emigrates abroad must obtain the
approval of the Government before resuming residence in
Romania. Such approval was not always granted by the
Ceausescu regime, but the NSF stated it would permit the
repatriation of Romanians who had emigrated or sought asylum
abroad. Several political exiles returned to Romania without
incident by year's end.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Although the Constitution assures the right of Romanians to
change their government and leaders, in practice they were
1237
ROMANIA
unable to exercise this right under Ceausescu's rule. The
Romanian Communist Party, led by Ceausescu, his wife, and a
few advisers, ruled the country, tolerating no opposition and
suppressing public criticism and dissent from their policies.
Officially, the Communist Party comprised about 16 percent of
the total population or about one-third of the adult
population. The Grand National Assembly (parliament) met for
two short sessions every year and approved the President's
decisions by unanimous vote. There is universal, compulsory
suffrage for those over the age of 18.
Street demonstrations protesting e ^usescu's rule erupted in
Timisoara in western Romania on December 17. Despite the
intervention of the army and security forces, which caused
many deaths, the protests continued in Timisoara and spread to
other cities. Army units in many instances refused to fire on
demonstrators, joining them instead. In Bucharest, thousands
of people attending a large public meeting on December 21
shouted down Ceausescu instead of applauding him, and the
security forces attempted unsuccessfully to suppress the
protests by force, causing many casualties. When Ceausescu
fled the city on December 22, a group of reform-minded
Communists, dissidents, intellectuals, students, and generals
assumed authority, calling itself the National Salvation Front.
The NSF, numbering 29 members at first and expanding to 145
members later, rules by decree through an 11-member executive
committee. It promised free elections in April 1990 in which
all political parties may participate. With the overthrow of
Ceausescu and his execution, and the arrest of all members of
the party's Political Executive Committee, the Communist Party
was deprived of its leading role in the State, but members (or
former members) of the Communist Party appear to be dominant
in the NSF.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights.
There are no human rights monitoring organizations operating
in Romania. No outside groups were permitted to visit Romania
to investigate alleged violation of human rights during
Ceausescu's rule. The Government under Ceausescu did not
comment officially on reports issued by governmental or
nongovernmental organizations such as the Council of Europe,
Amnesty International, or Freedom House, all of which were
harshly critical.
Romania continued officially to proclaim that discussion and
examination of its human rights situation was "unwarranted
interference in domestic affairs," despite its professed
support for human rights standards embodied in the United
Nations Charter and the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) .
After Romania signed the Vienna Concluding Document of the
CSCE, it announced that it did not consider itself bound by
those parts of the document related to the human dimension
(human rights), which it had tried but failed to amend.
Romania consistently refused to respond to any request related
to human rights. The NSF has pledged that Romania will
faithfully observe its CSCE human rights commitments.
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The November 14-17 session of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Governing Body established a commission of
inquiry to look into a compJ.aint against Romania for
employment discrimination against ethnic minorities. The
Government rejected the decision as null and void, despite
reminders of Romania's obligation as an ILO member to
cooperate. The complaint refers to employment discrimination
against the Hungarian minority.
In 1989 the Government sought to isrevent a Romanian citizen,
Dumitru Mazilu, from carrying out his responsibilities as
special rapporteur to the U.N. Human Rights Commission, a
position to which he had been named in 1985. Romanian
representatives stated that Mazilu was too ill to prepare his
report; Mazilu wrote U.N. officials that it was only the
actions of his Government that impeded him. In spite of
attempts to cut Mazilu off from all contact with the United
Nations, he was somehow able to transmit his report, which was
published in August. The Romanian authorities then
intensified their surveillance and harassment of Mazilu and
his family and blocked efforts by -foreign diplomats to gain
access to him. After Ceausescu's overthrow, Mazilu became
First Vice Chairman of the NSF.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status.
According to official figures, about 12 percent (2.7 million)
of Romania's 23 million citizens are members of ethnic
minorities, including Hungarians, Germans, Gypsies, and many
smaller groups. Based on a 1977 census utilizing
self-declaration, the Government under Ceausescu stated that
ethnic Hungarians make up the largest minority with some 1.7
million members. Some Hungarian sources claim the true figure
for the ethnic Hungarian population is over 2 million.
Most minority groups are concentrated in Transylvania, the
central and northwestern part of Romania. In recent years,
Ceausescu's regime reduced the opportunities for minorities to
have periodicals, theaters, and schools in their native
language. The ability of members of minority groups to visit
friends and relatives in neighboring countries was limited.
Minority groups protested that government controls and
restrictions constituted discrimination. Many observers
maintained the Government under Ceausescu was pursuing a
program of "Romanianization" in order gradually to absorb the
minority groups into a unified Romanian culture. The
Government denied discriminating against minority cultures.
There are no longer any television or radio broadcasts in the
Hungarian language. Most Hungarian-language theaters now have
a Romanian-language section. Hungarian- and German-language
newspapers continue to be printed.
In the field of education, primary schooling is still
available in Hungarian and German, and even in the native
language of tiny minorities, such as Czechs in western
Romania, although opportunities are shrinking. Under
Ceausescu's rule, the number of ethnic Hungarian children
being educated in Hungarian declined significantly. Several
German-language high schools still operate, although they face
declining enrollment of native German speakers because of the
emigration of members of the ethnic German community. Several
sources report that Hungarian-language sections in high
schools have replaced what were formerly entirely Hungarian-
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language high schools. Except in a few departments, students
can no longer take university entrance examinations in
minority languages, and opportunities for university study in
Hungarian have also decreased. Babes-Bolyai University in
Cluj , formerly two universities, one conducting its courses in
the Romanian language, the other in Hungarian, has increased
its intake of ethnic Romanian students over the years and made
Romanian the language of instruction in most subjects. All
publications, including those in the languages of minority
groups, must use the Romanian place names, not the Hungarian
or German equivalents.
Ethnic Hungarians point to other government policies under
Ceausescu they believe were designed to erode their cultural
identity. Under a 1989 regulation, parents were no longer
permitted to give their children Hungarian names which do not
have Romanian equivalents. Members of the Hungarian minority
claim that the Government used its controls over residence
permits, employment, and study opportunities to dilute the
concentration of the Hungarian population in its traditional
centers. The Government maintained that demographic changes
in Transylvania are natural and result in part from increased
industrialization which has drawn ethnic Romanian workers into
urban areas formerly inhabited predominantly by ethnic
Hungarians .
Women are constitutionally accorded the same rights and
privileges as men. The Government under Ceausescu sought to
upgrade the role of women in society with specific policies in
the areas of education, access to employment, and comparable
wages.
There is no information available on the extent to which
violence against women, including wife beating, may occur.
The Government during Ceausescu 's rule gave no indication
through the controlled press or through legislation that it
perceived a problem, and neither the Communist-controlled
women's organization nor independent human rights activists
addressed this subject.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Although the Constitution stipulates the right to join a
union, the labor code states that the primary function of the
trade unions is to "mobilize the masses for the fulfillment of
the Communist Party's program," and trade unions independent
of the party were prohibited. Romania's single trade union
system is imposed by law. The Labor Code entrusts the
party-controlled General Confederation of Trade Unions (UGSR)
with exclusive responsibility to represent the workers before
the Government. Under Ceausescu 's rule, workers did not have
the right to form their own associations, elect
representatives, or affiliate with international organizations
except through the official unions. Attempts to form
independent groups or unions were quickly suppressed.
Romania's labor code is silent on the right to strike, except
to elaborate procedures by which the union leadership is
required to mediate disputes between the workers and
management, with recourse to the courts when the dispute
cannot be settled. In practice, sanctions available to the
party and the union made it unlikely that such disputes would
reach the courts or be settled in a manner favorable to the
24-900 O— 90 40
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ROMANIA
worker rather than to the Government. Individual workers who
have been dismissed from their jobs may sometimes take their
case to civil court. Under Ceausescu's rule, the Government's
reaction to actual strikes, or to advocacy of the worker's
right to strike, was harsh repression. Worker demonstrations
in Brasov in 1987 were swiftly suppressed by the Government.
There were no confirmed reports of strikes or protests since
then — until the dramatic wave of political protests in
December 1989.
In 1987 Romania lost its eligibility for the U.S. Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) tariff treatment after the U.S.
Government found that Romania was not taking steps to afford
its workers internationalally recognized worker rights.
In 1989 the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU) lodged a complaint in the ILO alleging that the
Government resorted to acts of reprisal and repression
(discriminatory measures, imprisonment, violence, dismissals,
and demotions, as well as forced labor) against individuals
who attempted to form trade unions outside the official labor
central or who participated in protest movements or strikes.
The ICFTU cited the June 1988 arrest of 34 workers from an
armaments factory who had met to discuss the creation of an
independent union. It also charged that between 50 and 80
workers had been reported missing since the demonstrations
which took place in Brasov in November 1987 and that several
dozen workers were still under detention in 1989 despite an
amnesty decreed in 1988. These charges were extensively aired
by several ILO supervisory bodies in 1989. In addition, the
ILO's Governing Body, in November 1989, established a
Commission of Inquiry to look into another complaint against
Romania for employment discrimination against ethnic
minorities .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers do not have the right to organize or bargain
collectively. Wages are set in Romania by central planning
boards. While workers nominally have a direct voice in the
management of the workplace through the unions that all must
join, in most factories during Ceausescu's regime the union's
chief executive was also the senior party official, and a
primary function of the unions was to channel party doctrine
and directives to the workers. Unions also dispensed social
benefits, such as vacations at union-owned hotels (for which
the member pays only a fraction of the real cost),
low-interest loans, and access to cultural, educational, and
other leisure activities.
The institution of unrealistic production and sales quotas
during Ceausescu's rule and penalties in the form of salary
deductions for failure to meet them increased worker
dissatisfaction. No mechanism existed by which the workers
could protest such arbitrary reductions in pay. The worker
demonstrations in Brasov in 1987, which were suppressed by the
Government, were called to protests pay cuts and poor living
conditions .
There are no export processing zones in Romania.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The labor code stipulates that each citizen over the age of 16
has the right and the duty to work. Unemployment is a crime
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ROMANIA
("social parasitism"). With certain exceptions, such as
housewives, full-time students, and private farmers, any
unemployed able-bodied citizen must report to a government
employment bureau for placement in a job. A 1976 law states
that persons who refuse to take up gainful employment may be
fined or assigned to positions in the construction,
agricultural, or other sectors of the economy where they are
required to complete 1 year of service.
Since 1985 the Committee of Experts of the ILO has observed
that these provisions of Romanian law appear to constitute
forced labor in that they are an obligation to work under the
menace of penalties. At the 1988 ILO Conference of the
Committee on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations, the Romanian Government took the position
that these laws served to encourage able-bodied citizens to
contribute productively to society and that the sanctions
provided for by law had never been applied. Other sources
note, however, that individuals were frequently convicted for
"social parasitism" under a 1968 law which provides
imprisonment as a sanction for persons not gainfully employed.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
There is no specific minimum employment age, although Romanian
law requires schooling to age 16. According to the employment
code, children over 16 not enrolled in full-time schooling are
expected to work. Youths 14 years of age may be employed in
temporary jobs, and youths of 15 may be employed in industrial
work, so long as the employer provides continuing educational
opportunities and shows that the work being performed is
"appropriate for the age and condition" of the employee. In
such cases, the law limits work to 6 hours per day. Children
from age 11 may work in the fields or in other "patriotic
labor," usually as part of a school or other group activity.
b. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Constitution provides for an 8-hour workday (a 6-hour day
for arduous occupations), a 24-hour rest period each week,
paid vacations, and the "right to leisure." The monthly
minimum wage is equivalent to $220 at the official exchange
rate. It is diffocult if not impossible to maintain an
adequate standard of living at average wage levels. Labor law
elaborates further on these standards but allows employers to
override them "if conditions warrant." In 1989 there were
widespread reports of workers required to perform extra,
uncompensated labor to make up for lagging production or for
official holidays. Workers also reported that wages and
salaries were cut when an enterprise failed to meet its
production quota, even though production shortfalls were often
due to the lack of raw materials or insufficient electric
power .
The labor code promises Romanian workers a safe environment,
and the Ministry of Labor has established safety standards for
most industries and is responsible for enforcing them. In
practice, however, observers report that conditions in many
factories present substantial health and safety hazards.
Unions theoretically also have a responsibility to protect
worker health and safety. Although management and unions are
reportedly aware of these deficiencies in most cases, the
Ceausescu regime's emphasis on meeting production goals took
precedence over safety and health factors in light of
Ceausescu's insistence on rapidly paying off the foreign debt
1242
and on pursuing industrial and economic development at all
cost. A government-run institute devoted to worker safety and
health concerns has existed since 1968. It is relatively
small and does not appear capable of challenging unrealistic
government production targets or eliminating hazardous working
conditions, but it does work to ameliorate extreme conditions
in some factories (workers receive supplementary benefits in
some hazardous occupations) .
1243
SPAIN
Spain is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional
monarch, Juan Carlos I. In free and open parliamentary
elections in October, Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez was
elected to a third term. The fundamental rights of speech,
assembly, press, religion, movement, and participation in the
political process are guaranteed in the Constitution of 1978
and are respected in practice.
The security forces are under the full control of the
Government. This was last demonstrated in 1988 when three
police officers were each sentenced to 29 years in prison for
their role in the 1983 disappearance and presumed death of a
prisoner .
The Spanish economy is mixed, with primary reliance on private
initiative and market mechanisms. Spain continues to
experience high unemployment, although the economy is growing
and unemployment dropped in August to its lowest level since
October 1983. High unemployment is due in part to the entry
of new workers into the labor force. Women and youth are
disproportionately affected by the high level of unemployment.
In 1989 the human rights situation continued to be dominated
by the protracted campaign of terrorism waged by the Basque
separatist group ETA (Basque Fatherland and Freedom) . The
Government continued its efforts to bring individual
terrorists to justice while adhering to democratic standards
of due process and civil rights. Suspected terrorists
arrested and charged with crimes frequently assert that they
were abused by police. In 1989 there were no confirmed cases
of police abuse.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were approximately 42 terrorist-related incidents from
January through September 1989 in which 12 people were killed
and 18 injured. Of those killed, five were Spanish National
Police, one a civil guard, three military personnel, and three
civilians. All of the deaths and most of the injuries
occurred during actions claimed by or attributable to ETA. In
July ETA shot to death two military officers as they drove
down a street in Madrid. In September, also in Madrid, ETA
gunmen assassinated a public prosecutor involved in the cases
of several ETA terrorist suspects. Several days later, two
ETA members were killed in an armed confrontation with members
of the Guardia Civil. In a subsequent series of raids and
arrests, Spanish authorities claimed to have effectively
dismantled the "Araba Command," one of ETA's most violent
cells. In September two civil guards were gravely wounded in
a bomb attack on their barracks in Gerona by the Catalan
separatist group Terra Lliure.
The Government held intermittent talks with ETA in Algeria
during the past several years in an attempt to end the
violence. The talks broke down in early 1989, however. On
April 7, a 3-month truce by ETA effectively came to an end
when the group set off a series of bombs. Since then, ETA has
continued an intermittent campaign of bombings. Since 1987
there has been close and effective cooperation between the
1244
SPAIN
Spanish and French Governments in the fight against ETA
terrorism.
Two ranking police officers are in prison awaiting trial on
charges that they organized a secret antiter rorist
assassination band, the Antiterrorist Liberation Group (GAL),
which took credit for the killings of alleged Spanish Basque
terrorists in Southern France from 1983 to 1986. They were
arrested in May 1988. The delay in bringing the two policemen
to trial is not unusual for a criminal case. The law provides
for maximum imprisonment of 2 years before trial.
b. Disappearance
Kidnapings for ransom are occasionally carried out by ETA.
There are no claims that police or government security forces
carried out secret arrests or kidnapings.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There were no documented instances of police abuse during
1989, although ETA detainees routinely charge that they are
abused during detention. An improved police attitude with
respect to human rights over the past several years may be
attributed to enhanced police discipline, the willingness of
the Government to punish improper police behavior, publicity
in the press, and concern by the police unions themselves with
denunciations of police misconduct.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under the Constitution, a person is free from arbitrary arrest
and detention, and normally a suspect may not be held more
than 72 hours without a hearing. The Penal Code, as reformed
in 1988, permits a suspected terrorist to be held an additional
2 days without a hearing.
Exile is not practiced in Spain. With regard to forced or
compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary and the
right to a fair public trial. This right is observed in
practice. Defendants have the right to be represented by an
attorney, at state expense for the indigent. The right to be
released on bail is guaranteed, unless the court has reason to
believe a suspect may flee or constitute a serious threat to
public safety. The law provides for an expeditious judicial
hearing following arrest. Suspects may not be imprisoned for
more than 2 years before being brought to trial. In practice,
the delay generally is less than 1 year. In cases of petty
crime, suspects released on bail may face a wait of as long as
5 years before their trial comes up. Following a conviction,
defendants may always appeal to the next highest court. The
European Court of Human Rights is the final arbiter in cases
concerning human rights.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution protects the privacy of the home and
correspondence. Under the Criminal Code, government
authorities must obtain court approval before searching
1245
SPAIN
private property, wiretapping, or interfering with private
correspondence. The present antiterrorist law gives
discretionary authority to the Minister of Interior to act
prior to obtaining court approval "in cases of emergency."
There have been no complaints that the Minister has abused
this authority.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Government scrupulously observes the guarantees of free
speech and press provided for in the Constitution. Opposition
viewpoints are freely expressed in speech and through the
media. In 1989 the Government approved a law allowing three
new private television stations to begin broadcasts.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
As provided in the Constitution, all groups have the right of
free assembly and association for political or other
purposes. This right is fully respected and freely practiced.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
There is no state religion in Spain. Roman Catholicism is the
predominant religion, but other religions are represented and
function with full freedom. Adherence to a particular faith
neither enhances nor diminishes a person's status.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Spanish citizens have complete freedom to travel within and
outside the country. The Government restricts neither
emigration nor repatriation. The law on aliens permits
detention of a person for up to 40 days prior to expulsion but
specifies that the detention may not take place in a
prison-like setting. Spain has a liberal refugee law.
Generally, the Government grants refugee status on the
recommendation of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees .
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Spain is a multiparty democracy with open elections in which
all citizens over the age of 18 have the right to vote. At
all levels of government, elections must be held every
4 years. Opposition parties and groups take an active part in
the political process.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government cooperates readily with international human
rights groups, such as Amnesty International and the
International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as with
independent national groups, such as the Spanish Human Rights
Association. The Foreign Ministry, through an Office of Human
1246
SPAIN
Rights Affairs, takes an active interest in human rights
issues internationally.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens.
Education and economic and social services are generally
available to all without discrimination of any kind. An
independent ombudsman actively investigates complaints of
human rights abuses by the authorities. The Constitution
promises equal rights to women, and the Government has
indicated its intent to eliminate discrimination against women
wherever it occurs.
The Women's Institute, a government agency under the Ministry
of Social Affairs, actively promotes social equality, women's
mobility, and the participation of women in political,
cultural, economic, and social life. However, traditional
attitudes result in de facto discrimination against women in a
number of areas.
The Government and the largest labor union confederation are
active in trying to increase public awareness of sexual
harassment as a problem in the workplace. In February the
Government passed a law making it easier for women to file
charges of sexual harassment. The Government also funded a
project to develop new schoolteaching materials designed to
eliminate sexually stereotyped job roles.
The Government has identified domestic violence against women,
especially wife beating, as a social problem. The Women's
Institute reports that, in 1988, 14,711 complaints were filed
by women against their husbands and that 11,060 of these
complaints involved charges of physical abuse. Spanish law
treats wife beating as a form of assault and battery.
Punishment is accordingly meted out according to damage done.
In 1987 a law was passed recognizing the concept of marital
rape. This law took effect in 1988.
Several levels of government provide a number of institutional
remedies, such as shelters for battered women. The Government
also is attempting through education to change public
attitudes that contribute to violence against women. The
Women's Institute has charged that some judges are reluctant
to get involved in what they feel should remain a domestic
problem. Similarly, in smaller towns some police officers
have been reluctant to accept complaints from battered women.
To deal with this problem, the Ministry of the Interior
initiated a program in 1986 that created special sections
within police departments to deal with violence against women,
staffed by specially trained women.
Gypsies are a minority group representing 3 percent of the
Spanish population. Despite their constitutional rights, they
suffer de facto discrimination in housing, schools, and jobs.
Legal mechanisms exist by which they can seek redress, for
example, from discrimination by an employer. As a practical
matter, however, Gypsies do not normally seek such redress.
The Government has stated its commitment to securing equal
rights and treatment for Gypsies. A representative of the
Gypsy community serves as special advisor to the Minister of
Interior .
1247
SPAIN
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
All workers except those in the military services are entitled
to form or join unions of their own choosing without previous
authorization. The only requisites for forming a union are a
group of more than two persons and registration with the
Ministry of Labor and Social Security. There are no
limitations on the right of association for workers in special
economic zones. According to the European Commission, 11
percent of the Spanish work force is unionized.
Under the Constitution, trade unions are free to choose their
own representatives, determine their own policies, represent
their members' interests, and strike. They are not restricted
or harassed by the Government. A strike is legal when it
fulfills the requirement of 3 days' prior notice in the
private sector and 5 days in the public sector. Illegal
strikes are rare. Strikes affecting essential services must
respect legal minimum service requirements, which are
negotiated between the Government and the unions.
Spanish unions are free to form or join federations,
confederations, and international bodies. Two major unions,
the General Workers Union and the Basque Solidarity Union
(ELA/STV) are members of the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions and the European Trade Union Confederation.
ELA/STV and the United Workers Union are also members of the
World Confederation of Labor.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively was established
by the Workers Statute of 1980. Trade union and collective
bargaining rights were extended to all workers in the public
sector, except the military services, in 1986. Public sector
collective bargaining is restricted in those aspects that
require approval of Parliament, i.e., salaries and employment
levels. Collective bargaining is widespread in both the
private and public sectors. Sixty percent of the working
population is covered by private sector collective bargaining
agreements, although only a minority are actually union
members. Labor regulations in free trade zones and export
processing zones are the same as in the rest of the country.
There are no restrictions on the right to organize or on
collective bargaining in such areas.
The law prohibits discrimination by employers against union
members and organizers. Discrimination cases have priority in
the labor courts. No statistics are available on the number
of antiunion discrimination complaints. One practice which
the unions consider discriminatory is the use by employers of
temporary employment contracts. Around 26 percent of the work
force is employed under this type of contract. The unions
believe that employees engaging in union organizing under this
type of contract are frequently not allowed to renew their
contracts. This issue is the subject of a union complaint
pending before the International Labor Organization.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is outlawed in Spain and is not
practiced. Legislation is effectively enforced.
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SPAIN
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum age of employment as established by the
Workers Statute is 16 years. The Ministry of Labor and Social
Security is primarily responsible for enforcement. The
minimum age is effectively enforced in major industries and in
the service sector. It is more difficult to control on small
farms and in family-owned businesses. Legislation prohibiting
child labor is effectively enforced in the special economic
zones. The Workers Statute also prohibits the employment of
persons under 18 years of age at night, for overtime work, or
in sectors considered hazardous by the Ministry of Labor and
Social Security and the unions.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Workers in general have substantial, well-defined rights. A
40-hour workweek is established by law. Spanish workers enjoy
12 paid holidays a year and a month's paid vacation. All
workers receive 12 monthly paychecks a year plus 2 bonus
checks equivalent to an additional 2 months' salary. The
legal minimum wage for workers over age 18 is 14 "monthly"
paychecks amounting to $5,320 a year, which is sufficient for
a worker's decent standard of living. Minimum wages for those
aged 16 and 17 are less. The minimum wage rate is revised
every year in accordance with the consumer price index.
Government mechanisms exist for enforcing working conditions
and occupational health and safety conditions, but
bureaucratic procedures are cumbersome and inefficient.
1249
SWEDEN
Sweden is a constitutional monarchy and a multiparty,
parliamentary democracy. The King is Chief of State. All
executive authority is vested in the Cabinet, which is formed
through direct parliamentary elections every 3 years and
consists of the Prime Minister (Head of Government) and some
20 ministers. The Social Democratic Party, Sv/eden's largest,
retained power in the September 1988 elections.
The police, all security organizations, and the armed forces
are controlled by and responsive to the civilian government
and, with very few exceptions, are scrupulous in their
protection of human rights. Either the Government, the
judicial system, the Parliament, or an ombudsman investigates
thoroughly any allegations of human rights violations.
Sweden is an advanced industrial democracy with a high
standard of living, extensive social services, and a mixed
economy. Over 90 percent of businesses are privately owned.
Private persons are entirely free to express their political
preferences, pursue individual interests, and seek legal
resolution of disputes. Ombudsmen, appointed by the
Parliament but with full autonomy, investigate private
complaints of alleged abuse of authority by officials and
prescribe corrective action, if required.
Respect for human rights is a basic social value that
underlies Sweden's active support of international efforts to
improve human rights observance. The human rights situation
was largely unchanged in 1989. Some human rights
organizations, such as the Swedish section of Amnesty
International, again complained about human rights violations,
particularly with reference to refugees seeking asylum who are
rejected at the border. There have also been complaints about
individual Kurds who have been found deportable as suspected
terrorists. They have not been deported, however, since they
would face possible death penalties or other severe
punishments in their countries of origin. These Kurds are
restricted to their resident municipality and are not free to
travel in Sweden.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Killing for political motives by the Government or by domestic
opposition groups does not occur.
b. Disappearance
Abduction, secret arrests, and clandestine detention by
Swedish authorities do not occur.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Swedish law prohibits these abuses, and such prohibitions are
respected by Swedish authorities. Occasional accusations
against individual policemen for excessive use of force in
connection with arrests are carefully investigated and have
not produced evidence of a systematic problem. Three police
1250
SWEDEN
officers were suspended and six subjected to other
disciplinary actions after investigations.
After a report was made public about the degrading treatment
of some detainees, the Swedish Red Cross offered to provide
Swedish citizens as witnesses to assist foreign detainees in
Stockholm police custody. No actual proof of degrading
treatment could be found, but two guards were given other
assignments .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Statutory guarantees of individual liberty are observed.
Persons disturbing public order or considered dangerous may be
held for 6 hours without charge. Criminal suspects may be
held no longer than 12 hours without formal charges. If a
person files for bankruptcy and refuses to cooperate with the
official investigation, a court may order detention for up to
3 months (with judicial review every 2 weeks). Arrest is
public and by warrant. Legislation that took effect in 1988
to reduce the time between detention and arraignment from 5
days to 48 hours has been criticized, particularly by
prosecutors. The short time during which prosecutors have to
reach a decision has led to an increase in arraignments. In
particularly difficult cases, the time between arrest and the
first court hearing may be extended to 96 hours. Bail does
not exist, but suspects not considered dangerous or likely to
destroy evidence are released to await trial. By law, Swedish
citizens may not be deported. Convicted foreign criminals are
often deported at the conclusion of their prison terms, unless
they risk execution or other severe punishment at home.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution forbids deprivation of liberty without public
trial by a court of law. The judiciary functions freely and
independently. The accused has the right to counsel. Since
1983, however, budget cutbacks have restricted the
availability of public defenders to cases where the maximum
penalty could be a prison sentence of 6 months or more.
Convicted persons may appeal to a court of appeals, and in
some cases also to the Supreme Court. There are no military
courts in peacetime.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Freedom from these offenses is provided for by law. Home
searches are limited to investigations of crimes punishable by
at least 2 years' imprisonment, such as murder, robbery, rape,
arson, sabotage, counterfeiting, and treason. Search warrants
are granted only on the basis of well-founded suspicion.
Wiretaps are permitted only in cases involving narcotics or
national security. Searches and wiretaps normally require
court approval. When the time factor is critical, or when
life is believed to be in immediate danger, the ranking police
officer may approve these measures. Limitations on such
police decisions were introduced in 1988.
Human rights groups in Sweden have expressed concern about the
increased number of wiretaps. The number of persons subjected
to wiretaps, excluding those in connection with the Palme
murder investigation, reached a high of 414 in 1984 but
1251
dropped to 213 in 1986 and to 197 in 1987. There have been
public reports that illegal wiretaps and bugging were used by
the Swedish secret police both in the Palme murder
investigation and in a case involving a Soviet diplomat who
later was expelled for industrial espionage. These reports,
which caused a political scandal, are to be investigated by
the parliamentary Constitutional Committee.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Swedes enjoy these freedoms fully. Newspapers and periodicals
are for the most part privately owned. Government subsidies
to daily newspapers, regardless of political affiliation,
assure the expression of differing opinions. Swedish radio
and television broadcasting is a government monopoly. An
increasing number of Swedes are able to view foreign
television broadcasts on cable.
Publications containing sensitive national security
information as well as film and television programs portraying
excessive violence are subject to censorship. Commercial
video tapes are also screened and banned if they contain
scenes of unacceptable violence.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Swedes exercise these freedoms without restraint. Public
demonstrations require a police permit, for which applications
are routinely approved.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Swedes have unimpaired religious freedom. There is a state
Lutheran Church, supported by public funds, but all faiths are
freely observed. Parents have full freedom to teach their
children religious practices of their choice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement within and from the country and voluntary
repatriation are guaranteed by law and respected in practice.
Refugees, displaced persons, and others seeking political
asylum are on the whole generously treated, though long waits
and denial of asylum requests from applicants not meeting
internationally agreed criteria have become common.
Some travel restrictions were imposed on certain Kurds, who
were to be deported after serving prison terms for terroristic
crimes. Since it was legally impossible to deport the Kurds,
because they faced possible execution or other severe
penalties in their home countries, Swedish authorities have
restricted their movement to their respective communities of
residence.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Sweden has a long history of vigorous democratic political
life within a representative, multiparty parliamentary
1252
SWEDEN
system. The 349 seats in the unicameral Parliament are
divided proportionally among the 6 political parties currently
represented. To enter Parliament, a party must win a minimum
of 4 percent of the votes cast. For the first time in 70
years, a new party, the Greens, secured enough votes to be
represented in Parliament. There is universal suffrage above
the age of 18. Voting is not compulsory, but approximately 85
percent of eligible voters participated in the 1988 election.
Aliens who have been legal residents for at least 3 years have
the right to vote and run for office in municipal elections.
There has been periodic discussion about extending this right
to national elections.
Section 4 Government Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Ombudsmen serve as official governmental monitors of
individual rights in Sweden, effective both in making citizens
aware of their rights and publicizing and correcting abuses of
state authority. Active private organizations monitor issues
such as the impact on individuals of comprehensive social
legislation and the condition of the native Lapp population.
Government agencies are in close contact with a variety of
local and international groups working in Sweden and abroad to
improve human rights observance. State-supported Stockholm
University offers instruction in making human rights
complaints to bodies such as the European Commission of Human
Rights. The Government also published a pamphlet on the
matter in 1989, which was widely distributed free of charge.
In 1989 Sweden was criticized in three instances for
violations of human rights by the European Commission of Human
Rights. In all three cases, Swedish authorities took steps to
provide redress to the complainant. Sweden is a member of the
United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Basic human needs for the entire population are thoroughly met
without discrimination. The State provides social welfare and
medical services, benefits to families, pensions, and
disability and unemployment insurance. The Government runs
special programs to help immigrants adjust to Swedish life and
culture (including 240 hours of paid language instruction).
Two of Sweden's 284 municipalities refused to permit refugees
to settle in them. Both the Government and the political
parties tried to persuade these communities to change their
attitude. In a local referendum in connection with the 1988
elections, 70 percent of the voters in one municipality voted
to exclude refugees. The mayor of that town was expelled from
his party, the Center Party. However, studies show that a
majority of Swedes have a positive attitude towards refugees.
Certain refugee groups, particularly those from the Middle
East, complained that their relatives had difficulties in
obtaining visitor visas for Sweden. Sweden has been
restrictive in issuing such visas because many of these
visitors apply for asylum upon arrival in Sweden.
The Government supports groups working against racism.
Swedish schools seek to provide education and information
designed to counter racist tendencies. In 1986 the Government
1253
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appointed a special ombudsman to deal with complaints of
racism and discrimination. As a result, the number of civil
and criminal complaints being filed has increased.
In October 1985, the UNHRC carried out a study on Sweden. The
Commission commented upon the fact that Sweden lacks forceful
legislation against racism. Sweden's answer was that such
legislation would not be compatible with the Swedish
Constitution, which guarantees full freedom of speech and the
right to form organizations. However, a government commission
was set up to study methods of stopping racist groups. The
Commission presented its final report in February 1989. The
report recommended legislation banning extremist racist groups
and additional measures to discourage expressions of racism.
The Government is studying the Commission's recommendations.
Institutionalized efforts to extend equality between the sexes
continue. A law adopted in 1988 aims at promoting equality in
five general areas: in the labor market, in education, within
families, and in terms of women's role in the economy and
women's influence in society. A public ombudsman, called the
Equality Ombudsman, investigates complaints of sex
discrimination in the labor market. Employers are required to
base hiring decisions on merit and to pursue actively the goal
of equality.
Abuse against women has received a great deal of attention by
the Government . Studies have been conducted to survey the
cause and pattern of rapes and other forms of abuse. A
temporary increase in street rapes in 1988 was the reason for
one of the studies, but the rape rate during 1989 has been at
the same level as in 1987. Thirty-six percent of convicted
rapists were foreign nationals, although immigrants make up
only 10 percent of the population. Researchers, however,
believe that one cause for this may be that rapes perpetrated
by foreign nationals are reported more frequently than those
committed by native Swedes.
In recent years, many old laws have been amended and new laws
added to protect abused women from having their abusers
contact them or find out their whereabouts. In a few cases
women have been helped to obtain new identities and homes.
Both national and local governments support voluntary groups
that provide shelter and help to abused women. The Government
is continuing to investigate whether the increase in reported
rapes and abuse of women represents an actual increase or
reflects an improved awareness by women of their rights. Men
who rape or abuse women are provided rehabilitative treatment.
Section 6 Workers Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers have the right to associate freely and to strike. A
large majority of the working population, including career
military personnel and civilian government officials, belongs
to trade unions. Unions conduct their activities with
complete independence from the Government and freely affiliate
with international organizations.
Several strikes took place in 1989, some of them wildcat
strikes. Most strikes were in the public sector in protest
against reductions in the work force and the failure to meet
demands for large salary increases.
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SWEDEN
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers are free to organize and bargain collectively.
Swedish law fully protects workers from antiunion
discrimination and has sophisticated and effective mechanisms
for resolving disputes and complaints. There are no export
processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited in law and does not
exist in Sweden.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Compulsory education ends at age 16, and full-time employment
is normally permitted at this age under supervision of local
municipal or community authorities. Young people under age 18
may work only during daytime and under a foreman's
supervision. During the summer and in vacation periods,
children as young as 13 years of age may be hired for
part-time work or light "summer jobs" for periods of 5 days or
less, although it is rare for young people under 15 years of
age to find a job except with family members.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no minimum wage law. Wages are set by collective
bargaining contracts which typically are applied in nonunion
establishments as well. Even the lowest paid workers are able
to maintain a decent standard of living. A designated and
trained trade union steward monitors observance of the
regulations governing working conditions.
The standard legal workweek is 40 hours, although collective
bargaining agreements can provide for shorter or longer
workweeks. The amount of permissible overtime is also
regulated, as are rest periods. Sweden has a vacation law
which guarantees all employees a minimum of 5 weeks' paid
annual leave. A gradual increase to 6 weeks* annual leave
will take effect by 1993.
Occupational health and safety rules are closely observed.
Safety ombudsmen have the authority to stop life-threatening
activity immediately and call for a labor inspector. The
Swedish courts have upheld this authority. Swedish
authorities are studying as many as 400,000 jobs to compile a
list of those that are most dangerous and cause long-term
health problems, and are actively trying to improve the
situation for those employees.
1255
SWITZERLAND
Switzerland is a constitutional democracy with a federal
structure. Federal legislative power is vested in a bicameral
legislature. Given its linguistic and religious diversity,
Switzerland has developed a political system based on
considerable autonomy for its 26 cantons and on local and
national political consensus.
The Swiss armed forces are a militia based on universal
military service for able-bodied males. There is virtually no
standing army apart from training cadres and a few essential
headquarters staff functions. Police duties are primarily a
responsibility of the individual cantons, which have their own
distinct police forces. The National Police Authority has a
coordinating role and relies on the cantons for actual law
enforcement .
Switzerland has a mature, free-enterprise, industrial and
service economy which is highly dependent on international
trade. There has been virtual full employment and labor peace
for many years. The standard of living is one of the highest
in the world.
There were no significant human rights problems during 1989.
Switzerland maintained its own strong association with human
rights issues, exemplified by hosting the U.N. Human Rights
Commission in Geneva. The headquarters of the the
International Labor Organization and the International
Committee of the Red Cross are located in Switzerland.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no political killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of abductions, secret arrests, or
clandestine detention.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution provides freedom from all of the above, and
there were no allegations of any violations.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile is provided
by law. A detained person may not be held longer than 24
hours without a warrant of arrest issued by the magistrate
conducting the preliminary investigation. A suspect must
immediately be shown the warrant and has the right to contact
legal counsel as soon as a warrant is issued. A suspect may
be detained with a warrant until an investigation is completed,
but the length of investigative detention is always reviewed
by higher judicial authority, and investigations are typically
completed quickly. Release on personal recognizance or bail
is granted unless the examining magistrate believes the person
is a danger to society or will not appear for trial. There is
no summary exile, nor is exile used as a means of political
1256
SWITZERLAND
control, although non-Swiss convicted of crimes may receive
sentences which include denial of reentry for a specified
period following completion of a prison sentence.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for public trials. All courts of
first instance are cantonal courts, with right of appeal to
the Federal courts and freedom from interference by other
branches of government. Minor cases are tried by a single
judge, difficult cases by a panel of judges, and murder or
other serious crimes by a public jury. Even the most serious
cases are usually brought to trial within a few months. There
are no political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There were no reported violations of this nature by Swiss
authorities. Police entry into the premises of a person
suspected of a criminal offense is regulated by cantonal
legislation. Regulations differ widely among the cantons.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning
democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of speech
and press. Groups or associations determined to be a potential
threat to the State may have restrictions placed on their
freedom of speech and press. No groups or associations are so
designated at the present time. Broadcast media are government
funded but possess editorial autonomy, and foreign broadcast
media are freely available. Press and publishing are private
enterprises operated without government intervention. Academic
freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The only restriction on peaceful assembly and association is a
requirement to obtain permits from police authorities before
holding public meetings. These are routinely granted unless
authorities have reason to believe the meeting will lead to
violence.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Switzerland enjoys religious freedom. There is no single
state church, but individual cantons may support a particular
church out of public funds, and most cantons do so. Foreign
clergy are free to perform their duties in Switzerland. The
legal requirement for universal male military service provides
no exemption for conscientious objectors. They may apply for
military service which does not entail bearing arms, but in
the past refusal to serve has nearly always led to prosecution
and conviction. Efforts continued during 1989 to develop
alternative service for those claiming exemption for reasons
of conscience.
1257
SWITZERLAND
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Swiss citizens have freedom to travel in or outside the
country and can emigrate without difficulty. Switzerland has
traditionally been a haven for refugees, but public concern
over the growing number of asylum seekers, many of whom come
for economic reasons, sparked a government review of existing
policy. Although some asylum seekers were forced back into
Italy as they attempted to cross the border, there were no
cases of refugees being forced to return to countries in which
they fear persecution.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Switzerland is a highly developed constitutional democracy.
There is universal adult suffrage by secret ballot in Federal
elections. Elections are free and actively contested by four
major national parties and at least a dozen significant
regional or minor parties. Initiative and referendum
procedures provide unusually intense popular involvement in
the legislative process. Participation by women in politics
has been limited historically but continues to expand slowly.
One of the smallest and most rural of the 26 cantons still
excludes female suffrage at the cantonal level.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Switzerland cooperates with international and nongovernmental
groups in all areas of human rights. All major international
human rights groups are active in Switzerland, and some of the
leading ones — e.g., the United Nations Human Rights Commission
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) — are
based there. The ICRC is made up of Swiss nationals, and
Swiss play prominent roles in other humanitarian
nongovernmental organizations. Human rights advocacy groups
in Switzerland concern themselves almost exclusively with
lobbying the Swiss and other Governments about human rights
situations in other countries. During 1988 the European Court
of Human Rights found against Switzerland in a case of a
complaint by a woman who alleged that her legal rights had
been violated by an investigating magistrate in one of the
cantons. The Swiss changed legal procedures in 1989 to
prevent any repetition of this problem.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Languaoe, or Social Status
Although the Constitution prohibits discrimination against
women in the workplace, government and other sources noted in
1989 that further implementation was necessary to ensure equal
pay and other benefits for women. Switzerland created a
special government office of equal rights for men and women to
address this problem. A Federal Commission for Women's Rights
and several private groups, such as the Federation of Women's
Organizations, monitor and promote women's rights. The
discrimination that persists today is typically social, not
legal, but it nevertheless hinders opportunities for women in
fields that have been traditionally dominated by men.
Swiss policymakers have become aware in recent years of the
issue of violence toward women. Observers believe that many
1258
SWITZERLAND
cases go unreported, so that accurate statistics are lacking.
There is, however, widespread agreement that a problem
exists. The Federation of Women's Organizations and other
women's advocacy groups have heightened public consciousness.
Each city has an emergency telephone number through which
women who are victims of violence can obtain help and
counseling. Specialists work with police authorities to
interview women who report attacks. Appropriate laws exist
against wife beating and similar crimes, although there is
some disagreement among Swiss as to whether existing law
adequately prohibits spousal rape. While the penal code is
established at the Federal level, enforcement is the
responsibility of the cantons. Thus, variations in
enforcement can occur.
Italian and Romansch linguistic minorities (respectively about
10 and 1 percent of the population) express concern that the
limited resources made available to them by the Federal
Government endanger the continued intellectual vitality of
these languages. Some argue that this amounts to deprivation
of freedom of speech. The Federal Government's announced
policy is to ensure, through careful apportionment of funds,
that all linguistic groups have commensurate facilities and
means to carry out cultural activities in their own
languages. Employment opportunities and residence permits are
limited for foreigners. Some assert that this reflects racial
prejudice and discrimination, but these limitations apply to
all non-Swiss. There is no discrimination on religious
grounds .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
All workers, including foreign workers in Switzerland, have
freedom to associate freely, to join unions of their choice,
and to select their own representatives. Unions are free to
publicize their views and determine their own programs and
policies to represent member interests without government
interference. Unions may join federations or international
bodies. Swiss trade union federations belong to the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the World
Confederation of Labor, as well as to the European Trade Union
Confederation. The right to strike is legally unfettered, but
a unique labor peace agreement between unions and employers
has provided a nearly strike-free environment for over 50
years .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Swiss law provides workers the right to organize and bargain
collectively and protects workers from acts of antiunion
discrimination. The industrial sector is generally unionized;
in the service sector, union membership is less general. The
Government encourages voluntary negotiations between employer
and worker organizations, although for the most part employers
and workers alike (in common with most Swiss institutions)
seek successfully to exclude the Government from involving
itself in their affairs. There are no export processing zones
in Switzerland.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced or compulsory labor. While there is no
specific statute or constitutional ban on compulsory labor.
1259
SWITZERLAND
legislation regulating conditions of employment and,
specifically, the rights of a worker upon terminating
employment, make clear that compulsory labor would be illegal.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment of children is 15 years.
Children over 13 may be employed in light duties (e.g.,
helping in retail stores) for not more than 9 hours a week
during the school year and 15 hours otherwise. Employment
between ages 15 and 20 is strictly regulated. For example,
youths may not work at night, on Sundays, or under hazardous
or dangerous conditions. These laws are observed in practice
and enforced through inspections by the Federal Office of
Industry, Trades, and Labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no national minimum wage. Employer associations and
unions negotiate industrial wages during the collective
bargaining process. The Labor Act established a maximum
45-hour workweek for blue- and white-collar workers in
industry, offices, and retail trades, and a 50-hour workweek
for all other workers. The workweek for blue-collar workers
in most industries is 43 hours and for white-collar workers 40
to 43 hours. Overtime is limited by law to 120 hours
annually. The economy is normally at or near full
employment. The resulting take-home pay provides Swiss
workers and their families with a standard of living that is
among the highest in the world.
The Labor Act and The Federal Code of Obligations contain
extensive regulations to protect worker health and safety.
The regulations are enforced, providing a high standard of
worker health and safety. Female workers may not be employed
in dangerous work, and women in industrial enterprises may not
work at night or on Sundays. These special protections came
under review in 1989. The Government proposed to eliminate
restrictions against female Sunday or weekend work in its
effort to remove sexist bias from the labor law. There were
no allegations of worker rights abuses from any domestic or
foreign source.
1260
TURKEY
Turkey is a republic with a multiparty parliamentary system
and a relatively strong presidency. The Grand National
Assembly elected Prime Minister Turgut Ozal as President to
succeed Kenan Evren in November. Yildirim Akbulut of the
right-of-center Motherland Party, which won a 5-year mandate
in national elections in 1987, became Prime Minister. In
nationwide municipal elections held in March, the Motherland
Party obtained 21 percent of the vote. Opposition parties
have so far called unsuccessfully for early elections.
The Turkish National Police in the cities and the Jandarma in
the countryside are responsible for maintaining public order.
A legal "state of emergency" continues to exist in eight
provinces in the southeast, where the Turkish Government is
combatting Kurdish terrorists. The state of emergency allows
the civilian governors to exercise certain quasi-martial law
powers .
Turkey has a mixed economy with state-owned, publicly owned,
and privately owned companies and a significant agricultural
sector. The Government has liberalized the economy in recent
years and given it a strong, free market, export orientation.
Approximately 80 percent of 1989 exports were industrial
goods. After several years of rapid growth, the economy has
stalled, and the gross national product grew at a rate of less
than 1 percent in 1989. Unemployment, running at approximately
15 percent, and inflation, which climbed to an annual rate of
75 percent in 1989, remain serious problems.
Although Turkey in 1988 ratified the United Nations and the
European Conventions Against Torture, continuing instances of
torture were the principal human rights problem in 1989.
Other concerns included restrictions on incommunicado
detention, use of excessive force against noncombatants in
efforts to suppress Kurdish terrorists, freedom of expression,
and various forms of discrimination against Kurds. Charges of
torture persisted. Almost always, they arose out of police
interrogations that took place during preliminary
investigations when suspects were held in incommunicado
detention and before they had been allowed access to counsel.
Draft legislation introduced in September to allow detainees
access to legal counsel within 24 hours was preempted by a
Prime Ministry circular ordering detainee access to attorneys,
but most detainees do not receive immediate access in
practice. Also in September, the Government submitted a bill
to Parliament which would shorten the time a detainee may be
held for investigatory interrogation. In November, the main
opposition Social Democratic Populist Party submitted to
Parliament draft legislation to repeal Articles 141, 142, and
163 (so-called thought crimes). The Justice Committee is
currently considering it. At year's end, the Government was
edging toward its own proposal to amend these three articles.
The Government may ease some provisions but now appears
unlikely to support full repeal. The Government announced its
intention to consult with the two opposition parties
represented in Parliament while drafting a proposal. The
Government also announced that it would accept decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights without reservation.
The press is active and criticizes the Government vigorously.
But certain penal code articles and laws restrict full freedom
of expression, both for individual persons and the press. In
December President Ozal acknowledged publicly the need to
1261
TURKEY
change these laws but said time is needed to develop a
national consensus. Prosecutors continue to apply these laws
aggressively although court decisions in general continue to
expand the scope of press and individual freedom of
expression. Women enjoy full legal equality with men but
continue to be subject to economic and other discrimination
owing to traditional social attitudes.
The Government rejects the assertion of a separate cultural
identity for Muslim groups, such as those of Kurdish ethnic
origin. Publishing materials in Kurdish or writing about
Kurdish history is prohibited and has resulted in
imprisonment, and entertainers have been arrested for singing
Kurdish songs in public performances. However, political
leaders and the Parliament are now discussing Kurdish issues
more openly. Parliamentarians of all parties, including some
members of the ruling Motherland Party, have called for easing
restrictions on speaking Kurdish and expressions of Kurdish
culture. The opposition Social Democratic Populist Party
introduced a repeal bill to Parliament in November, but no
action had been taken by year's end.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known politically motivated, unlawful killings
instigated by government or political opposition groups.
There have been allegations of death by torture of detainees
in police custody (see Section I.e.), Kurdish terrorists
active in the southeast murdered numerous fellow Turks of
Kurdish origin; and Jandarma searches for Kurdish Workers
Party (PKK) terrorists are alleged to have resulted in
expulsions, beatings, torture, and arbitrary killings of
innocent civilians (see Section l.d.).
b. Disappearance
There were no known disappearances caused by government forces.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Article 17 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution states that "no
one shall be subjected to torture or ill treatment
incompatible with human dignity." In 1988 Turkey ratified
both the Council of Europe Convention for the Prevention of
Torture and the U.N. Convention Against Torture. However,
credible allegations of torture continued in 1989. A
carefully researched report by the New York Bar Association in
1989 concluded that torture was widespread in Turkish police
stations and that the Government thus far has taken only
limited steps to implement its obligations under pertinent
international conventions. Suspects in common and political
crimes frequently appear to be tortured by the police during
initial interrogations while held incommunicado. Critics and
former detainees accused the police of employing such methods
as beatings on the soles of the feet, cold water hoses,
electric shocks, and hanging by the arms. Where torture did
not occur, they charged that beatings and psychological abuse
were common. Contacts with former detainees and others
indicate that these sorts of abuse did, in fact, occur.
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TURKEY
Allegations of torture are difficult to prove or disprove
since government-ordered medical examinations generally take
place after signs of abuse would have disappeared. The Ankara
Medical Association in June banned one doctor for 6 months
because she had allegedly issued certificates saying detainees
had not been tortured, when in fact they had.
In September the parliamentary Justice Committee, with the aid
of experts from the Ministry of Justice, initiated draft
legislation which could effectively eliminate the practice of
incommunicado detention by allowing detainees prompt access to
legal counsel and by permitting lawyers to be present during
police interrogations. In September a Prime Ministry circular
ordered prosecutors to allow detainees immediate access to
counsel. According to the circular, suspects detained for
individual crimes are allowed access to an attorney within 24
hours, and those detained for collective crimes are allowed
such access within 48 hours. Thus far, few detainees have
benefited from the circular because, in practice, the
prosecutor's office must approve the suspect's request to see
an attorney. In October the Ministry of Justice clarified the
circular — although to what effect is unclear--stating that
prosecutors should not deny detainees' requests to meet with
their attorneys.
In September the Council of Ministers introduced a hill in
Parliament to reduce the period a suspect could be detained
prior to formal arraignment in State Security Court and
criminal court cases from 15 to a maximum of 10 days. In
"collective" or group conspiracy crimes, detention would last
4 days, extendable up to 10 days if requested by the
prosecutor. Those accused of individual crimes could be held
only 48 hours. The proposal would not take effect in the
eight southeastern provinces currently under a state of
emergency. Here authorities could continue to hold detainees
up to 30 days. The Government also announced it would accept
the European Court of Human Rights' decisions without
reservation.
Government officials in 1989 still asserted that torture was
neither widespread nor systematic. Compared to the nature and
number of torture allegations, however, the number of actual
prosecutions was low and the sentences disproportionately
mild. In October two police officials from Hatay were
sentenced to prison terms of 4 years and 3 months for a
torture-death in 1985. Accused officials are generally
allowed to work and draw salaries until convicted, and they
may benefit from the Turkish law that reduces all sentences by
one-third for good behavior.
It is unclear how many, if any, people died of torture during
1989. In one claim filed with the Turkish Human Rights
Association, the petitioners asserted that Adem Satilmis,
accused of theft, died in the Ankara Central Prison on May 30
as a result of torture administered in the course of an
interrogation the week before. The examining doctor's report
noted that the cause of death was "suspicious."
In February the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, trying to refute
Amnesty International claims that more than 100 people died of
torture while being detained in Turkish prisons in the 1980's,
issued a statement that police had found evidence of torture
in "only" 32 deaths, 3 of which occurred in 1988. In a later
clarification, it declared that "only" 14 deaths could be
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TURKEY
ascribed to torture, though investigation into 12 other cases
was continuing.
Torture is not practiced in Turkey's prisons. However,
Jandarma and guards have beaten prisoners in the course of
searches, particularly following the discovery of escape
tunnels. Two prisoners who had been participating in an
organized hunger strike died in the course of being
transferred to another prison. The authorities ascribed their
deaths to dehydration, but others allege the two had been
beaten.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Except in limited circumstances, such as when a person is
caught in the act of committing a crime, a prosecutor must
issue a detention order. This can lead to 15 days of
detention under present legislation. In provinces under a
state of emergency (currently 8 in the southeast), the
detention period may be extended to 30 days. Once formally
charged, a detainee is arraigned before a judge and allowed to
retain a lawyer.
Under existing legislation, a detainee's next of kin must
normally be notified "in the shortest time" after arrest. A
detainee does not have the right to bail; the arraigning judge
may release the accused on presentation of an appropriate
guarantee or order him held in preventive detention if the
court determines that he is likely to flee or destroy evidence.
The Constitution specifies the right of detainees to request
"speedy conclusion of arraignment and trial." Nevertheless,
judges have ordered a significant number of persons detained
while their cases progress, sometimes for a number of years.
While many cases involve persons accused of violent crimes,
others involve simple membership in illegal organizations.
There is no formal external exile. The Government has refused
to renew the passports of a number of Turks working abroad who
have refused to return home to face court charges or perform
military service. These persons may apply to the Interior
Ministry for permission to return to Turkey. Internal exile
is legal but is rarely invoked.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Turkish court system and judicial procedures are modeled
on Italian (criminal) and Swiss (civil) law codes. Defendants
normally have the right to an open trial.
The Constitution declares that judges shall be independent in
the discharge of their duties and provides for the security of
their tenure. It also prohibits authorities from giving
orders or recommendations concerning the exercise of judicial
power. In many instances, charges brought by the prosecutors
are dismissed by the courts.
Eight state security courts try defendants accused of
terrorism or other offenses against the security of the State,
including drug smuggling and membership in an illegal
organization. The same standards of evidence and general
rules of procedure are required as in ordinary courts. A
conviction or acquittal in either system may be appealed. If
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TURKEY
an appeals court overturns a lower court's guilty verdict, the
case is sent back to the lower courts for reconsideration. If
the lower court insists on its original verdict, the case is
returned to the appeals court for a binding opinion. The
court provides counsel for indigents in all cases.
In some cases, particularly capital cases, appeals to the
Supreme Court or to the High Court of Military Appeals are
mandatory and automatic. If a death sentence is confirmed by
an appeals court, it must be approved by the Council of
Ministers, then by the Parliament, and finally by the
President. No death sentence has been carried out since 1984.
Two martial law courts in Istanbul and Ankara are still
conducting trials relating to arrests made during the martial
law regime following the 1980 military takeover of power.
Most of these arrests date from the early 1980"s. At least
one mass trial involving Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Left), with
1,400 defendants, is still continuing in Istanbul. The total
number of defendants in detention being tried or awaiting
trial in the martial law courts probably numbers several
thousand.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of a person's
domicile and the privacy of correspondence and communication.
Government officials may enter a private residence and
intercept or monitor private correspondence only upon issuance
of a judicial warrant.
In the eight provinces under a state of emergency, the
governor (or regional governor) may empower authorities to
search residences or the premises of political parties,
businesses, associations, and other organizations without a
warrant. Authorities may also search, hold, or seize without
warrant persons, letters, telegrams, and documents. There is
some evidence that these powers have been used for political
purposes, particularly against activists involved in
opposition parties and the labor movement.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Since 1984 several thousand violent Kurdish separatists,
mostly members of the illegal PKK, have conducted a campaign
of terrorism in southeast Turkey against security forces as
well as against fellow Turks of Kurdish origin who do not
support them. According to November government figures, 193
security force members and 326 civilians have been killed in
terrorist incidents in the southeast since July 1987. In the
same period, security forces killed 308 terrorists. The
summer of 1989 saw an expansion of PKK activity, despite
extensive security operations and government efforts to create
better economic conditions for the inhabitants of the region.
Attempts by security forces to evacuate some villages in order
to facilitate operations were halted after well-publicized
public outcries. Other villagers claimed that the activities
of both the PKK and government security forces compelled them
to leave their homes. Villagers complain that Jandarma
searches for PKK terrorists and for evidence of local support
for them have resulted in expulsions, beatings, torture, and
arbitrary killings of innocent civilians. In January
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villagers in Yesilyurt in southeastern Turkey accused Jandarma
members of having tortured them and having forced them to eat
human excrement. A Jandarma major is currently on trial for
his involvement in this incident.
In July opposition Social Democrat Populist Party deputy Fuat
Atalay and the victim's family claimed that Osman Esendemir, a
villager from Siirt province suspected of being a PKK member,
had been tortured and killed by village guards under the
command of local security forces.
In August the governor of a province under a legal state of
emergency expelled eight people from the area for a period of
up to 3 months. The action was extensively reported and
criticized in the print media; the regional governor affirmed
that it is unlikely this power will be invoked again and
suggested the length of expulsion might be reduced.
In September the Government opened an investigation into the
killing of six villagers by security forces near Silopi in
southeastern Turkey. Villagers claimed that the six were
innocent and not PKK terrorists as the security forces claimed.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Turks are generally free to speak their mind. The press,
which is in private hands and which reflects a wide spectrum
of opinion, does not hesitate to criticize the Government.
There is no government newspaper; all papers reflect
opposition views to a greater or lesser extent.
Nonetheless, a number of restrictions on freedom of speech
exist. The criminal code has longstanding prohibitions on
speech or writing considered threatening to the democratic and
secular system of government and the security of the State.
These proscriptions apply to: advocacy or activities on
behalf of a government based on class or racial domination
(e.g., communism or fascism); the establishment of a
theocratic state (e.g.. Islamic fundamentalism); or the
creation of a separate state on ethnic lines (e.g., Kurdish
separatism) . Violations of these articles may result in the
death penalty, although in practice no one has been sentenced
to death in recent years for violating Articles 141, 142, or
163. A government-sponsored bill in Parliament in September
proposed that the death penalty no longer apply to such
offenses .
While it is permissible to criticize government leaders or
policies, the criminal code also provides penalties for those
who "insult the President, the Parliament, and the Army,"
ranging from a 3-year minimum sentence for insulting the
President to a 6-year maximum for insulting the other branches
of government. Judges have generally been rigorous in
examining the evidence and have dismissed many charges brought
under these laws, but aggressive application of the law by
prosecutors has resulted in arrest and long and expensive
trials in many cases.
Public prosecutors have used these laws to harass dissidents,
real or imagined. To cite one example, a 15-year-old high
school student was detained for 3 months on a charge of having
spread "Communist propaganda" by drawing a Soviet flag and
writing "long live the workers" in his school notebook. The
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prosecutor asked for a sentence of 7 1/2 to 15 years. The
student was acquitted by a court in October, but only after
missing a year of school.
Publications must designate a "responsible editor" who is
legally accountable for a publication's contents. Many have
faced repeated criminal proceedings. Fatma Yazici, one-time
responsible editor for the leftist magazine, Toward the Year
Two Thousand, was sentenced in absentia to 6 years and 3
months in prison for publishing an article entitled "Decisions
of the Kurdish Workers Party Conference." Ms. Yazici faces a
total of 17 1/2 years* imprisonment for four convictions
related to her editorial activities. She has not surrendered
for sentencing and is presumed to have gone into hiding. On
the other hand, the Istanbul State Security Court acquitted
Milliyet reporter Mehmet Ali Birand and responsible editor
Eren Guvener in April for having published a series of
interviews in Syria with PKK leaders.
Obscenity laws have resulted in the confiscation and banning
of numerous publications and films, among them a Turkish
reissue of Henry Miller's "Tropic of Capricorn." Libel laws
have halted newspaper articles critical of government leaders,
including a series highly critical of then Prime Minister Ozal
that appeared in the mass-circulation newspaper Sabah in
April. At the same time, an equally critical book on the then
Prime Minister has headed the Turkish bestseller list during
the past year.
The number of people held under laws restricting speech and
political activities is difficult to estimate but may total
5,000 at the current time. Further breakdowns are difficult
to obtain. Some are held or convicted for their writings or
ideas; others are held under these laws for being members of
proscribed organizations or acting upon their ideas in a way
deemed detrimental to the security of the State. According to
a newspaper article appearing in February, 26 editors were
currently serving sentences, and 2,792 writers, translators,
and journalists had been prosecuted since the Motherland Party
came to power in 1983. The vast majority of those held under
these laws are leftist, but a number of rightwingers ,
generally religious conservatives, are being held as well.
Turkish radio and television (TRT) is a government monopoly.
Opposition figures and many of their supporters believe that
TRT's broadcasts and news coverage have a strong progovernment
bias, despite coverage of opposition leaders and their
parties. A government commission apportions party access to
television and radio during election and referendum campaigns
based on the percentage of parliamentary seats each party
holds. Works of certain leftist writers and Kurdish
performers are said to be banned from broadcast on TRT for
political or cultural reasons.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Peaceful assemblies are permitted with prior approval from the
authorities. Requests for such assemblies are generally
granted, but assemblies are restricted to sites chosen by the
authorities .
The law on associations reflects concern over the involvement
of some organizations in the violence which preceded the
military intervention of 1980. It prohibits associations from
having ties to political parties or engaging in political
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activity. Associations must submit their charters for
government approval before they are allowed to form.
The Constitution and the law governing political parties
proscribe student and faculty involvement in political
activities. Political parties may not form youth branches.
Students and professors, however, may participate in politics
and political parties as individuals, and a number of
academicians have been elected to Parliament.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Turkey is a secular state. The Constitution provides for
freedom of belief, freedom of worship (if in a public
building, the building must be specifically designated for
this purpose and approved of by the State) , and private
dissemination of one's religious ideas.
Turkey's population is overwhelmingly Muslim. Although Turkey
is a secular state, religious instruction, heavily weighted
toward Islamic prayer rituals, is compulsory for all students,
Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
Prosecutors view proselytization and religious activism on the
part of Islamic fundamentalists and Christian evangelicals
with suspicion, especially when their activities are seen to
have political overtones. Islamic fundamentalists have been
charged with membership in illegal organizations or advocating
a theocratic state. Courts dismissed all charges brought
against Turkish and foreign evangelical Christians in 1988.
The police, nevertheless, have on occasion refused to renew
evangelicals' residence permits or have taken steps to expel
them from the country.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Turkish citizens enjoy freedom of movement within Turkey and
are generally free to travel abroad. The Constitution
provides that a citizen's freedom to leave may be restricted
on account of the national economic situation, civic
obligations (generally military service), or criminal
investigation or prosecution.
During the spring and summer of 1989, Turkey generously
accepted an influx of over 300,000 Bulgarian Turks escaping a
forcible assimilation policy in Bulgaria that denied them the
right to use their names, their language, and their cultural
identity. Turkey has pledged to receive and resettle, over
time, all such people coming from Bulgaria. At year's end
about 70,000 had returned to Bulgaria. Some 35,000 Iraqi
Kurdish refugees who arrived in the late summer of 1988 remain
in camps in the southeast. Of the 60,000 Iraqi Kurds who
originally came, a few thousand have returned to Iraq; over
20,000 went to Iran; and slightly over 300 have been resettled
in France. Several hundred thousand Iranians remain in
Turkey. Turkey serves as a de facto country of first asylum
and safe haven for many of them; it neither grants them legal
refugee status nor requires visas.
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Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Turkish citizens have the right and ability to change their
government peacefully, within certain legal constraints.
Turkey has a multiparty, presidential parliamentary system.
Three partie.s are represented in Parliament: the governing
Motherland Party, and the opposition Social Democratic
Populist and the Correct Way parties. The opposition parties
are vigorous and outspoken. Elections for public office are
on the basis of mandatory universal suffrage for those over 21
and a secret ballot.
Turkey's President is elected by Parliament for a single
7-year term. Prime Minister Turgut Ozal was elected President
on October 31, 1989 .
Parliamentary seats are allocated on a weighted proportional
representation basis. Under a "barrage" system, the Turkish
election law excludes parties obtaining less than 10 percent
of the total national vote. This measure is intended to
prevent political fragmentation and recurrence of the
parliamentary paralysis of the late 1970's. The law is
designed to allow a party which obtains a plurality of the
popular vote to obtain a strong majority in Parliament. In
the November 1987 parliamentary elections, a 36-percent
plurality of the popular vote gave Prime Minister Ozal's
Motherland Party 292 seats (65 percent) in the 450-member
unicameral Parliament.
The Constitution provides equal political rights for men and
women. Members of minorities, Muslim and non-Muslim, face no
legal limitations on political participation.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
There are no restrictions placed on representatives of private
organizations who wish to monitor human rights in Turkey.
They are free to speak with private citizens. The Government
continues to be ambivalent toward these groups because of its
belief that their reports are biased. Consequently, access to
government officials or facilities may be refused or
restricted. The Government refused to cooperate with a visit
by Helsinki Watch representatives investigating Turkish prison
conditions in March, but cooperated with a visit in May by a
delegation from the New York City Bar Association
investigating Turkey's compliance with the U.N. Convention
Against Torture.
A nongovernmental Human Rights Association, officially
approved in 1987, has branches in provincial cities and
organizes discussions, publications, rallies, and petitions.
The Social Democratic Populist Party, the principal opposition
party, has a human rights committee and has actively pursued
human rights issues in Parliament. Members of the main
rightwing opposition party, the Correct Way Party, as well as
leading figures in the ruling Motherland Party, have also
spoken out against human rights abuses.
Under the European and U.N. Conventions against Torture, which
Turkey has ratified, committees or rapporteurs are allowed to
visit all places of detention at any time, following
notification to the Government. In August Senators DeConcini
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and Lautenberg of the U.S. Commission of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe visited a prison in Ankara
and interviewed a number of prisoners.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution proclaims Turkey to be a secular state,
regards all Turkish citizens as equal, and prohibits
discrimination on ethnic, religious, or racial grounds. The
Treaty of Lausanne also guarantees the rights of Turkey's
non-Muslim minorities. Among the non-Muslim religious groups,
there are some 50,000 Armenians, 20,000 Jews, 20,000 Syriac
Christians, 18,000 Arab Orthodox, 6,000 Greek Orthodox, and
several thousand Roman Catholics and Chaldean Christians.
Members of these minorities are heavily represented in
business and the professions. These groups operate churches,
monasteries, synagogues, schools, and charitable religious
foundations, such as hospitals and orphanages, but have faced
a number of restrictive bureaucratic policies and procedures
governing their activities and institutions. The expropriation
of church buildings and church-owned property, largely by
municipal governments, has been a serious problem for several
Christian communities in Hatay Province.
Since the attempted Allied partition of Turkey and a number of
tribal rebellions in the eastern part of the country during
and following the First World War, Turkish governments,
beginning with Ataturk, have sought to assimilate the
country's various ethnic groups into the mainstream of Turkish
society. As a result, a variety of Turkish laws and practices
make it difficult, especially for Muslim ethnic or sectarian
minorities, to maintain fully distinct or separate identities
within Turkish society. The Government believes that to
permit such groups as the Kurds to do so could eventually
bring the unity of the State into question. For the
Government, the violent separatist demands of PKK terrorists
dramatize such a threat.
Millions of Turkish Kurds have emigrated to industrialized
cities in the western part of the country and are fully
integrated into the political, economic, and social life of
the nation. Most parliamentary representatives from
southeastern Turkey are ethnic Kurds, whatever their party
affiliation. So are a number of ministers, including Interior
Minister Abdulkadir Aksu and State Minister Kamran Inan.
While Prime Minister, President Ozal publicly referred to his
Kurdish background.
Nevertheless, the Government's pursuit of full assimiliation
has led to the proscription of the publication of any book,
newpaper, or other material in the Kurdish language. Neither
are materials dealing with Kurdish history, culture, and
ethnic identity permitted, and there have been instances of
the arrest of entertainers for singing songs or performing in
Kurdish. While some forms of cultural activity are permitted,
the foregoing limits on cultural expression are a source of
genuine discontent to many Turks of Kurdish origin,
particularly in the economically less developed southeast,
where they are in the majority.
There are no restrictions on the private use of Kurdish, and
the regional governor of the southeast affirmed several times
during 1989 that the use of Kurdish does not connote
"separatism." In 1988 the Government began to permit
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Kurdish-speaking prisoners to converse in Kurdish with their
lawyers or visitors. However, court proceedings still must be
conducted in Turkish, and the poor quality of court-provided
translators sometimes disadvantages Kurdish defendants. The
opposition Social Democrat Populist Party submitted a bill to
Parliament that would eliminate restrictions on the use of
Kurdish, including in publications, but at year's end
prospects for its passage were poor.
The Government has long been a leader in promoting and
protecting women's rights. Turkish women are accorded equal
economic opportunity, and urban middle-class women benefit
from a strong tradition of work outside the home. At the same
time, poor women and those living in lural areas are more
likely to be bound by discrimination based on tradition.
Their marriage and property rights are guaranteed by laws
based on the Swiss Civil CoJe. However, in many parts of
Turkey, laws requiring civil marriage are ignored, and
polygamy, under the form of Islamic marriage, is accepted but
rarely practiced.
Violence against women, especially wife beating, is not
uncommon. The police normally do not intervene in domestic
disputes. Turks of either sex may file civil or criminal
charges but rarely try to resolve family disputes in court.
Turkish law makes no discrimination between the sexes in laws
concerning violence or abuse, and courts make no distinction
between men and women.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Most workers has^e the right to associate freely and form
representative unions. Exceptions are public school teachers,
civil servants, the police, and military personnel. The law
prescribes that unions and confederations may be founded
without prior authorization on the basis of a petition to the
governor of the province where the union's headquarters are to
be located.
Unions are independent of the Government and ruling party,
however, unions, like other organizations, must have
government permission to hold meetings or rallies. Unions
must also allow the police to attend conventions and record
the proceedings. Union officers may serve no more than eight
consecutive 3-year terms in a given union position. The
Constitution requires candidates for union office to have
worked 10 years in the industry represented by the union. The
Government protects the person and property of trade unionists,
The 1988 amendments to the 1983 labor law clarified the right
of unions and their officers to express views on issues
directly affecting members' economic and social interests, but
did not undo constitutional prohibitions on any union role in
party politics. Unions may not establish organic or financial
connections with any political party or other association. In
practice, union leaders and the executive board of the Turkish
Confederation of Labor (Turk-Is) have been able to convey
clearly in election and referendum campaigns their support
for, or opposition to, given political parties without,
however, citing parties or candidates by name.
The Government may not summarily dissolve a union.
Prosecutors may request labor courts to order a trade union or
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confederation into liquidation only if the union has violated
specified legal norms.
Except in stipulated industries such as public utilities, the
petroleum sector, life and property protective services,
sanitation services, and national defense, workers have the
right to strike. Turkish law and the labor court system,
however, require collective bargaining before a strike. The
law specifies a series of steps a union must take before it
may legally strike and a similar series of steps before an
employer may engage in a lockout. Nonbinding mediation is the
last of those steps. In those sectors in which strikes are
prohibited, binding arbitration is the last step.
Once a strike is declared, unions are restricted in the
actions pickets may take as well as the number of pickets they
may place at each entrance and exit of a strike site. The
struck employer may respond with a lockout. However, the
employer is prohibited from hiring strikebreakers or using
administrative personnel to perform jobs normally done by
strikers. Unions are forbidden to engage in secondary
(solidarity) strikes, wildcat strikes or general strikes.
In 1989 there were more than 118 strikes in Turkey involving
some 35,000 workers. All were peaceful, and most were
resolved by wage and benefit settlements approximating or
exceeding Turkey's inflation rate of about 73.5 percent.
There were two particularly long strikes, one for 130 days by
about 10,200 workers against state papermaking enterprises,
which was settled in January 1989; and a 137-day strike by
some 22,000 workers against two state-owned steel mills,
settled in September. These two long strikes contributed to a
new Turkish record of over 2,000,000 lost worker-days in 1989.
Unions may form or join confederations and international
bodies. The law requires governmental approval to do so and
prohibits affiliations with organs hostile to Turkey or to
freedom of religion or belief. Turk-Is, the major Turkish
labor confederation, has 32 affiliates with a total of some
1.5 million workers. Turk-Is is affiliated with the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the
European Trade Union Confederation. There are a number of
smaller confederations, the most important of which is
religiously oriented Hak-Is, comprised of approximately
170,000 workers in 6 unions in various fields. Independent
unions also exist, for example, that of the steelworkers and
the still larger automobile workers' union.
At its 1989 sessions, the Committee on Freedom of Association
(CFA) of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
extensively reconsidered the several cases filed against the
Government alleging violations of ILO Convention 87 on Freedom
of Association. The cases, some of which go back to 1981,
concern the dissolution of the trade union DISK and its
affiliates and the trial and imprisonment of their leaders;
certain provisions of the Turkish Constititution and labor
laws which the CFA contends violate worker rights; and a more
recent complaint involving pending charges against the
President of the Turkish Automobile Workers' Union. Noting
that the Government continues to cooperate in the proceedings,
the CFA requested, among other things, that the Government
expedite a decision on the appeals of the DISK defendants;
modify the offending provisions of the Constititution and
laws; and provide details of the charges against the
automobile union president.
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b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
All industrial workers have the right to organize and bargain
collectively, and most industrial activity and some public
sector agricultural activities are organized. The law
requires that, in order to become a bargaining agent, a union
must have 10 percent of the workers in a given industry as
members as well as 50 percent plus one of the workers at a
given work site. This has the effect of favoring established
unions. There is no agent election; the union submits its
membership roll to the Labor Ministry and requests
certification as the collective bargaining agent. Once
certified, the union receives checkoff privileges, and
compensatory payment from nonunion members. The employer must
enter good-faith negotiations with the certified union.
In June the ILO Conference approved a special paragraph citing
Turkey for violation of ILO Convention 111, which forbids
discrimination against any particular class of workers (i.e.,
teachers). Under Turkish law, teachers employed by the State
may not organize.
Organization and collective bargaining are permitted in newly
established, duty-free zones at Mersin and Antalya, but
workers in those zones will not be allowed to strike until
1994 (10 years after the zones were legally established).
Until that date, settlements not otherwise reached will be
determined by binding arbitration. Workers in firms within
these zones are paid in foreign exchange rather than in
Turkish currency, giving them a hedge against inflation as the
Turkish currency depreciates.
In its 1989 report, the ILO Committee of Experts asserted that
provisions of Turkish law requiring a union to organize a
certain percentage of workers in order to negotiate an
agreement, and giving the Government authority to postpone a
strike and impose compulsory arbitration, are incompatible
with Convention 98 on collective bargaining. The Committee
asked the Government to indicate what measures had been taken
to bring the legislation into compliance.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor is prohibited by the Constitution and
statutes, and it is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Constitution and labor laws forbid employment of children
younger than 15 years of age. The Constitution also prohibits
women and children from engaging in physically demanding jobs,
such as underground mining, and from working at night. The
laws are effectively enforced in the organized industrial area.
In practice, however, many children work in Turkey. Families
frequently need the supplementary income their children can
earn. Many young boys shine shoes and peddle sesame rolls and
sandwiches on city streets. In family-owned businesses such
as restaurants, boys visibly younger than 15 work long hours,
for example, as busboys. In addition, there is an informal
and essentially unsupervised apprentice system in which young
boys work at low wages, e.g., in auto repair shops, in hopes
of learning a trade. Girls are rarely seen in public in work
circumstances, but many are kept out of school to work on
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indoor handicrafts, such as rug weaving, especially in rural
areas .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Labor Ministry is legally obliged to set minimum wages at
least every 2 years, through a minimum wage board. The latter
is a tripartite government-industry-union body. On August 1,
Turkey's minimum wage was increased to the equivalent of just
over $100 monthly at the mid-September exchange rate. The
previous minimum wage was $56 for industrial workers and $52
for agricultural workers; this year's changes established a
unified rate for both categories. Minimum wage workers take
home roughly $64 per month. The minimum wage is effectively
enforced.
Without support from other sources, it would be difficult for
a single worker and impossible for a family to live only on
the minimum wage. The minimum wage is generally paid to
persons new to the work force or providing temporary or part-
time services. Most workers earn considerably more. It
should also be noted that workers receive a hot meal daily (or
a food allowance), transportation to and from work, a fuel
allowance, and other fringe benefits which, according to the
Turkish Employers Association, make basic wages alone only
about 36 percent of total remuneration.
Labor law provides for a nominal 45-hour workweek and mandates
a right to leisure. Most unions have bargained for fewer
hours in the workweek, both to increase premium-pay overtime
and to obtain more leisure time. Labor law limits the number
of overtime hours a worker may be required to work to 3 hours
a day for up to 90 days in a year.
Occupational safety and health regulations are mandated by
law, but the Government has not carried out an effective
inspection and enforcement program. In practice, financial
constraints, limited safety awareness, carelessness, and
fatalistic attitudes result in scant attention to occupational
safety and health by workers and employers alike.
1274
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) has been a
one-party state, dominated by the leadership of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) . That leadership has been a
self-perpetuating elite which, with the assistance of a
powerful secret police apparatus, attempted to direct all
aspects of public life. Although the Soviet Union is a
multinational state, political power has always been highly
centralized in Moscow.
The past year witnessed a remarkable opening up of the
political process and improvements in human rights practices,
although the Soviet Union has a considerable distance to go
before it will meet the standards set forth in the Helsinki
Final Act. In March, elections of deputies to the newly
created Congress of People's Deputies were the freest since
November 1917. Many old-line regional party bosses and
machine candidates lost to reformers, some of whom were not
party members. The Congress elected a legislature, the
U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, that has shown some independence in
confirming ministerial appointments and drafting legislation.
Though the Communist Party remains the sole recognized
political party (with a few local exceptions), the leadership
no longer rigidly controls all party members' expressions and
actions. Clear differences between conservative and reformist
party members have emerged in public. Party members in the
Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet have not
voted a party line. Article 6 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution,
which enshrines the Party's leading role in society, has come
under fierce public attack.
Some important reforms have been institutionalized, including
the creation of new legislative bodies and an election process
that in many, if not all, cases allows a genuine choice
between candidates. Local elections, scheduled for 1990, may
contribute significantly to political decentralization. Legal
reform, on the other hand, has proceeded slowly (although
major steps are promised for 1990). The widely held view that
President Mikhail Gorbachev's continued presence at the helm
is critical to the success of reform suggests that the human
rights improvements effected in recent years can still be
reversed.
The Committee for State Security (KGB), police authorities,
and prosecutors' offices are charged by the party leadership
with enforcing the population's compliance with policy
decisions, directives, and legislation. In some parts of the
country, they have sought to intimidate dissenters and
potential dissenters through short-term detention and
administrative sentencing of demonstrators, summoning persons
selectively for warning conversations, and harsh press attacks
on dissidents. Unlike other government agencies, the KGB has
been subjected to only a modicum of glasnost (openness) and
perestroika (restructuring), although a media campaign has
attempted to clean up its image and portray it as an agency
that observes the law and protects citizens' rights.
In response to growing socioeconomic problems and in
conjunction with a broader effort at reform, Soviet authorities
have initiated the gradual decentralization of economic
decisionmaking and authority. In October 1989, the Supreme
Soviet took up a range of laws expanding earlier reforms and
significantly revamping notions of property, land, and
enterprise. This was aimed at introducing market elements into
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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
the economy. While private enterprise remains highly
circumscribed, new scope was provided under perestroika for
quasi-private activity by independent farmers and cooperatives.
In 1989, though the top leadership's approach to the exercise
of power changed significantly, old authoritarian habits
continued to pervade the governmental system at lower levels.
There were frequent instances of the use of arbitrary
authority, including the attempted intimidation of dissidents
by the local police, particularly the KGB. The inability of
these local officials to follow through with the ruthlessness
that was once possible made their arbitrary actions
increasingly ineffective.
Subject to the foregoing limitations, there is now general
respect for freedom of expression, freedom of association, some
freedom of the press and of assembly, and freedom of religion.
The Ukrainian Catholic Church, the last denomination to suffer
severe repression, was permitted to register its congregations
in December. Government interference in religion has now been
substantially reduced, and the Government's official
sponsorship of atheism is now on the decline.
This generally positive picture, reflecting the intentions of
the reform leadership, is marred, however, by the inability or
unwillingness of lower ranks of the bureaucracy to adhere to
the new standards. Thus, while severe punishment for dissent
is now a matter of the past, petty harassment of citizens who
offend the sensibilities of local bureaucrats continues.
Emigration from the Soviet Union increased dramatically during
1989. Ethnic Germans, Jews, Armenians, and other Soviet
emigrants totaled about 200,000 during 1989, more than any
other year in recent memory. More liberal bills on freedom of
conscience and the press are expected to be introduced in
1990. Of the new laws adopted so far, one specifically allows
strikes, although it forbids them in such key areas as
transportation and energy.
Abroad, the Soviet Union ended its illegal occupation of
Afghanistan by meeting the February 15, 1989, deadline for
withdrawing all its troops.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known instances of political killing in 1989.
However, Soviet security troops on April 9 used clubs and gas
in Tbilisi to break up a peaceful nationalist demonstration
resulting in 19 deaths and over 200 injuries requiring
hospitalization.
b. Disappearance
There have been no known instances of prolonged or permanent
disappearance in recent years.
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c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Many Soviet prisoners suffer both mental and physical abuse
and mistreatment during interrogation, trial, and confinement,
according to a wide variety of reliable sources. Life in
prison or labor camps continues to be marked by isolation,
poor diet and malnutrition, compulsory hard labor, beatings,
frequent incarceration in punishment cells for violations of
camp rules, inadequate medical care, and harsh restrictions on
family visits and correspondence.
Soviet officials report that violence, hostage-taking, and
crime in Soviet prisons and camps rose sharply in 1989.
However, numerous reforms on a trial basis are reportedly
under way within Soviet prisons and camps. These include
furloughs, increased visiting privileges by family and clergy,
better food, less crowding, greater restrictions on the use of
punishment cells, and rewards for productive workers in the
form of financial incentives and early releases. Many of
these reforms are expected to be included in the new draft
penal code.
In March a team of U.S. psychiatrists and legal experts was
permitted to visit Soviet psychiatric hospitals and examine
patients. Prior to and during the team's visit, authorities
released several psychiatric patients suspected of having been
confined for political reasons. Since the visit, those
patients whom the team examined and found healthy have been
released. The U.S. delegation in its final report noted the
continuation of practices that lend credence to continuing
concerns about psychiatric abuse. The team's report, in
addition to its discussion of the problem of psychiatric abuse,
analyzed the state of psychiatry in the Soviet Union and
offered recommendations. The Soviet authorities commented
positively on the latter. Critics of past Soviet psychiatric
practices, both within and outside the Soviet Union, have
expressed concern that psychiatrists associated with
psychiatric abuse have remained in positions of professional
leadership.
There were no confirmed reports of new long-term
hospitalizations of political dissidents. The year saw
several instances of persons being temporarily confined in
psychiatric hospitals for political reasons. All were
released within a few months.
Soviet authorities claim to have removed over 1 1/2 million
persons from the register of mentally ill in 1989 and intend
further reductions in its scope and size. Approximately
6 million persons still remain on the register. Inclusion in
the register of the mentally ill leads to many social and
legal disadvantages, especially in obtaining residence permits
and employment.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
In 1989 Article 190-1, which outlawed "the dissemination of
deliberately hostile fabrications defaming the Soviet State
and social system," was repealed. Article 70, which outlawed
"anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" without defining it,
was amended in July by a decree of the Supreme Soviet. In its
new form, the law outlaws only calls for the use of violence
to overthrow the State.
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In general, however, reform of the Soviet Criminal Code is
lagging behind schedule. The Code still includes Articles 142
and 227, which restrict the free exercise of religious beliefs.
However, there were no known convictions under these religious
articles in the last 3 years.
Sverdlovsk activist Sergey Kuznetsov was tried and convicted
in 1989 on charges stemming from participating in a December
1988 rally marking International Human Rights Day. In early
January 1990, Kuznetsov was released following a reduction of
his 3-year sentence to time already served.
Some human rights activists in 1989 were detained undet the
provisions of a Supreme Soviet decree on meetings and
demonstrations (see Section 2.b.). While a number of large
demonstrations have been permitted under the provisions of
that decree, most notably in the Baltic states and the
Caucasus, many have been forbidden.
The Criminal Code provides Soviet authorities the power to
detain citizens for 3 to 4 hours for questioning; after this
period, detainees must either be charged or released.
According to the Code of Criminal Procedure, pretrial detention
can last as long as 9 months, and prisoners are not entitled
to consult with a lawyer until shortly before trial. Prolonged
pretrial detention thus can function as a form of preventive
detention. Eleven members of the Karabakh Committee and two
other leading Karabakh activists were detained without trial
from December 1988 until their release in May 1989.
Internal exile has almost disappeared in the Soviet Union.
The December 1988 draft of the "Principles of Criminal
Legislation" called for the elimination of internal (and
foreign) exile, but the new law has not yet been formally
adopted. Nonetheless, almost all exiled prisoners had been
released by the end of 1988, and there have been no known
instances of persons being exiled since then. Since the end
of 1988, no known political or religious prisoners have been
serving sentences solely under Articles 70, 142, 190-1, or 227.
Questions remain about certain Soviet prisoners convicted on
criminal charges whose actions would not now be considered
crimes by the current Government, or where political
considerations may have contributed to their conviction or
sentencing. In July the Soviet Government accepted a U.S.
proposal for an exchange of information on such criminal cases.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Communist Party control of society extends to the legal and
judicial system and negates constitutional guarantees of the
objectivity and independence of the judicial process. The
Soviet press continues to expose problems in the Soviet
judicial system. Some initial steps have been taken towards
judicial reform. The Supreme Soviet passed a law aimed at
increasing judicial independence which gives the judiciary
control over the promotion of judges and establishes
multicandidate elections for judges. In addition, the
Government declared it will double judges' salaries.
Since there were few political trials in 1989, it is difficult
to judge how perestroika may have contributed to reform in
this area. However, in the case of Sverdlovsk activist Sergey
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Kuznetsov, Sverdlovsk court officials rejected two of his
choices for lawyers and declared the trial closed to the
public. Defense attorneys, like judges, are subject to
political pressures and constraints applied by the security
forces and the party. According to official statistics, about
60 percent of attorneys are party members. In this area, as
with the press, limits have expanded but restrictions remain.
For example, there have been charges that attorneys must have
special clearance to act as a defendant's counsel in cases with
political implications, although this may not now be the case.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Government interference in personal life is pervasive.
However, the authorities' view that it is a citizen's duty to
inform on the unorthodox attitudes of family members, friends,
and neighbors may be changing. For example, most government
agencies now refuse to accept anonymous denunciations.
Security forces routinely monitor the residences and
telephones of certain Soviet citizens and foreigners, despite
constitutional guarantees of the inviolability of citizens'
homes. The resolutions of the XIX Communist Party Conference
specifically called for guaranteeing the privacy of private
communications, but legislative changes in this area have not
yet been accomplished. According to the law, no one may enter
a home against the will of the resident "without legal
grounds." In practice this provision has little restraining
effect on investigative agencies. A new U.S.S.R. Supreme
Soviet decree provides a legal basis for Ministry of Internal
Affairs troops to enter private homes in pursuit of a suspected
criminal. There were virtually no house searches for political
materials reported in 1989 until the end of the year, when
house searches were conducted in Leningrad, Tbilisi, Saratov,
and Sverdlovsk.
Through the control of mail and telephone circuits, the
authorities can selectively restrict contact between citizens,
intercepting mail or blocking telephone connections. While
this has become much less frequent than in the past, it is
still practiced when the authorities consider vital political
interests to be affected. For example, Moscow-based human
rights activists reported that they could not get calls
through to their contacts in Tbilisi during the disturbances
there in April and could not reach contacts in Ivanovo during
the hunger strike there by religious activists.
Despite laws still on the books intended to discourage
contacts with foreigners, there has been a dramatic decrease
in government interference with such contacts. For example,
foreigners who visited refuseniks or dissidents were harassed
far less than in the past. It has also become much easier for
Soviet citizens to invite American relatives and friends to
visit the U.S.S.R. as private guests.
All jamming of Radio Liberty in Russian and other languages
was halted in 1989, thus vastly increasing the range of
foreign broadcasting to which Soviet citizens have easy
access. Voice of America broadcasts also are not jammed.
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Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and press to the
extent that it is in accordance with the "interests of the
people and the strengthening and development of the Socialist
system." During 1988 and 1989 that last phrase was
interpreted more broadly. The degree of glasnost and the
range of acceptable opinion have expanded considerably.
A dramatic and unprecedented example of glasnost in the Soviet
media during 1989 was complete television broadcasts of the
debates in the Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme
Soviet on a host of formerly taboo topics.
Unofficial or independent publications continue to flourish in
spite of occasional police harassment and a lack of access to
reproduction supplies. Reportedly, there may be as many as
600 independent publications in the Russian language alone,
representing a wide spectrum of political, religious, and
cultural views. Although the independent press tends to be
concentrated in Moscow and Leningrad, there also are many
publications in the republics. As in the past, any
independent publication may be closed down at the whim of the
authorities because it is not legally recognized.
For the most part, the police look the other way when
Independent publications are distributed. From time to time,
however, police have rounded up distributors of independent
papers, as they did to several distributors during the second
week of September in Moscow's Pushkin Sguare.
The new draft press law, currently under discussion in the
Supreme Soviet, states: "The right to establish mass media
belongs to state and public organizations, creative unions,
religious, cooperative, and other affiliations of citizens
created in accordance with the law, and also to work
collectives and citizens of the U.S.S.R." Ostensibly, this
means that anyone may start a newspaper, although an editor
would presumably have to register with local government
authorities. According to the draft, any publication which
"promotes wax, racism, or the violent overthrow of the Soviet
Government, or advocates religious or ethnic intolerance" may
be suspended by the authorities.
Working conditions for foreign journalists continued to
improve in 1989, including access to newsmakers and
policymakers, greater ease in reporting and transmitting news,
and the virtual absence of harassment. There has been some
limited travel by journalists to closed areas, but also
restrictions or outright bans on travel to normally open areas
in times of trouble, e.g., Tbilisi after the April massacre.
Most universities and research institutes continue to be
operated by the State or the party; however, Soviet academics
are exerting considerable pressure for more autonomy from
central authorities. Some universities have gained more
freedom to determine their own curriculums, particularly in
the area of social sciences and history. Archival access
continues to open up for Soviet scholars, although perhaps not
fast enough to satisfy the most progressive.
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b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
According to the provisions of the July 1988 Supreme Soviet
decree on meetings, street marches, and demonstrations,
organizers must apply to local officials 10 days before a
meeting is scheduled, and officials must notify organizers of
the decision at least 5 days before the scheduled date of the
event. Civil and criminal penalties may be levied against
those who participate in unauthorized demonstrations.
The corresponding law on demonstrations in the Russian
Federated Soviet Socialist Republic has stiff penalties:
participation in unauthorized demonstrations is punishable by
fines of up to $495 and/or administrative arrest for up to 15
days. Repeat offenders may be fined up to $1,650, arrested
for up to 15 days per offense, and/or sentenced to corrective
labor for 30 to 60 days with a deduction of 20 percent of
their earnings. If criminal responsibility is established,
the law provides for deprivation of freedom for up to 6
months, corrective labor for up to 1 year, and a fine of up to
$3,300. While many persons have received fines of up to $495
and sentences of up to 15 days, no one is reported to have
been sentenced to the stiff er penalties. (The Soviet monthly
mean wage is about $220 to $225.)
Implementation of the law on demonstrations varied widely
between different regions in 1989. Authorities in the Baltic
states gave permission to virtually all gatherings, including
mass demonstrations on August 23 that marked the 40th
anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
Large, unauthorized demonstrations were held with increased
frequency in 1989. There were numerous mass meetings and
marches in the Caucasus, major nationalist demonstrations in
Ukraine and Moldavia in the second half of 1989 and throughout
the year in the Baltic states, and large unauthorized
demonstrations by supporters of Boris Yel'tsin in Moscow in
March.
Nonetheless, local authorities in several cities, including
Moscow, used the July 1988 law on demonstrations selectively
to deny many groups permission to hold gatherings. For
example, organizations such as the Democratic Union, a group
committed to the peaceful removal of the existing Soviet
system of government, have consistently been refused
permission to demonstrate, and their leaders have been
subjected to repeated administrative punishment for violating
regulations on demonstrations.
On April 9 in Tbilisi, Soviet security troops used clubs and
gas to break up a peaceful nationalist demonstration, resulting
in at least 19 deaths and over 200 injuries requiring
hospitalization. An investigative commission of the Georgian
Supreme Soviet concluded that the troops used toxic gas. In
October it published a detailed report of the incident which
asserted that the final decision to send in troops was made by
Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov and former KGB Chief Viktor
Chebrikov. The central Government has denied direct
involvement in the incident. On December 24, Anatoliy Sobchak,
Chairman of a special commission designated to investigate the
Tbilisi incident, presented the commission's final report to
the Second Congress of People's Deputies. The report concluded
that the military had applied unnecessary force to put down
the demonstration; had not acted with the authorization of
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proper authorities; and had used improperly two types of riot
control gases.
On October 2 in L'vov, troops reportedly used plastic bullets
against nationalist demonstrators, resulting in numerous
injuries. The People's Front of Belorussia was forced to hold
its founding conference on June 25 in Lithuania because
Belorussian authorities would not allow the conference to take
place in Minsk. On several occasions, interethnic violence in
the Caucasus and Central Asia resulted in authorities
declaring a state of emergency and banning all demonstrations.
The Constitution grants citizens the right to associate in
public organizations "in accordance with the aim of building
communism." Previously, public associations were organized by
the authorities or subject to their strict control, and the
Government suppressed independent associations. Beginning in
1987, thousands of unofficial or informal organizations were
founded to provide a forum for discussion of political, social,
ecological, and other issues. Many of these clubs produce
journals or bulletins; most actively support perestroika.
They exist in a legal twilight zone, however, if they are not
registered with the State as required. Without registration —
in some cases not sought and in others sought but not granted —
a group may not have a bank account or a public meetingplace.
In several areas, particularly in the Baltic states,
unofficial groups act increasingly like political parties.
Many People's Front organization candidates in the Baltic
states won election to the new Congress of People's Deputies.
So-called People's Fronts have also emerged in Ukraine,
Belorussia, Moldavia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moscow, and
Leningrad.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Soviet Constitution guarantees the "right to profess or not
to profess any religion and to conduct religious worship or
atheistic propaganda." The right to conduct religious worship
and the right to make atheistic propaganda are not equivalent,
however, since the former right does not include the right to
conduct "religious propaganda," i.e., to engage in public
defense of religious values or to rebut official attacks on
religion. Moreover, extensive legislation and administrative
regulations on "religious cults" place additional restrictions
on freedom of religion. This legislation is now under review,
and less restrictive legislation is expected to be introduced
to the Supreme Soviet in 1990.
The Government displayed a much more tolerant attitude toward
religion in 1989 than in the past. Approximately 3,000 new
Russian Orthodox institutions were registered, mostly parishes
but also 10 monasteries and 2 new seminaries. Russian Orthodox
priests were allowed to visit the ill in hospitals and the
imprisoned in jails. Both the Russian Orthodox and the
Baptists have become engaged in charity work, from which they
were previously banned. Baptists report no problems with
their ambitious new parish-building efforts.
In Central Asia, greater glasnost is revealing that Islam
still has a strong hold on at least parts of the population.
Moslems have been granted permission to open a number of new
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mosques and one theological school. A number of Moslems
imprisoned for their religious beliefs were released in 1989.
Registration with the Soviet Council on Religious Affairs is
still required for religious groups of 20 adults or more. The
Council reportedly has yet to respond to 5,000 requests for the
registration of new Russian Orthodox parishes. The State's
refusal to grant registration has sometimes been used to deny
legal status to entire religious denominations. Once
registered, religious congregations must still theoretically
accept strict regulations which prohibit proselytizing,
religious discussion and Bible study groups, charitable
activity, and formal religious training for children.
A number of groups of believers continue to refuse to register
officially on the grounds that much of the legislation
affecting "religious cults" contradicts the tenets of their
religious beliefs. Unregistered believers, such as some
Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh-Day Adventists, and
Pentecostalists , are subject to repressive measures, including
harassment at school or place of employment, denial of access
to housing, and dismissal from work. The press has reported,
however, that the Government is considering registering the
Jehovah's Witnesses. Although Pentecostalists are still
harassed, mainly in the form of fines, such harassment
decreased in 1989.
In December the Ukrainian Council for Religious Affairs
attached to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers officially
announced a policy of permitting Ukrainian Catholic
congregations to register. This action ended the illegal
status of Ukrainian Catholic believers that has lasted since
1946. During 1989 Ukrainian Catholics had become much more
assertive: they held a number of open-air masses attended by
thousands of faithful, and some of their bishops and clergy
came out of hiding. Several Ukrainian Catholic religious
services were broken up by government forces, however, and
Ukrainian Catholic priests continued to be fined for
performing them, though to a lesser extent than in the past.
By year's end, they reportedly controlled about 80 churches.
The practice of religion still is discouraged in various ways,
including limitations on the number of sacred books, such as
the Bible or the Koran, which may be printed. Only a few
religious publications of controlled content, such as the
Vestnik of the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate, are officially
allowed to be published; however, some unofficiaj. Orthodox
publications, including "Bulletin of the Christian Community"
and "Choice," have so far been tolerated.
In 1988 customs regulations restricting the importation of
Bibles and religious literature were abolished, although laws
against speculation continued to limit the numbers that could
be imported. In practice, this meant that registered
religious groups were able to import large quantities of
Bibles, while travelers carrying more than one Bible ran the
risk of confiscation at the border on the pretext that the
Bibles were intended for speculation. Persons reported the
delivery of small quantities of Bibles and other religious
books through the mail, although many such packages continue
to be seized or stolen in the mail. The Hare Krishnas are
currently protesting the decision of the Council on Religious
Affairs to withhold approval for the importation of 200,000
copies of Hare Krishna religious literature. The literature
was impounded by Moscow customs officials in September.
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The number of clergymen and places of worship today is only a
small fraction of the number which existed before the October
1917 Revolution. At the same time, Soviet officials recognize
that over ^^O million Soviet citizens adhere to some religion.
Existing seminaries and other institutions of clerical
education have been permitted to enroll a larger number of
students, but they still do not provide a sufficient body of
trained clergy for officially registered denominations,
especially given the widespread interest in participating in
religion observed in 1989.
The Communist Party is, according to its rules, an atheistic
organization. Membership in the party, considered incompatible
with religious belief, is in effect a requirement for
advancement to most positions of authority or prestige in the
country. Thus, the authorities have largely excluded
practicing believers from positions of power. However,
believers are no longer rigorously excluded from public
activities or from access to the media.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement is not guaranteed by law. Although
citizens are generally free to move about within the country,
travel in certain areas (e.g., frontier regions or areas of
military significance) requires special permission. All adults
are issued identity documents or internal passports which must
be carried during travel and used to register visits of more
than 3 days with the local authorities. Although approximately
20 percent of Soviet territory is formally closed to travel by
foreigners, most territory outside of major urban centers is
in practice difficult to visit or inaccessible and is therefore
closed in effect to travel by foreigners.
The right to choose one's place of residence, although formally
provided for by law, is subject to restrictions. Everyone is
required to register his or her place of residence. The
authorities limit the number of residence permits in several
dozen large cities, including Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev,
where housing is at a premium.
Soviet authorities, in response to U.S. representations, now
allow Soviet citizens to obtain exit permission while
continuing to live in their homes, work at their jobs, and
keep their children in school. The final checkout from Soviet
society that requires them to relinquish these basics now will
be allowed by Soviet authorities only after the applicant has
shown a permit from another country to take up residence there.
To travel abroad, Soviet citizens must have a passport for
foreign travel and an exit visa, usually valid for 6 months,
specifying the destination for each trip. According to Soviet
Foreign Ministry officials, more than one-half million Soviet
passports were issued for external travel in 1989.
During 1989 many persons without relatives abroad were allowed
to travel abroad to visit friends. However, Soviet citizens
usually can travel on private visits to the West only if they
receive an invitation from an individual who undertakes all
financial responsibility for the trip. Currency regulations
and requirements to purchase tickets in rubles also restrict
travel opportunities, even if formal exit permission is
granted.
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During 1989 thousands of Soviet citizens residing abroad
permanently as well as former Soviet citizens were permitted
to return on short family visits or for other reasons. This
trend, which began in 1987 and continued in 1988, grew rapidly
during 1989.
Currently, Soviet law does not recognize the right of citizens
to emigrate by choice. The Soviet system continues to restrict
emigration (with notable exceptions for some ethnic and
religious groups) to those citizens who married a foreigner or
desire reunification with immediate relatives abroad. In 1989
the Soviets drafted a new law on emigration which would provide
broad legal guarantees on the right to travel abroad (with some
restrictions). In November the draft law passed a first
reading in the Supreme Soviet. Final passage is expected in
1990.
The most frequently used barrier to emigration, aside from the
requirement of an invitation, is the requirement that
prospective emigrants should have had no access to "secrets."
In some cases, persons have been denied exit permission
although they have had no access to "secrets" for more than 10
years. In a few cases, denial has been based on mere
possession of a clearance, although there was never any access
to classified information. The application of this restriction
is often quite arbitrary. In 1989 the Soviets lifted the
security restrictions on many persons and permitted their
emigration.
Another barrier to emigration still in effect is the
requirement that family members sign release forms for their
children--meaning that they may refuse to release adult
children from financial or moral commitments.
In 1989 it was rare that a person not employed in security-
related work lost his job when submitting an emigration
application. The vast majority of those applying for visas
for the first time were approved, and social ostracism eased
considerably for would-be emigrants. Jewish emigration in
1989 exceded 72,000, the highest yearly total since the
pre-World War I era, up considerably over the 1988 total of
19,292 and the 1987 figure of 8,155. The highest recent
yearly total had occurred in 1979, when 51,000 Jews emigrated.
During 1989 more than 9,000 Soviet Armenians emigrated to the
United States. More than 98,000 Soviet ethnic Germans were
permitted to leave the Soviet Union in 1989 for the Federal
Republic of Germany. This figure, again, represents a
dramatic increase over the previous year's 45,000 departures.
Soviet authorities in 1989 continued to resolve a significant
number of divided family cases affecting the United States,
France, the United Kingdom, and Australia.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Soviet citizens do not have the right to change their system
of government, although the reforms instituted during the past
year have opened the way to increased popular participation in
the political process. Multicandidate elections, political
campaigning, and the secret ballot are becoming the norm. The
Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet engage in
open, frequently televised debate. Separation of party and
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government has enabled special interest groups to exert more
influence on government policy and structures.
Divisions within the CPSU continue to be clearly visible, as
are the competing views of other parliamentary groups.
Differences within the CPSU between central party authorities
and those in the republics have also emerged sharply. The
threat of the Lithuanian party that it may sever its ties with
the CPSU and operate independently and the vote in two of the
three Baltic states to eliminate the leading role of the CPSU
severely test the ability of the CPSU to control all political
decisionmaking. Furthermore, the threat of the Baltic states
to declare their independence from the Soviet Union reflects
the desire of their populations to seek by their own actions
to change their system of government. The U.S. Government has
not recognized the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states
into the Soviet Union.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights.
Soviet authorities have adopted a more forthcoming approach to
foreign criticism of their human rights record, acknowledging
problems and stating their desire to make their society more
"humane." They have also acknowledged that the human rights
situation in the U.S.S.R. is subject to discussion in official
bilateral and multilateral contacts. During 1989 they held
several meetings with U.S. officials on human rights issues.
The Soviet Government in 1989 began to permit foreigners, on a
very limited, controlled basis, to examine the status of human
rights in the U.S.S.R. In August the Soviets permitted U.S.
Congressmen Frank Wolf and Christopher Smith to visit Perm
Labor Camp 35 and interview more than 20 prisoners. They also
permitted staff members of the Congressional Helsinki
Commission to meet freely with dissidents, refuseniks, and
others. The Soviet Union committed itself to permit private
persons and nongovernmental organizations access to the human
rights conference of the Helsinki signatory states scheduled
to be held in Moscow in 1991. The Soviet Union is a member of
the United Nations Human Rights Commission.
Unofficial Soviet human rights groups, however, complain that
Soviet authorities ignore their inquiries on human rights
issues and only answer questions posed by the Soviet Human
Rights Commission, which officially is described as a
nongovernmental organization but is clearly an officially
organized body.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for the equal status of all Soviet
citizens, regardless of nationality, sex, or language. The
Soviets recognize more than 100 nationalities in the U.S.S.R.,
and the Soviet federal system is based on nationality. Many
ethnic groups have territorial and administrative entities.
The 15 Soviet Republics, some of which were formerly
independent countries, represent some of the largest and most
developed nationalities. Other smaller nationalities have
autonomous republics, oblasts, or districts, but some 55
million Soviets live outside their nationality's
administrative region or belong to a nationality that has
none. The national rights of those Soviet citizens have not
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been adequately addressed, as the party admitted at the CPSU
Plenum on Nationalities in September.
During the Brezhnev period, a quota system was used
extensively throughout the Soviet Union as part of a broader
nationality policy. Some ethnic groups benefited
significantly from that policy, as they obtained more
positions in universities and middle-class occupations than
they would have if merit had been the main criterion. Other
groups suffered. President Gorbachev has opposed the quota
system, in part out of the belief that it has fostered
deep-seated corruption in many parts of the country. At the
same time, those ethnic groups that benefited from Brezhnev's
"affirmative action" program have begun to lose substantial
privileges and opportunities.
Most minorities in the Soviet Union have suffered official
government discrimination as a result of the policy of
Russif ication or as a result of opposition to that policy.
Perestroika has involved the transfer of increased power to
the republics to decide internal questions. The republics
have responded by putting greater emphasis on their local
cultural and linguistic heritage. Members of ethnic
minorities, especially non-Slavs, are rarely found at the
highest level of nationwide organizations and academic or
governmental bodies, though minorities tend to dominate their
own local organizations, including those at the republic
level. Developments regarding the rights of national
minorities are described below:
Ukraine -- A number of unofficial groups that foster the
Ukrainian language and culture organized and met during the
year. The Ukrainian Popular Front, "Rukh," held its founding
Congress September 8-10 in Kiev. The Congress proceeded
without interruption by the authorities, although afterward
several participants were harassed and threatened with arrest.
Unofficial Ukrainian gro. r^s continued to call for the
establishment of Ukrainian as the official language of the
Republic, and a draft law declaring Ukrainian the official
language was published in September. The Ukrainian Communist
Party leadership opposed this demand. They also tended to
repress religious and nationalist dissent more harshly than
did leaders in other republics. Nevertheless, the authorities
allowed greater scope for Ukrainian cultural activity and
tolerated a number of Ukrainian samizdat journals. The
central Soviet leadership sharply criticized the Ukrainian
leadership for its heavy-handedness , and, on September 20,
Vladimir Shcherbi tsky, a conservative holdover from the
Brezhnev period of rule, lost his seat on the Politburo and
his leadership of the Ukrainian party.
Moldavia -- National activism continued during 1989 with
innumerable demonstrations against official government policy
concerning cultural, economic, ecological, and religious
rights. In May several unofficial groups formed the People's
Front of Moldavia to protest the Moldavian Communist
leadership's intransigence. Almost all unofficial groups were
criticized by both the national and local official press.
In August and September, numerous strikes and demonstrations
by both Russians and Moldavians were held, each side advancing
its view of the content of the Republic's language law. In
September the Moldavian Supreme Soviet passed a language law
declaring Moldavian the official language of the Republic and
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Russian the language of interethnic communication. The
Russians continued their strikes for weeks after the law was
passed and was endorsed by a U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Commission
which had been sent to Moldavia to investigate the situation.
Armenia and Azerbaijan -- Violence continued between
Azerbaijanis and Armenians over the Armenian enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. In mid-September, an Azeri
economic blockade against the Armenians resulted in severe
shortages of food, fuel, and consumer goods.
In May Soviet authorities released all 11 members of the
Karabakh committee, who had been held without trial since
December 1988. Two other leading Karabakh activists, Khachik
Stamboltsyan and Aleksandr Akopyan, were also released from
detention.
In July a military order banning mass gatherings, meetings,
and demonstrations was announced in Baku. Nevertheless, the
Azerbaijan People's Front continues to organize regular mass
rallies. A demonstration organized by the unofficial group
"Birlik" was broken up by police, and about 40 people were
detained.
Georgia — The April 9 incident is described in Section 2.b.
The Georgian Popular Front held its founding conference in
Tbilisi in July. Violence broke out in August and September
between Georgians and Abhkazians over the ethnic rights of
Abhkazians. Tensions continue between the Christian Georgians
and the Muslim Abkhazians and are increasingly acquiring
religious overtones.
Central Asia -- In June Uzbeks in the Fergana Valley began
attacking the local Meskhetian Turk population. Reportedly,
local policemen assisted in the persecution of Meskhetians by
providing Uzbeks with addresses.
In Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan, and Kirgiziya, the Republic
Supreme Soviets passed laws making the respective local
languages the official language of each republic. Russian was
declared the language of interethnic communication. These
language laws will probably result in wider use of the local
languages in everyday life. In Uzbekistan, a similar language
law is currently under debate. Ethnically motivated attacks
on local nonindigenous populations along with the language
laws have led to a sizable exodus of Europeans and Caucasus
peoples from these republics.
Germans — A society of Soviet Germans called "Revival"
(Vozrozhdeniye) was established in Alma Ata in June. The
society plans to chronicle events that concern Soviet Germans,
coordinate activities of recently established German
sociopolitical clubs, and act as a cultural center for Soviet
Germans in Kazakhstan. A special Supreme Soviet commission on
the German problem is currently investigating ways to satisfy
some German ethnic concerns.
Crimean Tatars -- In 1989 Crimean Tatars still encountered
problems returning to their homeland, from which they were
forcibly removed in 1944. However, their situation is
improving somewhat, and a number of them have been able to
return. Crimean Tatar activists were occasionally attacked by
the official press. Recently, the Supreme Soviet officially
exonerated this and all other ethnic groups deported by Stalin
during World War II.
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Jews — Though the country's top leadership no longer fosters
anti-Semitism and appears embarrassed by it, there has been a
sharp increase in popular expressions of anti-Semitic
attitudes. Jews have become increasingly concerned over the
danger of violence. They view the activities of organizations
such as "Pamyaf as particularly dangerous and are troubled by
the failure of the leadership to speak out against anti-
Semitism. On the other hand, the reform press has condemned
anti-Semitism strongly and repeatedly. Jews have welcomed
their increasing cultural and religious freedom, which
includes the opportunity to study Hebrew. Toward the end of
the year, a broadly representative meeting of Jewish activists
took place and a countrywide representative Jewish organization
was formed, the first such meeting and organization since the
October Revolution.
Women nominally enjoy the same legal rights as men, including
the right to participate in all areas of the social, political,
and economic life of the Soviet Union. An extensive system of
day-care service and maternity leave benefits allow women to
retain employment after having borne children, which is a
necessity as virtually all women have no economic choice but
to work both inside and outside the home. Women bear the main
brunt of the hardships of Soviet daily life, such as waiting
in long lines for food products. Women's rights activists
report that only about 20 percent of the demand for
contraceptives is satisfied. The result is over 6 million
abortions a year, with consequent dangers to women's health,
given the poor hygienic conditions in most Soviet medical
facilities .
Women rights activists report widespread domestic violence
against women throughout all the republics of the U.S.S.R.,
often involving widespread male alcoholism. Wife beatings are
a particularly pressing problem in the Central Asian
Republics, where several cases of women committing suicide
because of untenable living conditions with husbands and
in-laws were reported in 1989. Statistics on this problem are
as yet unavailable in the Soviet Union, though women activists
are trying to compile them. The difficulty of women's lives
in the Soviet Union continued to be discussed in the Soviet
press in 1989. The Council of Ministers has established a
special branch (with a woman at its head) to study the
problems of women. One of the first subjects to be discussed
by the Supreme Soviet was safety conditions for women engaged
in manual labor, including restrictions on weights women could
be assigned to lift and night-shift work.
Special privileges shield many members of the Soviet elite
(the party, the military, the diplomatic service, the
scientific-technical intelligentsia, and the cultural and
sports establishments) to varying degrees from social and
economic hardships. Privileges include access to better
housing, schools, medical care, and foreign travel, as well as
access to restricted stores with high quality food and
imported consumer goods. The system of special privileges,
already somewhat reduced in 1988 from earlier levels, came
under sharp criticism in the new Supreme Soviet in the second
half of 1989. Promises were made about reviewing and possibly
closing the Health Ministry's so-called Fourth Department,
which provides health services to senior party and government
officials. As market elements have been introduced and quasi-
private enterprise has spread, money and not just political
influence has begun to provide broader access to amenities.
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Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
In the Soviet Union, the right of association as defined by
the International Labor Organization (ILO) does not formally
exist, though in practice the authorities showed an
increasingly liberal attitude toward the free association of
workers in 1989. Approximately 30 functional trade unions,
encompassing virtually the entire Soviet labor force, operate
under the direction of the officially sponsored All-Union
Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) , a government
umbrella mass organization which advances Soviet and Communist
labor interests. The AUCCTU serves as a means of political
indoctrination, propaganda, and management control of
workers. It is not known ever to have taken an official
position that differed significantly from the Communist
Party's stand, and its officials work in close concert with
their party counterparts at all levels. The AUCCTU funds and
controls the Prague-based labor international known as the
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) , which seeks to
promote Soviet political objectives among workers around the
world.
Despite the AUCCTU' s official omnipresence, independent
organized labor activities emerged in 1989. In March workers
began organizing a group which by summer became the "USSR
Association of Socialist Trade Unions" (SOTSPROF), which
loomed as an alternative all-Union federation to the AUCCTU.
SOTSPROF has won limited legal status to conduct its
activities. In early summer, two groups of independent
workers groups met in Moscow, and an organizing committee
emerged which reportedly seeks to pull together a congress of
workers, with the goal of nominating candidates for local and
republic elections in late 1989 and early 1990. In cities
throughout the U.S.S.R., fledgling independent union movements
have sprung up.
Hundreds of thousands of Soviet coal miners in virtually every
coal-producing region of the country walked off the job in
July for periods ranging from 1 or 2 days to much longer
periods. Their demands included higher pay and better working
and living conditions. Overnight, strike committees formed
spontaneously at individual mines, and these committees
ultimately combined into city, regional, and interregional
bodies. Regional strike committees gained formal recognition
when negotiators representing the local Communist Party, local
government, and the AUCCTU signed agreements. The strike
committees won a continuing role overseeing fulfillment of the
strike accords and of the coal industry as a whole. By
contrast, the AUCCTU demonstrated its role in the Soviet
system by siding with the party and the Government against the
interests of the workers that the AUCCTU claims to represent.
To avoid antagonizing the strikers, Soviet authorities have
allowed these various nonofficial trade union activities to
proceed unhindered, and have provided both a measure of
recognition and even support to some. The AUCCTU, in
particular, provided facilities to SOTSPROF organizers and
coal miners' strike committee leaders. Some regarded this as
an effort by the AUCCTU to associate itself with, or even
co-opt, independent activities. Some independent workers'
groups also established international contacts.
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In October the Supreme Soviet passed legislation on procedures
for settling labor disputes. For the first time since 1917,
this legislation formally established the right to strike for
Soviet workers, albeit only after detailed and lengthy dispute-
settlement procedures have been exhausted. The law also
established a formal ban on strikes in transport, energy,
communication, government, and the military services, and it
included broad, undefined references to "essential services"
which could be used to block strikes in virtually any part of
the economy. However, all workers apparently enjoy the
protection of the law's labor dispute-settlement procedures.
As it has in the past, the ILO's Committee of Experts in 1989
examined provisions of Soviet law and the Constitution which
establish a system of trade union monopoly and a leading role
for the Communist Party. Restrictions were lifted on the
right of workers to meet only after prior authorization. But
legislative measures do not exist which would ensure the right
of workers to establish trade union organizations outside the
existing trade union structure, and the right of workers'
organizations to organize their activities and formulate their
programs in full independence and without interference from
the public authorities.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Virtually all Soviet workers automatically become members of
an affiliate of the official trade union organization, the
AUCCTU. There is no evidence that persons refusing to join the
union have difficulty in finding jobs, although this was the
case several years ago. Persons involved with SOTSPROF or with
other new, independent labor organizations report no
interference with their activities or discrimination against
them at the workplace. Coal miners' strike committee leaders
likewise report no adverse consequences from their activities.
Although reform legislation on organizing and collective
bargaining is under consideration, it has not yet been
passed. The Soviet Government has shown some willingness to
deal with unofficial labor groups when forced by circumstances
to do so, as in the case of the coal miners' strikes. Most
day-to-day representation of Soviet workers' interests is
conducted solely by officials of the AUCCTU, who remain
subordinate to the Government and to the Communist Party, and
thus do not necessarily represent workers' interests fully.
Factory and enterprise Work Collective Councils also represent
worker interests to a certain extent, but they exercise broad
managerial functions and have not shown much inclination to
challenge management or bargain for their members.
Substantial progress has been made toward setting up special
economic zones in at least three areas of the country to
attract foreign investment, but the formal, legal steps to
accomplish this have not yet been taken.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Soviet law contains no prohibition on forced or compulsory
labor; indeed, persons sentenced to deprivation of freedom are
expected to work. Convicted criminals, including those
confined for political offenses, work, often under difficult
conditions, in labor camps or in local projects to assist in
the production of primary and manufactured goods. Prisoners
are theoretically paid the same wage as factory workers, but,
according to the Corrective Labor Code of the R.S.F.S.R., up
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to 90 percent of this pay goes to prison authorities,
supposedly to cover the costs of their maintenance.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Soviet law establishes a statutory minimum age of 16 for
employment. No evidence of widespread violation of this law
exists, though anecdotal reports have appeared of child labor
in Central Asian Republics.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The government-established wage scale sets the base wage for
the lowest level unskilled worker at $140. According to the
Soviet State Statistical Committee, the average monthly wage
for blue- and white-collar workers in mid-1989 was $373 and
for collective farm workers $263 at the October 1989 official
exchange rate. (The ruble is not a convertible currency, and
its official value in terms of the U.S. dollar does not
represent actual purchasing power for purposes of
international comparison.) Soviet statistics put the mean
wage at about $220 to $225 per month. Workers living in the
harsh climates of Siberia and the far north, as well as those
working in the Far East under similarly harsh conditions,
receive bonuses doubling or even tripling their pay.
The standard workweek in the Soviet Union is 40 hours. In
addition, many workers are required to work Saturdays and
additional overtime at the discretion of local management.
Most must also "donate" a working Saturday once a year for
which they receive no pay. For blue-collar workers, this
means an unpaid day at the factory; white-collar workers are
called to help clean up neighborhoods and perform other social
services. Many white collar workers are also sent at harvest
time, on a paid and unpaid basis, to work in the fields of
local collective and state farms that need additional manpower
for the harvest. Soviet law provides for annual paid holidays
for all workers. The actual time varies, but most Soviet
citizens receive 4 weeks or more of paid vacation each year.
Soviet law establishes minimum conditions of workplace safety
and worker health. These conditions are frequently violated
and no effective mechanism for enforcing them exists.
Workplace accidents are reportedly common. Workers file
safety complaints mainly through their trade union
organizations, which have proven relatively ineffectual in
ameliorating conditions.
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
The United Kingdom (U.K.) of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland is a constitutional monarchy with a democratic
government. As there is no written constitution, human rights
are "residual," i.e., assumed unless limited by statute.
Human rights traditionally have been respected and guarded by
the people and their elected governments. Laws bar
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or
political opinion.
Conflict between the Protestant majority and Catholic minority
communities in Northern Ireland continued in 1989 to require
special measures for governing the region and providing for
public security. Illegal paramilitary groups on both sides of
the conflict continued their campaigns of violence. The
Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) , signed by the Governments of the
U.K. and Ireland in 1985, affirms that the status of Northern
Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom can only be changed
with the consent of a majority in the North. It also provides
for an intergovernmental conference to discuss the two
Governments' views on Northern Ireland affairs. The
conference has met regularly since its inception and has given
particular attention to enhancing security cooperation.
Throughout the U.K. and Hong Kong, public order is maintained
by civilian police forces. In Northern Ireland, because of
terrorist violence, police of the Royal Ulster Constabulary
(RUC) are supported by Army units.
The United Kingdom has a highly developed industrial economy.
Persons may own property and pursue private economic
interests. The Government provides comprehensive social
welfare services.
Under a 1985 agreement between the U.K. and China, control of
Hong Kong will revert to China in 1997. The agreement states
that Hong Kong after 1997 will retain its social, legal, and
free-market capitalist system and will continue to be
nonsocialist . For now. Hong Kong's legal system closely
parallels that of the U.K., and fundamental rights ultimately
rest on oversight exercised by the British Parliament.
In the United Kingdom and in Hong Kong there continued to be
widespread support for and protection of human rights in
1989. Both Governments continued to be responsive to popular
pressures for changes in governance, and both took measures to
bring regulations and practices into accord with the findings
of domestic and international bodies which have recommended
changes to improve legal and other human rights. However,
U.K. policy toward refugees in Hong Kong generated
international controversy.
Terrorist bombings and killings carried out by the illegal
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in both Northern
Ireland and Britain, and terrorist acts in Northern Ireland
committed by similar groups claiming to represent parts of the
Protestant community, constitute the single most dramatic
threat to public order and security in the U.K. Actions of
the security forces and the legal system were primarily
responsible for keeping deaths caused by terrorism and the
conflict between communities to far fewer than 100 in 1989, as
in recent years. However, a public prosecutor's decision to
overturn the 1975 conviction of the "Guildford Four" (three
men and one woman) for murder by bombing (and widespread
charges that the police falsified evidence in the case)
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
underlined skepticism among Catholics in Northern Ireland
about equality of justice there (see Section l.d.)-
There was controversy in the last months of 1989 because of
revelations that security force documents identifying alleged
PIRA suspects and others were allowed to come into the
possession of Protestant terrorists who used them to identify
targets for attacks. Tensions and long-held animosities
between the two communities in Northern Ireland continued to
mean that many Catholics were denied equality of some rights
and opportunities despite government efforts to redress their
grievances. New legislation approved in 1989 will strengthen
government efforts to eliminate employment discrimination.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The British Government does not practice or condone killing
for political motives.
By August 20, 1989, 2,755 people had died in 20 years of "the
troubles" in Northern Ireland (which has a population of 1.5
million). In 1989, 62 persons were killed in incidents of
terrorism in Northern Ireland, 23 of whom were members of the
security forces (including the regular army. Royal Ulster
Constabulary and the Ulster Defense Regiment). Thirty-nine
persons were killed by security forces.
Security forces in Northern Ireland continued the use of
plastic baton rounds (PBR's or plastic bullets) for riot
control. One person was killed by a PBR in 1989.
b. Disappearance
Government authorities do not abduct, secretly arrest, or hold
persons in clandestine confinement, nor do they sponsor or
condone such activities. In 1989 there continued to be
instances of persons abducted or illegally held hostage in
terrorist incidents in Northern Ireland.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
British laws forbid torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment of prisoners and provide penalties for
violations of those laws. Confessions obtained by such
methods are not admissible as evidence in court.
In February 1988, Amnesty International (AI) called on the
Government to review the convictions of those involved in an
October 1985 riot at the Broadwater Farm housing estate in
north London in which a police officer was killed. Several
defendants claimed that they were denied access to lawyers and
families during police interrogation and that they were
threatened and forced to make admissions or sign statements
under duress during interrogation. As of February 1989,
results of an official investigation have not been made
public, and no statement has been issued by the Police
Complaints Authority, which has been supervising the
investigation.
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
New codes of practice regarding the questioning of suspects by
security forces in Northern Ireland were mandated under the
provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern
Ireland) Order 1989. They will come into effect in early 1990.
All complaints concerning the police made by members of the
public in Northern Ireland are monitored by the independent
Commission for Police Complaints. The Commission is
independent of both the Government and the police and is
charged with supervising police investigations into the most
serious complaints.
There was controversy over the introduction of "genetic
fingerprinting" in criminal investigations and as evidence in
trials. The law in Northern Ireland allows police to use oral
swabs for DNA testing of cells in cases of serious crime. In
Northern Ireland, taking oral samples is considered
"nonintimate" and may be done against a prisoner's will. In
England and Wales, however, such samples are considered
"intimate" and may be taken only with the written consent of
the subject and then only by a medical practitioner.
Britain has ratified the Council of Europe Convention on the
Transfer of Sentenced Persons, by which prisoners may be sent
to their home countries to serve their sentences. Within the
United Kingdom, convicts are almost always required to serve
their prison time in the general region where the crime was
committed.
On August 24, the Hong Kong Government announced it would end
in 1990 the practice of corporal punishment based on a review
of obligations under international conventions and other
factors. There were complaints by some nongovernmental
organizations that the Hong Kong Government deliberately
allowed living conditions in overcrowded Indochinese refugee
camps to deteriorate and failed to provide adequate shelter,
nutrition, and health care. The Government moved the asylum
seekers to other centers, which also became very overcrov/ded
(see Section 2.d.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Police may make arrests without warrants in cases of
reasonable cause to suspect criminal guilt. Those arrested
without warrant must be released on bail unless brought before
a magistrate's court within 24 hours. Generally, persons
charged with nonserious offenses may be released on bail. In
cases such as crimes of violence, however, magistrates have
remanded persons for periods of up to 18 months before trial.
The law allows the Government, in an emergency situation and
subject to review by Parliament, to restrict personal
liberties .
Acting on the premise that the fundamental "right to life" has
been in serious jeopardy due to the violence in Northern
Ireland, the Government adopted the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Acts of 1978 and 1987 which are
applicable only to Northern Ireland; and the Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989 (originally
enacted in 1974), almost all of which is applicable to the
entire United Kingdom. Both Acts are subject to parliamentary
review and require periodic renewal to remain in effect.
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
The 1989 Prevention of Terrorism Act allows the police to
arrest, without warrant, persons anywhere in the U.K. whom
they reasonably suspect to be involved in terrorism. Such
persons may be detained for up to 48 hours without judicial
review, and up to a further 5 days on the authority of the
Home Secretary or, in Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland.
In November 1988, the European Commission of Human Rights
ruled that, in the case of four men detained in 1984 under the
Prevention of Terrorism Act, a detention of just over 4 days
was excessive and violated the requirement contained in the
European Convention on Human Rights that a person should be
brought "promptly to court." In response to an adverse
decision, the Government gave notice of its intention to
derogate temporarily from the relevant articles of the
European Convention on Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which govern
detention. Although the Government has said it was seeking
ways to bring U.K. practice into conformity, the 7-day
detention power was retained in the Prevention of Terrorism
Act of 1989.
In Northern Ireland police and military personnel, in dealing
with cases of suspected terrorism, may enter and search
without warrants, and members of the Armed Forces on duty may
arrest without a warrant any person suspected of having
committed or being about to commit any offense. Such persons
may be held for up to 4 hours, after which they must be
transferred to police custody or released.
In Northern Ireland persons arrested or detained have the
right to a lawyer after 48 hours. There is credible evidence,
however, that lawyers often encounter delays in access beyond
the legal limit.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Fair trial is provided for by law and observed in practice in
the United Kingdom in the vast majority of cases. An indigent
defendant has the right to counsel of his choosing. All
criminal proceedings must be conducted in public, with the
exception of juvenile court cases and cases involving public
decency or security. In a trial on charges under the Official
Secrets Act, the court may be closed at the judge's
discretion, but the sentence must be passed in public.
In October the U.K. Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP)
directed that the Government abandon its charges against the
"Guildford Four" who had been convicted and imprisoned with
life sentences in 1975, and the four were released from
prison. The decision was taken before the court because DDP
received information contrary to evidence used in
prosecution. The State therefore sent the case for review by
the Higher Appellate Court, which subsequently overturned the
conviction. The Government also initiated corruption
proceedings against police officers who had been involved in
taking the case to court. New reviews of the cases of the
"Birmingham Six" and "Maguire Seven", who had been imprisoned
since 1974 also for murder by bombing, now appear likely.
The majority of criminal prosecutions in Great Britain which
come to trial are heard by juries. In Northern Ireland,
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
however, the right to trial by jury has been suspended for
certain terrorist-related offenses because of the intimidation
of juries by terrorists. "Diplock Courts," in which a single
High Court judge presides over a trial without a jury, were
established in Northern Ireland by legislation in 1973. While
these courts have been criticized by some human rights groups,
a report published by the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York stated that Diplock Courts conform to the
requirements of international standards of fair trials and
that there has been no serious claim that a factually
erroneous conviction has occurred in a Diplock Court.
The Government's ability to provide trials by multiple judges
or with juries is limited in Northern Ireland because of PIRA
terrorism against the judiciary. The PIRA has announced it
will even attack workmen who perform services at the homes of
judges. On July 31, a massive car bomb exploded outside the
Royal Courts of Justice in Belfast causing extensive damage.
In November 1988, the general law on evidence in Northern
Ireland, the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988,
was enacted. In part, the law affects the traditional right
to silence of accused persons under British law by permitting
the courts to draw whatever inference they deem proper,
including an inference of guilt, if a subject remains silent
during questioning. The provision was introduced as a means
of dealing with the "wall of silence" encountered by the
police when questioning suspected terrorists as well as with
"ambush testimony" whereby a suspect does not speak until his
trial when he presents a surprise alibi. The Standing
Advisory Commission on Human Rights believes that unless such
inferences are restricted in their application and incorporate
appropriate safeguards, the law may lead to a lack of
confidence in the administration of justice in Northern
Ireland.
The Criminal Law Jurisdictions Act, enacted by both the U.K.
Government (1975) and the Irish Government (1976), permits
trial in either the Republic of Ireland or in the U.K. of
those accused of certain terrorist offenses regardless of
whether the offense was committed in the other country.
Minors convicted of murder may be subjected to indeterminate
detention. In Northern Ireland, where public attention has
focused on this issue, there were 30 minors serving
indeterminate sentences at the end of 1989, including 17
prisoners who had served 8 or more years for murders committed
while they were under the age of 18 and whose release dates
had not been decided.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The right of privacy is well respected in both law and
custom. Warrants are generally required for a police search
of private premises. However, under the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978, any member of the Armed
Forces on duty or any constable may enter any premises or
other place if he or she considers it necessary to do so to
preserve peace or maintain order. Changes in the 1987
Emergency Provisions Act now require a standard of "reasonable
grounds of suspicion" before a dwelling may be entered to
search for munitions or transmitters.
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Strongly held tradition, an independent press, and a
democratic political system combine to secure freedom of
speech and press. Viewpoints independent and critical of the
Government are well represented.
In 1988 the Government banned radio and television broadcasts
of live or recorded statements made by representatives of PIRA
or other illegal terrorist organizations or of Sinn Fein, the
legal political arm of the IRA, or by others who express views
which "solicit, support, or invite support for such
organizations." There are no restrictions on reporting their
words. Exceptions are made for coverage of elections and
parliamentary proceedings. The written media were not
affected by the notices. The measures drew widespread
criticism as undermining freedom of speech and press. The ban
is being challenged in domestic courts on grounds it is
unlawful under the Northern Ireland Constitution Act of 1973
and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Hong Kong has traditions and practices of free speech and
press similar to those in the U.K. Individuals and groups
freely criticize the Hong Kong Government, and the media are
free to air all views and opinions.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Except in cases of extreme civil disorder, in which public
safety is judged to be at risk, the authorities do not
exercise their statutory right to limit the freedom of public
assembly. However, some critics believe that the 1986 Public
Order Law gives police too much discretion to restrict public
assembly.
The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1989 and the Northern
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978 include sections
prohibiting membership in, or support of, organizations
involved in terrorism. These organizations are specifically
listed in the statutes. The lists do not include political
parties .
The summer "marching season" in Northern Ireland presents
special problems. These marches commemorate the traditions of
opposing sectarian communities. Each community considers them
a right, but they are controversial and have been a source of
public disorder. Under the law, the police must be notified 7
days before a planned march and may impose conditions,
including rerouting. No permits to march were denied in 1989,
and there were no serious disorders during the 1989 marches.
Peaceful assembly and association are permitted and regularly
practiced in Hong Kong.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Government policy and general practice ensure freedom of
religion in Great Britain and Hong Kong. While both England
and Scotland have established churches, the U.K. Government
makes no direct financial contribution to them, and their
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existence does not limit the freedom or access to public life
of members of other churches. The Government provides funds
for church schools.
In Northern Ireland, the Constitution Act of 1973 specifically
prohibits discrimination on the basis of religious belief or
political opinion. There is no similar law in Great Britain.
There are no religious bars to holding public office. The
sovereign must be a member of the Church of England.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
U.K. citizens enjoy freedom of movement within the country and
in foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation.
The Prevention of Terrorism Act includes one exception to this
general principle. The Act gives the Home Secretary the
authority to exclude or prevent from entering mainland Britain
anyone he believes may be connected with terrorism related to
Northern Ireland, unless that person was born in Great Britain
or has been ordinarily resident there for 3 years. Similar
authority is granted to the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland to exclude persons not native to or resident in that
province. Between November 1978 and March 1989, 287 persons
were the subjects of exclusion orders in the U.K. As of March
1989, 143 of these orders still were in operation. The
National Council for Civil Liberties has called exclusion
orders a system of "internal exile" to exclude persons in
Northern Ireland from entering Britain (which does not
preclude travel outside of Britain) . The Standing Advisory
Commission on Human Rights objects to the continued
availability of exclusion orders because the evidence used is
not tested in any court. The Secretary of State must only be
"satisfied" that a person is or has been involved in the
commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism.
In Hong Kong, in response to the arrival of large numbers of
people from Vietnam seeking asylum, the Government implemented
a screening program in accord with an agreement concluded by
the International Conference on Indochinese Refugees in Geneva
in June 1989. Those who are determined by the screening
process not to be eligible for refugee status are detained in
camps pending determination of what will become of them.
There were international complaints that the Government
deliberately allowed living conditions in some camps to have
inadequate standards of shelter, nutrition, and health care.
At the same time, the widespread opinion of Hong Kong
residents was that their Government should not expend any
additional resources on the camps and asylum seekers.
On December 12, 51 Vietnamese were forcibly returned from Hong
Kong to Vietnam on the grounds that they were found to be
economic migrants, not genuine refugees. The ensuing public
debate included the U.S. view opposing involuntary
repatriation to Vietnam and favoring concerted international
action to encourage voluntary repatriation of Vietnamese, on
the one hand, and the U.K. view of the need to repatriate
Vietnamese like other illegal immigrants, on the other hand.
The U.K. Government undertook to monitor the treatment of the
51 returnees through periodic visits to their homes.
In the U.K., there were charges by human rights and
immigration rights groups that the Government denied asylum to
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
some who were entitled to recognition as refugees, among them
Tamils and others from Sri Lanka.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The Government is formed on the basis of a majority of seats
in the House of Commons, won in freely contested elections
held at intervals not longer than 5 years. Participation in
the political process is open to all persons and parties, of
which there are several, representing a broad range of
political views. For parliamentary and local elections, all
citizens 18 years of age and over have the franchise. Women
have full rights of participation and are represented at all
levels of British political life. Racial minorities comprise
about 5 percent of the total population. There are several
nonwhite members of Parliament, and there are nonwhite elected
members of local governments.
Most British dependent territories have small populations,
under 60,000, and are ruled by appointed governors or
administrators assisted by executive councils (usually
appointed) and legislative assemblies or councils (partly
elected) .
Hong Kong, with a population of over 5 million, is a free
society with legally protected rights but without a broad
democratic base. The Governor is appointed by the crown, and
representative government with members selected by universal
franchise exists only in rudimentary form and without formal
political parties. The Hong Kong Government is committed to
further democratization but elections, direct or indirect,
determine only a minority of seats in municipal councils and
the legislative assembly.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government maintains an open attitude toward international
inquiries into alleged violations of human rights in the
United Kingdom. It cooperates fully with the European
Commission of Human Rights in investigations of complaints and
has usually taken steps to rectify its own laws and policies
when they were found not to be in conformity with the European
Convention on Human Rights.
The United Kingdom is a party to several human rights
conventions, participates in international and regional human
rights bodies, and is the host country to international
nongovernmental human rights organizations, including Amnesty
International. In 1973 the Standing Advisory Commission on
Human Rights was established to monitor human rights in
Northern Ireland.
The Hong Kong Government has cooperated with international and
nongovernmental organizations, for example, by providing
access to its centers for Vietnamese asylum seekers.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Race Relations Act bars discrimination on the basis of
race, color, nationality, or national or ethnic origin, and
outlaws incitement to racial hatred. Various studies.
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
however, have shown disproportionate unemployment, low
educational achievement, and other problems for some minority
groups. In 1984 a code of practice on employment, proposed by
the Commission for Racial Equality and accepted by the
Government, took effect but does not have the force of law.
The Government has made improvements in the legal protection
offered women in employment as a result of test cases taken to
the European Court of Justice which have claimed that British
law did not conform to European Community legislation on equal
rights. U.K. tax laws as of 1990 will treat married women
more equally. Women have equal property rights and equal
rights in divorce courts.
The Government's technical and vocational education
initiative, covering all students aged 14 to 16, was launched
to counter sex stereotyping in the school system and in career
counseling. Equal opportunity commissions were established in
Britain in 1975 and in Northern Ireland in 1976 to assist in
the enforcement of equal opportunity legislation.
There are no conclusive statistics on the extent of violence
against women in the U.K. Women increasingly report violence
in the family to the police; offenders in such cases often are
prosecuted and may be imprisoned. Women's shelters, operated
by voluntary groups, provide refuge for battered wives, and
local governments routinely provide counseling services. Rape
victims receive similar support, and convicted rapists usually
are imprisoned. It is not illegal, however, for a man to rape
his wife.
In Hong Kong, violence against women, including wife beating,
occurs but the extent of the problem is not known. There has
not been a significant increase in reported cases in recent
years, but cultural and other factors are believed to hinder
reporting of incidents to the authorities. The Hong Kong
Government passed a domestic violence ordinance in 1987
covering violence inflicted upon spouses, cohabitants, and
those under 21. Domestic violence also may be prosecuted
under criminal statutes. The Government enforces these laws
and prosecutes violators. Professional counseling and medical
services are available to victims, and there are some private
shelters for battered women.
There is no evidence of governmental discrimination on
religious grounds in Great Britain. In Northern Ireland,
however, anti-Catholic discrimination involves a complex range
of historical and social factors. The majority Protestant
community historically has controlled much of the local
economy and been more prosperous than the Catholic community.
Since 1972, when direct British rule was introduced in
Northern Ireland, specific measures have been taken to combat
religious discrimination. These include reform of the
electoral rolls, prohibition of religious or political
discrimination by any level of government, appointment of a
Commissioner for Complaints to deal with grievances against
local government, appointment of a central housing authority
to meet the problem of discrimination in housing, prohibition
of discrimination in employment, and a special effort to
recruit more Catholics into the police.
Since 1976 the Fair Employment Agency (FEA) has served as the
focal point of the Government's efforts to end job
discrimination in Northern Ireland. Within the Northern
Ireland civil service, the proportion of Catholics under age
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
35 reflects their proportion in the population, but
Protestants still dominate in the upper age groups. In
Northern Ireland overall, the Catholic male unemployment rate
is 2.5 times that of Protestant men.
The Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act, approved by
Parliament in 1989, is intended to end employment
discrimination and is aimed at outlawing even unintentional or
"indirect" discrimination. All public sector employers and
private firms with 25 or more workers must register with the
new Commission, monitor the religious composition of their
work force, supply annual monitoring reports to the
Commission, and review their overall employment practice at
least once every 3 years. Employers must have regard to the
need for affirmative action measures to remedy
underrepresentation and consider the setting of goals and
timetables. They will face criminal penalties and loss of
government contracts for failure to comply with the law. The
Act also establishes a new Fair Employment Tribunal to
adjudicate individual complaints of discrimination. While the
legislation has been criticized by some for not proposing
"strong and effective provisions for targets and timetables,"
in general it has been praised by leaders of the Catholic
community.
PIRA assassinations and death threats have largely stymied
government efforts to increase recruitment of Catholics, now
around 10 percent, into the police force and related security
fields. The PIRA has carried out a terror campaign not only
against police officers but also against persons who provide
services to the security forces. Since 1973, for example, 26
prison staff members were murdered while off duty.
In Hong Kong, the Chinese language has equal status with
English in many government operations. Legislation is enacted
on a bilingual basis, and Legislative Council proceedings are
conducted in both languages. The Hong Kong Government actively
promotes "localization" of the civil service by increasing the
number of Hong Kong Chinese in top administrative and
policymaking positions.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
U.K. workers have the right to associate freely, choose
representatives, publish journals, openly promote their views,
and elect representative assemblies to determine union
policies and procedures. Workers in the dependency of Hong
Kong have the same rights guaranteed by the Hong Kong trade
union ordinance. British worker rights are underlined by U.K.
ratification of relevant International Labor Organization
(ILO) conventions which also apply in most instances to
dependent territories, including Hong Kong.
U.K. unions are free of government control but must register
their accounts with the government trade union certification
officer. The law requires periodic selection of senior union
officials by secret ballot. It also mandates secret ballots
before strike calls, prohibits unions from disciplining
persons who ignore strike calls, and establishes a procedure
for trade union members to lodge complaints against their
unions with a government-appointed ombudsman.
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
There is no specific statutory "right to strike" in the U.K.
or Hong Kong, and voluntary cessation of work may be
considered a breach of contract. A system of immunities,
however, protects unions and individuals from prosecution when
engaged in legitimate disputes. Legislation adopted in the
1980*s narrowed these immunities in the U.K. by excluding
secondary strikes and those deemed to be political. Unions
encouraging such strikes were fined in the courts and had
assets seized. Where there is no right to strike, as with the
police, there are alternative means to resolve disputes.
The British Trade Union Congress (TUC) lodged a complaint with
the ILO, supported by the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU), about a series of legislative changes in
the 1980's. The ILO's Committee of Experts (COE) in 1989
stated that it considers a number of aspects of the
legislation are not compatible with the requirements of ILO
Convention 87 on freedom of association. These include the
concept of "unjustifiable discipline" by unions, the erosion
of protection against civil liability for industrial action,
and dismissals in connection with strikes and other industrial
action.
The TUC also brought a separate complaint to the ILO about
legislated restrictions in the U.K., charges which were
repeated in a report of the ICFTU. The COE observed that the
U.K. legislation was not compatible with ILO Conventions 87
and 98.
The TUC also complained to the ILO that the Government as an
employer limited the freedom of association of public sector
workers. The Government dismissed workers at a high-security
communications facility who retained membership in a union
after a government ban. The COE affirmed that the dismissals
were in violation of Convention 87.
U.K. and Hong Kong unions maintain active affiliations with
international organizations, although Hong Kong unions must
first obtain government permission for such affiliations.
Politically, many major trade unions in the U.K. have
traditionally had a close relationship with the Labour Party.
The party and the unions pride themselves, however, on their
independence. Unions are allowed to make political
contributions if they have voted to establish separate
political funds. Hong Kong unions, however, are not permitted
to have political action funds and instead emphasize social
and cultural activities.
b. The Right To Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively is deeply
rooted in common law. It is confirmed under appropriate ILO
conventions ratified by the U.K. which also apply to Hong
Kong. There is no legal obligation for employers to bargain
with workers' representatives, but collective bargaining is
extensively practiced in the U.K. and involves 10.5 million
workers, about 40 percent of the work force. Approximately 17
percent of Hong Kong's work force is organized.
In 1987, after a prolonged period when the Government and
teachers' unions failed to reach agreement, the Government
abolished the negotiating forum for teachers' contracts and
empowered the concerned Cabinet Minister to settle disputes
after hearing the recommendations of an advisory body. The
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UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
Government said it will not establish a new negotiating
procedure until 1991. The ILO, in response to a TUC complaint
that this was contrary to Convention 98, asked the Government
to ensure that new procedures would enable teachers to bargain
collectively.
Hong Kong workers may appeal through industrial tribunals in
cases of alleged antiunion discrimination. Remedies may
include reinstatement, which rarely occurs, or indemnities,
which are rarely imposed.
There are no export processing zones in the U.K. or its
dependent territories and possessions.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is prohibited in the U.K. and its
dependent territories and possessions and is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The compulsory school age in the U.K. is 16, and children
under that age are prevented from doing industrial work unless
part of an educational course. Educational authorities may
prohibit or restrict other employment of children. Child
labor is only rarely a problem in the U.K. Children in Hong
Kong may do part-time work at age 13 and full-time work at age
15. The Labor Inspectorate effectively enforces Hong Kong law.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The U.K. and Hong Kong do not have legislated minimum vjage
rates. In some low-wage industries in the U.K., wage councils
of employers and trade unionists establish wage rates which
are enforceable for workers aged 21 or over. Minimum rates so
established are substantially below national average wage
figures. Trade unions expressed concern that a government
proposal in December 1988 to abolish wage councils would leave
U.K. workers without minimum wage protection.
The Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974 requires employers
in the U.K. to ensure worker health and safety in ways that
are "reasonably practicable." A Health and Safety Executive
(HSE) enforces applicable regulations and may initiate criminal
proceedings and issue enforcement notices. A Health and Safety
Commission submits regulatory proposals to the Government,
encourages research and training, and appoints investigatory
committees. The law allows unions to name workers as safety
representatives and requires employers to give paid leave for
them to fulfill their functions. An employer must establish a
safety committee if requested by two such representatives.
The U.K. system and practice for assuring health and safety is
well regarded, but unions in 1988 said lack of staff and
resources limit the abilities of the HSE. Oil rig workers
expressed concern that the Department of Trade and Industry,
not HSE, is responsible for safety on oil rigs.
Under legislation in Hong Kong the Labor Department's Factory
Inspectorate promotes workers' safety and health in industry
through education, publicity, and inspection. In 1988 it
conducted nearly 70,000 inspections. The Occupational Health
Division investigates occupational disease claims, conducts
workplace environment testing, and provides medical
examinations to workers handling hazardous materials.
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YUGOSLAVIA
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a multiethnic,
federal state comprising six republics (one of which has two
autonomous provinces); the Constitution terms the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) the "leading organized
political and ideological force."
The ideology and practice of Yugoslav "workers'
self-management" socialism differ substantially from the
traditional centralized Soviet model. In the highly
decentralized system set up by the late President Tito, the
locus of power resides with republic and provincial government
and party authorities. This system was intended to preserve
stability among Yugoslavia's contentious ethnic groups, but it
has also impeded effective leadership at the national level.
State security and uniformed police are under the jurisdiction
of Federal and Republic Secretaries for Internal Affairs. The
armed forces are under Federal jurisdiction, although a
controversial amendment to the constitution of the Republic of
Slovenia is intended to restrict their use in that Republic.
In the economic system, workers' self -management is intended
to allow workers to run their own enterprises through a system
of elected workers' councils. In practice, however, political
officials have traditionally exercised considerable, and often
decisive, influence over the management of enterprises in
areas under their jurisdiction. The Yugoslav Government is
embarking on a major program of economic reform, intended to
open the Yugoslav economy to market forces by reducing
government regulation, reforming the banking system, expanding
competition by making enterprises more independent, and
encouraging private enterprise and foreign investment.
Obstacles to reform include political and bureaucratic
resistance and economic difficulties, such as an inflation
rate which may reach 2,500 percent by year's end. Nearly 85
percent of agricultural land in Yugoslavia is privately owned,
and there is a growing number of private enterprises in
services and small-scale manufacturing, particularly in the
Republics of Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia.
Political pressure to observe human rights continued in 1989,
coming both from within Yugoslavia and from external sources.
Freedom of speech and freedom of expression in the media and
the publishing industry increased, "alternative" political
associations were founded in several areas, and the first
direct elections were held in four republics, using the secret
ballot and multiple candidacies (all from the LCY) to choose
representatives to the collective Federal Presidency. The
Republic of Slovenia continued to lead the way toward
democratic practices.
In some other regions of the country with different historical
and cultural traditions, political and civil liberties,
including freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and the
right to a fair trial continue to be restricted to varying
degrees. There were numerous arrests on charges of "hostile
propaganda" and similar offenses, particularly in Kosovo and
in Macedonia, where ethnic Albanians accused of "nationalism
and separatism" were the primary victims. According to
government reports released in 1989, of 436 persons officially
acknowledged to have been sentenced for political offenses in
Yugoslavia, 336 were in Kosovo. March demonstrations by
ethnic Albanians protesting the Serbian effort to assert
1305
YUGOSLAVIA
greater control over the Province of Kosovo led to at least 25
deaths, including those of two police officers.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reported instances of such killings in
Yugoslavia .
b. Disappearance
No instances of prolonged or permanent disappearance were
reported.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Yugoslav Constitution and the law forbid torture, and
there were no reports of its practice. However, there were
numerous credible reports that people were sometimes beaten,
mistreated, or threatened during detention in Yugoslavia. The
Yugoslav press reported that many Albanians subjected to
"isolation" after March demonstrations in Kosovo (see Section
l.d.) were subjected to beating, deprivation of food and heat,
and other forms of mistreatment. In October guards were
indicted for beating Albanian prisoners in two Serbian
prisons. At year's end, the trial was continuing.
There are also credible reports that use of psychiatry is
abused in Yugoslavia. In 1989 the "Anatoliy Koryagin
Committee" was formed to document and protest psychiatric
abuse. The Koryagin Committee claims to have recorded at
least 60 such cases. The Yugoslav Forum for Human Rights, a
quasi-official body, in an appeal to the Yugoslav President,
included psychiatric abuse as one of the serious human rights
problems in the country. Legal experts believe that
government rngulations designed to safeguard against
involuntary admission to mental hospitals are sometimes
ignored.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Yugoslav criminal law and procedures are influenced by the
Napoleonic and Soviet law codes. They include many provisions
inconsistent with generally accepted civil and human rights.
Yugoslav law provides for pretrial detention for up to 3
months, with a possible 3-month extension, which is often
implemented. Access to prisoners in pretrial detention by
family or legal counsel is sometimes restricted, ostensibly to
prevent interference with investigations. Fikret Abdic,
defendant in the highly publicized "Agrokomerc" financial
scandal, was held in jail for over 2 years during his trial
and pretrial investigation.
In March, as part of government measures to counter
demonstrations by Albanians protesting Serbian efforts to
expand Serbian influence in Kosovo Province (see Section
2.b.), Yugoslav authorities subjected 237 Albanians from
Kosovo to a legal procedure known as "isolation" which had not
previously been used in Yugoslavia in this fashion. These
people were rounded up and held for up to 3 months, in most
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YUGOSLAVIA
cases denied access to attorneys or to families. The majority
were not held in Kosovo but in prisons in Serbia, where they
were subjected to beatings, cold, inadequate food, and harsh
interrogations. Isolated prisoners were reportedly detained
under suspicion of belonging to illegal organizations, contact
with "hostile" emigre groups, illegal aims trafficking, and
organizing strikes and demonstrations. Of the 237 persons
isolated, 41 were eventually charged with criminal offenses
and 18 with misdemeanors. Yugoslav human rights activists
consider the way the authorities employed isolation in Kosovo
to be inconsistent with Yugoslav criminal procedures, which
apparently allow such isolation through house arrest but not
through imprisonment. The use of "isolation" in Kosovo was
widely criticized in the Yugoslav press and even by the
President of Yugoslavia, and by July the authorities said that
no one was being held any longer in this condition.
In February Yugoslav authorities arrested Azem Vlasi, a former
leader of the League of Communists of Kosovo, on suspicion of
"counterrevolutionary activity." The trial of Vlasi and 14
others began in November and was still under way at year's
end. Based on the charges brought forward by the prosecutor,
however, Yugoslav human rights advocates have argued that the
charges against Vlasi amount to holding him criminally liable
for policies he carried out, while a leader in Kosovo, which
ran counter to those of Serbia.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Each republic and province has its own criminal code and court
system. Decisions by the highest republican and provincial
courts, their supreme courts, may be appealed to the Federal
Supreme Court, which seeks to ensure the uniform application
of law. The Constitutional Court may rule on the
constitutionality of laws and regulations. Offenses by those
in the armed forces or offenses by civilians deemed to affect
national security are tried in the military court system.
Defendants have the right to be present at their trials and to
have an attorney, at public expense if needed. The majority
of trials, including those on political charges, are conducted
in accordance with Yugoslav legal norms, without overt
interference by outside authorities. In some cases, however,
Yugoslav courts may be influenced by political authorities.
During debate in 1988 over a proposed constitutional amendment
to remove the "moral-political" suitability test imposed for
the election of judges of regular courts, considerable
criticism emerged of political interference and other
conditions (low pay, short terms of office, election by the
local communities ) which combine to make judges susceptible
to outside influence.
In many political cases, the outcome is often predetermined by
the political authorities. Moreover, the Yugoslav legal
system contains numerous inequities toward the defendant,
regardless of whether the trial is criminal or political.
Long periods of pretrial detention are allowed. The defense
is sometimes restricted in the time allowed to prepare its
case. While the prosecution can call as witnesses whomever it
wants, the defendant has the right only to request the court
to call witnesses, and the court has complete discretion
whether or not to honor the request. The Supreme Court is
considered to be more free of political interference than
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YUGOSLAVIA
local or republic-level courts, according to some legal
observers .
Although ordinary criminal trials are almost always open to
the public, some political trials are not. In September
observers from the International Helsinki Federation who
sought to visit an "open" trial in Kosovo were told that
foreigners could not attend.
The Federal Criminal Code defines a number of "political"
criminal acts ranging from armed rebellion, terrorism, and
espionage, to broad, imprecise categories such as hostile
propaganda, "arousing national, racial, and religious hatred,
dissension, or intolerance," and "damaging the reputation of
Yugoslavia." In addition, the republic and provincial
criminal codes cover a variety of misdemeanors considered
political crimes, including "spreading false rumors and
defaming the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia."
Authorities frequently bring charges against those who make
derogatory or inflammatory ethnic statements or other
statements considered politically unacceptable. There is wide
variation in local practice.
Yugoslav law permits the arrest and imprisonment of Yugoslav
citizens for acts considered criminal offenses under Yugoslav
law, even when they are committed abroad and are not crimes in
the country in which they take place. Such cases are often
based on the expression of views "hostile" to the Yugoslav
Government or association with perceived anti-Yugoslav emigre
groups. In February the Committee for Defense of Thought and
Expression, a Belgrade-based human rights group, revealed that
author Mihajlo Mihajlov's citizenship had been revoked by the
Secretariat of Internal Affairs of the Republic of
Bosnia-Hercegovina because of critical statements he had made
in the United States about the Yugoslav Government. Yugoslav
law permits the revocation of citizenship if the defendant had
another citizenship (in this case, U.S. citizenship) and if he
"through work abroad causes damage to the international and
other interests of Yugoslavia...."
The precise number of political prisoners in Yugoslavia is
difficult to determine. In 1989 Amnesty International
estimated that at least 200 political prisoners were being
held in 1988. Yugoslav authorities sometimes release
statistics on "political" prisoners, but these are often
incomplete or misleading. Moreover, Yugoslav statistics on
political prisoners generally appear to refer to persons
sentenced for criminal offenses and do not include the larger
number of people who receive misdemeanor sentences of 30 to 60
days for verbal crimes under republic or provincial laws.
After an amnesty in November in which 45 political prisoners
were released, Yugoslav government figures indicated that 232
persons were still being held in Yugoslavia for political
crimes. Government statistics for 1988, released in June
1989, revealed that, of 517 political charges filed
nationwide, 43 percent of the defendants were ethnic Albanians
from Kosovo, many accused of engaging in "separatist"
activities. Albanians were tried in other republics as well
as in Kosovo.
In the first half of 1989, charges for political crimes were
filed against 174 people in Croatia, resulting in 36
convictions, according to the Yugoslav press. As of September
19, 1989, in Kosovo, which has the largest number of political
1308
YUGOSLAVIA
prisoners in the country, 1,180 people had been indicted for
misdemeanors, and 56 for more serious criminal acts in
connection with the March demonstrations. Yugoslav
authorities state that such repressive measures are intended
to repel a threat to political stability which they believe is
posed by Albanian "nationalism and separatism."
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Arbitrary interference in private life occurs most often in
connection with government efforts to monitor opposition or
dissident activity. Although the judicial system includes
restrictions on arbitrary searches, these safeguards are
sometimes ignored. Authorities eavesdrop on conversations,
read private mail, and tap telephones in some cases. Yugoslav
citizens are generally free to receive and read foreign
publications; however, the publications of certain Yugoslav
emigre groups, particularly those advocating the dissolution
of the Yugoslav Federation or the redrawing of its internal
political boundaries, are considered hostile in themselves,
and their importation, possession, or sale is illegal.
Possession or circulation of pamphlets advocating republic
status for Kosovo in itself is considered a criminal offense.
In April, for example, Ismail Sherifi was sentenced to
2 months' imprisonment for possessing photographs of symbols
representing "Greater Albania," and many other Albanians have
been similarly sentenced (see Section 2. a).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The continuing Serbian campaign to assert greater political
control over the predominantly ethnic Albanian Province of
Kosovo (an area within the Republic of Serbia that Serbs
consider the historic cradle of their nation) led to
demonstrations by Albanians in February and March. The
Federal Government sent thousands of troops and police,
introduced a curfew, and banned public meetings. After
amendments to the Serbian Constitution were rammed through the
Kosovo Provincial Assembly in March, youthful demonstrators
began throwing stones at police, who responded with tear gas.
On March 27, the demonstrations turned violent, resulting in
the official toll of 25 deaths, including those of 2 police
officers. According to official accounts, security forces did
not begin firing until after one police officer had been
killed by gunfire. Unofficial sources assert that the
security forces used excessive force in dispersing the
demonstrators, including by beating them, indiscriminately
firing at them (sometimes from helicopters), and using
ammunition designed to increase deaths and injuries.
Unofficial and unsubstantiated reports assert that the number
of demonstrators killed exceeded the officially admitted
total. Government sources say 58,000 Albanians participated
in the March demonstrations; they identified 1,665 of them and
brought misdemeanor charges against 1,180 and criminal charges
against 56. During demonstrations on November 2 and 3, at
least three people were killed while protesting the trial of
Azem Vlasi (see Section l.d.), and 138 people were later
convicted of misdemeanors in connection with the
demonstrations .
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YUGOSLAVIA
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although the Yugoslav Constitution and law affirm the freedom
of speech and press, and there is a trend towards greater
respect for these freedoms, both law and practice impose
significant restrictions.
Arrests and convictions for what are called "verbal crimes"
(most often charges involving "nationalism" or "hostile
propaganda") continued in Kosovo Province and in Macedonia and
also occurred in other parts of Yugoslavia. The charge is
often used in combination with other charges such as "forming
illegal hostile organizations." For example, in April Fikirye
Musa was sentenced to 1 1/2 years' imprisonment in Pristina,
Kosovo, for her unpublished writings, including pro-Albanian
poetry, found in her possession. Ten others, all under the
age of 22, were codefendants in the trial. Three defendants
stated in court that they were exercising their freedom to
express nonhostile and noncounterrevolutionary opinions.
Nedzat Malichi and Hairedin Hiseni were sentenced to 5 years
each, the heaviest sentences passed at the trial.
In March Muzafer Ljuti was sentenced to 60 days' imprisonment
for shouting slogans in a restaurant and in a public square in
Macedonia. In April Violtsa Dushi , a bank director's
secretary, was sentenced to 60 days' imprisonment for taking
part in a demonstration in Urosevac, Serbia, where she shouted
hostile slogans. Some months earlier, she allegedly had made
a pro-Albanian speech to pupils at the local youth sports
center .
Outbursts of nationalism from other ethnic groups also led to
political trials. In July some 30 people were arrested and 6
convicted on misdemeanor charges of disrupting an official
commemoration in Knin, Croatia, of the 600th anniversary of
the Battle of Kosovo. One of these, Jovan Opacic, after
serving his misdemeanor sentence, was indicted for the same
actions under more serious criminal charges of "committing a
criminal act against the Socialist self-management system and
security of Yugoslavia" and "against the reputation of
Yugoslavia." At his trial in September, the most severe
charges against Opacic were dropped, and he was sentenced to
90 days' imprisonment on lesser charges.
All media are state owned, but the degree of official
oversight varies from republic to republic. Government
oversight of the media is carried out through publications
boards, which include ranking party officials. There are
important informal channels for official supervision of the
press, including editorial staffs' use of self-censorship.
Eighty-one percent of Yugoslav journalists in a recent poll
said they were members of the League of Communists. If a
story or press criticism displeases senior officials,
journalists and editors may be reprimanded, removed,
transferred, or encounter difficulty in future employment.
In May local authorities in Bar, Montenegro, closed down Radio
Bar because of its sympathetic coverage of a dockworkers'
strike. Local authorities recommended that journalists
covering the strike te disciplined, but republic authorities
intervened on the strikers' behalf, and the station resumed
broadcasting. Foreign broadcast media are easily received in
Yugoslavia.
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Despite periodic bans on specific publications, the media have
increased latitude to discuss and comment freely on a wide
range of political and social topics. They directly criticize
government and LCY officials at all levels, although,
reflecting the political infighting among the republics, they
prefer to target officials outside their own republics.
Direct criticism of Tito is still rare and controversial.
Albanians in Kosovo may well be jailed for calling for their
Province to be given republic status within Yugoslavia, while
in other parts of the country journalists or public figures
may openly advocate this step. The first nonofficial
newspaper since World War II began publication in 1989 in
Slovenia .
Public prosecutors have the power to ban temporarily the
publication and sale of books or periodicals if they think
that the content is, for example, "false" or could "disturb"
the public. However, a judge must review the temporary ban,
and editors have the right to contest the prosecutor's
decision at the hearing. In February Ratko Dimitrovic was
sentenced to 3 months in jail for an article he had written in
Politika, a Belgrade daily, in 1988. An issue of the magazine
Nasi Dani was banned in April because it was found to be
insulting to Bosnian officials. In 1989 at least nine
magazine issues were banned, seven of them student
publications. In three cases, the ban was later lifted by
court order on appeal. Banning publications is usually done
at the local or republic level. The criteria for such action
varies from region to region; and criticism of the Federal
Government was the most frequent reason cited for banning
publications .
Indirect constraints can sometimes also be applied to
publications. The Serbian youth magazine Non had its printing
contract with the Politika publishing house canceled in
November because of Non's criticism of Politika's stands in
support of the Serbian leadership. Non was able to find
another printer, however. In December Politika canceled the
printing contracts of two other magazines, citing "technical
reasons . "
In book publishing, the authorities generally provide only
loose oversight. The Yugoslav publishing industry puts out a
wide range of U.S. and Western European books, including the
works of Soviet and Eastern European dissidents. "The Satanic
Verses" was published in both Macedonian and Serbo-Croatian in
1989, despite objections from Yugoslav Muslim groups.
Academic freedom was severely damaged in the Province of
Kosovo when at least 30 instructors were expelled from the
University of Pristina, and large numbers of teachers at all
educational levels were disciplined or fired under suspicion
of influencing students toward Albanian separatist views. At
least 1,500 party members have been expelled in Kosovo for
allegedly espousing separatist views, and Kosovo party
officials have stated that those expelled should also be fired
from "leading positions," including those in the managerial
level of business enterprises.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Yugoslav Constitution guarantees freedom of assembly, but
this right traditionally has been severely circumscribed in
practice. Public political demonstrations generally have been
permitted only in support of offici3.1 policies and by
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officially recognized organizations. All public gatherings
must be registered by the authorities, who will often seek to
ban those that run counter to official policies. In 1988 and
1989, however, thousands of discontented workers or farmers
marched in peaceful but unauthorized protest demonstrations to
Belgrade or republic capitals. The authorities generally met
with the protesters and did not try to disperse them by force.
In 1989 there were a number of large demonstrations in Serbia,
Kosovo, Montenegro, and elsewhere. Demonstrations by Serbs
were tolerated or even encouraged if they coincided with the
Serbian leadership's objectives. Albanian demonstrators in
Yugoslavia, even if peaceful, faced possible use of force by
police and dismissal from their jobs. Albanian demonstrations
in Kosovo were banned and eventually dispersed by force.
Demonstrations in Montenegro in January led to the overthrow
of the Republic government. After a peaceful demonstration by
several thousand Serbs on July 9 in the Croatian town of Knin,
6 persons were sentenced to 30 to 60 days' imprisonment on
misdemeanor charges.
In Macedonia, Liman Jashari was sentenced to 10 years, and
four others were sentenced to terms of from 6 to 8 years for
organizing the August 1988 demonstration in Kumanovo of ethnic
Albanians. In the Macedonian town of Bitolj , 10 ethnic
Albanians were tried for "hostile propaganda," "association
with the aim of carrying out hostile activities," and
"counterrevolutionary acts." Eight ethnic Albanians in
Macedonia were sentenced in 1989 to prison terms of from 5 to
11 years for participating in a demonstration on language
rights .
In Kosovo, Yugoslav authorities reacted strongly to
demonstrations and strikes in February and March (see Section
l.f.). Slovenian authorities banned a May 8 demonstration
organized by nonofficial groups supporting the "Ljubljana 4,"
a group of journalists and one soldier convicted in 1988 on
charges of revealing military secrets. The demonstration took
place, however, when the official youth organization agreed to
sponsor the event. Slovenian authorities banned a
demonstration of Serbs and Montenegrins planned for December 1
in Ljubljana.
Freedom of association is guaranteed under the Yugoslav
Constitution, and, although the scope of political association
is limited by the monopoly of power of the LCY, many new
nonofficial organizations have formed in the past year. To
obtain legal status, organizations must register with the
Government, but many do not, and the law is laxly enforced.
In February the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic
Initiative met for the first time in Zagreb. By the end of
the year, the organization had chapters in many cities in
Yugoslavia, including Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Titograd. A
number of nonofficial organizations were founded in Croatia in
1989. In December the Croatian League of Communists agreed
with a proposal by these groups for early republic elections
in which all political groups could compete. Other new
organizations include human rights groups and environmental
groups in Montenegro and Serbia. In Slovenia, many alternative
political associations formed in 1988 and 1989 will be
competing for seats in the republic elections in the spring of
1990. Human rights organizations, for esample the Yugoslav
branch of the International Helsinki Federation, have
unhampered contact with their international affiliates.
1312
Association for the purpose of hostile activities is a crime
under Yugoslav criminal law, and this law has been used to
prosecute ethnic Albanians who advocate republic status for
Kosovo. In February 11 Albanians were convicted in Pristina,
Kosovo, on this charge, receiving sentences of from 4 months
to 8 years. In April, 10 ethnic Albanians were convicted in
Prizren, Kosovo, on this charge, receiving sentences of from 1
to 5 years. Most of the accused belonged to an association
called "Marxist-Leninists of Kosovo." A group of ethnic
Albanian soldiers was convicted in January under this article
for organizing a hostile association in their garrison in Nis
in April 1988.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Yugoslav Constitution provides for freedom of religious
practice but proscribes "abuse" of religion and religious
activities for political purposes. Yugoslav authorities
officially encourage atheism. Religious believers in
Yugoslavia are not generally subject to overt persecution, but
open practice of one's faith is normally a disqualification
for high positions in government, business, the media, and
academia. In practice, however, religious freedoms vary from
republic to republic, depending in part on the political and
historical role of the various religions. The largest faiths
in Yugoslavia are Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and
Islamic. Since World War II, the Jewish community has
numbered fewer than 10,000, but it is active and well
organized. There is a small Protestant community which
includes denominations such as Pentecostals, Baptists, and
Jehovah's Witnesses.
In Serbia, the Serbian Orthodox Church has enjoyed unusually
good relations with republic authorities over the past 2
years. The Serbian media in general have provided an
unusually comprehensive and sympathetic view of religion.
Belgrade television covered Christmas celebrations in
Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana in 1988 and the dedication of
the new Cathedral of St. Sava in Belgrade in June 1989.
In Slovenia, where most believers are Catholic, the
authorities also have displayed a tolerant attitude toward
religion. In 1989 December 25 became an official holiday in
Slovenia. The authorities in Croatia, however, have a more
reserved position toward the Catholic Church, in part stemming
from a tradition of conflict between the Catholic Church and
the Communist authorities that goes back to World War II.
All Saints' Day (November 1) became an official holiday in
Croatia in 1989.
Yugoslav authorities maintain restrictions on the public
activities of religious communities, including limits on
religious education, on publishing activity, and on the
construction of new churches and other facilities. In recent
years, the application of these rules has been more relaxed in
keeping with a somewhat more tolerant approach by the
authorities toward all nonofficial activity. As yet, however,
there have been no changes in the rules themselves. Religious
communities in Yugoslavia have vigorous publishing programs,
although they do not have their own printing facilities. The
construction of new places of worship requires the consent of
local government authorities, who sometimes construct
1313
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bureaucratic obstacles. The Serbian Orthodox Church in Split,
Croatia, a predominantly Catholic area, is having difficulty
in getting permission to complete its Church, and the Islamic
communities in Belgrade and Split have had applications
pending to build new mosques for many years. Authorities in
Macedonia have been reluctant to issue permits for the
construction of new mosques. In the Banat region of Vojvodina
Province, authorities reportedly denied permission to begin
the construction of churches in 1989. In Zagreb (Croatia),
the Jewish community has received official permission to
construct a new synagogue, which will be combined with a
Jewish cultural center. Several new mosques were completed in
Bosnia in 1989, but up to 500 requests for building permits
for religious edifices remain unfulfilled in this republic,
where Muslims account for about 40 percent of the population.
Primary education outside the state system is not permitted in
Yugoslavia. There are some opportunities for religious
education at the secondary and university level for all major
faiths. The Catholic Church, for example, maintains 8
secondary schools (about 100 pupils each), 2 theological
faculties, and 5 seminaries in Croatia and Slovenia. The
Serbian Orthodox Church has four high schools and two
theological faculties, one of which just opened in 1989. The
Yugoslav Islamic Association runs three high schools in the
Muslim areas of the country and one Islamic theological
faculty in Sarajevo. The degrees offered by these
institutions are not officially recognized by the Yugoslav
authorities. Yugoslav religious communities, both Christian
and Muslim, also make vigorous efforts to provide religious
instruction outside of school for children and young people.
Religious believers are subject to restrictions while doing
obligatory military service. Active duty military personnel
may not attend religious services or have religious materials
in their possession. In April the Federal Presidency amended
the law on military service to permit conscientious objectors
to serve in the military without bearing arms for a period of
24 months, twice as long as the standard conscription period.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement within the country is provided for by the
Constitution and generally permitted in practice. No exit
permits are required to visit the more than 135 countries with
which Yugoslavia has diplomatic or consular relations.
Passports are routinely available to most Yugoslavs, and
roughly half of Yugoslavia's population has passports for
foreign travel. Approximately 700,000 Yugoslavs are employed
as "guest workers" in Western Europe.
The Yugoslav authorities have sometimes denied passports to
well-known dissidents, but recently prominent critics, such as
Milovan Djilas and Dobroslav Paraga, have received passports
and traveled abroad. In Croatia, human rights activists
demonstrated in front of the Croatian Parliament in early 1989
to seek reinstatement of passports for the approximately 50
Croats who have had their passports confiscated or denied on
political grounds.
In 1989, however, the authorities began to deny passports to
Albanians and Gypsies, in large part because so many of them
were seeking asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
In 1988, 20,800 Yugoslavs sought asylum in the FRG. According
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YUGOSLAVIA
to press reports, FRG authorities threatened to require visas
for all Yugoslavs entering the FRG, which would have created a
hardship for the approximately 600,000 Yugoslavs already
living there. The Yugoslav Government responded by denying
passports to several thousand people, mostly in Kosovo and
Macedonia.
The law on the entry of foreigners into Yugoslavia notes the
right of permanent asylum and provides for government
assistance to persons granted that right. Yugoslavia extends
temporary asylum to refugees who, with the assistance of the
Belgrade office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), seek permanent resettlement in third
countries. According to UNHCR figures, in the first 11 months
of 1989, a total of 4,401 new cases were registered with UNHCR
in Yugoslavia, and 4,171 cases were resolved by permanent
settlement outside Yugoslavia. As of November 30, 1989, there
were 1,081 people residing in Yugoslavia who had been accepted
by the UNHCR refugee program but whose permanent settlement
had yet to be arranged. Of those interviewed by UNHCR during
this period, one-third were denied refugee status and returned
by Yugoslav authorities to their country of origin.
Romania is the source of most refugees in Yugoslavia. The
Yugoslav Government says it screens out what it considers
"undesirables:" criminals, mentally ill people, and
unaccompanied minors are sent back to Romania without the
opportunity to be interviewed by the UNHCR. The number of
Romanians seeking asylum who are returned to Romania without
being interviewed by the UNHCR is a matter of some dispute.
In October, about 30 Romanians (out of several hundred
asylum-seekers held in a Yugoslav detention facility) were
involuntarily returned to Romania following their
participation in a hunger strike protesting the action of the
Yugoslav authorities to force them to depart the country
without being interviewed by the UNHCR. After the toppling of
the Ceasescu regime, some of the Romanian asylum-seekers in
Yugoslavia voluntarily returned to Romania.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Yugoslav citizens do not have the right to change the basic
system of government. The 2-million-member League of
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) formally maintains a monopoly
on political power. The party's authority at the Federal
level, however, is greatly dispersed and diluted because of
the decentralization of decisionmaking power to the parties in
the six republics and two provinces. With few exceptions, no
major initatives, including constitutional amendments, may be
adopted by the Federal Government without the unanimous
consent of the republics and provinces. Autonomous political
"associations" proliferated in 1988 and 1989, reflecting a
growing demand at the grassroots level.
The collective State Presidency (Chief of State) is
responsible for overall policy direction. The Federal
Executive Council (Cabinet), headed by the Prime Minister, is
responsible for running the governmental machinery and
proposing specific legislation. The terms of government
officials are from 1 to 5 years, with a possible extension for
one additional term.
The Federal Assembly, responsible for enacting legislation,
operates sometimes by majority vote and sometimes by consensus
1315
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among delegations representing the country's eight Federal
units. Although over 99 percent of the assembly delegates are
members of the LCY, the Assembly has been active and
contentious in recent years and has several times rejected or
drastically altered proposals endorsed by the Presidency and
Cabinet. Its debates generally are fully reported in the
media. As a result of 1988 constitutional amendments, in the
spring of 1990 one house of the bicameral Federal Assembly
will for the first time be chosen by direct election using
secret ballots and multiple candidacies.
In 1989, for the first time, members of the Federal Presidency
from Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Macedonia
were elected in their republics in competitive elections by
secret ballot. All the candidates were members of the LCY,
and government organs controlled the list of candidates.
There are about 20 "alternative movements" in Yugoslavia, some
of which are registered as official organizations and some of
which are not. Some of the "alternatives" operate under the
umbrella of the Socialist Alliance of Working People, a
party-approved mass organization. Others openly advocate
competition with the LCY and, in Slovenia, have indicated
their intention to put forth lists of candidates in the 1990
spring elections. Independent groups in Croatia may do so as
well. The national daily Borba printed the platforms of 16
alternative groups in June. Among the groups founded in 1989
were the Croatian Social-Liberal Alliance, the Alliance of
Workers, the Social Democratic Union of Slovenia, and the
Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative. An old
established organization, the Serbian Writers Association,
issued a public statement in May calling for an independent
judiciary, a free press, and the introduction of a multiparty
system in Yugoslavia.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
In the past, the Government criticized Western charges of
human rights violations within Yugoslavia as interference in
Yugoslav internal affairs and as efforts to bring pressure on
Yugoslavia to alter its social, economic, or political
system. In recent years, the Government has been somewhat
more willing to acknowledge human rights as a legitimate topic
for other governments. It is still reserved about discussing
specific instances of human rights violations, particularly
alleged violations in Kosovo. A fact-finding mission from the
European Parliament in June was denied a meeting with
political prisoners and was harshly criticized in the press.
A September delegation from the International Helsinki
Federation met unofficially with ethnic Albanians and Serbs
but was denied any meetings with government officials. The
group returned in October for meetings with government
officials, including the President, the first time an official
of that rank had met with human rights activists. Yugoslavia
is a member of the U.N. Human Rights Commission.
Of the domestic human rights groups, the largest is the Forum
for Human Rights, established by the Socialist Alliance to
monitor domestic human rights trends and foster understanding
of Yugoslavia's international commitments to human rights.
The Forum has presented findings and suggestions for changes
in the legal code to the Federal Presidency and the Federal
1316
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Ministry of Justice, including elimination of "verbal crimes"
and the practice of isolating prisoners.
Helsinki Watch has a branch in Yugoslavia, and several
independent human rights groups have sprung up among the
"alternative movements." In April, 30 human rights
organizations from all over Yugoslavia met for the first time
in Sarajevo, Bosnia. They founded a joint committee, the
Sarajevo Trial Working Group, which on December 11 published a
letter in the national daily Borba criticizing human rights
abuses in a 1983 trial of Muslim fundamentalists.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for the equality of citizens
regardless of sex, and the Government is officially opposed to
racial discrimination. Despite government efforts, however,
some social prejudice continues to exist, particularly with
regard to ethnic Albanians and Gypsies, who constitute 8 and
0.7 percent respectively of Yugoslavia's population. On the
other hand, the Serbian minority in the Autonomous Province of
Kosovo has complained sharply of physical mistreatment and
discriminatory practices on the part of the Albanian majority
(over 90 percent of Kosovo's population).
Ethnic Albanians are concerned about anti-Albanian sentiment
in the country as a whole. There is legitimate suspicion that
certain government policies on family subsidies are
specifically aimed at ethnic Albanians, who have the highest
birthrate in Europe. Macedonia already limits "social
welfare" payments to the first three children in a family;
Serbia is considering plans to follow suit. Macedonian
authorities have manipulated building code regulations
governing the height of walls to justify the bulldozing of
walls that traditionally surround Albanian homes in the
Republic.
In an effort to reverse the emigration of Serbs and
Montenegrins from Kosovo, Serbia restricts all sales of real
property in Kosovo by Serbs and Montenegrins to Albanians.
Prospective sales must be submitted to a review board which
determines whether or not the sale was "coerced" by the
Albanian purchaser. In practice, this amounts to a ban on
purchase of Serbian and Montenegrin property in Kosovo by
Albanians. Some try to avoid the restriction by engaging in
"secret sales," which is a criminal offense. In September two
ethnic Albanians were sentenced to 60-day jail terms for
secretly buying Serbian property in Vucitrn. It appears that
only Albanian buyers are prosecuted for such transactions, not
Serbian sellers.
Similarly, jobs and housing are reserved for ethnic Serbs who
wish to move back to Kosovo. Some Albanians were fired simply
to make room for returning Serbs. In one instance, the nephew
of the former Kosovo party chief Azem Vlasi was fired because
"his presence was an irritant to the Serbs in the workplace,"
according to the Yugoslav press.
There is legal equality of the sexes under Yugoslav law.
Maternity leave for employed women is routinely granted for
periods between 9 and 12 months. Working mothers are given
day-care allowances based on their salaries and the number of
children to be cared for. Also, a working mother may take
sick leave when her child is ill (up until 2 years after its
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YUGOSLAVIA
birth), and the father may do so when the mother is ill.
Statistics on the prevalence of violence against women are not
readily available, but spouse abuse is not uncommon in the
lesser developed parts of Yugoslavia. Legal penalties for
spousal abuse are the same as those for assault of any person;
however, the abused spouse must make out a complaint, and this
is seldom done. Data collected by feminist hotlines in
Zagreb, Belgrade, and Ljubljana over the past 2 years recorded
6,000 women who reported wife abuse. The same source reported
that women's lives were endangered in one case out of five.
The official Yugoslav Women's Organization has begun a legal
initiative to exact harsher legal penalties for wife abuse and
rape and to make the Slovene Republic law against rape within
marriage also a Federal law. Federal marriage laws allow the
woman to keep her maiden name, to continue working if she
wishes, and to have "equal input in the decision as to where
the couple will live." There are feminist groups in the
larger cities of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia (including
Vojvodina) campaigning for improvements in women's rights.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Since 1950 Yugoslavia has had a unique industrial relations
system in which most enterprises are neither privately owned
nor owned by the state, but are defined as socially owned.
Neither the Yugoslav Constitution nor the law prohibit the
formation of unions outside the structure of the sole labor
central known as the Council of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia
(CTUY) . However, the CTUY is accorded various rights and
responsibilities under legislation, and the Constitution also
provides that unions shall pursue the objective of building
and defending a self-managing Socialist society.
Trade unions are organized geographically by republic and
province and by craft at all levels. Workers are not required
to join the official unions, but virtually all workers (93
percent) in the socially owned sector of the economy do. The
trade unions are formally independent of the Government and
the LCY but unquestionably are influenced by political
leaders. The degree of political influence appears to vary
considerably by region and level. Trade union independence in
general appears to be growing, as reflected in the increasing
frequency of strikes and strike threats organized by the
unions. (A majority of strikes in 1989 were organized by union
bodies . )
Federal law makes no provision for the free formation of
independent trade unions, although there is no specific ban
either. At the republic level, an amendment to the
constitution of Slovenia adopted in September provides for
free trade union association. In Croatia, the Republic
Presidency and official union organization have both publicly
backed the free formation of independent unions. Moreover,
workers in that Republic established their own railroad union
in November, and Yugoslavia's commercial pilots formed an
independent union in December. The issue has not become
relevant for small private firms to date, and the rights of
the trade unions to organize in the private sector are
guaranteed by the new law on labor relations.
Yugoslav workers have had a constitutionally guaranteed right
to strike since November 1988, although strikes have been
1318
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commonplace for years. A law on strikes is currently under
debate in the Federal Assembly. The right to strike includes,
and is exercised by, workers in socially owned firms and the
Government. Preliminary figures indicate some 1,900 strikes
occurred during 1989, involving 470,000 workers.
Strikes are resolved through negotiations between the workers'
strike committee and a combination of management, the workers'
council, and (at times) politicians. The position of the
trade union generally depends on the activism of the union
local. In Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia, official union
policy enjoins locals to support or sponsor strikes favored by
a majority of workers.
Although not a participating member of the World Confederation
of Labor since 1950, the CTUY has good cooperation with that
organization, as well as with the European Trade Union
Confederation. The CTUY, although not a member of the
Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) ,
has also begun cooperation with the WFTU at the craft union
level .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Western-style collective bargaining has not existed in
Yugoslavia. The new law on labor relations introduces the
concept of "collective agreements" to be negotiated between
the unions and Chambers of Economy (semiofficial Chambers of
Commerce), but the system remained untested in 1989. Workers
at present continue to protect their interests through the
self-management system.
All large firms in Yugoslavia are socially rather than
privately owned. All the employees at any one enterprise
belong to the same trade union, which also includes the
managers. Under Yugoslav law, workers elect their council (a
body separate from the trade unions) which has a voice in
selecting management and must approve by majority vote major
(and sometimes minor) business decisions, including wage
levels, by the enterprise. Enterprise managers are
increasingly bound by law to more Western-style standards of
business discipline. Yugoslavia has no economic incentive
zones, nor are there any special industries where labor
standards differed from those elsewhere in the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by the Yugoslav Constitution and is
generally not practiced. However, many Yugoslavs were
surprised to learn during the State's enforcement of "special
measures" (i.e., a state of emergency) in troubled Kosovo
Province that the Government may impose a "work obligation" on
workers in industries of "broader social significance." The
"work obligation" was also invoked during the September strike
of railroad workers in Croatia, despite the fact that no state
of emergency was in place at the time, violation of the "work
obligation" may be punished by criminal and administrative
penalties .
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment of children is 16 years. Of
those unemployed in Yugoslavia, 78 percent are under the age
of 30, and in practice, young people often must wait years for
their first job.
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e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Yugoslavia has an official 42-hour workweek, with generous
vacation time and sick leave benefits. The republics set
minimum wage levels, which vary widely in keeping with varied
levels of economic development and prices. The August minimum
monthly wage in more developed Slovenia, for example, was
roughly the equivalent of $170, while in poorer Montenegro it
was roughly $35. Wage levels were raised frequently during
the reporting period. The trade unions point out that minimum
wages lag behind inflation, leaving workers who earn only the
minimum at or below "the poverty line."
Yugoslavia has extensive federal and republic laws and
regulations on worker safety. Occasional press reports and
informal observations of many Yugoslav workplaces suggest that
enforcement of work safety rules is lax.
1320
' NEAR EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND
SOUTH ASIA
AFGHANISTAN*
The Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to
power in a coup in 1978 and imposed a totalitarian system
backed by a Soviet invasion in 1979. Since its establishment,
the regime has faced continuous armed opposition — supported by
a large portion of the population. Unable to subdue the
resistance of tens of thousands of armed "mujahidin" fighters,
the Soviet Government began a 9-month troop withdrawal which
was completed on February 15, 1989. The regime's control has
been reduced to Kabul and other population centers, garrisons
to protect them, and some lines of communication if the regime
uses sufficient military force to protect them. While the
regime has been able to stave off a final victory by mujahidin
troops, it has been unable to expand its area of control. In
February the regime declared a state of emergency and put
political power in the hands of a 20-member Supreme Military
Council for the Defense of the Homeland. Fighting between
regime and resistance forces continued throughout 1989.
During its war of occupation, the Soviet Union employed
massive air and artillery bombardments and emplaced millions
of mines. The fighting generated over 5 million refugees,
one-third of Afghanistan's prewar population. International
observers estimate that over 1 million Afghans have died as a
direct consequence of the war.
For its part, the resistance has sought to attain a greater
degree of political unity and offer an alternate form of
government while continuing its efforts to oust the Kabul
regime. Disunity among resistance groups, however, has
contributed to the regime's ability to survive. In February
1989, representatives of the major resistance parties formed
the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) to oversee a transfer of
power. Since its establishment, the AIG has been organizing
its ministries and seeking to broaden its support, although by
year's end much work remained to be done.
Internal security functions in regime-controlled areas are
performed primarily by the secret police under the Ministry of
State Security (WAD). More than 25,000 Afghans are thought to
work for the Ministry, with Soviet security advisers.
The Afghan economy is basically agricultural, with land tenure
in the hands of individuals or family/tribal groups. An
entrepreneurial/trading class and some small scale
manufacturing exist. Continued fighting through 1989 added to
the already tremendous dislocation suffered by the economy in
the war. As a result of war damage, as well as abandonment
and neglect, the economic infrastructure will require years to
recover .
There was little change in the human rights situation in
1989. On the one hand, the regime allowed a political group,
the National Salvation Society, to form, and published a list,
with profound apologies, of the names of 11,000 people
executed during the first 20 months following the coup in
*Since the American Embassy in Kabul was closed for security
reasons in January 1989, the United States has no official
observers in Afghanistan. This report therefore draws to a
large extent on unofficial sources.
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AFGHANISTAN
1978. On the other hand, the February state of emergency-
limited still further freedom of expression and public
assembly and the right to privacy. Virtually all of the
categories of human rights discussed in this report are denied
outright or are severely restricted. The U.N.'s Special
Rapporteur, in his report issued on October 30, 1989, sets the
number of political prisoners at 3,000, with the conditions of
prisoners awaiting trial or verdict described as deplorable.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Arbitrary killing and other acts of violence against suspected
opponents of the Kabul regime were commonplace. Executions
continued in Afghan prisons, often following summary trial and
conviction — sometimes for political offenses — by special
courts. Reportedly, regime forces and some mujahidin groups
have executed prisoners in the field. The fierce fighting
early in the year around the city of Jalalabad involved
reported mujahidin executions of regime troops who had
surrendered.
There have also been murders of Afghans both inside and
outside Afghanistan which have been ascribed to mujahidin
groups as well as to WAD agents.
b. Disappearance
Disappearances continued in areas under regime control. This
is frequently the result of the impressment into military
service of males as young as 13 years old. Some persons also
disappear as a result of the action of mujahidin, who have
been reported to have abducted or captured regime military and
civilian cadre and suspected regime collaborators.
In its October report, Asia Watch cites five cases of
disappearances of intellectuals and alleges that throughout
the conflict the distribution of arms and aid has been an
important factor in the conflict among resistance groups and
that aid workers and intellectuals have been a frequent target
of attack.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Regime authorities frequently use torture to punish or to
extract information or confessions. The practice is
sufficiently widespread to indicate that it has official
sanction. Torture techniques include both physical and
psychological abuse; the use of electric shock to sensitive
areas of the body, immersion in water, and beatings are common
forms of abuse reported by victims and witnesses. Threats of
abuse against family members and prolonged sleep deprivation
are typical forms of psychological torture. Some reports
describe cases of mental disturbances induced by torture in
regime prisons.
In its 1989 Report, covering 1988, Amnesty International (AI)
noted that it had continued to receive reports of the torture
and ill-treatment of prisoners, although again, as noted in
its 1988 report, on a smaller scale than in previous years.
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AFGHANISTAN
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There are no legal safeguards to prevent arbitrary arrest or
detention. Afghans living in areas controlled by the regime
face unwarranted seizure by security personnel. Often,
detainees are either not told of the charges against them
before trial or are simply not brought to trial. Arrest
warrants are not issued, and the right to judicial
determination of the legality of detention is not accorded.
Detainees typically are held incommunicado, sometimes for
years, as is the case with several hundred prisoners held in
the WAD sections of Pol-e-Charkhi prison. Although bail is
sometimes granted, it is not a standard feature of the
regime's legal procedures. Formal charges may come only after
months of interrogation.
There were continuing instances of arbitrary detention in
1989, principally as a result of the impressment of civilians
into military service in Kabul and, to a lesser extent, in
other cities controlled by the regime. The Kabul regime's
military and secret police continue to impress large numbers
of underage boys into the military, taking them from the
street and sometimes from classrooms and homes. The
authorities do not inform the parents of the young men of
their impressment. Relatives of soldiers who desert are often
arrested by the regime to punish the deserters and deter
others from deserting. Since the Soviet departure, regime
impressments have been stepped up.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
All courts are controlled by the ruling PDPA, and defendants
may be denied their legal rights because of charges regarding
their political beliefs. Most persons accused of nonpolitical
crimes are tried in the ordinary criminal court system under
the norms of judicial codes in existence before the PDPA coup
of 1978. Those political detainees who are charged and
brought to trial are usually arraigned on allegations of
treason, espionage, or terrorism and are tried and sentenced
in secret. As a rule, they must provide their own defense,
without benefit of counsel.
Death sentences generally are carried out quickly after a
perfunctory review by the authorities. There is no mechanism
to appeal a death sentence. The U.N.'s Special Rapporteur for
Afghanistan, in his report of October 30, 1989, notes this as
a contradiction to Article 14(5) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, to which Afghanistan is a
party. According to the 1987 Constitution, death sentences
are carried out after the approval of the President. In areas
not controlled by the regime, civil and criminal cases are
tried by Islamic judges (qazis) and community elders under
Islamic, or Shari'a, law and according to Afghan custom. Asia
Watch reports that trials of Afghan prisoners by mujahidin
parties during the war do not conform to internationally
recognized standards of fair trial.
No precise estimate is available on the number of political
prisoners held by the regime, but observers agree that it is
at least 3,000. The mujahidin are not known to hold political
prisoners, although they do detain Soviet and regime personnel
for extended periods. An unknown number of Soviets, captured
prior to the withdrawal, are still being held by the
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AFGHANISTAN
resistance in the hope of exchanging them for prisoners held
by the regime and, the resistance claims, by the U.S.S.R.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Constitutional protections were suspended by the February 17
declaration of a state of emergency. Afghans complain that
regime forces routinely employ sweeps through residential
areas and confiscate property, including homes. Telephones
are frequently tapped and correspondence monitored.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Prior to its withdrawal in mid-February, the Soviet Union
launched an intense campaign of bombardment along supply and
evacuation routes as well as in areas where regime garrisons
were hard pressed by resistance forces. These attacks caused
large numbers of casualties indiscrimately among the civilian
population. Following Soviet withdrawal, the Kabul regime
continued high altitude bombing and began frequent launches of
inaccurate yet powerful Scud surface-to-surface missiles. At
least 1,000 Scuds were launched between February and late
October, causing, together with bombings and artillery
barrages, hundreds of additional civilian deaths and
injuries. Regime and Soviet forces placed millions of
landmines around fortifications or scattered them by artillery
or aircraft during the Soviet occupation. More have been used
by the regime since the Soviets left (and a lesser number of
mines, especially antitank mines, have been sown by the
mujahidin). Nothing has been done by the Soviets or the
regime to remove them or help the U.N. accomplish the task.
Although the U.N. has sponsored a program to detect and remove
mines, the mines will pose a significant hazard to civilians
for years.
Mujahidin rocket attacks against airfields and military
positions under government control have also caused numerous
civilian casualties. Asia Watch, in a report published in
November, focused on allegations of human rights abuses
perpetrated by various resistance groups, most frequently the
Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. These included
politically motivated murders and kidnapings of Afghan refugee
intellectuals, killing of prisoners, and indiscriminate
attacks on government-controlled civilian targets.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Constitutional provisions regarding freedom of expression were
suspended under the February 17 declaration of a state of
emergency. The regime tolerates almost no criticism in the
public media, and private criticism can result in detention
and arrest. Afghans are guarded in their conversations lest
antiregime comments be reported to the secret police. There
is no academic freedom, leading to a continuing exodus of
academics and intellectuals, and the educational infrastructure
is seriously at risk. All media are owned and controlled by
the regime and tightly supervised. The press, radio, and
television are used exclusively to convey the regime's policy
and interpretation of world events. The unlicensed import and
sale of non-Soviet video and audio tapes, magazines, books,
and posters are forbidden, although this ban is generally
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AFGHANISTAN
ineffective. Western radio broadcasts in local languages are
frequently jammed, although some programs do get through.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
There is no freedom of peaceful assembly and association in
areas controlled by the regime. The February declaration of a
state of emergency put further limits on constitutional rights
to assemble. A 1987 party decree passed by the Revolutionary
Council theoretically provided for the expression of political
views at variance with those of the PDPA, but the party
continues to set the bounds for acceptable dissent. While
political demonstrations do occur, they are invariably staged
by the Government. Attempts to hold unauthorized peaceful
assemblies are dealt with forcefully. Large numbers of people
from the upper and middle classes have fled the country
because of severe restrictions on political and social
activity.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The population of Afghanistan is overwhelmingly Muslim.
Although Sunnis predominate, with 80 to 90 percent of the
population, there is an important Shi ' a minority primarily
concentrated in the Hazarajat region of central Afghanistan
and, since the war began, in Kabul. Small enclaves of Hindus
and Sikhs traditionally have lived peacefully alongside their
Muslim neighbors.
Since the 1978 coup, the regime has sought, with marginal
success, to supervise strictly all religious organizations.
The regime's policy pronouncements, including statements by
President Najibullah, routinely invoke religious terminology
in what is seen by most Afghans as a cynical effort to appeal
to the populace. The regime has made some effort to win
support from Muslims through the construction and repair of
mosques and religious schools. Within the last year, the
regime has declared its dedication to Islamic ideals and does
not interfere with the practice of religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Domestic travel remains severely restricted by wartime
conditions. In 1988 the regime reportedly loosened its
requirements and lowered the charge for obtaining a passport
for foreign travel.
The large numbers of mines remaining from the Soviet
occupation and additional mining by regime forces, since the
Soviet withdrawal, of the principal overland routes and passes
(as well as the smaller number of mines sown by the mujahidin)
have caused a large number of casualties among the civilian
population and creates serious risks for returning refugees
who travel over these routes.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Afghan citizens have neither the right nor the ability
peacefully to change their government. The regime-controlled
areas of Afghanistan have a totalitarian government under the
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AFGHANISTAN
control of the PDPA, which is kept in power by the Soviet
Union. The ruling PDPA is modeled closely on the Soviet
Conununist Party. Under military pressure from the resistance,
the PDPA has presented proposals for various ways to change
the country's form of government, including creation of a
coalition transition government. However, under these
proposals, the PDPA would continue to hold the reins of real
power.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The regime's relationships with international humanitarian
organizations investigating human rights practices in
Afghanistan is now less obstructionist than in the past. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was granted
permission in 1988 to visit persons detained by the
Government, and such visits are now taking place. The ICRC
also continues to conduct a medical program in Kabul.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan, Felix Ermacora,
visited Kabul in September, at the invitation of the
Government, to gather material for his fourth report on human
rights in Afghanistan which he submitted in an interim form in
October. His report covers a wide range of human rights
abuses and issues on both sides and offers a series of
recommendations. In its 1989 Report, covering 1988, AI noted
that in April it had appealed to President Najibullah and to
Soviet authprities to ensure that allegations of torture and
extrajudicial executions would be fully investigated and that
those found responsible be brought to justice; there was no
indication that a response had been made.
Some mujahidin groups have permitted the ICRC and journalists
sporadically to visit some Soviet and Afghan prisoners held by
them. In June leaders of the Afghan Interim Government (AIG)
met with a group of private citizens from the U.S.S.R., which
included relatives of Soviet soldiers missing in action.
During the year other private individuals and organizations
met with AIG leaders on the prisoner-of-war (POW) issue. In
November two Soviet POW s were released to their families and
returned to the Soviet Union.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, and Social Status
In traditional Afghan society, the participation of women in
activities beyond the home and field is limited by long
established beliefs, customs, and religious practices. The
social position of some women, generally those residing in
Kabul, has improved somewhat over the past decade. The
disruption of the war and diversion of large numbers of males
to military service and combat have affected the lives of
women living in areas controlled by both the regime and the
resistance. Under the regime, the role of women in some
nontraditional occupations such as banking, the media, and the
civil service has expanded. Women have suffered because of
social and ideological pressures in the refugee community in
Pakistan. What little freedom they had before has been
greatly circumscribed. Attitudes towards women's roles remain
a subject of debate within the resistance, including
assertions by some fundamentalist parties that there should be
further restrictions on public appearances by women. But even
among fundamentalists some change is detectable. One of the
1326
ATGHANISTAN
fundamentalist parties, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezbi-e-Islami ,
has issued membership cards conferring voting rights on
females. The Special Rapporteur noted in his report that a
special matter of concern is the abduction and mistreatment of
Afghan women.
Violence against women is known to occur in Afghanistan, but
little is known about its extent. Abuse within the family is
seldom mentioned publicly in this traditional society, and the
regime does not acknowledge the existence of a problem. There
are no official statistics on the subject.
Afghanistan is home to several religious sects and a number of
ethnic, tribal, and linguistic groups whose relations to one
another have traditionally been marked by rivalry and
occasionally by hostilities, both within the regime and the
resistance. Local loyalties often override those to the
nation as a whole. A particularly strong line of cleavage
along religious, ethnic, and geographic lines lies between the
minority Shi 'a and and the traditionally dominant Sunni
Afghans. Internal regime politics reflect these rivalries,
but the PDPA also tries to take advantage of them for its own
purposes. This includes dispatching troops belonging to one
ethnic group to other parts of the country where they are not
normally present. This continues a longstanding practice —
which predates the Communist takeover — aimed at making it
easier to repress the local population and to prevent military
defections, but it also heightens hostilities between groups
and sparks frequent violence. Shi ' a Muslim resistance groups
are not represented in the seven-party resistance Alliance, in
part because of traditional antipathy and discrimination on
the part of Aghan Sunnis toward their Shi 'a countrymen.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution and the labor law (enacted in 1987) assert
that individual workers have the right to form trade unions,
and such unions are theoretically independent of state
organs. In practice, however, the structure of union
organization is modeled on that of the Soviet Union,
individual unions are overseen by the Central Council of Trade
Unions, an umbrella organization controlled by the ruling
PDPA, and there is no evidence of worker participation in
decisionmaking. There is no provision in law for the right to
organize independent unions, and there is no right to strike.
Workers have been threatened with loss of jobs or imprisonment
for refusal to join party organizations. The Central Council
of Trade Unions is affiliated with the Communist-controlled
World Federation of Trade Unions. Afghanistan has been a
member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) since
1934 but has ratified neither ILO convention 87 regarding
Freedom of Association nor Convention 98 on Collective
Bargaining.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Within the constraints mentioned above, workers have the
theoretical right to organize and bargain collectively.
Acording to labor law, in large economic organizations at the
end of each Afghan year, a new collective contract is signed
following negotiations between the management and the councils
of representatives of the trade union organizations at the
primary level with the consensus of the workers' collective*.
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AFGHANISTAN
In practice, there is no genuine labor-management bargaining
and the workers' collective rubber stamps decisions taken by
officials. There has been some discussion about setting up
labor courts and other mechanisms for the resolution of
disputes, but no action has been taken.
There is no indication that there are any special economic or
export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution forbids the imposition of forced labor, but
notes that the "performance of compulsory labor in wartime,
natural calamity, and other states of emergency which threaten
public life and order shall be excluded from this." Given
that wartime conditions exist, and that the regime imposed a
state of emergency in February, this constitutional provision
is, in effect, superseded. The most frequent manifestation of
the use of forced labor is the "voluntary" labor engaged in by
students for short periods for construction projects during
their annual vacations, during a time when they are seconded
to the military.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The labor law specifies the conditions of work for adolescents,
noting that persons aged 13 to 15 should work a maximum of 30
hours a week, and those aged 16 to 17 should not work more
than 35 hours a week. The law also specifies that adolescents
should receive the same pay as persons 18 and older.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The labor law stipulates that the usual hours of work on
average should not exceed 40 hours a week, and that on
Thursdays working time should not exceed 5 hours. Provision
is made for time off for prayers, meals, holidays, weekends,
annual leave, sick leave, and emergency leave. No information
on any statutory minimum wage is available. There are general
provisions which set out the employer's responsibility to
ensure healthy and safe conditions of work, and accident
compensation. There appear to be no effective enforcement
mechanisms to ensure fair and safe labor practices. The State
Committee on Labor and Social Security is understaffed and,
like most ministries and state committees of the current
regime, not very active.
1328
ALGERIA
Following several years of deteriorating economic conditions
and an eruption of urban riots in October 1988, Algeria took
steps toward a more open, multiparty political system in
1989. The approval of a revised Constitution in February
formally converted Algeria from a Socialist state, in which
power had been invested in a single party, the National
Liberation Front (FLN) , to a multiparty system. However,
President Chadli Bendjedid, as Minister of Defense and
Chairman of the still dominant FLN, continued to hold decisive
political power. The FLN remained the only party represented
in the National Assembly.
Internal security is maintained on a day-to-day basis by the
urban police (Surete) and the rural police (Gendarmerie),
which generally adhere to constitutional guarantees against
arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. When major breakdowns of
internal security occur, as happened in October 1988, the
security forces (General Delegation for Documentation and
Security) and the armed forces assume important roles in
restoring internal order. In the past, they have been known
to ignore constitutional protections.
The Government continued to pursue an economic structural
reform program that emphasized the development of agriculture,
job creation, and decentralization of economic decisionmaking.
Low oil prices, high population growth, and inflation hampered
the Government's efforts to meet social needs. Popular
discontent focused on massive unemployment, inadequate
housing, below-standard education, and chronic scarcity of
consumer goods.
The Government took a number of steps in 1989 which advanced
human rights in Algeria and provided the potential for
additional improvement. The new Constitution provides for the
right to form political parties and civic associations and to
strike, and reinforces the rights to freedom of expression,
opinion, and assembly as well as the independence of the
judiciary. The Government also abolished the State Security
Court, legalized 14 political parties, and significantly
reduced restrictions on the press.
The Government's failure, however, to arrest and prosecute
those in the police and security services who killed and
tortured several hundred people during the October 1988 riots
remained an important human rights concern. In an atmosphere
of rising Islamic activism, significant societal and legal
discrimination against women also remained a major problem,
but received increasing attention from many of the newly
organized political parties and civic associations.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of such killings in 1989, in contrast to
1988 when the army killed several hundred persons during
widespread urban rioting.
1329
ALGERIA
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of abductions, secret arrests, or
clandestine detention in 1989.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The National Committee Against Torture alleged in June that
there were incidents of excessive police force in 1989,
including two cases in which suspects were reportedly blinded
while in detention. There was no independent confirmation of
these charges; the Algerian League of Human Rights (ALHR)
contended that there had been no credible reports of torture
since October 1988.
President Bendjedid promised in November 1988 to launch an
investigation into reports, generally accepted as true, that
the police and military security services used systematic
torture during the October 1988 riots. He also promised to
punish the guilty. His promise followed the publication of
accounts of six cases of torture reported in the French-
language weekly Algerie-actualite and the release of an ALHR
report on 51 torture cases, both of which contained graphic
accounts of the methods of torture employed (see the Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988) . According to the
ALHR report, one victim died as a result of torture.
There was no evidence in 1989 that the President's promise to
prosecute torturers had been kept. The Government has not
carried out an investigation into charges of torture, nor have
any dismissals of police or security service personnel linked
to torture charges been made public. Even though the National
Assembly in 1989 ratified the 1984 U.N. Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, the Assembly never publicly questioned the
practice of torture inside Algeria.
In October 1989 the National Committee against Torture
published a so-called black book on torture. Printed by a
state-owned printing firm, the report contained 87 accounts
(some previously published) of police abuse or torture alleged
to have occurred during or shortly after the October riots.
According to these accounts, the police. Gendarmerie, and
military security all employed torture. The accounts alleged
that, for persons suspected of having participated in rioting
and looting, the police used torture as much to effect summary
punishment as to produce confessions, and that for those
suspected of holding unorthodox political opinions, torture
was used as a last resort by the security services to extract
information on clandestine political activities. Throughout
1989 the Committee and the Association of Families of the
Victims of October pressed the Government to prosecute police
and security force personnel involved in torture and for
compensation for victims. The ALHR reported that the
Government paid indemnities to some of the families of persons
killed in the October riots.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution states that no one may be held, arrested, or
prosecuted except as provided by law. It also provides that
detention for questioning in criminal investigation cases
cannot exceed 48 hours, after which the suspect must be
charged or released. This period can be extended to 4 days.
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ALGERIA
Detainees must be informed immediately of charges against
them. Once charged, a person may be held under preventive
detention indefinitely while his case is being investigated.
There is no bail system. Lawyers are entitled to access to
their clients at any time. Meetings are supervised visually
by a guard.
In previous years. Amnesty International (AI) has noted its
concern about cases of prolonged incommunicado detention, and
leaders of the ALHR declared in 1987 that elimination of this
abuse, as well as the practice of "administrative" or
technical house arrest, was their first priority. The ALHR
has not forcefully pursued this issue. An ALHR report on
preventive detention, promised for 1989, has not been issued.
Exile is not a legal form of punishment in Algeria. A number
of opposition figures live abroad, however, to escape arrest
and trial, ostensibly on criminal charges. At least two
well-known opposition figures. Socialist Forces Front leaders
Hocine Ait Ahmed and Abdelhafid Yaha, returned to Algeria
during 1989 with the express intention of participating in
political life, with apparent government acquiescence.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
As part of its political reform program, the Government, by
means of a vote in the National Popular Assembly (APN) ,
abolished the State Security Court in April 1989. The State
Security Court never sat in permanent session but had been
called into existence periodically only to hear specific cases
involving "national security."
The judicial system is divided into civil and military
courts. There are no Islamic courts in Algeria. The new
Constitution emphasizes the independence of the judiciary, and
Justice Minister Benflis has been a strong proponent of
efforts to bolster the judiciary's independence. Civil courts
have always been generally, but not entirely, free of
executive or military control; during 1989, judges reportedly
became more determined in asserting their independence of
outside, i.e., government influence. Judges are appointed by
the Ministry of Justice. Military courts deal directly with
espionage and offenses committed by military personnel.
Defendants in civil courts have unrestricted access to
counsel; there is no harassment of defense counsel. The
Algerian Bar Association has a pool of lawyers who provide
free services to defendants who cannot afford counsel. As far
as can be determined, criminal defendants are made fully aware
of the charges against them at the time they are bound over
for trial. Defendants have the right to confront witnesses
and present evidence. Trials are public, although generally
not publicized, and defendants have the right of appeal.
During the October 1988 riots, as many as 4,000 people were
arrested on civil disturbance charges. Some of those detained
were tortured or otherwise mistreated while in custody. Many
were released soon after order was restored; the rest were
released on provisional liberty November 1, 1988, including
some who had been tried and convicted. There were no reports
that any detainees, including those released provisionally,
were rearrested or brought to trial in 1989.
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ALGERIA
In its 1989 Report covering 1988, AI reported that over 180
political prisoners remained in jail. There was no evidence
that there were political prisoners being held at the end of
1989.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the home,
and it is generally respected, except in cases involving the
security forces. Police may not enter a house without a
warrant from the local prosecutor or investigating magistrate,
and may not enter a residence during the night hours. The
police and security services are believed to use telephone
monitoring systems, reportedly without prior court
authorization, as required by law.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Algeria made significant progress toward freedom of expression
during 1989, although restrictions remain. Following the
October 1988 riots, a number of citizens' associations
emerged, many to protest the use of torture by the police and
army during the unrest. The public meetings and outdoor
rallies launched by these groups broke ground for the 30-odd
political parties that became active in the period after
January 1989. Although these groups were technically illegal
at the time of their creation (before the revised Constitution
and implementing legislation were approved), the Government
did not seek to suppress them. For the first time since
independence, Algerians were able to speak their minds
relatively freely and publicly and were able openly to
criticize the Government and national leaders.
The Algerian press tried in 1989 to redefine its role
vis-a-vis the Government. Algeria's 1982 information code,
which labeled journalists "agents of the State," was already
under attack at the time of the October 1988 riots. In the
aftermath of the disturbances, journalists demanded a new code
that would stipulate their rights and duties, set out legal
procedures by which the Government could call them to account
for their views, and provide for protection from coercion into
false reporting. An information code adopted by the National
Popular Assembly in July without participation by professional
journalists merely set out a series of punitive measures for
articles that blasphemed Islam and other religions or were in
some way contrary to the "national interest." President
Bendjedid, who viewed the bill as too restrictive, sent it
back to the Assembly for reconsideration, which was completed
in November when the bill was finally rejected by the APN. At
the end of the year the Government had not yet introduced
alternative legislation. In September the newly appointed
Prime Minister, Mouloud Hamrouche, announced that he would not
name a Minister of Information, arguing that governmental
control of the information sector at the cabinet level was
inconsistent with the liberal spirit of the revised
Constitution.
Although censorship had not been formally abolished at year's
end, the print media enjoyed a far greater degree of editorial
freedom than they had at any period since independence.
Although the ruling FLN party continued to receive the lion's
share of coverage, the viewpoints of other political parties
1332
ALGERIA
appeared regularly. Individual Algerians, writing as
columnists, often expressed opinions contrary to those of the
Government. Criticism of government economic and social
policies and management appeared relatively often in the
established, government-controlled press, and was frequently
seen in the publications of various political parties, the
legal distribution of which began in September. Radio and
television, which have always been under government control,
also enjoyed a greater freedom, but to a lesser extent than
the print media.
Some foreign publications are openly sold, although in limited
numbers only because of the scarcity of foreign exchange. The
French-language Paris weekly Jeune Afrique is proscribed,
however, because it is seen as hostile to Algerian interests,
and the French daily Le Monde is occasionally seized. The
growing number of satellite dish antennas in Algeria provides
a large and varied sector of the population with access to
European television news and constitutes the greatest single
outside source of information for Algerians. European and
other North African radio broadcasts are easily received in
Algeria .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The new Constitution provides for the rights to assembly and
association without reservation. Implementing legislation
adopted during the spring set out procedures for obtaining
permits to hold public gatherings. As far as can be
determined, the Government has routinely granted such
permits. A political rally held in May, however, was broken
up by the authorities on the grounds that the organizers had
not received a permit. Prior to the first anniversary of the
October riots, the Government announced that groups intending
to hold public meetings in commemoration of the anniversary
need not apply in advance for a permit but were required to
supply the name of the organization sponsoring the meeting,
its time and place, and number of expected participants. This
policy was respected by the Government.
In early 1989, the National Committee Against Torture and the
Association of Families of the Victims of October, neither of
which had received formal government authorization to exist
and hold meetings, were allowed to hold several rallies and
meetings without interference. The Government did, however,
ban a mock "torture trial" in December 1988 and prohibited an
antitorture student demonstration in early 1989.
According to the July 1989 Political Associations Law,
membership in political organizations is permitted for all
Algerians except judges, army and security service personnel,
and members of the Constitutional Council. All
nongovernmental associations must be approved by the Interior
Ministry. A 1987 amendment to an earlier law on civic
associations, however, allowed some citizens' groups to begin
operating without advance approval. ALHR set the precedent in
1987 as the first important association allowed to exist
outside government or FLN control. Other associations, such
as the Algerian Consumer Association and the Family Planning
Association, followed shortly thereafter. Following the
October 1988 riots, however, the number of citizens' groups
proliferated, but many did not comply with the Ministry's
approval procedure. These associations ranged in purpose from
antitorture protest groups to professional associations
intended as alternatives to the established, FLN-linked
1333
ALGERIA
unions. Except for two instances in late December 1988 and
early January 1989, when antitorture protests were banned, the
Government did not interfere with the activities of these
groups. In July the Interior Ministry approved the
application of the Algerian League for the Defense of Human
Rights (LADDH), a group which had existed illegally since 1985
under the leadership of reputed Berber nationalist Abdenour
Ali Yahia. In a November announcement, the National Committee
Against Torture asserted that the Interior Ministry's failure
to consider its application for legal status within 3 months
constituted a rejection of the application.
Mass organizations for youth, women, farmers, veterans, and
workers and professional groups were in the past all tightly
controlled by the FLN. At its sixth party congress in
November 1988, the FLN decided to lessen its ties with these
organizations, for example, by dropping the requirement that
they be headed by FLN members. Although they were intended to
play key political roles in mobilizing popular support for
government programs, the mass organizations failed to do so.
The organizations for youth and women became increasingly
irrelevant, while the more narrowly focused farmers, veterans,
and workers organizations had somewhat greater success in
presenting the views of their constituencies to the
government .
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution declares Islam to be the state religion, but
also prohibits discrimination based on "opinion or any other
personal or social circumstance or condition." The Government
protects the rights of the very small Christian and Jewish
populations and includes leaders of these communities at
ceremonial state functions. There is little evidence of
individual prejudice. The Christian clergy focuses its
activities on the foreign community since both society and
government strongly discourage conversion from Islam. The
Jewish population numbers less than 300; it maintains a
synagogue in central Algiers. The Islamic clergy is
government trained and the Ministry of Religious Affairs
assigns imams to state-funded mosques. Privately funded
mosques, however, can choose their own religious leaders.
During the early months of 1989, certain mosques were used by
leaders of Islamic fundamentalist political movements as
operational headquarters. The Ministry of Religious Affairs
subsequently issued an order prohibiting the use of places of
worship for political purposes.
d. Freedom of Movement Within The Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom to travel within Algeria and abroad and to emigrate is
provided for by law and generally is respected in practice.
In order to leave the country, an exit visa is no longer
required, but men who are 19 years of age or older must have
proof of completion of mandatory military service, and
employees of state organizations, who are paying back
educational scholarships through work, also need
authorization. Because of bureaucratic inefficiency,
passports sometimes take months to acquire, although this
situation is improving. The amount of hard currency which
Algerians may obtain in Algeria to carry abroad (the
1334
hJSEEIA
equivalent of $200 once every 4 years) had been the primary
limitation on foreign travel. In late 1988, the Government
suspended even that meager allowance as part of stringent
economic austerity measures imposed to cope with a significant
drop in export revenues. The allowance was not reinstated
during 1989.
Foreign diplomats must apply for permission to travel farther
than 50 kilometers from Algiers. The 50-kilometer limit for
diplomats is not strictly enforced, however, and permission to
travel farther is quickly granted upon application. Travel
within Algeria for other visitors is generally unrestricted,
except in areas designated as "military zones." Visitors must
register with local police if they are staying overnight.
Gendarmerie checkpoints in the countryside routinely inspect
vehicle registrations and occasionally search vehicles.
The Constitution provides for the right of political asylum.
It is estimated that more than 100,000 refugees from the
Western Sahara live in camps in southwestern Algeria. They
are largely supported by the Government and, to a much lesser
extent, by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) .
Algeria continues to provide refuge and support to drought
victims from Niger and Mali located in four camps near
Tamanrasset. In 1989 Algeria, Niger, and Mali reached an
agreement on a gradual repatriation of these refugees, whose
number in 1989 rose to an unprecedented 20,000, following the
expulsion of Nigerien and Malian workers from Libya.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Algeria's one-party political system, in place from
independence until February 1989, did not permit citizens to
change their government. The FLN chose all candidates for
public office and public debate was restricted to officially
sanctioned forums and issues. The constitutional revisions
and implementing legislation adopted in 1989, however, put in
place the framework of a multiparty system which has the
potential to allow citizens to change theii government.
However, by year's end, the new system remained untested,
since elections were not held during 1989.
The key component of political reform in 1989 was the approval
in February of a greatly revised Constitution that recognized
the "right to create associations of a political character."
The political associations law adopted in July was broadly
interpreted by the Interior Ministry, which approved
applications from political parties ranging from Comjnunist
(Socialist Vanguard Party) to Islamic fundamentalist (Islamic
Salvation Front) . In addition to the FLN, there were 14
legalized political parties in Algeria as of late 1989. A new
electoral code, revised to accommodate multiparty elections,
included some elements of proportional representation. Prime
Minister Hamrouche announced in October, however, that the new
electoral code favored the FLN and that his Government would
seek to amend it to include a greater degree of proportional
representation. Elections for local and provincial-level
assemblies, originally scheduled for late 1989, were postponed
until the first half of 1990, ostensibly to give new political
parties more time to organize. National Assembly elections
have yet to be scheduled. At year's end the FLN, which had
been the only legal party from independence until 1989, held a
distinct advantage in resources and organization over most of
the newly legalized parties.
1335
ALGERIA
At year's end, Algeria's basic political institutions remained
the same, although their interrelationships had been altered
by constitutional revisions. The President, charged with
assuring national defense and conducting foreign policy, could
appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister, whose selections for
gov^ernment ministers were subject to presidential approval.
The Government presented its program to the National Popular
Assembly for debate and approval. The Assembly could reject
the program once, forcing the Government to resign; a second
rejection would result in both the dismissal of the Government
and the dissolution of the legislature.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Algerian Government normally does not readily discuss its
human rights record with outside governmental or
nongovernmental organizations. The Government is extremely
sensitive to criticism, particularly, but not exclusively, to
allegations of human rights violations which appear in the
European press, and sometimes publishes its own pointed
rejoinders to critical articles.
There are two legally established local human rights leagues;
as of 1989, both had observer status at the International
Federation for Human Rights in Paris. The Algerian League of
Human Rights (ALHR) was established in 1987 and received the
Interior Ministry's approval the same year. It represented
Algeria in the Maghreb Human Rights Association, created in
February 1989. In 1989 the ALHR had about 1,200 members and
regional offices in 36 of the country's 48 provincial
districts. In February a much smaller human rights league led
by an Algiers attorney was subsumed into the ALHR. With
several successes to its credit, notably its role in helping
to promote the release of almost all political prisoners in
1988, the ALHR participated actively during 1989 in debates on
constitutional reform, a new information code, torture, and
the Islamic fundamentalist prisoners serving extended
sentences for having participated in a 1985 uprising.
The second group, the Algerian League for the Defense of Human
Rights (ALDHR) received the Interior Ministry's approval to
operate in July 1989. Established in June 1985, the ALDHR had
operated illegally for 4 years under the leadership of
a±torney . Abdenour Ali Yahia, who was also known for his
involvement in Berber nationalist causes. The ALDHR held its
first open meeting in June 1989, at which it declared its
right to champion human rights causes under the revised
Constitution. At this meeting, however, former founding
members who objected to Ali Yahia 's leadership style split off
from the ALDHR and claimed to have constituted their own
league. At the end of 1989, this new organization had not yet
received the Interior Ministry's approval.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The 1989 Constitution specifically prohibits discrimination
based on birth, race, sex, opinion, or any other personal or
social condition or circumstance. It omits, however, the
specific guarantees for women's political, economic, social,
and cultural rights that had been included in the 1976
version. It does not appear that minority groups are treated
unfairly in access to jobs, housing, education, and health
24-900 O— 90 43
1336
care. The Government's difficulties in meeting social needs
in these areas are mostly caused by the country's extremely
rapid population growth and significant drop in oil revenues,
and minorities seem to fare no better or worse than the Arab
majority.
Berber ethnic consciousness remains strong and is fueled
primarily by the Berbers' desire to preserve their distinctive
cultural identity and language in the face of the Government's
emphasis on the development of Algeria's Arab identity.
Berber spokesmen assert that the Government seeks to repress
the distinct Berber culture, including the teaching and
propagation of the Amazight (Berber) language. Although
Amazight has never been taught in primary and secondary
schools, until 1980 it was taught at Tizi Ouzou University.
Following rioting in the region in 1980, the University's
chair for Amazight studies was abolished and has not been
reinstated. In 1989 two Berberist political ^rties, the
Rally for Culture and Democracy and the Socialist Forces
Front, both of which promote the preservation of Berber
culture, were legalized by the Interior Ministry.
Women face significant discrimination in Algerian society,
which has been subject to rising Islamic fundamentalist
activism. Under Algeria's 1984 family code, inspired by
Islamic law, women are perpetual minors who, regardless of
their age or civil status, remain under the legal guardianship
of a husband, father, or brother. The code also permits
polygamy, makes it more difficult for a woman than a man to
obtain a divorce, and awards only 4 months of alimony to the
woman regardless of the husband's means and the circumstances
of the divorce. Because Islamic law and the family code
forbid Algerian Muslim women from marrying non-Muslims,
Algerian women engaged to non-Muslim men sometimes are
subjected to harassment, including passport confiscation, by
authorities upon entering or leaving the country.
Culture and tradition relegate the Algerian woman to inferior
status. Violence against women is known to occur, but little
is known about its extent. Wife beating and sister beating
are presumed to occur frequently; both are condoned as
acceptable practices by local authorities, in particular, and
society in general. Abuse within the family is seldom
mentioned publicly because of the value attached to family
honor in this conservative society, and the Government does
not acknowledge the existence of a problem. Wives who are
victims of wife beating may file criminal charges or sue for
divorce, but the filing of such cases is believed to be rare.
In Algeria's Muslim context, and despite the country's
postindependence rhetoric about female equality, some Algerian
women find themselves pressured to wear Islamic dress (usually
the hidjab--a headcovering with an ankle-length overdress) by
husbands and fathers jealous of the family's reputation.
Whether they are motivated by family pressure, personal piety,
or a desire to avoid harassment on the street, the number of
young women wearing Islamic dress in cities as well as in
rural areas has risen dramatically over the last several years.
With the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria, many women
regard themselves as increasingly under attack from proponents
of Shari'a (Islamic) law and those who blame male unemployment
on female participation in the workplace. A backlash against
these attitudes found expression in a spirited march organized
by women's groups to celebrate International Women's Day on
1337
ALGERIA
March 8. Some 3,000 men and women demonstrated in front of
the National Assembly to demand the abrogation of the 1984
family code. The demonstrators also voiced their opposition
to the introduction of Shari'a law and demanded governmental
assurances that constitutional guarantees against
discrimination would be upheld. The then Prime Minister,
Kasdi Merbah, and Assembly Speaker Bitat reportedly assured a
delegation of demonstrators that both the letter and spirit of
the Constitution would be strictly applied. Governmental
assurances notwithstanding, in 1989 women's groups in Algeria
still saw fundamentalist pressures and the 1984 family code as
the greatest threats to women's rights.
It is estimated that about 500,000 Algerian women work outside
the home, and an increasing number are trained and employed in
the professions. Women serve in the armed forces. According
to government statistics, girls represent 44 percent of all
children enrolled in primary and secondary schools. According
to 1985 statistics, (the latest available) 72 percent of all
school-age girls were enrolled in 1985. Islamic
fundamentalist efforts to end coeducational classes so far
have been unsuccessful.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
From independence until 1989, workers and professionals did
not have the right to form autonomous labor unions. In 1987
the International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of
Experts reported that the single trade union system in Algeria
was reinforced by legislation and acted to deny workers the
possibility of establishing and joining organizations of their
own choosing. Since 1962, the right to organize and represent
workers had been the prerogative of the general union of
Algerian workers (UGTA) , an FLN-linked mass organization.
During 1989, however, at least two independent professional
unions were established with tacit government approval. These
were the Movement of Algerian Journalists (MJA) and the Union
of Algerian Engineers. Also during 1989, doctors in both
Algiers and Oran worked to create their own professional
associations independent of the UGTA-linked union of Algerian
Physicians.
Blue-collar workers did not succeed during 1989 in their
efforts to establish independent labor unions despite
challenges by factory level activists to the UGTA's
authority. The July 1988 law that reinforced the UGTA's
status as sole labor representative remained on the books,
although it was generally accepted, even by the Government,
that the law had been overtaken by post-October 1988 events.
The Government tolerated an extended series of strikes without
making reference to the 1988 law. The Government announced
plans to submit a new draft law but had not done so by the end
of the year. During 1989, in response to a more volatile
labor environment, the UGTA loosened its ties to the FLN and
pursued the activist role it had assumed in 1988. In
particular, the UGTA sought to protect wages and job security
as the effects of the Government's austerity program were
increasingly felt.
The Constitution as revised in 1989 recognizes the right to
strike but stipulates that it must be exercised within the
framework of the law. Previous legislation prohibits strikes
in the public sector, and the Government has not yet
1338
ALGERIA
introduced legislation to supersede that law. Nevertheless,
spontaneous, illegal strikes occurred frequently during 1989,
as workers demanded higher wages and increased benefits or
protested various management practices. Although the law
prescribed prison sentences for illegal strikers, the
Government apparently chose not to enforce that provision.
In 1989 the UGTA represented Algeria in the International
Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and in the Maghreb Arab
Union Regional Association.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Pending the adoption of new legislation to implement
constitutional revisions, the July 1988 labor law remains
technically in effect. That law, like its predecessors,
maintains the UGTA's status as the sole authorized workers'
representative, while providing for full representation and
unrestricted organizing under UGTA auspices, collective
bargaining, access to the workplace, unrestricted issuance of
union publications, and time off for official union
activities. Antiunion discrimination is illegal and unions
are granted the right to initiate collective and individual
court cases on employer-related grievances. Labor laws are
applied uniformly throughout the country, but enforcement is
lax. There are no export processing zones in Algeria.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced or compulsory labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum employment age is 18 years. The minimum age is
enforced in the state sector, the country's largest employment
sector. It is unregulated in the small private sector, but
violations are not widespread. With continuing economic
hardship, however, there was an increase in the number of
children occupied in informal employment, such as in street
vending .
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Algeria has a 44-hour workweek and strict occupational and
health regulations, but enforcement is generally lax. The
legal minimum wage is very low--$190 per month at the official
exchange rate — and not adequate to provide a worker and his
family with a decent standard of living. It was not known
whether the minimum wage was enforced in the informal sector.
1339
BAHRAIN
The extended family of the Al Khalifa has ruled Bahrain since
the late 18th century and dominates its society and
government. The Constitution confirms the Amir as hereditary
ruler. The current Amir, Shaikh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa,
governs Bahrain with the assistance of his brother, the Prime
Minister; his son, the Crown Prince; and an appointed Cabinet
of Ministers. The Government has suspended some provisions of
Bahrain's 1973 Constitution, including those articles relating
to the National Assembly which the Government disbanded in
1975. There are few judicial checks on the Amir and his
Government .
Bahrain is one of the more heterogeneous societies in the
Gulf, where social ties and interpersonal associations are
formed in a complex web of family, tribal, economic, and
religious affiliations. Bahrain is divided between the Shi'a
and Sunni sects of Islam, with the Shi'a comprising over
two-thirds of the indigenous population. There are important
sectarian divisions among the Shi'a. Despite their numerical
disadvantage, the Sunnis predominate because the ruling
family, supported by powerful merchant families, is Sunni.
Two clandestine fundamentalist political groups with links to
Iran, drawing support from some Shi'a, and two underground,
secular, leftist groups advocate violent political change.
Recently, there has been a splintering of the latter,
accompanied by an increase in fundamentalist rhetoric from
those groups supported by Iran, the main source of
anti-Bahrain subversion and terrorist actions.
The Ministry of Interior is responsible for public security.
Under its auspices the police force and the Security and
Intelligence Service (SIS), with approximately 8,000 to 10,000
employees combined, are responsible for maintaining internal
order and preventing sectarian violence and terrorist actions.
Bahrain's leaders seek to foster the open social and
commercial environment needed to attract international
business, while protecting the ruling family's preeminence,
preventing sectarian violence, and thwarting externally
inspired subversion. Faced with limited oil resources,
Bahrain has diversified its financial base, attracting
companies doing business in financial services,
petrochemicals, and light manufacturing. Bahrain has used its
oil revenues to build an advanced infrastructure in
transportation and telecommunications, and has become a
leading regional financial center. The economy benefited from
the region's economic boom in the 1970 's and early 1980 's, but
suffered from the decline in oil prices beginning in 1986.
The human rights situation in Bahrain was basically unchanged
in 1989, and civil liberties remain greatly restricted. Major
human rights concerns include arbitrary detention and alleged
abuse of detainees held on security grounds, lack of fair
trials in security cases, and restrictions on freedom of
speech and press, assembly and association, women's rights,
and the right of citizens to change their government.
Expatriate workers from developing countries tolerate limited
trade union rights for fear of loss of employment and
deportation.
1340
BAHRAIN
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no known disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is prohibited by law, and there is no evidence of a
policy of systematic physical mistreatment of criminal
offenders. There were several unconfirmed reports in 1989
charging mistreatment and torture at the hands of the SIS.
There are no reliable reports about what happens during
detention in security prisons (where questioning may continue
after sentencing) since visits by nongovernment persons are
generally prohibited. In its 1989 Report, covering 1988,
Amnesty International (AI) noted that it had received new
allegations of physical and psychological torture and
ill-treatment of detainees, apparently to obtain confessions.
It said that, in a number of cases, detainees were reportedly
made to stand upright for many hours, were deprived of sleep
for long periods, beaten or suspended, and threatened while
detained incommunicado and in lengthy solitary confinement.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Political activity is strictly controlled by the security
forces, and persons are sometimes detained and arrested
arbitrarily on suspicion of antiregi.ae activity. Activities
that could lead, under provisions of the security law, to
detention, questioning, warnings, or arrest include membership
in subversive, illegal organizations; painting antiregime
slogans on walls; joining antigovernment demonstrations;
possessing or circulating antiregime writings; preaching
sermons with an extreme fundamentalist or a radical political
tone; or harboring or associating with persons committing such
acts .
According to the State Security Act of 1974, persons may be
detained for a period not to exceed 3 years. Detained persons
have the right to appeal after a period of 3 months, and, if
the appeal is denied, every 6 months thereafter from the date
of the original detention. According to AI , some Shi ' a were
detained briefly before Shi ' a religious occasions; others
reportedly were detained after "Ashoura (a Shi 'a commemoration
of the martyrdom of Husayn) or other religious gatherings at
which antigovernment or anti-American political statements
were made. In the past, detainees have sometimes been held
incommunicado for lengthy periods, although family members can
usually find out where the detainee is being held.
Confessions following such detention are common. Persons
imprisoned for political offenses are sometimes released on
the condition that they immediately go into exile.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
1341
BAHRAIN
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
A person arrested may be tried in either an ordinary criminal
court or the Security Court. Civil trials provide procedural
guarantees including open trial, the right to counsel (with
legal aid available when necessary), and the right to appeal.
Security cases, however, are tried directly by the Supreme
Court of Appeal, sitting as the Security Court. Such trials
are held in secret, there is no right to judicial review of
the legality of arrests, and the court is exempted from
adhering to the procedural guarantees of the penal code. All
records pertaining to trials by the Security Court are
regarded as state secrets. Sentences imposed by the Security
Court can, at the discretion of the Court, be referred to the
Amir for clemency.
The Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) maintains a separate court
system for military personnel accused of offenses under the
military code. These courts do not review cases involving
civilian criminal or security offenses.
Some estimates indicate that fewer than 50 persons are now
being held for political reasons. In its 1989 Report, AI
estimated the number of political prisoners at well over 100.
Among them were 14 alleged supporters of the banned Bahrain
National Liberation Front and 18 alleged supporters of the
Islamic Enlightenment Society.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Interior Ministry can authorize entry into private
premises without judicial authorization. Telephone calls and
correspondence are subject to monitoring by the SIS. Police
informer networks exist.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for the right "to express and
propagate opinions," but in practice Bahrainis cannot freely
challenge the legitimacy of the regime in speech or writing.
Political meetings are not permitted; gatherings which might
take on a political tone are monitored through informers.
Criticism of government policies and programs in such areas as
municipal services, unemployment, and education is tolerated
and commonly seen in the press.
The Information Ministry exercises wide powers over the local
media, and the press generally follows official policy
closely. In the past, minor deviations have brought closure
of the offending newspapers. In 1989 an Arabic-language daily
was closed for 3 days for printing articles found to be
insulting to Islam; the paper reported the lurid details of a
divorce case, which the Minister of Justice had denied
occurred. Bahrain is generally open to international media,
but the Government does not condone unfavorable coverage of
its domestic affairs; it is not uncommon for the Government to
revoke the press credentials of foreign journalists. Since
the Ministry of Information also sponsors the journalists'
residency permits, such actions are tantamount to deportation.
The State owns all radio and television stations and blocks,
as do all its Gulf neighbors, Iranian television broadcasts.
1342
BAHRAIN
Only senior government officials may own and use satellite
dishes. All newspapers are privately owned and exercise
self-censorship in reporting on antiregime activities and in
criticizing the Government. Former Information Ministry
officials serve as editors of the two Arabic daily papers,
which are regarded as semiofficial.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Although the Constitution affirms the right of free assembly,
public political demonstrations or meetings are prohibited.
Professional organizations are permitted. The large number of
social and sports clubs have traditionally served as forums
for discreet political discussion. The Government monitors
the activities of these organizations, which are generally
small and limited in scope. Groups seeking to hold meetings
in public places must obtain permits. Permits for religious
ceremonies, including those of the Shi "a, are routinely
granted.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
trade unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
The population is overwhelmingly Muslim, and Islam is the
state religion. Christians and other non-Muslims, including
Jews, Hindus, and Baha'is, enjoy considerable freedom to
practice their religion. Some maintain places of worship, but
some small groups practice in their homes. Religious tracts
of all Islamic sects and publications of other religions are
readily available in bookstores.
Proselytizing is not encouraged, and anti-Islamic writings are
prohibited. Both Sunni and Shi ' a sects are subject to
government control and monitoring, but there is no
interference with routine worship or religious activities.
Public religious events, most notably commemorative marches by
the Shi "a, are permitted but are closely watched by the
police. There appear to be no restrictions on the number of
Bahrainis permitted to make pilgrimages to Shi 'a shrines and
holy sites in Iraq. However, religious study in and
pilgrimages to Iran are strongly discouraged. Conversions
from Islam to another religion are tolerated.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Bahrainis are free to move within the country and change their
place of residence or work. Passports can be denied on
political grounds. Bahrainis living abroad who are suspected
of political offenses may face imprisonment without public
trial upon return to Bahrain. Refugees are not repatriated to
countries they have fled, but are obliged to depart Bahrain
immediately. There are some Iranian emigres who have fled
Iran since 1979 and have permission to remain in Bahrain, but
they have not been granted citizenship. Travel to Iran,
especially by Shi 'a, is discouraged by the Government.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right or ability peacefully to change
their government or their political system. With the
abolition of the National Assembly, there are no formal
1343
BAHRAIN
democratic institutions, and neither political parties nor
opposition organizations are permitted. Bahrain is ruled by
the Al Khalifa family, headed by the Amir. All government
positions are appointive. About one-third of the cabinet
ministers are Shi 'a, although they do not hold key
portfolios. The average Bahraini can attempt to influence
government decisions only through the submission of written
petitions and informal contact with senior officials,
including appeals to the Amir at his regular public
audiences .
Four clandestine political groups agitate for change in
Bahrain. The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, the
group responsible for the 1981 coup attempt, is almost
exclusively militant Shi 'a in its makeup. It calls for
violent revolution. The Islamic Call Party advocates a
relatively moderate form of populist Islam and demands reforms
in the social and economic structure of Bahrain. Both have
ties to Iran, call for the establishment of an Islamic
Republic, and attract some support from the younger,
disaffected Shi'a. Public displays of their activism have
decreased. Two underground, secular leftist groups, the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and the pro-Soviet
National Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, have ties with
radical Arab regimes and Arab nationalist organizations.
Their influence in Bahrain appears to have decreased in recent
years .
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
No internal human rights organizations exist. No
nongovernmental investigations occurred in 1989. AI notes in
its 1989 report that it proposed in 1988 a follow-up visit to
one it conducted in 1987 and that it provided recommendations
for improvements in human rights practices. The Government
did not respond.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status.
Although there are notable exceptions, Sunni Muslims enjoy a
more favored status in Bahrain than the Shi'a, who form
approximately two-thirds of the population. Sxinnis receive
preference for employment in sensitive positions, including in
the Bahraini Defense Force and the managerial ranks of the
public sector. Statistics are unavailable, but Shi'a tend to
be employed in lower paid, lesser skilled jobs. Social and
municipal services in most Shi'a neighborhoods, particularly
in rural villages, are markedly inferior to those found in
Sunni urban communities. The Government has tried to remedy
social discrimination, improve living conditions for the
Shi'a, and encourage sectarian integration through the
development of government-subsidized housing complexes, open
to all Bahrainis on the basis of financial need.
Legal rights of concern to women are subject to Islamic law.
Specific rights vary according to Shi'a or Sunni precedent, as
determined by the person's faith. Bahraini women have the
freedom to wear the clothing of their choice (a large
percentage wear Western dress outside the home), to work
-outside the home, to drive a car without escorts, and to
travel outside the country.
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BAHRAIN
Islamic law (Shari'a) governs the legal rights of Bahraini
women. Specific rights vary according to Shi "a or Sunni
interpretations of Islamic law, as determined by the person's
faith or the court in which various contracts have been
made--as in the case of marriage. In distinction to Sunni
women, Shi 'a women do have the right to initiate a divorce and
are, theoretically, equal to men in all other respects. Women
of either sect may own and inherit property. Women may
represent their own interests in all public and legal
matters. According to Islamic tradition, a woman generally
loses custody of her children after they reach the age of 7,
but, in the case of proven incompetence on the husband's part,
this is not applied. According to national custom, a
non-Bahraini woman automatically loses custody of her children
if she is married to, and divorces, a Bahraini man. Women can
obtain passports without permission of a male head of the
household and can exit the country without permission.
With the development of the Bahrain economy, women have
increasingly taken jobs previously reserved for men. Women
now constitute about 18 percent of the Bahraini work force.
The Government has encouraged the hiring of women, has enacted
special laws to promote female entry into the work force, and
is itself a leading employer of women. Generally, women work
outside the home during the years between secondary school or
university and marriage. Women make up the majority of
students at Bahrain's universities.
The status of women is a continuing subject of debate. There
are women's organizations which have as a goal the betterment
of the status of women under both civil and Islamic law.
These organizations are supported by the Government.
There is little information available regarding violence
against Bahraini women. More evidence exists regarding
violence against expatriate women working in Bahrain as
domestics. Cases of domestics beaten badly enough to require
hospitalization have been reported to the police and in the
newspapers. Although many victims of employer violence may
fear dismissal and deportation, cases of successful complaints
by employees abused by their sponsor are on record.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Although the Constitution recognizes the right of workers to
organize, there are no trade unions, primarily because the
Government actively discourages them. Strikes are not
permitted. In response to labor unrest in the mid-1950 's and
in 1965 and 1974, the Government encouraged--and now closely
controls — the formation of elected workers' committees in
major companies. Since 1982, when the Government granted
permission to form the first Joint Labor Management
Consultative Committee (JCC), 12 JCC's have been established
in the major industries. The JCC's represent close to 70
percent of the island's labor force. Nonindustrial expatriate
workers, about 60 percent of the work force, are denied even
these limited "rights." Bahrain has been a member of the
International Labor Organization (ILO) since 1977 but has
ratified neither ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association
nor Convention 98 on Collective Bargaining.
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BAHRAIN
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There are no collective bargaining units or contracts. As
noted above, in 12 key industries employing significant
numbers of Bahrainis, the Government has sanctioned the
formation of Joint Consultative Committees comprised of
representatives from management and employees. These JCC ' s
are empowered to resolve labor disputes, organize workers'
services, and discuss wages, working conditions, and raising
productivity. But the workers have no independent, recognized
vehicle for addressing these or other labor-related issues.
Labor law and practice are uniform throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Government prohibits the use of forced or compulsory
labor. The press, however, regularly reports instances where
private-sector employers compel expatriate workers from
developing nations to perform work not specified in their
contracts. Once a complaint has been lodged by a worker with
a grievance, the Labor Ministry opens an investigation and
often takes appropriate action.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for employment is 14 years. Juveniles between
the ages of 14 and 16 receive special protection under the
labor laws. They may not be employed in hazardous conditions
or at night and may not work over 6 hours per day or on a
piecework basis. Child labor laws are enforced.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Bahrain's labor law, enforced by the Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs, provides for acceptable conditions of work for
all adult workers, including adequate standards regarding
hours of work (maximum 48 hours per week) , and occupational
safety and health. Minimum wage scales, which exist for both
private and public sector employees, generally afford a decent
standard of living for a worker and his family.
In practice, however, expatriate workers are seriously
disadvantaged by the requirement that all foreigners must be
sponsored by Bahrainis or Bahrain-based institutions and
companies in order to work. Under this system, sponsors can
cancel the residence permit of any person under their
sponsorship and thereby blacklist individuals so that they
cannot obtain entry or residence visas from another sponsor.
Such power contains the potential for exploitation since
foreign workers are often unwilling to report abuses of their
rights for fear of forced repatriation. Instances of
expatriate workers being denied their guaranteed holidays,
days off, and vacations without compensation, have been
reported by the English-language daily, which serves as an
unofficial ombudsman for expatriate workers. In 1989 some
expatriate housemaids charged their employers with sexual
harassment .
The Government has initiated a plan to replace 20,000
expatriate workers in the private sector. The official
unemployment rate in 1987 was 3.2 percent; however, a Ministry
of Labor official announced in May 1989 that the indigenous
unemployment rate was about 10 percent.
1346
Bahrain's labor law does not recognize the concept of equal
pay for equal work. Asian workers are paid lower wages than
their Bahraini counterparts. Westerners and Bahraini workers
are paid comparable wages; women are generally paid less than
men. However, women are entitled to 60 days of paid maternity
leave and nursing periods during the day.
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BANGLADESH
The Bangladesh Constitution provides for a presidential form
of government and a unicameral Parliament of 300 members. The
President appoints the ministers, 20 percent of whom do not
have to be members of Parliament. The Prime Minister, also
appointed by the President, serves more as the leader of the
parliamentary majority than as leader of the Government. H.M.
Ershad, then the Army Chief of Staff, took power in 1982 in a
bloodless coup and, after retiring from the military, was
elected President in 1986 in elections boycotted by the major
opposition parties.
The present Parliament, composed of 252 members from the
President's Jatiyo Party and 48 members from smaller parties,
was formed in elections held in March 1988 which were marred
by the absence of major opposition parties, sporadic violence,
lov7 voter turnout, and fraudulent vote counts. Parliament
held two sessions in 1989 and passed limited autonomy
legislation for the three Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)
districts and a Ninth Constitutional Amendment which provides
for an elected Vice President and limits both the President's
and Vice President's tenure to two consecutive 5-year terms.
In view of continued questioning of the current Parliament's
representative character, the Government has offered to hold
midterm parliamentary elections, but the major opposition
parties have refused to participate because they do not
believe there can be free and fair elections under President
Ershad.
The police and paramilitary forces, all of which are
controlled by the Home Affairs Ministry, bear primary
responsibility for maintaining internal security.
Paramilitary forces include the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), which
guards the borders, the Bangladesh Ansars (a home guard which
assists the police in maintaining law and order) , and the
Village Defense Parties (VDP) , a uniformed but normally
unarmed local militia. The army plays an internal security
role in the CHT, where attacks by tribal insurgents against
security forces, Bengali settlers, and other tribals continued
in 1989. Tribals have accused security forces of
participating in or instigating attacks by settlers. Despite
these accusations, there were no confirmed reports in 1989 of
retaliation by army troops in the area.
Bangladesh is one of the world's poorest and most densely
populated countries. The Government's key programs aim at
economic development through reduced population growth,
increased crop yields, decentralization of administration, and
development of the private sector. The economy recovered
somewhat from the devastating floods of 1988, and below-normal
rainfall prevented serious flooding in 1989.
Overall, there were no major changes in the human rights
situation in 1989. The internally divided opposition's
inability to remount its campaign to oust the present
Government brought a year of relative political stability,
with fev;er reported instances of human rights abuses than in
1988. Municipal elections conducted during the year were
relatively peaceful, as were local government council
elections in June in the three CHT districts. However, a
parliamentary by-election in September was marred by
allegations of voting irregularities. Significant
restrictions remained on the ability of citizens to change
their government, freedom of the press, and a variety of
1348
BANGLADESH
women's rights, and there remained concerns regarding abuse of
prisoners and detainees and arbitrary detentions.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
While January elections in 80 of Bangladesh's 86
municipalities were relatively peaceful, sporadic violence
resulted in at least 6 deaths and over 500 injuries, including
injuries to a number of law enforcement officials. Police
fired above the heads of crowds to disperse them, but
apparently no fatalities were inflicted by law enforcement
authorities. There was also violence on university campuses
throughout the year as student wings of various political
parties clashed repeatedly. These encounters often caused
injuries and sometimes resulted in deaths.
For a discussion of killings related to the CHT insurgency,
see Section l.g.
b. Disappearance
There were no confirmed reports of disappearance resulting
from official actions in 1989. As in the past, however, armed
tribal insurgents in the CHT kidnaped a number of persons in
raids on Bengali villages.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution forbids torture and cruel, inhuman, or
degrading punishment or treatment. Despite several
allegations, there were no confirmed reports of such incidents
in the CHT in 1989, but Amnesty International (AI) and local
human rights groups continue to monitor this area and to
encourage the Government to safeguard the rights of tribal
people. In response to previous requests, the Government
submitted a report to AI on several alleged instances of
torture in the Hill Tracts dating from 1986.
Police treatment of accused criminals is usually rough and can
include abusive interrogations and beatings. Reports of
fatalities from such treatment are relatively rare; however,
local human rights groups have begun increasingly to
investigate individual cases and confirmed five such deaths in
1989. The Government has not interfered in such
investigations. In its 1989 Report, covering 1988, AI noted
that it had renewed reports of torture of criminal suspects in
police custody, several of whom were alleged to have died as a
result. Mistreatment of ordinary citizens frequently goes
unpunished, but police and jail officials involved in
mistreating prisoners are sometimes disciplined in cases where
the victim or his family and friends can attract publicity or
persuade human rights groups to investigate the allegations.
There are also occasional reports of abusive treatment of
citizens by a variety of lower level government officials,
party bosses, and labor leaders--who intimidate others through
violence or threats of violence.
1349
BANGLADESH
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under the Special Powers Act of 1974 (SPA), the Government can
detain an individual without charge for an initial period of
30 days to prevent the commission of "any prejudicial act" as
defined in the legislation. The Government is obligated to
charge the detainee formally by the end of this period or
release him if it fails to file a charge. The individual can
legally be held until completion of an investigation if the
Government brings a charge. In practice, though not in the
law, the detainee has 15 days to respond to the specific
charge in writing to the Home Affairs Ministry, which can
grant early release. Detentions under the SPA are not subject
to judicial review until after 6 months, at which time a
committee of three jurists examines the case to ascertain
whether there is sufficient reason to continue the detention.
Although the detainee is theoretically entitled to see a
lawyer at the time he is detained, in practice a lawyer is
generally not allowed to see the detainee until a specific
charge has been filed.
Forty alleged activists in a Hindu separatist movement were
detained under the SPA in the early part of 1989. Twenty-six
remain incarcerated. Human rights activists fear that the SPA
is increasingly used against political opponents in rural
areas and to detain indefinitely suspected criminals against
whom the Government has insufficient evidence for a formal
charge. Human rights activists and some press accounts note
that the Government often issues new detention orders against
individuals as soon as the original detention has expired or
been vacated by the courts.
The Government put the number of SPA detainees at 2,157 as of
April 30, although human rights groups believe the actual
figure is higher. Persons detained under the SPA are often
subsequently charged under criminal statutes.
The right of a detainee to a judicial determination of the
legality of his detention exists in local law. Bangladeshi
legal and human rights organizations, however, continued to
report cases of suspects who were arrested on minor charges
but who remained in jail for long periods without trial.
There were no reports of persons being exiled in 1989.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 5.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Supreme Court is generally considered independent,
although pressure is sometimes brought to bear in political or
security cases. Civilian courts hear civil and criminal cases
in public trials, and the right of counsel is respected.
Though generally considered fair, civil courts are
overburdened and effectively available only to those who can
afford representation. In addition, the time-consuming and
expensive process of pursuing cases discourages many from
seeking redress through the courts. There are few legal aid
programs to assist litigants and no public defenders.
Although the legal time limit for disposal of criminal cases
is 240 days at the district level and 120 days at the
magistrate level, a shortage of judges and a backlog of over
500,000 criminal and civil cases makes longer delays a common
occurrence. The continuation of a 1-day-a-week boycott of the
Supreme Court by barristers who oppose several court-related
government decisions hampered the timely dispensation of
1350
BANGLADESH
justice even further. A relatively small number of the cases
in the backlog involves detainees.
A Bangladeshi nonprofit human rights group, with funding from
The Asia Foundation (TAF) , has established a training program
for new lawyers. A TAF training program for judges has to
date trained 255 assistant judges and 45 midlevel judges, and
TAF continues to support the legal outreach program of a local
human rights group.
The Government claims to hold no political prisoners.
Bangladesh human rights groups assert, however, that some
persons detained under the SPA are actually political
prisoners. Currently such groups do not maintain statistics
on the number of political prisoners in the country, and
estimates vary considerably.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Bangladesh law requires a judicial warrant before authorities
enter a home, and courts require evidence supporting a
reasonable suspicion before issuing a warrant. However, the
SPA permits authorities to search premises without a warrant
under certain circumstances, and authorities have in the past
entered the homes of opposition leaders, detained individuals,
and searched their premises without warrants. The
Government's civilian and military intelligence services are
widely believed to monitor the opposition by such means as
selective wiretaps and interception of mail.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Despite government efforts to address tribal grievances in
1989 through limited autonomy legislation for the CHT, the
longstanding Slianti Bahini (Peace Force) insurgent movement
remained active. This insurgency began in the early 1970's
and has been sustained by the tribal people's fears that their
traditional way of life and special status in the hill areas
are being undermined by settlers from the overpopulated
plains. During the past 4 years, government policy has
discouraged settlement in the Hill Tracts. Some 300,000
ethnic Bengalis remain in the 3 hill districts along with
approximately 500,000 tribals.
Due to restricted access to the Hill Tracts, the veracity of
accusations of atrocities committed by the tribals or security
forces cannot be confirmed. Shanti Bahini attacks on Bengali
settlements, military personnel, and tribals, many of which
resulted in deaths and destruction of property, continued in
1989 and escalated in late July following the June CHT local
government council elections. Precise figures are not
available, but the Government estimates that these attacks
killed at least 300 persons by mid-September and drove more
than 1,500 tribals to refugee camps in neighboring India.
Others put the number of new refugees at a much higher level.
A number of tribals alleged to be Shanti Bahini insurgents
also died in clashes in 1989 with military personnel. In
addition, between 16 and 36 tribals were killed and
approximately 500 were injured in May when the alleged Shanti
Bahini assassination of a county council chairman provoked
reprisals by settlers against tribals. Although some sources
charge that government security forces instigated the
reprisals, or at least were slow to restore order, there is no
1351
BANGLADESH
evidence of military complicity in the Bengali settlers'
attacks on the tribals. In 1989 there was no confirmed
evidence that the security forces disobeyed strict government
orders to avoid reprisals against the tribal people and to
prevent others from such retaliations. Complaints of human
rights violations in the Hill Tracts continued to be far fewer
than those received as recently as 1987, and despite Shanti
Bahini threats to kill candidates and voters, June elections
to fill seats on the newly created CHT district councils were
for the most part peaceful. The Government offered amnesty to
Shanti Bahini insurgents on two occasions in 1989.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and expression
and freedom of the press, subject to "reasonable restrictions"
in the interest of national security, international relations,
and public order, decency, and morality. In practice, the
Government has a variety of means to attempt to control the
press, including formal and informal censorship, "guidance"
from the Press Information Department, temporary closures of
newspapers, and arrest or intimidation of journalists. The
SPA allows the Government to ban domestic publications, to
hold any newspaper employee responsible for the paper's
content, and to compel journalists to reveal news sources.
Most publications are heavily dependent upon advertisements
from the Government or government-owned corporations; these
advertisements reportedly account for as much as 75 percent of
advertising revenues. Although all newspapers are
theoretically eligible to receive public sector advertising if
they meet minimum circulation requirements, publishers
complain that the placing and withholding of advertising, as
well as payment for it, are often used as a means of
influencing the press.
In 1989 several Bengali-language weeklies — which tend to be
censored more heavily than dailies — were banned for
"objectionable" statements or commentary. A number of other
publications banned between 1984 and 1988 remained closed in
1989. Bans on these newspapers have been in effect for
varying lengths of time, with some appearing to be permanent.
The Government owns and operates all radio and television
facilities. In the print media, it owns two Dhaka newspapers,
including one English-language daily and one Rajshahi daily.
The Government also owns BSS, the national news service. Two
wire services. Eastern News Agency and the United News of
Bangladesh, are privately owned.
Bangladesh has 74 dailies and 290 weeklies and periodicals.
Three of the Dhaka English-language dailies and most
Bengali-language periodicals and newspapers are privately
owned and reflect the views of various political parties. All
major newspapers report on both government and opposition
activities, although coverage of the opposition is less
extensive in the government-owned publications. Articles and
editorials critical of the Government appear, but criticism of
President Ershad, his family, or the armed forces is not
tolerated. The weekly Robbar, banned in June 1988 for
printing commentary critical of the President, remained closed
in 1989, and hearings on a legal challenge filed by Robbar's
publisher were repeatedly postponed.
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BANGLADESH
Three journalists were detained in 1989. The editor of the
Bengali- language daily Shakti was arrested in June for
publishing an "objectionable report." He was released on bail
the following day. The chairman of Purabi and the editor of
Runner, two Jessore dailies, were arrested and held for 3 days
in September for publishing a "defamatory report" on the State
Minister for Religious Affairs.
Opposition political parties also exert pressure on newspapers
and magazines hostile to them in efforts to intimidate them.
Tactics include anonymous threatening telephone calls and
threats of arson.
Although 56 foreign publications (18 dailies and 38
periodicals) are generally available in Bangladesh, the
Government has sometimes used the Customs Act of 1969 to
prevent the importation of foreign publications critical of
President Ershad. The Government invoked the Act in 1989 to
ban one issue of the London-based weekly Natun Din for
printing an "undesirable" article. The Government also banned
the book "The Satanic Verses" and issues of foreign
publications dealing with the controversy for a few weeks. No
foreign journalists were arrested, barred from entry, or
expelled in 1989. In June, foreign journalists were invited
to cover the CHT district council elections under government
escort .
The Government retains the authority to require drama groups
to obtain certificates of approval to perform. No drama group
in Dhaka bothers to apply for such authorization in practice,
but the law is enforced outside the capital. Drama groups are
required to submit scripts to the district commissioner, and
actors who perform in unauthorized plays are theoretically
subject to arrest.
The Government censors films primarily to ban pornography.
All films from South Africa and Israel are prohibited.
Students are generally free to express a wide range of
political opinion through campus organizations and
publications, and opposition parties sometimes use student
fronts to organize antigovernment demonstrations.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution assures every citizen the right to form
associations, subject to "reasonable restrictions" in the
interest of morality or public order. In practice,
individuals are free to join private organizations and
associations, and permits are usually not required for public
meetings. There are no restrictions on affiliation with
international organizations.
For a discussion o£ freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Bangladesh, 87 percent of whose people are Muslims, has
recognized Islam as its state religion since the passage in
June 1988 of the Eighth Constitutional Amendment. This
amendment also states that all other religions may be freely
practiced. Although conversion is possible, there is strong
social resistance to conversion from Islam. Members of
religious minorities have also reported being questioned by
1353
BANGLADESH
the security service about conversion activity. Proselytizing
by Bangladeshi citizens, which is permitted by the
Constitution, is mostly directed toward such minority groups
as Hindus and tribal people.
Government policy continues to permit various religions to
establish places of worship, train clergy, travel for
religious purposes, and maintain links with coreligionists
abroad. Missionaries, including foreign clergy who serve
expatriate congregations, are permitted but they may not
proselytize Muslims. Some missionaries perceive the various
bureaucratic obstacles they face, including lengthy delays in
obtaining or renewing security clearances and residence visas,
as intended to curb Christian influence by reducing the number
of missionaries and limiting their humanitarian activities.
Appeals to the Government have sometimes been successful in
removing such obstacles.
Despite official assurances of freedom of religion and
equality of treatment, the establishment of Islam as the state
religion continued to cause concern in 1989 among the Hindu,
Christian, and Buddhist minorities. Some minority group
members complain that this constitutional change has
emboldened Muslim fanatics and criminal elements hostile to
the minorities. As in 1988, there were reports of harassment,
robbery, vandalism, and encroachment on property owned by
non-Muslims .
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Bangladeshi citizens are free to move about within the
country, except in designated areas of the CHT. Travel by
foreigners is also restricted in the CHT and some other border
areas. Bangladeshis are generally free to visit and emigrate
abroad, subject to foreign exchange controls, but civil
servants wishing to travel abroad must obtain permission from
the Government. In some instances, persons considered to be
security risks are barred from traveling abroad. One former
minister was barred twice from leaving the country. Though
the Government rarely hinders citizens wishing to return from
abroad, in 1989 a Bangladeshi student was detained upon
arrival in Dhaka from London, reportedly on the grounds that
he had engaged in "anti-Bangladeshi activities." The right of
repatriation is observed.
Approximately 250,000 non-Bengali Muslims, known as Biharis or
"stranded Pakistanis," remain in Bangladesh pending
resettlement in Pakistan. After independence in 1971, these
persons opted for Pakistani citizenship and Pakistan agreed to
accept them, provided financing for resettlement costs was
made available from outside sources. A Saudi Arabia-based
social organization has been trying for several years to raise
money for this purpose and claims that sufficient funds could
be found if permission was granted for the Biharis to
resettle. The main obstacle to resettlement is communal
tensions and recurrent violence between Biharis already in
Pakistan and other ethnic groups, which makes the addition of
250,000 more Biharis a politically difficult issue for the
Government of Pakistan at this time. Anti-Bihari
demonstrations in Pakistan delayed indefinitely a modest
repatriation effort by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) planned for January. This contributed to
increased frustration in the Bihari community and prompted a
1354
PANGLADESH
hunger strike and other demonstrations during the summer
months .
The Biharis, n.ost of whom still reside in 66 camps throughout
Bangladesh, may seek employment and conduct other activities,
but they face disadvantages as noncitizens. Biharis may apply
for Bangladeshi citizenship at any time, and those who do so
are granted full rights of citizenship.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The governing party's dominance of the electoral process and
the fraud and violence which have characterized national
elections in recent years raise serious doubts about the
ability of Bangladeshi citizens to change their government
peacefully and democratically. In addition, the political
polarization between the Government and the opposition and
internal divisions within the opposition continued to prevent
agreement on the holding of parliamentary elections.
After assuming power in a bloodless military coup in 1982,
Bangladesh's current leader, H.M. Ershad, assumed the
presidency in December 1983. He was elected to the presidency
in an election in 1986 which the major opposition groupings,
including the Awami League/Eight Party Alliance, the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and the Islamic fundamentalist
Jamaat-E-Islami , boycotted.
Bangladesh's present Parliament was elected in March 1988
elections that were marred by a boycott by major opposition
parties, sporadic violence, low voter turnout, and voting
fraud. The Parliament passed most legislation by wide margins
and with little debate.
The Constitution does not require new parliamentary elections
before 1993. The Government has publicly stated its
willingness to hold midterm parliamentary elections, but the
major opposition parties have thus far refused to participate
as long as President Ershad remains in power. The Government
has met with human rights activists to discuss ways to hold
free and fair elections; however, human rights observers,
while welcoming such meetings as a positive step, remain
doubtful of the Government's sincerity about ensuring the
holding of such elections. In September the Government began
updating its 1983 electoral rolls.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government is sensitive to international opinion regarding
human rights issues. Although there were no visits to
Bangladesh in 1989 by AI or similar groups, the Government
made efforts to respond to outside inquiries by submitting
reports to AI on its investigation into several allegations of
mistreatment dating from 1986. The Government also shared
with AI its findings on the settler reprisals which took place
in Langdu in the CHT in May (described in Section l.g.). In
addition, the Government invited and provided facilities for
members of the diplomatic community and foreign press who
observed the CHT local government council elections in June.
International human rights organizations represented in
Bangladesh include the International League for Human Rights,
The Law Association tor Asia and the Western Pacific, and The
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BANGLADESH
International Commission of Jurists. There are also a number
of local human rights organizations which monitor developments
through their rural branches, investigate allegations of
abuse, and seek to prosecute human rights violators. Human
rights groups are also active in promoting awareness of human
rights and the law among the country's largely uneducated
rural majority. The Government generally does not hamper
these groups' activities.
Bangladesh is an active member of the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights. In August the U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities dropped all cases
against Bangladesh regarding alleged human rights abuses in
the CHT and decided unanimously to "thank the Government of
Bangladesh for its cooperation and express its satisfaction
with the progress made in respect to the treatment of its
tribal population."
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
By custom and Islamic tradition, women occupy a subordinate
place in society and a family's ability to seclude its women
is a symbol of middle or high social status. These underlying
attitudes and social barriers circumscribing the participation
of women in activities beyond the home are strongly entrenched
and show few signs of weakening. For the approximately 86
percent of Bangladeshi women who live in rural areas, early
marriage, high childbearing rates, and long hours of household
and farm labor leave little opportunity for nonfamily
interests or outside employment. Even in urban areas and
among the affluent, the traditional social system makes women
economically dependent upon their husbands and other male
relatives. Except in the export-oriented garment industry,
women are virtually absent from the cash-earning work force.
The daily press testifies to a pattern of domestic violence
against women: murder, rape and other physical abuse, breach
of matrimonial contract, denial of inheritance rights, and
desertion. The suicide rate among women is reportedly almost
three times higher than among men. Laws to protect women
include the Anti-Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980; the Cruelty to
Women Act of 1983; the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1984;
and the Illegal Trafficking of Women Act of 1988, but
enforcement of these laws is lax. It is a capital offense to
traffic in women, to kill a woman in the course of rape, or to
murder a woman for dowry. Even so, dowry killings, in which
the husband or his family attack and sometimes murder the
bride for nonpayment of a supposedly promised dowry, are
believed to occur frequently in rural areas. Although
newspapers frequently print reports in which a husband accused
of dowry killing is tried and punished, the vast majority of
these cases are believed to go unreported. The recently
created National Advisory Committee Against Repression of
Women plans to set up local branches in rural areas to address
the problems of abused women, but there is still little
recourse for victims of crimes committed within the family or
home.
Members of minority religious groups are disadvantaged in
practice, though not in the law, in their access to government
jobs and political office. In the years immediately following
Bangladesh's independence, members of some minorities,
principally Hindus, lost or had serious difficulty retaining
their properties as a result of the prejudicial administration
1356
BANGLADESH
of vested property laws. These laws permitted the Government
to use or even sell property belonging to persons who left
what is now Bangladesh between 1965 and 1971. Although the
President in July reiterated a 1984 executive order requiring
the return of such property to the original owners, some human
rights activists contend that property is still occasionally
seized under these laws.
Discrimination against the tribal people in the CHT with
respect to property rights has been a persistent issue. Until
1985, tribal land, for which there is frequently no deed, was
parceled out by authorities to Bengali Muslim settlers in the
CHT. Tribal peoples' property rights were also violated by
the issuance of false deeds, physical attacks, actions taken
following the failure to meet mortgage payments, or
confiscation by the army in areas where the tribal insurgency
is active. There were no reports of such violations in 1989,
and the Government's CHT local government councils
legislation, which grants land allocation and regulation
authority to elected, tribal-dominated district councils,
affirmed the tribals" land rights. The legislation also gives
the councils authority over local law enforcement, housing,
health, and educational facilities. Even so, concern over
these issues lingers among many of the hill people.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides for the right of association,
subject to restrictions imposed by law. The Constitution also
provides for the right to form labor unions, subject to
governmental approval. Although the Government has the legal
right to suspend unions, it took no such action in 1989.
Workers in trade associations or unions may draw up their own
constitution and rules, elect officers, develop programs, and
conduct business without government interference. There are
no restrictions on joining confederations or affiliating with
international organizations. However, union members need
governmental clearance to travel to international labor
meetings. No such clearances were withheld in 1989.
The right to strike is not specifically recognized in the law
but is an accepted form of protest in Bangladesh. Numerous
strikes were held in 1989. The Essential Services Ordinance
of 1958 permits the Government to bar strikes for 3 months in
any sector deemed "essential." Labor unions represent only 3
percent of the work force, a reflection of the low level of
industrialization. Nevertheless, unions are powerful and
important in such sectors as jute, tea, and transportation.
There are several national labor centrals in Bangladesh. Most
labor unions and federations are associated with a political
party. The Workers-Employees United Council (SKOP) , the
largest trade union federation, is sympathetic to the
opposition .
The Committee of Experts (COE) of the International Labor
Organization in 1989 noted that Bangladesh's law contains a
number of defects affecting freedom of association and
collective bargaining rights, including restrictions as to the
range of persons who can hold office in trade unions,
wide-ranging supervisory powers vested in the registrar of
trade unions, and a rule requiring that a union organize at
1357
BANGLADESH
least 30 percent of the workers in an establishment before it
can be registered.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
By law, workers have a limited right to collective
bargaining. Public sector employees cannot form unions or
bargain collectively. There is no formal process of
mediation. Except in the Chittagong Export Processing Zone,
unions in the private sector can generally bargain
collectively without government interference. The Government
suspended union activity in the Chittagong Export Processing
Zone in 1985 and the suspension remains in effect.
Workers have participatory rights in union business in theory,
but both union leaders and employers often violate them in
practice. Union leaders allegedly make decisions without
first consulting members, and allegations have been lodged of
irregularities in union elections. For their part, employers
frequently ignore laws prohibiting antiunion discrimination, a
practice which is particularly prevalent in the garment
industry, where the work force is predominantly female.
Employers have also been accused of harassing union leaders
and of firing workers for union activities. Although laws
against such practices exist, the difficulties of prosecuting
a court case against an employer discourage union attempts to
have them enforced.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor.
Although this prohibition is substantially respected, there
have been unsubstantiated reports of bonded labor on some tea
and rubber plantations. The Government actively seeks to
prevent the trafficking of bonded laborers into other South
Asian countries.
The COE in 1989 requested the Government to repeal a law of
1952 (which the Government said was no longer operable) making
it a punishable offense for a government employee to terminate
employment without the consent of the employer. The COE also
asked the Government to correct a law dealing with the
forcible conveyance of seamen on board ship to perform their
duties .
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The Employment of Children Act prohibits the offering of
employment to any person under the age of 14, but the act is
not enforced. Sanctioned by tradition and encouraged by dire
economic necessity, child labor is a serious problem. Legal
minimum ages for various types of employment, which range from
12 to 17, are seldom enforced, and the country's poverty is
such that children are regularly engaged in all available
jobs. There is no compulsory education. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics estimated the number of child laborers at
approximately 3 million in 1986. These children pedaled
rickshaws, served as domestic servants, worked as helpers in
transport services, carried loads at railway stations and
river terminals, labored at construction sites, and were
employed in great numbers in agriculture.
1358
BANGLADESH
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Regulations regarding minimum wage rates, hours of work, and
occupational safety and health are not strictly enforced.
Income levels, which average $1 to $2 per day with the minimum
wage at approximately $.07 per hour, are not sufficient to
sustain a decent standard of living. The Factories Act of
1965 and the Shops and Establishments Act of 1965 limit normal
working hours to a maximum of 8 hours per day and 48 hours per
week. With overtime, the workweek may not legally exceed 60
hours. Although the law stipulates that overtime work is to
be compensated by double the hourly rate, overtime pay
practices do not conform to these requirements. Safety
equipment and precautions are largely unknown, and the small
number of safety inspectors are frequently untrained and
underpaid.
1359
BHUTAN'
Bhutan has been ruled since 1907 by the Wangchuck dynasty of
hereditary monarchs. Isolated in the Himalayas between India
and Tibet, the small Kingdom (about the combined size of
Vermont and New Hampshire, with a population of about 1.5
million) has been able to escape external domination since the
10th century. It was not until the rule of King Jigme Dorji
Wangchuck (1952-72) that a Bhutanese ruler took steps to move
the Kingdom from centuries of medieval seclusion toward a more
representative political system and a better integrated, more
productive economy. Although he retained strong executive
powers, the King created several important institutions,
including the National Assembly (1953), the Royal Advisory
Council (1965), and the Council of Ministers (1968), to
provide broader participation in the Government. The King,
however, still plays the predominant role in decisionmaking.
Serfdom was abolished, land reform introduced, laws codified,
and the judiciary separated from the executive. There is no
written constitution or bill of rights. The present monarch,
Jigme Singye Wangchuck, has been in power since 1974 and has
continued Bhutan's social and political evolution, although
progress has been seriously handicapped by the Kingdom's
limited administrative capacity and resources.
Internal security is maintained by the Royal Bhutan Police.
It is assisted by the Royal Bhutan Army, which consists of
8,000 lightly armed men.
Bhutan remains, at least in terms of national income
statistics, the poorest country in South Asia, with a per
capita income half that of its neighbor India; this figure is
deceptive, however, since the largely rural population grows
much of its own food. Bhutan remains one of the most
traditional and least developed countries in the world. The
large majority of the population is illiterate and rural,
living on subsistence agriculture and pastoral pursuits in a
largely barter economy. Economic growth takes second place to
self-sufficiency in national policy objectives. Over the past
several years, Bhutan has successfully reduced its almost
total economic dependence on India. It continues to restrict
access by the outside world in the hope of minimizing the
spread of foreign influences. This has not been completely
successful, however, as a large majority of the development
labor is foreign. The number of tourists is strictly limited
to 3,000 a year. The Bhutanese have closed Buddhist
monasteries to tourism to maintain the "religious purity" of
those shrines.
Knowledgeable Bhutanese report no major violations of human
rights in 1989. Although the Government is still essentially
autocratic, most observers agree that Bhutan suffers few of
the problems of disaffection and repression that afflict many
third world countries undergoing more rapid change. The
Government is concerned about the dangers of ethnic strife and
has adopted policies that encourage ethnic integration.
•Bhutan and the United States have not exchanged diplomatic
representatives, and U.S. officials travel there
infrequently. Since few scholars have published studies on
the contemporary Bhutanese polity or society, information on
Bhutanese practices which bear on human rights is neither
readily available nor complete.
1360
BHiiTAM
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no known political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance
There were no known disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
There was no evidence of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment. Serious crimes are still rare,
although reportedly there has been a trend toward more
criminal activity in recent years with the growth of a foreign
labor force in the country, widening economic disparities, and
greater contact with foreign cultural values. Mutilation was
outlawed in 1965.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There is no special or preventive detention, and arrests can
be made only under legal authority. As far as is known, exile
is not employed as a form of punishment.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Criminal cases and a variety of civil matters are adjudicated
under an 18th century legal code revised in 1957. Familial
questions are resolved according to the traditional religious
norms of the two major religious groups in the country.
Buddhist law governs the majority of Bhutanese, and Hindu law
is applied in areas where persons of Nepali origin predominate.
The Kingdom's legal system does not provide for juries, the
right to be represented by legal counsel, or due process in
the Western sense. However, trials are public and are usually
carried out expeditiously. There are generally no prosecuting
or defense attorneys because the number of lawyers in the
country is insufficient to serve in these capacities. Judges,
appointed by and accountable to the King, are responsible for
all aspects of a case, including investigation, filing of
charges, prosecution, and judgment of the defendant. A
separate judiciary was established in 1968 which provides for
local, district, and national courts with original and
appellate jurisdiction. Final appeals may be made to the King.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
There are no written guarantees of privacy, but tradition has
bolstered the concept. In practice, the Government does not
generally intervene arbitrarily or unreasonably in the lives
of the people. Buttressing the nation's traditional culture,
however, is a priority for the Government. In 1989, by royal
decree, the wearing of national dress was made compulsory for
all citizens in order to preserve and promote the Kingdom's
unique identity. Bhutanese found violating the decree are
1361
BHUTAN
fined $10 or sentenced to jail for a week. From all reports,
the decree is not being rigorously enforced.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
With an adult literacy rate of around 12 percent, Bhutan's
population is relatively unaffected by the print media. The
Government's weekly newspaper is the country's only regular
publication. Indian and other foreign newspapers and
publicatiops are distributed without apparent government
control. Bhutan has no television. In 1989 the Government
ordered the dismantling of all television antennas to prevent
the people from watching foreign programs. The government
radio station broadcasts for 3 hours daily in the four major
national languages. Criticism of the King is permitted in the
National Assembly but not in the public media.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
While no written guarantees of these freedoms exist, Bhutanese
generally enjoy the freedom of peaceful assembly and
association. There are no private voluntary social, communal,
or economic associations and no professional or trade
organizations. For a discussion of freedom of association as
it applies to labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Buddhism is the state religion of Bhutan. The Government
subsidizes monasteries and shrines and provides aid to about
half of the Kingdom's 12,000 monks. The monastic
establishment enjoys statutory representation in the National
Assembly and Royal Advisory Council and is an influential
voice on public policy. Citizens of other faiths, who are
mainly Hindus of Nepali origin, enjoy freedom of worship. In
an effort to encourage national cultural integration, the King
has declared major Hindu festivals to be national holidays,
and the royal family participates in them. Foreign
missionaries may live in Bhutan if they have some other
functional capacity, but they are not permitted to proselytize.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There is freedom of movement within Bhutan for all Bhutanese
citizens and no bar on emigration or foreign travel. For many
years, Bhutanese traveled little inside or outside the
Kingdom, but the recent construction of roads and the
establishment of air links with New Delhi, Calcutta, Dhaka,
Kathmandu, and Bangkok have encouraged travel. A policy
introduced in the 1950's, which prohibited the exiled leaders
of an outlawed Nepali-Bhutanese political party from returning
to the country, has been liberalized to allow them to return.
Since 1986, Bhutan has been conducting a drive to identify
people without work permits. In this process, about 1,000
foreigners have been expelled from the Kingdom, of which over
900 were largely Nepalis with some Bangladeshis; 93 were
Indians. The Indian press reported in 1989 that the number of
establishments run by Indian nationals in Bhutan is gradually
declining with the termination of their trading licenses.
1362
BHUTAN
Bhutan traditionally has welcomed refugees and exiles from
other countries in the region. Some 6,000 Tibetans sought
refuge in Bhutan in 1959, joining approximately 4,000 Tibetans
already in the country. Because ^t perceived threats to its
national security from the Tibetan refugees' suspected lack of
allegiance to Bhutan, the Government required in 1979-80 that
they either accept Bhutanese citizenship or face expulsion. A
considerable number sought refuge in India. Those Tibetans in
Bhutan who accepted Bhutanese citizenship have been assured by
the Government that they will be free to return to their
homeland. The Government decided not to carry out its threat
to deport those who did not apply for Bhutanese citizenship.
It is government policy not to accept new refugees from Tibet,
although a handful of refugees have come across the border
since the imposition in March of martial law there.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
The citizens of Bhutan do not have the right to change their
government. Bhutan is a traditional monarchy, with sovereign
power vested in the King. It is a highly elitist system, with
decisionmaking centered in the palace and involving only a
small number of officials in the civil and religious
establishments. Although the present King and his father have
endeavored to integrate women and southerners (Nepali ethnics)
into the body politic, the system is still dominated by the
male members of an aristocracy of Tibetan Buddhist ancestry.
Political parties do not exist, and their formation is
discouraged. Local administration is carried out by centrally
appointed government officials. Villages, however, have the
traditional right to elect by consensus their own headmen, who
form the lowest rung of the administrative hierarchy. The
Government is in the process of administrative decentralization
as a means of bringing the administration of the country
closer to the people and giving them a more direct role in
governance. When the King is touring outlying districts of
the Kingdom (which he does frequently), any citizen can flag
down his car and present an aide with a written petition,
which is assured an official response.
The 150-member National Assembly is composed of 105 members
elected by limited franchise (heads of family in Hindu areas,
village headmen in Buddhist regions), 12 elected by the
monastic establishment, and 33 high-level officials of the
government administration appointed by the King. Its
principal functions are to enact laws, approve senior
appointments in the Government, and advise the King on matters
of national importance. It also provides a forum for
presenting grievances and rectifying cases of
maladministration. Voting is by secret ballot, with a simple
majority needed to pass a measure.
The King cannot formally veto legislation passed by the
Assembly, but he can refer bills back to it for furthe..
consideration. The Assembly occasionally has rejected the
King's recommendations or delayed their implementation, but
the King has always had enough influence to persuade the
Assembly to approve any legislation he considers essential or
to withdraw any proposed legislation he opposes. Government
officials may be questioned by the body, and ministers can be
forced to resign by a two-thirds vote of no confidence.
1363
BHUTAN
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
No international agency or group is known to have sought entry
into Bhutan to investigate human rights conditions. No
nongovernmental human rights groups are known to exist in
Bhutan, nor do human rights appear to be a subject of domestic
political debate.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
In contrast with some of its neighbors, Bhutan has not
developed either a rigid caste system or customs which
sequester or disenfranchise women. Boys tend to outnumber
girls by about two to one in primary school, and seven to one
at secondary level, but family land is divided equally between
sons and daughters. Bhutanese traditionally place girls in a
lower status than boys because of their lesser importance to
the family economy. Girls receive poorer nutrition and lesser
medical attention than boys. The disparity between the higher
mortality rates of female versus male infants has resulted in
an overall ratio in the population of 97.2 females per 100
males, one of the lowest in the world.
The sexes mix relatively freely, marriages can be arranged by
partners themselves as well as by their parents, and divorce
is common. A man is allowed by law to have three wives, but
polyandry is not sanctioned. Legislation has been enacted in
recent years making marriage registration compulsory and
favoring women in matters of alimony. Although violence
against women is known to occur, no information is available
on its extent. In 1989 some 10 percent of the persons
employed by the various government ministries and departments
were women.
Potentially the most divisive issue in Bhutan is. how to
accommodate the large (estimated at 20-30 percent) segment of
the population of Nepali Hindu origin. The country's Buddhist
majority has long been concerned about being outnumbered by
immigrants from Nepal, as occurred in neighboring Sikkim. In
the past, the Government responded to this concern by tightly
limiting immigration and restricting residence and employment
of the Nepali population to the southern part of the country.
More recently, the Government has liberalized its policy
toward the Nepali minority. The Government now encourages
intermarriage, educates some students in regions other than
their own, and gives higher priority to economic development
of the south. By law, southerners may own land and establish
business in the north and vice versa, but reportedly it is
sometimes still difficult for non-Buddhist Bhutanese (except
government officials) to buy property in Buddhist areas.
More and more young Bhutanese of Nepali origin are entering
public economic and administrative bodies, and laws concerning
land tenure and taxation in the south are being liberalized.
Although the language of instruction is English, there is a
requirement that Dzongkha, the language of the western
highlands, be taught in all schools, and this requirement is
said to disadvantage students from other areas. In general,
however, the Government appears to be sensitive to the
problems of national integration and is attempting to
eliminate the factors which, in the past, led some Nepali
Bhutanese to describe themselves as second-class citizens.
1364
BHUTAN
Families with ties to the palace and senior levels of the
Government are strongly favored in their access to state
scholarships for foreign education. Nevertheless, the King is
making a serious effort to draw qualified persons from a
broader range of social and ethnic backgrounds into the
prestigious civil bureaucracy. Among the non-Drukpa (ruling
elite) officials is the Minister of Trade, who is of Nepalese
origin.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Trade unionism is not permitted and Bhutan has no labor
unions. Bhutan is not a member of the International Labor
Organization .
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
There is no collective bargaining nor legislation addressing
labor-related issues pertaining to the small industrial work
force, which makes up less than 1 percent of the population.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
As far as is known, there is no law prohibiting forced or
compulsory labor but it is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
There are no laws governing the employment of children.
However, children are not employed in industrial labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
As noted above, there is no legislation addressing labor
issues. There is no legislated minimum wage, standard
workweek, or health and safety standards. The shortage of
labor in Bhutan is such that the larger industrial firms, all
of which were established relatively recently, are organized
along modern lines and incorporate a considerable amount of
labor-saving technology. No industrial plant employs more
than 60 to 70 workers, and most of these are guest workers
from Nepal. Apart from a few larger plants, the entire
industrial sector consists of home-based handicrafts and some
60 privately owned small or medium-scale factories producing
consumer goods.
1365
EfiXEI
Egypt is a republic in which the President and his party, the
National Democratic Party (NDP) , are the dominant political
forces. The NDP, in power since 1978, commands large
majorities in the two Parliamentary bodies, the People's
Assembly and the Shura (Consultative) Council; three of the
five legal opposition parties have some representation in the
Parliament. The Cabinet is headed by a Prime Minister
appointed by and responsible to the President. Mohammed Hosni
Mubarak was elected President by the People's Assembly in 1981
and reelected to a second 6-year term in July 1987. In
accordance with the Constitution, his reelection was affirmed
by a popular referendum.
Internal security is the responsibility of several different
organizations. Of the three intelligence services, the
General Directorate for State Security Investigations (GDSSI),
which reports to the Interior Ministry, is the main agency
responsible for domestic security, although there are several
other police services, including the Central Security Force
which protects public buildings, facilities, and foreign
missions. Investigations pertaining to national security may
be undertaken by any of the three intelligence agencies,
depending on the nature of the case. GDSSI conducts most
undercover investigations of domestic opponents of the regime,
and also carries out interrogations of suspects arrested under
Egypt's state of emergency legislation. It has been linked to
many of the reports of torture and abuse of prisoners and
detainees.
Egypt's economy has diversified over the past two decades as
industries such as petroleum and services such as tourism have
grown in importance. An inefficient public sector dominates
the economy, and the Government also maintains an extensive
network of subsidies and regulations as part of a social
contract perceived by major segments of the population as
essential to their economic security. Severe economic
problems — sluggish growth, rising inflation, and shortages of
foreign exchange — led the Government to design a reform plan
aimed at reducing the Government's large budget deficit and
increasing the role of market forces in the economy.
Implementation of this plan continues to be held back,
however, by deep-seated social and political resistance.
Human rights remained significantly restricted in 1989. The
primary problems continued to be torture of detainees, with
apparently ineffective efforts to investigate, try, and punish
perpetrators of such abuses, an emergency law that permits
prolonged detentions without due process, and various
restrictions on political activities, which call into question
the ability of citizens to change their government by
democratic means. The Government continued its use of
emergency law authority — currently in effect until 1991 — to
detain a wide variety of persons suspected of involvement in
subversive activities. The number of political detainees is
higher than last year's level, as at least 1,500 persons,
including Islamic activists, alleged Communists, and strike
participants were detained. Most of these were subsequently
released. Those most likely to suffer from human rights
abuses are Muslim activists or other groups perceived to be a
threat to the Government. Women are likely to suffer from
discrimination and abuses sanctioned by tradition.
1366
EGYPT
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no confirmed reports of unlawful government-
instigated killings for political reasons, nor were there any
reported political killings by underground groups. Twenty
persons have been indicted for their role in the "Egypt's
Revolution" organization, accused of killing two Israeli
diplomats and attempting to kill a number of other Israeli and
American Embassy personnel in a series of attacks in 1984-87.
The trial, which began in November 1988, continued throughout
1989.
b. Disappearance
There were no confirmed reports of disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Although torture and other forms of mistreatment are forbidden
by the Constitution and the law, convincing reports indicate
they continue to be practiced by police and security
officials, and punishment of such actions is rare. Egyptian
courts will not accept confessions or testimony considered to
have been obtained under torture and have ordered the release
of defendants in a number of state security trials because of
reports by forensic medical examiners that the defendants had
been tortured. Detainees and prisoners who claim to have been
tortured can and do appeal for redress to the courts and
public prosecutor. In rare cases the courts award financial
compensation to torture victims. The law also provides for
jail sentences ranging from 3 to 10 years for officials
convicted of torture, and first degree murder charges may be
brought against those who inflict torture resulting in the
victim's death. In August a court ordered Interior Minister
Zaki Badr to pay the nominal compensation of about $40 to one
victim's family in a case in 1988 in which police officers
tortured to death a son who refused to testify against his
father. There were no instances in 1989 of police being tried
and punished for such actions.
In a report issued in May on arbitrary detention and torture
under the Egyptian Government's emergency powers, Amnesty
International (AI) concluded that the "seriousness of the
allegations, medical evidence and consistency of detail" of
detainee mistreatment have convinced it that a "pattern of
torture" exists in Egypt.
Egyptian human rights activists note that most torture
allegations involve members of the Islamic Gamaat, while other
political detainees usually are not subjected to similar
treatment. In August, however, security forces broke up a
labor strike at an iron and steel complex in Helwan and
detained up to several hundred workers. According to a report
written by members of the Egyptian Organization for Human
Rights (EOHR), arrestees were subjected to mistreatment
including verbal abuse, systematic beatings, and threats of
sexual violence, as well as the denial of medical assistance.
In late August, security forces detained 52 persons, including
four members of the EOHR, on suspicion of belonging to a
1367
EfiXEI
"Communist Workers' Party." There is reliable evidence that
members of this group were also tortured while under detention.
There is no evidence that the authorities brought charges
against those accused of torture or mistreatment. In early-
January 1990, EOHR published a second report charging that
torture and sexual abuse of prisoners has become so widespread
that it appeared to be a matter of policy by security forces
holding those detained both for political and nonpolitical
reasons.
The Arab Human Rights Organization, in its 1989 annual report,
states that many cases of torture have been disclosed and that
reports have been submitted to the prosecutor's office
requesting full investigation. It does not say whether the
Government has responded to these submissions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Two systems of criminal procedure are in effect: ordinary
criminal procedures and the emergency law. Under ordinary
procedures, arrests follow investigations, and arrested
persons are charged with violations of specific laws. With
the important exception of certain applications of the
emergency legislation, preventive detention is not practiced.
Arrested persons have the right to a judicial determination of
the legality of detention, and there is a system of bail. The
ordinary law states that a detained suspect must be brought
before a magistrate and formally charged within 48 hours of
his arrest or be released. By and large, there is careful
observance of constitutional and legal safeguards in the
arrest and pretrial custody stages. Arrests occur openly and
with warrants, and the accused are brought before an
independent judiciary.
The major exceptions to the normal procedures arise when the
emergency law, which gives the Government extraordinary
powers, is applied. The Constitution and the emergency law
empower the President, when national security or public order
are thought to be in peril, to invoke emergency powers
authorizing the arrest and detention of persons suspected of
being dangerous to national security, irrespective of
provisions of the penal code. Egyptian law specifies a wide
range of offenses, deemed harmful to national security, which
may be tried before a parallel system of state security courts
under the emergency legislation. Despite a provision of the
Constitution which states that a state of emergency may only
be imposed in case of war, foreign invasion, civil strife, or
natural disaster, a state of emergency has been imposed almost
without interruption for the last 41 years and continuously
since the assassination of President Sadat in 1981.
Under the emergency law a person may be held without charge or
due process while an investigation is conducted. Within 30
days the detainee may petition the State Security Court to
review his detention. The Court has 15 days to review the
case, following which it may order the detainee's release.
The Interior Minister then has 15 days to offer objection to
the Court's decision, following which another State Security
Court has a further 15 days to review the Minister's
objection. If the second Court upholds the decision to
release the detainee, the decision must be implemented. The
Interior Minister, however, may simply order the detainee
arrested again, in effect allowing the Government the right of
indefinite detention of suspects in state security cases.
24-900 O— 90 44
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During the People's Assembly debate in 1988 over the extension
of the emergency law, the Government argued that the law is
only applied against "terrorists, drug pushers, and illegal
currency traders." In fact, the emergency law is used against
those categories of suspected criminals, but it was also
applied in 1989 to detain, among others, striking iron and
steel workers, student demonstrators. Islamic student
activists, and relatives (including young children) of
suspects sought for questioning.
The Egyptian Minister of Interior acknowledged detaining 1,500
Islamic fundamentalists during April and May after a clash
between fundamentalists and police in Fayyoum. In a wave of
arrests in August and September, police detained some 300 more
Islamic fundamentalists, 20 members of the Muslim Brotherhood
(on charges of indoctrinating young children against the
regime), and some 40 alleged Shi'ite Muslims on charges of
plotting against the Government. Police also detained
striking iron and steel workers and 52 persons (including four
human rights advocates) on suspicion of belonging to a
"Communist Workers Party." In December 300 fundamentalist
students were detained after a clash between police and the
students at Assyut University. In most cases, detainees are
released after interrogation and never brought to trial. In
fact, AI noted that "in recent years, only about 5 percent of
those arrested for investigation in connection with
security-related offenses have ever been brought to trial,
suggesting that the great majority of such prisoners are held
in the absence of any real evidence incriminating them in the
offenses they are alleged to have committed."
Detainees are sometimes held incommunicado. According to AI's
report, "in practice, political detainees' first access to
legal counsel has been delayed for days or even weeks at a
time. Many individuals are arrested without being allowed to
inform their relatives of their detention."
Exile is forbidden by law and is not practiced. With regard
to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Egyptian judiciary includes four types of regular courts:
Summary Courts, Primary Courts, Appeals Courts, and the Court
of Cassations (Supreme Court), and two kinds of special
courts, the Court of Ethics and the State Security Courts.
The courts are independent of the executive branch of
government .
The provisions in Egyptian law for public trial do not apply
in state security cases. Persons accused of certain
security-related offenses, which may trigger emergency law
provisions at the Interior Ministry's discretion, are usually
tried in public sessions in the State Security Courts. These
Courts have less independence than other courts because their
decisions may be challenged by the executive. However, the
State Security Courts have procedural safeguards (including
the right of the defendant to be represented by an attorney,
the attorney's access to the prosecutor's investigation, and a
prohibition against secret testimony), and their judges are
drawn from the ranks of the senior judiciary. The judgments
of the State Security Courts may be appealed to the Higher
State Security Court.
Under the emergency law, only the President may amend.
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commute, or cancel a sentence or order a retrial. The law
also grants the President the authority to approve or reject
all rulings of the State Security Court system. In some
cases, the President may order defendants in state security
cases to be tried before military courts, although the
applicability of this provision to civilian defendants is
repeatedly challenged on constitutional grounds. In July
counsel for the defense challenged the original 1986 referral
of a case involving defendants accused of burning video clubs
to military court. The Egyptian Code of Criminal Procedures
states that court hearings should be conducted publicly, but
permits the Court to order part or all of the hearing to be
conducted in secret session or to restrict access to the court
"in order to preserve public order or morals." The court
trying the Egypt's Revolution case has not ordered the
hearings to be held in secret session, but has restricted
access to the courtroom to those who have obtained special
permits from the court. The proceedings have been covered
thoroughly in the press.
No reliable statistics exist on the number of political
prisoners. Opponents of the regime are not arrested for
criticizing government leaders or policies. The Interior
Ministry has drawn a distinction between indoor opposition
meetings, rallies, and discussions, which are tolerated, and
public demonstrations, which are not. For the most part,
those tried and convicted for their political activities have
been members of groups advocating the violent overthrow of the
regime, but many people have been detained for questioning
under the emergency law for varying periods without ever
coming to trial.
The High Judicial Council is empowered to override decisions
by the Ministry of Justice regarding judicial appointments,
promotions, and other personnel matters. The Council of
State, a court system having jurisdiction over disputes
between private citizens and government agencies, is
independent of the Ministry of Justice and is effectively
safeguarded against arbitrary dismissal of its members.
In August the Higher State Security Court ordered the release
of 50-odd members of an Islamic organization accused of
inciting religious strife and trying to undermine government
authority. In September several persons charged with being
members of a "Communist Worker's Party" were released on their
own recognizance after several days of detention.
Two judicial institutions sometimes criticized by the
opposition as superfluous and potentially dangerous to the
judicial system are the Court of Ethics and its investigating
agency, the Office of the Socialist Prosecutor. Created in
1980, while Sadat was seeking to counter public criticism of
widespread corruption in government, the Court is charged with
trying offenders of "Socialist values," meaning investigations
of allegations of corruption and illegal business activities.
The other tasks of the Office of the Socialist Prosecutor
include approving candidates for elective positions in the
trade union movement, professional syndicates, and local
government councils, as well as performing security checks on
appointees to senior government positions. The Socialist
Prosecutor may impose travel bans on officials under
investigation. The Socialist Prosecutor and Court of Ethics
were involved in a number of recent cases, including those
involving Islamic investment companies. The Socialist
Prosecutor referred 13 Islamic investment companies to the
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Financial and Commercial Affairs Prosecutor, and the Court of
Ethics placed the money of some Islamic investment company-
owners under sequestration,
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides for freedom from arbitrary
interference in private life by the State or by political
organizations, but this freedom is significantly abridged in
cases under the emergency law. Ordinarily, police must obtain
a warrant from the Public Prosecutor before undertaking
arrests, searches, or seizures. On occasion the courts have
dismissed cases when they determined warrants were issued
without sufficient cause. Police officials who conduct
searches without proper warrants are subject to criminal
penalties. However, the emergency law empowers the President,
or the Minister of the Interior acting as his deputy, to
authorize searches of persons or premises without following
normal procedures. The internal security services have the
capability to monitor telephone and other private
conversations of the political opposition and a broad range of
citizens suspected of illegal or subversive activity. There
are persistent and credible reports of routine screening of,
and in some cases interference with, correspondence and
especially international mail. As with search warrants,
telephone taps and mail screening normally require the prior
authorization of the Public Prosecutor, but normal procedures
do not prevail when the emergency law is invoked. GDSSI and
the other domestic intelligence agencies engage routinely in
surveillance of opposition politicians, political or social
activists, foreign diplomats, and suspected subversives.
Employees of most government facilities, public sector
factories, and foreign embassies presume that their activities
are monitored by government informants.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the
press, and in general the Government has provided press
freedom and resisted curbs on political expression. Egyptians
openly express their views without fear of retribution on a
wide variety of political and social issues, sometimes airing
vigorous criticism of the Government. A lively debate of
national issues and criticism of government officials is
evident in the media and the theater. Much commentary
reflecting differences of opinion appears regularly in the
major government-owned dailies and magazines. Radio and
television are state owned and all broadcasts are closely
supervised by the Government. National newspapers are
corporately independent and therefore less controlled, but
they still essentially answer to the Government.
The opposition papers are free to publish stories supporting
the political inclinations of their sponsoring organizations.
Journalists and other persons slandered or maligned in the
press may sue in court or, in the case of journalists, raise
the matter with the press syndicate. By virtue of their
positions, the President and members of the People's Assembly
and the Shura Council may not sue for libel. There have been
repeated moves to strip opposition Members of Parliament of
their parliamentary immunity so that they could be sued for
articles appearing in their parties' newspapers.
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The Government occasionally exercises influence on the
national dailies and magazines, the editors in chief of which
are appointed by the presidency and can be dismissed by the
NDP-dominated Shura Council. The Council supervises the press
to some extent through the Higher Press Council, a 45-member
body chaired by the Speaker of the Shura Council and composed
of senior press figures. One of the Higher Press Council's
functions is to approve applications for new publications. No
applications to publish independently owned journals were
approved in 1989. The Council's approval, however, is only
required for publications appearing regularly.
There is no overt censorship, with the exception of press bans
occasionally imposed by the State Security Prosecutor on
stories which might affect the course of investigations under
way in State Security Court cases. In September allegations
that suspected Communists arrested in August were tortured
while detained were aired extensively in the opposition
press. Nevertheless, journalists and editors working for the
government-supported newspapers are sometimes given guidance
by officials about the treatment of specific issues. This
guidance is given informally to senior editors and board
chairmen by senior officials such as the Information
Minister. This does not happen routinely; usually the editors
know the policy and are aware of the limits which they are
expected to observe. Opposition press coverage of the arrests
of Islamic extremists and suspected Communists, strikes, and
public demonstrations was not censored.
In August 1988, the Government closed down the Nasserist
opposition newspaper Sawt al-Arab following a controversial
attack by the paper's editor on the Saudi ruling family. That
was the only instance of government action to silence an
opposition newspaper in recent years. Supporters of the
newspaper lost an appeal in 1989 to resume publication in
Egypt and are publishing Sawt al-Arab abroad.
The universities enjoy a considerable degree of academic
freedom. In the past, faculty clubs at several universities,
especially the Universities of Alexandria and Assiut, have
held political discussions which led to friction with the
Minister of Interior and threats to dissolve the clubs.
Faculty members are more likely to feel social pressure to
conform than any actual interference in their publications or
research. Controversial books by Egyptian authors are
published freely in Egypt but are sometimes banned from
overseas distribution by the Government. A wide variety of
foreign reading matter in Arabic and other languages is
available at newsstands and major hotels, although there are
isolated reports of the seizure or censorship of foreign
publications .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Under the emergency law, the Government can and does place
limitations on the constitutionally assured right of
assembly.
Permission is required from the Ministry of Interior to hold
public meetings, mass political rallies, and protest marches.
In September the Governor of Ismailiyya banned a meeting of
the Lawyer's Syndicate during which arbitrary arrest, torture,
and human rights abuses were to be featured as topics. Also
in September, security forces arrested several Islamic
activists who participated in a press conference sponsored by
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the Physicians' Syndicate to denounce arrests and alleged
torture ordered by the Interior Ministry. In October the
Ministry is reported to have acted to prevent the holding of a
seminar, sponsored by the Islamist-dominated Engineers'
Syndicate, intended to promote a campaign against torture.
Generally, however, the Minister of Interior permits protest
rallies on the campuses and at the facilities of professional
associations, particularly the Bar Association. Street
demonstrations, however, have been banned on the grounds that
they are a likely source of violent disturbances. Islamic
organizations are permitted to organize public religious
ceremonies, often attended by tens of thousands of people, on
major holidays, but persons regarded as Islamic radicals may
still be denied permission to organize public assemblies.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
According to the Constitution, Egypt is an Islamic state which
provides for freedom of religious expression and equality
before the law, regardless of religion. Egypt has a tradition
of religious tolerance, and, with some notable exceptions, the
authorities generally uphold the rights of religious
minorities and the rights of individuals to practice their
religion. In accordance with Islamic law, only Islam,
Judaism, and Christianity are fully recognized as religions
with laws, traditions, and rites which must be respected. The
overwhelming majority of Egyptians practice Sunni Islam or
Coptic Christianity.
Coptic Orthodox Christians, the most significant religious
minority, may constitute 10 percent of the population,
although their numbers are a subject of controversy.
Coptic-Muslim relations continued to be generally good in
1989, with no increase in incidents of sectarian violence from
the level of 1988.
While most Egyptian Jews emigrated in the 1950 "s and 1960 's,
those few who remain appear to practice their faith without
restriction or harassment.
Various Protestant denominations operate, some with
significant Egyptian membership, while others have a small,
largely expatriate following. Members of recognized religions
may maintain links with coreligionists abroad. Other small
religious groups continue to face difficulties.
Significant problems are encountered by those who convert from
Islam to Christianity. Christian missionaries who engage in
proselytizing Muslim Egyptians may be prosecuted under the
penal code or under the broad terms of the Law of National
Unity, even though missionary work is not specifically
banned. This represents a major departure from the
traditional Islamic practice in which proselytizing Muslims
would be considered a capital offense. Conversion from Islam,
while officially not restricted or penalized, is discouraged
by the Government, and even more so by social pressure. In a
number of cases involving converts from Islam, the security
authorities have used the state of emergency legislation to
arrest and detain converts, without bringing specific charges,
on the grounds that converts threaten social peace and
intercommunal relations. Those who convert cannot have the
religion category changed on their national identity cards or
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other legal documentation.
All recognized faiths can, in principle, establish places of
worship, run schools, and train enough clergy to serve
believers. Synagogues and churches routinely receive police
protection. Under a law dating back to the Ottoman era,
however, non-Muslims must obtain a series of permits
culminating in a presidential decree to build or repair places
of worship. Obtaining authorization can take years and is
often not granted. This is a point of contention, especially
among Coptic Christians.
Egyptian law prohibits the use of places of worship to
criticize the State. The courts have not yet ruled on a
challenge to the constitutionality of this restriction.
Although the Government maintains that sermons by Islamic and
Coptic religious figures are not censored, Muslim prayer
leaders are occasionally detained and questioned for
delivering allegedly inflammatory sermons in their mosques.
The Ministry of Religious Endowments has also been known to
substitute its prayer leaders at mosques for preachers it
regards as troublesome, as well as to take over the
administration of some privately run mosques considered to be
centers of antigovernment activity.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Egyptians are free to move within Egypt, except in
well-defined military districts; there are additional
restricted areas to which foreigners may not travel.
Exceptions to freedom of foreign travel and emigration apply
to males who have not completed compulsory military service,
unmarried women under 21 or married women who must obtain
their father's or husband's permission to obtain a passport,
and persons under investigation for criminal offenses or whose
travel is banned by emergency law provisions. Citizens who
leave the country have the right to return. There are no
known cases of citizenship being revoked for political
reasons. Under the state of emergency, the Prime Minister has
authority, which he may delegate to the Interior Minister, to
restrict foreign or domestic travel. The total number of
persons denied the right to travel abroad is relatively small,
and travel bans are generally applied according to normal
legal procedures.
Egypt's record on granting political asylum generally has been
good, and the extradition of those granted political asylum is
prohibited by the Constitution. Several thousand non-Egyptian
Arabs residing in Egypt, including many Libyan dissidents,
have been granted political asylum. Egypt also allows the
children of some African refugees awaiting resettlement to
study in Egyptian schools and grants residence to a number of
elderly persons who have remained stateless since the Second
World War.
Although there were two well publicized cases of deportation
in 1988, there were no known deportations in 1989.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Although the right exists theoretically, as a practical matter
citizens do not have the ability to change the government by
democratic means. Since the 1952 revolution, Egypt has had a
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political system characterized by a strong presidency. Four
former military officers, including Mubarak, have served as
president in that period, but civilian government has become
increasingly separated from military influence. Nasser ruled
a one-party state, Sadat created an embryonic multiparty
system, and Mubarak has liberalized the political atmosphere
by expanding the range of legal opposition activities. While
Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) dominates the
political scene, there are now five legal opposition parties
which are allowed to organize, hold rallies, publish their
views, and enter candidates for election to the People's
Assembly, the Shura Council, and local councils. Still, the
political process remains significantly restricted, and in
1989 there was some slowing of the general trend of the last
several years toward increasing political liberties and a
widening scope for legal opposition participation in the
political system.
The NDP is a nonideological party which groups together a
range of political camps, some of which support the statist
and Arab nationalist policies promoted by former President
Nasser, while others support the more liberal economic and
pro-Western foreign policies promoted by Sadat. Still others
are Mubarak supporters of little fixed ideological
commitment. It has a dominant role in most party-based
institutions in the country. It holds almost every seat in
the Shura Council, as well as virtually all the seats in the
1,300 local popular councils across the country.
According to the Constitution, the President is elected by the
People's Assembly; his election is then ratified by popular
referendum. Both of President Mubarak's elections to 6-year
terms of office, most recently in 1987, followed these
constitutional provisions. These procedures, in principle,
allow the Egyptian people to exercise their right to change
their government. The opposition argues that the Constitution
should be amended to allow for direct popular election of the
President. President Mubarak has countered that he is
"administering democracy by doses" and that the public is not
prepared for full democracy.
The People's Assembly comprises 458 members, of whom 448 are
elected. The remaining 10 are appointed by the President.
The Constitution reserves half of the elected seats for worker
and farmer deputies. In the 1987 elections, the NDP won 348
seats, plus the 10 appointed seats. The two principal
opposition groups, the Socialist Labor Party (in alliance with
the Muslim Brotherhood) and the New Wafd, won 56 and 25 seats
respectively. The Assembly debates and passes laws and must
approve the Government's general policies and civilian
budget. The military budget is not subject to parliamentary
review. Assembly members can and do, however, call for
parliamentary investigations and interpellate ministers. This
often vigorous questioning is broadcast on television and
covered in the press.
The opposition parties continue to make credible complaints
about electoral fraud by the Government and about the method
of calculating election results used by the Ministry of
Interior. NDP candidates won all of the elected seats in the
June Shura Council elections and a September by-election in
Port Said. The 1987 postelection ruling by the State Council
Administrative Court that the NDP should give up 39 seats to
the Wafd and the Islamic alliance was never implemented. The
ruling remains under discussion in both the State Council and
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Constitutional Court systems.
The opposition parties and some within the NDP and government
leadership also object to the "party list system" used to
calculate election results in the People's Assembly, arguing
that direct election of individual candidates is fairer to
smaller parties than is proportional representation and would
assure better qualified candidates and popular participation.
However, the outcome of the Shura Council elections, which
were contested on an individual basis, have tended to focus
debate on the larger issue of electoral fairness. Some regime
critics argue that the political system is designed to ensure
that the NDP and the Government retain control of all state
institutions. Government supporters argue, however, that
President Mubarak has firmly established at least an
elementary multiparty system in order to create checks and
balances and give expression to a broad range of political
views.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government has not responded to most of the queries from
Amnesty International and other international groups about
human rights concerns. However, in 1988 it received two AI
delegations, including one headed by the organization's
Secretary General, to discuss human rights. These visits
resulted in a report submitted to the Government which
included a number of recommendations (June 1988). The
Government provided some preliminary comments in response.
Human rights groups in Egypt continue actively to promote
domestic and foreign human rights issues, even though they
have not been accorded official recognition by the
Government. The Egyptian Chapter of the Arab Organization for
Human Rights (AOHR) , which has been active for several years,
was denied permission by the Social Affairs Ministry to
establish itself as a legally recognized organization on the
grounds that its activities were political in nature. Local
human rights observers believe the Interior Ministry detained
and reportedly tortured four persons in late August because of
their activities as members of the Egyptian Organization for
Human Rights. The Government has also denied recognition to
the larger AOHR and refused permission for the establishment
of a local chapter of AI . Nevertheless, the AOHR continues to
maintain regional offices in Cairo and publishes its
newsletters and annual review of the human rights situation in
the Arab world without interference.
The AOHR has sought and been denied access to prison
facilities to inspect conditions and meet with prisoners.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Egyptian law provides for equality of the sexes, but aspects
of the law and many traditional practices are discriminatory
against women. Marriage and personal status are primarily
based on the religious law of the individual concerned, which
for most Egyptians is Islamic law. Under Egyptian law a
married woman must have her husband's permission to obtain a
passport, and he may stop her from traveling for any reason.
A child must have his or her father's permission to obtain a
passport, and even if the parents are divorced and the mother
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has custody, the child's mother need not be informed if the
child obtains a passport or travels outside of Egypt.
The Revised Family Status Law, enacted in July 1985 to replace
a 1979 law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Constitutional Court, amplified the legal basis for equality
of the sexes beyond rights contained in Islamic law. It
largely ensures a woman's right to divorce and preserves the
wife's child custody and property rights. A second marriage
by the husband (multiple marriage for men is acceptable
practice in Islam) is grounds for the first wife to divorce,
if it is shown that the marriage had caused her material
psychological harm, or if the husband fails to declare such
subsequent marriages. A wife has the option of retaining the
family residence or receiving financial compensation. These
aspects of the family status law only apply to Muslims.
Christians do not practice plural marriage, and the Coptic
Church permits divorce only in unusual circumstances.
Under Islamic law, which is applied in personal status
matters, female heirs are entitled to one-half the amount of
inheritance that male heirs can receive. However, only male
heirs have a duty to provide for all the members of the family
who need assistance.
Economic necessity as well as changing attitudes are drawing
more and more women into the work force. They are
increasingly well represented in medicine, law, and
education. Within more traditional communities, prevailing
cultural values make it more difficult for women to work
outside the home. Some jobs are advertised for males only.
Despite the legal stipulation of equality, women living in
more traditional areas occupy a subordinate and dependent role
in the household. Women's rights advocates also note that
some traditional attitudes and practices — particularly female
circumcision. Islamic legal attitudes toward divorce and
plural marriage, and the male relatives' responsibility to
punish even to the point of death their female relatives who
bring dishonor to the family by actual or presumed violation
of the strict traditional code of sexual conduct — are highly
discriminatory toward women. Some of these acts are illegal.
Most of these traditional practices are disappearing from the
cities but are still practiced to varying degrees in the
countryside. Although violence against women is known to
occur, little is known about its extent. There are no
reliable statistics on the subject. Abuse within the family,
such as wife beating, is seldom discussed publicly owing to
the value attached to privacy in family matters in this
traditional society.
Reliable statistics are not available for female circumcision
in Egypt. While it is not against Egyptian law, the law
prohibits doctors from performing it in government hospitals.
One doctor who has done extensive research on this subject
maintains 80 per cent of women in Egypt's rural areas receive
the milder form of excision/circumcision, although in parts of
Upper Egypt the more drastic infibulation is practiced. In
the larger cities the rate decreases to 50 percent in the less
educated classes and almost zero in the middle and upper
classes .
Coptic Christians work in all career fields, occupying many
leadership positions in the business and professional
communities. Copts continue to enjoy access to public
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employment, although there appears to be some discrimination
against young Copts seeking to obtain employment in the
government or public sectors. Coptic representation at the
highest levels of government increased slightly in 1987 — from
2 to 3 of the total of 33 cabinet ministers and from 9 to 11
of 458 People's Assembly deputies — following the People's
Assembly elections and a minor cabinet reshuffle. Copts
seldom advance to the senior ranks of the military (there are
no Coptic generals), security, or diplomatic services, nor are
there any serving Coptic governors (26 states) or security
directors of governorates .
Some Copts allege that they are discriminated against in
admissions to some fields of medical study, particularly
obstetrics and gynecology. Islamic activists have objected to
the prevalence of Copts in the medical and pharmacological
professions, arguing that Muslim women should not be treated
by Coptic doctors or go to Coptic pharmacists. There are also
reports that universities have effectively blocked Coptic
professors from becoming administrators and chairmen of
certain departments. Copts note that Arabic language classes
use the Koran as the major text.
Although religious minorities face social prejudice and
individual acts of discrimination from some Muslims, there is
no evidence that these acts are officially inspired or
condoned. President Mubarak has emphasized publicly the full
equality of Copts and other religious minorities. The courts'
application of Islamic law to personal status matters among
Muslims, and the Islamic influences elsewhere in the legal
system, have not affected the constitutionally assured
freedoms of Copts and other minorities. Coptic observers have
alleged that it is Islamic fundamentalists who contribute most
heavily to the discrimination experienced by the Copts, but
that government officials, reluctant to antagonize the
fundamentalists, fail to rectify situations created by their
anti-Coptic actions.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The law provides for the workers* right to join local
committees of workers. About 20 to 25 percent of the work
force is unionized. Any establishment employing 50 or more
workers must allow them the right to organize a local
committee if the workers so desire. These locals are
affiliated with national trade unions, organized along
sectoral lines, all 23 of which are required to affiliate with
the single labor federation, the Egyptian Trade Union
Federation (ETUF) . There have been complaints to the
International Labor Organization (ILO) that requiring all
national trade unions to join a single federation infringes
upon workers' freedom of association. In its 1989 report, the
ILO Committee of Experts (COE) again asserted that the law
institutionalizes a single trade union system, contrary to
Convention 87 on Freedom of Association. The Government has
shown no sign that it intends to accept the establishment of
more than one federation. The leadership of the Federation
asserts that it actively promotes workers' interests and that
there is no need for another federation.
ETUF is a member of The Organization of African Trade Union
Unity and was readmitted to the International Confederation of
Arab Trade Unions in March (from which it was expelled in
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1978) . ETUF sends observer delegations to International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions' and World Federation of
Trade Unions' conferences, but, in an effort to maintain its
nonaligned status, has not joined either one.
The ETUF is dominated by the NDP and therefore works, at the
least, in close concert with the Government. The ETUF, which
has a pyramidal structure, holds its elections periodically,
with each level electing the leadership of the next level.
Candidates for offices are approved by the Office of the
Socialist Prosecutor. A council of national union presidents
elects the ETUF Council, which in turn elects the President of
the Federation from among its ranks. The trade union movement
takes pride in the relative independence of its electoral
procedures; a large number of union presidents were not
reelected in 1987. The person and property of union leaders
are not threatened by the Government or nongovernmental
antiunion forces. The 1989 report of the ILO COE, while
noting some positive developments, repeated its request that
the Government not interfere in the internal affairs of the
unions and allow these matters to be determined by union rules.
The labor law provides for a system of arbitration to resolve
disputes about wages and working condition. While the labor
law and labor unions are silent on the right to strike, the
larger body of Egyptian law, in fact, restricts workers' right
to strike. The Criminal Code provides criminal penalties of
up to 2 years in jail for civil servants or public sector
employees who strike and more severe penalties for those who
incite others to strike. The National Security and Unity Law
of 1977 punish workers by hard labor if they participate in a
strike that "constitutes a threat to the national economy" or
in a gathering or sit-in that "endangers the public peace."
The Government has occasionally reacted harshly to strikes in
the public sector. In August the security forces allegedly
beat and detained hundreds of workers who participated in a
strike at the Helwan Iron and Steel Complex. One worker was
killed. Detainees subsequently complained of mistreatment and
torture while held in prison.
The strongest antistrike provision is contained in the Law of
National Unity which prohibits strikes that threaten the
national economy. The full implications of this law are not
yet clear. In 1987 the State Security Court ruled in the case
of a 1986 train conductors' strike that the Government is
obligated as a signatory to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights to allow workers the
right to strike peacefully. However, a presidential review
panel refused to accept the Court's decision, and the issue
remains unresolved. In August participants in the strike at
the Helwan Iron and Steel Complex were arrested under the same
law. The 1989 report of the ILO COE called on the Government
to bring its legislation into conformance with Convention 87
by eliminating the existing broad restrictions on the right to
strike.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The law provides for the workers' right to organize.
Establishments employing 50 or more workers must allow them to
organize a local committee. Collective bargaining is
permitted in the private sector (including in export
processing zones) but not in the public sector where most
union members are employed. For the most part, private sector
wages and benefits are higher than those in the public sector.
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Trade union leaders note that there is a distinction between
the unions' function in negotiating with the public sector and
the private sector. Public sector wages and benefits are set
by law at the national level. Trade unionists point to the
constitutional provision that half the members of the People's
Assembly must be workers and farmers and claim that the
struggle to protect workers' interests in the public sector
takes place in the legislature. ETUF also says that it holds
regular private discussions with senior government officials,
in which the Federation promotes the interests of the
workers. The 1989 report of the ILO COE again cited
provisions of the Labor Code directing labor and management to
conform to national economic interests as being at odds with
the provisions of Convention 98 on the Right to Organize and
Bargain Collectively.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced labor. There are no reports
of forced or compulsory labor.
d. Minimum Age of Employment for Children
The minimum age for employment is 12 years (which is also the
age at which a child has completed compulsory education) . The
law permits children between the ages of 12 and 16 to work up
to 6 hours a day with 1 hour of rest but prohibits them from
working after 10 p.m. or from engaging in certain forms of
dangerous or heavy labor, such as mining. There is
considerable evidence, however, that underage children
continue to perform full-time jobs, particularly in rural
areas. Growing numbers of urban children are also working as
families are forced by economic necessity to increase their
sources of income. Newspaper articles in both the
progovernment and opposition press have charged that several
million children may be working full-time in violation of the
labor law. Informal private sector workshops and cottage
industries appear to be the main urban users of child labor.
Representatives of both government and labor argue that such
unregulated industries cannot be supervised. It is also the
case, however, that larger private textile factories also
employ large numbers of young girls, who may work up to
12-hour shifts. No consistent attempt is made to enforce the
law regarding child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Employers are required by law to provide acceptable terms and
conditions of employment for their workers. Working
conditions are discussed between union representatives and
management in public sector companies. The minimum wage of
approximately $10 a month is low but is part of a social
contract which includes generous government subsidies of
foodstuffs and other basic necessities. Within the local
context, most workers are able to maintain a decent standard
of living for themselves and their families. The minimum wage
law is enforced where government labor inspectors have access,
but there are enclaves of labor activity, especially in the
rural areas, where government inspectors have no access. The
regular workweek is fixed at 48 hours for factory workers.
Many workers increase their incomes by working overtime or at
second jobs.
Employers are legally required to meet worker safety and
health norms, which are modeled on the ILO's suggested
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standards. There are special provisions for women workers,
including generous maternity leave. Employers who violate
wage, hour, and safety and health provisions face civil and
criminal penalties. Labor inspectors enforce these provisions
with varying degrees of success. Employers are seldom
prosecuted, but reliable sources confirm that the courts
occasionally impose fines on offending companies. The worst
violators of the legal provisions on conditions of labor are
small workshop owners in the informal sector whose operations
are not subject to supervision or inspection.
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India, a secular republic, is the world's largest democracy.
Its multiparty political structure is a composite of Indian
political traditions and aspects of the British parliamentary
system. Free elections are held regularly at national and
state levels. National elections held the last week of
November resulted in the replacement of the former Congress
(I) Government with a minority National Front Government
supported from outside by rightwing and leftwing parties.
Prime Minister V.P. Singh's National Front holds 26 percent of
seats in the Lok Sabha (lower house) against 36 percent held
by former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's Congress (I) party.
The National Front holds 17 percent of the seats in the Rajya
Sabha (upper house) against 56 percent held by Congress (I).
Congress (I) still controls the legislatures of 14 of the 25
states and participates in the ruling coalition of 2 more.
The National Front controls the legislatures of 4 states.
State Assembly elections in 10 states are due in early 1990.
By the end of 1989, "President's rule" (direct rule from New
Delhi) was in force only in the state of Punjab.
The internal security apparatus includes both national and
state-controlled paramilitary and police forces. While the 25
states have the primary role in maintaining law and order, the
central Government has responsibility for protecting the
fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution, both in
law and practice. The Union Ministry for Home Affairs
controls the nationwide Indian Police Force, the paramilitary
forces, and the intelligence bureaus. The state governments
control their own police forces, the provincial armed
constabularies, and some specialized police forces. Over the
past four decades since India's independence, control of law
and order operations has moved increasingly under the Home
Ministry. This tendency stems in part from the rapid growth
of the intelligence bureaus, which function with little
reference to the state governments, and in part from the
increased use of paramilitary forces against armed radicals in
disturbed areas. These forces are deployed in the northeast
states, Punjab, and Kashmir.
In India's mixed economy, agriculture, nonfinancial services,
consumer-goods manufacture, and some heavy industry are
private. The states or the central Government own and run
banking and insurance, air and rail transport, public
utilities, and key heavy industries. Regulation of private
economic activity is being relaxed, but resource and balance
of payments constraints posa problems for rapid deregulation.
India's 800 million population is growing at over 2 percent
annually. According to a 1989 United Nations Children's Fund
report, 40 percent of the urban population and 51 percent of
the rural population live below the poverty level.
Positive human rights developments during the year included
the release of most Golden Temple detainees from Jodhpur jail;
the release of a number of prominent Sikh political figures
who had been held in detention for several years without
trial; the lifting of restrictions on travel by foreigners to
Punjab; the peaceful holding of national elections in Punjab;
and the initiation of negotiations between Bodo revolutionaries
and the Government. At year's end, the new Government
initiated several positive human rights measures that
demonstrated a willingness to seek a negotiated solution to
the Punjab crisis. India is a basically democratic polity
with strong and legally sanctioned safeguards for individuals,
a vigorous free press, and action-oriented voluntary
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organizations. Nonetheless, significant human rights abuses,
many of them generated by severe social tensions (including
casteism and uften violent ethnic, sectarian, linguistic, or
tribal communal politics), remained. The severity of human
rights problems varied considerably from state to state.
Problem areas included: extrajudicial "encounter" killings by
the police (see Section l.a.), particularly in Punjab and
Andhra Pradesh; incommunicado detention for prolonged periods
without charge under antiterrorist laws; torture and deaths of
suspects in police custody; lack of prosecution of police
accused of abusing and raping vietainees; uneven implementation
of laws affecting women's rights; the increase of "dowry
deaths" (wife murder); the significant exploitation of
indentured and child labor; separatist terrorism in Punjab and
Kashmir; and unchecked intercaste and communal violence,
notably in Bihar.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for tne Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The Government does not condone political killing, and
stringent law and order policies were pursued, particularly in
the states of Punjab and Kashmir and in the northeast, to curb
political or communal violence. On the other hand, local
political leaders in various parts of India were often
involved openly in communal or caste-related violence that
resulted in killings.
Law and order in the Indian system is primarily each state's
responsibility. The willingness of authorities to institute
judicial proceedings in cases of politically related violence
and the evenhandedness of the police, however, vary from state
to state. While the Government enhanced law and order
measures in some areas in the face of violent radicals or
communal tensions, human rights groups in India continued to
attribute political and extrajudicial killings to the
suppression of legal safeguards contained in security laws and
the failure to institute criminal proceedings against police
personnel accused of misdeeds. Critics have accused the
police throughout India, particularly in the northeast, Andhra
Pradesh, and Punjab, of staging fake "encounters" with
terrorists to cover up deaths in detention and of wrongly
attributing causes of deaths of persons in police custody.
Such killings are so widespread that the Human Rights Watch
and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, in a report issued
in 1989, characterized them as constituting a "pattern of
extrajudicial killings." No security officials, as far as can
be ascertained, were convicted of "encounter" killings or
deaths in custody during 1989.
Punjab remained the most intractable of India's ethnic
regional problems. While complete government statistics are
unavailable, the press reported fewer deaths by separatist
terrorists in Punjab in 1989 than the previous year; human
rights observers, however, believe the figures may in fact be
higher than the 1988 figures. Press statistics compiled from
January to late September show 1,255 deaths by terrorist
violence, 595 terrorists killed, and 1,584 arrested. In
addition, 89 security force deaths were recorded. The
Government repotted that, in the 6 months ending June 1989,
564 persons had been killed as a result of terrorist violence.
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336 terrorists killed, and 1,593 arrested. Most central
security forces in Punjab are non-Sikhs; the majority of state
police are Sikhs, as are the militants. Most victims of the
violence are unarmed Sikhs, although a number of Hindu
civilians have also been caught in crossfire.
In the 6 weeks following the January 6 execution by hanging of
Kehar Singh, convicted of conspiring to assassinate Indira
Gandhi, 169 persons were killed in Punjab, including 12
persons hanged to death by terrorists, according to a
government statement. Prominent politicians killed by
terrorists in 1989 include Rajinder Kaur, the leading woman
political figure in Punjab. In June terrorists shot and
killed 19 members of a militant Hindu group who were meeting
at a park in the Faridkot district. Two security personnel
were killed in a subsequent bomb explosion at the site.
In Punjab, separating deaths caused by politically motivated
terrorists from deaths as a result of common crime is
difficult, because neither the press nor the Government makes
a careful distinction between the two. Police at the local
level have been accused by critics of subsuming common crime
under terrorist crime to avoid or delay investigations of
police actions. The Government publicly admitted that police
officials in the most terrorist-prone districts have been
heavyhanded.
The Government announced it was taking steps to prosecute
those involved in the anti-Sikh riots centered in New Delhi
that followed Mrs. Gandhi's assassination in October 1984, in
which an estimated 3,000 persons died. Formal charges were
filed against 2,300 persons in 225 cases. More than half of
these cases remain before the courts. In the 11 cases
decided, 80 persons were sentenced to prison, 6 for life.
Critics charge, however, that the principal instigators of the
riots are protected from prosecution by their high political
office and that none of those arrested were major figures in
the anti-Sikh rioting.
Political militancy in India's only Muslim majority state,
Kashmir, rose markedly in 1989. In mid-1989, two major
terrorist organizations, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation
Front (JKLF) and the People's League, began killing moderate
politicians, including three major political figures. In
December the JKLF kidnaped the medical-student daughter of the
new Home Minister and only released her when five jailed
Kashmiri militants were released in exchange. Terrorists also
stepped up use of bombs in public places. The militants'
grievances had both political and economic roots. Augmented
powers given to the police aimed at controlling the violence
appeared instead to escalate it. In August paramilitary
troops entered the Jama Masjid, Srinigar's largest mosque,
after they were allegedly shot at by militants who fled into
the mosque complex. According to journalists, four people
were killed in the shooting that ensued. Press reports
indicated that about 150 of those arrested remain in
interrogation centers. On August 27 in Leh, Kashmir state,
police opened fire on a crowd of rock-throwing Buddhists
agitating against the state government's administration.
Three local people were killed and two dozen wounded.
In the eastern state of Bihar, communal and intercaste
killings continued, despite state deployment of paramilitary
forces. In April in Hazaribagh, Bihar, at least 19 people
were killed after a religious procession inflamed communal
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tensions. Press reports cited Bihar police complicity in
attacks by Hindus on Muslims. On July 18, the government of
Bihar rejected a demand for a judicial inquiry into the
Hazaribagh riots.
In late October, processions of Hindu fundamentalist groups in
Bhagalpur, Bihar, triggered communal violence that resulted in
hundreds of casualties over the following days. Official
figures give the death toll as 404, but press figures indicate
over 1,000 bodies were found in Bhagalpur and 150 surrounding
villages. For 3 days, until the Army took over, the violence
continued while local, overwhelmingly Hindu police stood
back. At nearby Chandeli village, nearly 100 Muslims believed
to be under police protection disappeared overnight. Press
sources report the villagers were murdered by criminal
elements and their bodies thrown into a river. At least 25
bodies were found in the village well. In the wake of the
killings, 35,000 persons were evacuated to relief camps. A
citizens" group filed a writ petition in the Patna high court
accusing the superintendent of Bhagalpur police of failing to
use the police to protect the victims. The superintendent of
police was transferred. The Chief Minister of Bihar announced
on December 16 that two high court judges would run special
courts to deal with the 500 criminal cases registered by
victims of the Bhagalpur riots. In addition, a commission of
inquiry has begun work to probe the killings.
Links between politicians, criminal gangs, and landlords
prevail in rural areas of such states as Bihar, where "senas"
(private armies) and local police are used to resist demands
for social and economic reform. In central Bihar and in a few
tribal areas, some "Naxalites" (a loosely applied term for
several leftist militant groups) joined the electoral process
through association with the Indian People's Front (IPF).
This contributed to a lessening of violence. The IPF won one
seat in the Lok Sabha in the November national elections. The
Bihar police confront a difficult situation in which political
violence and counterviolence are commonplace. Police
personnel implicated in excesses are rarely identified or
brought to justice.
In Assam, to the northeast, where ethnic and communal
rivalries continued to fester, the United Tribal Nationalists
Liberation Front (UTNLF) in September called for a judicial
inquiry into the massacre of 29 tribal people at Borkajuh.
The UTNLF claims the killings were planned by nontribal
criminal elements in connivance with local police. The
judicial inquiry was rejected, and the results of an official
investigation were not released by year's end.
Throughout the year, violence broke out as nontribal Assamese
encroached on Bodo tribal lands. The All Bodo Students' Union
(ABSU) , agitating for a separate state for the plains tribals
of Assam, was accused of calculated killings of nontribals,
including functionaries of the ruling Asom Gana Parishad. The
ABSU denied involvement. Strong police countermeasures
resulted in the killing of an unknown number of Bodo
civilians, many of whom reportedly had nothing to do with the
agitation. No charges have been lodged in the deaths.
Tripartite talks initiated on August 28 in New Delhi between
the Indian Government, the ABSU, and the Assam government
reached agreement on several issues. A panel was appointed to
look into the grievances of the Bodos in Assam. The state
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began to release 1,500 detained Bodo militants (the ABSU
claims 5,000 Bodo militants are in detention) and announced a
policy of "minimum force" against the militants as a measure
to normalize the situation. The militants have responded by
suspending their agitation.
Politically motivated killings showed an upward trend in West
Bengal. The Director General of West Bengal police is
reported to have said that almost all major political parties
are involved in the violence.
The largest riot in western India occurred in February in
Bombay, Maharashtra, over Salman Rushdie's book "Satanic
Verses." Though the Government had banned the book to avoid
violence, young male Muslims took to the streets, destroying
property. The police restored order at a cost of at least 12
dead and over 100 injured. The Chief Minister and media
commended the police for preventing further violence.
In the southern state of Andhra Pradesh, police and Naxalites
continued to engage in violence and counterviolence . The most
militant of the Andhra Naxalites, the People's War Group
(PWG), escalated its attacks on rural state government
functionaries in 1989. In June it kidnaped and subsequently
murdered a popular official of the ruling Telegu Desam Party
(TOP) in retaliation for the detention and disappearance of
two PWG members. At the same time, the Andhra Civil Liberties
Committee, a private group, accused the police and the TDP of
staging over 200 fake "encounters" with Naxalites to cover up
deaths in police custody. In June the state government, in an
effort to reduce violence, declared a virtual amnesty for
Naxalites who surrendered to state authorities. Approximately
240 took advantage of the Government's offer, although the
hard-core Naxalite strength remained intact.
In Madhya Pradesh in October, a procession of about 30,000
Muslims celebrating the birth of Mohammed turned violent,
leaving more than 50 persons dead. The communal rioting in
the city of Indore razed a portion of the Hindu commercial
center and several nearby Muslim ghettos.
b. Disappearance
Indian law provides safeguards against disappearance by
requiring an arrested person to be brought before a magistrate
within 24 hours of arrest. These safeguards are not always
applied in practice. In addition, they do not apply to
persons arrested under national security laws. The right to
judicial determination of the legality of the detention can be
sought from the higher courts to redress unlawful detention
but is often unavailable to the families of poor or uneducated
victims. Reports of disappearance in Punjab and elsewhere
remain difficult to investigate because access to independent
observers is severely restricted. Amnesty International (AI)
stated in a July 1989 report, "India: Some Recent Reports of
Disappearances," which covered 1987-88, that disappearances in
India are frequently not reported. The report noted that
several dozen cases remain unresolved.
A May editorial in a national daily noted frequent reports in
Punjab of young men being arbitrarily detained, interrogated
under duress, and held incommunicado for weeks at a time
without notification of relatives. The AI report on
disappearances cited the case of Manjit Singh and Jatinder Pal
Singh, arrested by plainclothesmen in Mohali, Punjab, in early
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January and subsequently seen in detention at the end of the
month by other detainees. Police informed relatives that the
two were not in police custody; persistent attempts to
establish their whereabouts have yielded no information to
date .
In January 1989, the U.N. Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearance recorded it had informed the Indian
Government of 33 cases of disappearance, many of which
concerned the May 1987 events in Meerut, Uttar Pradesh, in
which 80 unarmed men, women, and children were killed. The
state paid compensation to the families of 13 of the victims
of the killings, but officials continue to deny that the
Provincial Armed Constabulary was responsible for the deaths
and refused to publish the findings of the official inquiry
into the deaths and disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture and cruel treatment or punishment are prohibited by
law in India. Confessions or information extracted by force
cannot, by law, be admitted in court. Significantly, however,
under Section 15 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act (TADA) of 1987, a confession made to a police
officer is admissible in evidence, provided the police have
"reason to believe that it is being made voluntarily." The
frequent press accounts of police brutality in obtaining
confessions from= detainees under this law have fed widespread
charges of police excesses.
The press and human rights groups continued in 1989 to
document allegations of abuse of detainees by police in many
Indian states. In its 1989 Report, covering 1988, AI referred
to widespread reports of torture in India and noted that in a
few cases the courts had granted compensation to torture
victims. The Minister of Home Affairs reported March 9 that
five persons had died in police custody in Delhi in the
previous year. He said that in at least one case police
officials, including the station house officer, were found
responsible for causing injuries that resulted in the
detainee's death. The case was pending trial in the court at
year's end. He also stated 13 cases of beatings of detainees
by police personnel in Delhi had been reported during the
current year. In one case, a policeman was transferred to a
nonsensitive post, and, in another, three policemen were
placed under suspension.
The Association for the Protection of Democratic Rights
reported a number of lockup deaths in the state of West Bengal
(19 in 1988). In Bihar, there were 50 such deaths in the past
4 years. Since the majority of those allegedly killed
belonged to poor or socially backward sections of society,
without political affiliation, their deaths did not raise a
public furor. Following the death in Hasnabad jail on June 3
of an active Communist Party member under indictment, the
of f icer-in-charge of the Hasnabad police station was arrested
on charges of murder, then released on bail. By year's end,
he had not yet been brought to trial.
In the northeast, the police and paramilitary have been
accused of torturing suspected radicals in Assam. Under the
Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in force in the northeast,
security personnel are not held accountable under civil law
for their acts. In the state of Manipur, AI expressed concern
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over continuing police intimidation and torture of witnesses
and a lawyer now involved in court hearings. The court is
examining evidence about earlier allegations of torture and
reprisal killings by members of the paramilitary Assam Rifles,
who deny all allegations.
Scheduled castes and tribes (the lowest levels of Indian
society, listed on "schedules" to receive special protections
and safeguards under the Indian Constitution) are particularly
vulnerable to police violence. A report in July by the
People's Union for Civil Liberties estimated that
approximately 90 villages in Bastar, Madhya Pradesh, were
raided from 1985 to May 1989 by armed police. The report
states the tribal possessions were looted, villagers killed,
and over 250 persons detained. There have been numerous
allegations of the mass rape of female members of the
scheduled castes and tribes by the police. An officer accused
of such actions is rarely tried but more commonly is suspended
temporarily or reassigned to another post. In May the All
Bodo Students' Association claimed that about 100 tribal
women, including teenage girls, were gang-raped by Assam
police. The Bodo People's Action Committee submitted a
complaint to the governor, but there was no official inquiry
and no arrests.
Press reports about prison conditions include charges of
sexual abuse of prisoners and the use of prisoners by prison
officials for domestic labor. At least 20,000 children and
youngsters under 18 years old are reported to be in jail,
comprising nearly one-eighth of the prison population.
Although Parliament passed the Children's Law in 1960 to
safeguard young prisoners against abuse and exploitation, most
states have not followed suit with their own laws to implement
it; consequently, nearly 40 percent of the 390 districts in
India are without a children's law. The Supreme Court has
criticized the states for not providing separate facilities
for children in jails and for not constructing reformatory
institutions .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution requires that an arrested person be informed
of the grounds for arrest, given the right to be represented
by counsel, and produced before a magistrate within 24 hours
of arrest. At this initial appearance, the accused must
either be remanded for further investigation or released.
These provisions have been upheld by the Supreme Court and are
generally respected.
Despite such legal safeguards, there were continuing reports
in 1989 of arbitrary arrest or detention. A well-known human
rights activist. Dr. K. Balagopal, General Secretary of the
Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committees (APCLC) , was
abducted in August by plainclothesmen, reportedly as a hostage
for two policemen held by the People's War Group. Indian
press reports commented that his arrest was prompted by the
prominent role he played in the APCLC exposure of police
excesses. Dr. Balagopal was released several days later,
following a public outcry. He stated he had been held by the
Special Task police forces but was not brought before a
magistrate or charged.
The Constitution permits the enactment of preventive detention
laws in the event of threats to public welfare and national
security. Such laws provide for limits on the length of "
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detention (up to 2 years) and for judicial review of such
detention. Several laws of this type remain in effect.
The National Security Act (NSA) permits detention of security
risks; police anywhere in India can charge suspects under NSA
provisions. For a detainee to be released under this law, a
court must determine that all grounds for detention are
invalid. Under the NSA's strong special and preventive
detention provisions, a person may be detained for up to one
year without charge or trial (2 years in Punjab) on loosely
defined security grounds, but must be brought before a Defense
Ministry advisory board within 7 days of arrest; at this time
the detainee may be released on the basis of "insufficient
grounds." No official figures were available on the number of
people in detention under NSA provisions in 1989. Human
rights groups claim that no accurate record is kept of the
many people held without charges, so they have no way of
making accurate estimates of the numbers of persons in
detention. A large number of detainees were, however,
released in 1989.
The TADA, though enacted to fight terrorism in Punjab, is
applicable throughout India. Fourteen state governments
currently have invoked the TADA. In designated areas,
incommunicado detention is permitted pursuant to the TADA.
The Act permits maximum detention of 2 years but also provides
the right of review and access to legal counsel. The Home
Minister announced that between the Act's institution in 1987
and March 1989, 7,969 persons had been arrested under the TADA
in Punjab. Following application of the TADA to Gujarat in
1987, 4,491 people were arrested under the Act through June
1989. As with the NSA, accurate estimates for all detentions
under the TADA are not available.
In early March, the Prime Minister proposed a special package
of measures to help normalize the political situation in nine
districts of Punjab. The package included the release of the
187 remaining detainees held in Jodhpur jail since 1984 on
charges of waging war against the State. Seventy-eight were
subsequently rearrested on criminal charges; 4 remained in
jail at the end of 1989. In addition, the Government
announced the withdrawal with respect to the nondisturbed
areas of Punjab of the special detention provisions of the
National Security Act and the removal of restrictions on
travel by foreigners to the region. Before leaving office,
Gandhi ordered all charges to be dropped against S.S. Mann and
three others accused of conspiracy in the assassination of
former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. (Mann had spent 5 years
in detention awaiting legal action on earlier charges of
subversive activities.) At the same time, former Punjab Chief
Minister P.S. Badal and the president of a major Sikh
political-religious organization, G.S. Tohra, were also
released after several years in detention. In one of his
first acts after taking office. Prime Minister V.P. Singh paid
an informal visit to the Sikh Golden Temple in Amritsar along
with senior members of his Cabinet to indicate that resolving
Punjab tensions is a high priority for the new Government. He
followed up with an all-party meeting of leaders across the
political spectrum aimed at shaping a national consensus for a
political solution to the Punjab situation.
The Lok Sabha of the Parliament voted on December 28 to repeal
the controversial 59th Amendment to the Constitution. The
opposition voted with the Government, and Raja Sabha approval
is likely to follow quickly. The amendment had annulled the
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Constitution's guarantees of the right to life and liberty
during an emergency and permitted President's rule in any
state for up to 3 years without prior parliamentary approval.
Exile is not practiced as a punishment in India.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Indian Criminal Procedure Code provides for open trial in
most cases but allows the judiciary, under certain
circumstances, to hold closed proceedings. Such circumstances
include proceedings involving official secrets, trials in
which statements prejudicial to the safety of the State might
be made, or trials under provisions of national security
legislation such as the TADA. Sentences must, however, be
announced in public.
India's legal procedures generally assure a fair trial, but
the process can be drawn out and inaccessible to the poor.
Defendants have the right to choose counsel from an Indian bar
that is fully independent of the Government. The Indian bar
has a record of vigorously protesting infringements of human
rights. Effective appeal channels exist at all levels of the
judicial system.
The judiciary is independent from the executive branch.
Judges are selected by the Law Ministry following
consultations with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Some aspects of personal law, such as marriage, divorce,
succession, and child custody, are regulated by the
traditional laws and practices of the Hindu, Muslim, Parsi
(Zoroastrian) , Christian, and Jewish religions. The
Government's declared policy is not to interfere in the
personal laws, particularly of the minority communities, with
the effect that discriminatory personal laws, often against
women, are upheld.
The Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act of
Parliament (TAAA) permits the establishment of special courts
sitting in camera and allows the identity of witnesses
testifying before a special court to be kept secret. Under an
unusual provision of the TAAA, a defendant charged with
"waging war" carries the burden of proving his innocence.
Civil rights groups charge that these special rules are
contrary to the presumption of innocence cuscomary in Indian
law.
In 1989 the judicial authorities in Punjab failed to bring to
trial a number of alleged terrorists who had been charged, as
well as some police offenders. As justification for continued
detention. Government officials claim they are unable to find
witnesses to testify against terrorists.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Under Indian law, warrants are normally required for searches
and seizures. In a criminal investigation, police may conduct
searches without a warrant if obtaining a warrant would cause
undue delay, but they must justify such searches in writing.
Under the Disturbed Areas legislation, the authorities
continue to have special powers in Punjab to search and arrest
without a warrant and to shoot to kill under certain
circumstances. They have also been granted a significant
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expansion of telephone surveillance powers.
Surveillance of communications, including tapping of
telephones and intercepting personal mail without judicial
warrant, is authorized under the Indian Telegraph Act "on the
occurrence of any public emergency or in thp interest of the
public safety or tranquillity." These powers have been used
by every state government, generally in a low-key manner and
specifically, rather than generally, targeted. The Postal
(Amendment) Bill, passed by Parliament but never signed into
law, empowers the Government to censor mail in certain
circumstances, such as in a public emergency. At year's end,
the new Government promised to withdraw the Postal Bill.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Free speech and expression are protected by the Constitution,
and newspapers vigorously reflect a variety of public, social,
and economic beliefs. The Government controls the allocation
of newsprint and the placement of Government and public sector
advertisements, however, and has been accused of using these
means to exert influence over the press. National television
and radio, which are government monopolies, are frequently
accused of manipulating the news to the benefit of the
Government. At year's end, the Government announced it will
introduce legislation to give statutory autonomy to radio and
television.
Under the Official Secrets Act, the Government can restrict
publication of the most sensitive security stories. Several
major national publications regularly publish investigative
reports and allegations of government wrongdoing, and the
press as a whole champions human rights causes and criticizes
perceived government lapses. At year's end, the Government
said it will amend the Official Secrets Act to give people
greater access to information.
An event widely perceived as threatening press freedom was the
Kashmir government's effort in August to enact the "Special
Powers (Press) Bill, 1989." Concerned about growing violence
and press coverage of terrorists, the state government claimed
that the bill was necessary to prevent the press from
publishing secessionist writing in the state. The bill would
give power to the state assembly "to regulate and control
printing and publication of certain materials in the interest
of public order and the security of the State," with penalties
of up to 1 year in prison and stiff fines. The bill was
passed by the State Assembly in August, but action by the
second house, the State Legislative Council, was deferred
following strong public criticism. The proposal was referred
ultimately to the Press Council for its recommendations. In
October the state government withdrew the bill, accepting the
Council's view that the government had sufficient powers to
deal with cases of objectionable writing.
Journalists in Bihar have had a running feud with the local
police, whose misdeeds they attempted to bring into the open.
In July the Dhanbad police allegedly beat up members of the
press after charging them with offenses ranging up to
"attempted murder." The journalists were produced handcuffed
in court, and those sent for medical treatment were shackled
to their hospital beds. All were subsequently released by
order of the Bihar Chief Minister. A 2-day bandh (strike)
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organized in August in protest succeeded in focusing public
attention on police ill-treatment of the journalists.
In Punjab there have been occasional reports of journalists
being harassed and intimidated by terrorists, local leaders,
and special interest groups. Several vendors of the Hind
Samachar group of publications were killed by terrorists who
objected to the group's editorial policies which condemned
extremism.
Films are reviewed by the film censorship board before being
licensed for distribution. The board deletes material deemed
offensive to either public morals or religious or communal
sentiment .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution protects the right of peaceful assembly and
the right to form associations. These rights are respected.
Government authorities sometimes require permits and
notification prior to permitting parades and demonstrations.
At times of civil tension, local governments can ban public
assemblies and impose a curfew. Ordinarily, local governments
respect the right to protest peacefully, including such
traditional Indian forms of protest as "gherao," in which an
official or his office is surrounded by protesters who allow
no movement, and sitdowns blocking public thoroughfare.
In Sukinda Valley, Orissa, mine workers of the largest chrome
ore deposit in Asia have alleged police harassment of their
peaceful protests against mechanization. AI has expressed
concern with regard to the situation of those workers.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
India remains a religious mixing bowl, with all faiths
enjoying freedom of worship. Government policy does not favor
any religious group. Nevertheless, communal tensions over
religious differences continue to be a social problem and pose
challenges to the secular nature of the Indian polity. For
example, the Bombay-based Shiv Sena has made militant Hinduism
its only political plank.
There is no bar to proselytizing by Indian Christians, but the
Government limits the number of foreign missionaries and laws
in some states discourage them from openly proselytizing. In
Bihar, confrontations have persisted betv7een Christian
missionaries and Hindu fundamentalists. Indian religious
organizations may maintain communications with coreligionists
abroad. Financial contributions from abroad are subject to
scrutiny and licensing by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Despite laws in various states removing obstructions to the
exercise of religious freedom, Harijans (the lowest, formerly
"untouchable," level of Indian society) are still prevented
from entering Hindu temples in some areas.
The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Ordinance
makes it an offense to use any religious site for political
purposes or the use of temples for harboring persons accused
or convicted of any crime. While specifically designed to
deal with Sikh places of worship in the Punjab, the ordinance
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technically applies to all religious sites. In general, the
Government has been careful to avoid placing restrictions on
Sikh religious practices or on the management of Sikh places
of worship.
A full bench of the high court in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, has
been called to decide five suits relating to the Ram
Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid dispute, which centers on whether
Hindus can build a temple on a sacred site where a Muslim
mosque now stands. Court proceedings over who rightfully
controls the disputed site were continuing at year's end.
Prime Minister V.P. Singh placed a settlement, either judicial
or negotiated, as one of his Government's highest priorities.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Indian citizens enjoy full freedom of movement within the
country, except in certain border areas where, for security
reasons, special permits are required. Foreign travel and
emigration are without political restrictions. Millions of
people of Indian origin live abroad. Foreigners (including
diplomats) must obtain special permission to visit Assam and
other sensitive border areas. In March Prime Minister Gandhi
reopened Punjab to foreigners in general. (It had previously
been open to accredited foreign journalists.)
India admitted millions of refugees and displaced persons at
the time of partition in 1947 and granted them citizenship,
integrating them fully into Indian society. Subsequent
migration to India has largely been the result of upheavals in
nearby countries, and some of the refugees in these migrations
have not been granted citizenship or fully integrated. In
some cases, both the refugees and their hosts consider their
stay temporary, although it may be for a long time.
The most recent migrations have been of Chakmas and other
tribals and nontribals from Bangladesh (estimated at about
70,000 by the Government) into the northeastern states,
especially Tripura, and Tamils from Sri Lanka into Tamil
Nadu. Chakmas who have been offered the opportunity to return
to Bangladesh have generally chosen not to do so, despite
reports of scarce resources in the camps located in Tripura.
Elsewhere in the northeast, the Assam state government is
committed to identifying "foreigners" who have entered that
state from neighboring Bangladesh with a view towards
repatriating them, though to date it has forced few to leave.
Tamils from Sri Lanka in Tamil Nadu are provided shelter and
subsistence by the Government. The 1987 accord between India
and Sri Lanka, aimed at settling the Sri Lankan ethnic
conflict, calls for repatriation of these refugees. Under the
repatriation scheme, some 40,000 refugees were returned to Sri
Lanka by 1989; another 12,000 are estimated to have returned
on their own. Over 80,000 are still in India, however,
according to the Minister of State for Home Affairs. There
are reports of a renewed flight of some Tamils to India now
that agreement has been reached for a staged total withdrawal
of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) from northeast Sri
Lanka. These Tamils fear that disorder will follow the
departure of the IPKF.
Several thousand Afghans have entered India since the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Many have been resettled
elsewhere, outside India. In 1989 the refugee population more
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than doubled when fears of war in Kabul impelled Afghans to
leave for India after the Soviet withdrawal. About 5,000
currently are being protected and assisted by the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) .
In addition, nearly 2,000 Iranian refugees are under the
UNHCR' s protection. Many were studying in India when the
Iranian revolution came in 1979, but most had either arrived
from Iran on tourist visas or fled on fraudulent documents to
join Zoroastrian, Baha'i, or Christian communities in India.
Although India is not a signatory to the U.N. Convention and
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the Government
allows the UNHCR to operate normally, grants the refugees
renewable residence permits, and otherwise behaves as a
signatory.
India continues to provide humanitarian assistance and
protection to the large Tibetan refugee communities in
Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, and elsewhere in India, whose
members number in excess of 90,000.
There are reports that the Government, after initially
offering sanctuary to Burmese students fleeing the political
turmoil in Burma in 1988, may have subsequently deported some
of the refugees. Many have returned voluntarily, but the
border is porous and access to the border area is restricted,
making it difficult for observers to assess the present
situation.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
India is governed under a complicated but democratic
parliamentary system. The Constitution provides for full
adult suffrage; the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18 in
1989. Elections are held regularly, involving multiple
parties. A parliament can be constituted for not more than 5
years, except under constitutionally defined emergency
situations .
On the advice of the Prime Minister, the President can declare
President's rule, or a state of emergency, in any state in the
event of war, external oppression, internal disruption, or
collapse of the constitutional machinery in the state. Under
President's rule, the central Government, through the
Parliament and the President, directly administers the state
by replacing the elected state government with an appointed
governor. President's rule is for 6 months and must give way
to new elections, unless it is extended by Parliament for an
additional 6 months. In 1989 Tamil Nadu, Mizoram, and
Nagaland held state elections and are no longer under central
control. In August the Government declared President's rule
in Karnataka, where the ruling opposition party lost a
significant part of its support in the state assembly; central
control ended following state elections held in November.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The central Government, while tolerant of dissent within
India, is sensitive to international allegations of human
rights violations. India's ambassador to the United States
stated in May that, "as a sovereign and democratic nation,
India cannot permit investigations by foreign governments or
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INDIA
organizations into any aspect of her domestic affairs."
Despite the reopening of Punjab to foreigners, AI
representatives continue to be denied permission to
investigate human rights problems there. In September India
invited a U.S. congressional delegation to visit Punjab for
first-hand information on human rights.
In its 1989 Report, covering 1988, AI said that it had
informed the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture and Special
Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary Executions of its concerns
regarding India and that its reports were also submitted to
the Indian Government but that it had not replied. The Indian
Government stated in March that it was examining AI ' s report
on human rights violations in Bihar; various incidents of
alleged human rights violations were being investigated, and
appropriate action has been taken by the law enforcement
agencies, according to the Government spokesman. Also in
March, then Minister of State for External Affairs Natwar
Singh reacted publicly to the State Department's 1988 Human
Rights Report on India to the U.S. Congress, stating that the
Government does not accept the veracity of all the Report's
findings .
Independent Indian human rights organizations are active and
vocal. They include Citizens for Democracy, the People's
Union for Civil Liberties, the People's Union for Democratic
Rights, and the Indian People's Human Rights Commission, all
of which send out teams to study specific allegations of human
rights abuses and publish reports on their findings.
India is a member of the U.N. Human Rights Commission. It
will host the World Congress on Human Rights in April 1990,
the first time the conference will be held in Asia.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Several provisions in the Constitution promise equality before
the law and prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender.
Legally sanctioned gender discrimination is manifested,
however, in various family, marriage, and inheritance laws.
In recent years, several changes have been made in personal,
criminal, and labor laws governing women, including the Dowry
Prohibition Act, the Equal Remuneration Act, the Prevention of
Immoral Traffic Act, and the Sati (Prevention) Act. Deeply
rooted traditions, often tied to religious or social practice,
mean, however, that these laws are unevenly enforced (more
enforced in urban areas, less in the countryside). An
estimated 80 percent of India's women for whom these laws are
designed live and work in the rural areas. According to a
government-sponsored report by the National Commission on
Self-employed Women ( "Shramshakti" ) , most rural women are
employed as agricultural labor in the unorganized sector,
where they are vulnerable to exploitation. Traditional
practices relating to asset and land ownership give women
little control over land use, retention, or sale. The Hindu
Succession Act provides equal inheritance rights for Hindu
women, although in practice married daughters are not always
given a share in parental property. Inheritance rights for
Muslim women are regulated by traditional Islamic law, which
provide less than what a male heir would receive; in practice,
women seldom get even that portion. Under the tribal land
system, notably in Bihar, tribal women do not have the right
to own land; the practice of putting women to death there as
"witches" is closely linked to the denial of property rights.
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Female bondage, forced prostitution, child marriage, and
relative neglect of female children still remain common in
parts of Indian society.
The Government has under consideration a draft National
Perspectives Plan for Women whose main objectives would be to
remove gender bias in the law. Among other proposals, it
suggests more emphasis on the training of women and includes
recommendations on matrimonial property issues.
Women's rights groups point out that the burden of providing
an adequate dowry for girls is a factor in making female
births less desirable to the parents. There is some evidence
that female infanticide may be practiced in some sectors of
the society. Health care and nutrition for female infants
tends to be of a lower priority than for boys. The marked
disparity between the lower mortality rates of male versus
female infants in the 0-5 age group has resulted in the
unusually low ratio in the Indian population of 933 females
per 1,000 males (the ratio varies considerably among the
states) .
An Indian government study shows that violence against women,
including molestation, rape, kidnaping, and wife murder, has
followed an upward trend in the past decade. This may be due,
in part, to growing consciousness by women of their legal
rights so that more report crime. The claim that dowry deaths
(usually by burning) of young married women result from their
inability to meet their husbands' families' property demands
has been challenged by women's rights groups, who state that
insufficient dowry is often used as an excuse for societally
condoned violence against married women. Dowry crimes are a
complex issue involving attitudes of parents to daughters, the
social and economic status of women, defects in the law, and
the failure of police to implement existing law. Figures
given in the lower house of Parliament in July 1989 indicate
that between 1986 and 1988, registered cases of dowry deaths
nearly doubled, from 1,319 to 2,152, despite the strengthening
of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The actual total may be
substantially higher as much domestic violence goes unreported
or is not registered by the police, according to women's
groups. By law, every unnatural death of a woman which occurs
in the first 7 years of marriage must be investigated by the
police and a magistrate. However, a member of the Indian
police on the Union Public Service Commission stated in March
that about 95 percent of registered cases of dowry death end
in acquittal as corrupt police and medical officers tamper
with crucial evidence.
The "Shamshakti" report notes that 94 percent of Indian women
work in the unorganized sector, not controlled by labor laws.
In spite of a statutory minimum wage fixed in each state,
contractors set their own lower wage when employing women.
This is so even though one-third of all households are
supported solely by women, while in another third, they make
50 percent of the financial contribution. The report points
out that even those women covered by labor laws are not
adequately protected because the laws are unevenly enforced.
About 150 women's organizations in India are active in working
for social justice and economic advancement of women and in
linking women's problems to larger social concerns.
The Government has initiated programs to improve the lot of
the lower-caste Hindus who make up 15 percent of the
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population and the tribal minorities who constitute a further
7 percent. The reservation system, whereby lower castes
("scheduled castes," "scheduled tribes," and "other backward
communities") are offered preference in areas of employment
and admission to educational institutions, attempts to
strengthen the legal protection accorded to these
underprivileged and often victimized groups. The system has
met with limited success. The overall literacy rate among
scheduled castes and tribes is 21 percent. The literacy rate
among scheduled caste women is much lower; in some regions it
is estimated at less than 2 percent.
In some cases, higher-caste communities have mobilized against
policies of reserving jobs and other privileges for the
disadvantaged, with violence sometimes resulting. Political
controversy surrounds the question of whether lower castes,
tribes, and classes should be given preference in education,
employment, and housing when the program is perceived as
threatening the economic position of higher-caste groups. In
several states, the system of reservations for disadvantaged
groups is manipulated for political gain by local party
leaders; preference is sometimes given illegally to persons
who are not disadvantaged.
The number of crimes reported against Harijans and tribals was
recorded up to 1986 at an annual rate of 15,000 a year,
although this figure is low, as most such crimes go
unreported. The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, adds to the 1976 Civil
Rights Protection Act by specifying a new range of offenses
and by providing stiffer sanctions and special courts. The
Act obligates all states to take actions to prevent atrocities
and to restore the feeling of security among the scheduled
groups. Such humiliating actions as forced feeding of
obnoxious matter, public parading of unclothed victims,
forcible eviction from abodes, and denial of access to public
places now legally constitute atrocities punishable by a jail
sentence of up to 5 years. Economic offenses such as bonded
labor and dispossession of lands are also criminalized.
Assault against women in the scheduled groups is an offense,
as is use of force to affect voting behavior. Special courts
are empowered to try cases under the new act.
Notwithstanding legal provisions for their welfare and
protection, tribal people are frequently uprooted from forests
to make way for various development projects, e.g., dam
building, or following flooding, and are not provided with
proper recovery assistance.
Minority religious groups continue to charge that they are
victims of discrimination. Terrorist actions have increased
violence and distrust between Hindu and Sikh communities in
Punjab. Although they are treated equally under the law,
Sikhs, particularly young males, continue to be subjected to
more rigorous security precautions than others in certain
circumstances .
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Indian workers have the full constitutional right of
association as defined by the International Labor Organization
(ILO). Indian workers are guaranteed the right to form and
join unions of their own choosing, including in export
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processing zones. Trade unions have the legally protected
right to strike. Unions represent less than 25 percent of the
total of industrial workers. Most Indian workers (estimated
at over 70 percent) are in the agricultural sector,
traditionally unorganized, although recently trade unions have
begun organizing efforts in that sector as well. Indian trade
unions are independent of the Government. Most trade unions
have some form of ties to a political party, national or
local. Nevertheless, trade unions are usually adamant about
preserving their formal independence from political parties,
and in practice they have been known to differ from their
respective political parties on labor-related issues. Major
trade union organizations are affiliated with recognized
international confederations, such as the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
Workers enjoy the right to strike in principle but, under the
Essential Services Maintenance Act, the Government can ban
strikes and require conciliation or arbitration in specified
essential industries. Legal mechanisms exist for challenging
the assertion that a given dispute falls within the scope of
this act. The only major industrial strike in 1989 was
conducted by the port and dock workers. According to
provisional government figures, there were 750 strikes from
January to September, accounting for 9.6 million man-days
lost. Figures for the last 10 years show the number of
strikes and lockouts have been declining.
The ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) in early
1989 reported on allegations by a Communist trade union
federation that management had incited police and thug
repression of union members on Assam tea and plywood estates.
Another case, brought by the same complainant, alleging
violence against union members in Tripura, was considered by
the CFA at its May-June session. The Government, which denied
all the allegations, was urged to promote a climate free from
violence, pressure, or threats against trade unionists.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to organize (including protection against antiunion
discrimination) and to bargain collectively has existed in
Indian law for decades. Trade unions carry out these
activities independently and without government or, in
general, employer attempts to interfere. Police and judicial
authorities are generally quick to protect peaceful union
activities. However, as noted in Section 2.b., mine workers
in Sukinda Valley, Orissa, alleged harassment by the police of
their peaceful protests against mechanization.
In addition to the availability of normal civil and criminal
courts, a system of specialized labor courts exists to hear
and adjudicate labor-related complaints. New legislation
seeking to modernize and streamline the bargaining process and
the internal organization of unions was introduced in the
Parliament in 1988, but, pending consultations with trade
union and employers' organizations, it has not been acted upon.
Collective bargaining is the normal means of reaching
industrial relations agreements and settling disputes, and
trade unions are usually vigorous in defending worker
interests in this process. Where collective bargaining fails
to establish locally equitable wage levels, the Government may
set up tripartite boards, including trade union
representation, to determine them. Export processing zones
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exist at several locations in India but are not particularly
active at present. Physical access to such zones is
ordinarily limited, including to union organizers. Unions do
not appear to be active in the zones, but collective
bargaining rights apply within them.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced labor is prohibited by the Indian Constitution, and
legislation passed in 1976 specifically bans the practice of
"bonded labor." A Supreme Court decision has defined "forced
labor" as work at less than the minimum wage (minimum wages
are usually set by the states, not the central Government).
Under this unique definition, "forced labor" is widespread
throughout India, particularly in rural areas. "Bonded
labor," although illegal (subject to imprisonment for up to 3
years) and actively opposed by the Government, also occurs in
agriculture and construction. It is the result of a private,
contractual relationship whereby a worker incurs or inherits
debts to a contractor and then must work off the debt, plus
extensive interest. Since most of these workers are
illiterate, these bonds may continue indefinitely, especially
if the contractor lends them subsequent small amounts "on
account . "
The Government estimates, based on reports from the states as
of March 31, 1989, that there were 242,532 bonded workers in
the country, of whom 218,272 had been "rehabilitated" by
government authorities. The Gandhi Peace Foundation, however,
estimates the number at 10 times the government figure.
Private social organizations, such as the Council for
Advancement of Peoples' Action and Rural Technology (CAPART)
and Action for Welfare and Awakening in Rural Environments
(AWARE), and some trade unions are active in identifying cases
of bondage and pursuing them with relevant (usually state)
officials. Even with better coordination and greatly
increased resources to overcome the complicated jurisdictional
division between the state governments and the central
Government, the eradication of bonded labor is likely to be
slow. ILO committees have also examined the issue of bonded
labor and have requested the Government to continue its
efforts to put its practices in conformity with ILO Convention
29 on Forced Labor, which India ratified in 1954.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
It has been estimated that one-quarter of the world's child
labor is attributable to India, where poverty and the lack of
compulsory education make it an especially serious problem.
According to a Labor Ministry survey, 1 out of 4 Indian
children between the ages of 5 and 15 is working. Government
statistics put the total at 17.5 million in 1985. Other
figures put it as high as 44 million.
In 1986 legislation was enacted banning the employment of
children under 14 in hazardous occupations and regulating
their employment in others, and in 1987 the Labor Ministry
announced a crackdown in 10 of the most blatantly abused
sectors. In 1988 the Parliament's Public Accounts Committee
requested that the Government consult with outside experts to
set up educational programs for child workers and to change
parental attitudes, to carry out "exemplary punishment" of
erring employers, and to harmonize the various existing
legislative controls on the practice. In 1989 the Prime
Minister proposed a special tax on employers of child labor.
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Five hundred new child welfare projects were inaugurated in
1989, including health and nutritional programs. A Small
Child Labor Division within the Labor Ministry has been
created. Nevertheless, progress has been slow. Some
employers of child labor have been openly defiant about
continuation of the practice and resisted attempts by the
Labor Ministry at enforcement. As in the case of bonded
labor, the central Government often points to the division of
jurisdiction between the state governments and the central
Government in dealing with the practice, and urges private
organizations (including trade unions) to do more. Although
almost all child labor abuses occur in sectors outside the
traditional reach of labor organizations, trade unions have
recently become more active in this field, often concentrating
on "consciousness-raising" among women workers who work
alongside their children. Despite all these efforts,
enforcement of existing law appears inadequate to cope with
the dimensions of the problem. The 1989 central government
budget allowed only $2 million for all child welfare programs.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
While the basic minimum wage, and its enforcement, varies
according to the state and sector of industry, most
"organized" workers receive much more than the minimum wage,
especially when legislatively mandated bonuses and other
benefits are included. The prescribed minimum wage in the
unorganized sector for Delhi is about $50 per month for
unskilled workers. Daily wage rates for construction workers
xange from $1.74 for unskilled workers to $2.34 for skilled
workers. The minimum wage, without bonuses or benefits, is
considered adequate only for the most minimal standard of
living .
The Factories Act establishes an 8-hour workday, a 48-hour
workweek, and various standards for working conditions. These
standards are generally enforced and accepted (indeed,
improved upon by various enlightened employers and aggressive
unions) in the modern industrial sectors but are less often
observed in older, smaller, and less economically robust
industries .
Occupational safety and health measures also vary widely,
although this is an area in which both Government and trade
unions have become more active. Governmental resources
devoted to inspection and enforcement of standards are
generally recognized to be inadequate. Several international
organizations and foreign government agencies, including the
U.S. Agency for International Development, are working with
the Government of India on various occupational safety and
health projects.
24-900 O— 90 45
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IBM*
Iran is an Islamic Republic under the leadership of Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Grand Ayatollah Khomeini after
Khomeini's death in June. The formal system of government,
based on a Constitution approved in 1980 by popular referendum
and revised in July 1989, features a parliament and a
president elected from among multiple candidates by universal
suffrage. However, all candidates must meet highly
restrictive religious and political criteria imposed by the
Council of Guardians, and as a result the choice offered to
voters is narrow. The Government is dominated by a political
elite composed of Shi "a Muslim clerics and of laymen allied
with these clerics which attempts to impose its views on
political and socioreligious orthodoxy. However, there are
significant factional differences on important economic and
political issues, such as private property ownership and
relatibns with the West.
The Government's hold on power is reinforced through arrests,
summary trials and executions, and other forms of intimidation
implemented by an extensive internal security system.
Political arrests are made by the Revolutionary Guards or,
less commonly, by revolutionary committees (komitehs), local
neighborhood groups which once were quasi-official but which
have now been subsumed under the Ministry of Interior. In
practice, these groups retain a certain amount of autonomy,
particularly in the provinces, and the central Government is
sometimes unable to control their activities fully.
The disruptions of the revolution, the devastation of the
Iran-Iraq war, and government mismanagement have caused
serious economic deterioration in Iran. Inflation is probably
above 50 percent, while unemployment is about 40 percent of
the work force. Many industries are operating at less than
half capacity. Corruption and black market activities are
rife. The Government has not yet made many key decisions
regarding reconstruction strategy and economic development;
these include the nature and level of foreign participation in
reconstruction, the role of the private sector, and government
versus private control of foreign trade.
Iran continued in 1989 to be a major violator of human
rights. Abuses included summary executions of political
opponents; widespread torture; repression of the freedoms of
speech, press, assembly and association; arbitrary detentions;
lack of fair trials; continuing repression of the Baha'i
religious community; denial of the right of citizens to change
their government; and severe restrictions on women's and
worker rights. In his inaugural speech in July, President
Rafsanjani pledged that the Government would respect the
"freedom and dignity of individuals." Although the Government
implemented a series of steps to regularize judicial
procedures and bring the security forces under closer
supervision, by year's end it was not apparent that the
pattern of abuses noted above had been significantly altered.
Both Amnesty International (AI), in its 1989 Report covering
1988, and the U.N.'s Special Rapporteur for Iran, Reynaldo
Galindo Pohl, cited instances of torture, execution after
*Because of the absence of a United States Mission in Iran,
this report draws heavily on unofficial sources.
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summary proceedings, and the holding of political prisoners as
among continuing human rights abuses in Iran. According to
Galindo Pohl, the Government of Iran acknowledged the
large-scale executions which took place during the last
several months of 1988. He concluded that "acts are being
committed in Iran that are incompatible with international
human rights instruments that are binding on the Iranian
Government . "
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The total number of people killed for political reasons in
1989 is unknown. Given the lack of basic procedural safeguards
in political trials, most of the executions ordered each year
in such cases amount to summary executions. Moreover, the
Government often cloaks political charges with accusations of
criminal activity, e.g., narcotics trafficking.
A rash of political executions which began in the late summer
of 1988 — and claimed between several hundred and several
thousand lives — subsided in early 1989. Under a new antidrug
law announced in late 1988, the Government executed hundreds
of accused drug traffickers throughout the year, a number of
whom, according to a variety of sources, were actually
political detainees.
In August AI reported that 851 persons had been executed for
alleged drug-related offenses, out of a total of over 1,200
executions during the year for criminal offenses. Many of
those killed were hanged en masse in cities around the
country, some from construction cranes.
In its 1989 Report, AI also charged that secret executions of
political prisoners was common.
The Government has sought to reduce the time between
commissioji of a capital crime and the execution of the accused
to a period of 10 days. In a February statement, the
country's highest judicial authority stated that the new
directives were being followed and prisoners were being
executed within a very few days.
b. Disappearance
The number of disappearances in 1989 is unknown.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Accounts of torture in Iran's prisons continued to be received
in 1989 and included a wide range of inhuman practices.
According to various human rights groups and eyewitness
accounts, floggings, mock executions, and suspension from the
ceiling are common methods of torture, as are threats of
sexual abuse of female prisoners and female relatives of male
prisoners. AI reports that relatives of political suspects
have been imprisoned to pressure the suspects to give
themselves up. Guards have threatened to torture family
members of detainees, and relatives or other prisoners have
occasionally been forced to watch torture. A number of
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prisoners, including young children, have been raped by
Revolutionary Guards. According to the United Nations Special
Rapporteur, one eyewitness reported the torture of women
prisoners immediately after giving birth.
Beatings of all kinds, both by single guards and by several
guards at once, are common. Allegedly, prisoners are flogged
on the soles of their feet until they can no longer walk.
Brutal common criminals have reportedly been introduced among
political prisoners and incited to torture and rape the other
prisoners .
The U.N. Special Rapporteur, in a report issued in 1988, noted
that torture in Iranian prisons has become more
sophisticated. Steps allegedly have been taken to eliminate
traces of physical torture, including the use of new types of
cables to beat prisoners, and the physical separation of
tortured prisoners from other inmates until all marks of abuse
have disappeared. A machine is reportedly used to perforate
the soles of feet after they have been flogged to reduce the
swelling .
Prisoner protests against the inhuman conditions in Iranian
prisons have reportedly been met with beatings, denial of
medical care, and, in some cases, execution.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arrests for expression of views critical of or different from
those of the Government were known to occur in the past, but
it is not known how many may have occurred in 1989.
In the past, some persons have been arrested on trumped-up
criminal charges when their actual "offenses" were political.
Individuals were taken into custody on vague charges such as
"corruption on earth" or "crimes against God." The lack of
fair trials and other procedural safeguards encourage such
practices .
No judicial determination of the legality of detention exists
in Iranian law. There is reportedly no legal time limit on
incommunicado detention. Suspects are held for questioning at
local Revolutionary Guard offices or in jails.
There have been reports that children often have been taken
into custody with their mothers. Some women have been
imprisoned solely because they have associated with men who
are political suspects.
In February the Government announced an amnesty for imprisoned
members of banned opposition organizations that applied to
2,600 persons out of a total of 3,500 the Government admitted
had been imprisoned for political activities. According to
the Government, the amnesty did not apply to those who
committed serious crimes in the course of these activities.
The Government claimed that all 2,600 were released but there
was no independent confirmation, and opposition elements have
claimed that few of those supposedly amnestied have returned
home. In October the Chief of the Judicial Branch announced
another amnesty and a reduction in the sentences of those who
were convicted by "public, military, and Islamic revolutionary
courts." The program, which was made subject to numerous
conditions, has not been fully implemented, and no figures are
available on the number released.
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With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
There are essentially two different court systems. The
civilian courts deal with criminal offenses, and the
revolutionary courts, established in 1979, try "political"
offenses .
No trial by a revolutionary court can be called fair or public
in the usual sense. If the trial is staged publicly, it is
generally because the prisoner has already been forced to
confess to a crime. Individuals tried for political offenses
enjoy virtually no procedural or substantive safeguards.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur noted in a special report in 1989
that reports continued to be received about the lack of many
basic procedural guarantees. Defendants reportedly did not
have access to a defense lawyer, were unable to call witnesses
on their behalf, and were unable to appeal. Some persons have
been blindfolded during their trial. AI has reported that
many convictions are based on confessions extracted under
torture during incommunicado pretrial detention. Some
individuals have been imprisoned beyond the limit of their
sentence, and even executed after the formal expiration of
their prison term.
Restraints on arbitrary actions of the revolutionary courts
were reportedly severely weakened in 1985 by a government
decision to limit the review authority of the Supreme Court.
The judicial system is further weakened by the fact that
revolutionary courts can consider cases formally under the
jurisdiction of the civil and criminal courts. Assignment of
cases to regular rather than revolutionary courts is haphazard
and apparently occurs mainly when arrests are made by regular
police. Revolutionary courts can also overturn the decisions
of civilian courts.
For common criminal offenses, many elements of the
prerevolutionary judicial system survive, and the accused
often have the right to a public trial with benefit of lawyers
of their own choosing, assuming they can afford the fee. Even
this judiciary is not fully independent, however. Many of the
former judges were retired after the revolution, and new
judges selected. One criterion for new judges is grounding in
Islamic law, and political acceptability is a requirement for
any government position. Favorable verdicts reportedly can
often be "purchased" from the judges serving on civil and
criminal courts and to a lesser degree from judges of the
revolutionary courts.
No reliable estimate is available on the number of political
prisoners. In its 1989 Report, AI , noting that 1,200
political prisoners had been executed, estimated that
"thousands of others" remained in prison.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Government rejects the Western distinction between a
public sphere which the state may control and a sphere of
private life (religion, culture, thought, and private
behavior) which the State may not properly control.
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Authorities still enter homes, tap phones, and open mail, but
these activities seem to occur less frequently now than in
previous years.
Special Revolutionary Guard units and neighborhood komitehs
check on social activities. Women whose clothing does not
completely cover the hair and all of the body except hands and
face, or who wear makeup, are technically subject to arrest.
In the past, men have also been required to dress "modestly,"
eschewing, for example, short-sleeved shirts. In 1989 the
social climate reportedly became somewhat more tolerant after
the death of Khomeini; the komitehs were said to be much less
in evidence on the streets. As the year ended, however, there
were some reports that the momentum seemed to have changed,
and there was closer application of Islamic standards of dress
and conduct.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution states that "publications and the press may
express ideas freely, except when they are contrary to Islamic
principles, or are detrimental to public rights." In
practice, most publications are controlled by the Government;
independent publishers run the risk not only of press
shutdowns and confiscation of publications and equipment but
of arrest and summary punishment if they are overly critical
of the Government.
All books must be submitted to the Ministry of Islamic
Guidance for censorship before they can be published.
Publishers, authors, and printers also engage in substantial
self-censorship before submitting books to the Ministry in an
effort to avoid the substantial penalties, including economic
losses, incurred when books are rejected.
Newspapers, which are usually associated with various
government factions, reflect a variety of viewpoints.
Officials and government policies are often subjected to
public criticism, but newspapers are forbidden to criticize
the concept of the Islamic republic, or to promote ethnic
minority rights. Nevertheless, some independent publishers
out of favor with the Government continue to survive, and some
books and pamphlets critical of the Government are published
without reprisal. Foreign books, newspapers, and magazines
may be imported only after they have been censored.
All broadcasting facilities are government owned.
The severity of restrictions on academic freedom has been
relaxed somewhat in recent years. However, course content is
still monitored, and there is little genuine critical
discussion of issues. To achieve tenure, professors
reportedly must cooperate with government authorities over a
period of years. All textbooks proposed for use at the
universities are reviewed by government authorities to
determine their acceptability.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution permits unarmed assemblies and marches
"provided they do not violate the principles of Islam." The
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only ones permitted in practice are those sponsored by the
Government, such as Friday prayers and sermons and parades on
official occasions.
The Constitution allows the formation of political parties,
groups, and professional associations, as well as Islamic and
some minority religious associations, provided they do not
violate the principles of "freedom, sovereignty, [and]
national unity" or question Islam or the Islamic Republic. In
practice, most independent organizations have either been
banned, co-opted by the Government, or are moribund.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
In Iran religion is almost inseparable from government. The
President and many other top officials are mullahs (Islamic
clergymen) , as are the Speaker of the Parliament and nearly
half the deputies in Parliament.
Approximately 90 percent of Iranians are Shi ' a Muslims. Aside
from slightly over 1 percent who are non-Muslims (Baha'is,
Christians, Zoroastrians , and Jews), the rest are Sunni
Muslims. The Sunnis are mostly Kurds, Arabs, Turkomans,
Baluch, and other ethnic minorities whose political influence
is very limited. The Constitution declares that "the official
religion of Iran is Islam and the sect followed is Ja'fari
Shi "ism," but it also states that "other Islamic denominations
shall enjoy complete respect."
The small Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian (the pre-Islamic
religion of Iran) populations are concentrated mainly in urban
areas. Their religions are recognized by the Constitution,
and they elect representatives to seats reserved for them in
the Parliament. They are permitted to practice their
religions, to instruct their children, and — although with a
great deal of disruptive interference — to maintain schools.
The Government continues to discriminate against the Baha ' i
community, Iran's largest non-Muslim minority (300,000 to
350,000 members). The Special Representative stated in his
1989 Report that information he received indicated that
Baha'is are still being harassed for their faith. The Baha'i
religion, an offshoot of Islam, is considered a "misguided
sect" by the authorities and is not officially recognized.
Between 1979 and 1988 the Baha'is suffered severe persecution,
mainly government directed and aimed at the religious
leadership.
In 1983 the Prosecutor General issued an order that
effectively banned all Baha'i religious activity and provided
the legal foundation on which virtually all members of the
faith can be charged with crimes. Baha'i property was
confiscated, shrines demolished, businesses disbanded or
confiscated, and known Baha'is denied public sector employment
and social services. Baha'i marriages are still not
recognized. Baha'is are forbidden to participate in social
welfare organizations, their businesses are outlawed, and they
may not teach their faith. Baha'i national leaders dissolved
the community's organizations in obedience to the Prosecutor
General's edict, but they subsequently were arrested, and at
least some were executed. Many ordinary Baha'is were also
arrested on vague charges.
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In some important respects, the Government has ameliorated its
treatment of Baha'is. No Baha'is were reported to have been
arrested or executed in 1989; the number of Baha'is held in
prison fell to fewer than 15. A small number of Bahai's have
been issued visas to leave the country. Some Baha'i property
confiscated by the Government was returned, although the
amount represents a fraction of the total seized. Baha'i
children are now permitted to attend grade school and high
school (although Baha'is cannot attend college or be employed
on college faculties). Some Baha'is were allowed quietly to
reopen their businesses.
The Government has not officially abandoned its anti-Baha'i
policies; widespread discrimination against, and persecution
of, the community persists. The Government continues to
attack the Baha'i community as a front for political and
espionage activities, and prohibits the community from
electing leaders or conducting religious activities.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Iranians may travel to any part of Iran, although there have
been restrictions on travel to Kurdish areas at times of heavy
fighting. Persons may change their place of residence without
obtaining permission.
Travel outside Iran is considerably easier now than before
1983. Khomeini's decree of December 1982 established the
right to travel abroad; prior to that time passports and exit
visas had been difficult to obtain. In 1989, however, there
was evidence that airport departure procedures were again
tightened, and the exit tax was increased sharply.
Males of draft age are not issued exit visas except for
approved courses of study, and Iranians who are suspect
politically, such as some retired military officers and
high-level public officials under the former regime, are not
able to leave. Persons who have not repaid loans obtained
from development banks under the old government also are
denied exit visas. Reportedly some Iranians, particularly
those whose skills are in short supply and who were educated
at government expense, must post bonds to obtain exit visas.
Iranian Jews are permitted to obtain passports and to travel,
but they are normally denied the multiple-exit visas given to
most Iranians and must make a fresh application (with a fresh
fee) for each planned trip. Permission is not normally
granted for all members of a Jewish family to travel outside
Iran at the same time.
Iranians are generally able to return to Iran after long
periods abroad without reprisal. Since the cease-fire, the
Government has encouraged the many thousands of skilled
Iranians living abroad to return to help rebuild the country.
Of those who have gone back in recent years, a number have
been able to pursue, through the Iranian judicial system, the
return of their properties. However, many exiles complain
that formal legal guarantees of their safety have not yet been
provided, and as a result, many remain reluctant to return.
There are some categories of individuals who may be in danger
if they return to Iran. Some of those with close ties to the
former regime, draft evaders, and those who departed the
country illegally face possible arrest upon their return.
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Members or sympathizers with the People's Mojahedin
Organization of Iran, an opposition group, are subject to
imprisonment and torture or even execution should they return.
Nevertheless, immediate relatives of persons wanted by the
Government are often able to live in Iran, travel outside, and
return without undue difficulty.
Iranian passports have always been stamped "not valid for
emigration," but the Government does not make a clear
distinction between legal residence in another country and
emigration. According to the regulations, Iranians with a
legal residence outside Iran may be issued passports and
advance exit visas by the Iranian embassy, consulate, or
interests section in their country of residence. Iranians who
have acquired U.S. citizenship are considered Iranian (in
effect dual nationals) unless they have formally renounced
their Iranian citizenship in accordance with Iranian law.
Dual nationals have complained that the Iranian Interests
Section in Washington will neither give them visas in their
U.S. passports nor issue them Iranian passports and exit visas
on the grounds that their residence in the United States is
not legal because, according to Iranian law, they emigrated
illegally. Although such services may be denied, there are no
known instances of the denial of Iranian citizenship to
Iranians who left Iran, or to those who have remained there.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Iran is ruled by a group of religious leaders (mullahs) and
their lay associates who share a belief in the legitimacy of a
theocratic state based on Ayatollah Khomeini's interpretation
of Shi ' a Islam. Citizens are not free to question or to
change this form of government.
The revolutionary Government has held elections at fairly
regular intervals for president. Parliament deputies, members
of the Council of Experts (responsible for choosing Khomeini's
successor), and members of local government councils.
Presidential elections were held in July, and by-elections for
Parliament were contested in December. All elections have
been hard fought, generally with several candidates for every
position. Voting is by universal suffrage. All candidates
must be approved by the Council of Guardians, however, and
only those meeting the Council's vaguely described political
and religious criteria may run. In practice, only supporters
of the theocratic state are accepted.
Although the Ministry of Interior announced in December 1988
that political parties would be allowed to form, provided they
met the Government's religious and political criteria, only
one was licensed. After Khomeini's death, the movement toward
legalization of more political parties appeared to end.
The independence of the Parliament is established in the
Constitution and exists to a large degree in practice. While
Parliament deputies are typically allied with various powerful
political and religious officials, they may speak and vote
independently and may shift from one faction to another.
Vigorous parliamentary debates — normally covered extensively
in the press — cover a wide variety of issues. Harsh criticism
of government officials is often heard in these debates, and,
in some cases, laws proposed by the executive branch have been
voted down.
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The Constitution provides for a Council of Guardians composed
of 12 members: 6 clerics unilaterally appointed by the
Leader, and 6 lay members well grounded in Islamic law who are
nominated by the head of the Judicial Council, subject to the
Parliament's approval. The Council of Guardians must certify
all bills passed by the Parliament as being in accordance with
Islamic law and the Constitution. If bills fail to be
certified, they are sent back to the Parliament for revision.
They cannot become law until passed by the Parliament and
certified by the Council.
The Council has rejected various important bills and portions
of bills passed by the Parliament, including legislation on
land reform, foreign trade, private enterprise, the press
code, and reform of the civil code.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government has been uncooperative with foreign human
rights groups, whether government sponsored or independent,
regarding their activities as interference in the country's
internal affairs. Foreign diplomats stationed in Tehran who
attempt to develop information about human rights abuses face
strong interference from Iranian authorities. There are no
internal human rights groups.
In its 1989 Report, AI said that during 1988 it had repeatedly
asked the Government for information about charges against
persons sentenced to death or executed, and asked about trial
procedures followed in cases involving the death penalty. It
also called for an end to political executions, flogging and
amputations, the release of political prisoners, and
guarantees of fair trials within a reasonable time. AI also
asked the Government several times to allow a delegation to
visit Iran to discuss human rights concerns. AI said the
Government did not respond to any of these inquiries.
The Government has opposed efforts in the United Nations to
criticize its record on human rights. Nevertheless,
resolutions expressing the United Nations' concern about human
rights abuses in Iran have passed annually in the General
Assembly and in meetings of the U.N. Human Rights Commission
(UNHRC) . In referring to the finding of his 1988 Report, the
U.N. Special Representative stated in his 1989 interim Report
that he maintains his conviction that acts are being committed
in Iran that are incompatible with international human rights
instruments that are binding on the Iranian Government.
Since 1984 the Government has refused to allow a UNHRC Special
Representative to enter Iran to prepare his reports and has
not commented on human rights violations submitted for its
consideration. However, in November Iran's Permanent
Representative to the U.N. presented a letter to the Special
Representative inviting him to visit Iran to prepare a report
on the human rights situation there. The report is scheduled
to be presented to the 46th session of the UNHRC in February.
However, the modalities of the visit have yet to be worked out.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Women, always the object of discriminatory practices in Iran's
conservative society, have faced even more discrimination
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since the revolution. Witnesses who presented testimony to
the U.N. Special Representative reported the torture and
execution of women detainees, some of whom were raped before
execution. Ultraconservative dress, entirely hiding the hair
and all of the body except the face and hands, is a
requirement for all women, regardless of their religion,
national origin, or citizenship. In the past, women have been
harassed, detained, or physically attacked if they appeared in
public in clothing which official or self-appointed guardians
of public morality deemed insufficiently modest. However, as
noted in Section l.f., women in 1989 reportedly enjoyed
somewhat greater freedom in dress and appearance although
proponents of orthodoxy remained strong.
The Family Protection Act, passed under the Shah, was revoked
by the Islamic Government and replaced by a civil code
reflecting Islamic law. A bill passed in mid-1983 did give
women the right to divorce their husbands, and regulations
announced in 1984 substantially broadened to 12 the number of
grounds for which a woman may seek divorce. A husband may
obtain a divorce without having to state a reason or go to
court. The new marriage regulations provide for improved
financial settlements for wives whose husbands divorce them.
Although violence against women is known to occur in Iran,
little is known about its extent. Abuse within the family is
considered a private matter in this conservative society and
is seldom discussed publicly. There are no official
statistics on the subject.
The Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Baha ' i minorities
suffer varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination
in a number of areas, particularly with respect to employment,
education, and public accommodations. Muslims who have
converted to Christianity are similarly discriminated
against. For example, one requirement of university admission
is passing a test on Islamic theology, which has the effect of
excluding most religious minorities from higher education.
Applicants for public sector employment are similarly screened
for adherence to standards of Islamic orthodoxy, with much the
same effect. There have also been reports that religious
minorities have suffered discrimination in the legal system,
such as receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits,
and of suffering heavier punishments than those imposed on
Muslims. Although Sunnis have encountered religious
discrimination on the local level, the Government has made
efforts to reduce Shi ' a-Sunni antagonism.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
There are no real labor unions. A national organization known
as the "Labor House," founded in 1982 as the labor branch of
the now defunct Islamic Republican Party, is the only
authorized national labor organization. It works closely with
the Islamic societies and "Islamic labor councils" set up in
most Iranian factories. Labor House is headed by Hossein
Kamali, the Minister of Labor; as such, it is largely a
conduit of government influence, not a trade union founded by
workers to represent their interests.
The officially sanctioned Islamic labor councils also are
instruments of government control and not bodies created and
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controlled by workers to advance their own interests, although
they have frequently been able to block layoffs or the firing
of workers.
There is also a system of "guild unions," which operates on a
regional basis. These guild unions issue vocational licenses,
fund financial cooperatives to assist members, and help
workers to find jobs. The guild unions operate with the
cooperation of the Government.
No information is available on the right of workers in Iran to
strike. No strikes are known to have taken place in 1989.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
In practice, the right of workers to organize independently
and bargain collectively is extremely limited.
It is not known whether labor legislation and practice in the
export processing zones differ in any significant respect from
the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of
Experts (COE) , said in its 1989 report that it looked forward
to learning of the repeal of Section 273 of the Penal Code.
In its previous comments, the COE had stated that this
provision, which compelled able-bodied citizens to engage in
gainful occupation, was incompatible with the ILO Convention
on Forced Labor and should be amended. The Government
indicated that the Penal Code, which would abolish this
section, has been adopted by the Council of Ministers and
presented to the Parliament for final approval.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Iranian labor law, which exempts agriculture, domestic
service, family businesses, and, to some extent, other small
businesses, forbids employment of minors under 12 years and
places special restrictions on the employment of minors under
18. In addition, women and minors may not be used for hard
labor or, in general, for night work. The extent to which
these regulations are enforced is not known.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The labor law establishes a 6-day workweek of 48 hours maximum
(except for overtime at premium rates), with 1 day of rest
(normally Friday) per week as well as at least 12 days per
year of leave with pay and a number of paid public holidays.
There are also legal provisions with respect to minimum wages
and health and safety in workplaces. Further information on
these laws is not available.
Given the large segments of the economy exempted from the
labor law, the State's still unresolved administrative
disorganization resulting from the revolution, the effects of
the war with Iraq, and the general lack of effective labor
unions, it is unclear to what extent the provisions of Iran's
labor law affect most of the labor force.
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IRAQ
Iraq is in effect a one-party state governed by the Arab
Ba'ath Socialist Party (ABSP) through a Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC) which has both executive and legislative
authority under the provisional Constitution of 1968. Saddam
Hussein holds decisive power as President of the Republic,
Chairman of the RCC, and Secretary-General of the Regional
Command of the ABSP. Two other small parties are essentially
support groups for the Government. In 1989 the Government
announced its intention to adopt a multiparty system enshrined
in a new constitution. Elections for the National Assembly —
which has few powers — were held April 1. A draft constitution
which would reportedly allow a multiparty system was completed
in 1989 and is expected to be put to a referendum in early
1990. It remains to be seen, however, whether this will
dilute the monopoly of power held by Saddam Hussein and the
ABSP. Iraq's population comprises many disparate groups, most
notably Shi 'a and Sunni Muslim Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans, and
various Christian sects, predominantly Assyrians and Chaldeans.
Iraq's military is large and well trained, and parts of it,
notably the Fursan, or Kurdish tribal levies, have
responsibility for security within the Kurdish autonomous
region. The National Police is responsible for civil order.
The Government exerts a high degree of control over the
economy, dominated by the petroleum sector, and owns all major
industries. The Government has been carrying out a program of
divestiture and privatization in agriculture, tourism,
services, and light industry, and is trying to attract
investor capital and expertise in the operation of the
economy. However, close government regulation of economic
activity is expected to continue.
Iraq's human rights record remained abysmal in 1989.
Effective opposition to government policy is stifled; the
intelligence services engage in extensive surveillance and
utilize extralegal means, including torture and summary
execution, to deal with antiregime activity. The civil rights
of Iraqi citizens continue to be sharply limited, and Iraqis
do not have the right to change their government. The
freedoms of speech and press and of assembly and association
are virtually nonexistent. Other important human rights
problems include continuing disappearances and arbitrary
detentions, lack of fair trial, widespread interference with
privacy, excessive use of force against Kurdish civilians, and
an almost total lack of worker rights. In addition to the
repressive domestic controls that predate the war with Iran,
tight wartime controls, including travel restrictions, remain
in effect despite the August 1988 cease-fire with Iran.
An armed Kurdish insurgency continued in 1989, but at a
reduced level. Although there were no allegations that the
Government used chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians in
1989, as it did in 1988, in its efforts to crush the
rebellion, it continued to violate the human rights of
elements of the Kurdish population. The Government announced
in June that in its campaign to suppress the rebellion it has
pursued a program since 1987 of establishing a depopulated
security zone along the full length of Iraq's borders with
Iran and Turkey. Under this program, the Government has
destroyed villages within a 30-kilometer-wide zone and
relocated approximately 500,000 Kurdish and Assyrian
inhabitants into more easily controlled and protected towns.
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cities, and newly constructed settlements in traditional
Kurdish areas.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
For years execution has been an established Iraqi method for
dealing with perceived political and military opponents of the
government, including, but not limited to, members of the
outlawed Da'wa organization (an Iran-supported fundamentalist
Shi'a Muslim group that has engaged in acts of international
terrorism). In some cases, a family only learns that one of
its members has been executed when the security services
return the body and require the family to pay a fine.
Amnesty International (AI), in its presentation before the
U.N. Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities in August, stated that it had
received allegations that some 80 army deserters were executed
in December 1988 and charged that the Government executed 11
of its Kurdish opponents in March and April 1989.
In its February report, "Iraq: Children: Innocent Victims of
Political Repression," AI stated that it receives allegations
of hundreds of executions in Iraq each year. AI cited the
case of 29 Kurdish children and youths allegedly executed in
January 1987. In addition, AI , in its 1989 Report covering
1988, cited allegations that hundreds of civilians, including
women and children, were executed at Tanjaro Military
Garrison, Sulaimaniya province. Independent information to
confirm the allegations cited in AI reports is not available.
b. Disappearance
In the February report, AI asserted that thousands of people
arrested over the years by Iraqi security or intelligence
forces reportedly have "disappeared" while in detention, with
many feared executed. In its August presentation to the U.N.
Subcommission, AI reported the disappearance in mid-April of
Mulla Muhammad Dalgayi, described as the imam of Qal'at Diza,
who was among delegates from Kurdistan who reportedly met with
government officials to appeal against forced settlement of
the Kurds at Qal'at Diza. He was reportedly arrested in
Baghdad and has since disappeared. An Assyrian organization
based in the United States charged in March that the
whereabouts of 33 Assyrians, who took advantage of the amnesty
issued by the Government and returned to Iraq from Iran and
Turkey, were unknown.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture and prescribes stiff
punishment for it, but it is clear that both physical and
psychological torture are used by the authorities, especially
the security police. Given the rigid chain of command within
the Government and the security services, torture could not be
practiced without the knowledge or authorization of senior
officials.
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Emigre groups and former prisoners assert that persons
detained by the security police for political or
security-related matters are frequently tortured and
mistreated. Treatment is reported to be worst immediately
following arrest and during the period of interrogation and
investigation, which can last for months. Torture and brutal
treatment are not limited to political cases.
Security-related offenses are broadly defined and include such
routine criminal matters as currency violations.
In its 1989 Report, AI stated that the routine torture and
ill-treatment of prisoners continued to be widely reported.
It said the victims included detainees below the age of 18 who
were reportedly beaten, whipped, given electric shocks, and
deprived of food. The Government categorically denied any use
of torturs against children as an official policy or as a
practice, and stated its readiness to consider fully any
individual allegation with a view to bringing perpetrators to
justice. Impartial observers have so far been unable to look
into these allegations.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
While the Constitution and legal code provide for the rights
of citizens and place checks on police powers in such areas as
arrest, detention, imprisonment, and search, these provisions
have virtually no weight in political or national security
cases, although they are generally respected in ordinary
criminal cases. Security police not only make arbitrary
arrests but also secretly detain suspects, whose fate
sometimes becomes known only after they have been executed.
Security charges have included espionage, treason, and
conspiracy against Iraq, often in collaboration with unnamed
foreign enemies.
The relocation of 500,000 Kurdish villagers to other areas of
Kurdistan since 1987 may be considered a form of internal
exile. The Government declared in June 1989 that it was
creating an uninhabited security zone to ensure the safety and
security of citizens in the border regions (who were subjected
to shelling and military operations during the vjar with Iran)
and to provide better services to the villagers.
Although the Government has ceased expelling Iraqis of
supposed Iranian descent, most of the few remaining Iranians
have been imprisoned or live under the fear of deportation or
incarceration. Spouses of Iraqis of Iranian origin are
required to obtain a divorce or suffer the same consequences.
Moreover, other Iraqis, whose grandparents are shown not to be
of Iraqi origin, are subject to arbitrary detention and
deportation.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Iraq's legal system provides for investigation by police and
then by an inquiry judge who may refer a case to the courts or
dismiss it. Judges try criminal cases; there are no juries.
Convictions may be appealed to the Court of Appeal and then to
the Court of Cassation, the supreme court. There are no
Shari'a courts per se in Iraq; however, family courts
administer Shari'a law modified by Iraqi custom.
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Trials of ordinary cases are held in civil, criminal, and
religious courts and are open. Defendants are entitled to
counsel--at government expense if the defendant is indigent.
Charges and evidence are available for review by the lawyer.
Appellate courts hear cases not under the jurisdiction of the
Revolutionary Courts.
In contrast to ordinary cases, security cases are handled by
the Revolutionary Courts, which usually hold closed trials.
Security cases include espionage, treason, smuggling, currency
exchange violations and drug trafficking. The right of
defense in such courts is said to be severely restricted. The
"special courts" constituted by the RCC for specific
incidents, such as the reported conspiracy against the regime
in 1979, are also closed. These special tribunals are
apparently exempt from constitutional safeguards of
defendants' rights; defendants are held incommunicado, and
confessions extracted by torture are admissible. Appeals can
be taken only to the chairman of the RCC. However, the
utility of this appeal is questionable, since there are
reports that executions take place shortly after trial.
Political dissent in Iraq is taken by the authorities to
encompass a wide range of activities and, in an environment
where public acknowledgement of arrest or imprisonment is
rare, it is extremely difficult to estimate the number of
political prisoners. In its 1989 Report, AI stated that
"thousands" of political prisoners continued to be arbitrarily
arrested and detained, especially members of prohibited
political parties. Army deserters, and draft resisters.
Relatives, iiicluding children of suspects, are said to be held
as hostages to compel confessions.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution provides protections for the inviolability of
the home, and strong cultural values reinforce these
protections. Police must obtain a search warrant before
entering the home of a criminal suspect. However, warrants
are not required for the arrest of security suspects.
Although most arrests occur outside the home, there have been
reports of forced entry and arrest by the security police,
particularly of suspected members of the outlawed Da'wa
organization.
Although the Constitution provides for the confidentiality of
mail and telegraphic and telephone correspondence, many Iraqis
believe that the monitoring of telephones is a common practice
and that all mail is subject to review by censors. The
security services and Ba'ath Party maintain pervasive networks
of informers. The Government maintains a close watch against
Iranian attempts to exploit dissatisfaction among Iraqi Shi'a,
who adhere to the branch of Islam prevalent in Iran.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
Elements of Iraq's Kurdish population have engaged in armed
struggle with all governments of Iraq periodically since the
1920's. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 sparked a
new antigovernment insurgency by Kurdish elements, many of
whom fought with or aided Iran during the war. From 1981 to
1989, the Government's efforts to crush the rebellion
militarily resulted in approximately 8,000 deaths, many of
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them civilians killed indiscriminately by chemical weapons in
1988.
Although the fighting was at a reduced level in 1989, Kurdish
military operations continued, as did government measures to
contain them. Kurdish rebels continued to announce their
hostility towards the central Government. On August 29, 1989,
the leader of one group of insurgents stated to the press in
Geneva that his group would target foreign interests in Iraq
supporting the Iraqi regime. At year's end, the cycle of
Kurdish rebellion and government repression remained
unresolved.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The freedoms of speech and press are not respected. The
Constitution prohibits "any act aimed at undermining the
national unity of the people, provoking racial, sectarian, and
regional bigotry, or violating gains and achievements of the
country." The Government views political dissent as a threat
to its security and strictly controls speech and all
information media. All publications are subject to
censorship. The Government and the Ba'ath Party own and
operate the press, radij, and television. The media do not
criticize the Government, and news reporting is strongly
biased. There is no presentation of opposition viewpoints.
Few foreign periodicals reach Iraq and those that do may be
censored. Western newspapers are not sold. Foreign visitors'
magazines, newspapers, cassettes, cameras, and video cassettes
may be confiscated at the airport. To control the
dissemination of political leaflets, word processors and
computers must be registered. Failure to register is a
criminal offense. Iraqis no longer need to register their
typewriters or photocopiers, but foreigners in Iraq must do
so. Taking photographs of military installations, government
buildings, or areas near sensitive locations is forbidden and
punishable by imprisonment. Journalists and photographers
visiting Iraq at the invitation of the Government are required
to present film taken in Iraq for inspection by the
authorities .
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are severely limited. Public meetings may only
be organized under the auspices of the Government or the
Ba'ath Party. Association for nonreligious purposes and
demonstrations without government approval have met with
severe repression. Professional organizations are subject to
control by the Ba'ath Party Central Vocational Bureau.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Iraq is an ethnically and religiously diverse society. Since
its rise to power in 1968, the Ba'ath Government, while
carefully controlling religious groups, has enforced tolerance
of religious diversity, seeking to submerge religious
differences in the promotion of secular nationalism. A 1981
law gave the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs the
authority to promulgate laws and regulations governing places
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of worship, appointment of clergy, publication of religious
literature, and participation in religious councils and
meetings. Muslim religious leaders operate under close
government supervision, are considered government employees,
and receive their salaries through the Government. The
Government administers the principal Muslim shrines and
mosques and has provided allotments to them and to churches
for maintenance and refurbishing. There are no penalties
under Iraqi law for changing one's religion, although there is
a social stigma for Muslims who convert to another faith.
While the Government has assumed much greater authority in
Islamic religious affairs since 1981, it has been less
intrusive into the religious affairs of Iraq's Christians, who
number more than 500,000 and constitute nearly 4 percent of
the population. Their freedom of worship in churches of
established denominations is legally protected, but they are
not permitted to proselytize or to hold meetings outside
church premises. Convents and monasteries exist, and some new
churches have been constructed, in some cases with government
financial support. The Jewish community has decreased from
150,000 following World War II to under 400. There is no
evidence of recent persecution. One synagogue in Baghdad
still functions.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Iraqis are generally free to travel within the country and to
change their residences or workplaces. However, they are
likely to be constrained by social, cultural, and religious
traditions which define the areas occupied by the various
ethnic and religious groups. Sensitive border and other
security areas are off limits. There are police checkpoints
on highways and outside major towns, but Iraqis and
nondiplomatic foreigners travel freely in nonrestricted areas.
The Government's harsh campaign to suppress Kurdish rebels,
involving mass relocations of Kurdish villagers, has nullified
the right of hundreds of thousands of Kurds to choose their
place of residence. Since the Government began its program of
forced relocation in 1987, an estimated 500,000 people have
been uprooted. Since traditional Kurdish culture has been
deeply embedded in the rural village, the forced removals and
razing of villages has had a destructive impact on the lives
of some half a million Kurds.
Most foreigners who remain in the country for more than 30
days and all Iraqis must obtain exit permission. Travel has
been severely limited since September 1986, when the
Government imposed tight restrictions on currency exchange.
These restrictions were eased somewhat in 1989, but the most
an Iraqi may exchange is 1,000 dinars ($3,220). Because of
the drain on the economy caused by the war and reconstruction,
permission to travel abroad is restricted to a few categories
of Iraqis, including officials, businessmen, government-
approved students, and persons needing medical treatment. In
1989 the Government eased restrictions to permit one parent to
visit his or her offspring who is studying or working abroad.
While permission for medical treatment abroad may be granted,
permission to transfer hard currency abroad to pay for it may
not be. In cases of those desiring medical treatment in the
United States, the Government now requires a bond to be posted
by an American friend or relative with the Iraqi embassy in
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Washington before exit permission is granted. The minimum
amount of this bond is $10,000. The Government sometimes
limits the countries an Iraqi traveler may visit and, should
the traveler visit a nonauthorized country, a small fine may
be levied upon his return. Iraqis who have residences abroad
may depart the country, provided they originally left before
the war began. A married woman must have the permission of
her husband to travel abroad.
The Government can require a prospective traveler to post a
substantial bond to assure his return. The RCC decreed in
1987 that Iraqi students abroad who refuse to return to Iraq
must reimburse the Government for all education received in
Iraq or abroad at government expense. The decree is
applicable retroactively to students who have refused to
return since May 16, 1983, the date the Government began
requiring employees leaving government jobs before 20 years of
service to reimburse the State for the cost of their
education. Amounts due can be recovered by confiscation;
nonpayment may result in imprisonment. Each student must
provide a guarantor before traveling abroad. This guarantor
and the student's parents may be held liable if the student
fails to return.
There is no specific ban on emigration or special restrictions
for members of minority groups; however, emigration is
discouraged. For the past several years, almost all of those
given permission to emigrate have been Christian Iraqi wives
of former Iraqi citizens now living abroad as citizens of
another country. Prospective emigrants have had travel
permission delayed and have been harassed. Many emigrants
leave behind substantial property because of the difficulty of
exporting assets. Currency exchange violations are considered
national security offenses, and penalties can be severe.
Non-Iraqi spouses of Iraqi citizens who have resided in Iraq
for 5 years are required to take Iraqi nationality or leave
Iraq. Many people, including several Americans, have thus
been obliged to accept Iraqi citizenship and are therefore
subject to the present travel restrictions. In March 1984, an
order by the RCC reduced the residency period before
naturalization to 1 year for the spouses of Iraqi citizens
employed in government offices. The Iraqi spouse faces
penalties for noncompliance, including loss of job, a fine of
approximately $10,000, and repayment of the costs of
education. Iraq does not recognize the concept of dual
nationality, and many Iraqi "dual nationals," especially the
children of an Iraqi father and a mother of non-Iraqi birth,
have been denied permission to leave Iraq to visit the country
of their other nationality.
In recent years, the Government has instituted special
programs to encourage repatriation of qualified
professionals. Aliens of Iraqi origin can apply for a
document permitting them to enter and exit from Iraq without a
visa .
Other persons of Iraqi origin are permitted to return,
including many persons who were admitted to other countries as
refugees. A number of such people, especially Assyrian
Christians, have returned on temporary visits. They are free
to come and go, within the limits of the present travel
restrictions, since they are not considered to have violated
Iraqi laws. However, those who emigrated only after the
beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, including several U.S.
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permanent resident aliens, have been unable to depart from
Iraq after returning. In September and November 1988 and in
February and March 1989, the Government announced amnesties
for Kurds who fled the country for any reason. Approximately
2,000 have voluntarily returned from refugee camps in Turkey.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Iraqi citizens do not have the ability peacefully to change
their government. President Saddam Hussein and the RCC rule
Iraq through the Ba'ath Party. It reportedly has some 1.5
million adherents, representing about 9 percent of the
population.
There are two other small legal political parties, both
Kurdish. They and the Ba'ath Party constitute the Patriotic
and Progressive National Front, essentially a vehicle of
support for the Government. Members of the military or
security services may engage in political activities only
within the Ba'ath Party. Association with the party is not
required for appointment to senior government positions or
military ranks or election to the National Assembly, but is
normally necessary to attain political influence. Opposition
groups, including various Kurdish groups and splinter parties,
are severely repressed. The Communist Party was removed from
the National Front and declared illegal in 1979. The Da'wa
organization, a violent Shi'ite group, is still proscribed,
and its members are subject to incarceration and execution, as
are members of other parties believed to be cooperating with
Iran. Plans the Government announced in 1988 to permit legal
formation of opposition parties were not implemented in 1989.
General elections were held for the 25Q-seat National Assembly
in April. Though in theory possessing a wide range of
official duties, the Assembly exercises little real
authority. The majority of the more than 900 candidates were
independents, although all supported current government
policies. The elections by secret ballot were more open than
in the past, and some high-ranking Baath party officials were
defeated.
The biennial elections for the Legislative Assembly of the
Kurdish Autonomous Region were held in September 1989. All
174 candidates, from the three legal parties and independents,
had to satisfy the same requirements as National Assembly
candidates. The Legislative Assembly does not exercise
meaningful authority.
In October 1989, an Experts Commission finished drafting a new
Constitution to replace the Provisional Constitution of 1970.
Iraqi officials assert that the new Constitution will provide
more guarantees of human rights. However, the new
Constitution has not yet been made public pending approval by
President Saddam Hussein and the RCC.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government allows one human rights group to operate inside
Iraq, but this is largely under government control. The
Government has rarely cooperated with private foreign groups
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or international organizations in investigating events or
practices in Iraq.
The Government denies charges that it violates human rights,
and claims that the information on which AI and other human
rights groups base their charges comes from pro-Iranian and
Kurdish Iraqi exile groups in London and Paris. In its 1989
report on children in Iraq, AI cited several instances in
which Iraqi authorities had commented on AI reports or
responded to AI inquiries, but in each case these authorities
had defended the Government's actions as justifiable or denied
the accuracy of AI ' s information. A resolution before the
U.N. Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities in August 1989, recommending that the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights study the human rights
situation in Iraq, was narrowly defeated.
Iraq does cooperate with the International Committee of the
Red Cross in efforts to resettle Iranian civilian refugees in
third countries, and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
has had a permanent representative in Iraq since April 1988
who registers Iranian refugees and works for their
resettlement .
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
The Ba'ath Party is committed to the equality of the sexes,
and a series of laws since it came to power in 1968 has
steadily improved the status of women. There have been laws
to protect women from exploitation in the workplace; grant
subsidized maternity leave; permit women to join the regular
army, popular army, and police forces; and equalize women's
rights in divorce, land ownership, taxation, suffrage, and
election to the National Assembly. In the 1970's, the
Government imposed legal penalties on families that opposed
sending their women to literacy schools, and on men who were
seen harassing women. While the application of these laws has
resulted in significant tangible improvements for women, a
number of problems remain. Married women may still travel
abroad only with the permission of their husbands. School
enrollment of females has been increasing in recent years,
reaching 45 percent in elementary schools and 36 percent in
secondary schools in 1985-86.
Women represent about 47 percent of agricultural workers and
about 25 percent of the total work force. The war accelerated
the Government's drive to elevate the status of women, and it
appears to have significantly reduced, if not removed,
barriers to the acceptance of women in traditional male
roles. Women are increasingly employed as architects,
construction engineers, oil engineers, air traffic
controllers, and factory and farm managers. Their role in the
armed forces is limited to the medical field.
Violence against women, such as wife beating and rape, is
known to occur but little is known about its extent. Such
abuse is customarily dealt with within the tightly knit Iraqi
family structure because of the value attached to personal
privacy in this conservative society. Consequently, there is
no public discussion of the subject, and there are no official
statistics. Excessive violence against women would be grounds
for divorce and criminal charges, but suits brought on these
charges in Iraq are believed to be rare.
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The use of minority languages is unrestricted. Kurdish is an
official language used in schools and media in Kurdish areas.
Turcomans publish in their dialect of Turkish, and Christians
often use Aramaic as well as Arabic.
The Shi "a, who make up roughly 55 percent of the population,
have historically been economically, politically, and socially
disadvantaged throughout much of the Middle East. The
Government has a declared policy to raise their living
standards and equalize opportunities for their economic and
professional advancement. For four centuries, political power
in Iraq has been concentrated in the hands of the Sunni
minority. Sunni Arabs, who comprise 20 to 25 percent of
Iraq's population, dominate the RCC, the Regional Command of
the Ba'ath Party, and the Cabinet. However, increasing
numbers of Shi'as hold prominent positions, and the economic
status of the Shi 'a has improved through intensive government
investment in the economic and educational infrastructure of
southern Iraq.
Although Christians sometimes allege discrimination in
education and jobs, adherence to their religion has not
prevented many from obtaining wealth and professional
advancement. The Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,
a Chaldean Christian, has represented Iraq at meetings of the
foreign ministers of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference. Other Christians hold important official and
private positions.
Citizens considered to be of Iranian origin carry special
identification. They are often precluded from desirable
employment and their advancement may be impeded. Many
"Iranian" families have been in Iraq for generations. The two
holiest shrines of Shi ' a Islam, the prevalent sect in Iran,
are located in Iraq. For generations Iranians have come to
Najaf and Karbala on pilgrimage or to study in the seminaries,
and many settled there. Some "Iranians" say their forebears
were not from Iran but claimed Iranian nationality to evade
Ottoman military conscription.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Trade unions independent of government control do not exist in
Iraq. Under the trade union organization law of June 2, 1987,
a new single trade union structure was prescribed for
organized labor. Workers in private and mixed enterprises and
in cooperatives--but not public employees or workers in state
enterprises--have the right to join a local union committee.
The committees form trade unions which in turn are part of
provincial trade union federations. At the top is an umbrella
organization, the Iraqi General Federation of Trade Unions,
which is organically linked to the Ba'ath Party and required
to promote party principles and policies among union members.
The General Federation is affiliated with the International
Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the Communist-controlled
World Federation of Trade Unions. It is also active in the
tripartite Arab Labor Organization, headquartered in Baghdad.
Although workers legally have the right to strike, after
providing notice to the Labor Ministry, no such strikes were
reported in 1989. There was a 1-day wildcat walkout by
Egyptian workers protesting excessive work hours.
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b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to bargain collectively is not recognized. Salaries
for public sector workers (i.e. the bulk of the employed) are
set by the Government. Wages in the private sector are set by
the employers or negotiated individually with workers.
Iraq, which has ratified International Labor Organization
(ILO) Convention 98 on the Right to Organize and Bargain
Collectively, was criticized by the ILO's Committee of Experts
(COE) in 1989 for the fact that its new labor code of 1987
fails to provide workers with protection against antiunion
discrimination. The COE also expressed regret that the 1987
Act on trade union organizations did not provide for
collective bargaining.
There are no export processing zones in Iraq.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Although compulsory labor is prohibited by law, during and
shortly after the war with Iran the Popular Army, the militia
of the Ba'ath Party, employed press-gang methods to draft
recruits. However, these activities ceased in November 1988,
and the Popular Army was for the most part demobilized in 1989.
ILO supervisory bodies again in 1989 expressed concern that
the Penal Code permits the punishment of civil servants with
imprisonment, including compulsory prison labor, for breaches
of labor discipline, which include resigning from one's job.
A November cabinet meeting, reported in the government-directed
press, quoted the remark of a minister that resignation from
government jobs should be free, confirming that heretofore
civil servants have had to buy their way out of government
service.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children are frequently encouraged to work as necessary to
support the family, but the employment of children under age
14 is forbidden in all enterprises other than small-scale
family enterprises. Children between the ages of 14 and 18
who are employed are protected by law: they work fewer hours
and have more privileges than adult workers.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The workweek in urban areas is 6 days, 7 to 8 hours a day, for
workers in the private and mixed sectors. These provisions do
not apply to agricultural workers whose workweek and hours of
work per day can vary according to individual employer-employee
agreements. Hours for government employees are set by the
head of the ministry for which the employee works. Many
government employees routinely work longer than 8 hours a day,
some of them as much as 12 hours per day.
Occupational safety programs are in effect in state-run
enterprises, and inspectors make visits irregularly to private
establishments. Enforcement varies widely. A government
decree to extend occupational safety and health protection was
issued and subsequently withdrawn in December 1988, reportedly
resulting in the dismissal of the Labor Minister.
A special problem arose after the Government decided in June
to reduce drastically the amount of hard currency foreign
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workers could remit. It is widely believed that the
Government took this measure to "encourage" foreign workers to
leave the country, thus freeing jobs for demobilized Iraqi
soldiers. Workers not on contract were particularly hard
hit. Most of the over 2 million Egyptian workers in Iraq were
manual laborers. When they learned they would be able to
transfer only $32 per month, they began to leave Iraq in
droves, an estimated 2,000 per day by air alone. Egyptian and
other foreign workers in Iraq have claimed that some Iraqi
employers forced them to work 12 to 15 hours a day for 8
hours' pay or refused to pay wages. The Government has
admitted that Iraqi banks have been slow to pay remittances.
Egyptian workers are in fact receiving their savings a year
after leaving Iraq.
1423
TSRAF.L AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES*
Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a multiparty
political system and free elections. There is no
constitution, but a series of basic laws defines the
responsibilities of government institutions. The legislature
(the Knesset) can limit the government and force its
dissolution, Israel has an independent judiciary. Public
debate on issues of concern to Israelis is open and lively. A
vigorous free press scrutinizes all aspects of Israeli life
and politics.
Since Israel's founding in 1948, it has been in a formal state
of war with most of its Arab neighbors, except Egypt, with
which it concluded a peace treaty in 1979. As a result of the
1967 war, Israel has occupied the territories of the West
Bank, the Gaza Strip, the eastern sector of Jerusalem, and the
Golan Heights.
Since its founding, Israel has experienced numerous terrorist
incidents, within and outside its borders. In this atmosphere
of hostility and threat, Israel has relied heavily on its
military and related services for security and has retained
many of the security-related emergency regulations from the
preindependence British mandate period.
^ '^
Internal security is the responsibility of the general
security service (Shin Bet), which is under the authority of
the Prime Minister's office. The police are under the
authority of a separate minister. The Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF) — which include a significant portion of the Israeli
adult population in either active duty or reserve status
— also plays a role in maintaining internal security. The IDF
is under the authority of a civilian Minister of Defense. The
Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee reviews the
activities of the IDF and the Shin Bet.
Israel enjoys a relatively high standard of living. It has a
predominantly market economy with substantial government
regulation and subsidies for basic commodities. Economic
policy has a strong social welfare orientation.
Israeli citizens have a range of civil and other rights
generally comparable to those in advanced Western
democracies. Israel's Arab citizens have nonetheless not
shared fully in the rights granted to, and the duties levied
on, Jewish citizens.
In 1989, as in 1988, Israel's most significant human rights
problem has been its practices in confronting the Palestinian
uprising in the occupied territories. (For detailed
discussion, see the separate report on the occupied
territories . )
•Because the legal status of the West Bank, Gaza, and East
Jerusalem and the political and human rights conditions differ
sharply from those in Israel, the situation there is dealt
with in a separate report following the report for Israel.
1424
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Political killings in Israel are neither practiced nor
sanctioned by Israeli authorities. In 1989 nearly 20 Israeli
civilians were killed within pre-1967 Israel by Palestinians
in circumstances that appeared to be related to the ongoing
political conflict in the occupied territories. Approximately
five Palestinians from the territories were killed within
Israel by Israeli private citizens in what may have been
indirect retaliation for these incidents. Palestinians and
Israelis apprehended for these acts were dealt with through
the normal process of Israeli law.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of government-condoned disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Israeli laws and administrative regulations prohibit, and
provide specific penalties for, such activities. However,
where security concerns predominate, these strictures have
been violated. (See the occupied territories report for a
discussion of allegations of mistreatment of prisoners.)
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Israeli law and practice guarantee against arbitrary arrest or
imprisonment. Writs of habeas corpus and other procedural and
substantive safeguards are available. Defendants are
considered innocent until proven guilty.
Administrative detention, with no formal charge or trial, has
in the past been imposed on Israeli citizens for security
reasons under emergency regulations. Two Israeli Arabs were
adminstratively detained in 1989. The Minister of Defense may
issue a detention order for a maximum of 6 months. Within 48
hours of issuance of such an order, a district judge must
review the case and may confirm, shorten, or overturn the
detention order. Failing review within the designated time
period, the detainee must be released. The detainee may be
represented by counsel and may appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Government may withhold evidence from the detainee and
counsel on security grounds.
In 1989 Israel continued to hold most administrative detainees
from the occupied territories in detention centers inside
Israel. (For a full discussion of administrative detention of
Palestinians, see the separate report on the occupied
territories . )
Israel does not exile its citizens.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The right to a hearing by an impartial tribunal with
representation by counsel is guaranteed by law. The judiciary
is independent and effectively insulated from political
interference. All nonsecurity trials are open. According to
1425
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
the Ministry of Justice, security cases may be tried before a
military court or a civil court and may be partly or wholly
closed to the public. The burden of justifying nonpublic
proceedings falls to the prosecution. Defense counsel is
present, even during closed proceedings, but may be denied
access to some evidence on security grounds. According to the
Ministry of Justice, in security cases in which access to some
evidence is denied, that evidence is not presented to the
court .
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Privacy of the individual and the home are protected by law
within Israel. Emergency regulations permit mail to be
stopped, opened, and even destroyed on security grounds. A
1979 law allows tapping of telephones for security reasons,
with confirmation by the Prime Minister or Defense Minister.
Interference with mail and the tapping of telephones are
practiced infrequently.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
(See the separate report on the occupied territories.)
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Individuals, organizations, the press, and the electronic
media freely debate a wide range of public issues and
criticize government officials and policies, except where
sensitive security-based considerations or other censorship
provisions apply. Press articles dealing with
security-related matters must be submitted to the military
censor. Israel's Arabic-language press is censored more
strictly than the Hebrew-language press. In 1989 a High Court
of Justice ruling narrowed the range of material that could be
censored on security grounds. Movies are occasionally
censored if deemed pornographic, offensive to religion or
social mores, or likely to disturb public order. Theater
censorship was ended in 1989 for a 2-year test period. All
newspapers are privately owned and managed. Most of the
electronic media are run by the independent Israel Broadcast
Authority, whose chief is appointed by the Government.
Security regulations make it illegal to possess or distribute
literature of an outlawed organization for purposes of
encouraging support for that organization or its cause or
publicly to express support for such an organization. There
was no indication that anyone was prosecuted under this law in
1989. Provisions against maintaining contact with, or
accepting support from, an outlawed organization apply to the
media as well as individuals. In 1989 the license of an
Arabic-language newspaper was revoked on the grounds of links
to an outlawed organization.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Israelis representing almost any point of view are free to
assemble and associate. The law and court rulings protect
these rights. However, security regulations prohibit
membership in, or contact with, outlawed organizations, their
subdivisions, or their individual members. In 1989 an Israeli
1426
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIFn TERRITORIES
peace activist was jailed for meeting with Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat, eight
Israelis were charged with meeting PLO members, and the 1988
convictions of four others for a similar offense were under
appeal. A Knesset member met publicly with Yasser Arafat, but
his Knesset immunity protected him from prosecution.
c. Freedom of Religion
Israel is a democracy. There are strong guarantees of freedom
for all religious faiths. Approximately 82 percent of its
citizens are Jewish. Muslims, Christians, and Druze, and
members of other minority religions make up the remaining 18
percent. Travel to visit religious sites or perform religious
obligations in and outside Israel is widely permitted. In
1989 Israel facilitated the pilgrimage to Mecca of over 5,000
Israeli Muslims.
Each recognized religious community in Israel has legal
authority over its members in matters of marriage, legitimacy,
inheritance, and conversion. Orthodox religious authorities
have exclusive control over these matters in all sectors of
the Jewish community, whether or not they are Orthodox.
Missionaries are allowed to work in Israel. A 1977
antiproselytizing law, prohibiting the offering and receipt of
material benefits as an inducement to conversion, has not been
employed.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Israeli citizens can move freely within Israel except in
military or security zones, or in cases where they may be
confined to their neighborhood or village by administrative
order under emergency regulations. In 1989 two Israeli Arabs
were confined in this fashion, but were later released.
Israeli citizens are free to travel within the occupied
territories, except in those sections temporarily declared
closed military areas. (See the occupied territories report
regarding the effect of Palestinian attacks on Israeli
civilians' freedom of travel.)
Israeli citizens are free to travel abroad and to emigrate,
provided they have no outstanding military obligations or are
not restricted by administrative order. In 1989 the Israeli
Government renewed restrictions on the travel of one Israeli
Arab political activist, without giving an official reason.
Israel welcomes Jewish immigrants, including Jewish refugees,
to whom it gives automatic citizenship and residence rights.
It accepts back Israeli citizens who have emigrated. Israel
has allowed the return of some Palestinians on the principle
of family reunification but has rejected the great majority of
requests for return.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Israel is a parliamentary democracy, with a multitude of
parties representing a wide range of political views.
Relatively small parties regularly win seats in the Knesset.
All adult Israeli citizens have the right to participate in
the political process and to vote by secret ballot.
1427
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Participation of eligible voters, including Israeli Arabs, in
national elections is high by Western standards. In the 1988
national elections, Israeli Arabs won 6 of 120 Knesset seats.
Israeli citizens, including Israeli Arabs, actively
participated in the 1989 local (municipal) elections.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights.
Israel is responsive to international and nongovernmental
interest in its human rights situation. It hosts and works
with a delegation of the International Committee for the Red
Cross. It permits regular visits by a wide range of private
and international organizations concerned about human rights
such as Amnesty International (AI), the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, the International Labor Organization (ILO), and
others. The Government routinely investigates and responds to
human rights inquiries by such organizations as AI . The
Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs have human rights
offices .
The number of local human rights and political action groups,
already very active, expanded in 1989, primarily in response
to the continuing uprising in the territories.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status.
Women's rights in Israel are protected by the equal
opportunity law, which forbids sex discrimination. For
example, it requires employers to pay male and female workers
equal wages for equal work. Other laws and regulations give
protection to women employees regarding pregnancy, childbirth,
and child care. The Government includes a senior adviser on
the status of women, and the Civil Service Commission and
several government ministries have officers responsible for
women's rights. Nongovernmental women's organizations work
actively in promoting women's rights and welfare. Women are
drafted into the army but do not fill combat-related
positions .
Domination of personal status law by religious courts means
that women are subject to restrictive interpretations of their
rights in such crucial areas as marriage, divorce, and
inheritance.
The courts in Israel deal firmly with persons convicted of
violence, including violence against women. Human rights
groups, especially women's groups, are increasingly active in
dealing with the issue of domestic violence against women, and
the Government provides some funding for intervention
activities .
Israeli Arabs, who comprise approximately 18 percent of
Israel's population, have made substantial educational and
material progress since the founding of Israel. A few have
risen to responsible positions in the civil service, generally
in the Arab departments of government ministries. The year
saw the appointment of the first Arab woman judge. The
Arabic-speaking community has access to local and foreign
Arabic newspapers and magazines, internal and external Arabic
television programming, and Arabic-language radio services.
However, Israeli Arabs have not attained the same quality of
education, housing, or other services as Israeli Jews.
1428
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Relative to their numbers, they are underrepresented in the
student body of most universities, and in higher level
professional, academic, and business ranks.
The Israeli Druze and Circassian communities, at their
initiative, are subject to Israel's military draft, and some
Bedouin Arabs serve voluntarily in special units. However,
most Israeli Arabs are not subject to the draft, and few
volunteer. Consequently, they have less access than do other
Israelis to such social and economic benefits as housing and
new-household subsidies, and government or security-related
industrial employment, for which military service is either a
prerequisite or an advantage.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Israeli workers and employers have freely established
organizations of their own choosing. Israel has a powerful
free trade union movement, the General Federation of Labor in
Israel (Histadrut), and a much smaller rival federation.
About 80 percent of employed Israelis (including 70 percent of
employed Israeli Arabs) are members of Histadrut trade unions
or are covered by its collective bargaining agreements.
Histadrut is a vast service organization which also runs
industries, banks, cooperatives and the country's largest
health and child care systems. Histadrut's position as the
preeminent representative of Israeli labor predates the
establishment of the State of Israel and is not imposed by law.
Histadrut's members democratically elect their national and
local officers and those of its affiliated trade unions and
women's organization, choosing between political party lists.
Plant or enterprise committee members are elected
individually.
The right to strike is exercised frequently. There is a legal
obligation to give 15 days' notice prior to a strike or
lockout, unless otherwise specified in the collective
bargaining agreement. Strikes often erupt without prior
notice or Histadrut authorization, although Histadrut tries to
maintain discipline with a central strike fund. The
Government occasionally appeals to labor courts for
back-to-work orders to restore essential public services while
negotiations continue, but these orders are temporary and not
always granted. Labor courts include employer and employee
representatives. Strike activity in 1989 was relatively low;
among the more important strikes were those by employees of
Histadrut's health care system and by employees of the
Histadrut-owned KOOR Industries.
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem have the same rights
of labor association. While a number of such residents are
members of Histadrut, at least 14 Arab unions independent of
Histadrut also operate.
Approximately 100,000 nonresident workers work in Israel.
Most of them are Palestinians living in the West Bank and
Gaza. While the total number of Palestinians working in
Israel appears not to have changed significantly from 1988, a
number of f actors--entry permits required of Gaza workers,
general strikes in the territories, and Israeli-imposed
curfews--have had serious short-term effects on daily workers
and have probably depressed the weekly average of hours worked
per worker.
1429
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Nonresident workers cannot be members of Histadrut. They are
nonetheless entitled to union representation, and can join,
vote for, and be elected to shop-level workers' committees in
establishments where they number at least 20 or comprise at
least 10 percent of the work force.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right of Israelis to organize and bargain collectively is
enshrined in law and freely exercised. The majority union
(generally Histadrut) is the exclusive bargaining agent.
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem have the same rights
under Israeli law. The Arab unions operating in East
Jerusalem conduct their own collective bargaining.
Nonresident workers (primarily Palestinians) may not organize
and bargain collectively on their own in Israel, but those
that work in the organized sector are entitled to the
protection of collective bargaining agreements and
representation by the bargaining agent. The majority of these
workers, however, work outside the legal hiring mechanism and
lack this protection.
There are no export processing zones in Israel.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Israeli citizens are not subject to forced or compulsory labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
By law, children under age 15 may not be employed. Those aged
15 may not be employed if subject to compulsory education,
except during vacations, or in apprenticeships, or with a
permit from the Labor Minister under special conditions. The
Minister may also allow an artistic performance by a child
under 15, with safeguards. Employment of children aged 16 to
18 is restricted to ensure time for rest and education. A
Labor Inspection Service enforces these provisions, but
enforcement may be lax in smaller, unorganized enterprises.
Israeli labor exchanges in the West Bank and Gaza do not
permit Palestinians under 17 to be employed in Israel.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Wage income in Israel is generally sufficient to provide
workers and their families a decent standard of living.
Legislation in 1986 established a minimum wage at 45 percent
of the average salary, calculated periodically. An October
1989 adjustment raised it to $447 a month. Most wages and
salaries are established in collective bargaining agreements.
The Labor Minister frequently uses the 1957 collective
agreements law to extend private-sector wage settlements to
the public sector and sectoral wage settlements to other,
uncovered enterprises. Along with union representation, the
Labor Inspection Service effectively enforces labor, health,
and safety standards in the workplace.
By law, maximum hours of work at regular pay are 47 hours per
week, 8 per day, and 7 the day before the weekly rest, which
must be at least 36 consecutive hours and should include the
Sabbath. Exceptions may be approved by the Labor Ministry but
may not exceed 10 hours per day, or an average of 47 hours per
week. By national collective agreements, the public sector
moved to a 5-day, 42.5-hour week in April 1989, while the
1430
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
private sector established a maximum 45-hour week in August
1988 and an April 1990 deadline for all firms to institute the
5-day week.
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem have the same rights
under Israeli law and union contracts and are entitled to the
same working conditions as Israelis.
About 33,000 of the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians working in
Israel enter the job market legally through Israeli employment
service labor exchanges in the West Bank and Gaza. Employers
pay wages and social contributions for these workers to the
service, which deducts taxes, employee social contributions,
and a 1-percent union fee, and pays the balance to the
workers. The same percentage is deducted from the pay of
Palestinians working legally in Israel as is deducted from the
pay of Israeli workers for social contributions. However,
they do not receive the same benefits from the National
Insurance Institute (Nil, similar to U.S. social security),
because many Nil benefits require residence in Israel.
The Nil provides commuting workers with workers' compensation
for occupational injury or illness and employer bankruptcy
insurance. These workers are also entitled to maternity
benefits, including free hospital care and 12 weeks' paid
maternity leave, but only for births in hospitals in Israel.
Nonresidents are ineligible for Nil old-age, survivors', and
disability pensions, unemployment compensation, or insurance
for long-term care or injury in nonoccupational accidents.
They are also ineligible for Nil children's allowances, funded
only by employer contributions, and for Nll-administered
welfare programs funded by Israeli taxpayers through the
budget .
Because of these restrictions, only 1.2 percent of nonresident
Palestinian workers' pay goes to the Nil, compared to 5.35
percent for an Israeli. The other 4.15 percent is an
equalization deduction which was established to keep labor
costs equivalent. This amount goes to a special finance
ministry fund to be earmarked for social and development
expenditures in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinians estimate
that this amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars since
1970 and claim that the Government of Israel has not accounted
for its use of the funds. Expenditures for the territories
are reviewed by the Knesset Joint Committee for Defense and
Finances, but are not made public.
A report issued in December by the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) on the social and economic
conditions of West Bank and Gaza workers recommends that the
social security system be revamped so that those who work in
Israel are able to receive full social benefits or else be
reimbursed for the value of their contributions which are
deducted from gross wages.
Nonresident Palestinian workers who are legally hired are
covered by the minimum wage law and by the larger system of
social benefits granted through collective bargaining
agreements. They are entitled to receive a pension through
the Labor Ministry at age 65 after at least 10 years'
employment in Israel, based on earnings and years worked,
which is equivalent to Histadrut pensions granted to
Israelis. They are also entitled to sick leave, severance
pay, and paid vacations of 14 to 28 days per year, by law as
well as by Histadrut contract.
1431
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Histadrut has sought to defend the rights of nonresident
Palestinians who were dismissed for absences during the
uprising, maintaining that military curfews and community-wide
strikes are beyond their control. Histadrut has not been able
to get large numbers reinstated but has worked to get many
their severance pay. The labor federation has used plant-site
visits, Arab-language broadcasts, fliers, and workplace posters
to inform nonresident Palestinians of their legal rights and
benefits. Histadrut began holding seminars on worker rights
in 1988 for employees recruited through West Bank and Gaza
labor exchanges.
The majority of the nonresident Palestinians who work in
Israel bypass the employment service hiring system, thereby
losing social benefits but also avoiding taxes and social
contributions for themselves and their employers. Their wages
and working conditions are often below Israeli Isgal
standards, particularly in seasonal agriculture and small
restaurants, garages, and construction sites where many work.
Enforcement of minimum wage laws is not stringent. In 1989
the employment service carried out stricter enforcement of the
requirement that they be hired through labor exchanges, but
this has not halted the trend toward more Palestinians working
in the informal sector. Employment service inspectors have
begun fining employers $250 per illegally hired worker as an
alternative to long drawn-out criminal court complaints.
According to the regulations, nonresident Palestinian workers
are not allowed to stay overnight in Israel without a permit.
The pressures of strikes in the territories, the occasional
closure of the territories, and Palestinian activist efforts
in Gaza to resist Israeli imposition of entry permits for all
Gaza workers have induced more Palestinian workers to stay
overnight in Israel illegally, often in substandard
conditions. In practice, relatively few of the estimated
thousands who regularly stay overnight are detained by the
police. However, police have recently stepped up efforts to
enforce the law against those workers who lack overnight and
entry permits.
The 1989 report of the ILO Director General reviewed the
situation of nonresident Palestinian workers in ^srael. It
reiterated its recommendations for action to combat illegal
employment and eliminate inequalities with respect to
benefits, working conditions, and job security. It called for
restructuring the system of benefits so that workers'
contributions would be used strictly for social security
programs and not for other purposes.
24-900 O— 90 46
1432
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
This report differs from most other reports contained in this
volume in one fundamental respect: whereas other reports
describe the relationship between the government and the
governed in countries over which the governments in question
exercise sovereignty, this report deals with lands under
foreign military occupation. The lands now known as the
"occupied territories" were occupied by Israel in the 1967
War. Israel has not been recognized to have sovereign rights
over any of the occupied territories: the West Bank, the Gaza
Strip, the Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem. Regarding East
Jerusalem, Israel has asserted sovereignty and annexed it.
The West Bank and the Gaza Strip are governed under Jordanian
and British law, as modified by military orders. Israeli law
and civilian administration have been extended to the Golan
Heights .
The United States considers Israel's occupation to be governed
by the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 Fourth Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War. Israel denies the applicability of the Fourth
Geneva Convention to the West Bank and Gaza, but states that
it observes the Convention's humanitarian provisions in those
areas .
Since 1967, there have been episodic but sometimes intense
outbreaks of violence within the occupied territories,
reflecting Palestinian opposition to the occupation. In
December 1987, there was a dramatic outburst of civilian
unrest and violence. This has continued throughout 1989 and
has been far more widespread and intensive than at any time
heretofore. This has led to a severe crackdown by the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF).
The human rights situation in the occupied territories remains
a source of deep concern to the United States. Overall, there
were more Palestinian deaths in 1989 than in 1988. A total of
432 Palestinians were killed in intifada-related violence in
1989, of whom 304 were killed by Israeli security forces and
settlers and 128 by other Palestinians; 13 Israelis, soldiers
and civilians, were killed by Palestinians during 1989.
This unrest and violence, known as the intifada, has as its
minimum goal the end of Israeli occupation, a goal strongly
supported by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The
leadership of the uprising, known as the United National
Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) , attempts to direct and
coordinate intifada activities. As it developed, groups of
young people which have formed in individual localities but
are loosely associated with each other and coordinate their
tactics have, throughout the occupied territories, enforced
business shut-downs and strikes, and directed attacks at
Israeli military patrols and Israeli travelers, particularly
settlers, whose cars are routinely pelted with stones.
Occasionally firebombs have been thrown. The security forces
have responded with tear gas, rubber and plastic bullets, and
metal bullets.
Israeli occupation authorities have sought to end the intifada
through widescale arrests, detention, raids on homes in which
suspects were thought to reside, and more severe forms of
punishment, including deportation. The rules of engagement of
the Israeli Defense Forces provide for the use' of force in
case of self-defense in life-threatening situations, in the
arrest of a suspect to a crime if the suspect resists, and
1433
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
dispersing a violent riot which endangers public order or the
safety of soldiers. The rules allow the use of live fire only
as a last resort and under defined procedures in these
circumstances. The guidelines for the use of force stipulate
that once force is no longer needed, it should no longer be
applied. The Government of Israel makes clear to all forces
serving in the occupied territories the need to adhere to the
rules of engagement. However, violations of these rules have
resulted in death and injuries. Only a relatively small
number of such incidents have resulted in prosecution, and the
sentences meted out have tended to be light.
An important aspect of the situation in the occupied
territories in 1989 has been the significant increase in
violence by Palestinians directed at other Palestinians. This
has taken a number of forms, including assassinations, other
acts of violence, and threats of violence. This took place in
an environment influenced by some statements by various
Palestinian leaders and the Unified Command promoting violence
(e.g., a call by one UNLU leaflet to use knives, hatchets, and
Molotov cocktails), tough Israeli security measures, the
breakdown in law enforcement against conventional crime, and
factional differences among Palestinians. The Unified Command
has not disassociated itself from the phenomenon of
intra-Palestinian violence but has sought to curb that element
not under its control.
The strength of the Islamic fundamentalist Hamas movement has
contributed to this intra-Palestinian violence and atmosphere
of intimidation. Hamas opposes any reconciliation with
Israel, and it would appear that its appeal, albeit still
limited to a minority of the Palestinian population, has also
shaped intra-Palestinian tensions.
Israel's open, democratic society enables widespread access to
data on and investigations of human rights in the territories,
notwithstanding IDF restraints applied there. Israel has
designated officals in the Ministry of Defense with whom U.S.
officials discuss specific allegations of human rights
violations .
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Political killing is not condoned by Israel. However, in 1989
there were allegations that Palestinian activists were
intentionally killed by Israeli security forces or
Palestinians working for them. Israel categorically denied
these charges.
Israeli settlers killed 11 Palestinians during marches,
patrols, retaliatory raids, and other incidents. The IDF
condemned such vigilantism and attempted to stop it. Charges
were brought against one settler leader in 1989 for the 1988
slaying of a Palestinian, and he has been on trial. Suspects
in other killings were released for lack of evidence after
they failed to cooperate with police.
Palestinian attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians in
1989 resulted in 13 deaths and 196 injuries. The authorities
1434
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
investigated these cases and prosecuted suspects in some of
them.
During 1989, 128 Palestinians were killed by other
Palestinians. Many were also wounded. There has been
intimidation against some of those who are employed by the
Civil Administration, and, in some cases, against some of
those who have expounded the need for political compromise.
Among those killed this year were a number of Arab policemen
or local Arab village officials. Israelis state that a number
of the victims of intra-Palestinian violence have been killed
for seeking to express moderate views. Many of the victims
were working with the Israeli security authorities, and
Palestinians claim that some of them were armed and provided
information leading to arrests of uprising activists.
Palestinians state that other victims were habitual criminals
or people killed due to private disputes.
Some of these attacks and acts of intimidation were carried
out by young Palestinian activists, often masked, who were
members of the "strike forces" which enforce directives
relating to the conduct of the uprising. However, some
attackers were members of self-styled Palestinian gangs which
operated autonomously. The emergence of gangs called the Red
Eagles and Black Panthers in Nablus in the northern West Bank
has been a new development of concern both to Israelis and to
most of the Palestinian community; these gangs and other
individuals have also engaged in acts of violence as vendettas
or as settling scores not connected with the intifada.
(For further discussion of casualties, see Sections I.e. and
i.g.)
b. Disappearance
Israel does not sponsor or condone disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Torture is forbidden by Israeli law, and Israeli authorities
assert they do not condone its use in the occupied
territories. IDF orders forbid the use of force after the
detention of a suspect and the cessation of violent
resistance. Nevertheless, reports continue of harsh and
demeaning treatment of prisoners and detainees, as well as
allegations of beatings of suspects and detainees, including
beating during house searches, which is contrary to IDF
rules. At least 10 deaths can be attributed to beatings.
Palestinians and international human rights groups claim that
other cruel practices--including enforced standing in one
position for prolonged periods, hooding, sleep deprivation,
and cold showers--have continued since being confirmed in the
1987 report of the Landau judicial commission referred to in
the 1988 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Physical
and psychological pressures are particularly severe in
incommunicado detention during investigation and
interrogation.
Most convictions in security cases are based on confessions.
An attorney is normally not allowed to see a client until
after interrogation is completed and a confession, if
obtained, has been made. Individuals may be held up to 14
days after arrest before the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) is permitted access, which is often delayed.
1435
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
According to IDF figures, 9,138 Palestinians were being held
in IDF prison facilities as of January 1, 1990. Two military
detention centers were added to the nine existing facilities.
The Ketziot detention facility uas expanded and improved, but
serious overcrowding continued. Conditions at military
detention facilities varied. Several prison riots and hunger
strikes protesting conditions occurred. In March a prisoner
in Gaza died while under Shin Bet interrogation. An Israeli
investigation concluded that the cause of death was natural
(an ulcer), and there is no presumption of mistreatment. The
investigation also held that lax supervision may have
contributed to the death, and a medical orderly has been
disciplined. Another prisoner in Gaza died December 19 under
interrogation in Shin Bet custody. An official autopsy
concluded that death was caused by internal stomach bleeding
brought on by a blow. Israel initiated an investigation into
this incident.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
No new deportation orders were issued in 1989, but 26
Palestinians (including 5 journalists and 5 labor leaders)
were deported in 1989, many after a lengthy appeals process up
to the Israeli High Court of Justice, under deportation orders
issued in 1988. Two others avoided formal deportation by
signing agreements to remain abroad and avoid political
activities for 5 years. The deportation process is
characterized by a lack of formal charges and the use of
secret evidence not disclosed to the suspect or his attorney.
The United States considers deportations to contravene Article
49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Israeli High Court of
Justice has not accepted this view.
Palestinians under deportation orders may appeal to the
Israeli High Court. The Court has overturned no deportation
orders .
Administrative detention for alleged security reasons without
formal charges was widespread in 1989. Israel maintains that
administrative detention is used only against persons engaged
in activities threatening security; however, in a number of
cases persons appear to have been detained for nonviolent
political activities. While the number of administrative
detainees at any one time varies, IDF figures indicate that
the number was 1,271 as of January 1, 1990. Most were
detained under a 6-month order, although many orders have been
renewed for a second or third time. In August the maximum
length of detention under orders was extended to 12 months.
District military commanders may order administrative
detentions without formal charges. A detainee may appeal the
order to a military judge. Only a small percentage of orders
is overturned on appeal. Secret evidence, not made available
to detainees or their attorneys, is often used to support
administrative detention orders. Rulings by military judges
can be appealed to the High Court, which may review secret
evidence, but there have been no reversals. According to the
IDF, approximately 30 percent of detention orders were
shortened or canceled on appeal in 1989 after portions of the
detention period were served.
The authorities continued to transfer detainees and prisoners
convicted of security offenses from the occupied territories
to facilities in Israel, particularly the Ketziot detention
camp in the Negev Desert and Megiddo Prison near Afula in
1436
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
northern Israel. Such transfer^, in the view of the United
States, contravene Article 76 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention. However, the Israeli High Court dismissed a 1988
petition brought by Ketziot detainees and held that the
Convention's provisions could not be enforced by an Israeli
court since they had not been enacted into Israeli law.
Any soldier can arrest without warrant a person who has
committed, or is suspected of having committed, a criminal or
security offense. Persons arrested for common crimes in the
occupied territories are usually provided the opportunity for
bail, access to an attorney, and a statement of charges,
although these rights are sometimes delayed. Individuals may
be held in custody without a warrant for 96 hours, and may be
held without formal charges for up to 18 days. The normal
pretrial detention period is 60 days. A high court judge may
approve unlimited 3-month extensions. Security detainees are
usually denied bail and are routinely held without access to
counsel for 18 days. Access may be denied indefinitely if
officials believe granting it would impede the investigation.
Many security suspects are arrested without warrants and may
be so held for up to 96 hours. Denial of notification of
arrest to immediate family members, attorneys, and consular
officials is common and under law can be extended for up to 14
days. Incommunicado detention for a period of 8 days is
permitted with a court order. Detainees are often not told
the reasons for their detention. In September Israel
announced improved family notification procedures. However,
the problem of delayed notification continued.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Palestinians accused of nonsecurity offenses are tried
publicly in local courts by Palestinian judges, except where
jurisdiction has been transferred by military order.
Palestinians accused of security offenses, which are broadly
defined and, as administered, cover Palestinian nationalist
activity of a nonviolent character, are tried in Israeli
military courts before panels composed of one or three
judges. Charges are brought by military commanders. Suspects
are entitled to counsel. In 1989 there were long delays
before trial because military courts were overburdened by the
large number of uprising-related security cases. An increased
number of judges and prosecutors was inadequate to cover the
workload.
Most military trials are public, though access is controlled
and in some cases limited. Consular officers are allowed to
attend military court proceedings involving foreign citizens,
but there have been delays in gaining admission. Acquittals
are very rare in security cases. Most convictions in military
courts are based on confessions. The absence of bail, long
pretrial delays, and physical and psychological pressures
increase the likelihood of confessions. These are usually
recorded in Hebrew, which many defendants are unable to read.
In April a military appeals court staffed by active duty and
reserve military officers was established with branches in the
West Bank and Gaza. Appeals from decisions by three-judge
panels may be brought by the defendant or the prosecution.
Cases heard by single-judge panels, which can impose prison
sentences of up to 5 years, may be appealed only with the
permission of the court. According to Israel's Judge Advocate
General, the court heard 25 cases through mid-October in which
it accepted 15 defense appeals and 7 prosecution appeals.
1437
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Nonjudicial administrative orders of the military government
may be appealed to area military commanders and to the High
Court. The court almost never reverses Civil Administration
or military orders based on security considerations.
Israeli settlers in the occupied territories accused of
security and ordinary offenses are tried in the nearest
Israeli district court under Israeli law. These courts are
presided over by professional judges, and standards of due
process and admissibility of evidence are stricter than in
military courts.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Military authorities may enter private homes and institutions
without a warrant in pursuit of security objectives. Forced
entries, which are a regular part of IDF operations, have
resulted in beatings, destruction of property, and arrests.
Military orders also authorize the authorities to occupy
buildings, or parts of buildings, as military observation
points. Security officials frequently questioned Palestinians
about their political views, and temporarily detained people.
Demolition and sealing are nonjudicial administrative
punishments ordered by the area military commander.
Demolition and sealing of houses in the occupied territories
are carried out pursuant to Article 119 of the Defence
(Emergency) Regulations of 1945. Under the regulations,
military commanders may order the demolition or sealing of any
house from which they suspect a firearm has been discharged or
bomb thrown, or any house situated in an area, town, village,
quarter, or street the inhabitants of which they are satisfied
have committed offenses against the regulations. The Israeli
High Court ruled in January that houses of stone-throwers
could be demolished. In July the High Court ruled that houses
rented by offenders could be demolished and that owners have
48 hours to appeal a demolition order to the area military
commander, who can waive this right in cases of "operational
military need." Final appeals can be made to the High Court.
The High Court has delayed orders but has not overturned any
of them. In 1989, 170 Arab houses were demolished or sealed
for security reasons (88 demolished, 82 sealed).
Owners are not allowed to rebuild, making the punishment one
of indefinite duration. House demolition as punishment is
enforced only against Arab residents of the occupied
territories. The United States believes demolition and
sealing as punishment of families contravenes the Fourth
Geneva Convention. Israel, however, holds that the Convention
permits demolition under imperative military considerations.
The Israeli High Court has ruled that demolition is lawful in
certain circumstances.
Mail and telephone conversations are sometimes monitored.
Telephone service to specific areas is sometimes interrupted
by the authorities.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
While the rules of engagement set forth the limits within
which force may be used, there were nonetheless a number of
instances in which these limits were exceeded. IDF
regulations permit use of live fire only when soldiers' lives
are in real and immediate danger, to halt fleeing suspects, or
1438
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
to disperse a violent riot. Only a specific attacker may be
fired on; fire is to be directed at legs only; and fire may be
directed at a fleeing suspect only if a serious felony is
suspected, and as a last resort. Rules of fire were expanded
in 1989 to allow firing at any fleeing masked individual.
Soldiers may fire high-velocity ammunition only after
exhausting other methods, including tear gas, rubber bullets,
and warning shots.
IDF guidelines often were not followed, resulting in avoidable
deaths and injuries. Most Palestinians were killed by high-
velocity rounds shot by the IDF or border police in the course
of incidents involving stones, firebombs, and fleeing
suspects. Many deaths and wounds were from bullets in the
head or upper body. Misuse of plastic and rubber bullets
continued to result in death and serious injury. In January
noncommissioned officers were authorized to fire them. Tear
gas was occasionally used in houses and enclosed spaces in
violation of instructions for its use, which can be
potentially lethal.
Estimates vary of the number of casualties from violence in
the occupied territories. Figures compiled from press,
Palestinian, hospital, international organization, and Israeli
government sources indicate that in the occupied territories a
total of 432 Palestinians were killed in 1989 (including the
casualties already described in Section l.a.: 11 Palestinians
killed by settlers, and 128 Palestinians killed by other
Palestinians) . Estimates of the number of Palestinians
wounded varies from over 5,000 to up to 20,000. As also
reported in Section l.a., 13 Israelis were killed by
Palestinians and 196 injured in the occupied territories
during 1989.
According to the IDF, 435 cases of IDF conduct were
investigated in 1989, of which 47 resulted in court-martial;
some were dropped for lack of evidence, and others were sent
to unit commanders for disciplinary action below the level of
court martial. However, regulations often were not vigorously
enforced, many cases of unjust killing did not result in
disciplinary action, and punishments often were lenient. In
May four members of an elite IDF unit were cleared of
manslaughter charges and convicted on reduced charges of
"causing grievous bodily harm" in the 1988 beating death of a
Gazan. The court found their officers had issued "manifestly
illegal orders" in authorizing the beatings, but there was no
prosecution of the officers. The 9-month sentences of the
soldiers were later commuted to 6 months. The High Court of
Justice on December 24 ordered the court-martial of an IDF
colonel, who had resigned after the IDF had severely
reprimanded him for ordering the breaking of bones of
detainees. The IDF Judge Advocate General's office announced
December 25 that another IDF colonel would be court-martialed
for having shot to death a Palestinian resident of the Bureij
refugee camp in Gaza. The official investigation of an
incident in Nahclin in April 1989, which had resulted in five
Palestinian deaths, acknowledged serious errors. Several
Israeli security personnel involved in Nahalin were
transferred and disciplined.
There were several controversial incidents in 1989 involving
the entry by Israeli security forces into Palestinian
hospitals and clinics. Israel denies that it interferes with
medical services and supplies as a matter of policy but
acknowledges that at times its security forces enter hospitals
1439
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
to pursue and arrest fleeing rioters or those suspected of
security offenses. It denies allegations of mistreating
patients or staff and asserts that Palestinians use hospitals
as refuges for uninjured rioters. Palestinians deny this and
charge that security forces in some cases used tear gas and
beat patients and staff, in contravention of international
law. Palestinians allege that security forces at IDF
roadblocks deliberately held up ambulances transporting
wounded. Israel charges that ambulances are used to transport
uninjured security suspects.
Israel, in response to a tax boycott, imposed a siege on the
West Bank town of Beit Sahour. All access to the town was
blocked for over 40 days, during which Israeli authorities
seized merchandise and vehicles to pay outstanding tax bills.
Israel claims these actions were justified by the tax
boycott. Palestinians claim that certain Israeli tax
practices are inconsistent with international law, including
the imposition of a value added tax (VAT) and other taxes
which did not exist before 1967, the summary seizure of
private property, and Israel's failure to address whether the
tax revenues were being utilized for the benefit of the
population of the occupied territories.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
East Jerusalem is an active center of Arabic publication,
including newspapers. There is no press elsewhere in the
occupied territories. The Israeli authorities imposed tight
restrictions on the Arabic press, citing broadly defined
security reasons. Publications in East Jerusalem must submit
to the military for prior censorship all copy relating to the
security, public order, and safety of Israel and the occupied
territories. Some reports and editorials related to the
uprising and Palestinian political goals were permitted, but
articles and editorials were routinely expurgated. Arabic
translations of uprising-related news stories which had
previously appeared in the Hebrew language press were
routinely censored from the Arabic press.
The display of Palestinian political symbols, such as flags,
national colors, and graffiti, is punishable by fines,
detention, or imprisonment. According to the IDF, very few
persons were sentenced in 1989 solely for displaying
nationalist symbols, although this charge may be levied along
with other more serious charges for violent activity. Public
expression of support for the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), its component factions, Muslim extremist
groups (such as Hamas), and other banned organizations is
prohibited.
No broadcast media originate from the occupied territories.
The authorities have jammed inflammatory radio broadcasts from
neighboring countries. In August the use of fax machines in
the Gaza Strip was banned. A military order closing a
prominent Palestinian press service was renewed, and two other
Palestinian press services were closed.
For alleged security offenses, Israeli security authorities
administratively detained at least 20 journalists,
interrogated numerous others, and raided newspaper offices.
1440
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
A permit is required for publications imported into the
occupied territories. Imported materials may be censored or
banned for anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli content or support of
Palestinian nationalism. In addition to temporary
restrictions on individual publications, there were temporary
bans on the distribution of all East Jerusalem Arab newspapers
in the West Bank and Gaza on four occasions. Possession of
banned materials, such as uprising leaflets, is punishable by
fine and imprisonment. The IDF periodically declared all or
parts of the West Bank and Gaza closed military areas, one
primary effect of which was to exclude journalists except
under military escort. Reports by foreign journalists are
subject to censorship under a system of self-regulation.
Israel kept all Palestinian universities in the West Bank and
Gaza closed throughout 1989, allegedly because they were
contributing to violence. The vocational, secondary, and
elementary schools in the West Bank, closed in January,
reopened in July and August but were closed again in
mid-November. Schools in Gaza and East Jerusalem were open
for most of the school year. Alternate, off-campus classrooms
organized by parents and teachers were banned on security
grounds, although some continued to operate.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.
Military orders ban public gatherings of 10 or more people
without a permit. (No permits were requested in 1989.)
Political parties and other groups, including some labor
unions, viewed as political are banned. Private organizations
must be registered, though some operate without licenses.
Palestinian charitable, community, professional, and self-help
organizations were permitted to operate unless their
activities were viewed as overtly political or supporting the
uprising. Persons involved in such activities were arrested,
interrogated, administratively detained, or denied permission
to travel.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is respected in the occupied territories.
No group or sect is banned on religious grounds. Muslim and
Christian holy days are observed. Both faiths operate schools
and institutions (although religious schools were subject to
the same extended closure as other West Bank schools) .
Religious publications circulate subject to the laws for
publications detailed in Section 2. a.
In the wake of a demonstration in the al-Aqsa mosque area in
Jerusalem, which resulted in some worshipers at the Western
Wall below being pelted with stones, the Israeli authorities
restricted access to the Al-Aqsa mosque during the Muslim holy
month of Ramadan and the Id al-Adha holiday. Security forces
raided mosques and confiscated mosque loudspeakers, claiming
security reasons. There was no indication that such raids or
arrests of Muslim clergy were directed at religious freedom
but rather at political or security-related activities.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Occupied Territories,
Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Freedom of movement was restricted periodically in the West
Bank and Gaza by IDF curfews, which were often prolonged to
discourage protest activities. Hundreds of curfews, some
1441
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
lasting several weeks, were imposed. During curfews, people
were usually allowed to leave their houses to obtain food and
medical care for short, defined periods. These curfews caused
severe hardship.
All residents of the West Bank and/or Gaza were sometimes
prevented from traveling to East Jerusalem or Israel. Peace
advocacy groups from Israel were sometimes forbidden to visit
Palestinian villages, for alleged security reasons.
Thousands of Palestinians in the occupied territories travel
abroad each year. Israel imposed travel restraints on some
political activists and on family members of some deportees.
There were cases in which young men were denied permission to
travel unless they agreed to remain abroad for an extended
time. Exit travel permits were delayed for some Palestinians
returning abroad for work or study after visiting relatives in
the occupied territories. According to figures from the
Islamic Waqf, which supervises mosques and Islamic properties
in the occupied territories, over 90 percent of the Muslims
who applied were permitted to make the hajj. Palestinians
claim that those denied permission were denied because of
nationalist activity.
There are no obstacles to emigration. Israel sometimes
refuses to renew laissez-passers of Palestinians from the
occupied territories who live or work abroad on the grounds
that they have abandoned their residence, even though they may
not have acquired foreign citizenship. Palestinians who
obtain foreign citizenship are ordinarily not allowed to
resume residence in the occupied territories. They are
permitted to return as tourists only and sometimes are denied
entry entirely. Enforcement of the 3-month limit for tourist
visas for stays by Palestinians is uneven.
Entry or residency permission is frequently denied spouses,
relatives, and children following the emigration of the head
of the household. According to press reports, at least 100
spouses were deported for lack of residence permits in 1989.
Persons who marry Palestinians in the occupied territories
generally are not allowed to take up residence there. Israel
has also denied the return of former West Bank residents who
were not present in the territories, for whatever reason, at
the time of the 1967 census.
Requests for family reunification far exceed the numbers of
those granted. Palestinians say thousands of family
reunification requests are pending. According to the
Government of Israel, in 1988 and 1989 a total of 3,266 family
reunification applications v/ere filed for the West Bank, of
which 695 were approved. For Gaza, 278 applications were
filed in 1988 and, through July 1989, 219 were filed. Figures
on the number approved for Gaza are not available. Israeli
officials acknowledge that family reunification is limited for
demographic and political reasons and assert that the laws of
occupation do not require Israel to permit immigration into
the territories. Restrictions on residence, tourist visas,
reentry, and family reunification do not apply to Jews
resident in the occupied territories, whether or not they are
Israeli citizens.
1442
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government.
The West Bank and Gaza are ruled under occupation by Israel's
Ministry of Defense through a military governor and civil
administration. Palestinians have no means to participate in
significant policy decisions concerning land and resource use
and planning, taxation, trade, and industry. Municipal
elections were last held in 1976 in the West Bank, and most
mayors elected then were later dismissed on security grounds.
Palestinians appointed by Israel have filled most vacancies.
Some appointed mayors have resigned or stopped working because
of the uprising and, in some cases, threats from other
Palestinians. One Israeli-appointed municipal secretary was
killed by other Palestinians.
East Jerusalem is governed as part of Israel. Arab residents
of East Jerusalem are permitted to vote in municipal elections
but have largely boycotted them. In the 1989 Jerusalem
elections, less than 5 percent of Jerusalem's Arab population
voted.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights.
Israel normally permits international human rights groups to
visit the occupied territories. Israel cooperates with a
number of such organizations, and officials are generally
available for meetings on human rights issues. However, some
of these organizations often complain that Israel's responses
are inadequate, not all inquiries receive answers, and some
groups' requests for meetings with officials or access to
detention facilities are denied.
Many local groups — Israeli, Palestinian, and mixed — are
concerned with human rights. Their publications and
statements are generally allowed to circulate in the occupied
territories. They are allowed to hold press conferences.
Individuals working for a prominent Palestinian legal rights
organization were detained, beaten, prevented from traveling
freely, and harassed at military checkpoints.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status.
Israeli settlers in the occupied territories are subject to
Israeli law, while Palestinians live under military occupation
law. Under the dual system of governance applied to
Palestinians — both Muslim and Christian — and Israelis,
Palestinians are treated less favorably than Israeli settlers
on a broad range of issues, including the right to due
process, right of residency, freedom of movement, sale of
crops and goods, land and water use, and access to health and
social services. Israeli settlers involved in security
violations have been treated far more leniently than
Palestinians guilty of similar offenses. Offenses against
Israelis are investigated and prosecuted more vigorously than
offenses against Palestinians. Israelis have residency rights
in the occupied territories under Israel's Law of Return,
regardless whether they have foreign nationality.
Israel continued to place land under its control for military
purposes, roads, settlements, and other purposes which
restrict use by Palestinians and discriminate in favor of
1443
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Israeli settlers against Palestinians. Palestinians do not
participate in the Higher Planning Council, which plans land
use in the occupied territories and exercises planning powers
transferred from local, municipal, and village councils in
1971. Issuance of permits to Palestinians for house
construction is tightly restricted.
The Israeli Civil Administration provides basic services. In
1989 such services were sharply reduced due to the economic
disruption caused by the uprising and a Palestinian tax
boycott. There was no public accounting of revenue and
expenditure.
Palestinians and persons of Arab descent entering the West
Bank via the Jordan River bridges, regardless of citizenship,
are subject to extensive searches, and many complain of harsh
or humiliating treatment. Israel limits the funds visitors or
residents may bring into the occupied territories for
Palestinian use to about $300 per person per month unless
Israeli authorities grant permission in advance. There are no
limits on funds for Israeli settlers.
There is no legal discrimination against women. Violence
against women is not legally condoned. The participation rate
of women in the labor force is low, and exists primarily in
traditional professions and occupations, although there are
exceptions. Women's societies flourish and play an important
social role.
Section 6 Worker Rights
The applicable sections for West Bank and Gaza Palestinians
working in Jerusalem and Israel are contained in the country
report for Israel. Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem
have the same rights and are governed by the same law as
workers in Israel.
a. The Right of Association
The labor law in force in the West Bank is Jordanian Law No.
21 of 1960, as amended by military orders. It permits workers
to join unions without prior government authorization. It
also permits the formation of unions by any group of 20 or
more workers from the same trade or workplace, with prior
government authorization. The International Labor
Organization (ILO) Director General's report has noted that
the Israeli authorities have approved no applications since
1979. No petitions were submitted in 1989. Out of
approximately 90 unions functioning in the West Bank, 31 are
licensed.
Israeli authorities, citing security concerns, actively
discourage union activities in the West Bank. The authorities
state that the West Bank umbrella federations and many
individual unions are fronts for illegal political
organizations rather than trade unions. Israel claims that no
legitimate union activities are disrupted and that its actions
are intended to prevent illicit political activity.
More than 100,000 West Bank Palestinians, representing a full
range of blue-collar and white-collar professions, were
members of approximately 90 trade unions in 1989. Unions
belong to one of three organizations, all calling themselves
the General Federation of Trade Unions in the West Bank
(GFTU) . The largest GFTU claims membership in the
1444
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU),
although the Tunis-based Palestinian Trade Union Federation
(PTUF) is ICATU's affiliate of record. Two GFTU's have
applied for membership in the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). There is no connection between any
of the West Bank unions and the Government of Israel or the
Israeli Histadrut Labor Federation.
Military Order (M.O.) 825 of 1980 requires that Palestinian
unions present lists of candidates for union office to the
Civil Administration (CIVAD) for approval 30 days before
elections. CIVAD has said that it will enforce M.O. 825 by
disallowing the election of candidates not approved in
advance. The order authorizes the CIVAD to remove from the
lists any candidates who have been convicted of a felony or
misdemeanor. Because Palestinian trade unionists fear that
the CIVAD will use the order to exclude those candidates who
have served in administrative detention, they refuse to adhere
to the order.
Like all organizations and individuals in the occupied
territories, Palestinian labor organizations are subject to
disciplinary measures for engaging in political activities.
The premises of the GFTU in Nablus remained closed on the
grounds they had been used for political rather than union
activities. Union-related meetings of 10 or more persons must
have the prior approval of the CIVAD.
There has been no dissolution of unions by administrative or
legislative action. Under prevailing labor law, unions have
the right to strike only after submitting a complaint to the
CIVAD for mandatory arbitration. No strikes have been
authorized under this procedure. However, authorities have
not interfered with unauthorized strikes called over strictly
labor issues. More than 20 such strikes took place in the
West Bank in 1989.
Union leaders have been among those detained for alleged
security offenses. GFTU leaders have been denied permission
to travel to ILO conferences, but they and their
representatives have been permitted to travel abroad at the
invitation of labor organizations in other countries.
Delegations from the ICFTU and foreign trade unions, in
addition to the annual ILO mission, visited the West Bank in
1989 and met with the GFTU leaders.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bargaining is protected. The CIVAD does not record
collective agreements because some unions and/or their leaders
are not legally recognized. However, most union-employer
agreements are honored without interference from the
authorities. The only legal forum for labor grievances in the
West Bank is the CIVAD's military court system. Palestinians
view the system as unsympathetic and prefer to use the
traditional technique of mediation by community notables.
There are no export processing zones in the occupied
territories .
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no forced or compulsory labor in the occupied
territories. Under existing law applicable to the occupied
territories, there is no statutory ban on forced labor.
1445
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Forced labor is, however, banned (except under certain
exceptional circumstances) by the Fourth Geneva Convention.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
A 1978 military order raised the minimum working age in the
West Bank and Gaza to 14, and there are no known instances of
child labor in industry or construction.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
In the West Bank, Jordanian law allows a maximum workweek of
48 hours, except for certain hotel, food service, and cinema
employees, whose workweek is 54 hours. In Gaza, Israeli
authorities amended this law to provide for a 45-hour workweek
for day laborers and a 40-hour week for salaried employees.
There is no effective enforcement of maximum workweek laws.
There is no minimum wage provision in the West Bank or Gaza.
The Ministry of Labor's inspection service is charged with
enforcing health and safety standards in the West Bank and
Gaza, but no inspections take place.
1446
JQSDM.
Jordan is a hereditary monarchy with a constitution granting
the King broad powers. The King forms and dissolves
governments and is the ultimate arbiter of policy. The Prime
Minister and the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) exercise
considerable responsibility for many issues. The Constitution
also provides for a bicameral parliament and an independent
judiciary. New elections for the Parliament, which was
dissolved in 1988, were held on November 8, 1989.
Martial law has been in effect since the 1967 war against
Israel, which ended with Israel's occupation of the West
Bank. Under martial law, the General Intelligence Directorate
(GID) and Public Security Department (PSD) have broad powers
to monitor segments of the population that they believe might
pose a threat to the security of the regime. Certificates of
good conduct from the GID are needed for all public sector
jobs, and for many private sector jobs as well. The GID must
also approve any public gatherings or activities sponsored by
private clubs and organizations. Under martial law, some
detained persons have been denied the opportunity to
communicate with their families or attorneys for varying
periods, sometimes for several months.
Jordan has a mixed economy, with government participation in
certain sectors, largely in communications, transportation,
and heavy industry. Jordan has limited natural resources but
in the past has received up to $2.5 billion annually in
workers' remittances and financial grants from its Gulf
neighbors. It now faces severe budgetary constraints as these
revenues have fallen off sharply along with the price of oil.
Currency depreciation and steep increases in the cost of
living combined to create a public furor which culminated in
disturbances in April 1989. As one result of the unrest.
Prime Minister Rifa'i resigned and a new Cabinet was named,
headed by Sharif Zaid Ben Shaker.
The new Government is committed to economic restructuring and
export-led growth and development, and moved quickly to
implement an International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic
adjustment program that aims at reducing government spending
and stimulating the development of Jordan's private sector in
order to offset the decline in foreign assistance and
remittances .
After the November elections, the new Government took several
significant steps toward political liberalization, including
the release of 48 political detainees, the transfer of
jurisdiction over several categories of crimes from military
to civilian courts, easing of press restrictions, and
elimination of travel and work restrictions imposed under
security provisions for political beliefs. However, the
absence of political parties, government intervention in the
press, the continuance of martial law, and the wide scope of
powers exercised by the police remain as important human
rights concerns.
1447
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
The Governm'snt does not sanction political killing. While
there have been political killings by nongovernmental groups
in the past, there were none in 1989. Summary executions do
not occur in Jordan.
b. Disappearance
No disappearances were reported.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Jordanian law provides for the decent treatment of prisoners,
and judicial authorities have been known to dismiss cases
based on apparent mistreatment of prisoners. However, there
are occasional reports of ill-treatment of detainees by the
security authorities. The Director of Public Security
maintains a special office to handle any public complaints of
abuse by security officers.
Prison conditions are Spartan by Western standards, but not
intentionally degrading. Jordanian authorities hosted a penal
foundations conference in August 1989, in part to exhibit
their new rehabilitation center at Al Swaqa. The center is
the focus of a 3-year effort to upgrade prison facilities,
manifesting the reorientation of incarceration in Jordan from
simple removal from society to actual rehabilitation. All
prisoners are accessible to the International Committee of the
Red Cross, which regularly inspects all detention facilities.
Amnesty International (AI) published reports of ill-treatment
of arrestees by security forces following the disturbances in
April. AI said some prisoners were beaten and one woman was
beaten, insulted, and held with those incarcerated for
criminal offenses. In its 1989 report covering 1988, AI noted
that it had received new reports of the torture of political
prisoners .
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Although Jordan has been under martial law since 1967, most
persons are placed in custody by Jordanian authorities in
accordance with the criminal code, which requires imposition
of charges within 48 hours. Persons may then be detained
pending trial for 15 days, or longer if a court approves the
prosecution's request for an extension. The criminal code is
generally applied to persons arrested for designated martial
law crimes, which include espionage, bribery of public
officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black-
marketing, and security offenses. In the past, security
forces have apparently detained incommunicado (or with limited
outside access) some persons suspected of cross-border
infiltration and security crimes.
The GID can detain a person without trial for varying
periods. However, under martial law provisions, such arrests
should be confirmed within a maximum of 15 days by the Prime
Minister or by local administrators serving as military
governors. Security detainees can be held without charge for
1448
indeterminate periods or can be formally charged and brought
before the martial court for trial.
In 1989 up to 70 persons were in detention for 4 months after
the disturbances in April. None was charged. In early
September, all but four were released. In December the
Government released 48 political detainees.
A petition for judicial review of the legality of the arrest
of any detained person may be brought before the High Court of
Justice but is unlikely to be granted in security cases.
Exile is forbidden by the Constitution and is not practiced in
Jordan. For a discussion of forced or compulsory labor, see
Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
All criminal cases, except martial law crimes and crimes
committed by military personnel, are tried in civilian
courts. The legal code and the independent selection of
judges help to assure a fair trial. Trials are held in open
court, except in a few cases such as those involving sexual
offenses. Defendants are presumed innocent until proven
guilty and have the right to be represented by counsel, to
prepare a defense, to cross-examine witnesses, and to refrain
from giving self-incriminating testimony. The court appoints
a lawyer for those who cannot afford one if the potential
sentence is execution or life imprisonment. An effective
appeals process may be utilized by either the defendant or the
prosecution, except in those cases tried before the Martial
Law Court, which has no provision for appeal.
Civilian judges must demonstrate legal competence in written
and oral examinations before selection by a board composed of
three judges, the Chief Attorney General, and the Under
Secretary of the Justice Ministry. A procedure exists for
disciplining judges accused of serious transgressions of the
law, i.e., "bad conduct." Penalties for those found guilty
range from payment of fines to removal from office.
Martial law crimes are adjudicated in a military court before
a panel of three military officers trained in the law. In
practice, the military court observes the law of criminal
procedure and defendants are given the same rights as in a
civilian court. However, AI has expressed concern that trials
by the Martial Law Court "fell below international standards
for fair trial." No right of appeal exists from decisions of
the military court; however, sentences of the court for
martial law offenses must be ratified by the Prime Minister in
his capacity as Military Governor. He has authority to
increase, reduce, or annul the sentences. The cases are
reviewed for fairness by a legal advisor or the Justice
Minister before the Prime Minister makes a decision. The
military court also adjudicates all crimes committed by
military personnel. In these cases, the commander-in-chief of
the armed forces must ratify the sentences.
In 1989 the Government established a special committee to
review the convictions of persons convicted for political
offenses. In December it transferred authority over several
crimes from military to civil courts; military courts will no
longer have jurisdiction over the following issues:
violations of the Combating Communism Law; affiliation with,
or membership in, an unlicensed or banned political party;
1449
JQBDM.
attacks on government or military officials; violations of
orders issued by the military governor; murder for revenge;
weapons violations; forgery; and passport fraud.
Religious courts have jurisdiction over most family matters,
such as marriage, divorce, child custody, or guardianship.
The Shari'a (Muslim religious law) applies to Muslims in these
areas, and a Shari'a court system handles disputes.
Ecclesiastical courts handle similar matters for members of
the main Christian sects. The civil courts administer the
cases of other religious groups. Shari'a law, however, must
be applied to questions of inheritance for all communities.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Jordanian authorities respect the inviolability of the home.
Police searches of homes require warrants, except in rare
cases involving security or the hot pursuit of fleeing
suspects. There are allegations that security personnel
sometimes monitor telephones and correspondence, but the
practice is evidently not widespread.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for the freedoms of speech and press
but permits censorship under martial law. Such censorship has
become institutionalized over the years, and journalists do
not feel free openly to criticize the Government. Jordanians
freely express wide-ranging opinions, including criticism of
the Government, in informal settings. Public debate is muted
in the state-owned radio and television networks. Government
ownership of newspapers was raised to over 50 percent during
the tenure of Zaid Rifa'i's Government in early 1989. As a
result of self-censorship, editorial opinion generally
reflects the Government's views. However, reporting of the
current economic and financial developments has been
exceptionally frank. The media have also begun to address
politically sensitive issues, such as the lifting of martial
law and the ban on political parties.
The Government frequently provides editors with guidance on
key foreign policy and security matters. On other issues,
government interference is sporadic and critical commentary,
though occasionally tolerated, is limited. Currently, all
journalists must register with the Information Ministry and
join the Journalists' Association. Foreign newspapers and
magazines are widely available, although they are subject to
censorship.
On December 11 the Government returned the management of the
four major newspaper establishments to their original
directors, who had been dismissed in 1988 and replaced by
government-appointed management following disagreements
between the Government and the press.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Public demonstrations require a permit, rarely granted, from
the Interior Minister. All organizations require government
approval and may not have political objectives. Government
surveillance of public meetings, university activities, and
organization gatherings is pervasive. Professional
1450
JQBDAS.
associations for doctors, engineers, lawyers, pharmacists, and
similar professional groups exist. Professionals must join
these associations in order to practice. The associations
maintain influence with the Government in their respective
fields and defend the interests of their members. However,
until recently, they have tended to follow the government
line. Officers are elected by the membership. Executive
committees of clubs are vetted by the GID.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Well over 90 percent of Jordanians practice Islam, the state
religion. The Government adheres to the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of worship. The approximately 5 to 10
percent Christian minority is indigenous, and holds senior
government positions in numbers far exceeding their proportion
of the population. There appears to be little discrimination
against most religious minorities, who are well represented at
all levels in the government, military, and business
community. Laws making harassment of religious minorities a
crime are enforced. A variety of Christian groups — including
Catholic, Orthodox, Armenian, and Protestant--maintain
churches, schools, hospitals, and other institutions. A small
Baha'i community also exists. A few foreign clergymen reside
in Jordan. Although proselytizing among Muslims is forbidden,
conversion by Muslims is not a criminal offense.
All religious groups must register with the authorities in
order to obtain official permission to operate in Jordan.
However, there are instances wherein denominations have failed
to register but are nonetheless permitted to meet without
harassment.
The only religious group restricted by the Government is the
Jehovah's Witnesses. The Government states that it has no
objection to the Witnesses' doctrine, but it is illegal for
them to organize or assemble in Jordan. The Witnesses'
religion prohibits them from taking oaths of allegiance,
saluting flags, or serving in the armed forces. These
religious restrictions are perceived as evidence that
Witnesses are unreliable and disloyal.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Movement within Jordan is unrestricted, except in certain
military zones. With a few exceptions (primarily military
personnel and reservists who need permission for foreign
travel), the Government does not restrict emigration or
foreign travel. However, a woman must present the written
consent of her husband, father, closest male relative, or male
guardian to obtain a passport and may be required to present
the same type of permission when she wishes to travel abroad
without her husband.
Children may have to present proof of their father's consent
to leave Jordan. Citizens who have left Jordan have the right
to return. There are no reported cases of revocation of
citizenship for political reasons. Some citizens returning to
Jordan, particularly those who have traveled to Communist
countries, are questioned by the GID. Jordanians may possess
dual nationality.
1451
In December the Government eliminated travel and work
restrictions imposed by security provisions respecting
political beliefs, and indicated that passports previously
held by security authorities would be released.
Jordan has faced a long-term refugee problem from the influx
of Palestinians made homeless by the 1948 and 1967
Arab-Israeli wars. According to the most recent statistics,
Palestinian refugees and their descendants registered with the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) on the East
Bank total 870,490. UNRWA estimates that another 200,000
refugees have failed to register for one reason or another.
While these refugees are free to live anywhere, almost 216,000
of them still live in 10 refugee camps scattered across
Jordan. The total includes refugees from the 1948
Arab-Israeli war and does not include a large but undetermined
number of other persons from the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel
who have settled on the East Bank since 1948. All Palestinian
refugees residing in Jordan prior to August 1988 can obtain
fully valid Jordanian passports. They have the unrestricted
right to live, work, and own property in Jordan. Palestinians
residing on the West Bank may obtain passports valid for 2
years. The Government also issues temporary Jordanian
passports to between 26,000 and 27,000 Gazans resident on the
East Bank who can prove they were displaced prior to 1971.
Jordan is unique among Arab states in having granted full
citizenship to all Palestinians on the East Bank, i.e., to a
refugee population exceeding its own indigenous population at
the time. The Interior Ministry routinely grants permits for
travel between the East Bank and Israeli-occupied
territories. Jordan has granted asylum even in cases which
have strained relations with neighboring states.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Executive and legislative powers are constitutionally vested
in the King, who rules with the assistance of an appointed
Council of Ministers. The Constitution may not be amended
without the approval of the King. Thus, Jordanian citizens,
although constitutionally entitled to elect members of the
lower house of Parliament, are not ultimately in a position to
change their system of government.
The Parliament was dissolved in 1988 as part of a policy to
sever Jordan's ties to the West Bank, but new elections were
held in November 1989. Parliament is composed of an appointed
Senate and an elected lower house. The Parliament is
overshadowed by the executive branch but has the right to
propose laws and approve (or reject) treaties and laws
proposed by the Council of Ministers. The Parliament also has
the right to pass a vote of no-confidence in the Council of
Ministers, thus obliging the Prime Minister and his Cabinet to
resign. The Constitution also gives the King broad scope to
postpone the election of a new lower house or the recall of
the previous house. The Government has allowed considerable
political activity by "political groups" in preparation for
the parliamentary elections. Most municipal and town councils
are elected by popular vote. The person receiving the highest
number of votes is traditionally confirmed as mayor by the
Minister for Municipal Affairs and then by the Prime
Minister.
Women were enfranchised in 1973 and may also run for public
office. King Hussein appointed female cabinet ministers in
1452
JQSD&S.
1979 and in 1984 and has encouraged the participation of women
in the political process.
Article 16 of the Constitution allows Jordanians to establish
political parties, but such parties are currently outlawed.
However, several informal political groups operate openly.
All persons seek elected office as independents. Article 18
of the election law amended in 1989 states that candidates may
not belong to an unlawful organization, and that "an unlawful
organization is one whose principles, goals, and objectives
are incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution."
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government is generally responsive to inquiries on
individual human rights cases. Representatives of foreign
embassies and international humanitarian organizations are
allowed access to prisoners and detainees. The Government has
often responded positively to recommendations from such
representatives. In its Report covering 1988, AI reported
several instances in which it had communicated its concern to
the Government about alleged human rights violations and noted
that the Government had "responded to Amnesty International's
appeals and inquiries on a number of occasions."
The Jordanian Lawyers' Professional Association, which has a
human rights committee, dramatically increased its advocacy on
behalf of political prisoners in 1989. Other local
organizations and ad hoc groups also occasionally issue
statements and petitions on such human rights concerns as
Palestinian rights and the ban on political parties. The
Jordan Federation for Business and Professional Women hosted
an Arab conference on human rights in Amman in April. Jordan
has played an active role in the United Nations Human Rights
Commission, and the Crown Prince is a cofounder of the
Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues.
The International Committee of the Red Cross maintains an
office in Amman and has access to detainees.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
In general, there is no official discrimination based on
ethnicity or religion. Equality between men and women is the
legal norm. In practice, however, certain traditions
constrain women's freedoms, and entry of women into
professional and academic realms, traditionally the preserve
of men, can spark resentment and opposition.
Nevertheless, the role of women in society has been changing
in recent years. Women now account for half the student body
at the elite University of Jordan. Women today comprise
roughly 12 to 20 percent of the labor force, compared to 4
percent in 1975. In 1989 the military, for the first time,
set up a special basic training course for women, who serve in
both the officer and enlisted ranks. An increasing number of
women operate businesses and work in such professions as
medicine, engineering, banking, and architecture. In 1990 the
number of women lawyers in the Bar Association is expected to
double, from 90 to 180. However, professional women and
women's associations believe that more remains to be done to
increase female participation in these areas. There are
female police officers, and two Jordanian women fly for Royal
1453
JORDAN
Jordanian Airlines, which qualified its first female airline
captain before any scheduled U.S. airline.
Gauging the extent of physical abuse of women is difficult as
it is almost never discussed publicly. The Koran allows a
husband to discipline his wife, which could be interpreted, in
extreme cases, as a license to discipline with force. Because
of this Koranic principle, the issue is considered a personal
one, and this view is reflected in the attitude of the police
and the judiciary. Sources in the medical field say that
while they know wife beating takes place, the victim is
constrained by familial and sociocultural norms from seeking
outside recourse to assistance, both medical and legal. No
statistics are available.
Consular cases involving U.S. citizen wives of Jordanian men
confirm that the problem exists and at most levels of
society. Technically, wife beating is illegal and grounds for
divorce. However, familial and tribal relationships serve to
inhibit pressing charges; those same cultural constraints make
gathering evidence of abuse next to impossible. Legal sources
report that the filing of divorce cases or assault cases by a
wife against her husband based on the grounds of wife beating
is very rare.
In matters of inheritance and divorce, women are treated
differently. Under Islamic law, sons inherit twice as much as
daughters. However, the son is required to use his
inheritance for the maintenance of his mother and sisters,
while a female is free to retain her inheritance for herse 
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